Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167916 August 26, 2008

SARAH P. AMPONG, petitioner,

DECISION

REYES R.T., J.:

CAN the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly assume jurisdiction over administrative proceedings
against a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher, committed prior to her appointment
to the judiciary?

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming the CSC’s exercise of administrative jurisdiction over petitioner.

The Facts

The following facts are uncontroverted:

On November 10, 1991, a Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) 2 was held in Davao City.
A certain Evelyn Junio-Decir3 applied for and took the examination at Room 16, Kapitan Tomas
Monteverde Elementary School. She passed with a rating of 74.27%.4

At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong (nee Navarra) and Decir were public
school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS).5 Later, on August 3, 1993, Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel,
Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.

On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office
(CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the
transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in
the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility
was different from the one who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong who took and passed the
examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.

The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the existence of a prima facie case
against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service. On August 23, 1994, they were formally charged and required to file answers under oath.
The formal charge reads:

That sometime before the conduct of the November 10, 1991 Professional Board Examination for
Teachers (PBET), a certain Ms. Evelyn B. Junio (now Decir) took the said examination at Rm. 16
Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary School, Davao City, with a passing rate of 74.27%; That
on July 5, 1994 she appeared before the CSC Region XI Office to get her Guro Certificate; That
upon verification, it was found out that the picture attached in the Picture Seat Plan, marked as
 Annex "A" and "A-1," respectively, were not the same compared to the picture attached in the
CSC Form 212 of Evelyn Junio-Decir marked herein as annex "B," "B-1," respectively. There was
also a marked difference in the signatures affixed in the said annexes; That further investigations
revealed that it was the pictures of Ms. Sarah Navarra, wife of her husband’s first cousin, who
took the said examination in behalf of Ms. Evelyn Junio-Decir, a provisional teacher; That the said
act of Mesdames Decir and Navarra are acts of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; that in (sic) taking the CS examination for and in behalf of another
undermines the sanctity of the CS examinations; All these contrary to existing civil service laws
and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

In her sworn statement dated November 3, 1994, Decir denied the charges against her. She reasoned
out that it must have been the examination proctor who pasted the wrong picture on the PSP and that her
signatures were different because she was still signing her maiden name at the time of the examination.
In her Answer, Decir contended that:

2. The same accusation is denied, the truth being:

a. When I took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) in the year
1991, I handed my 1x1 I.D. picture to the proctor assigned in the examination room who
might have inadvertently pasted in the Seat Plan [the] wrong picture instead [of] my own
picture;

b. With respect to the marked difference in my signature both appearing in the aforesaid
Seat Plan and also with the Form 212, the disparity lies in that in the year 1991, when I
took the afroresaid examination, I was still sporting my maiden name Evelyn B. Junio in
order to coincide with all my pertinent supporting papers, like the special order (s.o.),
appointment and among others, purposely to take said communications. However,
immediately after taking the PBET Examination in 1991, I started using the full name of
Evelyn Junio-Decir.6

Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO on February 2, 1995
and admitted to the wrongdoing. When reminded that she may avail herself of the services of counsel,
petitioner voluntarily waived said right.

On March 13, 1995, petitioner gave another admission in the following tenor:

Q: Now, what is then your intention in coming to this Region inasmuch as you are still intending
to file an answer to the formal charge?

A: I came here because I want to admit personally. So that I will not be coming here anymore. I
will submit my case for Resolution.

Q: So, you intend to waive your right for the formal hearing and you also admit orally on the
guilt of the charge on the Formal Charge dated August 24, 1994?

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: What else do you want to tell the Commission?

A: x x x Inasmuch as I am already remorseful, I am repenting of the wrong that I have done. I

Q: Now inasmuch as you have declared that you have admitted the guilt that you took the
examination for and in behalf of Evelyn Junio Decir, are you telling this to the Commission without
the assistance of the counsel or waiver of your right to be assisted by counsel.

A: Yes, Ma’am. I am waiving my right.7 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner reiterated her admission in her sworn Answer dated March 16, 1995:

3. That, during the commission of the act, I was still under the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, as Teacher in-charge of San Miguel Primary School, Malungon North District, way
back in 1991, when the husband of Evelyn Junio-Decir, my husband’s cousin came to me and
persuaded me to take the examination in behalf of his wife to which I disagreed but he earnestly
begged so that I was convinced to agree because I pity his wife considering that she is an
immediate relative, and there was no monetary consideration involved in this neither a
compensatory reward for me, as I was overcome by their persuasion;

4. That, despite the fact that I was a teacher, I was not aware that the acts I was charged, is a
ground for disciplinary action and punishable by dismissal;

5. That I should not have conformed to this anomalous transaction considering that I was born in
a Christian family, and was brought up in the fear of Lord, and had been a consistent officer of the
Church Board, had been a religious leader for so many years, and had been the organizer of the
Music Festival of the Association of Evangelical Churches of Malungon, Sarangani Province, thus
I was devoted to church work and was known to be of good conduct; and that my friends and
acquaintances can vouch to that, but I was just forced by circumstances to agree to the spouses
Godfre and Evelyn Decir.8 (Emphasis added)

CSC Finding and Penalty

On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them
from the service. The dispositive part of the CSC resolution states:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Evelyn J. Decir and Sarah P. Navarra guilty of
Dishonesty. Accordingly, they are meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties.
The PBET rating of Decir is revoked.9

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction.10 She argued that
the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court; that the CSC
acted with abuse of discretion when it continued to exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty as
a judicial employee. She contended that at the time the case was instituted on August 23, 1994, the CSC
already lost jurisdiction over her. She was appointed as Interpreter III of the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel,
Sarangani Province on August 3, 1993.

The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.11 According to the Commission, to allow petitioner to
evade administrative liability would be a mockery of the country’s administrative disciplinary system. It will
open the floodgates for others to escape prosecution by the mere expedient of joining another branch of
government. In upholding its jurisdiction over petitioner, the CSC differentiated between administrative
supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and administrative jurisdiction granted to the Commission
over all civil service employees:
 Moreover, it must be pointed out that administrative supervision is distinct from administrative
jurisdiction. While it is true that this Commission does not have administrative supervision over
employees in the judiciary, it definitely has concurrent jurisdiction over them. Such jurisdiction
was conferred upon the Civil Service Commission pursuant to existing law specifically Section
12(11), Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which
provides as follows:

"(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or through it directly or on

The fact that court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court does
not totally isolate them from the operations of the Civil Service Law. Appointments of all officials
and employees in the judiciary is governed by the Civil Service Law (Section 5(6), Article VIII,
1987 Constitution). (Emphasis supplied)

CA Disposition

Via petition for review under Rule 43, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. 12 She insisted that as a
judicial employee, it is the Supreme Court and not the CSC that has disciplinary jurisdiction over her.

In a Decision dated November 30, 2004,13 the CA denied the petition for lack of merit.

The CA noted that petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her.
Rather, she willingly appeared before the commission, freely admitted her wrongdoing, and even
requested for clemency. Thus, she was estopped from questioning the Commission’s jurisdiction. The
appellate court opined that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active
participation in the proceedings before a court, tribunal or body will estop such party from assailing its
jurisdiction.

The CA further ruled that a member of the judiciary may be under the jurisdiction of two different bodies.
As a public school teacher or a court interpreter, petitioner was part of the civil service, subject to its rules
and regulations. When she committed acts in violation of the Civil Service Law, the CSC was clothed with
administrative jurisdiction over her.

Issue

Petitioner, through this petition, assigns the lone error that:

The Honorable Court of Appeals-First Division decided a question of substance in a way not in
accord with law and jurisprudence, gravely erred in facts and in law, and has sanctioned such
departure and grave error because it ignored or was not aware of Garcia v. De la Peña, 229
SCRA 766 (1994) and Adm. Matter No. OCA I.P.I. 97-329-P (CSC v. Ampong) dated January 31,
2001, which reiterate the rule that exclusive authority to discipline employees of the
judiciary lies with the Supreme Court, in issuing the questioned decision and resolution; which
grave error warrant reversal of the questioned decision and resolution.14

Put simply, the issue boils down to whether the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of
the Judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still with the Executive or Education
Department.

Our Ruling
The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but We rule against the petition on the ground
of estoppel.

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations.15 Pursuant to
its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil
Service examinations."16 This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity
or anomaly connected with the examinations.17

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.18 By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations.
It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.19 Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the
Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence
of the judiciary.20

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,21 this Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil
service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial employee under
the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton,22 involving judicial employees who also
impersonated civil service examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary charges
before the OCA because respondents were judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty
and meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that "respondents’ machinations reflect their
dishonesty and lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public servants and
employees of the judiciary."23

Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service Law
by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public
school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service
examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of
another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-
supervised examination.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the
administrative reach of the Supreme Court.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.

Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before
the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the present case.

However, We are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. The
previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure
an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. 24 As this Court
declared in Aquino v. Court of Appeals:25

In the interest of sound administration of justice, such practice cannot be tolerated. If we are to
sanction this argument, then all the proceedings had before the lower court and the Court of
Appeals while valid in all other respects would simply become useless. 26

Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to adopt a different theory on appeal to
impugn the court’s jurisdiction.27 In Emin v. De Leon,28 this Court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction by
the CSC, while recognizing at the same time that original disciplinary jurisdiction over public school
teachers belongs to the appropriate committee created for the purpose as provided for under the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers.29 It was there held that a party who fully participated in the proceedings
before the CSC and was accorded due process is estopped from subsequently attacking its jurisdiction.

Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before
the CSC. She filed with it her answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC found her guilty,
she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling. These circumstances all too clearly show that due process
was accorded to petitioner.

Petitioner’s admission of guilt stands. Apart from her full participation in the proceedings before the
CSC, petitioner admitted to the offense charged – that she impersonated Decir and took the PBET exam
in the latter’s place. We note that even before petitioner filed a written answer, she voluntarily went to the
CSC Regional Office and admitted to the charges against her. In the same breath, she waived her right to
the assistance of counsel. Her admission, among others, led the CSC to find her guilty of dishonesty,
meting out to her the penalty of dismissal.

Now, she assails said confession, arguing that it was given without aid of counsel. In police custodial
investigations, the assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an extra-judicial confession to be made
admissible in evidence against the accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance was waived, the waiver
should have been made with the assistance of counsel.30

But while a party’s right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in proceedings criminal in nature, there is
no such requirement in administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea,31 this Court ruled that a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is
under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.32

Petitioner’s admission was given freely. There was no compulsion, threat or intimidation. As found by the
CSC, petitioner’s admission was substantial enough to support a finding of guilt.

The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the procurement
and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or
procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts
to any violation of the Civil Service examination."33 Petitioner impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to
ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a deception to secure a
passing mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.34

This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."35 Petitioner’s dishonest act as a civil
servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that petitioner should not have
been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she
committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, petitioner’s present status as a judicial
employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice
is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to
the least and lowest of its personnel.36 As the Court held in another administrative case for dishonesty:

x x x Any act which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not
be countenanced. We have not hesitated to impose the utmost penalty of dismissal for even the
slightest breach of duty by, and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of, said officers and
employees, if so warranted. Such breach and irregularity detract from the dignity of the highest
court of the land and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.

xxxx

As a final point, we take this opportunity to emphasize that no quibbling, much less hesitation or
circumvention, on the part of any employee to follow and conform to the rules and regulations
enunciated by this Court and the Commission on Civil Service, should be tolerated. The Court,
therefore, will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an
effective and efficient system of justice.37 (Emphasis added)

We will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary expects the best from all its employees. 38 Hindi namin
papayagan ang pandaraya sapagkat inaasahan ng Hudikatura ang pinakamabuti sa lahat nitong
kawani.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 *ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
NACHURA CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice