Revilla Jr. v. Sandiganbayan First

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 218232. July 24, 2018.]
RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR. , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST

DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.
[G.R. No. 218235. July 24, 2018.]
RICHARD A. CAMBE , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 218266. July 24, 2018.]
JANET LIM NAPOLES , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.
[G.R. No. 218903. July 24, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST

DIVISION), RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR., and RICHARD A. CAMBE ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 219162. July 24, 2018.]
RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR. , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST

DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
The petitions for certiorari 1 in G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235, and 218266, led by
petitioners Ramon "Bong" B. Revilla, Jr. (Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), and Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles), respectively, assail the Resolution 2 dated 1 December 2014 of the
Sandiganbayan denying them bail and the Resolution 3 dated 26 March 2015 denying their
motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240. aScITE
In G.R. No. 218903, the O ce of the Ombudsman assails the Resolution 4 dated 4
September 2014 of the Sandiganbayan denying the prosecution's motion to transfer the
place of detention of Revilla and Cambe, and the Resolution 5 dated 20 May 2015 denying
the motion for reconsideration. In G.R. No. 219162, Revilla assails the Resolution 6 dated 5
February 2015 of the Sandiganbayan granting the prosecution's motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and the Resolution 7 dated 28 May 2015 denying his motion
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
for reconsideration.
The Facts
The cases before us stemmed from the Information dated 5 June 2014 led by the
O ce of the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles, among others, with the crime of Plunder, de ned and penalized under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended. The Amended Information 8 reads:
In 2006 to 2010, or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable
Court's jurisdiction, above-named accused RAMON "BONG" BAUTISTA REVILLA, JR.,
then a Philippine Senator and RICHARD ABDON CAMBE, then DIRECTOR III at the
O ce of Senator Revilla, Jr., both public o cers, committing the offense in relation
to their respective o ces, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN B. LIM, and JOAN RAYMUND S. DE ASIS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire ill-gotten
wealth amounting to at least TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php224,512,500.00),
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions
under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the
project identi cation, NAPOLES gave, and REVILLA, JR. and/or CAMBE
received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from
REVILLA, JR.'s Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of REVILLA, JR.'s endorsement, directly or through
CAMBE, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of REVILLA, JR.'s PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or ctitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
o cial positions, authority, relationships, connections, and in uence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
Upon arraignment, Napoles and Cambe pleaded not guilty to the charge against them,
while petitioner Revilla refused to enter any plea; thus, the Sandiganbayan entered a plea of
not guilty in his behalf pursuant to Section 1 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. 1 0
In a Resolution 1 1 dated 19 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest
against Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and led a Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam
1 2 praying for his detention at the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014,
Cambe also voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and led an Urgent Motion to
Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) 1 3 pending trial of
the case.
In two separate Resolutions 1 4 both dated 20 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan ordered
the turnover of Revilla and Cambe to the PNP-CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City for detention
at its PNP Custodial Center Barracks.
G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235 and 218266
Revilla led a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam dated 20 June 2014; Cambe led an
Application for Bail 1 5 dated 23 June 2014; and Napoles led a Joint Petition for Bail dated
25 June 2014, together with co-accused Ronald John Lim (Lim) and John Raymund De Asis
(De Asis). 1 6
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan conducted the bail hearings for Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles.
During the bail hearings, the prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely:
Commission on Audit (COA) Assistant Commissioner in the Special Services Sector Susan
P. Garcia; Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Directors Carmencita N. Delantar
and Lorenzo C. Drapete; the whistleblowers Benhur K. Luy (Luy), Merlina P. Suñas (Suñas),
Marina C. Sula (Sula), and Mary Arlene Joyce B. Baltazar (Baltazar); National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator III Joey I. Narciso (Narciso); and Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) Bank Officer II Atty. Leigh Vhon Santos (Santos).
The Sandiganbayan summarized the prosecution's evidence as follows:
From 2007 to 2009, accused Revilla was allocated and utilized [Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)] in the total amount of P517,000,000.00,
covered by twelve (12) [Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs)], for livelihood and
agricultural projects. He named the [Technology Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC),
National Agri-Business Corporation (NABCOR), and National Livelihood Development
Corporation (NLDC)] to be the [implementing agencies (IAs)], and endorsed ve (5) of
Napoles' [non-governmental organization (NGOs)], i.e., [Agri & Economic Program for
Farmers Foundation, Inc. (AEPFFI) , Philippine Social Development Foundation, Inc.
(PSDFI) , Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI) , Social
Development Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. (SDPFFI) , and Agricultura Para
Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI) ,] as project partners. Of the 12 SAROs, Luy
identi ed six (6) SAROs in his Summary of Rebates, showing how he came up with
the supposed P224,512,500.00 rebates/commissions/kickbacks mentioned in the
Information. The six (6) SAROs with their corresponding amounts, bene ciary NGOs,
IAs, and the amount of commissions received by Revilla, through Cambe, mentioned
in Luy's Summary are shown in the table below:
TABLE A
Amount Rebates
SARO IA NGO Date Received
(Php) Received (Php)
1. ROCS-07-05486 25 million TLRC AEPFFI 7.5 million March 27, 2007
2. ROCS-08-05254 65 million NABCOR MAMFI/ 10 million June 24, 2008
SDPFFI
17,250,000.00 July 3, 2008
3. ROCS-08-05660 15 million NABCOR MAMFI 7,750,000.00 July 23, 2008
4. D-08-9558 40 million TLRC SDPFFI 17 million Dec. 5, 2008
5. ROCS-08-09789 40 million TLRC SDPFFI 2 million Dec. 12, 2008
18 million Dec. 15, 2008

6. G-09-07065 80 million NLDC AEPFFI and 9 million Oct. 6, 2009
APMFI 9 million Oct. 6, 2009
2 million Oct. 6, 2009
TOTAL Php265 Php119,500,000.00
million
Other commissions without corresponding SARO numbers lifted from Luy's
Summary are shown hereunder.
TABLE B
Date Received IA/Particulars Rebates Received (Php)
April 6, 2006 PDAF-DA 2006 5 million
June 6, 2006 DA – 2006 5 million
April 12, 2007 DA – 50 M 9.5 million
April 19, 2007 PDAF-DA 50 M and TLRC 50 M 2007 3 million
August 2, 2007 2 million
August 10, 2007 3 million
October 16, 2007 PDAF 82 M 5 million
November 15, 2007 PDAF DA and TLRC 82 M 2007 project 5 million
November 23, 2007 PDAF 82 M project 3.5 million
December 21, 2007 PDAF 82 M project 10 million
December 26, 2007 PDAF 82 M project 10.5 million
May 9, 2008 PDAF 80 M 5 million
March 17, 2010 28,512,500.00
April 28, 2010 5 million
TOTAL Php105,012,500.00
Total Rebates Received Table A + Table B Php224,512,500.00
Accused Revilla's commissions represented 50% of the project cost, 25%
percent of which was released by accused Napoles upon showing that the DBM
already received accused Revilla's endorsement letter with project listings. The other
25% was released upon issuance of the SARO. On the other hand, accused Cambe's
share was 5% of the project cost.
But there were instances that, prior to the issuance of the SARO and
preempting its release, accused Revilla advanced money from accused Napoles.
There were also times that his share was given to him in tranches until the full
amount was paid. Thus, there appear entries in Luy's Summary of Rebates without
corresponding SARO numbers, and in amounts less than 25% or 50% of the amount
of the SARO. Accused Cambe got his commission either together with that of
accused Revilla or separately. To acknowledge receipt of the rebates for himself or
that for accused Revilla, accused Napoles' o ce had accused Cambe sign JLN
vouchers which, however, were already shredded upon the instruction of accused
Napoles.
Upon release of the SARO, documents like letters signed by accused Revilla
indorsing accused Napoles' NGO, MOAs signed by accused Cambe, project proposal,
and foundation profile, were submitted to the IA.
Subsequently, the IA, after deducting a 3% management fee, released a check
in the name of the NGO endorsed by accused Revilla. Accused Napoles had either the
president of the payee NGO or anybody from his trusted employees receive the check.
Accused Napoles' representative signed the IA voucher and, in return, issued a receipt
to the IA in the name of the foundation.
The check was then deposited to the account of the payee foundation. After it
was cleared, accused Napoles had her trusted employees withdraw the proceeds of
the check. The money was brought to accused Napoles, usually to her o ce at 2502
Discovery Center, and was disposed of at her will or upon her instruction. Part of the
proceeds was used to pay the commissions of accused Revilla and Cambe. Some
were kept at the o ce vault or was brought to her condo unit at 18D Paci c Plaza.
Accused Napoles' share was pegged at 32% and 40%, depending on the IA, and she
used it to buy dollars and to acquire properties in the Philippines and abroad. She
also made deposits in a foreign account to support her daughter Jean and accused
Napoles' brother Reynald Lim in the US.
To make it appear that there were implementations of the projects for which
accused Revilla's PDAFs were intended, the NGOs submitted liquidation documents
such as o cial receipts, delivery receipts, accomplishment reports, which were all
fake, and lists of bene ciaries which were just fabricated having only signed by
Napoles' employees, children, household helpers, drivers, and security guards. The
receipts were issued by bogus suppliers which were likewise owned or controlled by
accused Napoles. 1 7
On the other hand, the defense presented Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui (Pagui), a lawyer
and retired document examiner of the NBI, as expert witness. In his Report No. 09-10-2013,
attached to his Judicial A davit dated 12 November 2014 and adopted as his direct
testimony, Pagui stated that upon comparison of Revilla's purported signatures on the
photocopies of the PDAF documents and the standard documents bearing Revilla's
authentic signature, the purported signatures are not authentic and a xed by Revilla. Pagui
examined the originals and photocopies of the PDAF documents in open court using a
magnifying glass, and he maintained that the purported signatures are not authentic and
a xed by Revilla. Pagui likewise testi ed that he also examined the photocopies of
documents with signatures of Cambe and his ndings were embodied in Report No. 10-11-
2013.
On cross-examination, Pagui testi ed that during his stint as document examiner in
the NBI, it would take them an average of one or two days to examine a signature, their
ndings would be reviewed by the majority of the examiners present in the Questioned
Document Division of the NBI, and it was the NBI's policy not to examine photocopies of
documents as safety precaution. He, however, believed that an examination of the
photocopies can now be made since there are already clear copies. He con rmed that it
took him three months after the submission of the specimen signature and questioned
signature to nish his Report, while it took him only a few minutes to make a conclusion that
the photocopies are faithful reproduction of the original. Pagui was paid a professional fee
of P200,000.00 for examining the signatures of Revilla and Cambe. ATICcS
Cambe dispensed with the presentation of his witness, Fabian S. Fabian, supervisor of
the Records Section of the Philippine Airlines after the parties stipulated on the authenticity
and due execution of the Certi cation he issued and the Passenger Manifest for Flight Nos.
PR 102 and PR 103. Napoles likewise dispensed with the testimony of Joel M. de Guzman,
representative of the Bureau of Immigration, after the parties stipulated on the authenticity
and due execution of her immigration records. Both Cambe and Napoles adopted the direct
examination of Pagui.
The Sandiganbayan thereafter admitted all the documentary exhibits of Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles except for Exhibits 273 to 277 of Revilla for lack of sponsorship.
Revilla made a tender of excluded exhibits and rested his case. Cambe and Napoles also
rested their case relative to their application for bail.
In a Resolution dated 1 December 2014, 1 8 the Sandiganbayan denied the separate
applications for bail led by Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. The Sandiganbayan held that the
prosecution duly established with strong evidence that Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in
conspiracy with one another, committed the crime of plunder de ned and penalized under
RA 7080; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to bail.
In a Resolution dated 26 March 2015, 1 9 the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit:
(a) Napoles' Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 December 2014; (b) Revilla's Omnibus
Motion: (1) for Reconsideration, and (2) To Adduce Additional Evidence dated 17 December
2014; and (c) Cambe's: (1) Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 December 2014, and (2)
Motion to Adduce Additional Evidence and Request for Subpoena embodied in his Reply
dated 28 January 2015.
Thus, Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles led their separate petitions for certiorari assailing
the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan before this Court. The petition led by Revilla is
docketed as G.R. No. 218232, the petition led by Cambe is docketed as G.R. No. 218235,
and the petition filed by Napoles is docketed as G.R. No. 218266.
On 21 December 2016, Revilla led a Motion to Withdraw 2 0 the Petition for Certiorari
he led before this Court alleging that "[c]onsidering, however, that the presentation of
prosecution evidence in the Plunder Case below will already commence on 12 January 2017,
and that trial will be conducted every Thursday thereafter, petitioner will avail of the
remedies available to him in said proceedings once the insu ciency of the evidence against
him is established." 2 1
G.R. No. 218903
Meanwhile, on 14 July 2014, the O ce of the Ombudsman, through the O ce of the

Special Prosecutor, led a Motion to Transfer the Place of Detention of Accused 2 2 Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) facility in
Camp Bagong Diwa or other similar facilities of the BJMP. The motion states that the PNP
Custodial Center is not a detention facility within the supervision of BJMP under RA 6975
and their continued detention in a non-BJMP facility affords them special treatment. In a
Manifestation dated 4 August 2014, the prosecution alleged that the Sandiganbayan
ordered the detention of Napoles in the BJMP facility in Camp Bagong Diwa; thus, as for
Napoles, the motion of the prosecution became moot.
In his Opposition 2 3 dated 26 July 2014, Revilla alleged that his detention in the PNP
Custodial Center is in accord with the Rules and upon a valid resolution of the
Sandiganbayan. On 6 August 2014, Cambe also led his Opposition 2 4 to the Motion to
Transfer the place of his detention.
In a Resolution 2 5 dated 4 September 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
failure to advance justi able grounds for Revilla and Cambe's transfer. The Sandiganbayan
held that detention in facilities other than a jail is sanctioned in our jurisdiction and there is
no law mandating that detention prisoners shall only be detained in a jail supervised by the
BJMP. The Sandiganbayan also found that it was not shown that Revilla and Cambe were
granted benefits above the standards set for other detention prisoners.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan Resolution, while
Revilla and Cambe filed their separate Opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In a Manifestation (Re: Unauthorized Movement of Accused Revilla on 14 February
2015) with Motion (For the Issuance of an Order Directing the Concerned PNP O cials to
Explain) 2 6 dated 27 February 2015, the prosecution alleged that Revilla was allowed to
attend the birthday celebration of Juan Ponce Enrile in the PNP General Hospital under the
guise of a medical emergency on 14 February 2015, bolstering its argument that Revilla's
detention in the PNP Custodial Center is improper.
In his Comment 2 7 to the Manifestation, PDDG Leonardo A. Espina alleged that he
directed the CIDG to investigate the incident, and he approved the recommendations of the
CIDG to le an administrative case for Grave Misconduct and violation of PNPHSS 2012
Manual of Operations, and criminal case against PSUPT Eulogio Lovello R. Fabro (Fabro),
PSINSP Celina D. Tapaoan (Tapaoan), and PO2 Jaydie Pelagio upon nding that Fabro and
Tapaoan connived to facilitate the visit of Revilla to Enrile and tried to cover it up by
requesting the attending physician PCINSP Duds Raymond Santos to change his statement.
In a Resolution 2 8 dated 20 May 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
reconsideration of the prosecution for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan did not consider as
su cient reason the reported unauthorized visit of Revilla to the hospital room of Enrile to
justify his transfer to Camp Bagong Diwa, since the concerned PNP o cials have already
been admonished for failure to comply with the Sandiganbayan's Order.
Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed
a petition for certiorari before us assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 4
September 2014 and 20 May 2015. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 218903.
G.R. No. 219162
On 27 October 2014, the O ce of the Ombudsman, through the O ce of the Special

Prosecutor, led an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Attachment/Garnishment 2 9 against the monies and properties of Revilla to serve as
security for the satisfaction of the amount of P224,512,500.00 alleged as ill-gotten wealth,
in the event that a judgment is rendered against him for plunder. The motion states that
there is an imminent need for the issuance of the ex parte writ to prevent the disappearance
of Revilla's monies and properties found to be prima facie unlawfully acquired, considering
that the AMLC reported that many investment and bank accounts of Revilla were
"terminated immediately before and after the PDAF scandal circulated in [the] media," 3 0 and
Revilla himself publicly con rmed that he closed several bank accounts when the PDAF
scam was exposed. The details of the monies and properties sought to be attached were
attached as Annex "B-Motion" in the prosecution's motion. TIADCc
On 14 November 2014, Revilla led an Opposition 3 1 to the prosecution's motion,

arguing that the factual basis for the issuance of the writ is yet to be proven, and that the
issuance of the writ would unduly preempt the proceedings in his bail application.
On 28 January 2015, the prosecution led an Urgent Motion to Resolve Ex Parte
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment, 3 2 alleging that the
safeguarding of Revilla's properties has become even more necessary after the
Sandiganbayan denied Revilla's bail application and ruled that there is strong evidence of his
guilt.
In a Resolution 3 3 dated 5 February 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution's motion upon nding of its su ciency both in form and substance. The
Sandiganbayan held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is properly
anchored on Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 57, and Sections 1 and 2 (b) and (c) of Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued a Writ of Attachment directed to the Acting
Chief, Sheriff and Security Services of the Sandiganbayan. On 10 July 2015, the
Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's amendatory motion and issued an Alias Writ of
Preliminary Attachment, which included the properties under the known aliases or other
names of Revilla and his spouse, Lani Mercado. 3 4
Revilla led a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in a
Resolution 3 5 dated 28 May 2015. The Sandiganbayan held that the writ of preliminary
attachment is not the penalty of forfeiture envisioned under Section 2 of RA 7080, contrary
to Revilla's argument. The Sandiganbayan further elucidated that the issuance of the writ is
an ancillary remedy which can be availed of during the pendency of the criminal case of
plunder, and it is not necessary to await the nal resolution of the bail petition before it can
be issued.
Thus, Revilla led a petition for certiorari before us assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated 5 February 2015 and 28 May 2015. This petition is docketed as G.R. No.
219162.
In a Resolution 3 6 dated 4 August 2015, the Court En Banc resolved to consolidate
G.R. No. 219162 (Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [First Division] and People of
the Philippines); G.R. No. 218232 (Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [First Division]
and People of the Philippines); G.R. No. 218235 (Richard A. Cambe v. Sandiganbayan [First
Division], People of the Philippines, and O ce of the Ombudsman) ; G.R. No. 218266 (Janet
Lim Napoles v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity
as Ombudsman, and People of the Philippines); and G.R. No. 218903 (People of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], Ramon "Bong" Bautista Revilla, Jr. and Richard
A. Cambe).
In a Resolution 3 7 dated 21 February 2017, the Court En Banc resolved to note the
compliance dated 10 February 2017 led by the counsel of Revilla informing the Court that
Revilla's Motion to Withdraw dated 14 December 2016 pertains only to the petition in G.R.
No. 218232.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 218232, Revilla raises the following issue for resolution:
The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's application for admission to bail despite
the fact that the evidence on record do not show a clear and strong evidence of his
guilt [for] the crime of plunder. 3 8
In G.R. No. 218235, Cambe argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions:
A. The denial of petitioner's application for bail was based on Criminal Procedure
1900 (General Order No. 58), which requires a much lower quantum of proof to deny
bail (i.e., proof of guilt is evident or presumption of guilt is strong), and not on
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which requires proof that
"evidence of guilt is strong."
B. The denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration was based on the
concept of "totality of evidence" which is applicable in Writ of Amparo cases only.
C. Even assuming that "proof evident," "presumption great," or proof that "the
presumption of guilt is strong" are the tests to determine whether petitioner may be
granted or denied bail, the assailed resolutions were based on mere presumptions
and inferences. 3 9
In G.R. No. 218266, Napoles alleged that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in ruling:
A. that the prosecution was able to prove with strong evidence that [Revilla] and
[Cambe] conspired with [Napoles], in amassing, accumulating, and acquiring ill-
gotten wealth. Thus, their petition for bail should be denied.
B. that the hard disk, disbursement ledger and the summary of rebates are
reliable and with integrity.
C. [that] the testimonies of the witnesses and the documents they [submitted are
credible].
D. [that] x x x that the evidence of the prosecution prove[s] plunder. 4 0
In G.R. No. 218903, the O ce of the Ombudsman, through the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor, alleged that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction:
A. when it substituted its own judgment and refused to apply the clear mandate
of [RA 6975].
B. when it denied the transfer of private respondents to a BJMP-operated facility
despite the absence of cogent reasons to justify their detention in a facility other than
that prescribed by law.
C. when it refused to recognize that the continued detention of private
respondents at Camp Crame affords them special treatment and subjects them to
different rules and procedures. 4 1
In G.R. No. 219162, Revilla alleged that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the State's Ex-Parte Motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment considering that:
A. the issuance of the assailed writ is erroneous and premature. The plunder law
does not allow the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, as it amounts to a
prejudgment and violates petitioner's constitutional rights to presumption of
innocence and due process; and
B. there is neither legal nor factual basis for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment or garnishment. 4 2AIDSTE
The Ruling of the Court
G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235, and 218266
At the outset, we note that Revilla withdrew his petition before the Court assailing the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying him bail. In withdrawing his petition, he stated "[he]
will avail of the remedies available to him in [the plunder case before the Sandiganbayan]
once the insu ciency of the evidence against him is established." 4 3 Accordingly, we no
longer nd it necessary to rule upon the issues raised by Revilla in his petition in G.R. No.
218232.
Now, we proceed to determine whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying bail to Cambe and
Napoles, who are charged with the crime of plunder, after nding strong evidence of their
guilt.
Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual
opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules
which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. 4 4 We have held that discretion is guided by: first,
the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which
this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are
deemed to be part of the laws of the land. 4 5 The discretion of the court, once exercised,
cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such
discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 4 6
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong , shall, before conviction, be bailable by
su cient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court emphasizes that offenses punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is
strong:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong , regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The grant or denial of bail in an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as
plunder, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong . This requires the conduct of bail hearings where the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, 4 7 subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal. 4 8 The court is to conduct
only a summary hearing, or such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail . 4 9
The order granting or refusing bail which shall thereafter be issued must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. 5 0 The summary of the evidence shows that
the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been
presented and most importantly, considered. 5 1 The summary of the evidence is the basis
for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. 5 2 Only after weighing the pieces of
evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his discretion. 5 3 Thus,
judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by a nding of the facts relied
upon to form an opinion on the issue before the court. 5 4 It must be exercised regularly,
legally and within the con nes of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. 5 5 Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice, and outright arbitrariness. 5 6
In the present case, we nd that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon
a finding of strong evidence that they committed the crime of plunder in conspiracy with one
another.
Plunder, de ned and penalized under Section 2 5 7 of RA 7080, as amended, has the
following elements: (a) that the offender is a public o cer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by a nity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section
1 (d) 5 8 hereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
In nding that there is strong evidence that petitioners Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles
committed the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan held that:
THE FIRST ELEMENT. Accused Revilla and Cambe were public o cers at the
time material to this case, accused Revilla being a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, and accused Cambe being Revilla's Chief of Staff/Political
O cer/Director III as appearing on the face of the documents on record. Accused
Napoles is a private individual charged in conspiracy with accused Revilla and
Cambe. As provided in Section 2 of RA 7080, "[a]ny person who participated with the
said public o cer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense."
THE SECOND ELEMENT. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The separate and individual acts of accused Revilla, Cambe and Napoles
convincingly appear to have facilitated the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth by accused Revilla. It is immaterial whether or not the prosecution
has presented evidence that accused Cambe and Napoles by themselves have
likewise amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at
least P50 Million each. It is su cient that the prosecution has established that
accused Revilla and accused Cambe have conspired with one another, and with
accused Napoles in the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50 million. AaCTcI
The Court is persuaded that the prosecution has presented compelling

evidence that accused Revilla amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth by
repeatedly receiving from accused Napoles or her representatives or agents, money,
through accused Cambe, and in those several occasions, accused Revilla and/or
Cambe made use of his or their o cial position, authority, connections, and
influence. This was established by the testimonies of the witnesses and the
documents they testi ed to which, at this stage of the proceedings, [have]
remained unrebutted, and thus, given full faith and credence by the Court.
From 2006 to 2009, accused Revilla was earmarked PDAF from the national
budget. He had no physical and direct possession of the fund. However, as the fund
was allocated to his o ce, he alone could trigger its release, after accomplishment
of the necessary documentary requirements. All he had to do, and which he actually
did, was to request its release from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA)
or from the DBM accompanied by a list of projects and endorsement naming a
certain implementing agency on the DBM's menu as project implementor. Finding
everything to be in order, the DBM processed accused Revilla's request, approved it,
and eventually released the SARO. Accused Revilla was informed of this release.
After the SARO, the DBM issued the NCA to cover the cash requirements of the IA
authorized under the SARO. The DBM issued Notice of Cash Allocation Issued (NCAI)
to the Bureau of Treasury. In tranches, the IA issued checks to the NGOs. The NGOs
were paid in full of the project cost upon submission of liquidation reports with
supporting documents, such as delivery receipts, purchase orders and list of
beneficiaries, with corresponding signatures.
xxx xxx xxx
It is well to note that accused Revilla's endorsement consisted of two phases.
The rst phase consisted of letters addressed to PGMA or the DBM requesting for the
release of the PDAF, with attached list of priority projects. Itemized in the list were the
location, name and amount of the project as well as the IA he desired to implement
the project. The second phase consisted of letters to the IAs subsequent to the
issuance of the SARO, this time, endorsing Napoles' NGOs to the IAs as the latter's
project partners.
The endorsement letters and other documents submitted to the IAs show that
accused Revilla's participation did not just stop at initiating the release of his PDAF,
but extended to the implementation stage of his identi ed projects. He sent
communications to the IAs appointing and authorizing accused Cambe to monitor,
follow up, or assist in the implementation of the projects, and "to sign in his behalf all
other documents needed to smooth the process." Accused Cambe, for accused
Revilla, conformed to the project activities and project pro les prepared by the NGOs.
He likewise signed on the tripartite MOAs with the representatives of the IA and the
NGO concerned. Also, accused Cambe, by himself or for accused Revilla, signed
liquidation documents such as accomplishment/terminal reports, reports of
disbursement (fund utilization), inspection and acceptance reports.
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Revilla could not have possibly drawn money from his PDAF
allocation directly to himself. He had to do it through channels or conduits to
camou age the ow with a semblance of legitimacy. Here lies the indispensable
participation of accused Napoles. Like accused Revilla, accused Napoles stayed at
the background, using other people as her tentacles to ful ll her part of the
conspiracy. Although accused Napoles' signature does not appear in any of these
documents, evidence abounds to support that she was the brains behind the vital link
of the conspiracy. Luy, Suñas, Sula and Baltazar, who once worked for accused
Napoles, consistently declared that they moved and acted upon the instruction of
Napoles, from the creation of fake NGOs to the diversion of the proceeds of the
PDAF. Accused Napoles engineered the creation of the NGOs through which the
proceeds of accused Revilla's PDAF were funneled.
Evidence discloses that the NGOs were illicitly established for some dishonest
purpose. Their presidents and incorporators either have working or personal relations
to accused Napoles, or unknown to her, or ctitious. The addresses of the NGOs were
either the location of her property or that of her employees whom she made
presidents, or otherwise inexistent. The lists of bene ciaries were bogus, and this
was con rmed by the COA during its own investigation where it was found that either
there were no projects implemented or there were no such names of bene ciaries
that existed.
Accused Napoles' connection to and control of the NGOs are made
evident by the bank transactions of the NGOs. Records of bank
transactions of these NGOs reveal, as testi ed to by witness Santos from
the AMLC, that the accounts of these NGOs with the Landbank and
Metrobank were only temporary repository of funds and that the
withdrawal from the accounts of the NGOs had to be con rmed rst with
accused Napoles notwithstanding that the accounts were not under her
name. It is well to note that the bank accounts of these NGOs were opened
by the named presidents using JLN Corp. identi cation cards. These
circumstances are consistent to the testimonies of accused Luy, Sula,
Suñas and Baltazar that as soon as the check of the PDAF proceeds were
encashed, accused Napoles directed them or any of her trusted employees
to withdraw the same. At this stage, the Court sees no basis to doubt the
strong evidence against accused Napoles.
Accused Revilla managed to remain incognito in reaping bene ts from the
illegal scheme with the help and cooperation of accused Cambe. Concededly, there
are no direct proofs that accused Revilla received commissions/rebates out of the
proceeds of his PDAF routed to accused Napoles, but the circumstances persuasively
attest that accused Revilla on several occasions, received money from the
illegitimate deals involving his PDAF, through accused Cambe. Also, accused Cambe
profited from the same transactions so far computed at P13,935,000.00.
There are solid reasons to infer that accused Cambe acted on behalf
of accused Revilla and with the latter's imprimatur , and that accused
Revilla effectively clothed accused Cambe with full authority. Consider
these: (1) accused Cambe worked for Revilla in the Senate; (2) accused
Revilla designated accused Cambe to follow up, supervise and act on his
behalf for the implementation of the projects, and to sign necessary
documents; (3) accused Cambe, representing accused Revilla or Revilla's
o ce, signed the MOAs and other documents used to support the
issuance of the checks from the IA to accused Napoles' NGOs to
supposedly nance the projects out of accused Revilla's PDAF. Accused
Cambe likewise signed liquidation documents such as accomplishment
reports; (4) Luy, Suñas, and Sula forthrightly and positively identi ed
Cambe to have received from them or from accused Napoles the
commissions/rebates of accused Revilla; (5) the said witnesses likewise
candidly testi ed that accused Cambe also personally got his own
commission either from them or from accused Napoles; (6) Luy had
recorded the commissions/rebates per his testimony, and as shown by his
disbursement ledgers and Summary of Rebates. These points may rest
heavily on the credibility of the witnesses. But, as discussed, the Court, in
the meantime, saw no cogent justification to invalidate their testimonies.
xxx xxx xxx
THE THIRD ELEMENT. Of the Php224,512,500.00 alleged in the Information to
have been plundered by accused Revilla and/or Cambe, the prosecution has so far
strongly proven the amount of P103,000,000.00 broken down below. This is the total
amount received by accused Cambe for Revilla, to which Luy, Sula and Suñas have
testified to their personal knowledge. In other words, Luy, Sula or Suñas either directly
handed the money to accused Cambe, or they saw accused Napoles, or any one of
them, give the money to accused Cambe. Thus: EcTCAD
Date Amount
April 6, 2006 Php5,000,000.00
June 6, 2006 5,000,000.00
March 27, 2007 7,500,000.00
April 12, 2007 9,500,000.00
April 19, 2007 3,000,000.00
August 10, 2007 3,000,000.00
2008 10,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
October 6, 2009 9,000,000.00
October 6, 2009 9,000,000.00
October 6, 2009 2,000.000.00
October 22, 2009 12,000,000.00
October 22, 2009 8,000,000.00
March 2010 15,000,000.00
Total Php103,000,000.00 5 9
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Sandiganbayan exercised its judicial discretion within the bounds of the
Constitution, law, rules, and jurisprudence after appreciating and evaluating the evidence
submitted by the parties.
During the bail hearings, both parties were afforded opportunities to offer their
evidence. The prosecution presented nine witnesses and documentary evidence to prove
the strong evidence of guilt of the accused. The defense likewise introduced evidence in its
own rebuttal and cross-examined the witnesses presented by the prosecution. Only after
both parties rested their case that the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution, which contains
the summary of the prosecution's evidence. The summary of the prosecution's evidence
shows the basis for the Sandiganbayan's discretion to deny bail to Cambe and Napoles.
In nding strong evidence of guilt against Cambe, the Sandiganbayan considered the
PDAF documents and the whistleblowers' testimonies in nding that Cambe received, for
Revilla, the total amount of P103,000,000.00, in return for Revilla's endorsement of the NGOs
of Napoles as the recipients of Revilla's PDAF. It gave weight to Luy's summary of rebates
and disbursement ledgers containing Cambe's receipt of money, which Luy obtained from
his hard drive. The Sandiganbayan likewise admitted Narciso as expert witness, who
attested to the integrity of Luy's hard drive and the files in it.
In nding strong evidence of guilt against Napoles, the Sandiganbayan considered the
AMLC Report, as attested by witness Santos, stating that Napoles controlled the NGOs,
which were the recipients of Revilla's PDAF. The Sandiganbayan found that the
circumstances stated in the AMLC Report, particularly that the bank accounts of these
NGOs were opened by the named presidents using JLN Corp. IDs, these accounts are
temporary repository of funds, and the withdrawal from these accounts had to be confirmed
first with Napoles, are consistent with the whistleblowers' testimonies that they were named
presidents of Napoles' NGOs and they withdrew large amounts of cash from the NGOs'
bank accounts upon instruction of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan also took note of the COA
report, as con rmed by the testimony of Garcia, that Revilla's PDAF projects failed to
comply with the law, Napoles' NGOs were fake, no projects were implemented and the
suppliers selected to supply the NGOs were questionable.
Accordingly, there is no basis for the allegation of Cambe that the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions were based on mere presumptions and inferences. On the other hand, the
Sandiganbayan considered the entire record of evidence in finding strong evidence of guilt.
For purposes of bail, we held in People v. Cabral 6 0 that: "[b]y judicial discretion, the
law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is
strong. 'Proof evident' or 'Evident proof' in this connection has been held to mean clear,
strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the
guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered. 'Presumption great' exists when the circumstances testi ed to are such
that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong , clear, and
convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of
any other conclusion. " 6 1 The weight of evidence necessary for bail purposes is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but strong evidence of guilt, or "proof evident," or "presumption
great." A nding of "proof evident" or "presumption great" is not inconsistent with the
determination of strong evidence of guilt, contrary to Cambe's argument.
Cambe further alleged that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in relying
on the concept of totality of evidence, which only applies in writ of amparo cases. To
support this argument, Cambe's previous counsel cited Razon, Jr v. Tagitis. 6 2
We speci cally held in Razon that the: "unique situations that call for the issuance of
the writ [of amparo], as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address
these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in
ordinary court actions and proceedings." 6 3 Thus, the case of Razon should not have been
applied in this case. On the other hand, as we held in People v. Cabral: "[e]ven though there is
a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the
presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused." 6 4
Accordingly, an examination of the entire record — totality of evidence — is
necessary to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt, for purposes of
granting or denying bail to the accused.
In their separate petitions before us, Cambe and Napoles attempt to individually
refute each evidence presented by the prosecution. In his petition, Cambe alleges that there
was even no evidence that: (1) he is a public o cer; and (2) he and Napoles also amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00. Napoles, on the other
hand, argues that there was no direct evidence that Revilla amassed ill-gotten wealth. In
addition, Napoles argues that: (1) the whistleblowers' testimonies lack credibility and are
hearsay because of their admission that they never saw Revilla talk with Napoles about their
alleged agreement; (2) the AMLC report is multiple hearsay; and (3) the hard disk,
disbursement ledger, and summary of rebates are not reliable because Narciso is not an
expert witness, and the entries in the disbursement ledger are hearsay. In short, Cambe and
Napoles question the conclusions of the Sandiganbayan insofar as its appreciation of the
facts is concerned.
Generally, the factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan are binding upon the Court. 6 5
However, this general rule is subject to some exceptions, among them: (1) when the
conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) said ndings of facts are conclusions
without citation of speci c evidence on which they are based; and (6) the ndings of fact of
the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. 6 6 HSAcaE

We will not set aside the factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan, absent any showing
that the Sandiganbayan exercised its discretion out of whim, caprice, and outright
arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
In any event, Cambe is estopped from claiming that he is not a public o cer. Cambe
himself admitted in his Application for Bail that "while accused Cambe is a public
officer , he did not act by himself or in connivance with members of his family x x x." 6 7
Furthermore, such is a factual finding of the Sandiganbayan, which is binding before us.
Also, there is no need to prove that Cambe and Napoles likewise amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 or that Revilla talked
with Napoles about their alleged agreement. The charge against them is conspiracy to
commit plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , 6 8 we held that "the gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal
gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused
ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions,
gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for [petitioner Estrada] . " 6 9 Also, proof of the
agreement need not rest on direct evidence , as the agreement itself may be inferred
from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. 7 0 It is not necessary to show that two or
more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried
out. 7 1 Thus, in Guy v. People of the Philippines , 7 2 we held that conspiracy was properly
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan because even though there was no direct proof that
petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government and give unwarranted bene ts to a
certain corporation, their individual acts when taken together as a whole showed that they
were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The
conspiracy to commit plunder need not even be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but only
for purposes of determining whether bail shall be granted.
Moreover, in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we held
that the trial court's — the Sandiganbayan's — assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, sometimes even with nality. 7 3 This Court will not interfere with
that assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material
facts or gravely abused its discretion. 7 4 Minor and insigni cant inconsistencies in the
testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses, for they show
that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed. 7 5 Moreover, the testimony of a witness
must be considered in its entirety and not merely in its truncated parts. 7 6 Similarly, we held
that "the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion." 7 7
As for the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to whistleblowers' testimonies, expert's
testimony, AMLC report, the hard disk, disbursement ledger and summary of rebates, we
emphasize that for purposes of bail, the court does not try the merits or enter into
any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused , nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may
be offered therein. 7 8 The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may con ne itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination. 7 9
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 8 0 The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 8 1
We nd that the Sandiganbayan was far from abusive of its discretion. On the
contrary, its ndings were based on the evidence extant in the records. In its appreciation
and evaluation of the evidence against Cambe and Napoles, the Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in nding that the prosecution established strong
evidence of their guilt.
G.R. No. 218903
We nd that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the prosecution's motion to transfer the
detention of Revilla and Cambe from the PNP Custodial Center to a BJMP-operated facility.
The Rules of Court provide that an arrest is the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. 8 2 An arrest is
made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest . 8 3 Section 24 of RA 6975, or An Act
Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior
and Local Government, and for Other Purposes, provides that: "The Philippine National
Police (PNP) shall have the following powers and functions: x x x (e) Detain an arrested
person for a period not beyond what is prescribed by law, informing the person so detained
of all his rights under the Constitution; x x x." The Revised PNP Police Operational
Procedures Manual provides that: "any person arrested due to the commission of a crime/s
can be detained/admitted in the PNP Detention/Custodial Center." 8 4 As de ned in the
Revised PNP Police Operational Procedures Manual, 8 5 a detention/Custodial Center is an
institution secured by the PNP Units concerned for the purpose of providing short term
custody of [a] detention prisoner thereby affording his safety and preventing escape
while awaiting the court's disposition of the case or his transfer to the appropriate
penal institution.
In the present case, both Revilla and Cambe voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan upon the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them, albeit with motion
to elect the detention facilities in the PNP Custodial Center. Upon their voluntary surrender,
they are deemed arrested and taken into custody. The Sandiganbayan thereafter allowed
both Revilla and Cambe to be detained in the PNP Custodial Center barracks. Under the
Rules of Court, the court, such as the Sandiganbayan in the present case, shall exercise
supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary
detention. 8 6
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not speci cally pointed out
by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules. 8 7 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
acted within its jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in ordering the commitment of
Revilla and Cambe in the PNP Custodial Center. HESIcT
Clearly, Section 24 of RA 6975 vests authority in the PNP to detain arrested persons
such as Revilla and Cambe, and the Revised PNP Police Operational Procedures Manual
includes the PNP Detention/Custodial Center as an institution where any person arrested
due to the commission of a crime/s can be detained/admitted.
The prosecution, however, anchors its motion to transfer the detention of Revilla and
Cambe on Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and Section 63 of RA 6975. Section 3,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that: "It shall be the duty of the o cer executing the
warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without
unnecessary delay." On the other hand, Section 63 of RA 6975 provides:
SECTION 63. Establishment of District, City or Municipal Jail. — There shall be
established and maintained in every district, city and municipality a secured, clean,
adequately equipped and sanitary jail for the custody and safekeeping of city and
municipal prisoners, any fugitive from justice, or person detained awaiting
investigation or trial and/or transfer to the national penitentiary, and/or violent
mentally ill person who endangers himself or the safety of others, duly certi ed as
such by the proper medical or health o cer, pending the transfer to a medical
institution.
The municipal or city jail service shall preferably be headed by a graduate of a
four (4) year course in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, nursing, social work or
criminology who shall assist in the immediate rehabilitation of individuals or
detention of prisoners. Great care must be exercised so that the human rights of
[these] prisoners are respected and protected, and their spiritual and physical well-
being are properly and promptly attended to.
However, both Section 3 of Rule 113 and Section 63 of RA 6975 are inapplicable in the
present case. It must be noted that Revilla and Cambe voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan, and there is no opportunity for the arresting o cer to execute the warrants
of arrest against them. Moreover, the said rule merely refers to the duty of the arresting
o cer to deliver the arrested person to the nearest police station or jail. The rule did not
state about the duty "to detain" the arrested person to the nearest police station or jail.
There is nothing in the rule referring to the place of detention of the arrested person.
In the same manner, there is nothing in Section 63 of RA 6975 which expressly
mandates and limits the place of detention in BJMP-controlled facilities. On the other hand,
it merely provides that: "there shall be established and maintained in every district, city and
municipality a secured, clean, adequately equipped and sanitary jail x x x." When the language
of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application.
Section 61 of the same law states that the BJMP shall exercise supervision and
control over all city and municipal jails, while the provincial jails shall be supervised and
controlled by the provincial government within its jurisdiction. 8 8 Evidently, a provincial jail is
a place of detention not within the supervision and control of the BJMP. From the law itself,
there are places of detention for the accused, which are not within the control and
supervision of the BJMP.
Thus, to argue, as the prosecution did, that Revilla and Cambe's detention in the PNP
Custodial Center afforded them special treatment because it is not a jail supervised by the
BJMP would be similar to saying that detention of an accused in a provincial jail supervised
by the provincial government would afford such accused special treatment.
Aside from its bare statements, the prosecution did not advance compelling reasons
to justify the transfer of detention of Revilla and Cambe. The prosecution likewise failed to
substantiate its allegation of special treatment towards Revilla. As the Sandiganbayan
properly held:
The prosecution failed to advance compelling and reasonable grounds to
justify the transfer of accused Revilla and Cambe from the PNP Custodial Center,
Camp Crame, to a BJMP controlled jail. Since their detention at the PNP Custodial
Center on June 20, 2014, the conditions of their con nement have not been altered
by circumstances that would frustrate the very purpose of their detention. Both
accused have submitted themselves to the Court when required. No concrete
incidents have been cited by the prosecution to establish that their continued
detention in Camp Crame is no longer viable, and that the better part of discretion is
to transfer them to a BJMP controlled jail. The prosecution does not articulate what
is in a BJMP facility that the PNP Custodial Center lacks, or vice versa, which will
make a difference in the administration of justice.
Before the Court is simply a general proposition that the accused should be
con ned in a BJMP controlled detention facility based on some rules, which the
Court have previously discussed to be unacceptable, backed up by an
unsubstantiated generic declaration that the PNP Custodial Center affords them
special treatment not extended to all other detention prisoners under BJMP control.
To the prosecution, this is a violation of the constitutional right to equal protection of
the other detention prisoners, like Atty. Reyes, who is now detained in a BJMP facility.
But, the Court is not convinced. To agree with the prosecution on the matter of
special treatment is to accept a general notion that the public o cers in a BJMP
facility are more circumspect in the handling of detention prisoners than in a non-
BJMP facility, like the PNP Custodial Center. Verily, the "special treatment," e.g.,
wedding anniversary celebration of Senator Jinggoy Estrada claimed by the
prosecution, does not go with the place. It has even nothing to do with accused
Revilla and Cambe. "Special treatment" is a judgment call by the people concerned in
the place. For no matter which detention place will accused Revilla and Cambe be
con ned if the people controlling that place would extend them privileges not usually
given to other detention prisoners, there would always be that dreaded "special
treatment." Thus, special treatment can be addressed by ensuring that the people
around the accused in their present detention facility will deter from giving them
exceptional bene ts, through a rm implementation of policies and measures, and
the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance. The "special treatment" cannot be
remedied by transferring the accused to another detention facility. The transfer must
be reasonably justified.
The Court solicitously agrees that it is the fact of detention and not the place
of detention that is important. x x x. 8 9
In its Resolution dated 20 May 2015, the Sandiganbayan stated that it so took into
account, considering the circumstances of the accused, the security conditions of the place,
and its proximity to the court. 9 0 With these factors, the Sandiganbayan viewed that the PNP
Custodial Center would be able to secure the accused and ensure their attendance at trial, at
a reasonable cost to the government. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the
factual ndings of the Sandiganbayan are binding upon the Court. We a rm the order of the
Sandiganbayan directing the PNP-CIDG "to keep the accused in its custody at the aforesaid
barracks (PNP Custodial Center Barracks) and not allow the accused to be moved, removed,
or relocated until further orders from the court." 9 1 caITAC
G.R. No. 219162
We nd that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment against Revilla's monies and properties.
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to jointly determine in the same proceeding the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability, considering that
the ling of the criminal action before the Sandiganbayan is deemed to necessarily carry
with it the ling of the civil action. 9 2 The same law provides that the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings led with the
Sandiganbayan. 9 3 The Rules of Court state that the provisional remedies in civil actions,
insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal action. 9 4
The grounds for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment have been
provided in Rule 57 and Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Rule 127 states that the provisional
remedy of attachment on the property of the accused may be availed of to serve as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused when the
criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public o cer, in the
course of his employment as such, or when the accused has concealed, removed
or disposed of his property or is about to do so. 9 5 Similarly, Rule 57 provides that
attachment may issue: "x x x (b) in an action for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public o cer x x x; (c) in
an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or
converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or
disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized
person; x x x." 9 6
It is indispensable for the writ of preliminary attachment to issue that there exists a
prima facie factual foundation for the attachment of properties, and an adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nulli cation. 9 7 Considering
the harsh and rigorous nature of a writ of preliminary attachment, the court must ensure that
all the requisites of the law have been complied with; otherwise, the court which issues it
acts in excess of its jurisdiction. 9 8
Thus, for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment to be valid, an
a davit of merit and an applicant's bond must be led with the court in which the action is
pending. 9 9 For the a davit of merit, Section 3 of the same rule states that: "[a]n order of
attachment shall be granted only when it is made to appear by the a davit of the applicant
or some other person who personally knows of the facts that a su cient cause of action
exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof, that there is no su cient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to
applicant or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover is as
much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims." The mere
ling of an a davit reciting the facts required by Section 3, however, is not enough to
compel the judge to grant the writ of preliminary attachment. 1 0 0 Whether or not the
a davit su ciently established facts therein stated is a question to be determined by the
court in the exercise of its discretion. 1 0 1 The su ciency or insu ciency of an a davit
depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance or rejection,
upon his sound discretion. 1 0 2 On the requirement of a bond, when the State is the applicant,
the filing of the attachment bond is excused. 1 0 3
We nd that the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction since all the requisites for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment have been complied with.
Revilla, while still a public o cer, is charged with plunder, committed by amassing,
accumulating, and acquiring ill-gotten wealth, through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts, as follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary bene t from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to bene t
particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of o cial position, authority, relationship,
connection or in uence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. 1 0 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the crime of plunder is based on a claim for public funds or property
misappropriated, converted, misused, or malversed by the accused who is a public officer, in
the course of his employment as such. The ling of the criminal action for plunder, which is
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, 1 0 5 is deemed to necessarily carry with it the
ling of the civil action. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary attachment is an available
provisional remedy in the criminal action for plunder.
In its Motion, the prosecution alleged that: "[Revilla] converted for his own use or
caused to be converted for the use by unauthorized persons the sum of Php515,740,000.00
worth of public funds sourced from his PDAF through 'ghost' projects." 1 0 6 In Cambe v.
O ce of the Ombudsman , 1 0 7 we agreed with the Ombudsman's nding of probable cause
against Revilla and held that for purposes of arriving at a nding of probable cause, "only
facts su cient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not
absolute certainty." Thus, we held that the prosecution's evidence established a prima facie
case for plunder against Revilla:
Taking together all of the above-stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO
reports tend to prima facie establish that irregularities had indeed
attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and that he had a hand
in such anomalous releases, being the head of O ce which
unquestionably exercised operational control thereof . As the Ombudsman
correctly observed, "[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a
Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects
and programs. He indorsed [Napoles'] NGOs in consideration for the remittance of
kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-
funded projects turned out to be 'ghost projects,' and that the rest of the PDAF
allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause
to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."
Hence, he should stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. For the same
reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least P50,000,000.00
(i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or acquired through a
combination or series of overt acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore,
Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder. 1 0 8 (Emphasis supplied)
ICHDca
Thus, contrary to Revilla's insinuations, there exists a prima facie factual foundation
for the attachment of his monies and properties.
Furthermore, in its Resolution dated 1 December 2014 denying bail to Revilla, the
Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution duly established with strong evidence that Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one another, committed the crime of plunder. The
nding of strong evidence for purposes of bail is a greater quantum of proof required than
prima facie factual foundation for the attachment of properties. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
properly exercised its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment upon
appreciating and evaluating the evidence against Revilla.
Moreover, the A davit of Merit attached to the Motion and executed by graft
investigators of Revilla's PDAF likewise established that (1) a su cient cause of action
exists for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment; (2) the case is one of those
mentioned in Sections 57 and 127 of the Rules of Court, and (3) that Revilla has no visible
su cient security in the event that judgment is rendered against him. The su ciency of the
a davit depends upon the amount of credit given by the Sandiganbayan, and its
acceptance, upon its sound discretion. We refuse to interfere in its exercise of discretion,
absent any showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
Even assuming that plunder is not based on a claim for public funds or property
misappropriated, converted, misused or malversed by the public o cer, the prosecution
nevertheless alleged that Revilla has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is
about to do so, which is another ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment. The AMLC report, attached to the Motion, states that many investment and
bank accounts of Revilla were "terminated immediately before and after the PDAF scandal
circulated in [the] media," and Revilla himself publicly con rmed that he closed several bank
accounts when the PDAF scam was exposed. Revilla failed to rebut these allegations with
any evidence.
Considering that the requirements for its issuance have been complied with, the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment by the Sandiganbayan is in order.
Contrary to Revilla's allegation, a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even
without a hearing. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court states that: "[a]n order of
attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the
court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and
must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of
the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be su cient to
satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as
hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that xed in the order, which may be the amount
su cient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as
stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs. x x x."
I n Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 1 0 9 this Court ruled that "a
hearing on a motion or application for preliminary attachment is not generally necessary
unless otherwise directed by the trial court in its discretion." 1 1 0 In the same case, the Court
declared that "[n]othing in the Rules of Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and
mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ of attachment." 1 1 1 Moreover, there is an
obvious need to avoid alerting suspected possessors of "ill-gotten" wealth and thereby
cause that disappearance or loss of property precisely sought to be prevented. 1 1 2 In any
case, Revilla was given an adequate and fair opportunity to contest its issuance.
Also, contrary to Revilla's allegation, there is no need for a nal judgment of ill-gotten
wealth, and a preliminary attachment is entirely different from the penalty of forfeiture
imposed upon the nal judgment of conviction under Section 2 of RA 7080. By its nature, a
preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable
the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main
or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. 1 1 3 As such, it is
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the
ultimate effects of a nal judgment in the case . 1 1 4 The remedy of attachment is
provisional and temporary, designed for particular exigencies, attended by no character of
permanency or finality, and always subject to the control of the issuing court. 1 1 5
On the other hand, Section 2 of RA 7080 requires that upon conviction, the court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State. The State may avail of the provisional remedy of attachment
to secure the preservation of these unexplained wealth and income, in the event that a
judgment of conviction and forfeiture is rendered. The ling of an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is a necessary incident in forfeiture cases. 1 1 6 It
is needed to protect the interest of the government and to prevent the removal,
concealment, and disposition of properties in the hands of unscrupulous public o cers. 1 1 7
Otherwise, even if the government subsequently wins the case, it will be left holding an
empty bag. 1 1 8 TCAScE
This Decision does not touch upon the guilt or innocence of any of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE , we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit and AFFIRM the assailed
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Martires,
Tijam and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Jardeleza * and Caguioa, * JJ., took no part.
Reyes, Jr. J., I join the dissent of J. Velasco.
Separate Opinions
VELASCO, JR. , J., concurring and dissenting :
I concur with the majority's finding that Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of Senator
Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) and Richard Cambe (Cambe) from the PNP Custodial
Center to a BJMP-operated facility. However, on the matter of Revilla's supposed waiver of
his right to bail, I digress from the majority's opinion. And consistent with my position in
Cambe v. O ce of the Ombudsman, 1 I dissent from the ponencia insofar as it denies
Cambe's application for bail and sustains the graft court's issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment against Revilla's monies and properties.
Withdrawal of Petition in G.R. No. 218232
is not a waiver of the right to bail
I cannot concur with the position that Revilla's withdrawal of his petition in G.R. No.
218232 amounts to a waiver of his constitutional right to bail. Waiver of a right by
implication cannot be presumed. In criminal cases where life, liberty and property are all at
stake, obviously, the rule on waiver cannot be any less. 2 Jurisprudence illustrates that there
are (3) essential elements of a valid waiver: "(a) existence of a right; (b) the knowledge of the
existence thereof; and, (c) an intention to relinquish such right." 3 In People v. Bodoso , 4 this
Court held that the last element — the intention to relinquish the right — does not exist where
there is a reservation or a nature of any manifestation of a proposed action, viz.:
It is elementary that the existence of waiver must be positively demonstrated since a
waiver by implication cannot be presumed. The standard of waiver requires that it
"not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
su cient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." There
must thus be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be easily construed as surrender thereof;
the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and
validity of such waiver. Necessarily, where there is a reservation as to the nature of
any manifestation or proposed action affecting the right of the accused to be heard
before he is condemned, certainly, the doubt must be resolved in his favor to be
allowed to proffer evidence in his behalf.
Here, while Revilla withdrew his petition in G.R. No. 218232, he made the following
reservation:
Considering, however, that the presentation of prosecution evidence in the Plunder
Case below will already commence on 12 January 2017, and that trial will be
conducted every Thursday thereafter, petitioner will avail of the remedies
available to him in said proceedings once the insu ciency of the evidence
against him is established . 5
The absence of the intent to relinquish his right to bail is clear from Revilla's foregoing
statement. In fact, nothing therein shows his awareness that by withdrawing his Petition, he
was thereby abandoning his right to bail. On the contrary, Revilla clarified his intent to avail of
the remedies available to him. This necessarily includes the remedy of applying for bail.
In addition, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that in his Petition before the
Court in G.R. No. 236174, which assails the Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer to Evidence, Revilla even prayed, as an interim relief, that the Court grant him
bail. His lack of intent to abandon his right to bail should not, therefore, be gainsaid. Waiver
of a right is a matter of intention and must not be inferred by this Court in the face of clear
statements to the contrary.
This Court's ruling in People v. Donato 6 relied upon by the ponencia does not
foreclose Revilla's right to be admitted to bail. The factual circumstances in Donato and this
case are entirely different. In Donato, therein detainee, private respondent Rodolfo Salas,
withdrew his petition for habeas corpus, but with an explicit agreement with the government
that he would "remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his
person." 7 This is the reason why the Court in Donato ruled that there was a waiver of Salas'
right to be admitted to bail. Unlike Donato, no such express act or statement on the part of
petitioner Revilla is present.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that an order disposing a petition for bail is merely
interlocutory 8 and does not attain nality. 9 Precedent con rms this point. In the recent
case of People v. Escobar , 1 0 the Court recognized that a person may le a second
application for bail, even after bail has been previously denied.
With the foregoing, to conclude that petitioner Revilla waived his right to bail despite
his express intention is unwarranted. Revilla must be given the chance, should he so choose,
to again invoke and prove his right to bail.
On Cambe's Application for Bail
The Constitution prohibits the deprivation of a person's liberty and detention in the
absence of probable cause. As I discussed in my opinion in Cambe, 1 1 this probable cause
requirement to indict, and thus detain Cambe has not been satisfied, viz.:
Cambe
As to Cambe, the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution of the respondent OOMB
briefly outlines his alleged participation in the conspiracy, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
In ne, the Ombudsman, in its Joint Resolution, attempted to establish
Cambe's liability by presenting an elaborate, complicated scheme wherein he
purportedly conspired with Revilla, et al. and the whistleblowers to allegedly enable
Revilla to illegally acquire and amass portions of the PDAF through kickbacks.cTDaEH
Cambe's participation in the alleged conspiracy scheme to amass wealth,

therefore, hinges on his participation as staff member of Sen. Revilla, and his
purported signatures on the PDAF documents. On this point, Cambe argued that all
his signatures in the PDAF documents were forged, and, thus, his participation in the
conspiracy scheme has not been adequately established.
To underscore his point, he presented the examination report dated December
5, 2013 of Atty. Pagui, the forensic document examiner who examined the purported
signatures of Cambe appearing on the PDAF documents, and compared them with
various standard signatures presented by Cambe. In his report, Atty. Pagui
concluded:
xxx xxx xxx
Interestingly, the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution of the respondent
Ombudsman did not once mention the examination report of Atty. Pagui, nor did it
squarely address the allegation of forgery. It immediately dismissed the argument by
saying:
Forgery is not presumed, it must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Further, as gathered from the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, the fact of
Cambe, acting on his own as a public o cer, amassing or acquiring ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) through any of the means
provided under the plunder law or acting in violation of RA 3019 has not been
demonstrated.
The Ombudsman simply relied heavily on the statements of Luy, Sula, and
Suñas, who confessed to having conspired with Napoles in executing this scheme.
From their statements, the Ombudsman pieced together the participation of Revilla,
Cambe, and the other petitioners. Thus, Cambe asserts that the whistleblowers'
statements cannot be used against him under the res inter alios acta rule.
Respondents, through the OSG, claim that the case against Cambe fall under
the exception to such rule.
I am unable to agree. The exception to the res inter alios acta rule, as earlier
indicated, in Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
xxx xxx xxx
The requisites to bring a given set of facts under the exception to the res inter
alios acta rule were not met in the present case. Consider:
First, the alleged conspiracy has yet to be established by competent evidence.
Except for the whistleblowers' admissions/statements, no other evidence was
adduced to show that Cambe agreed to commit plunder or any crime. In fact, these
statements heavily relied upon do not even establish Cambe's participation in the
scheme or imply any wrongdoing on his part. The PDAF documents made much of
by respondents are tainted with falsehood, as the whistleblowers themselves
admitted, and can hardly be viewed to be independent and credible evidence to
establish said conspiracy.
The fact that some of the PDAF Documents Cambe purportedly signed were
notarized is of no moment in light of the admissions made by the "whistle-blowers"
that they themselves did the "notarization." In his Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated September 12, 2013, Luy admitted that Napoles' employees kept the
dry seals and notarial registers of several notary publics and used them to "notarize"
the PDAF Documents:
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the PDAF Documents by themselves are not reliable evidence of
Cambe's complicity in the conspiracy to funnel funds out of the PDAF.
Second, Luy, Sula, and Suñas' admissions pertain to their own acts in
perpetrating the scheme Napoles designed. This includes the forging and
falsi cation of o cial documents to make it appear their issuance was authorized
by legislators and their staff. Any alleged participation of Cambe as related to by the
whistleblowers is hearsay considering that their supposed knowledge as to Cambe's
role has Napoles, as source.
Moreover, Cambe's alleged receipt of P224,512,500.00 for Revilla and 5% for
himself from the years 2006 to 2010, which purportedly represent their commissions,
"rebates," or "kickbacks" for endorsing Napoles' NGOs was never corroborated by any
independent evidence aside from the whistleblowers' testimonies. The business
ledgers Luy submitted cannot be considered as such independent evidence since
they are still based on Luy's statement. The allegation made by Cunanan of the TRC
in his counter-a davit pertaining to his phone conversation with Cambe and Revilla,
has not been corroborated and does not establish any wrongdoing on the part of
Cambe or Revilla.
Finally, public respondents never refuted the fact that these statements were
made after the purported conspiracy had ceased. Luy, Sula, and Suñas only executed
their respective admissions/statements sometime in September 2013, long after they
have completed the alleged scheme.
What may be taken as independent evidence gathered during the FIO and the
NBI's investigations consisted of endorsement letters, MOAs, and other
documentation. They are of little evidentiary value, however, as they have been
shown to have been falsi ed and forged by Luy, Sula, and Suñas upon Napoles'
instructions. The COA report which found PDAF projects to be inexistent or have
never been implemented is also insu cient as to Cambe, as his alleged participation
is predicated on the forged indorsement letters, MOAs, and other documents. Even
the MOAs allegedly executed by the NGOs, the implementing agencies, and Cambe
as representative of Revilla, were admitted to have been "notarized" by Napoles'
cohorts, not by legitimate notaries. Owing to this aberration, the MOAs do not enjoy
the presumption of regularity and cannot be considered to be credible evidence to
establish probable cause against Cambe.
Aside from the whistleblowers' own admission of forgery, handwriting experts
Azores and Pagui had evaluated the authenticity of the PDAF documents and had
determined that the signatures on the PDAF documents were not made by one and
the same person. The testimonies of these experts cannot simply be swept aside by
mere resort to legal arguments, but must be addressed and refuted by superior
contrary evidence. Until then, the shifted burden to establish the authenticity of the
documents rests with public respondents. The evaluation by the Special Panel of
Investigators as to such authenticity would not, in context, su ce to overturn the
expert testimonies of Azores and Pagui since the Special Panel is not experts in the
field of handwriting analysis.cSaATC
The Ombudsman's selective appreciation of certain critical testimonial

evidence is a badge of grave abuse of discretion. She, for instance, accepted as
gospel truth the accusatory statements of Luy, Sula, and Suñas insofar as the
alleged participation of Revilla and Cambe in the scam is concerned, but in the same
breath disregarded their admission of forgery and fabrication of the PDAF
documents. In ne, the Ombudsman viewed as true those portions of the
whistleblowers' statements which would support the prosecution's version despite
contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
Considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach thus taken by
the Ombudsman, I submit that this Court should have exercised its power of judicial
review. Tolerating the practice of establishing probable cause based on
forged or questionable documents would expose the criminal justice
system to malicious prosecution . It will create a dangerous precedent. It will
encourage unscrupulous individuals to le trumped up charges based on ctitious,
spurious, or manipulated documents. Malicious lawsuits designed to harass the
innocent will proliferate, in clear violation of their rights enshrined by no less than the
Constitution. This, I cannot allow.
Without the satisfaction of the lower standard of probable cause, there cannot be a
strong evidence of guilt that could warrant Cambe's continuous detention. Therefore, I
submit that, at the very least, he should be released on bail.
As relevant here, and consistent with the doctrine on the presumption of innocence
accorded to accused, this Court has ruled that the sole purpose of con ning an accused in
jail before conviction is to assure his presence at the trial. Citing Montana v. Ocampo, 1 2 this
Court wrote:
In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important
factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of con ning accused in jail before
conviction, it has been observed, is to secure his presence at the trial. In other words,
if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would ee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should
be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's o cial
and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seem remote if not nil.
Thus, in this Court's July 12, 2016 Resolution in Enrile, 1 3 the Court stated that the
right to bail "should be curtailed only if the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high,"
taking into consideration circumstances such as the accused's past and present disposition
of respect for the legal processes, the length of his public service, and his individual public
and private reputation, thus:
Secondly, the imputation of "preferential treatment" in "undue favor" of the
petitioner is absolutely bereft of basis. A reading of the decision of August 18, 2015
indicates that the Court did not grant his provisional liberty because he was a sitting
Senator of the Republic. It did so because there were proper bases — legal as well as
factual — for the favorable consideration and treatment of his plea for provisional
liberty on bail. By its decision, the Court has recognized his right to bail by
emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only if the risks of ight from this
jurisdiction were too high. In our view, however, the records demonstrated that the
risks of ight were low, or even nil. The Court has taken into consideration other
circumstances, such as his advanced age and poor health, his past and present
disposition of respect for the legal processes, the length of his public service, and his
individual public and private reputation.
Given these precedents, this case should raise questions about whether the Cambe is
a ight risk who will jump bail should they be provisionally released. I maintain that Cambe is
not. To recall, Cambe surrendered within hours after the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant for
his arrest. Four (4) years have passed since trial in the plunder case ensued, without any
report of any misdeed or attempts to escape on his part. Clearly, Cambe cannot be
categorized as being the same as those who usually jump bail, shadowy characters
mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can ee from the
retribution of justice. Thus, I submit that his application for bail should have been considered
and granted by the Sandiganbayan.
The issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment against
Revilla is not warranted.
For the reasons set forth in my opinion in Cambe v. O ce of the Ombudsman, 1 4 I
submit that there is no prima facie case for plunder against Revilla that warrants the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment of his monies and properties. To reiterate my
discussion, there is nary enough reasonable and competent evidence to sustain probable
cause to indict him for plunder, viz.:
The majority sustained the Ombudsman's nding of probable cause to indict
Revilla for Plunder and violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, for supposedly amassing
ill-gotten wealth by allegedly misappropriating, or supposedly receiving commission
for allowing the misappropriation of, the PDAF in conspiracy with and/or by giving
unwarranted bene t to Napoles and her cohorts. As I have previously stated, I cannot
concur with the majority opinion.
A look at the evidence that the complainants had presented demonstrates that
there is nary any competent and relevant evidence that can constitute as
basis for the finding of probable cause against Revilla.
Ruling in favor of the complainants, the Ombudsman sweepingly concluded
that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her cohorts to amass ill-gotten wealth at the
expense of the State, specifying Revilla's role in the alleged conspiracy as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
To support such conclusion, the Ombudsman cited the counter-a davits of
Revilla's co-respondents and the whistleblowers' bare testimonies, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the pieces of evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman do not provide
su cient basis for even a prima facie nding of probable cause to believe that
Revilla negotiated and agreed with Napoles on: (i) the list of projects to be
chosen by the lawmaker; (ii) the corresponding IA that would implement the project;
(iii) the project cost; (iv) the Napoles-controlled NGO that would implement the
project; and (v) the amount of commission or kickback which the lawmaker would
receive in exchange for endorsing the NGO. Indeed, the Ombudsman's
a rmation of these allegations stands on mere inferences and
presumptions .
What is certain is that the Ombudsman surmised Revilla's involvement with
the PDAF scam from the following: (1) his purported signatures appearing in several
documents endorsing the NGOs a liated with Napoles; (2) the testimonies of the so-
called "whistleblowers"; and (3) the Counter-A davits of some of Revilla's co-
respondents. As will be discussed, these are neither relevant nor competent, and do
not constitute su cient bases to sustain the nding of probable cause to subject
Revilla to continuous prosecution.cHDAIS
The PDAF Documents

By the PDAF documents, Revilla supposedly coerced the IAs to choose the
Napoles NGOs to implement the projects identi ed by Revilla. The Ombudsman
should have been more than wary in accepting such allegations since Revilla, as a
member of Congress, was without authority to compel o cials or agencies of the
executive branch to act at his bidding. The IAs, in ne, simply do not come under the
jurisdiction of the Senate, let alone senators. In fact, free from the legislature's
control, the IAs are mandated by law to conduct a public bidding in
selecting the NGOs that would implement the projects chosen by the
legislator .
xxx xxx xxx
In a word, any endorsement made by Revilla does not bear any value that
could have compelled the endorsee IA to bene t a Napoles-controlled NGO. The
choice of the NGO made by the IA, without complying with RA 9184 and similar laws,
falls on the IA alone. This is apparent from the very words of the NBI Complaint x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
As Revilla maintained all along, his involvement/participation in the release of
his PDAF was limited only to the identi cation and selection of projects or programs
listed in the GAA and communicating such selection to the Chair of the Senate
Committee on Finance and the Senate President. Any endorsement made by him
does not and cannot sway these IAs to act per his will and contrary to legal
requirements. It is, therefore, perplexing that Revilla's involvement in the PDAF scam
is hinged on apparently worthless "endorsements" of Napoles-controlled NGOs.
Further, the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution especially since
the "whistleblowers" no less admitted to forging the lawmakers'
endorsements of Napoles' NGOs to the IAs along with all other PDAF
Documents . Suñas testi ed that they prepared these endorsement letters, upon
which Revilla is now being indicted. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The fact of having falsi ed or forged the signatures on the PDAF Documents
was again mentioned by Suñas in her own Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 5,
2013, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
During the September 12, 2013 Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Luy also
admitted forging the signatures of lawmakers:
xxx xxx xxx
Luy restated his testimony in his Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
September 12, 2013, where he admitted falsifying documents and forging signatures
of legislators and their chiefs of staff, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Not to be overlooked are the findings of handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores
and Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui. The two were one in saying that the signatures
appearing above Revilla's name on the PDAF Documents were not his. Mr. Azores, in
particular, concluded:
The questioned signatures above the printed name Hon. Ramon Revilla, Jr.,
Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr., Ramon Revilla, Jr., on one hand and the standard
signatures above the printed name Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr., on the other hand,
were not written by one and the same person .
Atty. Pagui similarly found the signatures above Revilla's name on the PDAF
Documents as not belonging to the latter. Atty. Pagui's conclusion after examining
the signatures on the PDAF documents and comparing them with Revilla's standard
signatures categorically declared that the signatures on the questioned
documents were not affixed by Revilla , viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
In fact, even a cursory glance at some of the PDAF Documents questioned by
Revilla reveals a forgery so obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the
naked eye of an ordinary person . A prime example is the "endorsement" letter
addressed to Gondelina Amata of the NLDC dated October 23, 2009, supposedly
signed by Revilla. Compared to the standard signatures submitted by Revilla, the
signature contained therein lacks the cursive ourishes of his true signatures and
instead contains sharp and blunt strokes. Similarly noticeable is the variance of the
letterheads used in these various endorsement letters, with some containing
supposed bar codes of Revilla's office, others simply a number.

Respondent Ombudsman, however, makes much of the letter dated
July 20, 2011 Letter addressed to COA Assistant Commissioner Cuenco,
Jr., wherein Revilla supposedly con rmed the authenticity of his and
Cambe's signatures on the PDAF documents. Upon closer examination of
the said letter, however, Mr. Azores found that even the said letter is
spurious . He noted, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The same nding was made by Atty. Pagui with respect to the same July 20,
2011 Letter. He observed:
xxx xxx xxx
At the very least, the Azores and Pagui ndings should have impelled the
Ombudsman to consider the veracity of the signatures on the PDAF documents given
that these experts' ndings uniformly detail discrepancies between the signatures in
the PDAF documents and Revilla's admitted genuine specimens of writing. That the
Ombudsman failed to even require NBI handwriting experts to study the
questioned signatures renders the immediate dismissal of the two
handwriting expert's certi cations highly suspect . Where the genuineness of
the documents is crucial to the respondents' defense, it is more prudent, as stressed
in People v. Agresor, to allow the opinion of handwriting experts:
The task of determining the genuineness of the handwriting would
have been made easier had an expert witness been employed to aid the
court in carrying out this responsibility . The records show that counsel for the
accused did ask the court for time to le a motion so that the handwriting may be
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to ascertain its authenticity.
Such motion was, however, denied by the court, ruling that "The Court itself can
determine whether or not that handwriting is the handwriting of the private
complainant."
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding
upon the courts, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which
the court can form its own opinion. Ultimately, the value of the expert testimony
would still have to be weighed by the judge, upon whom the duty of determining the
genuineness of the handwriting devolves. Nevertheless, the handwriting expert
may afford assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer. There is no doubt that superior skills along
these lines will often serve to direct the attention of the courts to facts,
assent to which is yielded not because of persuasion or argument on the
part of the expert, but by their own intrinsic merit and reasonableness.
As there was a dispute regarding the genuineness of the handwriting, it would
have been more prudent if the trial court allowed the presentation of a handwriting
expert by the defense. The denial of the request for time to le a motion to have the
handwriting examined in effect rendered the right of the accused to have compulsory
process to secure the production of evidence in his behalf nugatory.ISHCcT
Being uncontroverted and, in fact, con rmed by the complainants' witnesses, I

submit that this forgery of Revilla's signatures and the falsi cation of the PDAF
Documents should have dissuaded the Ombudsman from ling the Informations
against Revilla.
Certainly, the nding of probable cause to indict a person for plunder
cannot be based on admittedly falsi ed documents . While probable cause
falls below proof beyond reasonable doubt in the hierarchy of quanta of evidence, it
must nonetheless be supported by su cient, credible and competent evidence, i.e.,
there should be facts and circumstances su ciently strong in themselves
to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is
guilty of the crime with which he is charged . x x x
Testimonies of the Co-Respondents
Absent any credible proof of Revilla's actual link or participation in the alleged
scheme to divert his PDAF to Napoles' NGOs, the Ombudsman should likewise not
have accepted hook, line, and sinker any testimony of a participant in the supposed
conspiracy.
It is basic that an extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant
or declarant and is inadmissible against his or her co-accused . This basic
postulate, an extension of the res inter alios acta rule, is embodied in Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court x x x.
Under the rule, the testimony made by the confessant is hearsay and
inadmissible as against his co-accused even during the preliminary investigation
stage. x x x
The exception to the above rule, the succeeding Section 30 of Rule 130,
requires foremost, the existence of an independent and conclusive proof of the
conspiracy and that the person concerned has performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
As discussed above, besides the admittedly falsi ed and forged PDAF
documents, there is no concrete proof showing that Revilla pulled off any
"overt act" in furtherance of the supposed conspiracy with Napoles . Other
than saying that without Revilla, the scheme would have supposedly failed, the
Ombudsman has been unable to point to concrete set of facts to support her
conclusion as to the complicity of Revilla to the conspiracy in question. Thus, the
conclusion reached by the Ombudsman falls short of the threshold
requirement that conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the
commission of the felony itself . The quantum of evidence required is as should
be, as conspiracy is a "facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold."
For this reason, I submit that the testimonies of Revilla's co-respondents
cannot be taken against him. Yet, the Ombudsman repeatedly and freely cited the
previously withheld counter-a davits of Revilla's co-respondents in nding
probable cause to indict him for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The reliance on these previously suppressed testimonies of Revilla's co-
respondents to conjure up probable cause against him is not only violative of the res
inter alios acta rule, worse, it desecrates the basic rule of due process.
To recall, the counter-a davits of Revilla's co-respondents, in which the
foregoing statements were contained, were not furnished to Revilla before the
Ombudsman rendered the March 28, 2014 Resolution despite Revilla's Motion to be
Furnished. In denying the Motion, the Ombudsman held that it had no basis to grant
the motion and cited Artillero v. Casimiro . But Artillero is not even applicable to the
case. First, in Artillero, it was the complainant who claimed denial of due process
when he was not furnished with a copy of the counter-a davit of the accused. Here,
it is the petitioner, as accused, requesting for the counter-a davits of his co-
respondents. Second, the complainant in Artillero requested a copy of the counter-
a davit of the accused not because he wanted to answer the counter-charges
against him, such as what petitioner intended to do, but because he wanted to le a
reply lest his complaint is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
After denying Revilla's Motion to be Furnished and his Motion for
Reconsideration, the Ombudsman would suddenly turn around, nd Revilla's request
in order, and allow him to be furnished copies of the counter-a davits of some his
co-respondents.
In a bid to justify her initial refusal to provide Revilla with subject a davits,
the Ombudsman stated that Revilla was anyway eventually furnished the desired
documents before the rendition of the assailed June 4, 2014 Joint Order (albeit after
the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution) and yet chose not to submit his comment
within the time given him. Upon this premise, Revilla cannot, as the Ombudsman
posited citing Ruivivar v. O ce of the Ombudsman , be heard about being denied due
process having, as it were, "been given ample opportunity to be heard but x x x did
not take full advantage of the proffered chance."
I believe that that the Ombudsman has misread Ruivivar, which, at bottom, is
not consistent with the essence of due process: to be heard before a decision is
rendered . In Ruivivar, petitioner Ruivivar's motion for reconsideration that paved the
way for his being furnished with copies of the a davits of private respondent's
witnesses came after the Ombudsman rendered a decision. In the present case,
however, Revilla's request to be furnished with his co-respondents' counter-a davits
preceded the Ombudsman's issuance of her probable cause- nding resolution.
Clearly, the accommodation accorded Revilla was belated , i.e., after the denial
of his motion for reconsideration and way after the issuance of the resolution nding
probable cause against him. There lies the crucial difference.
It appears that the Ombudsman issued the May 7, 2014 Joint Order only as an
afterthought, as an attempt to address the defects of the preliminary investigation
the OOMB conducted on petitioner. However, such Order is of little moment as any
comment that Revilla would le would no longer have any bearing precisely because
the Ombudsman already issued the Joint Resolution on March 28, 2014 nding
probable cause against them.
Worse, the Court cannot see its way clear on why the Ombudsman limited the
grant to few counter-a davits when it could have allowed Revilla access to all
counter-a davits and other lings of his co-respondents. The Ombudsman
conveniently justi ed the selective liberality on the notion that only these counter-
a davits contain allegations that tend to incriminate Revilla to the scam. Yet, as
pointed out by Revilla, due process does not only cover the right to know and
respond to the inculpatory evidence, but also the concomitant right to
secure exculpatory evidence. The mere fact of suppression of evidence,
regardless of its nature, is enough to violate the due process rights of the
respondent .
Indeed, Morfe v. Mutuc teaches that the due process requirement is met
if o cial action is free from arbitrariness. But, the Ombudsman's denial
and limitation of Revilla's Motion to be Furnished, were arbitrary and
unreasonable for there was nothing improper or irregular in Revilla's
request . And it cannot be overemphasized in this regard that the requesting
petitioners offered to have the requested documents photocopied at his expense.
Verily, these limitations coupled with her use of the counter-a davits
requested against Revilla, without giving him a prior opportunity to know
each and every allegation against him , whether from the complainants and
their witnesses or his co-respondents , are random, unreasonable, and taint the
Ombudsman's actions with grave abuse of discretion for violating the sacred rule of
due process. As such, the statements contained in the Counter-A davits of
Revilla's co-respondents cannot be used to nd probable cause to indict
him . CAacTH
In Duterte v. Sandiganbayan where the petitioners therein were not su ciently

apprised of the charges against them during preliminary investigation, this Court
ordered the dismissal of the criminal case filed against them x x x.
In like manner, in the present case, Revilla was not su ciently apprised of the
entirety of the allegations against him before the probable cause nding Resolution
of March 28, 2014 was rendered by the Ombudsman. Consequently, his right to due
process was denied and I believe that this Court is duty-bound to reverse the
Ombudsman's action that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even assuming arguendo that the counter-a davits of Revilla's co-
respondents are admissible, the testimonies contained therein are inadequate to
engender the probability that Revilla was a knowing participant in the alleged scheme
to divert the PDAF. Buenaventura simply testi ed in general terms that she con rmed
the authenticity of the authorization given by Revilla without specifying how she
made such con rmation or providing the details of the documents and transactions
involved. In like manner, Sevidal broadly claimed that Revilla, through Cambe, was
responsible for "identifying the projects costs and choosing the NGOs" but did not
provide the factual details that justi ed her claim. Figura's declaration of having no
power to "simply disregard the wishes of [Revilla]" is a clearly baseless assumption.
Meanwhile, a closer look of Cunanan's testimony, which was a critical part of
the Ombudsman's Resolutions, bares the in rmity of his claim. While he could have
easily asked for a written con rmation of the authorization given by Revilla to
Cambe, Cunanan himself admitted that he, instead, supposedly sought veri cation
over the telephone. Yet, an audio recording of the alleged telephone conversation was
not presented or even mentioned. Not even a transcript of the alleged telephone
conversation was attached to Cunanan's Counter-Affidavit.
Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides that an audio
evidence, such as a telephone conversation, is admissible only if it is presented,
explained, or authenticated, x x x
Given that no audio evidence of the telephone conversation was presented,
much less "identi ed, explained or authenticated," the occurrence of the alleged
telephone conversation is rendered highly suspect, if not improbable, and any
testimony thereon is inadmissible and of no probative value.
But granting, arguendo, that Cunanan did call Revilla's o ce, it still begs the
question of how he could have recognized or con rmed the identity of the person he
was speaking with over the phone and not face-to-face. There is no indication, and
Cunanan never even hinted, that he was closely familiar with Revilla's voice that he
can easily recognize it over the phone in a single conversation.
This Court had previously declared that the person with whom the witness
was conversing on the telephone must rst be reliably identi ed before the
telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given probative
value . x x x
xxx xxx xxx
In this case where there is no authentication or identi cation of the person
with whom Cunanan was conversing on the telephone, Cunanan's testimony is
inadmissible and of no probative value.
In sum, the Ombudsman should have closely scrutinized the testimonies of
the alleged participants in the supposed conspiracy. This holds especially true for
testimonies that not only try to relieve the a ant from responsibility but also seek to
pass the blame to others. The Ombudsman, however, utterly failed to do so and
simply accepted the co-respondents' declarations as the gospel truth, unmindful that
a neglect to closely sift through the a davits of the parties can still force the
unnecessary prosecution of frivolous cases. By itself, this neglect constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion, which should be reversed by this Court.
Whistleblowers' Testimonies

Anent the elements of the crimes charged, the gravamen of the crime of
Plunder is the accumulation by the accused of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In a bid to satisfy this element against Revilla,
the Ombudsman heavily relied on the testimonies of the whistleblowers, Luy, Sula,
and Suñas. Yet, none of the witnesses stated that they deposited money
representing the alleged commissions to any of Revilla's accounts. Not
one of them testi ed that they personally handed money or saw anyone
handing/delivering money to Revilla as commission/kickback.
The closest thing passed as proof by the complainants is the private and
personal records of Luy. But, even Luy himself admitted his lack of personal
knowledge of Revilla's involvement in the PDAF scam, much less of the
former senator receiving money from it . x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing at once betrays t h e hearsay nature of Luy's testimony
against Revilla. The hearsay nature of Luy's testimony regarding Revilla's receipt of
money from his PDAF is again highlighted in Luy's Sworn Statement of November 8,
2013, viz.: x x x
Similarly, the testimony given by Suñas on September 12, 2013 regarding the
supposed receipt by Revilla of a part of his PDAF is not based on her own personal
knowledge. x x x
Given the hearsay character of the whistleblowers' testimonies, these are
devoid of any intrinsic merit, dismissible as without any probative value.
At most, the whistleblowers claimed that money was handed to Cambe. Yet,
there is nothing to prove that Revilla received the said money from Cambe
or that Cambe's alleged receipt of the said money was under his authority
or instruction .
For this and for the fact that there is absolutely nothing competent and
relevant that can sway a reasonable man to believe that Revilla had participated in
the PDAF scheme, I vote for the reversal of the Ombudsman's nding of probable
cause to indict Revilla for plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 on
account of grave abuse of discretion.
It must not be forgotten that the crimes involved in these cases are Plunder
and violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 — two grave charges that can strip a man of
his good name and liberty, as in this case. The Ombudsman should not have found
probable cause to indict Revilla given that there is nothing but falsi ed documents,
hearsay testimonies and declarations barred by the res inter alios acta that support
the complaints. Worse, the Ombudsman violated the due process protection of the
Constitution in citing a davits and testimonies not previously furnished Revilla.
Without a doubt, the Assailed Resolutions, insofar as it found probable cause against
Revilla, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
IAETDc
Accordingly, I vote that the Court resolve to GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos. 218235
and 219162 and ORDER the Sandiganbayan to provisionally release Richard Cambe upon his
posting of a cash bond in an amount to be set by the Sandiganbayan and RECALL the writ of
preliminary attachment issued against Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla in Criminal Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0240. Revilla is not barred from availing his right to bail.
Footnotes
* No part.
1. Pertain to the following petitions: (a) petition in G.R. No. 218232 filed by Revilla; (b) petition in G.R.
No. 218235 filed by Cambe; and (c) petition in G.R. No. 218266 filed by Napoles.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 218232), Vol. I, pp. 53-123.
3. Id. at 124-148.
5. Id. at 41-49.
7. Id. at 44-51.
8. Rollo (G.R. No. 218235), Vol. I, pp. 166-167. In an Order dated 26 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan
"resolved to PARTIALLY DENY the prosecution's motion to admit the amended information in
that the proposed substantial amendments were not allowed but, with the conformity of the
defense counsels, the Court authorized the prosecution to effect the formal amendments to
the said Information."
9. Id. at 19-20.
10. This provision reads: "(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea
of not guilty shall be entered for him."
12. Id. at 56-58.
13. Id. at 59-61.
14. Id. at 62-64.
16. Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 1 December 2014, footnote no. 2 states "The Court, in its Order
dated July 3, 2014, denied the petition for bail filed by accused Lim and De Asis (jointly with
accused Napoles), as they had remained at-large."
17. Rollo, (G.R. No. 218232), Vol. I, pp. 100-103.
18. Supra note 2.
19. Supra note 3.
20. Rollo (G.R. No. 218232), Vol. VII, pp. 3622-3626.
21. Id. at 3622.
23. Id. at 89-102.
24. Id. at 72-76.

25. Supra note 4.
27. Id. at 195-201.
28. Supra note 5.
30. Id. at 191.

31. Id. at 200-209.
32. Id. at 210-218.
33. Supra note 6.
34. Rollo (G.R. No. 219162), Vol. II, pp. 566-567.
35. Supra note 7.
36. Rollo (G.R. No. 219162), Vol. I, pp. 464-A-464-B.
37. Rollo (G.R. No. 218232), Vol. VII, pp. 3634-3635.
38. Id., Vol. I, p. 15.
39. Rollo (G.R. No. 218235), Vol. I, p. 6.
40. Rollo (G.R. No. 218266), Vol. I, p. 6.
42. Rollo (G.R. No. 219162), Vol. I, p. 11.
43. Supra note 21.
44. People v. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697 (1999).
45. Id.; Carpio v. Maglalang, 273 Phil. 240 (1991).
46. San Miguel Corp. v Sandiganbayan, 394 Phil. 608 (2000), citing Big Country Ranch Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 297 Phil. 1105 (1993).
47. Rules of Court, Rule 114, Section 8 provides: "At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify."
48. Comia v. Judge Antona, 392 Phil. 433 (2000), citing Cortes v. Judge Catral, 344 Phil. 415 (1997);
Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946).
49. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499 (2003), citing Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946);
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214 (1997).
50. Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214 (1997); Carpio v. Maglalang, 273 Phil. 240 (1991), citing
People v. San Diego, 135 Phil. 515 (1968).
51. People v. Cabral, supra note 44.
54. Aleria, Jr. v. Velez, 359 Phil. 141 (1998).
55. People v. Antona, 426 Phil. 151 (2002); Borinaga v. Judge Tamin, 297 Phil. 223 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death .
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (Emphasis supplied)
58. Section 1 (d) states:
d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes.
1)Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;
2)By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3)By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4)By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
61. Supra note 44, at 709. Boldfacing and underscoring supplied.
62. 621 Phil. 536 (2009).
63. Supra note 62, at 554.
64. People v. Cabral, supra note 44, at 709-710.
65. Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 34 (2003).
66. Id. at 82.
67. Rollo (G.R. No. 218235), p. 117. Emphasis supplied.
68. 427 Phil. 820 (2002).
69. Id. at 902.
70. Guy v. People of the Philippines, 601 Phil. 105 (2005).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. People of the Philippines v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487 (2010).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, 543 Phil. 436, 457 (2007).

78. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499 (2003).
79. People of the Philippines v. Judge Gako, 401 Phil. 514 (2000); Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214
(1997).
80. Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212014-15, 6 December 2016, 812 SCRA 537.
81. Id.
82. Rule 113, Section 1.
84. Section 20.2a (1) of the Revised PNP Police Operational Procedures Manual.
http://www.pnp.gov.ph/images/transparency_seal/2016/manuals/PNPOperationsManual.pdf
(accessed 24 October 2017).
85. Id.
88. Section 61. Powers and Functions. — The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over
all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the
provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the
National Government for not more than three (3) years alter the effectivity of this Act.
90. Id. at 46.
91. Id. at 62-64.
92. Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 10660, Section 4 provides: "Any
provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
93. Presidential Decree No. 1606, Section 9.
94. Rules of Court, Rule 127, Section 1.
95. Rules of Court, Rule 127, Section 2 provides: "When the civil action is properly instituted in the
criminal action as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the
accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
from the accused in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b)When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer
of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as
such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c)When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do
so; and
xxx xxx xxx"
96. Rules of Court, Rule 57, Section 1. Emphasis supplied.

97. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 234
Phil. 180 (1987).
98. Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 626 (1989).
99. Watercraft Venture Corp. v. Wolfe, 769 Phil. 394 (2015).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Republic of the Philippines v. Garcia, 554 Phil. 371 (2007).
104. RA 7080, Section 1 (d).
105. RA 7080, Section 3 provides: "Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act
shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."
106. Rollo (G.R. No. 219162), Vol. I, p. 190.
107. Supra note 80.
108. Supra note 80, at 599-600.
109. 281 Phil. 386 (1991).
110. Id. at 396, citing Toledo v. Judge Burgos, 250 Phil. 514 (1998).
111. Id., citing Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Judge Relova, 202 Phil. 741, 750 (1982).
112. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
supra note 97.
113. Lim, Jr. v. Spouses Lazaro, 713 Phil. 356 (2013).
114. Id.
115. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
supra note 97.
116. Republic of the Philippines v. Garcia, supra note 103.
VELASCO, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
1. G.R. Nos. 212014-15, 212427-28, 212694-95, 212794-95, 213477-78, 213532-33, 213536-37 &
218744-59, December 6, 2016.
2. People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
3. See Spouses Valderama v. Macalde, 507 Phil. 174 (2005).
4. Supra note 2.
5. Rollo (G.R. No. 218232), Vol. 7, p. 2622. Emphasis supplied.
6. 275 Phil. 146 (1991).
7. Ibid.
8. Pobre v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 360 (2005).
9. Ibid.
10. G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017.
11. Supra.
12. G.R. No. L-6352, January 29, 1953, cited in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
13. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) , G.R. No. 213847 (Resolution), July 12, 2016.
14. G.R. Nos. 212014-15, 212427-28, 212694-95, 212794-95, 213477-78, 213532-33, 213536-37 &
218744-59, December 6, 2016.

Revilla Jr. v. Sandiganbayan First

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Revilla Jr. v. Sandiganbayan First

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 218232. July 24, 2018.]

RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR. , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST

[G.R. No. 218235. July 24, 2018.]

RICHARD A. CAMBE , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),

[G.R. No. 218266. July 24, 2018.]

JANET LIM NAPOLES , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),

[G.R. No. 218903. July 24, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST

[G.R. No. 219162. July 24, 2018.]

RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR. , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST

18 million Dec. 15, 2008

Meanwhile, on 14 July 2014, the O ce of the Ombudsman, through the O ce of the

On 27 October 2014, the O ce of the Ombudsman, through the O ce of the Special

On 14 November 2014, Revilla led an Opposition 3 1 to the prosecution's motion,

The Ruling of the Court

G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235, and 218266

The Court is persuaded that the prosecution has presented compelling

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

G.R. No. 219162

Cambe's participation in the alleged conspiracy scheme to amass wealth,

The Ombudsman's selective appreciation of certain critical testimonial

The PDAF Documents

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Being uncontroverted and, in fact, con rmed by the complainants' witnesses, I

In Duterte v. Sandiganbayan where the petitioners therein were not su ciently

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

24. Id. at 72-76.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

77. Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, 543 Phil. 436, 457 (2007).

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx"

96. Rules of Court, Rule 57, Section 1. Emphasis supplied.

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