Professional Documents
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Atty Mangontawar Vs NPC
Atty Mangontawar Vs NPC
26, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Facts: A lawyer asserts his right to his contingent fees after his clients, allegedly behind his back,
had entered into an out-of-court settlement with the National Power Corporation (NPC). The
trial court granted his claim by way of summary judgment. However, this was reversed by the
Court of Appeals (CA) because the counsel was allegedly enforcing a decision that was already
vacated. In this petition, petitioner Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat (Atty. Gubat) attempts to
persuade us that the compensation due him is independent of the vacated decision, his
entitlement thereto being based on another reason: the bad faith of his clients and of the
respondent NPC.
Issue: WON resort to rule 65 is proper.
Ruling: No. Petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the remedy of appeal by way
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not only available but also the proper mode
of appeal. For all intents and purposes, we find that petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 as a substitute for a lost appeal.
Issue: WON petitioner’s resort to summary judgment is proper.
Ruling: No. He is not entitled to an immediate relief as a matter of law, for the existence of
bad faith is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. A summary judgment is allowed only if, after
hearing, the court finds no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
Issue: WON a lawyer may be deprived of his compensation for professional services rendered
if his client enters into a compromise agreement without the lawyer’s intervention?
Ruling: No. A client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the
lawyer, but the terms of the agreement should not deprive the counsel of his compensation
for the professional services he had rendered. If so, the compromise shall be subjected to said
fees. If the client and the adverse party who assented to the compromise are found to have
intentionally deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms of the compromise, insofar as they
prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside, making both parties accountable to pay the lawyer’s
fees. But in all cases, it is the client who is bound to pay his lawyer for his legal representation.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is a consensual contract, binding
upon the signatories/privies, and it has the effect of res judicata. This cannot however affect
third persons who are not parties to the agreement.
The validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the
payment of a lawyer’s adequate and reasonable compensation for his services should the suit
end by reason of the settlement. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client
should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer’s fees, especially
when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement cannot
bind the lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against
injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the
part of his counsel.
Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he
himself secured for his client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the clients own volition
should never completely deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation for his professional
services.