Randolf David Vs Arroyo
Randolf David Vs Arroyo
171396
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485,
171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue:
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well
as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when
the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President
may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be
observed.