Internship Diary For Submission

Internship Diary of Vishal Kumar
Internship Diary, Legal Drafts and

Internship Certificate
Submitted by:
Name- Vishal Kumar
Exam Roll No.- 170760
Class Roll No.- 173250
Section- ‘B’
Semester- Vth Semester, Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law,
University of Delhi
Session: 2019- 20
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List of Contents
Acknowledgement 4
Declaration 5
Importance of Legal Internship 6
How and why did I intern under AOR 7
Swarupama Chaturvedi?
Internship Day 1 8
Internship Day 2 9 - 10
Internship Day 3 11
Internship Day 4 11
Internship Day 5 12
Internship Day 10 38
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Internship Experience 121
Legal Notice 122 - 128
Application under Order VII Rule XI R/W 129 - 137
Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
for Rejection of Plaint
Bail Application under S. 437, Cr. PC, 1973 138 - 149
Internship Certificate ————————————————-
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Acknowledgement
It would be my esteemed privilege to express my modest gratitude to Advocate

Swarupama Chaturvedi (AOR, Supreme Court of India), whose care and
admonition helped me successfully complete the internship. I would also like to
take this opportunity to express my gratitude towards our teacher, Haris Sir, who
constantly steered the value of moot, internship and professional culture in us. My
heartfelt respect and compassion is always there with everyone in and around the
campus premises for the motivation, guidance and constant supervision which help
me to take a leap over the hardships encountered during the studies.
My Sincere Gratitude,
Vishal Kumar
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Declaration
I, VISHAL KUMAR bearing the University Enrollment No- R- 251/ 14, solemnly
affirm that I have successfully completed the internship under Advocate
Swarupama Chaturvedi between the period starting from 01.08.2019 to
30.08.2019. I have complied with each and every procedural requirements and
formalities and simultaneously ensured to strive for the highest standards during
the internship period.
Neither the said work, nor any part thereof has earlier been submitted to any
University or institution for the award of any degree, certificate or diploma.
Date: 20.11.2019 Vishal Kumar
Place: New Delhi
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Importance of Legal Internship
An internship acquaints the student pursuing Law to the actual practice of law
under an Advocate, corporate firm or as an individual practitioner. The knowledge
gained in the classrooms is limited to basic understanding of law. The need for a
legal internship arises from the reason of exposure, wherein a law student exposes
himself to the outside environment, unknown people, court turbulences and
professional ethics. At the same time, student develops new skills by being
involved in actual cases and projects. It helps to learn the basics of legal research,
its importance and methods to obtain information relatively quicker at the same
time improving writing skills by drafting a plethora of legal documents and briefs.
It gives a close insight of the Court system and learn how lawyers work within the
justice delivery mechanism. It let us to experience the very lifestyle of a lawyer,
how a lawyer feel when he put his legs into the shoes of his clients, their handling
methods and much more. Last but not the least it imparts empathy by the way of
dealing with clients.
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How and why did I join the office of Advocate Swarupama

Chaturvedi?
As a student of Political Science (graduation) and Law (currently), I have had

been always curious about contemporary issues going around. I always wanted to
work for the historical case beforehand. The value this case holds is beyond
community interests. I always wanted to unravel the case while touching and
working upon almost all the possible nuances of the case. The way it touched
different schools of jurisprudence in addition to history, science, calculations,
politics and economics is copiously appealing. So, I used to write on a plethora of
issues and sub- issues pertaining to the same. On being impressed of my writing
and analytical skills, Advocate Mukesh, who is currently a Junior working under
AOR Swarupama Chaturvedi, asked me to work and assist office in the
longstanding Ram Janambhoomi- Babri Masjid title dispute. I willingly accept the
offer and was very much vehement at giving my best to the matter. So, this made
me intern in the Chambers of Adv. Swarupama Chaturvedi who is an Advocate-
on- Record at Supreme Court of India.
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01.08.2019 (Thursday):
Reached office by 10.00 A.M. Was pretty much excited about this case related work. I was
welcomed with all humility and love. Was offered coffee, snacks and was asked to wait until
ma’am arrives therein. At that time, ma’am had matters in Supreme Court on Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code and IPR Laws. Meanwhile, I was given three bulky volumes of Ram
Janamhhoomi verdict that was delivered by the Allahabad High Court. I started looking into it,
even turning of pages took around 2 hours. The volumes were in around 5000 pages! Ma’am
returned by 17.00 HRS, thereafter I met her and she asked me to attend court proceedings and
prepare notes. She was assisting Ranjit Kumar who was arguing on behalf of “Ram Lalla”, so my
field of research was more or less restricted to Original Suit 3 and 5. In addition to attending
hearings, I was also asked to prepare briefs and research on case laws where place of worship has
been declared sacred and constructing or presence of structures pertaining to other religions or
sects are not allowed in those identified places. The research was specifically related to
Janamsthaan where our side was in arguing for Janamsthaan being juristic person hence a span of
108 Kos must be left free. With this meeting and a small interesting discussion relating with the
mediation process in the dispute, my first day at the office ended.
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02.08.2019 (Friday):
I went to the Supreme Court, met the clerk I was asked to and attended Day 21 Arguments of the
title dispute in courtroom no. 1. The 5- Judge bench was presided by CJI Ranjan Gogoi, J. S A
Bobde, J. Ashok Bhushan, J. D Y Chandrachud and S Abdul Nazeer. While attending the case, I
also prepared case notes- cum- arguments of counsels appearing on behalf of their sides.
Today, the court ordered an end to mediation proceedings. Day-to-day hearing will resume on 6
August. The five judge bench of the Supreme Court - comprising Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi,
Justice Sharad Bobde, Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice Abdul Nazeer and Justice Ashok
Bhushan - concluded that the mediation had failed to reach a settlement.
Background:
The Supreme Court is hearing an appeal to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment which
awarded equal parts of the Ayodhya title to 3 parties - Lord Ram represented by Hindu Maha
Sabha, Sunni Wakf Board and Nirmohi Akhara.
In September 2018, during Chief Justice Dipak Misra’s tenure, a three judge bench of the
Supreme Court held that a constitution bench need not decide the appeal. It ruled that a three
judge bench would suffice to hear the appeal and decide matters. However, in January 2019,
under Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi’s tenure, a five judge constitution bench was assigned to the
dispute. In March 2019, this five judge constitution bench ordered the parties to pursue
mediation proceedings for 8 weeks and attempt to conclusively reach a settlement. A three
member mediation panel - comprising former Justice FMI Kalifulla, senior advocate Sriram
Panchu and Sri Sri Ravi Shankar - was established by the court to guide the mediation process.
In May, the court extended the period of mediation until 15 August, upon the request of several
parties.
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However, on 9 July, one of the parties moved the court to resume daily hearings on the ground
that mediation proceedings had failed to settle the dispute. The court then directed the mediation
committee to submit a progress report by 18 July. On 18 July, the court decided to extend
mediation proceedings until 2 August, after which it would decide whether to commence daily
hearings in court.
Hearing of the day:
Chief Justice Gogoi began today’s hearing by stating that the mediation proceedings had failed to
yield an amicable settlement among the parties. Therefore, the court had decided to resume daily
hearings in the case from 6 August. Chief Justice Gogoi further stated that the parties must be
prepared to start the hearing on the appeals and directed the court’s registrar to keep the
necessary material prepared for the court’s perusal.
Senior advocate Rajeev Dhavan, on behalf of the appellant, stated that although the court had
not allowed further interventions in the matter, Dr Submramaniam Swamy’s writ which
originally plead intervention had survived. He further questioned why appeals filed by Ram Lalla
and Nirmohi Akhara would be heard first, despite the appellant filing the appeal first. He added
that he would need more than 20 days of full hearings to make his submissions.
Chief Justice Gogoi stated that all issues raised by senior advocate Rajeev Dhavan would be
considered by the court after the hearings begin.
The Supreme Court concluded that mediation proceedings had failed. Daily hearings on the
appeals will begin on 6 August.
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03.08.2019 (Saturday):
Drafted few legal documents apart from case analysis. Those legal documents don’t relate to the
Ayodhya matter.
I have attached the documents I drafted along with the submission.
04.08.2019 (Sunday):
The was an off- day at office.
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05.08.2019 (Monday):
Reached office by 9:00 AM. Worked on OOS No. 3 and 5. Read judgement as delivered by J.
Sudhir Aggarwal, J. S U Khan and J. Dharam Veer Sharma. Keeping in mind the magnanimity of
the judgement, it took around 8 hours to complete one reading of J. Sudhir Aggarwal and J. S U
Khan. I have also drafted a legal notice on this day, attaching it with the submission. This is what
I did for the day. After discussing some aspects of what I read with ma’am and other Juniors of
the office, I departed by 19:00 HRS.
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06.08.2019 (Tuesday):
Day 22 Arguments in the matter began that day. As usual, I took courtroom pass from the clerk I
was asked to and then went to Room no. 1.
Today, the court resumed day-to-day hearings in Ayodhya. The bench comprising of Chief
Justice R Gogoi and Justice S Bobde, DY Chandrachud, A Bhushan and Abdul Nazeer, is
hearing a set of appeals to the 2010 Allahabad judgment, which divided the Ayodhya title
equally between the Sunni Wakf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara and Lord Ram.
Sr. Adv. SK Jain presented arguments on behalf of the Nirmohi Akhara. His primary claim is that
the Nirmohi Akhara has wrongfully been deprived of possession and management of the Ram
Janmasthan (Ram birthplace temple). He relied primarily on two arguments. Firstly, he argued
that the site ceased to be a mosque when day-to-day namaz halted in 1934 (and Friday namaz in
1949). Secondly, he argued that temple worshippers could not claim possession over a temple.
Background:
Since March 2019, the parties have been unsuccessfully attempting to reach a settlement through
mediation proceedings. The court had ordered the parties to attempt mediation, while their
counsels reviewed official translations of court documents. Some parties objected to mediation,
submitting that it would be fruitless. Nevertheless, the court ordered them to attempt
it and appointed a mediation panel composed of retired Supreme Court Justice FM Kalifulla
(Chairman), spiritual leader Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and Sr. Adv. Sriram Panchu.
Initially, mediation proceedings were set to end in early May 2019, but the court extended the
mediation period until 15 August upon the request of some of the parties. However, in mid-July,
one of the parties (Gopal Singh Visharad) filed an application to resume day-to-day hearings,
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citing that no progress was being made in mediation. After reviewing the mediation panel's
report, the court ordered an end to mediation proceedings on 2 August.
The Bench assembled at 10.30 AM.
Before hearings began, the counsel for RSS ideologue KN Govindacharya urged the court to
provide audio recordings of proceedings or at least offer official transcripts. Chief Justice Gogoi
declined to consider the plea.
Chief Justice Gogoi announced that the bench would begin by hearing the appeals in suit number
3, filed by the Nirmohi Akhara. The Nirmohi Akhara owns and manages many temples across
Uttar Pradesh and other states. It is a religious establishment of a public character and a
registered society. It is a Panchayati math of the Ramand sect practising its own specific religious
customs. At the Babri Masjid, it manages various Hindu religious structures in the outer
courtyard, such as the Chabutra. In 1949, it filed a suit seeking possession of the disputed
Ayodhya site.
During the hearing, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud asked whether Nirmohi Akhara's suit sought for a
mandatory injunction or a declaration, being different types of relief. Sr. Adv. SK Jain responded
that it was seeking a mandatory injunction, but stressed that in effect, it becomes a declaration
for wrongful possession.
In the present appeal, the Nirmohi Akhara is represented by Sr. Adv. SK Jain.
1.1 Historical Possession of Disputed Land
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain’s first argument was that the Nirmohi Akhara historically possessed the dispute
land and that it is the rightful manager of the temple.
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He read out sections of the Allahabad High Court judgment to establish the history of the
Nirmohi Akhara's possession of the inner and outer courtyards at Ayodhya. However, he clarified
that the present suit was only for the possession of the inner courtyard and not the outer
courtyard.
1.1.1 Possession of the Outer Courtyard
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain brought the court's attention to a map delineating the boundaries of Babri
Masjid. Referring to this map, he submitted that the Nirmohi Akhara has been in possession of
the outer courtyard since 1886. He noted that the 1961 suit filed by the Sunni Waqf Board
disputed the Akhara's possession claim of the outer courtyard.
1.1.2 Possession of the Inner Courtyard
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain made submissions next on the inner courtyard, corresponding to Sections E, F,
G, H, I, J, K on the map. He submitted that the Nirmohi Akhara had been in possession of
the temple (inner courtyard) since 1934, at the least. He emphasised possession of the Bhandara,
Chabutra and Sita Rasoii.
1.2 Geneology of the Site: Ram's Birthplace
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain traced the genealogy of the site to ‘before the living memory of man’. He
submitted that Lord Ram was born at the site of the temple, which the Allahabad High Court has
recognized as a legitimate ‘Hindu belief’. He added that religious idols of Ram, Laxman and
Hanuman were also at the site.
1.3 Sunni Waqf Board's Suit is Barred by Limitation
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Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain focused his attention on suit 4 filed by the Sunni Waqf Board. He
contended that it was barred by limitation, as the suit was filed too long after the original cause
of action, when namaz ceased due to the appearance of Hindu idols.
He submitted that the Allahabad High Court held that the last evidence of namaz was in
December 1949, whereas the suit was filed in 1961. He pointed out that the limitation period is
six years under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which is a residual provision for all suits
not otherwise covered by the Act.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain added that even if Article 142 (similar to Article 120, but for immovable
property) applied, it still prescribed a 12-year limitation period that would bar the Sunni Waqf
Board's suit. This is interesting, because the Sunni Waqf Board's suit was instituted on 18
December 1962, i.e. within the 12 year limitation period.
1.4 The site ceased to be a mosque
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that the site ceased to be a mosque when the offering of five prayers in
a day ceased in 1934. He submitted that Friday namaz continued until 1949, but was insufficient
to claim the existence of a mosque. He cited judgments that suggested that a place is no longer a
mosque if daily namaz had ceased.
1.5 Figures and Images at the site
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain touched on the issue of figures and images being present in a mosque. He
submitted that while there cannot be any figures or images in a mosque, it was for the person
offering prayers to decide whether they wished to continue offering prayers in a place where
idols are present. He cited the Allahabad High Court judgment for support.
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Chief Justice Gogoi intervened, stating that the Allahabad High Court found no evidence to show
that a Hindu idol has been present at the site since time immemorial. He requested Sr. Adv. S.K.
Jain to provide evidence proving otherwise.
1.6 Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain advanced arguments on the maintainability of the Nirmohi Akhara's suit.
He argued that the statute of limitations would not apply. The Allahabad High Court had ruled
that the suit exceeded the statute of limitations under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, as it was not
filed within the mandatory period of 6 years.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that deciding the issue 'ultimately comes down to' Article 47 of the
1908 Act. He added that even if the remedy was extinguished, the right to the title would
remain.
At 12:54, the court broke for lunch.
1.7 Issues before the Allahabad High Court
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain resumed arguments on behalf of the Nirmohi Akhara in the afternoon session.
He took the bench through some issues before the Allahabad High Court 2010 judgment.
On the question of Nirmohi Akhara's suit having exceeded the statute of limitations, he cited
Justice Khan's opinion from the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, which clearly stated that
suits 3 (Nirmohi Akhara), 4 (Sunni Waqf Board) and 5 (Ram Lala) are not barred by limitation.
Sr. Adv. SK Jain then submitted that the Allahabad High Court did not decide on the issue
of whether the suit is not maintainable for failing to join certain necessary defendants.
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Chief Justice Gogoi asked about relief sought for in suit 5, filed on behalf of Ram Lalla
Virajman, the idol, and the Shri Ram Janmsthan. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that the relief
granted was a one-third title divsion, being the dome and the Sita Rasoi. SK Jain focused on
Justice Sharma's opinion in the Allahabad High Court judgment, wherein Ram Lala was held to
be a legal entity, capable of holding land.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain addressed whether the suit was maintainable as a plaint, which was issue 14
before the Allahabad High Court. He submitted that Justice Sharma had said yes, but Justice
Agarwal said no.
Sr. Adv. SK Jain also flagged issue 17, which asked 'Is the Nirmohi Akhara a Panchayati Matha
of Ramananda sect of Bairagis and is, as such, a religious denomination following its
faith according to its own custom?' He submitted that the Allahabad High Court had decided the
issue in favour of the Nirmohi Akhara.
1.8. Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain re-asserted that the Akhara's suit was not barred by limitation. He drew the
court's attention to Article 47 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which states that a limitation
period begins on the date of the final order. SK Jain argued that there was no final order in the
case before the Faizabad magistrate, who had placed the title under State receivership in
December 1949. He submitted that therefore, a cause of action never accrued, meaning
the limitation period never kicked in. He added that even if Article 120 applies, Article 47
continues to apply as well and hence the limitation period never began.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud stated that under Article 142 of the 1908 Act, one has to prove either
dispossession or discontinuation of possession. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that the Nirmohi
Akhara was in possession until it gave it up possession to the Government Receiver under court
orders. Justice Chandrachud responded by stating that disposession implies 'involuntariness', to
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which Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that the property was taken away from the Nirmohi Akhara after
the 1950 order.
Chief Justice Gogoi reiterated his question as to whether this amounted to disposession. With
this, the bench rose for the day and I too was done for the day. I submitted the notes I prepared to
the office, had discussion about the arguments raised that day and then left the office.
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07.08.2019 (Wednesday):
Day 23 Arguments began that day.
Background:
The court is hearing a set of appeals to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment that divided the
Ayodhya title equally between three parties: the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara and
Lord Ram.
From March 2019 onwards hearings were suspended for the parties to resolve the dispute
through mediation. The mediation proceedings were unsuccessful and on 6 August 2019, day-to-
day hearings resumed.
Yesterday, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain presented oral arguments on behalf of the Nirmohi Akhara. The
Nirmohi Akhara is a Hindu religious establishment, which claims not only the Ayodhya land
title, but also the exclusive right to manage the Ram Jamnasthan (Hindu temple at Babri Masjid).
It filed its original suit in 1959.
Relying on the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain attempted to establish
that the Nirmohi Akhara historically possessed the disputed land. He argued that a mosque
ceased to exist at the site after daily namaz ceased in 1934. He also argued that the Nirmohi
Akhara's suit was not barred by limitation. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain relied on Articles 47 and 142, and
Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 to argue that the suit was not barred by limitation.
Today, the court resumed hearing Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain on behalf of the Nirmohi Akhara. After
lunch, the court heard Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran for Lord Ram. In 1989, Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal had
filed a suit on behalf of Lord Ram and the Ram Janmabhoomi site itself.
Today's hearing:
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The bench assembled at 10.37 AM.
1.9 Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation:
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain resumed arguments on the limitation issue. Yesterday, he had argued that the
Nirmohi Akhara's suit was not barred by limitation.
He reminded the court that on 29 December 1949, the Additional City Magistrate of Faizabad
directed that the disputed property be given under receivership to the Municipal
Board and issued a preliminary attachment order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure ('CrPC') to that effect. On 5 January 1950, the state received the property. In 1959, the
Nirmohi Akhara filed a title suit over the dispute property.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain contended that despite the fact that the suit was filed 10 years after the
property went into the state's receivership, the suit was not barred by limitation. Relying on
Article 47 of the Limitation Act 1908, he argued that the limitation period never began, because
the Magistrate did not pass a final order in the Section 145 CrPC case. Since limitation would
only begin once the relevant authority passed a final order, there would be no limitation bar in
that case.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, any suit
can be filed unless it is 'expressly barred' by law. Justice Bobde questioned this reasoning
by stating that if the suit was supposedly filed within the limitation period under Article 47 of the
Limitation Act, it can only be tested within Article 47 of the Limitation Act and no other legal
provisions.
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Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain made a second argument for contesting the limitation period. He stated that
under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period is twelve years. Nirmohi Akhara
filed the suit within 10 years. Article 142 applies to the dispossession of immovable property.
1.11 Right of Shebaitship: Nirmohi Akhara's Right to Manage the Property and Possession
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain expanded on the notion that a deity has proprietary rights in an endowed
property, citing, among other cases, the litigation between Manohar Mookerjee and Raja Peary
Mohan Mookerjee. He made submissions on the Nirmohi Akhara's right of shebaitship.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that the 1949 order of attachment under Section 145 of Code of
Criminal Procedure only attached the physical property, and stated that the Magistrate
clearly allowed Hindus to continue performing religious ceremonies. He submitted that
nevertheless, the Nirmohi Akhara's right to manage the property was curtailed, along with its
right of possession
Justice DY Chandrachud interjected that the argument of possessory right and management right
being distinguishable would imply that Section 142 of the CrPC does not apply to the case,
clarifying that Section 142 speaks of an injunction pending inquiry, which covers both
possession and management. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain responded by stating that the management of
deity worship and management of a property are different.
Justice Bobde suggested that another argument may be that Nirmohi Akhari could not
manage the property as it lacked proper access to the property. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain added that the
obstruction of prayer has been held to be a wrong, relying on the reasoning used in the Sri
Hukumchand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh case in 1933.
1.12 Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation
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The bench briefly discussed the right to sue, when it accrues and the timeline of decrees. Justice
Bhushan clarified that the right to sue and right of execution are very different and accrue
differently.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain once again broached the issue of limitation, citing Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri
Chandramaul (AIR 1966 SC 735) and other cases. He re-iterated that the Faizabad magistrate
never passed any final order after the injunction of dispossession and therefore the limitation
period never began.
1.13 Did the Attachment Order extinguish Nirmohi Akhara's Right (if any)?
The bench asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to take them through the evidence of revenue payments
and land records, to determine (i) whether the Nirmohi Akhara owned the property; (ii) whether
this right was extinguished by the 1949 order.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain read out excerpts from the 2010 Allahabad judgment dealing wth evidence of
Nirmohi Akhara’s possession of the inner courtyard. Chief Justice Gogoi interrupted to state that
while judges' reasoning can be relied on, documentary evidence of possession or oral testimony
would better sustain the possession claim. Justice Chandrachud agreed, emphasising the need for
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to provide oral and documentary evidence to sustain the claim.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain was unable to provide such evidence as requested by the bench. He went back
to reading Justice Sharma's opinion in the Allahabad High Court judgment, which stated that
Hindus owned all the relevant areas, over which the Nirmohi Akhara is now claiming possession.
Justice Sharma made no distinction between 'Hindus' and the Nirmohi Akhara.
Justice Chandrachud stated that there is difference between the existence of the Ram Janmasthan
and whether the Nirmohi Akhara has possession of the site. He inquired whether there was
evidence to demonstrate when the Nirmohi Akhara began possessing the temple. Justice
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Chandrachud emphasised the value of revenue payments, land records, historical accounts and
traveller’s accounts.
Chief Justice Gogoi requested Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to take them through the evidence after lunch.
At 12.55 PM, the bench rose for lunch.
1.14 Evidence of Nirmohi Akhara's possession of the Inner Courtyard
After lunch, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain again relied on excerpts of the 2010 Allahabad High Court
judgment’s assessment of evidence. The bench requested him again to take them
through documentary and oral evidence and stated that the bench would begin hearing the appeal
in suit 5 (filed by the Ram Lala) while Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain prepares to argue on evidence.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain resumes arguments for the Nirmohi Akhara on 22 August 2019.
Senior advocate K Parasaran began presenting arguments on behalf of Ram Lalla (Lord Ram).
He began by emphasising the importance of determining limitation, by quoting from Section 3 of
the 1908 Limitation Act which states that every suit after the limitation period shall be dismissed.
2.1 Ram was born in Ayodhya
First, he stated that he must establish the nature of the deity, Lord Ram, and the relevant history
of events. Parasaran submitted that the spirit of Lord Ram is present at Janmabhoomi and can be
experienced by those who pray there, reasoning that the presence of idol is not necessary for the
presence of deity.
On the issue of whether Ram was born at Ayodhya, he submitted that Valmiki’s Ramayana states
that Lord Ram's place of birth is Ayodhya. He further submitted that what has to be proven is that
the custom of worshipping at the site (on the belief that Ram was born there) has existed for a
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significant number of years. He added that the unshakeable faith of millions of believers is itself
evidence.
He began citing historical documents, purporting to document the existence of a Ram temple. He
quoted extracts from the British District Judge’s writing that a Masjid had been built on land
bordering the Janmasthan. He emphasised that this conclusion was arrived at not by a Hindu
judge, but by a British judge to emphasise its fairness. He also stated that in 1885, the British had
established a railing to bi-furcated the inner and outer courtyard.
Justice Bobde inquired whether any other court of law has dealt with the issue of the birth of a
religious figure or prophet. He gave the example of the following claim: Has any other court
enquired into, say, deciding whether 'Jesus Christ was born at Bethlehem'. K Parasaran stated
that he did not know, but would survey other jurisdictions.
2.2 Installation of idols is not a 'continuous wrong’
At this point, K Parasaran addressed the question of whether the installation of idols in 1949 is a
'continuing wrong'. The Sunni Waqf Board has submitted that the installation of the idols and
consequent desecration of the mosque is a continuous wrong. Parasaran argued that in 1950, the
court’s receiver took charge of the property and that the continuous wrong ceased when the
receiver took charge because a court's order, by its nature, cannot further wrong. He further
submitted that the placing of the idols may have been the consequence of a wrong, but that it is
not a continuing wrong.
Justice Bobde clarified whether one group placing an idol that prevented the other group from
worshipping, as they do not believe in the idol, is a continuous wrong. After further back and
forth, Justice Bobde drew an analogy between K Parasaran’s argument of a completed act (and
not a continuous wrong) and trespass.
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The court transitioned to looking at the site plan of the disputed judgment. K Parasaran relied on
a map from the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment to take the bench through the disputed site.
He specified which parts of the site each party claims, where the idols are situated and what part
was attached to the state receiver in 1950.
Justice Bobde asked whether the idols have been studied. In particular, he inquired whether they
had been carbon dated.
K Parasaran provided the bench with archaeological details of the site, such as the existence of
stone slabs and carvings.
With this, the bench rose for the day and I too was done for the day. I submitted the notes I
prepared to the office, had discussion about the arguments raised that day and then left the office.
26
08.08.2019 (Thursday):
The court resumed hearing Senior Advocate K Parasaran on behalf of Lord Ram. In 1989, senior
advocate of Allahabad High Court DN Agarwal filed a suit on behalf of Lord Ram (Suit no. 5).
The first plaintiff in Suit 5 is Lord Ram Lalla and the second plaintiff is the Lord Ram
Janmabhoomi site itself. In today’s hearing, it claimed that the Ram Janmabhoomi site is a
juristic person and that the other suits in the Ayodhya title dispute are barred by limitation.
Background
The court is hearing a set of appeals to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment which divided
the Ayodhya title equally between three parties: the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara and
Lord Ram.
In March 2019, hearings were suspended so that the parties could attempt mediation. However,
the mediation proceedings failed and the court resumed day-to-day hearings on 6 August.
On 6 August, SK Jain presented oral arguments for the Nirmohi Akhara. Relying on the 2010
Allahabad High Court judgment, he attempted to establish the history of the akhara's possession
of the disputed land and submitted that the akhara’s suit is not barred by limitation. On 7 August,
the bench requested SK Jain to provide all documentary and oral evidence to sustain the akhara’s
claim of possession. When SK Jain requested time to prepare the evidence, the bench began
hearing Senior Advocate K Parasaran in Suit 5 on behalf of Lord Ram. K Parasaran sought to
establish evidence that the disputed site is the sacred place of Lord Ram’s birth and argued that
the placing of idols in the mosque in 1949 did not cause a continuous wrong to Muslims under
Section 23 of the 1908 Limitation Act.
27
Today’s Hearing
The bench assembled at 10.34 AM. Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi refused to hear
Subramaniam Swamy’s writ petition praying that pursuing the worship of Lord Ram without any
fetters is a fundamental right. CJI Gogoi stated that the writ petition would be heard at the
appropriate time.
Dr Rajeev Dhavan, on behalf of the Sunni Waqf Board, contended that Suits 3 (filed by Nirmohi
Akhara) and 5 are in loggerheads with each other, with one failing if the other is maintained.
Therefore, he requested that they be allowed to reply to each other and he would make his
submissions after.
Senior advocate K Parasaran reminded the court that it had promised to hear Suits 3 and 5 before
examining other claims. He stressed the importance of looking at whether Suit 3 was barred by
limitation, because the Allahabad High Court had dismissed it. He further contended that Article
47 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as claimed by Nirmohi Akhara, would not apply.
2.3 Installation of idols is not a 'continuous wrong’
He explained that for the purpose of his arguments, he would consider that the consequence of
placing Hindu idols inside the mosque in 1949 is a continuing injury and not a continuing wrong.
Further, he contended that the continuing wrong stops upon the 1950 Additional City Magistrate
of Faizabad issuing the order that the disputed property be attached under Section 145, Criminal
Procedure Code and taken over by a court receiver.
2.3.1 When does a cause of action arise for calculating limitation?
K Parasaran began by informing how the 2010 Allahabad High Court had decided on the
applicability of Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 to Suit 4. Article 120 is a residuary
28
provision that states that the limitation period is 6 years from the date when the right to sue
accrues for suits that are not covered under any other provisions of the Act. The High Court
judgment had barred Suit 4 (filed by Sunni Waqf Board) by applying Article 120. On 6 August,
Senior Advocate SK Jain (on behalf of Nirmohi Akhara) contended that Suit 3 was not barred by
Article 120.
On the question of when cause of action arises for calculating the limitation period in the Muslim
suit, K Parasaran submitted that a party cannot chose a cause of action when claiming wrong or
injury. He submitted that for determining the cause of action, the consideration is to be the
continuation of the wrong or tort and not continuation of the injury. He submitted that the
placement of the idols in the mosque is a continuing injury for the Muslim parties. Therefore, he
questioned why the Muslim parties waited 11 years until the demolition of the mosque to file a
suit. He argued that the very act of placing the Hindu idol shakes the Muslim faith and is a
serious injury for which one will immediately seek the remedy of filing a suit. He was contesting
the Muslim party’s argument that they are not barred by the limitation period to seek a remedy.
2.3.2 Limitation extinguishes both substantive and procedural rights
K Parasarn continued his argument that Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 extinguishes the
substantive right as well as the procedural right. Justice Chandrachud asked whether limitation
generally extinguishes only the remedy or both the right and the remedy. K Parasaran responded
that limitation is a procedural right that removes the procedure for remedy and thereby destroys
claims to the substantive right. While making this argument, he differentiated between justice-
making and the ends of justice. He submitted that the statutory recourse of limitation is realised
in the interest of public policy to impose time limits and ensure that old controversies do not
become immortally disputable. He further submitted that Articles 141 and 142 of the Limitation
Act 1908 do not apply to suits seeking declaration, and that only Article 120 will apply. He then
attacked the claims of adverse possession by other parties by citing case law and arguing that
adverse possession must be demonstrated for the whole land and not parts of the land.
29
He returned to his earlier argument on continuing injury and submitted that it is different from a
continuous wrong. Justice Bobde inquired what distinction K Parasaran was drawing between
injury and wrong by stating that injury as a word is synonymous with ‘wrong’. K Parasaran
answered that while a wrong may affect a right, an injury does not and that a wrong may be
committed once but the injury may continue. Justice Bobde stated that injury is said to be the
consequence of, or a result from, a wrong. K Parasaran affirmed that when a wrong is
committed, it leads to an injury. Justice Bhushan asked K Parasaran to clarify the position of his
submission.
K Parasaran submitted that the act of placing the idols was a completed act and a wrong and that
the injury following from the placing of the idols was a continuous injury. He submitted that the
act of placing the idols was not a continuous wrong. Justice Bobde asked if denying a person the
right to place of worship every day by placing an idol is not a continuous wrong. K Parasaran
responded that the lack of access affecting the right to pray is only a continuous injury. Justice
Bobde then asked K Parasaran to state an example of a continuing wrong according to his
understanding.
When K Parasaran was unable to respond for a few minutes, CJI Gogoi asked him to respond
tomorrow, after preparation. K Parasaran submitted precedent that states that a continuous wrong
is one which continuously affects right. He seemed to be implying that a new must be affected
each time by the wrong for it to classify as a continuing wrong and that it is only a continuous
injury when one wrong affects the same right continuously. He further submitted that as soon as
the decree of attachment of property and takeover by receiver was passed, the appellants were
dispossessed and lost their rights.
2.4 Ram Janmasthan (birthplace of Lord Ram) is not merely the ground of the main dome
of the mosque, but the surrounding area as well
30
K Parasaran then submitted that the Ram Janmasthan (birthplace of Lord Ram) is not merely the
ground of the main dome of the mosque, but the surrounding area as well. He argued that
although ‘Sthan’ means a specific place, it is not restricted to a specific dimension in size, and
that the Janmasthan is considered to be a very sacred site in Hinduism on account of its nature
and the fact that holy yatras are conducted through it. He explained that in legal understanding, a
building is not merely the constructed building alone but also the incidents to the building.
Drawing on this example, he claimed that the Janmasthan is therefore not merely the ground
below the main dome of the mosque but the surrounding land which is considered by Hindus to
be the birthplace of Lord Rama. He explained that the unshakeable faith of the people over the
area of land considered as the Janmasthan should be included to the ground below the dome
when deciding on the title of the disputed Ayodhya land title. He further argued that due to its
nature and significance, the Janmasthan was at the core of Hinduism and could not be bifurcated
into three parts.
2.5 A temple existed before the mosque was built
K Parasaran then made submissions relating to the existence of a temple before the mosque was
built. He primarily relied on the existence of the faith and belief of Hindu people and contended
that it is undisputed that Lord Ram existed before Emperor Babar, who built Babri Masjid. He
contended that no namaz has been offered at the temple and that the Bairagis (implying Nirmohi
Akhara) only came to the disputed site only after independence. He contended that no resistance
was made by any Muslim to any Hindu pursuing worship in the Janmasthan.
2.6 Ram Janmasthan is a juridical person
K Parasaran then summarised the findings and conclusions of the Allahabad High Court in Issue
1 of Suit 5 which addressed the question of who can file a suit in the present case. Justice
Bhushan interjected to ask if the Janmasthan (a piece of land) can be considered as a juridical
person with a juristic character. K Parasaran submitted that the forms of a deity are considered a
31
juristic person, by offering the example of the linga idol being placed in a Shiva temple and Lord
Shiva being considered the deity of the temple through the linga. Justice Bhushan stated that a
deity is considered a juristic person in law, and stressed that Janmasthan is a place. K Parasaran
responded that the presence of an idol is not the only necessity for deeming the temple to have a
deity as a juristic person. Justice Bobde, recognised that the legal definition of a juristic person
had expanded by observing that in 2017, the Uttarakhand High Court held a river to have a
juristic person. K Parasaran responded that in Hinduism, the sun and rivers are worshipped as
deities. Justice Chandrachud noted that K Parasaran was arguing that the divinity is not merely
restricted to the physical form but can be extrapolated to the general divine and source of
worship, for the purposes of identifying the juristic person. CJI Gogoi then requested K
Parasaran to continue with other issues and directed him to answer the question of whether
Janmasthan is a juristic person.
K Parasaran continued to summarise the findings of the Allahabad High Court’s judgment in
Issues 7, 13, 15 and 21. After reading relevant extracts of the judgment, he submitted copies of
the site plan to the bench to explain the particulars of the partition of the title after the Allahabad
High Court’s judgment.
He submitted that J Agarwal of the Allahbad High Court had held that Suit 3 was barred by
limitation and therefore the issue of providing remedy did not arise. He sought to draw attention
to the fact that Suits 3 and 4 had been disposed solely on the bar of limitation. He quoted
Explanation 5 of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code with Section 28 of the Limitation Act,
1908 and explained that the right to property claimed by the other parties had been extinguished
through limitation.
At 12.45 PM, the court decided to meet after lunch.
The bench assembled at 2.07 PM.
32
2.7 Muslims stopped namaz as mosque was desecrated
CS Vaidyanathan submitted that after 16 December 1949, Mulisms stooped offering namaz at the
mosque because they considered that it had been desecrated after the placing of the Charan
inside the mosque. The bench questioned whether the placing of Charan had barred the Muslims
and Digambaras from offering their prayers at the disputed site. CJI Gogoi inquired if there is
documentary evidence to shed light on the consequences of placing the idol inside the mosque.
K Parasaran continued with his arguments and cited case law on when the case of action is said
to arise.
CJI Gogoi stated that the hearings will continue tomorrow, despite it being a Friday and marked
for hearing miscellaneous matters. He also asked if the other appeals arising from Suit 5 will
need to be heard separately or could be tagged with the ongoing hearings.
With this, the bench rose for the day and I along with ma’am left for the office. I submitted the
notes I prepared to the office and had discussion about the arguments raised that day. This was an
important day for both the parties as the CJI by notifying the parties that he along with his co-
judges will hear the matter even on miscellaneous day. On the one hand, that gave us some relief
as the long standing dispute is finally going to see its doomsday, on the other it also ladened us
with responsibility of handling the case from stringently and in a diligent manner. After this, I
along with other counsels departed.
33
09.08.2019 (Friday)
The court resumed hearing Senior Advocate K Parasaran on behalf of Lord Ram. In 1989, senior
advocate of the Allahabad High Court DN Agarwal had filed a suit on behalf of Lord Ram. The
first plaintiff in the suit (Suit 5) is Lord Ram Lalla and the second plaintiff is the Lord Ram
Janmabhoomi site itself.
Background
Lord Ram.
In yesterday's hearing, it claimed that the Ram Janmabhoomi site is a juristic person and that the
other suits in the Ayodhya title dispute are barred by limitation.
Today's hearing
Before the hearing formally began, senior advocate Rajeev Dhavan for the Sunni Waqf Board
addressed the bench regarding the frequency of hearings. Friday is usually reserved for
miscellaneous matters, so it is unusual for the court to conduct regular hearings in a constitution
bench matter.
34
Dhavan submitted it would be difficult for him to 'assist the court' if the case is heard on all 5
weekdays, due to the amount of research required. He requested the bench not to 'rush' the matter
and only hear it from Tuesday through Thursday. Chief Justice Gogoi took note and stated that
the parties will be informed of the frequency of proceedings.
2.8 Sunni Waqf Board's suit is barred by limitation
K Parasaran resumed arguments on the issue of whether the Sunni Waqf Board's 1961 suit is
barred by limitation. While the suit was filed in 1961, it pertains to a Faizabad magistrate order
from 29 December 1949. A suit is barred by limitation when it is filed too long after the cause of
action (e.g. dispossession of land) took place. Different types of suits have different limitation
periods under the Limitation Act 1908. However, under section 23, while a party is suffering a
'continuous wrong' the limitation period is effectively infinite.
K Parasaran argued that the Sunni Waqf Board did not suffer a continuous wrong. Recall that the
1949 Faizabad magistrate order placed the title under the receivership of the state, but allowed
the pujas of the idols to continue. As a result, Friday namaz ceased to occur. The Sunni Waqf
Board have framed this as a continuous wrong.
First, K Parasaran repeated his argument that no 'executive order of a magistrate in a civil
position' can be construed as a wrong. He stated that unless it is appealed under Article 132 of
the Constitution, it is not wrong and binding. Second, he argued that even if it were a wrong, it is
not continued. He stated that the cause of action - the 1949 order - is complete, not recurring
[cites 2001 4 SCC 492]. K Parasaran described the continuous effect on the Sunni party as a
continuous 'injury', which he argued is distinct from a continuous 'wrong'.
35
Next, K Parasaran returned to the argument that the site itself (Ram Janmasthan) is a juridical
person. He referred to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, which held the same: 'the place
is itself a personification of divine spirit.'
He added that the worship of the divine, via ritual, means that the divine is manifested in a
formless, indestructible state. He emphasised that Hinduism allows the worship of God in any
form. Hence, he concluded that an idol is not necessary to establish the presence of the divine.
He gave the example of Kedarnath temple.
To substantiate his position, he submitted that previous judgments have recognized Hindu deities
as juridical persons. He cited a 1925 Privy Council case, wherein the Hindu shastra was
interpreted to treat a legal person as the equivalent of a natural person. He also gave the example
of a company, which is afforded legal status. By analogy, he submitted that Hindu idols have the
power to sue, or be sued.
K Parasaran continued to emphasise that Hindu deities may be formless. He submitted that the
use of idols was an innovation to aid concentration during worship. He submitted that the
sanctum sanctorum of a temple is divine and hence is called the Garbha Graha (holiest of holy
places). Citing Article 26, he stated the sanctum sanctorum is constitutionally protected.
He asked rhetorically whether the Garbha Graha alone is divine and not also the places
surrounding it: 'one cannot say God is present in the inner sanctum sanctorum alone'.
Parasaran submitted that it was in the public interest to extend the legal fiction beyond the
sanctum sanctorum to the entire disputed area. He cited [1966 3 SCC 242] which established the
Bhagvad Gita as law: 'when we think of the Hindu religion, it is impossible to adequately define
or describe it...it does not mean the worship of any one God or the practice of any 1 set of
rituals...it is rather a way of life'.
36
The court broke for lunch at 12.46
K Parasaran continued his arguments from prior to lunch. He cited various judgments:
• [1969 1 SCC 255] which established that a Hindu idol is a juristic person (a person for
the purpose of the law)
• Mariappa v Puttaramayya [AIR 1958 Kant 93] which clarifies the relationship between a
juristic person and the person who occupies a position as the head of a trust
K Parasaran contended that you cannot divide a juristic entity into several parts, assuming that
entire disputed site is a juristic entity. He offered the analogy of a human body which likewise
cannot be cut into pieces without inexorably altering its being.
Offering a genealogy, K Parasaran speculated that juristic persons were invented in order to
further human development. He argued that places of worship necessarily must be juristic
entities.
He submitted that a legal person is any person who in the eyes of the law has the capacity to be a
person. He clarified that a legal person requires a designated person to represent it for the
purpose of entering into contracts and generally exercising its 'juristic personality'. It is only in
the ideal sense that a property can be said to belong to an idol.
Now, he submitted that the juridical entity in this case (Ram Janmabhoomi) 'is' a certain area on
a map.
With this hearings concluded for the day. Responding to Dr Dhavan's comment at the beginning
of the hearing for five days a week hearing, Chief Justice Gogoi noted that if he required a break
between proceedings, the court will accommodate him. The next hearing is on Tuesday, 13
August, as Monday is a court holiday.
37
10.08.2019 (Saturday):
11.08.2019 (Sunday):
12.08.2019 (Monday):
Did case analysis of the Ayodhya matter. Prepare briefs of the Allahabad Judgement in OOS 3
and OOS 5 pertaining to different judges involved in delivering the verdict.
38
13.08.2019 (Tuesday):
The court continued hearing suit number 5 filed on behalf of Lord Ram. Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran
concluded his arguments.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan began arguing on behalf of Lord Ram. He submitted that the Ram
Janmasthan is a deity with a juridical personality, over which no party can claim possession. He
also argued that there was a pre-existing temple over which the mosque was built.
Background:
Lord Ram.
In the previous hearing, Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran argued that both suits 3 and 4 are barred by
limitation and that the Ram Janmabhoomi site is a juristic person.
Today's hearing
2.11 Plaintiff in a suit can claim alternative reliefs
Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran opened the hearing by arguing that a plaintiff could rely on two
inconsistent sets of allegations and alternative rights. He relied on the case law to submit that the
39
Civil Procedure Code does not bar a party from seeking alternative relief. He concluded his
arguments by submitting that only the allegations in the pleadings, and nothing beyond, could be
argued on the materials.
Then, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan outlined that he would place 'relevant documentary and oral
evidence' in respect to:
(i) whether Janmasthan is a deity;

(ii) whether there was a pre-existing temple over which Babri Masjid was built;
(iii) issues relating to land records.
He proceeded to read details of the pleadings in the other suits, to suggest the existence of the
temple.
2.12 Hindus and Muslims had joint possession of the land

He objected to the Sunni Waqf Board’s claim that it was in exclusive and continuous possession
of the disputed land. He submitted the Allahabad High Court’s finding that Hindus and Muslims
had joint possession of the land. He also submitted that Waqf Board’s cause of action arose on 16
December 1949, when idols were placed inside the mosque.
Reading the statement of the plaintiff in suit 4, he emphasised that namaz was offered five times
a day between 1856 and 1934, after which only Friday prayers were offered. He submitted that
even the counsels for the Waqf Board had accepted that Lord Ram was born at Ayodhya. They
only denied that the specific site of the mosque is the birthplace. Further, he submitted that the
Nirmohi Akhara has existed since the second half of the 19th century, but certainly not in the
16th century. He also alleged that an investigation into the revenue records found that they had
been manipulated.
2.13 There was a pre-existing temple before the Babri Masjid was built
40
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan submitted that historical and archaeological evidence such as
historical records, inscriptions on pillars and slabs in the temple, gazzetteers, court-appointed
Archaeological Survey of India excavation reports photographs of the disputed structure prior to
its destruction, photographs of artefacts inside the mosque in 1991 etc. supported his claims.
Next, he submitted that there is oral evidence by 80-90 year old Hindu and Muslim residents of
Ayodhya who recall Hindu prayers taking place continuously.
2.13.1 Existence of idol is not necessary for a temple to exist
At this point, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan returned to Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran's argument from the
previous hearing regarding the formlessness of deities. He submitted that the existence of an idol
is not a necessary condition for a temple to exist. He emphasised that what determines whether a
place is a temple, is dependent on whether people believe it to be one. If a large section of the
public considers a particular place to have a divine presence and offers worship in the belief that
it is likely to be the recipient of the divine presence’s blessings, then such divine presence is a
deity. He cited the examples of worshipping the Ganga and Yamuna as deities.
Delving into the realm of theology, he stated that a place is a deity on account of its divinity and
such status is non-alterable and cannot be destructed by human actions. He submitted that the
divine status of a deity is perennial.
2.13.2 Lord Ram devotees in the 17th century
Returning to material reality, he cited evidence from the early 17th century that suggests the
presence of Lord Ram devotees at Ayodhya. The British merchant, William Finch, had written
about parikrama and prostrating in the inner courtyard of the site in his travel journal.
41
2.13.3 No evidence that Hindus were denied access to the inner courtyard
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan emphasised that there exists no evidence that Hindus were denied
access to the inner courtyard from 1856 to 1949. Further, he submitted that there is no evidence
of namaz being offered in the inner courtyard between 1856 and 1934.
Focusing on the statements of plaintiffs and witnesses in suit 4, he sought to conclusively

establish that Hindus have offered worship at the site prior to 1961:
• Plaintiff’s Witness 1: Hindus have been doing parikrama for hundreds of years. Resident
of Ayodhya produced as a witness by plaintiff 2 in suit 4, 72 years old at the time of
giving evidence.
• Plaintiff’s Witness 2 (Haji Mehboob Ahmad): Janmasthan is where Lord Ram was born
and a number of people come from outside to offer prayers
• Plaintiff’s Witness 7: Hindus offer worship believing place to be Lord Ram's birthplace
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan relied on the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment which recognised
the Hindu belief that the site has been worshipped since time immemorial and is a deity. He
added that given that deities are perpetual minors (in the eyes of the law, as they require a legal
guardian), the Indian law of limitation would not apply.
He cited Justice Khan's opinion from the High Court judgment, wherein it was held that suit 5 is
maintainable because the idol is a deity capable of holding property. Note that while the High
Court unanimously held suit 5 to be maintainable for plaintiff 1 (Ram Lalla), only two judges
held it to be maintainable for plaintiff 2 (Ram Janmabhoomi site).
42
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan re-iterated that the birthplace is specifically where the devotees
worship, namely underneath the central dome, as they believe it to be the birthplace. He did so to
counter the potential claim that the birthplace is 50-60 paces away from the dome. The ASI
report argues that there was a temple there roughly 300 years ago.
He added that the Janmasthan cannot be restricted to the central dome alone because the
parikrama path extends beyond it.
2.15 Hindus and Muslims had joint possession of the land
2.15.1 Sunni Waqf Board cannot claim adverse possession
He returned to the Sunni Waqf Board's possession claim. He submitted that no adverse
possession claim can be made without establishing (a) exclusive possession and (b) ouster of
possession. He argued that the mere offering of namaz being offered for a few years does not
amount to a title claim via adverse possession.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan continued submitting that the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment
accepted that the mosque was not built on vacant land. Two of the three judges held that it was
built over the ruins of a temple.
2.15.2 No evidence that Hindus were denied access to the inner courtyard
He re-iterated that Hindus have always had access to the inner courtyard, even when disputes
arose, and were never ousted. He stressed that bewteen 1855 and 1934, Hindus had access and
had not been dipossessed
Justice Bode stated that Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan was equating access with possession.
43
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan simply re-stated that the parties are in joint possession. He said that
he is disputing the Sunni Waqf Board's claim of exclusive possession, which at best could be
claimed to be in joint possession.
Justice Chandrachud asked him to show evidence of co-possession. Chief Justice Gogoi added
that only the Waqf Board’s title was being negated by Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan but no
evidence was being produced to demonstrate the title of his party.
The bench broke for lunch at 12.52 PM.
The bench assembled at 2.20 PM.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan continued with his arguments on behalf of Lord Ram and Ram
Janmasthan.
2.16.1 Difference between concept of deity, abode of deity and property of deity
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan differentiated between the concept of a deity, the abode of a deity and
the property of a deity. He argued that the Ram Janmasthan is itself a deity and therefore res
nullius (without an owner, nobody’s property). As the Janmasthan is itself a deity, nobody can
possess it and Hindu worshippers can only claim access it.
He contended that the Allahabad High Court had erred in conflating three different concepts. The
High Court had recognised the place Janmasthan itself as the deity. However, it had held that the
deity owned the place (i.e. itself) and that Muslim and Hindu parties had joint possession
(assuming that a deity can be possessed). The latter two holdings, he argued, are inconsistent
with the High Court’s reasoning that the Ram Janmasthan is a deity.
44
He also questioned how Ram Janmasthan could vest in a deity, if it itself is a deity. He further
argued that devotees can only have access to, and not possession of, the deity.
Justice Chandrachud then summarised Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan’s argument as being that the
Ram Janmasthan, itself a deity, cannot hold the disputed land (itself). Justice Bobde clarified
whether Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan was differentiating this case (by contending that the property
is itself a person) from cases where the property is vested in a person.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan submitted that the Ram Janmasthan (the disputed property) is a
juristic person on account of being a deity itself and is not a property dedicated to a deity. He
cited case law to prove that deities have a juristic personality. Further, he contended that adverse
possession or joint possession may be claimed over the property held by a deity, but cannot be
claimed of the deity itself or the abode of the deity.
Justice Chandrachud pointed out that the worldview of considering Ram Janmasthan as a deity is
not universal. He stated that a second distinct worldview of the disputed site merely considered it
as a place of worship and not a personification of the divine.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan responded that the High Court had accepted the place Ram
Janmasthan as a deity. He submitted that the present case ought to revolve around the question of
access of worshippers and not possession by parties. He explained that a deity cannot be
destructed or divided in Hinduism as it regards idols to live forever, irrespective of human
actions. He contended that the deity cannot be mutilated and does not ever change its character.
Therefore, the construction of a mosque and the consequent human actions do not give any rights
over the disputed land to any party.
2.16.2 The disputed land was always a deity
45
Justice Bobde asked if the disputed land was always a deity or became a deity upon the
occurrence of a specific event.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan responded that the disputed land is a deity because the people hold
faith and believe that it is the birthplace of Lord Ram. The construction of the mosque does not
abrogate the divine nature of the disputed land as Hindus continue to worship and revere it as the
birthplace or Lord Ram and feel the sanctity and divinity of the place.
He clarified that both Hindus and Muslims could not claim possession over the disputed land as
they only had rights of access as worshippers, albeit for different religions. He then read out the
findings of the Allahabad High Court as evidence of the fact that the mosque was built on the
ruins of the temple. He claimed that the existence of a temple structure (irrespective of whether it
was existing or in ruins) is indisputable. He added that the fact that the temple structure was in
ruins did not alter the faith of devotees.
He cited extracts from previous court decisions to submit that Muslim parties and British
authorities had admitted that Hindus considered the Ram Janmasthan a divine place and offered
worship there.
Sr. Adv. Rajeev Dhavan, advocate for the Sunni Waqf Board, stated that Sr. Adv. C.S.
Vaidyanathan had not submitted a single exhibit or piece of evidence, apart from extracts of the
Allahabad High Court judgment, to make his claim. He stated that the process of reading
judgments without producing exhibits and evidence was a ‘hop, skip and jump’ approach to
substantiating one’s claims. He questioned whether the bench would patiently hear him read out
extracts from judgments to make his case or restrict him by stating that they had already perused
through the judgment.
Chief Justice Gogoi stated that it was the plaintiff’s ‘negative point’ that they were not
demonstrating evidence. However, he contended that every party could argue the case as per its
46
own choice and that the bench would extend the same time and attitude to all parties during the
hearings.
2.16.3 Deity cannot be divided as that is akin to mutilation
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan continued to make the point that a deity cannot be divided as it is
akin to mutilation.
I submitted the notes I prepared to the office, had discussion about the arguments raised that day
and then left the office.
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14.08.2019 (Wednesday)
Took leave from office because of health issues.
15.08.2019 (Thursday)
Today, the court heard Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan argue on behalf of Lord Ram in suit number 5.
He relied on historical accounts to argue that the belief that the disputed site is the birthplace of
Ram (Ram Janmabhoomi) precedes the construction of a mosque and has subsisted through time.
Background
The court is hearing appeals to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, which divided the
disputed land title between the Nirmohi Akhara (suit no. 3), Sunni Waqf Board (suit no. 4) and
Lord Ram (suit no. 5).
The bench comprises Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justices Sharad Bobde, D.Y.
Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan and Abdul Nazeer.
The legal dispute arose on 22 December 1949, when Hindu idols were placed under the Babri
Masjid dome. On 29 December, the Additional Civil Magistrate of Faizabad placed the site under
the custodial responsibility of the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
In 1959, the Nirmohi Akhara filed a title suit seeking possession of the disputed land. In 1961,
the Sunni Waqf Board did the same. In 1989, both were named as defendants in the Allahabad
High Court, when Deoki N Agarwal filed a suit on behalf of Lord Ram.
48
Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing Sr. Advs. K. Parasaran and C.S. Vaidyanathan present
arguments on behalf of Lord Ram. They contend that both suits number 3 and 4 are barred by
limitation. Yesterday, CS Vaidyanathan argued that the site is not even subject to possession
claims, as it is divine and hence a juridical entity itself.
Today's Hearing
2.17 Historical accounts demonstrate Hindu faith in the divinity of the site
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan began by arguing that the Ram Janmasthan site has been worshipped
since time immemorial. He submitted historical accounts that suggest Hindus’ continuous belief
in the divinity of the site.
First, he read extracts from the Puranas that state the religious dividends and benefits accruing
from worship at Ram Janmasthan. Upon prompting by Justice Bhushan, he dated the Puranas to
'time immemorial'. He also submitted that the Puranas discuss offering prayers at the River
Sarayu, next to Ram Janmabhoomi.
Next, he read from among the earliest Western accounts of Ayodhya by the English merchant
William Finch. William Finch, an employee of the East India Company, traveled across India
from 1583 to 1619. According to his travelogue, he visited Ayodhya sometime between
1608-1611. He did not mention a mosque. CS Vaidyanathan contended that if a mosque had
been constructed in 1520, William Finch would surely have written about it in his travels.
Sr. Adv. CS Vaidyanathan then read from the travel account of Joseph Tiefenthaler, an 18th
century Jesuit missionary, whose writings were translated by Johann Bernoulli. Tiefenthaler had
noted that Awadh, also known as Ayodhya, is a city of very olden times with a Swarga Dvara
(celestial temple), through which Ram took all the inhabitants of the city with him to heaven.
Tiefenthaler noted that consequently, the city became empty. It was later repopulated and a
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temple was constructed at the site of Lord ram’s birthplace. However, the Mughal Emperor
Aurangzeb (lived 1618-1707) demolished the temple and built a mosque to 'remove every
memory of Hindu superstition'. CS Vaidyanathan emphasised that Tiefenthaler makes references
to architectural details of the site and the Sita Rasoii.
Justice Chandrachud stated that Tiefenthaler recorded two alternative accounts of demolition -
one by Babur and one by Aurangzeb. He then inquired about the claim that inscriptions in the
mosque state that it was constructed during Babur’s time.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan reiterated that Finch's early 17th century account does note mention a
mosque or a demolition. He emphasised that Tiefenthaler noted the two different versions of the
demolition of temple he had overheard. However, both versions state that the mosque was built
after destroying a temple. Further, Vaidyanathan alleged that the authenticity of the inscriptions
is questionable.
Justice Bobde inquired whether historical evidence demonstrated Babur’s arrival in Ayodhya and
the construction of a mosque. Further, he inquired about when the mosque was first referred to as
Babri Masjid.
Senior advocate Rajeev Dhavan, who represents the Sunni Waqf Board, submitted that crucial
pages in the Baburnama, a key historical account are missing. He urged the court to distinguish
this from the absence of evidence to prove that Babur destroyed the temple and constructed a
mosque. .
CS Vaidyanathan then took the court through the 1838 report of British surveyor Montgomery
Martin. Martin's account contains the first reference of a mosque built by Akbar, the third
Mughal emperor.
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CS Vaidyanathan submitted that he was using Martin's account and other historical accounts not
to establish any facts, but to prove that the site always held religious significance to Hindus. He
differentiated between the European approach and Indian approach to history, by contending
that the European approach focused on the dates and names of events, while the Indian approach
focused on how people lived and what they believed.
Justice Chandrachud inquired if the evidence presented before the court was to establish
historical facts or demonstrate the faith and belief of Hindus over centuries. CS Vaidyanathan
clarified that purpose of presenting such evidence was only to demonstrate the faith of Hindus.
CS Vaidyanathan briefly read extracts from the 19th century British diplomat Edward Thornton's
writings, published in a British gazetteer. Thornton described Ayodhya as a place of religious
significance to Hindus.
Chief Justice Gogoi stated that some of the documentary evidence presented by CS Vaidyanathan
was disputed. CS Vaidyanathan submitted that Thorton’s writings were published by British
authorities in the gazetteer. Justice Chandrachud pointed out that the fact of Thronton’s writings
published in the British gazette did not conclusively establish the claims in the writings.
CS Vaidyanathan continued to present evidence. He read from the 1858 Encyclopaedia of India,
which describes 3 mosques built on the sites of three Hindu shrines. He highlighted Alexander
Cunningham's writings on Ayodhya and briefly touched on the early travelogues of Chinese
scholars Fa Hein and Hiuen Tsang, which mention Ayodhya as a holy place and the site of the
demolished Hindu temple.
Further, CS Vaidyanathan submitted 19th century accounts of the site, which describe its land as
sacred for Hindus. The accounts include the 1877 Gazetteer, 1860 report of Settlements of Land
Revenue in Faizabad published by Miller, in 1902 and the District Gazzetteer for the United
Provinces of Agra & Oudh.
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CS Vaidyanathan provided evidence that contain historical and detailed descriptions of the
Janmasthan and the various places holding importance with respect to Lord Ram. He submitted
that Ram Janmasthan is a revered place where an ancient temple was desecrated and a mosque
was built.
At 12.53 PM the bench rose for lunch.
The bench re-assembled at 2.12 PM. CS Vaidyanathan continued to take the court through
evidence. He read extracts from a 1996 report published by the Indian Institute of Science on the
early history of Ayodhya. He also tried to establish the religious significance of Ayodhya, and the
archaeological evidence of a pre-16th century Hindu temple at the disputed site.
He read out extracts that describe the destruction of temples and holy shrines at Janmasthan. He
reminded the bench that the Allahabad High Court judgment also made reference to this study
and that archaeological evidence from the 10th and 11th centuries stated the existence of a
temple at the Janmasthan.
2.17.1 Site was relevant to Buddhists but the faith of Hindu worshippers persisted
Justice Chandrachud inquired that the site also seemed to be of significant religious importance
to Buddhism. CS Vaidyanathan accepted that the site held significance to Buddhism. However,
he insisted that the relevant question is whether the faith of Hindu worshippers persisted. He
argued that the beliefs of Hindu worshippers about the divinity of the site persisted despite the
influence of other religions such as Jainism, Buddhism and Islam.
2.17.2 Original temple was demolished and a mosque was constructed
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Relying on the 1990 and 1991 photographs of the mosque site taken by Archaeological Survey of
India, he said that the original temple had been demolished and a mosque was later built on the
disputed land around 300 years ago.
He quoted extracts from the 1945 suit filed by the Shia Central Board of Waqf against the Sunni
Central Board of Waqf, to argue that even the Muslims had admitted that a mosque had been
constructed during the reign of Emperor Babur at the birthplace of Lord Ram.
Justice Bobde inquired what happened to the suit and how the Sunni Board of Waqf responded to
the suit whereas Chief Justice Gogoi sought to understand the prayer in this suit.
Sr. Adv. Rajeev Dhavan, on behalf of Sunni Waqf Central Board, submitted that the case was
decided in 1946. He stated that in the dispute between the Sunnis and Shias on the ownership of
the site, the Sunnis had won possession over the case.
The counsel for the Shia Central Board of Waqf submitted that the mosque was constructed by
Mir Baki, a Shia, on emperor Babur’s order. He contended that the mosque was therefore a Shia
mosque that no other party could hold claim over.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan summarised his arguments that there was no dispute over the
existence of the mosque. However, the mosque was built by demolishing the temple structure.
Further, he submitted that his arguments had placed reliance on historical evidence to show that
the divinity of the temple still exists. He contended that the Shari’a law does not consider a
structure as a valid mosque if it is built on the ruins of a temple. He reiterated that the findings
establish that the mosque was built on the same site as the temple - either by demolishing the
temple or building the mosque on the temple’s ruins.
53
16.08.2019 (Friday):
The court heard Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan argue on behalf of Lord Ram. He took it through
the archaeological evidence and argued that Babri Masjid was built on a temple in the 16th
century. Further, he attempted to establish that there exists evidence of a temple dating back to as
early as the Shunga dynasty (2nd century BCE).
Background
disputed land title among the Nirmohi Akhara (suit no. 3), Sunni Waqf Board (suit no. 4) and
Lord Ram (suit no. 5).
The bench comprises Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justices Sharad Bobde, D.Y.
Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan and Abdul Nazeer.
The legal dispute arose on 22 December 1949, when Hindu idols were placed under the Babri
Masjid dome. On 29 December, the Additional Civil Magistrate of Faizabad placed the site under
the custodial responsibility of the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
In 1959, the Nirmohi Akhara filed a title suit seeking possession of the disputed land. In 1961,
the Sunni Waqf Board did the same. In 1989, both were named as defendants in the Allahabad
High Court, when Deoki N Agarwal filed a suit on behalf of Lord Ram.
Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing Sr. Advs. K. Parasaran and C.S. Vaidyanathan present
arguments on behalf of Lord Ram. On 14 August, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan argued that the
54
Hindu belief is that the site is Ram Janmabhoomi, which pre-dates the construction of any
mosques.
Today's arguments
2.18 Archaeological evidence shows that Babri Masjid was built on a temple
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan resumed by taking the bench through a map of the site. He explained
that the path of parikrama shown on the map is a little different from what the oral evidence
indicates.
Repeating himself, he referred to photographs of inscriptions, which are allegedly evidence of a

temple pre-dating Babri Masjid. He highlighted a stone slab with the inscription 'Janmabhoomi'.
He substantiated his position by referring to the Allahabad High Court's interpretation of the
photographs.
2.18.1 Idols cannot be present in a mosque

He argued that the photographs show that the site was not a mosque, where prayers were offered.
Justice Bobde stated that there is a distinction between whether a structure was built as a mosque
and whether it is being used as a mosque. Vaidyanathan responded that images of human beings
or God can never be inside a mosque and hence, the site could not be a mosque.
Justice Bobde asked Ar. Adv. CS Vaidyanathan which hadith he was referring to. Loosely
referring to the Shariat, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan submitted that while namaz can be offered
anywhere, a mosque requires certain conditions to be met. He said that it is against the tenets of
Islam to have images of idols present in a mosque.
55
Senior advocate Rajeev Dhavan, who represents the Sunni Waqf Board, interjected to say that it
was offensive to say namaz can be offered anywhere. He submitted that Justice Sharma in his
opinion (2010 Allahabad High Court judgment) had stated prayers can be offered anywhere and
attributed it to Dhavan. Dhavan questioned whether this was a correct interpretation of Islam and
denied making the statement.
CS Vaidyanathan continued, showing the court a photograph of the Garuda idol and stating that it
shows that the site could not be a mosque. Justice Bobde inquired when the photo was
taken. Justice Bhushan stated that it would be helpful to present photographs in the period prior
to 1950 and explained that after 1950 the structure was evidently used as a temple. He recalled
the mention of a collection of photographs in the Commissioner's report. Chief Justice Gogoi
read out the mention of thirteen photographs taken by Basheer Ahmed.
2.18.2 Findings of Archaeological Survey of India
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan transitioned to read from the High Court order that directed the
Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) to excavate the site. He attempted to establish that the ASI
team worked under close supervision of all parties and lawyers. He detailed the composition of
the excavation team.
2.18.3 Relevance of ASI report to the dispute
Next, he took the bench through sections of the report. First, he sought to establish that the site
has seen successive structural activity on a public structure (s.a. a mandapa or temple) from the
Shunga (approx. 200 - 100 BCE) to Gupta dynasties (approx. 350 CE to 550 CE). He described
the existence of different formations at the site.
56
The bench went through relevant technical terms. Justice Bode inquired what statigraphy
is. Stratigraphy is the study of rock layers (strata) and layering (stratification). CS Vaidynathan
explained that stratigraphy allowed the ASI to date different strata at the site using carbon dating.
Rajeev Dhavan clarified for the court that only organic matter can be carbon dated. He submitted
that steel, iron and bricks could not be carbon dated. He inquired whether the idols had been
carbon dated. CS Vaidyanathan said no, only the surrounding materials had been carbon dated.
CS Vaidyanathan stressed that the ASI report establishes the presence of a religious structure in
as early as the 3rd or 2nd century BCE. He began discussing different artifacts and structures
from the Shunga and Kushan periods. He took the bench through the Gupta and Rajput era strata
as well.
At this point, Justice Bobde asked Sr. Adv. CS Vaidyanathan to clarify the relevance of the report
to the current dispute. He stated that the report appears to apply to many areas in the region and
is not specific to Ayodhya. Vaidyanathan stated that the report demonstrates that a public
structure, such as a mandapa or temple, was likely in place since the 2nd century BCE. Justice
Bobde was not satisfied and again asked Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan to clarify how this fact
relates to the dispute.
Justice Chandrachud directed Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan to page 59 of the report, which
describes a circular depression apparently made by cutting a large brick pavement. Vaidyanathan
suggested that it was a place of importance, as it faced the central structure where the Lord Ram
idol is kept. He posited that it was used to drain out water after the abhisheka of a deity.
At this point, the bench rose for lunch at 12.58 PM.
2.18.4 Land was not vacant when Babur built the mosque
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Arguments resumed at 2.18 PM. Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan began by responding to Justice
Bobde's query from prior to lunch: why are the ASI findings dating back to the Gupta empire and
earlier relevant to the dispute? He submitted that it is likely the public structure was a temple.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan speculated even further, suggesting that the site was likely always a
Lord Ram temple. He said it was always believed to be the Ram Janmabhoomi.
He used this as an opportunity to dispute the claim of the Sunni Waqf Board that the land was
vacant when Babur ordered the construction of a temple. He stressed that the archaelogical
evidence suggests otherwise.
2.18.5 Comparative analysis between the site and other temples in the region
Justice Chandrachud stated that Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan must go beyond contending their
argument and substantiate his own claim that a temple existed at the site. Further, he stated that
civilizations have always settled near rivers and that the same area may have been occupied and
vacated in different periods.
Justice Bobde asked whether there is evidence that any of the Gupta and earlier structures were
religious in nature. He stressed that the mere fact that a structure existed was not relevant to the
dispute.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan highlighted the 'massive hall' with the evidence of pillared columns.
He submitted that places of this scale were very likely to be religious in nature from that era.
Sr. Adv. Rajeev Dhavan clarified that the subsequent structures are not floors of the same
building.
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Justice Chandrachud asked Vaidyanathan to take the court through paragraph 109, that draws
some comparative analysis between this site and comparable temples in other parts of region
from the same eras.
CS Vaidyanathan read out extracts about the dimensions and physical features of the site. He
also explained that no habitational structures, such as houses, drains or wells were found. This
indicates that the site was not used for residential purposes.
He submitted that there is evidence of human activity at the site dating back to the 13th century.
He clarified that such evidence includes mutilated or broken artefacts.
He submitted that evidence of continuous human presence begins in the 10th century.
2.18.6 Pre-16th century architecture is that of a temple
He returned to the argument that the pre-16th century archaelogical evidence is indicative of a
temple. He described the 17 rows of pillar bases from north to south, wherein 5 pillars comprise
each row.
He argued that a mosque would never contain any pillars nor artifacts. He submitted that the 8
experts relied on by the Sunni Waqf Board suggested that an Islamic religious structure was
beneath the disputed site. He argued the ASI report does not support this claim.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan began to read the Allahabad High Court's interpretation of the ASI
report. He focused on the pillar bases.
2.18.7 May have been a shrine to Lord Shiva
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Returning to the circular depression, he submitted that the other archaeological thesis is that it
may have been a shrine to Lord Shiva. Justice Chandrachud asked how a pranala (the discharge
outlet) could be equated with the possible existence of a shiva linga. Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan
submitted that archaeologists must interpret in context. Justice Bhushan described the thesis as
guess work.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan described the terracotta figurines found at the site. Justice
Chandrachud said they do not indicate that the site is of any religious significance.
Arguments concluded for the day. Chief Justice Gogoi asked Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan what he
had would present after the ASI report. Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan responded that the oral
evidence and his conclusion were left. He said he could finish in around three to fours hours.
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17.08.2019 (Saturday):
That was an off day at office.
18.08.2019 (Sunday):
That was an off day at office.
19.08.2019 (Monday):
Took leave from office because of some health issues.
61
20.08.2019 (Tuesday):
Day 29 Arguments: 20 August 2019

disputed land title among the Nirmohi Akhara (suit no. 3), Sunni Waqf Board (suit no. 4) and
Lord Ram (suit no. 5). Today, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan who represents Lord Ram finished
taking the court through the documentary and oral evidence.
The morning session was marked by a dispute over the veracity of an inscribed stone slab, which
allegedly dates back to the 12th century. The inscription states that Ayodhya had a large Lord
Vishnu temple (Ram is an incarnation of Vishnu). Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan contended that this
was the temple upon which the Babri Masjid was built. Whether the slab was found in the debris
at the site has been contested.
In the afternoon session, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan took the court through the oral evidence. He
read through witness statements that describe the disputed site as of special relevance to Hindus.
Morning Session
2.19 Hindus have continuously worshipped at Ayodhya

Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan began today by reiterating his claim that Hindus have continuously
worshipped at Ayodhya. He pointed to 17th and 18th century accounts of Hindu worship at the
site.
He proceeded to speculate about how it was more dangerous to complete pilgrimages during the
19th and earlier centuries, than it is now. He suggested that this further demonstrates the
unrelenting faith of Hindu worshippers. He did not rely on any evidence.
2.21 Legal dispute is limited to the inner courtyard
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Next, he reiterated that the legal dispute is limited to the inner courtyard. He read from extracts
of the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, to claim that the outer courtyard is exclusive to
Hindus. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain made a similar submission on 6 August on behalf of the Nirmohi
Akhara.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan argued that a mosque cannot co-exist at the site, as the 'tenets of
Islam' prohibit (images of) idols inside of a mosque.
2.22 Evidence to show that mosque is constructed on the ruins of a temple
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan returned to the claim that the 16th century mosque was constructed
on the ruins of a temple. He presented the court archaeological evidence not included in the ASI
report. An inscribed stone slab was allegedly found at the site and it dates back to the mid-12th
century. The inscription is in Sanskrit and describes a 'big temple' for Lord Vishnu with 'rows of
lofty stone pillars' at Ayodhya, the capital of Saketa Mandala.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan submitted that the 4ft by 2ft slab was not carbon dated. However, he
said that paleographic evidence and the nature of the inscription date it to the 12th century. He
said the stone slab was recovered in 1992 after the mosque was demolished by Kar Sevaks.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan argued that the temple described in the inscription was at the disputed
site. He highlighted how the reference to pillars is in accordance with the ASI's findings. Further,
he argued that it is irrelvant if the slab was planted at the site because only its age and inscription
are of significance.
Justices Bode and Chandrachud sought to know how he was substantiating the translation he had
submitted.
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Justice Chandrachud asked what the nature of the challenge to the evidence was. In particular, he
asked whether there was a challenge to the credibility of the interpreter or his interpretation of
the inscription. Second, he asked whether there was a challenge to the authenticity of the slab
itself.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan explained that there were no challenges to the interpreter, a Mr. KV
Ramesh, nor his interpretation. The bench went through KV Ramesh's cross-examination by Shri
Zilani. KV Ramesh was an employee of the Archaeological Society of India (not to be confused
with the Archaeological Survey of India). Justice Bobde inquired into the nature of the society,
particularly asking about its leadership and source of funding. Sr. Adv. C.S.
Vaidyanathan submitted that they are registered society. Sr. Adv. Rajeev Dhavan interrupted to
note that SP Gupta who heads the society is himself a witness for Lord Ram.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan conceded that there is a challenge to the origin of the slab. Multiple
parties have disputed whether it was found at the Babri Masjid site in 1992.
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan attempted to establish that the slab was found at the site by relying on
a combination of photographs and an eye witness account. He used two photographs to show the
court from where the slab allegedly fell and where it allegedly landed. The former photograph
depicted a gap in the structure of the western wall.
He then read the statement of the witness who attests to seeing the slab fall - Ashok Kumar
Chatterjee was a press journalist with the Panchajanya and Faizabad resident. The statement says
the slab fell around 3 pm in the afternoon. The witness recalled other journalists being present,
but did not recognise them and speculated they were outsiders. The witness established that he
was present at the time of the demolition in 1992.
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Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan said that the stone slab in combination with the ASI report clearly
establish that the 16th century mosque was constructed on a temple. He concluded by stating that
the mosque was either built by demolishing a temple or on top of its ruins.
2.23 Oral testimony that Hindus have continuously worshipped

At this point, he began to take the court through the oral evidence. He sought to establish that
Hindus have continuously worshipped at the site.
A 90 year old witness (Mahant Sri Ramchandra Das) who gave evidence on 22 December 1999,
stated that Hindus worshipped at the site because they thought it was Ram's birthplace.
An 85 year old witness born in 1917, who moved to Ayodhya in 1938, recounts worshippers
offering darshan and performing parikrama (circumambulation) at the site. Further, he stated that
his grandfather and father told him it was where Vishnu was reincarnated as Rama.
The court broke for lunch at 1.00 PM. Chief Justice Gogoi inquired how much more time Sr.
Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan would require. He said he will likely take another 30 minutes.
Afternoon Session
The bench assembled at 2.14 PM. Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan continued to take the court through
witness statements. He highlighted how a range of witnesses attest to a large number of Hindus
worshipping at the disputed site.
2.24 Nirmohi Akhara cannot claim adverse possession
He went off on a tangent to argue that the Nirmohi Akhara cannot claim adverse possession of
the property, which entails occupying land another party already has the title to. He questioned
how they can claim to serve the deity and yet seek to possess his birthplace, itself a deity. The
Akhara's counsel Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain clarified that it is not seeking adverse possession.
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Justice Chandrachud asked Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan whether Hindu worship remained
continuous when access to the site was restricted by the State. Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan
submitted that worship never ceased.
As this point, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan began taking the court through the prosecution's
witness statements. Relying on the statement made by Mohammed Harshim (PW1), he submitted
that Muslim witnesses also refer to the site as a special place of worship for Hindus. Mohammed
Harshim (PW1), in his statement, described Ayodhya as a Hindu Mecca.
Continuing, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan read out Muslim witness statements describing lakhs of
Hindus descending upon the disputed site to perform parikrama around it. He used this as an
opportunity to reiterate his argument that the Ram Janmasthan extends beyond the central dome.
Multiple witness statements describe the performance of parikrama around the entire site.
Finally, he summarised his interpretation of the documentary and oral evidence. He argued that
the evidence demonstrates that Hindus believe the site is the Ram Janmasthan. He argued that
worship never ceased, even when a mosque was built at the site. He said that the presence of the
deity is in perpetuity.
He clarified that he had not dealt with the oral evidence tied to the ASI report. He said he would
submit such evidence, if the other parties questioned its evidentiary value.
Chief Justice Gogoi stated that hearings would continue tomorrow. Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan
will conclude his arguments and then Vishnu Singh will begin. If there is time, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain
will present documentary and oral evidence, which he had failed to submit.
Sr. Adv. Rajeev Dhavan again suggested that the Nirmohi Akhara and Lord Ram be allowed to
reply to each other, before proceeding to his suit (Sunni Waqf Board). He submitted that the two
66
parties present contesting claims. Chief Justice Gogoi said the Bench would consider allowing
replies.
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21.08.2019 (Wednesday):
The Supreme Court is hearing an appeal to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, which
divided the disputed title equally among the Nirmohi Akhara, Lord Ram and the Sunni Waqf
Board. Yesterday, CS Vaidyanathan submitted documentary and oral evidence in support of Ram
Lala's claims.
Today, CS Vaidyanathan concluded his arguments, reiterating that the disputed land is itself a
deity and hence cannot be possessed. He added that a second reason the land cannot be possessed
is that it is a public temple and hence is not subject to the claims of private parties. Finally, he
disputed the claims of the Nirmohi Akhara and the Sunni Waqf Board.
At at the end of the day, arguments on behalf of the lay worshipper Gopal Visharad began.
Morning Session
At 10.53 AM, CS Vaidyanathan resumed his arguments. He submitted that the Allahabad High
Court had held the suits of Nirmohi Akhara and Sunni Waqf Board to be barred by limitation. Yet
it had yet granted them relief. He questioned the decision’s standing in law.
2.25 No private party can claim possession of a public temple

He then cited case law to submit that no private party can claim possession of a public temple, as
this would alter its religious nature. He argued that the temple at the disputed site is a public
temple. Hence, he submitted that it is res extra commercium - meaning that none of
the parties could claim the right to the property title. He also reminded the court of his earlier
claim that the property is res nullius because the property itself is a juridical entity.
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2.26 The disputed property is a deity and external ownership cannot be claimed
Adverse possession is the claim to someone else’s property through exclusive and continuous
hostile possession. Note that neither Nirmohi Akhara nor Sunni Waqf Board are claim adverse
possession. Both parties argue that they own the land . However, CS Vaidyanathan equated their
claims to adverse possession, arguing that the ownership is with Lord Ram.
Justice Bobde and Justice Chandrachud directed CS Vaidyanathan to cite case law in support of
his arguments that the property of a deity is inalienable. He cited a Privy Council judgment.
Next, he added that the property cannot be claimed by adverse possession, since the deity is a
perpetual minor in law.
Justice Bobde asked if claims of adverse possession cann exist if the property is owned by a
lunatic and whether it could be alienated.
Justiec Nazeer asked if adverse possession could be claimed over property owned by a Waqf.
CS Vaidyanathan argued that the court in Ismail Faruqui held that the law of limitation would
apply to Waqf property. He added that no party can claim possession of land which itself is a
deity, or is owned by a deity.
Chief Justice Gogoi summarised CS Vaidyanathan's position as : 'the disputed property is itself a
deity and hence it cannot be possessed nor have its title claimed.'
CS Vaidyanathan proceeded to clarify his res extra commercium argument. He submitted that the
site is a public temple because devotees have historically performed worship there . He said that
it was hence not subject to private title claims. He argued that a mosque was illegally constructed
at the site and that thhis could not grant the Sunni Waqf Board any claims since the character of
the deity and the sanctity of the deity is perpetual and indestructible.
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Justice Chandrachud sought a clarification and asked whether there was authority to substantiate
that the assumed temple was res extra commercium and could not be subject to possession
claims. CS Vaidyanathan submitted that no one can destroy the character of a temple or an idol.
Justice Chandrachud then asked whether this simply amounted to his first argument, namely that
no one can claim possession of a deity. Vaidyanathan submitted that it was a different argument
about the the character of a temple.
2.27 Inalienability of mosques and temples
Vaidyanathan stressed that a temple, by its very character, is not subject to commercial claims - it
cannot be traded or possessed. Justice Chandrachud asked him to cite relevant case law. Before
Vaidyanathan could proceed, Justice Bobde asked him to clarify the court’s holding in the Ismail
Faruqui case on the the inalienability of mosques. The judgment held that the right to worship at
the site of a mosque ceases, when it is destroyed.
CS Vaidyanathan clarified for Justice Bobde that the Faruqui judgment draws from Indian
Mohamedan Law and prior judgments from the Lahore High Court, Privy Council and Supreme
Court. He submitted that Mohamedan Law does not consider the land on which a mosque is built
as inalienable.
Justice Bobde stated that Vaidyanathan had failed to answer Justice Nazeer's earlier question. He
re-stated the question as follows: if a property is voluntarily dedicated to God, does it become
inalienable forever or can a human act destroy its inalienable character?
Justice Bobde narrowed the question - can the trustee of a Waqf property sell it? CS
Vaidyanathan affirmed that a trustee could sell Waqf propetry'. He submitted that Hindu and
Mohammedan law differed on this issue. He argued that in Hindu law, the trustee of a shebiat can
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transfer the title of the property, only if such transfer does not destroy the character of the temple
or deity. However, he argued that this was not the rule Mohamedan law.
CS Vaidyanathan submitted that if the land on which a mosque lies is adversely possessed, then
the right to worship at the mosque ceases. He proceeded to read from the Ram Janaki case.
Justice Chandrachud presented the example of a court allowing the transfer of an idol in Keshav
Chandra Ghoshi, after considering the valid circumstances in that case.
CS Vaidyanathan responded to Justice Chandrachud by submitting that an idol cannot be

alienated, but the property held by the idol can. He distinguished between 'property as a deity',
the abode of a deity and property held by a deity. He submitted that only the property held by a
deity could be alienated under Hindu law.
CS Vaidyanathan then read extracts from Shaheed Ganj, where the Privy Council held that a
mosque could be adversely possessed. The Waqf's right to title was held to be extinct under
section 28 and Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 as no attempt had been found to drive out
those who had adversely possessed the property. CS Vaidyanathan submitted that the Privy
Council reached its judgment without deciding whether a Muslim institution can be regarded as a
juristic person, in response to Justice Bobde's question about the same.
Justice Bobde stated that the comparison between Hindu and Muslim law in this regard was
misleading, as Islam does not consider any property divine (in Islam nothing but God is
divine). CS Vaidyanathan agreed that Islam only considered God divine. The Chief Justice asked
him to return to his central argument.
2.28 Rights of debutters
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CS Vaidyanathan proceeded to case law pertaining to right of debutters. He submitted that it is

the duty of the court to protect the interests of idols and sustain proper proceedings for the
express benefit of trustees. He emphasised that in the present dispute, a temple cannot be built in
a new place as the place itself is divine.
Justice Bobde posited the hypothetical where unauthorized idols are placed in a road, to prevent
road widening. He said that he did not want Vaidyanathan's principle to apply in such cases.
Vaidyanathan submitted that in such cases, the principle would not apply as the land itself is not
divine.
CS Vaidyanathan proceeded to read case law which distinguishes between a private and public
debutter.
Next, he disputed the Nirmohi Akhara's claim of possession by submitting case law holdings that
a trustee's possession can never become adverse to the idol ortemple's claim. He further
submitted that a perpetual minor (deity), cannot suffer adverse possession.
CS Vaidyanathan read extracts from a 1953 Allahabad High Court judgment which clarifies the
circumstances under which section 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872 can be invoked. Section 110
places the burden of proof on the person who claims not to be the owner to substantaite such
claim.
He proceeded to argue that the Nirmohi Akhara's rights to manage the temple are not vested
rights. He submitted that the right to receive offerings is incidental to the service rendered by the
archaka (priest). He argued that the shebait cannot claim any independent rights.
He submitted that the Nirmohi Akhara sought an injunction order, but subsequently received
joint possession of the title, despite their right not being established.
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Next, he quoted case law that states public gazetteers can be relied on to clarify historical facts
on public issues. He sought to establish that the evidence he had earlier relied on was valuable.
The court broke for lunch at 12.57 PM.
Afternoon Session
2.29 Churches are not juridical persons
Justice Bobde had asked, in the morning session, whether churches are treated as juridical
persons. If so, what specifically is treated as the juridical person - the building, the congregation,
etc?
The bench reassembled at 2.15 PM. CS Vaidyanathan read out the judgment in MV Elizabeth to
respond to Justice Bobde's question of whether a church was ever held to be juridical person. CS
Vaiyanathan stated that to the best of his knowledge, a church was not held to be a juridical
person.
2.31 Nirmohi Akhara's claim is adverse to Lord Ram
Chief Justice Gogoi requested CS Vaidyanathan to conclude. CS Vaidyanathan proceeded to first

dispute the Akhara's and the Sunni Waqf Board's claim. He submitted that the Nirmohi Akhara is
explicitly claiming the title in conflict with Lord Ram. Therefore, he argued that they should not
have been granted a relief by the Allahabad High Court, as Lord Ram was not made a defendant
to their suit.
Citing the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, Vaidyanathan also submitted that the Waqf
property was not registered and that their title was not found on the revenue records.
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He further argued that the 1885 judgment could not apply res judicata, as the idol was not a
party. Recall that the 1885 judgment relied on the land division established in 1855, which
awarded the inner courtyard to the Mulsims and the outer courtyard to the Hindus.
He submitted that his suit is maintainable.
2.32 Allahabad High Court ruled in favour of Lord Ram in most issues
Finally, he stated that the Allahabad High Court judgment ruled most issues in the case in favor
of Lord Ram. He stated that the Allahabad High Court's judgment was reached by a 3 judge
bench which had throughly heard the case and perused all evidence. He requested the court to be
'reluctant in interfering' with the Allahabad High Court's judgment, submitting that it should only
interfere if the High Court's findings are so unreasonable that they conflict with the findings of
the lower court.
Next, the court heard PN Mishra who represents defendant 20 in suit number 4. In the civil
appeal, he represents the plaintiff in suit number 5.
3.1 Mosque land is not inalienable
Mishra first responded to Justice Nazeer's earlier question directed to CS Vaidyanathan about the
position of Islamic law on the alienability of land on which mosques are built. He argued that
Mohammad Hanifa's disciples held that the land on which a dilapidated or seldom used mosque
exists can be sold with the permission of the Qazi. He contended that the court is the present day
equivalent to a Qazi. He added that Islamic law requires the proceeds from the sale to be used for
building a mosque elsewhere with a significant Muslim population.
3.2 Evidence of worship through Hindu scriptures
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PN Mishra stated he would take the court through Hindu scriptures providing evidence for the
sanctity, and worship by devotees, at Ayodhya, reasoning that essential religious practice
questions must be decided on doctrine. He submitted he would rely on the Atharva Veda, Skand
Purana and Valmiki Ramayana, among other scriptures.
3.2.1 Atharva Veda
He began to read out Sanskrit verses from the Atharva Veda, which describe Ayodhya as a city of
gods housing a temple with three doors and therefore, he submitted, meaning three domes.
Chief Justice Gogoi inquired whether these documents had already been placed on the record.
Mishra submitted that the Allahabad High Court had examined these documents.
Justice Bhushan said that Mishra's arguments had already been submitted by CS Vaidyanathan.
He asked Mishra to summarise his main argument. Mishra submitted that Hindus have
continuously worshipped the Janmabhoomi and have never been dispossessed.
Justice Chandrachud asked PN Mishra to bear in mind that no party was contested the
genuineness of Hindu faith in the site. He told Mishra that he need not prove something which
has not been disputed. Mishra responded that the Sunni Waqf Board has questioned whether
Lord Ram was born at the disputed site.
3.2.2 Skanda Purana
PN Mishra submitted that the Skand Purana provides the exact location of the Ram
Janmasthan. He submitted that the scripture describes the course of worship devotees must
undertake: bathing in river Sarayu, then performing worship of Pindaru, then performing worship
at Vigneshwar. He submitted that the scripture states that to north-east of the Vigneshwar is
Ram's birthplace. He argued that this matches the current location of the disputed site.
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Justice Bhushan asked when the Skand Purana was written. PN Mishra submitted the following
geneaology: Sage Narad tells Skand (the son of Vishnu), who recounts to Agasthya, who
recounts to Ved Vyasa. Ved Vyasa wrote and edited the Purana, an oral tradition until then,
around 5,000 years ago. Justice Bhushan asked when the published work first came to light. PN
Mishra submitted that British researchers trace the written text to the Gupta period in the 4th or
5th century. However, the Purana in oral form dated centuries and millenia prior. He emphasised
that oral traditions rather than written texts were the norm in ancient India.
Justice Bhushan stated that the period of the Purana's codification as a written text was very
relevant, relative to the archaeological evidence of structures at the site.
Rajeev Dhavan submitted that the text was first written in the 8th century in Nepal and that rivers
change course, making it difficult to extrapolate the location of Ram's birthplace based on the
description in the scripture. He also stated that the explanations to the meanings of the verse
made by PN Mishra were not presented before the Allahabad High Court judgment.
Justice Chandrachud said that religious texts are primarily evidence of faith. He repeated that the
faith of worshippers was not being disputed by any party. He requested PN Mishra to briefly
present evidence relating to the faith of worshippers and proceed to detailed submission
of objective evidence.
Justice Bobde asked PN Mishra to show the bench the exact location of Vigneshwar on a map as
a claim of presenting objective evidence.
Chief Justice Gogoi also asked PN Mishra to show the court objective evidence. He suggested
that if the same was not ready, he should allow another party to argue first and prepare his
evidence in the meantime.
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PN Mishra continued to read from Skanda Purana verse. Chief Justice Gogoi asked him to show
the reference to the verse in the Allahabad High Court judgment. PN Mishra responded after
some delay, paragraph 4304 of volume 2.
Justice Bobde again requested Mishra to show the locations of places mentioned in the scripture
on a map. Chief Justice Gogoi stressed that PN Mishra should only proceed if he had anything
new to add to Vaidyanathan's submissions.
3.2.3 Ain-i-Akbari
PN Mishra then cited text written in the Ain-i-Akbari by Abul Fazl. He asserted that the Ain-i-
Albari mentioned Lord Ram's birth in Ramkot but made no mention of a mosque. He argued that
if a mosque was built by Emperor Babur (Akbar's grandfather), surely this would be mentioned
in Akbar's biography. Justice Bobde asked whether the High Court had considered this
contention, requesting reference to the specific page number.
Justice Bhushan said that this evidence was exhibited before the High Court, but he questioned
whether the judgment had relied on it. PN Mishra read from an excerpt of Justice Agarwal's
opinion which stated that Ain-i-Akbari mentioned a temple but not a mosque and that such a
mosuqe would have been mentioned if it were constructed by Babur.
Justice Chandrachud clarified that the excerpt is from Justice Agarwal's reflection on whether the
mosque was built by Babur or Aurangzeb. Justice Chandrachud said that Justice Agarwal's
educated guess was not relevant to the present case.
Chief Justice Gogoi directed PN Mishra to prepare a note of all the evidence he sought to submit.
Further he stated that PN Mishra should organise his evidence with references. He stressed that
any references to physical locations should correlate to the map being relied upon by the Bench.
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Next, Chief Justice Gogoi called upon VN Sinha who is appearing on behalf of th President of
the Hindu Mahasabha (defendent 11 in suit 5).
4.1 No mosque or structure could be built without British consent
VN Sinha submitted that from 1861 to the date of the first suit, no mosque or other structure
could be built without first receiving the approval of the British government since the land was
of nazul character after annexation of Oudh by the British. He submitted that Lord Canning
annexed the territory of Oudh in 1861 and that the Proclamation of the Governor General vested
all titles with the State.
Justice Bhushan said that the proclamation meant that sovereignty was assumed by the British,
not that all land titles were transferred to the State. VS Sinha was relying on a document to draw
the inference questioned by Justice Bhushan.
Justice Bobde asked Sinha not to rely on any evidence which has not been placed on the record.
After being reprimanded by the Chief Justice, VS Sinha said that he had not placed the docuemnt
relied upon before the bench, as was not yet prepared to argue, assuming that his suit would not
come up today.
Chief Justice Gogoi inquired whether any appeal arising out of suit number 5 was ready to be
heard. SK Jain (for plaintiff in suit no 3) interrupted to say that he was ready to be heard.
Chief Justice Gogoi said the Bench would hear Ranjit Kumar on behalf of the plaintiff in suit
number 1. The plaintiff is the son of Gopal Visharad (deceased) who worshipped at the site.
Ranjit Kumar sought to read the plaint in Hindi, submitting that the English translation is not
correct. Chief Justice Gogoi reprimanded him for not placing the correct English translation
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before the bench. He said that neither him nor Justice Nazeer would be able to follow and
directed Sinha to read it in English.
It appeared that Sinha was relying on a different English translation than the Bench. Upon being
corrected by the bench, he read out the accurate English translation of the plaint.
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22.08.2019 (Thursday):
Yesterday, Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan, the counsel for Ram Lalla, concluded his argument
that the disputed site is itself a deity and hence cannot be possessed by anyone.
Today, the court heard the counsel for Gopal Visharad. He had filed a suit (numbered as suit 1,
for ease of reference) in 1950 as a devotee after being denied entry to the central dome by state
authorities. He sought to be able to freely pray at the site and for a permanent injunction against
removing the idols, which were placed in the mosque in 1949. As Gopal Visharad is now
deceased, he is represented by his son, Rajendra Singh, whose counsel is Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar.
After arguments for Visharad concluded, the court heard Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain appearing for the
Nirmohi Akhara. On 7 August, the court had directed him to present evidence substantiating the
Akhara’s claims. Today, instead of presenting evidence, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain sought to dispute Ram
Lala's claims. The bench expressed dissatisfaction and stated that he was contradicting the
Nirmohi Akhara's written statement.
Morning Session
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar opened arguments at 10.33 am. He read the prayers from the 1950 original
suit, which sought that Hindu worship and darshan continue without any interference at the site.
5.1 The site itself is a deity
He adopted Sr. Advs. K. Parasaran and C.S. Vaidyanathan's arguments that the site itself is a
deity. He argued that as the site is a deity, citizens have a civil right to worship at it, which cannot
be curtailed in any manner.
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He submitted that the Sunni Waqf Board conceded that Friday namaz had ceased at the site after
16 December 1949.
5.2 Reliance on affidavits to determine continued Hindu worship
Next, Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar presented the court wiht evidence that had not been considered by
the courts below. He presented 14 affidavits containing witness statements of 20 persons.
Justice Chandrachud stated that if the persons had not been cross-examined before a court, their
statements could not be relied upon as fact. He stressed that this applied even if the statements
are in the public record, as public affidavits.
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar submitted that the witnesses were not cross-examined as trial took place
long after the written statements were made. Chief Justice Gogoi asked why they had not
challenged the dismissal of the affidavits by the trial court. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar responded that
the trial court disregarded the affidavits in the judgment, and not in an interim order that he could
have challenged.
5.2.1 Hindu worship did not cease despite construction of a mosque
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar read out the statement of Abdul Ghani, who attested that Hindu worship
did not cease, despite the construction of a mosque. Justice Bobde asked whether Ghani was a
Shia or Sunni Muslim, to which Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar was unable to respond. He then read the
statements of Hasnoor and Ghali Mohammed, both of whom stated that 'Muslims built a mosque
on Ram Janmasthan' and that both Hindus and Muslims worship at the site.
He clarified that all the affidavits were filed after the state receiver took over the property in
January 1950 as per the attachment order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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He continued to read witness statements from the affidavits which attested that Muslims neither
performed namaz at the site after 1950, nor did they object to Hindus worshipping at the site.
Justice Bobde inquired whether the Faizabad Magistrate who passed the attachment order had
considered these affidavits. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar submitted that the Allahabad High Court had
considered the affidavits. He added that the affidavits were placed on record after a verification
of the persons (Note that he did not state that affidavits were verified by the Faizabad
magistrate.).
He informed the court that an application had been made in the Allahabad High Court to transfer
the case out of the Faizabad district Magistrate's jurisdiction, which was subsequently rejected.
5.2.2 Statements in affidavits can be considered as verified facts
Justice Bhushan questioned how the statements in the affidavits could be relied upon as verified
facts. Justice Bhushan said that at best, the only fact established is that such statements were
made in affidavit.
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar pointed to Section 37 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which lists what
in the public record is considered a 'relevant fact' in law. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar also submitted
that the affidavits were placed on record after an authority verified the identity and the statements
of the persons. He added that the persons were all residents of Ayodhya, who had answered a
notice published in newspapers.
Justice Bhushan questioned how statements made under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure could be relied upon by a civil court. Ranjit Kumar cited Section 35 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which states that if a public servant or a person in performance of a duty makes an
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entry that states a fact in a public or official book, register or electronic record, the same is a
relevant fact.
Justice Bobde stated that no court could go into whether the statements made in the affidavits are
facts, as none of the persons are available for cross-examination.
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar requested the court to draw an inference from the statements, given the
absence of any objections to the affidavits by other parties. He requested the court to simply
consider the statements in the affidavits without regarding them as 'the gospel truth'.
5.2.3 Affidavits cannot be relied on as none of the witnesses were cross-examined
Justice Bobde inquired how the affidavits had been placed on record and whether the High Court
had cross-examined the persons making the statements.
Justice Chandrachud said that from a perusal of the record, the bench could only deduce that they
were preserved in court under the Section 145 CrPC case. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar disagreed,
stating that the affidavits were taken on judicial record as part of the case that went up to the
Allahabad High Court.
Justice Bode asked who had filed the affidavits before the High Court. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar
submitted that he himself had, to which Justice Bobde asked why he had not made sure the
persons were cross-examined.
The 14 affidavits, containing the statements of 20 persons, all state that the temple was
destroyed. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar contended that all 14 affidavits were exhibited before the High
Court.
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Justice Bhushan read from paragraph 120 of the High Court's judgment, which stated that the
High Court had summoned the affidavits form the Faizabad district magistrate.
Chief Justice Gogoi then asked Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar to produce the application he had made for
placing the affidavits as evidence before the High Court. Further, he asked Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar
to provide the order that the High Court passed in reference to the affidavits. Both the Chief
Justice and Justice Bobde sought to know who had deposed (testified) that the affidavits were
legitimate.
5.2.4 Historical exhibits to prove existence of 'Ram Janmasthan'
At this point, Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar placed historical exhibits from the 19th century before the
court. He sought to establish that the site was referred to as the Ram Janmasthan (birthplace) at
least 100 years before the suit was filed.
He discussed a 1850s dispute that referenced the presence of the Chaputra. He referred to a
complaint against Nihant Singh Fakir, a Sikh who entered the mosque, who placed an idol of
Guru Gobind Singh inside the mosque for worship. The Muezzin of Babri Masjid (Syed
Mohammed Khatir) filed his complaint on 1 December 1858. The plaint references the Chaputra.
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar continued to take the court through evidence. He referred to the 14 May
1877 report of the Deputy Commissioner, which recorded no objection to the second door at the
site being opened in the interest of public safety.
He submitted that the plaintiff's right to worship dates back to the 1850s, since the installation of
the railing and the opening of the door. He submitted that darshan continued to take place until
the filing of the suit.
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Chief Justice Gogoi inquired about whether the Allahabad High Court examined Exhibits 18 to
34 to determine whether worship had continuously taken place at the site. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar
pointed to Justice Agarwal's opinion in pages 1361-1415 of Volume 2 of the Ayodhya case's
judgment.
5.3 Hinduism allows for many kinds of worship
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar then argued that the plaintiff's right to worship stems from Hinduism
itself. He discussed case law that stated that Hinduism allowed for many different forms of
worship.
Afternoon Session
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar resumed arguments on behalf of Gopal Visharad (through his son) at 2.26
PM.
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar read case law that establishes that not all sects of Hinduism require idol
worship. He submitted that Hinduism allows for a wide range of beliefs and philosophies to
subsist together. He argued that temple worship is a part of Hinduism, and that those who do not
worship temples or idols could also be Hindus.
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar reiterated his earlier submission that the plaintiff's right to worship
persisted for at least a century before he filed his suit.
He read case law on the offer of worship at a Syrian Christian church. Justice Bobde had asked
Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan (for Lord Ram) yesterday, if a church had ever been considered a
juridical entity. Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar did not answer this question and stated that he would
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restrict himself to the question of the civil right to worship. The judgment in the case found that
in Episcopalian churches only the ordained priest can ‘perform’ worship .
Sr. Adv. Ranjit Kumar concluded his arguments by submitting that the affidavits are credible and
that a case can prima facie be inferred from them. He reiterated that all the affidavits state that no
namaz was performed after 1934. He requested the court to maintain the status quo and not in
any manner restrict the plaintiff's centuries-old, unfettered right to worship.
At this point, the court briefly heard Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran for the Ram Lalla.
The court then briefly heard Adv. V. N. Sinha of the Hindu Mahasabha.
4.2 Site was passed to the State after British annexed Oudh
Then, Adv. V.N. Sinha (Hindu Mahasabha) clarified his position from yesterday, stating that he
relied on Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran and Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan's arguments on the existence of a
deity to contend that the lands and soil of the site were passed on to the State after the British
annexation of Oudh. Adv. V. N. Sinha then requested to file his written statement as a reply after
hearing arguments for the Sunni Waqf Board. The court granted his request.
Nirmohi Akhara's Arguments
The court directed Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain, appearing for the Nirmohi Akhara to present his
documentary and oral evidence. The court had heard him on 6 and 7 August and had directed
him to resume arguments once he had organised his evidence.
1.15 Nirmohi Akhara claims shebaitship and not title
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Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that the Akhara was claiming shebaitship, which was the right to
manage the temple. He submitted that the shebait is the only one who may claim possession on
behalf of the deity.
Chief Justice Gogoi stated that Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain should limit himself to presenting evidence, as
he had already made extensive arguments previously. Justice Chandrachud stated that if Nirmohi
Akhara claimed the shebaitship, it could no longer also claim the title. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated
that the Nirmohi Akhara was not claiming title.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that the Nirmohi Akhara claimed possession of both the inner and
outer courtyards. He submitted that the Ram Lalla is not a worshipper, but a 'friend' of the deity.
He added that the Ram Lalla suit was filed in 1989, as opposed to the Nirmohi Akhara that filed
its suit much earlier
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stressed that the Nirmohi Akhara had always been the shebait because it had
continuously taken care of the temple. He stated that the Nirmohi Akhara is not a single person,
but a religious denomination that had always fulfilled this role.
1.15.1 Sunni Waqf Board and Umesh Pandey deny Nirmohi Akhara's shebaitship
Justice Bobde asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain if any other parties to the dispute had accepted the
Nirmohi Akhara as the shebait in their written statements. Sr. Adv. SK Jain submitted that none
of the parties had disputed the shebaitship, except for the Sunni Waqf Board and Umesh Chandra
Pandey. Pandey is defendant number 10 in the Nirmohi Akhara's suit.
With a view to disputing Umesh Pandey's statement, Sr. Adv. SK Jain proceeded to cite case laws
to argue that adverse inference be drawn with respect to Umesh Pandey’s submissions before the
lower court. Justice Nazeer prompted Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to address the issues in Umesh C.
Pandey’s submission so that he would argue for drawing adverse inference with context.
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1.15.2 Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal is not entitled to be 'next friend' of Ram Lala
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal, acting as 'next friend' for Ram Lala in
suit 5 never made any reference to the shebait. He submitted that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal had
never claimed to be a worshipper, but only a 'friend' of the deity. He argued that Sr. Adv. D.N.
Agarwal had not worshipped the deity at Ram Janmasthan as he had belonged to a different sect,
and alleged that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal himself had admitted this during cross-examination.
1.15.3 Arguments contradicting the Nirmohi Akhara's written statement

Justice Chandrachud stated that there would be two issues to consider, namely the juridical
character of the deity and who could represent the deity. He asked if Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain was
denying the juridical character of the deity. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that he was not denying the
juridical character of the deity, to which Justice Chandrachud responded by saying that this
explicitly contradicted Nirmohi Akhara's written statement. He asked for Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to
clarify his argument.
Justice Bobde emphasised that Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain was arguing contrary to his own written
statement, without amending the same. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain clarified that that the Nirmohi Akhara
was claiming shebait rights to manage the deity, which in turn has a juridical character.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that the site and deity belong to the Nirmohi Akhara as the shebait.
He stated that the Nirmohi Akhara was claiming management and not ownership.
Chief Justice Gogoi asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain how the bench could allow him to argue against his
own written submission. He stated that if Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain failed to justify the seeming
contradictions, the bench would not hear him any further.
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23.08.2019 (Friday):
Today is the tenth day of final hearing in the Ayodhya appeals. The 2010 Allahabad High Court
judgment had divided the disputed title equally among three parties: the Nirmohi Akhara, Ram
Lala and the Sunni Waqf Board.
Yesterday, Sr Adv. S.K. Jain representing the Nirmohi Akhara argued that the Nirmohi Akhara
was only claiming shebaitship (management rights of the temple), possession and not title. The
bench warned Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain not to contradict his own earlier written statement.
Today, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain sought to clarify his claims and take the bench through relevant
documentary and oral evidence.
Morning Session
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain requested the court for a week's additional time to present his arguments. Chief
Justice Gogoi stated that the court had already granted sufficient time and directed Sr. Adv. S.K.
Jain to restrict himself to presenting documentary and oral evidence. Chief Justice Gogoi stated
that presenting such evidence would probably not take longer than a day and made it clear that
the bench was 'looking forward to crisp, precise and pointed arguments’. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain then
requested permission to clarify his shebaitship argument.
1.15.4 Nirmohi Akhara's arguments contradict its written statement
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Chief Justice Gogoi asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to first clarify how he could argue against his earlier
written statement, referring to the title claim made by the Nirmohi Akhara. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain
offered to read the plaint in Ram Lala's suit as well as his written statement to clarify his
position. Chief Justice Gogoi pointed out that Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain was spending a lot of time
proposing what he would argue, but was not actually arguing.
Justice Chandrachud perused the Nirmohi Akhara's contradictory written statement. He cited
how the Akhara claimed to 'own' the idols under the main dome and in the outer courtyard. Sr.
Adv. S.K. Jain tried to argue that the statement was being made in the context of management
and did not lay claim to ownership rights.
1.16 Ram Lala's suit is not maintainable
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that only the Nirmohi Akhara could maintain its suit, unlike the
Ram Lala. He stressed that he could maintain his suit independent of the presence of the idols.
Justice Bobde asked whether the idol's suit was maintainable, referring to Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran
and Sr. Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan's arguments pertaining to Ram Lala's suit. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain
argued that the Ram Lalla idol was not installed in the Ram Janmabhoomi, but in a temple called
the Ram Janmabhoomi. Justice Bobde appeared confused and asked for a distinction between the
two places. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain's argument appeared to be that the idol referenced in Ram Lala's is
within the city of Ayodhya, but that the temple is different from the city. Justice Bobde did not
appear convinced.
1.16.1 Nirmohi Akhara does not oppose the deity, but the 'next friend' of the deity
Justice Chandrachud questioned Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain's argument, stating that a shebait could
not make adverse claims to the deity it purports to manage. He emphasised that the shebait could
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only act in the deity's interests. Justice Chandrachud asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain how he could be
seeking the dismissal of the deity's suit, saying 'If suit 5 is dismissed, your claim cannot survive'.
Justice Bobde also asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain how he could take a position opposing the deity. Sr.
Adv. S.K. Jain argued that he is not opposing the deity, but rather the plaintiff Sr. Adv. D.N.
Agarwal, who acted as the ‘next friend' of the deity.
1.16.2 Ram Lala has no valid claim over the outer lands
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain attempted to dispute Ram Lala's claim to the outer lands. He referenced
historical documents that contained accounts of the acquisition and demolition of outer lands.
Justices Bobde and Bhushan informed Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain that this was not relevant to the present
case, as the Allahabad High Court had not passed any decree with respect to such lands. Sr. Adv.
S.K. Jain submitted that it was relevant to the present case because, according to the Nirmohi
Akhara, Rama Lala was making claims over the outside area as well. He submitted that only the
Nirmohi Akhara’s name appeared in the historical documents and gazettes and therefore, only the
Nirmohi Akhara could argue for the Hindus.
In response to the bench's scepticism on relevance of this outer lands issue, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain
submitted that in the Allahabad High Court, the original plaint had made claims on the outer
lands and Justice Sharma's opinion had granted the same. However, the majority opinion did not
decide the issue. Justice Bhushan responded by saying that the majority opinion would
constitute the judgment. Justice Chandrachud added that neither Sr. Adv. K. Parasaran nor Sr.
Adv. C.S. Vaidyanathan had revisited the issue in the Supreme Court and therefore the issue of
disputing this claim did not arise.
The reason Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain raised the outer lands issue was to argue that Ram Lala's suit was
not maintainable. He submitted that Ram Lala’s next friend had failed to implead parties with
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respect to the outer lands issue. He stated that in order for the suit to be maintainable, it
required a rejoinder by parties who were not even impleaded in the lower court proceedings.
1.16.3 Idols were present under the central dome before December 1949
Justice Chandrachud asked Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain whether he was committed to the argument that the
idols were present before the night of 22 December 1949, in reference to the Allahabad High
Court judgment that held that the idols were placed under the central dome on that night. Sr. Adv.
S.K. Jain affirmed that the idols had been present under the central dome for a very long time,
prior 22 December 1949.
1.17 Evidence of Shebaitship
Justice Chandrachud pressed Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to substantiate his shebaitship claim using
documentary and oral evidence. Just as he did yesterday, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that
Umesh C. Pandey was the only Hindu party to dispute the Akhara’s claim.
Justice Chandrachud then directed Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to show evidence in support of shebaitship
as this was the ‘heart of [the Nirmohi Akhara’s] case’. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that he would
present oral evidence first before documentary evidence. He submitted that no other party had
disputed the oral evidence he would present.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain read out witness statements attesting to the Nirmohi Akhara managing various
temples at Ayodhya. The statements claim that the Nirmohi Akhara was in possession of both the
inner and outer courtyards.
Justice Chandrachud raised the issue of the Ram Chabutra, a structure at the site. According to
the Akhara's written statement, it was worshipping at the Chabutra. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain clarified
that this was a reference to the 'temple', the 'Ram Chabutra temple'. Justice Chandrachud pointed
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out that the written statement factually distinguished between the temple and the Chabutra. Sr.
Adv. S.K. Jain stated that oral statements are subject to ambiguities.
Justice Nazeer remarked on the nature of the oral evidence being presented, stating that an oral
testimony submitted in an affidavit does not carry the same weight as oral evidence given in a
witness box. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain pleaded with the bench to empathise with the fact that the Akhara
is very poor, and to ‘please understand [its] position’.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain then cited some documents that claimed that Nirmohi Akhara mahants were in
possession of the temple.
Justice Bobde enquired as to whether Nihant Singh Fakir had any connection to the Nirmohi
Akhara. Nihant Singh Fakir had placed an idol of Guru Gobind Singh in the mosque in the
1850s. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that he did not know whether Nihant Fakir was a member of
the Akhara, but that the idol that Fakir had installed was not connected to the Akhara. He added
that Fakir had stollen a 'nishan flag' from the Akhara and reiterated that even prior to the
incident, the Akhara was in possession of the site.
As Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain presented evidence, it became clear that his primary proof was negative in
nature, namely that no Hindus have contested the Nirmohi Akhara's shebait claim, thereby
proving the same. Justice Bobde did not appear satisfied with this line of argument. In response,
SK Jain submitted that all defendants were allowed to cross-examine the Nirmohi Akhara when
it filed a suit against the former Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Kalyan Singh's government
acquiring the land. Justice Nazeer asked why parties such as the Superintendent of Police (a
defendant in the Akhara’s suit against government land acquisition) would have any reason to
cross-examine the Nirmohi Akhara.
The bench rose for lunch at 12.58 PM.
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Afternoon Session
Arguments for the Nirmohi Akhara resumed at 2.16 PM.
1.18 Key differences between Nirmohi Akhara and Ram Lala's suits
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain listed some key differences between the Nirmohi Akhara's suit and Ram Lala's
suit filed by Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal. Firstly, he stated that the Ram Lala suit claimed that Babur
constructed a mosque on the ruins of a temple, whereas the Nirmohi Akhara claimed that it has
been a temple throughout. Secondly, the Ram Lala suit claimed that idols were only placed under
the mosque's central dome in December 1949, whereas the Nirmohi Akhara claimed that idols
had always been present under the central dome.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that the plaintiffs in Ram Lala's suit were 'outsiders' and that the
Nirmohi Akhara enjoyed 'the support of all the locals'. He cited witness statements given by 90-
year old Faizabad residents.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain claimed that the plaintiffs in Ram Lala's suit wanted to oust the Nirmohi
Akhara. He submitted that only the Nirmohi Akhara knew the traditions of the temple and how to
uphold them. He argued that if the court did not grant shebaitship, traditions of worship at the
temple would permanently change.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain read out statements of worshippers who had visited or worshipped at Ayodhya.
He was on the sixth statement of twenty witness statements.
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24.08.2019 (Saturday):
That was an off- day at office.
25.08.2019 (Sunday):
That was an off- day at office.
26.08.2019 (Monday):
Day 33 Arguments began that day. The Supreme Court is hearing final arguments in a set
of appeals against the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment that divided the disputed land title in
Ayodhya equally amongst the Nirmohi Akhara (suit number 3), Sunni Waqf Board (suit number
4) and Ram Lala (suit number 5 filed by Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal as 'next friend').
Today, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain resumed arguments on behalf of the Nirmohi Akhara. On 23 August,
he altered the Nirmohi Akhara's orginal argument where it claimed title and now the Nirmohi
Akhara only claims shebaitship rights, which are rights to manage the temple. The bench had
expressed frustration at the Nirmohi Akhara contradicting its earlier written statement.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain primarily focused on two arguments today. Firstly, he submitted that a shebait
should rightfully represent a deity in a legal suit. He argued that the Nirmohi Akhara was the
rightful representative of Ram Lala (and Ram Janmabhoomi), rather than Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal,
the 'next friend' of the deity. Secondly, he argued that the Nirmohi Akhara was not making any
claims in opposition to the deity, despite arguing that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal's suit was not
maintainable.
Morning Session
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1.19 Shebait should represent a deity in legal proceedings
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain referred to certain documents to support the claim that the Nirmohi Akhara is
the shebait of the idols and temple. His references were oral, without presenting the actual
documents to the court.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that no Hindu party had hitherto objected to the Akhara's shebait claim.
He submitted that not this supports the fact that the Akhara is the shebait.
1.21 Nirmohi Akhara's claims are not in opposition to the deity
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that since no Hindu party had objected to the Nirmohi Akhara's
shebaitship claim, it was clear that the Akhara was not making adverse claims against the deity.
Justice Bobde asked whether there were any other significant claims by the Nirmohi Akhara that
other parties had not disputed. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that no Hindu party had disputed the
Akhara's possession claims, either.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain substantiated the claim that no Hindus parties disputed the Nirmohi
Akhara's shebaitship by referencing Justice S. Agarwal's observation in the 2010 Allahabad High
Court judgment. Justice S. Agarwal had observed that the Nirmohi Akhara managed the idol
worship at the Ram Chabutra.
1.21.1 Nirmohi Akhara will not exclude others from worship
Justice Bobde asked whether the Nirmohi Akhara would exclude others from worshipping, to
which Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that the same would go against the Akhara's duties. He added that
the Nirmohi Akhara would be entitled to collect the offerings of worshippers as the shebait.
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1.21.2 Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal recognises Nirmohi Akhara's shebait rights
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal (the deity's 'next friend' in Ram Lala's
suit) recognised the Nirmohi Akhara's shebait rights. He submitted that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal
had relied on the written statements of Paramhans Ramchandra Das, the plaintiff in suit number
2, which was withdrawn in 1990. Paramahans Ramchandra Das recognised that the Akhara was
managing the temple. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that since Das accepted the Akhara's shebait
rights, it could be inferred that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal recognised the same as well.
1.22 Nirmohi Akhara was involved in civil disputes as the shebait
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain attempted to substantiate the shebait claim by taking the court through various
civil disputes concerning properties around the disputed structure, in which the Nirmohi Akhara
or its mahants were litigants. He argued that since the Nirmohi Akhara was a litigant, the same
demonstrates that it was responsible for managing the site. He referred to the 1885 suit, to which
Mahant Rahubar Das was a party and submitted that Das was a member of the Nirmohi Akhara.
1.23 Reference to P. Carnegie to establish historical possession of Nirmohi Akhara
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain described how the British archaeologist Patrick Carnegie wrote a report
in 1870 that referenced the Nirmohi Akhara. Justice Chandrachud directed Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain to
present documents directly relevant to the Akhara's shebait claim.
However, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain returned briefly to P. Carnegie's work, referencing a 19th
century sketch of Faizabad to establish that the Nirmohi Akhara's name has continuously been
included in historical records. Further, he read out accounts that reference the Nirmohi Akhara in
gazetters.
Justice Bobde stated that these historical accounts did not conclusively establish the Akhara's
shebait rights. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that the accounts established the Nirmohi Akhara's
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possession of the site. He submitted that references to a 'property Hindu' should be read to mean
the Nirmohi Akhara.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain referenced a historical agreement executed in 1900 whereby the Nirmohi
Akhara took responsibility for providing water to travellers. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that this
was an example of the Nirmohi Akhara performing its duty as the shebait.
Afternoon Session
1.24 Nirmohi Akhara's historical presence (cross-examinations and law lectures)
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain presented additional historical documents to show the presence of the Nirmohi
Akhara (not disputed after 1950) and their management of the temple and idols, includig cross-
examination of witnesses, such as as Abhiram Das and Dharam Das in the court below, as well as
former Chief Justice of India B.K. Mukherjea's law lectures.
The bench noted that devotees were only allowed to give prayers at the railing and the dome was
locked. Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that the Nirmohi Akhara has the keys to the
dome, referencing witness testimony stating that the locks were in control of the Nirmohi
Akhara.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that management of the Akhara cannot be disputed and stated that even
if the Nirmohi Akhara permitted access to other Hindus to access the site, it would not forefeit its
management rights.
1.25 Non-maintainability of Ram Lala's suit
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain returned to the issue of maintainability of Ram Lala's suit filed by Sr. Adv.
D.N. Agarwal. At the time Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal filed his suit, there was no indication in the
pleadings that the shebait, being the Nirmohi Akhara, had stopped working in the interest of the
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deity. He argued that therefore, Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal could not maintain his suit as the 'next
friend' of the deity. He reiterated his argument that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal could not maintain his
suit as the deity's 'friend', since his statements indicated he was not even a worshipper.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain clarified that the Nirmohi Akhara did not dispute the juridical nature of Ram
Lala nor the Ram Janmabhoomi. Justice Chandrachud specified that the Nirmohi Akhara's
written statement specifically denied the juridical personality of Ram Janmabhoomi. Further,
Justice Chandrachud stated that it was unecessary for the Nirmohi Akhara to oppose Sr. Adv.
D.N. Agarwal as there was 'nothing stopping' the Nirmohi Akhara from 'being a shebait'.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain submitted that past judgments have established that a shebait can file a suit for
the recovery of a deity's property without impleading the deity. Justices Bobde and Chandrachud
raised the issue of the Nirmohi Akhara's suit being adverse to Ram Lala's suit, to which Sr.
Adv. S.K. Jain reiterated that he was only opposed to Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal acting as the next
friend of the deity, and not the deity itself.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain proceeded to read out excerpts of judgments on the nature of shebait rights
[1951 SCR 1125, 1954 SCR 1005]. He added that an idol can only be represented by someone
other than the shebait if the shebait is acting against the interest of the deity.
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27.08.2019 (Tuesday):
The current Ayodhya dispute before the Supreme Court pertains to a set of appeals to a 2010
Allahabad High Court judgment, which divided the land title equally among the Nirmohi
Akhara, the Sunni Waqf Board and Ram Lala. The origins of the legal dispute trace back to 29
December 1949, when the Additional City Magistrate of Faizabad placed the site under the
receivership of the state, under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In
response, the Nirmohi Akhara and Sunni Waqf Board filed suits in 1959 and 1961, respectively.
In 1989, Ram Lala became a litigant when Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal filed a suit in the Allahabad
High Court, acting as the deity's 'next friend'. The Akhara and Board's suits, as well as other
relevant suits were transferred to the High Court and clubbed to this matter.
For the sake of brevity, the court has numbered the original suits as follows:
• Nirmohi Akhara = suit number 3
• Sunni Waqf Board = suit number 4
• Ram Lala (DN Agarwal) = suit number 5
Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argue on behalf of the Nirmohi
Akhara. In the previous few hearings, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain has changed the Nirmohi Akhara's
original argument. The Nirmohi Akhara had claimed the disputed land title earlier, and
thereafter claimed shebait rights, which are rights to manage the temple/deity. In addition, Sr.
Adv. S.K. Jain argued that Sr. Adv. D.N. Agarwal's suit was not maintainable. The bench
questioned how the Nirmohi Akhara could make adverse claims to the deity's suit, while still
claiming to be the shebait.
Morning Session
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1.26 Challenge to maintainability of Ram Lala's suit is conditional
Sr. Adv. SK Jain stated that the Nirmohi Akhara's challenge to the maintainability of Ram Lala's
suit is conditional. He stated that he would not press the issue if the other Hindu parties did not
dispute the Nirmohi Akhara's shebaitship rights.
1.27 Sunni Waqf Board's suit is barred by limitation
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain argued that the Sunni Waqf Board's suit is barred by limitation, as they had
failed to file a suit within the appropriate time. He said that there were three causes of action,
which were the riots of 1855, construction of the Ram Chabutra inside the mosque in 1931 and
the riot in 1934.
Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain stated that the Nirmohi Akhara's suit was not barred by limitation and directed
the court towards his arguments on 6 and 7 August. With this, Sr. Adv. S.K. Jain concluded for
the Nirmohi Akhara.
The court began hearing senior advocate PN Mishra for a Shankaracharya connected to the
Hindu Mahasabha (Janam Sthan Punroddhan Samiti's Shankaracharya Surupananda Ji Maharaj
of Dwarka Pith - defendant 20 in suit number 4).
3.3 Location of Ram Janmasthan
PN Mishra sought to establish the location of the Ram Janmasthan by referring to the Hindu
scripture Skanda Purana and a map (exhibit 36). He submitted that the temple is located north
west to the 'Lomus'.
Rajeev Dhavan (for Sunni Waqf Board) cast doubt into the judges' mind over the utility of
Mishra's account. Dhavan submitted that the Mishra's map lacked cardinal directions. He added
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that the maps relied upon by the Hindu parties should all reference the cardinal directions and
suggested relying on the mosque (as it faces west towards Mecca).
3.4 Location of Ram Janmabhoomi using scriptures and Edward's accounts
Next, PN Mishra relied on the research by British collector Edward, who set up 149 stone pillars
to assisst persons performing the Ayodhya pilgrammage detailed in the Skanda Purana
(Ayodhyāmāhātmya). Mishra argued that Edward accurately establishes the location of the Ram
Jamnabhoomi as described in the Skanda Purana. He read from the cross-examination of a
witness in 2004 (see Vol 62 of 2010 High Court judgment), who had performed the pilgrimmage
and attests to the accuracy of the stone pillars.
Justice Chandrachud stressed that there is a significant difference in relying on religious scripture
to indicate faith and relying on it to determine a physical location.
PN Mishra submitted that the Edward's knowledge, even if anecdotal, is valuable as it attests to
the veracity of research done in 1902, prior to any litigation in the current dispute.
Afternoon Session
PN Mishra resumed arguments after lunch. He cited the Valmiki Ramayana and work by the
scholar Hans Bakker, to re-establish the alleged location of the Ram Janmabhoomi as being the
disputed site. Further, he submitted that the Ram janmabhoomi has existed since time
immemorial.
Responding to Rajeev Dhavan's remark about cardinal directions from before lunch, PN Mishra
submitted that the full map with compass and topography can be found in the Allahabad High
Court judgment (volume 2, page 2045, paras 3539-3540).
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3.5 The site was not designated as Waqf Property
Next, he sought to dispute that the site had be designated as waqf property. He submitted that for
a property to be designated as waqf property, it must meet three conditions: at the time of
donation, the waqif (donor) must be the owner; he should make a public dedication; azaan (call
to prayer) should be called in public. The bench asked who had designated the site and PN
Mishra argued that no one had. He submitted that the Sunni Waqf Board argues that Babar did
when he ordered the construction of a mosque.
3.6 Babur did not build a mosque at the site
Then, he disputed that Babur had built a mosque at the site in the 16th century. He argued that
the site cannot be called or defined as a mosque. He stressed that Babur's memoir (Babur nama)
does not reference a mosque being constructed at Ayodhya. He also relied on the Jesuit
missionary Tiefenthaler's writing (relied upon by the Allahabad High Court), who in the 18th
century described the structure as contemporary. Further, Tiefenthaler describes disagreement
over whether the mosque was constructed by Babar or by Aurangzeb.
He argued that the Sunni Waqf Board's prayers rely on the assumption that the mosque was built
by Babar. He submitted that there are several discrepancies with regards to the inscriptions
allegedly demonstrating that the mosque dates back to the 16th century. In the 1885 suit, a
Faizabad civil judge observed that no Islamic inscriptions, only superscriptions, were found. PN
Mishra proceeded to show that there conflicting accounts of what the inscriptions say:
• A Fuhrer translates inscriptions in 1888 and argued that the mosque was constructed by
Mir Khan in 1523 (doesn't correspond with when Babur came to India).
• Syed Badrool Hasan takes ink stamps of the inscriptions in 1935. Archaeological Survey
of India interprets ink stamps in 1960s and lists different date for the construction of the
mosque
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PN Mishra argued that hence the inscriptions could not be relied upon. Further, he submitted that
the origin of the slab on which the inscription sits has been disputed. He relied upon Justice
Agarwal's opinion from the 2010 judgment.
3.7 Sunni Waqf Board's evidence is recent and unreliable
He concluded the day by questioning the value of the evidence relied upon by the Sunni Waqf
Board in the Allahabad High Court, which he submitted primarily stemmed from after litigation
had begun in the dispute. By contrast, he submitted that the evidence relied upon by him in
the High Court is 'pre-litigation' and dates back to time immemorial.
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28.08.2019 (Wednesday):
The Supreme Court is hearing a set of appeals to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment,
which divided the land title equally among the Nirmohi Akhara, the Sunni Waqf Board and Ram
Lala. The origins of the legal dispute trace back to 29 December 1949, when the Additional City
Magistrate of Faizabad placed the site under the receivership of the state, under Section 146 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In response, the Nirmohi Akhara (suit number 3) and
Sunni Waqf Board (suit number 4) filed suits in 1959 and 1961 respectively. In 1989, Ram Lala
became a litigant when Sr. Adv. Deoki N Agarwal filed a suit (number 5) in the Allahabad High
Court, acting as the deity's 'next friend'. The Akhara and Board's suits (and other relevant
suits) were transferred to the High Court and clubbed to this matter.
Yesterday, Sr. Adv. PN Misra for the Akhil Bhartiya Sri Ramjanam Bhoomi Punarudhar Samiti
(All India Sri Ram Birthland Restoration Committee; defendant 20 in suit number 4) sought to
establish the Ram Janmasthan's location using Hindu scripture and to date it back to pre-history.
Further, he disputed the Sunni Waqf Board's claim that Babur ordered the construction of a
mosque in the 16th century.
Today, PN Misra read out passages of the Baburnama, Ain-i-Akbari and other historical texts to
argue that Babur never constructed a mosque at the dispute site.
The Bench assembled at 11.15 AM.
Concluding yesterday
3.8 Location of Ram Janmasthan
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PN Misra submitted that before proceeding he would like to substantiate his argument from
yesterday regarding the location of the Ram Janmasthan. He showed the bench Edward pillar
number 100 (within the 24 parikrama, facing towards the Lomus), stating it indicated the
location of Ram's birthplace.
Then, he returned to disputing the inscription that the Sunni Waqf Board claims establishes the
mosque was built in the 16th century. He said that three different versions of the translation
produced three different inferences. He argued that the inscribed slab was hence unreliable.
Reading from the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment (page 1013 (paras 1012, 1480)), he
posited that the inscription may have been implanted in contemporary times.
3.9 Disputing the Sunni Waqf Board's historical narrative
3.9.1 Baburnama
He proceeded to take the bench through the Baburnama (memoirs of Babur) to argue that Babur
never constructed a mosque in Ayodhya. In doing so, he was disputing the Sunni Waqf Board's
historical narrative.
First, he sought to establish both the original text and the current translation's authenticity. He
submitted that the text commences from 1493-94 and covers Babur's 47 year lifespan. He stated
that Babur came to India in 1526. Reading from pages 1491-99 of the 2010 judgment, he
submitted that the text was originally retained in Turkish and went on to be translated in 1589 by
Abu Fazl Khan. He said that it was translated into English in 1922 by the British
orientalist Annette Beveridge.
PN Misra noted that the High Court's observations regarding missing pages in Babarnama. He
submitted that pages regarding 3 days in 935 Hijri (1528) are missing. He submitted that the
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inscriptions relied upon by the Sunni Waqf Board indicate that the foundation of the mosque was
laid in 1528.
Justice Chandrachud requested PN Misra to establish whether Babur came to Ayodhya at all.
Misra submitted that it was unclear. The text says that Babur reached the banks of the Saryu river
on 28 March 1528, roughly 80 miles from Ayodhya. There is a break in the narrative until 2
April.
At 12.00 PM the Bench took a break to sign orders in the Jammu and Kashmir petitions it had
heard earlier in the morning.
At 12.05pm, PN Misra continued to read from pages 1022, 1024 and 1025 of the 2010 judgment
to establish Babur's whereabouts. He sought to establish that Babur did not ever order the
construction or destruction of anything in Ayodhya. The Bench inquired about a reference to
idols being destroyed by Babur (para 1563). Misra responded that this was an account of Babur
defeating Ranga Sanga and subsequently ordering the destruction of Ranga Sanga's goblet.
The bench was satisfied that the Baburnama did not mention Babur ordering the demolition of a
temple at Ayodhya and, further, that the Allahabad High Court had recorded this.
The bench sought to know what PN Misra's positive claim is. Misra clarified why he was
focusing on disputing the Sunni claim, submitting that his client is the defendant in the Sunni
Waqf Board's suit, which is claiming that the temple at the site should be treated as a mosque.
The Bench noted that the site has features of both a temple and a mosque. The Bench asked PN
Misra, 'what happens when the subject of a declaratory suit has been destroyed? What are the
reliefs?' It emphasised that he should refer to a specific statute.
Before the court broke for lunch, PN Misra sought to cite a book referred to in the 2010
judgment (p 1624). Rajeev Dhavan interrupted to state that the page of the book Misra was
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relying on, had not been executed in the High Court. PN Misra referred to section 57 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and stated that the High Court had passed an order stating that all
historical books did not need to be executed.
PN Misra submitted that after lunch he would cover the Ain-i-Akbari and the Humayun-nama.
The Ain-i-Akbari is a 16th century document recording the administration of the Mughal Empire
under Akbar I. The Humayun-nama is a 16th century memoir of Humayun's life, authored by his
half-sister Gulbadan Begum. The bench requested PN Misra to provide the court with a short
summary of his prayers after he had finished taking it through these two documents.
3.9.2 Ain-i-Akbari
The bench reassembled at 2.07 PM. PN Misra took the court through the Ain-i-Akbari, in
particular reading out excerpts that offer detailed descriptions of Ayodhya (page 1070 of 2010
judgment). He submitted that the text does not mention a mosque at Ayodhya and argued that if
there had been mosque present in the 16th century, the text would have mentioned it. The bench
asked whether the Ain-i-Akbari details the locations of mosques in general. Misra submitted that
the text lists several mosques, but not one in Ayodhya.
PN Misra speculated that Akbar was also not a good candidate for the constructor of the mosque.
He argued that Akbar would not have destroyed the Ram Jamnabhoomi temple, citing the
emperor's generous policies towards Hindu laws mentioned in the Ain-i-Akbari (pages 201-03 of
text).
3.11 Alternate theory on the origins of the mosque
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Next, PN Misra attempted to substantiate his theory that the construction of a mosque on the
Ram Janmabhoomi was ordered by Aurangzeb. Relying on textual accounts of the history of
Mughals, he submitted that Aurangzeb ordered the destruction of various Hindu temples (paras
1626-1631 of 2010 judgment). He gave examples of the Vishnu Temple in Banaras and the
Jagganath Temple in Puri.
Rajeev Dhavan stated that the text relied on by PN Misra had not been placed on the record in
the Allahabad High Court. PN Misra rebutted that it had and told the bench that he would find
the relevant order.
Subsequently, Misra referenced the remarks of the Faizabad civil judge who visited the site on 18
March 1889, who had observed that the mosque was built on a site considered to be the
birthplace of Ram.
PN Misra concluded that he had the following left to cover:

1. The nature and structure of a mosque
2. Islamic Law, specifically Hanafi law
3. 1867 revenue records
The bench rose at 3.54 pm.
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29.08.2019 (Thursday):
The Supreme Court is hearing a set of appeals to the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment that
divided the disputed land title equally among the Nirmohi Akhara (suit number 3), the Sunni
Waqf Board (suit number 4) and Ram Lala (suit number 5 filed by DN Agarwal).
Yesterday, the court heard senior advocate PN Misra for the Akhil Bhartiya Sri Ramjanam
Bhoomi Punarudhar Samiti (All India Sri Ram Birthland Restoration Committee, defendant 20 in
suit number 4). PN Misra disputed the Sunni Waqf Board's claim that Babur constructed a
mosque in the 16th century. Today, he relied on Islamic scripture to argue that the building has
features that prevent it from being a mosque.
The bench assembled around 10.45 AM. The following is not an exact chronological summary of
proceedings.
PN Misra opened today by responding to Rajeev Dhavan's claim from yesterday that Misra was
relying on books that were not on the Allahabad High Court's record. PN Misra read from the
relevant High Court order to show that Dhavan had been mistaken. The order refers to the
defendants application under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
3.12 No evidence that Babur constructed a mosque
PN Misra argued that Babur did not construct a mosque at the disputed site in the 16th century.
He referred to Justice SU Khan's opinion in the 2010 High Court judgment, where Justice SU
Khan concurs with Justice Sharma and states that there is no evidence that Babur constructed the
mosque.
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Further, he once again disputed the inscriptions relied upon by the Sunni Waqf Board. He
submitted that there are two inscriptions in particular that have been heavily relied upon - one at
the entrance and the other at the pulpit inside the mosque. He submitted that they were both
badly damaged during the 1934 riots. He suggested that they were not reliable evidence.
Reading out excerpts from the judgment, he suggested that the mosque was built during the time
of Aurangzeb.
3.13 The structure cannot be classified as a mosque
Relying on historical texts, Islamic scriptures and archaeological evidence, PN Misra argued that
the structure could not be classified as a mosque.
3.13.1 Mosque cannot be constructed on disputed land
PN Misra's primary argument was that a mosque cannot be constructed on disputed land. He
submitted that Babur was not the owner of the site where the building was located. Relying upon
the testimony of Mohammad Idris, an expert on Islamic law, PN Misra submitted that a mosque
cannot be constructed on the land belonging to another person. In addition, he cited a firman
issued by Shah Jahan where Chief Qazi held mosque could not be built upon a land owned by a
jeweller named Sati Das Javeri. Finally, he drew the courts attention to books authored by Privy
Council judge Syed Amir Ali, an expert on Mohammedan Law. He read out from Ali's 'Spirit of
Islam' to reiterate that a mosque cannot be built on disputed land.
PN Misra argued that even if Babur had constructed a mosque, it would not substantiate the
Sunni Waqf Board's possession claim. He argued that as Babur was an invader, he did not own
the land upon which he constructed the mosque. Hence, Babur would not have been able to
create a waqf. Therefore, after Babur's death the mosque would have gone to his heirs and not
come under the control of the Waqf board.
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3.13.2 Site lacks water storage necessary for 'wudu'
He briefly referred to archaeological evidence to argue that the site lacked water storage to allow
for a wudu (necesssary for ritual purification prior to namaz).
Rajeev Dhavan accused PN Misra of 'ad libbing'. The bench directed Misra to refer to page
numbers from the High Court judgment (containing relevant exhibits) when relying on factual
evidence.
3.13.3 Existence of Idolatry
PN Misra argued that the site is not a mosque because it has images of living beings. Relying on
archaeological evidence, PN Misra submitted that the gates have two leaping tigers and a
peacock. Reading out the testimony of an expert on Islamic law, he submited that no Muslim
would depict living beings either inside or outside a mosque. He contended that in addition to
tigers and peacock, there was a picture of a Varaha Bhagwan (boar/pig) on the boundary wall.
'The question of depicting a pig doesn't arise at all', Misra read out.
Citing the testimony of expert witness Mohammad Idris, PN Misra submitted that if a mosque
has representative images of animals or people, the Imam is duty bound to remove the same
before offering namaz. He added that if namaz is offered without removing such images, the
namaz is considered makruh ('irregular').
The bench rose for lunch around 1 PM.
3.13.4 Reference to Islamic scriptures
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After lunch, PN Misra reiterated his arguments from the morning, but with direct reference to the
Qur'an and select Hadith. He sough to establish that the structure is not recognised as a mosque
by Islam.
PN Misra submitted that he would limit himself to the six Hadith which are almost universally
accepted by all Sunni Muslim (the al-Kutub al-Sittah). He said that he would assume the
following principle: any promise made by the prophet during his lifetime, is binding upon all
Muslims. He said that one such promise was to guarantee non-believers freedom of religion,
subject to their paying jizya (tax on permanent non-Muslim subjects).
3.13.5 Babur did not own the land
PN Misra substantiated his argument that Babur did not own the disputed land and hence could
not have constructed a mosque. Justice Chandrachud opined that Babur was an absolute monarch
and could go against Islamic law. PN Misra clarified that with regards to mosques, Babur would
be governed by Islamic law. PN Misra submitted that when Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodhi at the
battle of Panipat, he only gained the right of sovereignty that Lodhi possessed, as per Islamic law
3.13.6 Waqf cannot be created through an agent
Next, PN Misra submitted that Islamic law does not allow for a Waqf to be created through an
agent (ergo. Mir Baqi could not have created a Waqf on behalf of Babur).
Justice Bobde asked whether an emperor can create a Waqf out of State property or whether this
is limited to personal property. PN Misra submitted that the Mughal historian, Tarik e Firishta
(1560-1620), recorded the following: a conqueror can create a Waqf out of his remuneration (one
tenth or one fifteenth) from conquered land.
3.13.7 No evidence of regular namaz
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PN Misra concluded the day by submitting that prior to 1934 there existed no evidence of regular
namaz being offered at the disputed mosque. He added that Islamic law dictates that a structure is
only a mosque if namaz if offered twice after the azaan (call to prayer) is read.
The hearing concluded with Justice Chandarchud explaining a paragraph from the High Court
judgment on the mixed use of religious spaces. He stated that Islam is exclusionary in the sense
that a mosque cannot be used for non-prescribed forms of worship. He said that this was
unlike Hindu temples, which allow mixed use. He explained that God in the Gita says that 'even
if you are worshipping another God, you are worshipping me'. He emphasised that offering
namaz in a temple would not detract from the temple's nature.
The court rose at roughly 4 PM. PN Misra will conclude tomorrow morning, when he will
dispute the veracity of land records relied upon by the Sunni Waqf Board.
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30.08.2019 (Friday):
All the primary Hindu parties in the Ayodhya title dispute have now presented oral arguments
before the bench comprising Chief Justice Gogoi and Justices Bobde, Chandrachud, Bhushan
and Nazeer. Yesterday, Sr. Adv. PN Misra disputed the Sunni Waqf Board's claim that the
mosque dates back to the 16th century, on behalf of the Akhil Bhartiya Sri Ramjanam Bhoomi
Punarudhar Samiti (All India Sri Ram Birthland Restoration Committee).
Today, PN Misra argued that while the disputed structure could not be considered a mosque
under Islamic law, it holds special significance to Hindus as the Ram Janmabhoomi (birthplace
of Ram). Next, two opposing factions of the Hindu Mahasabha agreed to characterise the Sunni
Waqf Board's claim as one of adverse possession. Finally, the Shia Waqf Board claimed that the
last Mutawalli (Waqf caretaker) to manage the mosque before it was placed under the
receivership of the State, was Shia.
The court assembled at 10.49 AM. The following summary is not in exact chronological order.
3.14 The structure lacks the core features of a mosque
PN Misra cited various Hadith and the Qu'ran to argue that the structure lacks the core features
of a mosque. He submitted that a mosque cannot have images of idols or other living beings. He
referenced images found at the disputed structure and in particular drew the court's attention to
images of dogs, which he submitted are considered impure. Another problem he drew the court's
attention to is that of graves. He emphasised that Islam prohibits namaz from being offered in the
direction of graves, but that the site is surrounded by graves. Perhaps most significantly, he
submitted that a mosque cannot be used for the rituals of another religion. He argued that the site
could never have been a mosque because there exists evidence of Hindu worship at the site.
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3.15 Archaeological evidence shows the structure is not a mosque
PN Misra argued that the archaeological evidence shows that the structure is not a true mosque.
He drew the court's attention to the 2003 Archaeological Survey of India report and its finding
that there was a chulha and utensils at the site. He submitted that cooking cannot take place at a
mosque. Second, he argued that the structure lacked space to store water for a wudu (used for
ritual purification). The bench expressed scepticism towards his wudu speculation.
(See pages 1768-82 of the Allahabad High Court judgment for additional features of mosques
referenced by Misra).
3.16 Babri Masjid is not integral to Islam but the Ram Janmabhoomi is integral to
Hinduism
Next, PN Misra proceeded to argue that not all mosques are integral to Islam. Relying on Islamic
law, he argued that only three mosques are essential to Islam: Masjid al-Harām (Kaaba in
Mecca), Masjid an-Nabawī (Medina), Masjid al-Aqsa (Jerusalem). He characterised other
mosques as serving only the purpose of congregation. He argued that the Babri Masjid is not
integral to Islam, but that the Ram Jamnabhoomi is essential to Hinduism.
3.17 Islam allows for dispute resolution through use of scriptures
PN Misra sought to establish that Islam allows for disputes to be resolved using non-Islamic
scriptures. He read out a Hadith about a dispute between Muslims and Jews, recounted by Ibn
Omar (page 1768 of the Allahabad High Court judgment). Ibn Omar describes the dispute
being resolved by reference to the Torah. PN Misra submitted that during the prophet's time,
inter-religious disputes could be resolved by relying on the holy scripture of opposing religions.
3.18 Mosque cannot be constructed on disputed land
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Further, he argued that a mosque could not be constructed on a disputed site. He cited Shajahan's
farman, which states that a mosque built over another building is not a mosque. He submitted
that mosque cannot be constructed on land acquired via adverse possession. PN Misra reminded
the court that the site always has belonged to Ram according to the Hindu parties.
PN Misra disputed a series of the Sunni Waqf Board's claims with the aim of emphasising that
the burden of proof for claiming the structure was a 16th century mosque rested with Rajeev
Dhavan's client. Recall that PN Misra represents the defendant, while Dhavan the plaintiff in suit
number 4.
3.19 Insufficient evidence to show presence of a mosque
Sr. Adv. P.N. Mishra focused on the issue of whether the structure was validly dedicated as a
mosque. He sought to establish that there was insufficient evidence to show that the structure had
been dedicated as a mosque. First he informed the bench of the requirements for a valid
dedication, namely that the waqif (donor) must own the land and cannot be represented by an
intermediary agent. PN Misra said that the Sunni Waqf Board will have to prove not only that the
site was dedicated to God, but also that it was subsequently used exclusively as a mosque
(continous namaz twice a day).
The bench asked whether one can create a mosque from State property? PN Misra attempted to
establish that a ruler can only use a small percentage of state property to create a mosque. He
cited instances of rulers creating waqfs from personal property.
Next, PN Misra briefly disputed the veracity of the 1861 revenue records being relied upon by
the Sunni Waqf Board as evidence of their possession of the site. PN Misra submitted that an
1867 book indicates that the records were tampered with.
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3.21 Infrequent namaz at the site
PN Misra concluded by questioning the frequency of namaz offered at the site. First, he
submitted that there exists no evidence of namaz consistently taking place prior to 1855. Then he
focused on the period from 1934 to 1949. PN Misra submitted that only Friday namaz was
possible, as the Faizabad magistrate had locked the property after the 1934 riots. He cross-
referenced his claim against the report by the Waqf Commissioner. PN Misra submitted that the
last Friday namaz was offered on 16 December 1949, before the idols 'appeared' at the site.
Hindu Mahasabha
The bench proceeded to hear two factions of the Hindu Mahasabha. When it asked who is in
charge of the Hindu Mahasabha, advocate Hari Shankar Jain submitted that both factions claim
to head the organisation. The court has admitted appeals by both factions.
4.3 Sunni Waqf Board's possession claim is unsustainable
First, advocate Hari Shankar Jain for the first faction disputed the Sunni Waqf Board's possession
claim. He submitted that there exists no evidence of a mosque prior to 1855. Then, he argued that
Babur as an invader could not be granted constitutional rights. He cited the Baburnama to
describe Babur as a prosecutor of Hindus. He submitted that proof of a pre-medieval Hindu
temple exists and that recognising a mosque would violate Hindus' fundamental right to freedom
of religion under Article 25.
The court broke for lunch at 1 PM. It re-assembled at 2.15 PM.
4.4 The site can only be governed by Hindu law
After lunch, HS Jain sought to convince the court that the site could only be governed by Hindu
law. He submitted that the nature of a Hindu temple is inalterable, even if it is destroyed and a
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mosque is built on top of it. Further, he submitted that the Waqf property was not valid under the
1923 Wakf Act, as it had never been registered.
HS Jain concluded by putting two judgments on the record to establish that Lord Ram is a
constitutional entity (AIR 1962 SC 442, AIR 1998(7) SCC 392). When he sought to elaborate,
the bench said that no party was disputing that Ram was born at Ayodhya. HS Jain appeared to
want to establish the precise location of Ram's birth, stating that it was a question of logic as well
as of faith.
The bench declined to hear two other of HS Jain's arguments. The first had to do with the
concept of sovereignty, as defined in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain. Before he could elaborate, the
court asked him to move on. The second, which the Allahabad High Court also did not consider,
had to do with Babur allegedly demolishing a temple (see exhibits 54 and 55 in suit number 5).
HS Jain sought to frame Babur's actions as a civil wrong.
4.5 Adverse possession cannot be claimed against a deity
Next, the bench briefly heard the counsel for the second faction of the Hindu Mahasabha. The
counsel submitted that adverse possession claims cannot be made against a deity. He requested
the bench to take on the record his written submission.
Shia Waqf Board
6.1 Shia Waqf Board was in exclusive possession
MC Dhingra argued that the Shia Waqf Board held exclusive possession of the disputed mosque
until it was placed under the receivership of the State in 1949. He submitted that the last
Mutawalli (manger of Waqf property) of the mosque was Shia. He emphasised that it is a
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Mutawalli, not worshippers, who can possess a mosque. Further, he argued that Allah does not
possess the site as Allah is not a juristic person.
6.2 Sunni Waqf Board's claim of adverse possession

MC Dhingra framed the Sunni Waqf Board's claim as an adverse possession claim. In other
words, he submitted that the Sunni party forcefully possessed the site, while the Shia Waqf Board
was in rightful possession of it. He traced the adverse possession to when the Shia Mutawalli
employed a Sunni imam for the month of Ramadan, to perform a special namaz which Shia
imams cannot.
Further, MC Dhingra submitted that the Sunni Waqf Board first formally claimed the site in
response to a 26 February 1944 government notification, which required appointed district
commissioners to prepare a list of waqf property. The 1944 notification was issued under the
Enactment of Muslim Wakf Act, 1936. He clarified that he was not opposing the notification,
only the Sunni Waqf Board's claim.
The bench listed the matter for Monday. MC Dhingra stated he had two more points to make
regarding the trisection of the title by the Allahabad High Court in 2010.
The bench rose at 3.22 PM.
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Experience
The internship experience with Supreme Court AOR Swarupama Chaturvedi was a highly
imbibing one. It was an enlightening engagement. In addition to several nuances of social
engagement, the internship has also helped me in legal understanding of issues pertaining to the
social and political phenomenons around. Apart from verbatim focus on law, emphasis was also
placed on sociology, history, philosophy and jurisprudence. I also worked on case files, evidence,
documents and reports pertaining to multiple domains of learning. Worked and inspected upon
the Indian Evidence Act,1872 ,Code of Civil Procedure,1908 and other substantial legislations
like Constitutional Law, Indian Contract Act in addition to many other local legislations. I
regularly attended Supreme Court proceedings in the magnanimous case beforehand which
helped me to not only learn court ethics, art of arguing and assessment but also made me delve
deeper into the most lucrative business of law. It was indeed a fruitful experience learning the
nuances of law. The dose of knowledge and experience gained at the chambers would be
indispensable for my future career in Law. The internship was an augment to the theoretical
knowledge gained in the college.
121
LEGAL NOTICE
THROUGH SPEED POST/ EMAIL
Dated: 10th August, 2019
To
Ms. Neha Raj
D/o- Umesh Kumar Chaurasia
R/o- Bakarganj Bajaja Gali, In front of GD Electronics Mandir
Patna- 800004, Bihar
Email id:
Mobile:
Subject: With regard to non-payment of principal amount of loan along

with interest due thereon
Dear Madam,
Under the instructions and on behalf of My Client Shri Nitish Anand, S/o- Nawal
Kishore Prasad, R/o- Bakarganj Bajaja Gali, In front of Shiva Mandir,
Patna-800004, Bihar, (herein after referred to as ‘My Client’), I hereby serve upon
you, the Notice, present Legal Notice and state as under:-
1. That My Client and you the Notice are residence of the same locality and
have been friends since childhood and are acquainted to each other as such.
It is already in your notice that My Client has always been very fantastic in
his duty towards you and your family as a friend. Whenever you have
122
looked to My Client for financial, emotional and mental support, same has
always been warmly extended to you in utmost good faith by My Client.
2. That you have always acknowledged the support provided by My Client to
you and your family even in public through myriads means.
3. That during the year 2017- 2019, you were in financial problems arising
owing to your father’s treatment and estrange marital status. You, the notice
were in dire need of money to support your ailing father, business and also
for your sustenance.
4. That on various occasions between 2017-2019, you have demanded monies
from my Client by way of loan by representing and promising that same
would be duly retuned to My Client by you within reasonable time.
5. Believing on your aforesaid representations and promises, My Client has
always duly advanced loan of various amounts to you the notice on various
dates between 2017-2019 at an interest of 11.05% P.A. It is already in your
notice that as and when My Client was deficient on funds, he went to the
extent of taking loans in his name at different rate of interest and then
123
advancing the same to you believing on your promises to payback the same
along with applicable rate of interest.
6. That My Client had advanced loan to you, the notice on various dates
between the year 2017-2019 on nominal rate of interest to support you, the
notice in your business as well as for your daily sustenance. It is already in
your notice that the total of such loan amount (principal amount) advanced
to you by My Client till date amounts to Rs. 12,43,300 (Rupees Twelve Lakh
Forty Three Thousand and Three Hundred Only) which you, the Notice has
acknowledged and endorsed.
7. That the total amount due from you, the Notice to My Client inclusive of
interest thereon as on date is Rs. 17,26,920/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakh
Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Only) which has also been
endorsed and acknowledged by you the Notice.
8. That you, the Notice had always agreed to repay the said loan amount along
with interest thereon which till date amounts to Rs. 17,26,920/- (Rupees
Seventeen Lakh Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Only) to
My Client. However, to the utter shock and surprise of My Client, you, the
Notice has now squarely declined to pay back the said amount of Rs.
124
17,26,920/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakh Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred
and Twenty Only) stating that the interest amount is too high for you.
9. That despite numerous requests and references to the past communication by
My Client, you out of malafide intent and in utter disregard of the faith
reposed by My Client in you, have clearly declined to payback the said
amount to My Client to which he is legally entitled. You, the Notice have
utterly failed to deliver on your aforesaid promises by not returning the
aforesaid said amount to My Client.
10. That your aforesaid act is unbecoming, illegal, infested with ulterior motives
and bad intention and in utter disregard of your aforesaid promises and
representations on the basis of which My Client has always acted in a
bonafide manner. It may be noted by you that by your aforesaid act, you the
Notice have invited severe legal consequences of civil and criminal nature
upon you for which you alone would be liable.
11. That you, the notice have made yourself vulnerable to civil consequences
which entails exemplary damages, cost of litigation apart from making you
liable to pay the aforesaid sum of Rs. 17,26,920/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakh
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Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Only).
12. You, the notice have been making false and frivolous promises from the very
inception with malafide intent in order to defraud and cheat my Client. You
the notice, have also breached the trust of my client thereby misusing the
fiduciary relationship, existing between you the notice and my Client.
13. That by your aforesaid act, you the notice have exposed yourself to offence
punishable under the criminal law inter alia for breach of trust, cheating and
misappropriation of funds. My Client reserves his right to file a criminal
complaint against you, the notice in any other relevant provisions of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 as well as any other applicable laws in addition to
whatever have been mentioned hereinabove.
14. That by your aforesaid act, My Client has suffered huge loss as he needs to
pay regular interest on loan which was taken for your purpose and upon your
promises. The total of such additional interest payable by My Client which is
attributable to your failure to pay the aforesaid loan amounts is Rs. 2,00,000
(Rupees Two Lakh Only) for which you the Notice are alone responsible.
You, the Notice has also caused mental harassment, loss of reputation and
126
loss of opportunity to My Client which is quantified at Rs. 8,50,000 (Rupees
Eight Lakh and Fifty Thousand Only).
15. You, the notice are also liable to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000 (Rupees Twenty
Five Thousand Only) towards legal expenses for this legal notice to My
Client.
16. Accordingly, you the notice are hereby called upon to pay a total amount of
Rs.28,01,920 (Rupees Twenty Eight Lakh One Thousand Nine Hundred and
Twenty Only) head wise break of which is as under :
1. Rs. 17,26,920/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakh Twenty Six Thousand Nine
Hundred and Twenty Only) towards total loan amount and interest due
thereon.
2. Rs. 2,00,000 (Rupees Two Lakh Only) for additional interest owing to non-
payment of loan amount by you, the Notice on time.
3. Rs. 8,50,000 (Rupees Eight Lakh and Fifty Thousand Only) towards mental
harassment, loss of reputation and loss of opportunity.
4. Rs. 25,000 (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) towards legal expenses for
this legal notice.
127
17. Please note that the present notice is being issued without prejudice to any or
all rights and remedies available to My Client against you, including My
Client’s right to Claim further damages/ compensation from you.
18. In the event you, the Notice, failed to make the aforesaid payment as
enunciated in preceding paragraph no. 14 within 15 days of receipt of this
Legal Notice, My Client would be constrained to initiate appropriate civil/ or
Criminal legal proceedings against you at your own cost and risk. My Client
reserves all rights and remedies available to him under the applicable laws.
Yours Sincerely,
Mukesh Kumar
Note: A Copy of the present legal notice has been retained by my office for
future course of action and reference.
128
IN THE COURT OF LD. SHRI VIJAY SHANKAR, ADJ-06, SOUTH WEST,

DWARKA COURT, NEW DELHI
CIVIL SUIT NO. 296 OF 2016
IN THE MATTER OF:
Mrs. Raj Kumari Plaintiff
Versus
Rajesh & Ors. Defendants
APPLICATION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS UNDER ORDER VII

RULE XI R/W SECTION 151 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT.
The defendants above named most respectfully showeth:
1. The captioned Suit has been instituted by Plaintiff against the defendants
without any cause of action and the same is pending adjudication before this
Hon’ble Court. The present application is being filed by Defendants seeking
rejection of Suit No. 1090 of 2018. Defendants have already filed their
written statement and contents of the same may be read as part and parcel of
the present application and the same has not been repeated herein for the
sake of brevity.
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2. That at the very outset, it is submitted that the Land admeasuring 21 Bigha
and 14 Biswa falling in Khewat No.19/35, situated in revenue estate of
Village Mundhela Khurd, New Delhi was purchased by the answering
Defendants vide two separate duly registered Sale Deeds both dated
30.09.2005 bearing Document No.13194 (10 Bighas 17 Biswas) and 13195
(10 Bighas 17 Biswas) after paying consideration amount. In addition
thereto, the answering defendants also purchased land to an extent of 5
Bigha and 19 Biswa in Khata No. 25/34 vide registered Sale Deed dated
25.05.2005. It is further submitted that after the death of the Sh. Suraj Bhan
06.10.2002, the total extent of the land stood devolved upon the two legal
heirs (coparceners) namely Sh. Jai Bhagwan and Sh. Bhagwan with half
(1/2) share each and their name stood mutated accordingly in the revenue
record. In the above view of the matter, it is submitted that Sh. Jai Bhagwan
was well within his rights to sale his share of land property, as referred to
above, to the answering Defendants herein.
3. That by virtue of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, a married
daughter has no coparcenary rights in the agricultural land since such
married daughters are not included in the list of successors. It is admitted
130
position that before the death of late Sh. Suraj Bhan 06.10.2002, the Plaintiff
herein was married and was residing at her matrimonial house at village
Matiala in Delhi, where Plaintiff still continue to reside in her matrimonial
home. Further in view of Section 50 (a) of the DLR Act, if there are male
descendants in the line of succession, they would supersede all other legal
heirs. As such, after the death of late Sh. Suraj Bhan, all agricultural land
devolved upon the male legal heirs as the succession opened soon after death
of the father of Plaintiff, that Sh. Jai Bhagwan and Sh. Bhagwan to an extent
of half (1/2) share each. Viewed thus, there is no cause of action in favour of
the Plaintiff herein and the present Suit is liable to be rejected on this score
alone.
4. That the captioned suit is hopelessly barred under the law and as such is
liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that as per the case set up by the
Plaintiff, the cause of action qua the Sale Deeds arose on 30.09.2005 and the
period of limitation stipulated under the law had started running since the
said date and mere accrual of subsequent cause of actions, as has been
alleged in the plaint, would not stop the running of time since 30.09.2005. It
is submitted that both the sale deeds were executed by the plaintiff in favour
of answering defendants on the same day. So therefore, the present suit is
liable to be dismissed as time barred.
131
5. That no cause of action has arisen in favour of the Plaintiff and against the
answering Defendants as the Defendant No.4 was the recorded Bhumidar
and was having valid right, title and interest over the suit schedule land. It is
submitted that the Defendant No.4, having executed the Sale Deed dated
30.09.2005 sought to avoid the same and instituted Suit in that regard being
CS (OS) No. 714 of 2008 before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi raising
false and frivolous pleas. The Hon’ble High Court vide judgment and decree
dated 05.05.2008 in CS (OS) 714 of 2008 was pleased to dismiss the suit
with cost. The Defendant No.4 sought to assail the judgment and decree by
filing FAO (OS) No. 293 of 2008. However, the same was withdrawn
without there being any liberty. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff is
mischievously seeking to achieve what Defendant No.4 could not by way of
present frivolous proceedings. A copy of the order dated ________________
passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CS (OS) No. 714 of 2008 is
annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE A1. A copy of the order
dated 05.05.2008 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in FAO (OS)
No. 293 of 2008 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE A2.
6. That the captioned Suit is not maintainable in its present form given the fact
that the Plaintiff has not sought for consequential relief of possession despite
being not in the possession of the suit schedule property. It is submitted that
132
the answering Defendants have been in the possession of the suit schedule
property ever since execution of the Sale Deed. Following the judgment and
decree passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and the same having
attained finality after order passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the
Appeal, the answering Defendants have sold out the subject land and
delivered vacant and peaceful possession to the vendee in the year 2013
itself.
7. That the documents sought to be cancelled are duly registered documents
and the Plaintiff cannot take shelter under the plea that she was not having
the knowledge of the documents/ Sale Deeds as the Plaintiff is presumed to
have deemed notice of the said factum under the law. It is submitted that the
present proceedings is gross abuse of process of law in view of the judgment
and decree passed by the Hon’ble High Court and further that the Plaintiff
herein has suppressed that fact that daughters of Sh. Jai Bhagwan did in fact
instituted suit being Suit No.335 of 2008 seeking for permanent injunction
qua land forming subject matter of Sale Deed dated 25.05.2005. The
Hon’ble Trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 01.05.2008 was
pleased to reject the plaint. The Plaintiff the mischievously endeavoured not
only to suppress the exact extent of land but also twisted the relevant facts to
suit her case and mislead this Hon’ble Court. Additionally, the factum qua
133
the institution of Suit No.335 of 2008 has also been suppressed having
material bearing upon the case at hand. As such, the Suit is liable to be
dismissed as the Plaintiff has not approached this Hon’ble Court with clean
hands.
8. That the present application is bona fide and has been made in the interest of
justice.
9. That it is in the interest of justice to allow the present application. It is
humbly submitted that irreparable loss shall be caused to the defendants if
the present application is not allowed.
PRAYER
In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice,
Defendants most respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be
pleased to:
1. reject the plaint of Plaintiff in Suit No. 296 of 2016 under the
provisions of order VII rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with
exemplary cost;
2. order cost of the present proceedings in favour of defendants.
134
3. pass any such other order(s)/ direction(s) as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper.
Defendants
Through
Krishna Kumar Singh
Advocate for Defendants
Date:
Place: New Delhi
135
IN THE COURT OF LD. SHRI VIJAY SHANKAR, ADJ- 06, SOUTH WEST,
DWARKA COURT, NEW DELHI
CIVIL SUIT NO. XXX OF 2016
IN THE MATTER OF:
Mrs. Raj Kumari …Plaintiff
Versus
Rajesh & Ors. …Defendants
AFFIDAVIT
I, Rajesh Kumar, S/o Late Sh. Bhim Singh, Aged about 32 years, R/o House
No.119 and also at House No. 157, Aali Village, Badarpur, New Delhi, do hereby
solemnly state and affirm as under;
1. That I am the Defendant No. 1 in the above mentioned suit and Defendant
Nos. 2 and 3 are my brothers and I have been duly authorized by them by
way of power of attorney to swear the present affidavit on their behalf also
and am being well conversant with the facts of the case am competent to
swear the present affidavit.
136
2. That the contents of the accompanying application under order VII rule XI
of the CPC, which has been drafted by my counsel under my instruction,
have been read over to me in vernacular. I admit the same as true and correct
and nothing material has been concealed therefrom.
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION:
I, the above named deponent, do hereby verify at New Delhi on this the ____day of
August, 2019 that the contents of the present Affidavit are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief. No part of it is false and nothing material has
been concealed therefrom.
DEPONENT
137
BAIL APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 437 OF C.R.P.C ON BEHALF OF

THE APPLICANT SEEKING GRANT OF REGULAR BAIL IN
CONNECTION WITH FIR NO. XXXX REGISTERED AT HARI NAGAR
POLICE STATION UNDER PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO PUBLIC
PROPERTY ACT 1984 &323 OF ‘IPC’ 1860
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. That the present Bail Application is being made by the above named Applicant
before this Hon’ble Court seeking necessary orders and directions from this
Hon’ble Court for grant of regular bail to the Applicant in connection with FIR
No. XXXX dated 20.07.2019, lodged at Hari Nagar Police Station under
Section 3 of Prevention of damage to public Property Act 1984 & Section323
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). A Copy of
the First Information Report bearing No. XXXX dated 20.07.2019 lodged at Hari
Nagar Police Station under Section 3 of Prevention of damage to public Property
Act 1984 and 323 of IPC is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-A1.
2. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. That the Applicant is a law abiding citizen of India and a driver of ambulance
operating in Rao Tula Ram Hospital, Zafarpur.
138
2. That on 01.07.2019, the Applicant was coming back from his duty from Rao Tula
Ram Hospital, Zafarpur, when near Mundaka he saw that a car has met accident
and collided with metro pillar.
3. That the Applicant was stopped by some policemen for seeking help. The said car
had caught fire and two persons inside the said car were shouting for help. The
policemen and other people present there were not able to extinguish the fire and
pull those person out of the said car. The policemen took fire extinguisher from the
vehicle of Applicant but to no avail as the fire was out of control.
4. That the Applicant in pursuit to save the said person trapped inside the car hit at
the gate of the car to break it open and badly injured his leg.
5. That the Applicant was taken by policemen to ______ hospital for treatment where
MLC report was prepared. A carbon copy of the said MLC was also given to the
Applicant. A Copy of MLC is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-A2.
6. An FIR bearing No. ________ of 2019 dated _______ was lodged at _________
Police Station in connection to the aforesaid car accident wherein it was also
mentioned that the Applicant got injured in rescue operation. A Copy of FIR
139
bearing no. ______ of 2019 dated ___________ is annexed herewith and marked
as Annexure-A3.
7. That the Applicant due to the aforesaid injury was not in a position to walk till
20.07.2019. Furthermore, he was regularly taken to the hospital for changing
bandage and requisite treatment of the aforesaid injury. A Copy of Hospital report
is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-A4.
8. That on 20.07.2019 the present FIR bearing no. ______ of 2019, dated 20.07.2019
was lodged at Hari Nagar Police Station with respect to an incident which
happened in the nigh of 20.07.2019 to which Applicant is not connected in any
manner. It is most respectfully submitted that even the name of the Applicant is
not mentioned in the said FIR nor there is any description of any accused
resembling Applicant.
9. That on XXXX some policemen from Hari Nagar Police Station visited the home
of the brother-law of the Applicant. They enquired about car bearing
no.___________(right brand of the car) to which brother-law-of the Applicant
rightly told them that the said car although registered in his name but used by the
Applicant. Those policemen asked brother-in-law of the Applicant to call the
140
Applicant immediately along with the said car. It is respectfully submitted that
when Applicant reached there he was taken to the Hari Nagar police station along
with the said car at around 6:00 P.M.
10. That the policemen did not tell the reason for keeping the Applicant in the police
station. The Applicant was kept in the police station without any reason for the
whole night and after repeated request the policemen at the said police station told
the applicant to go home at around____ the next day i.e. on ______. However, the
policemen kept the said car of the Applicant in the police station and asked him to
come again on XXXX. it is respectfully submitted that the Applicant was not told
as to why he was being harassed by the police.
11. That on XXXX, the Applicant again visited the Hari Nagar police station in the
morning at around______ A.M. the policemen after keeping the Applicant in
custody for the whole day handed over the key of the said car in the evening at
around______ P.M and asked him to go home. It is most respectfully submitted
that till now Applicant was not aware of registration of the said FIR bearing No.
____ of 2019 dated 20.07.2019. furthermore, he was not told why he is being
called to the police station time and again.
141
12. That on 23.08.2019 the Applicant again received a call from Hari Nagar Police
Station and was asked to come to the Police Station.
13. That on the same day after receiving the said call, Applicant in a bonafide way and
with innocent mind went to Hari Nagar Police Station where he was arrested. It is
most respectfully submitted that at around 11:15 P.M a copy of FIR bearing
no.______ dated 20.07.2019 was given to the brother of the Applicant.
14. That the Applicant was presented before the Ld. Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts,
New Delhi on 24.08.2019 and send to judicial custody.
3. GROUNDS:
Present Application is made on the following amongst other grounds which are
taken and pressed without prejudice to each other;
1. BECAUSE the applicant has been falsely arrested by the Police of Police Station
Hari Nagar in FIR No _______ of _________ for offence under sections 3 of
P.D.P.P Act and 323 of the IPC. It is submitted that Police has implicated the
Applicant to show that some arrest has been made without any proof whatsoever.
142
Applicant is not connected with the alleged incident in any manner whatsoever
and he was at home at the time of incident. Applicant due to injury in his leg was
not able to move on his own without taking support at the time when incident
mentioned in the FIR is alleged to have been committed.
2. BECAUSE there is no eye witness who has seen the Applicant on incident place.
Even complainant also stated in FIR that when he gets down from car no one was
seen there. Complainant has not mentioned any description of accused either. So,
therefore there is no basis to connect the Applicant with the said incident and
arrest the Applicant with respect to the same.
3. BECAUSE neither Applicant’s name is mentioned in the FIR nor applicant was
present at the incident place at relevant times. Applicant was called by police on
02.08.2019 and was arrested on the same day without any basis.
4. BECAUSE the applicant/accused is permanent resident of above mentioned
address. The applicant has his old parent dependent upon him and the applicant is
the only bread earner for the family. Moreover, the Applicant being a poor driver
has no means as of now to support his ageing parent.
143
5. BECAUSE neither any recovery is to be effected from the applicant nor the
applicant is in a position to temper with the prosecution evidence. The applicant
undertakes to associate and cooperate with the investigation whenever required to
do so.
6. BECAUSE the Applicant was arrested after considerable delay even when he has
made himself available to the police on XXXX. It is respectfully submitted that
when police was not able to find any person in connection with the present FIR,
they chose to falsely implicate the Applicant to show that they have arrested the
real culprit.
7. BECAUSE the Applicant undertakes not to directly or indirectly make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case
so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police
officer or tamper with the evidence.
8. BECAUSE there is no chance of Applicant fleeing from justice and tampering
with the prosecution evidence.
144
9. BECAUSE keeping applicant in the judicial custody will not solve any purpose in
any manner. It is most respectfully submitted that the Applicant may be enlarged
on bail in order to live a respectful and dignified life in Society.
10. BECAUSE the Applicant has never been convicted by any court of law and is a
responsible and respectable citizen of India. It is most respectfully submitted that
Applicant does not have any criminal antecedent and keeping him with hardened
criminals in jail may not be proper.
11. BECAUSE the Applicant undertakes and is ready and willing to appear before any
authority as and whenever directed by this Hon’ble court. The Applicant further
undertakes to duly co-operate in investigation with the Police.
12. BECAUSE the Applicant undertakes to co-operate with the investigation agency
and shall neither influence witnesses nor temper with the evidence. It is further
submitted that the Applicant shall abide by the condition(s), if any, imposed by
this Hon’ble Court.
145
13. BECAUSE it is in the interest of justice to allow the present application as it
would not be prejudicial to the interest of the prosecution or the complainant in
any manner whatsoever.
14. BECAUSE there is a probability of trial taking long time and it may not be proper
to keep the Applicant in jail for so long. It is most respectfully submitted that even
if the Applicant is acquitted, he may not lead a life of normal, respectful and
dignified citizen of the country if he is kept in jail for a long period of time.
15. BECAUSE the Applicant is innocent until pronounced guilty by a competent
court. It is most respectfully submitted that he may be provided all rights of an
innocent person and be enlarged on bail subject to condition imposed by this
Hon’ble Court.
16. BECAUSE there is no chance of the Applicant escaping trial and fleeing justice.
17. BECAUSE the Applicant is innocent and have been falsely implicated in the
present case. It is apparent from the FIR itself that there is no allegation against the
applicant.
146
18. BECAUSE the applicant is willing to furnish surety and bail bonds to the
satisfaction of this learned court in case he is ordered to be released on bail. The
applicant is also willing to join the investigations and bind himself by the terms
and conditions laid down by the law or by this Hon'ble court. It is further
submitted that the no purpose would be served by keeping applicant in jail.
19. BECAUSE irreparable loss would cause to the Applicant if the present application
is not allowed and applicant is not enlarged on bail. It is most respectfully
submitted that the reputation of the Applicant has already taken a low in the
society by the false and concocted allegations against him and keeping him in
judicial custody would further aggravate the situation.
20. BECAUSE Applicant has prima facie case in his favour and there is no chances of
his conviction in view of the fact that no allegation in the complaint has been
against him and there is also no evidence against him.
4. That the Applicant seeks liberty to urge any other or future grounds as may be
available to the Applicant at the time of argument.
147
5. That the Applicant has not filed any other similar Application before any other
Court for the same or similar relief including the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.
6. That the present Application is being filed in the most bonafide manner, as advised
under law.
PRAYER:
In the facts and circumstance of the present case and in light of the submissions
made and contentions raised hereinabove, it is most respectfully prayed before this
Hon’ble Court that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
1. Pass necessary orders and directions, thereby granting the Applicant Regular
Bail in the present matter relating to FIR No. 340/19 dated 20.07.2019
lodged at Hari Nagar Police Station under Section Section 3 of Prevention of
damage to public Property Act 1984 and 323 of IPC on such terms and
conditions which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of
justice; and/or
148
2. Pass any other necessary and appropriate orders and direction, as this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case, in the interest of justice.
Dated: XXXX Petitioner/ Applicant

Place: Delhi Through
MUKESH KUMAR/RAJNISH K SINGH

Advocate
A-2/97,Sector - 8,Rohini
New Delhi – 110085
Note: Annexures pertaining to the Bail application have not been attached.
149

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Internship Diary of Vishal Kumar

Internship Diary, Legal Drafts and

It would be my esteemed privilege to express my modest gratitude to Advocate

Date: 20.11.2019 Vishal Kumar

Place: New Delhi

Importance of Legal Internship

How and why did I join the office of Advocate Swarupama

As a student of Political Science (graduation) and Law (currently), I have had

Hearing of the day:

The was an off- day at office.

The Bench assembled at 10.30 AM.

1.1 Historical Possession of Disputed Land

1.1.1 Possession of the Outer Courtyard

1.1.2 Possession of the Inner Courtyard

1.2 Geneology of the Site: Ram's Birthplace

1.3 Sunni Waqf Board's Suit is Barred by Limitation

1.4 The site ceased to be a mosque

1.5 Figures and Images at the site

1.6 Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation

At 12:54, the court broke for lunch.

1.7 Issues before the Allahabad High Court

1.8. Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation

Day 23 Arguments began that day.

The bench assembled at 10.37 AM.

1.9 Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation:

1.12 Nirmohi Akhara's suit is not barred by limitation

At 12.55 PM, the bench rose for lunch.

1.14 Evidence of Nirmohi Akhara's possession of the Inner Courtyard

2.1 Ram was born in Ayodhya

2.2 Installation of idols is not a 'continuous wrong’

Day 24 Arguments began that day.

2.3 Installation of idols is not a 'continuous wrong’

2.3.1 When does a cause of action arise for calculating limitation?

2.3.2 Limitation extinguishes both substantive and procedural rights

2.5 A temple existed before the mosque was built

2.6 Ram Janmasthan is a juridical person

At 12.45 PM, the court decided to meet after lunch.

The bench assembled at 2.07 PM.

2.7 Muslims stopped namaz as mosque was desecrated

Day 25 Arguments began that day.

2.8 Sunni Waqf Board's suit is barred by limitation

2.9 Ram Janmasthan is a juridical person

The court broke for lunch at 12.46

The was an off- day at office.

The was an off- day at office.

Day 26 Arguments began that day.

2.11 Plaintiff in a suit can claim alternative reliefs

(i) whether Janmasthan is a deity;

2.12 Hindus and Muslims had joint possession of the land

2.13.1 Existence of idol is not necessary for a temple to exist

2.13.2 Lord Ram devotees in the 17th century

Focusing on the statements of plaintiffs and witnesses in suit 4, he sought to conclusively

2.14 Ram Janmasthan is a juridical person

2.15 Hindus and Muslims had joint possession of the land

2.15.1 Sunni Waqf Board cannot claim adverse possession

The bench broke for lunch at 12.52 PM.

The bench assembled at 2.20 PM.

2.16 Ram Janmasthan is a juridical person

2.16.2 The disputed land was always a deity

2.16.3 Deity cannot be divided as that is akin to mutilation

Took leave from office because of health issues.

Day 27 Arguments began that day.