G.R. No.

L-69564 January 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ​plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE,

PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and MACARIO
PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, ​accused-appellants.

G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, ​petitioner,

vs.

HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVII,
QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ​respondents.

Facts

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard
Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty"
with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan,
Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22,
1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel ​de parte ​for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized by the
Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:

One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, ​* was formerly a co-security
guard of appellant Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua
and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street,
Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being
always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22,
1983).

At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in the morning
to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was relieved by
appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where
he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three companions, one of
whom he later Identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.

After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng Electrical
Supply as he usually does after office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year
old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the office, the two
children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp.
10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant
Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober, the
former asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions went inside
[pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].

At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her husband and
two children. On her way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the appellant
Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly,
she heard of shot coming from the direction of the garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw
Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house
to contact her husband through the intercom. But since the intercom was out of order, she hurriedly
went outside and met appellant Escober who volunteered the information "that he was not hit." [pp.
9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].

Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the gunshot. He
hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany was
lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit
'E' fun of blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms drawers
opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp.
1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as their children was
(sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a second one.
After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the two cars, they were brought to
the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug.
16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator Oscar Francisco was
dispatched to investigate the incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the Chinese
General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he arrived at the hospital at past 9.00
o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a cursory examination of
the victim and indicated on two separate sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds
sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he proceeded to the scene of
the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a police photographer, who arrived to
assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5, 1983].
Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E") which the former
said was found beside the pool of blood inside the room where the incident happened. In the course
of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of Vicente Chua were
forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with Vicente, he likewise
learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13,
Ibid]​ .

Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant Escober, the
security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version of
the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the written statements of the victims' parents,
Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively). Thereafter,
Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the result of his investigation to the City
Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations: "Detained the accused all
prima facie ​case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended. [pp.
13-23,​ Ibid​].

Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the appellant
Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily Identified by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as one of
those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of the incident on
December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on December 10,
1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982.
Also taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit "K") and
that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects who claimed that her son, Amadeo
Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein two appellants, in the
commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under custodial
investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit "M") wherein he did not only
admit his participation in the commission of the crime, but also implicated appellant Juan Escober
[pp. 25-26, ​Ibid​; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal, Police
Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan,
Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a certain Peter Doe,
2
albeit, only the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. ​

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his defense. His
testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:

Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective Security since
January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village,
Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7
p.m. he reported for work. When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned the
guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the guardhouse dirty
and also because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it. There
was a janitor but the security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun
but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the guardhouse. Then when he
was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted
to, and two men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large] entered and one man
[co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was not able to talk to Alorte alias Abuyen
because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a gun at Escober and also a knife and
they said they would kill him. He does not know the man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows
Alorte because he Alorte used to be his co-guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked
Escober to get into (climbed) the pick- up car inside the garage and the other man was pointing a
gun at Escober. Alorte and his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not
know the real name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man
who was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the courtroom and he
pointed to the person who answered by the name of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused.
Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle
(pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to get that gun when these four
men entered because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker
because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not
know why Alorte did not continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up the
office, they came down and talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not
hit for he was able to avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left. Escober went down from the
pickup and he heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua
at the house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed. So Escober went to the
house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called him, Alorte and his companions were no longer
at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he,
together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting
and he could not understand him because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and
got the car, parked it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the office, he was
bringing his son and placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua returned to the office
(after he called Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his son and placed him at the
balcony. The two children who were stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only two
cars at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they went. After
that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call the police.
Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave him a directory and asked him
(Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up himself
because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police came and after that, the owner of the
security agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform also arrived. They interviewed Escober and
forced him to go with them to the police precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had
not then arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard the Vising Electrical
Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought Escober to the precinct to get his statement
and there the police was forcing him to adroit he was the one who robbed and killed the children of
the Chuas and he told them do not know everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him
together with Abuyen Alorte inside the garage is not true because he was the one who told Mrs.
Chua that their children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was
finding (sic) to call him (Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing
something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He Identified his statement, Exhibit I
for the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his.
He knows the police who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober was at the
precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3, 1983, the date he testified
3
in court (tsn, 2-13). ​

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is
found in his Brief as follows:

PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983).
PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of Monumento." In the afternoon of 3 December 1982,
according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a
place near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions whom he introduced
all his relatives; after several drinks, he was requested to join the group to proceed to another place
for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a high gate'
because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983).
ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and the security guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused
Escober as the security guard) opened the door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE
then instructed PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two
companions entered the compound (TSN, pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).

PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while waiting he heard
the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then about to enter the premises but he met
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with blood stains in their arms;' that
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he followed them; that in response to
his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a
taxi and he was brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov. 9,
1983)

PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the Monuments market. No
lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation despite the fact that he informed the police
officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded to interrogate
him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a
place near Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was presented for his
signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many statements thereon are not correct that he
nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and was forced to sign it after they hurt
me by boxing me, subjected me to water therapy and he could not endure the pain, when they gave
(him) the electric shock treatment;" and that the portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are those
4
Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). ​

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his
manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing
the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the
prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as
counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration
for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of
pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated
November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic
review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION

IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER,

TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS
PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES:
FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED ESCOBER
(PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE
TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR
PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE
THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND
THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER 'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION
DURING THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING PETITIONER TO DEATH AS

SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

5
... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984. ​

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R.
No. 69564.

On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD

BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE MAIN
SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN- INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME
WAS ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF

REASONABLE DOUBT;

THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE
LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY,
6
NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND. ​

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to the form
and substance of the decision under review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is
null and void for it does not conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973
Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had
been transcribed.

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed
single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions. It reads:

The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of ​Robbery with Homicide
defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on or about
December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation again persons robbed
Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City and
taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of said robbery employed personal
violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby
multiple serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate deaths, to the damage of their heirs.

Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo
Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina
Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence consisted of the testimonies
of the two named accused above and some exhibits, contained in Pages ​1 to ​454 of the Records,
Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.

In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties, the arguments
and authorities cited therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the above information
are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty
of the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable cooperation as
defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating circumstances, and attended by aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of the crime, taking advantage of
number and superior strength, treachery, in band, among others, and that the defenses and excuses
of the accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory and uncorroborated. The circumstances
pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason
of accused Juan Escober in opening the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of
his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of
firing a gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and volunteering the
information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober regarding his actuation during the
half-hour robbery homicide was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted being
fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the said compound, and
later acting as lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some
drinks, not to get drunk admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve better to commit the
crime planned.

WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the amended information, this Court holding firmly
that when a hired security guard opens the compound under his protection to four men who turn out
to be robbers and murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and meets with said
malefactors immediately before the commission of the offense and stands guard at the gate and
flees with said malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to exculpate and excuse himself
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but
succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous (sic) justifications for the brutal
and merciless killing of innocent and helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of
being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing garbage and being fired at
but not getting hit but not knowing so many vital details a truthful witness would certainly not forget,
among others, thus that this court after a total appreciation of all the evidence on record is convinced
that there being apple (sic) circumstances present that could only possibly point to the guilt of said
accused for the most heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the
said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided
by Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is DEATH and
orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their victims compensatory damages of
P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly
and severally.

7
SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. ​

Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
is based ...

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the
respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the
Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits
supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was
allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what
"vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have
been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery,
in band, "among others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of ​Hernandez v. Colayco​, 64 SCRA 480, reiterating
Montelibano v. Director of Lands,​ 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular Government 15 Phil. 168; City of
Manila v. Insular Government​, 9 Phil. 71; ​Enriquez v. Enriquez​, 3 Phil. 746; ​Braga v. Millora​, 3 Phil.
458:

Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and proved at the
trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as when
the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is impossible to administer
justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on
his side.

It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in an action suit,
the circumstances of each question raised, and the nature and condition of the proofs furnished by
the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by the contending parties which he
finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion he has formed on
the issues raised; then only can be intelligently set forth the legal grounds and considerations proper
in his opinion for the due determination of the case.

As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization of
the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically
impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently and
logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial court.

Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by
respondent-judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious manner. He
obviously took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of
stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings
personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge did. The records show that he took
copious notes of the testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the
transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the
judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer
Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.

Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More
than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts.
Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court in the
case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:

At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude displayed by the
trial court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the body of
which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three typewritten pages, double-spaced and
wide-margined. While brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is not necessarily
determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding this murder case nonetheless should have
outlined in greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both prosecution and the
defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on record and the jurisprudence
and the authorities supporting the court's decision​.
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the decision. The issues
raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying declaration,
premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues raised are quite serious and
they deserved better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of
Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court ​a
quo f​ or the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all
evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now
before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the
8
accused-appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases. ​

The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation in the
crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during
the incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan. These
acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his
having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the
gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The
prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion
and that Escober's version of the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.

After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes
an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if
the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged
mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same would not constitute
sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that
could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a
security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to
exclude from the premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate
reason for getting in. For it must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew
Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact, even
Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with
Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound
thus:

20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si Roberto
Alorte sa malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?

S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong buwan ng Septyembre at
pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.

21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya
9
pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply. ​

The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was
a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that
"... it is not a common experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the
stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with
malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be
rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he
10
were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. ​

Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour
as found by the trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a
ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the need for immediate
escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same could have
been done to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from
Escober.

That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are further
bolstered by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and
extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986, submitted by
the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of
Macario Punzalan's statement reads:

FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Alorte.

FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]

FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hind ho,​ kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.​

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli
11
yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh. ​

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng bandana
alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan
naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay
niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya
na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito.
Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay
pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay
pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita
ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya
12
ko na sila at tumakbo na kami ... ​

These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators and therefore may
ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is
not even responsive to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which it
was given lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This
statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E scober although
the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him. That
Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere
ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its
execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity
in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and
pass on the blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is
indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a
sense of justice and fairness. Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was
this sense of justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial confession.
Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that he was a
co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would want to inform and assure his superior who is
presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the
prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of logic and reason.

The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the
testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at the garage where the shot
sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a
meter behind.

We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina
Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave
her statement on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So, soon
after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when she attributed
the blame on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted
in the tragic event.

Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's
narration of the situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other
interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony was of the same tenor,
i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This
was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at
which point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held
captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who
was not walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having seen.
She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which
was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua,
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult for her
to determine for certain the distance between Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was
merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.

Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared
that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were
13
nagmamadali [in a hurry]." ​ This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the impression
gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element
of speed injected into the 'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/
Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the crime, and tills can be
interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.

The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime
charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers, must be shown,
and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of
the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
14
commission of the crime itself. ​

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and [2] that his acts during the
commission of the crime, such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the
gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the prosecution's
reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding his actuations during the
incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional
15
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved ​ and its corollary rule
that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
16
defense. ​

Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and his having
opened the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A
less discerning mind could have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two
hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.

We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to remain
silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on
the merits.

17​
Punzalan's extra-judicial statement ​ is prefaced by the for lowing:

PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping
kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka
tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung
hindi mo nais.

2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung
hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng
isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.

3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring gamiting

katibayan laban sa iyo.
4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay magbigay
ng salaysay.

Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong

mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?

Sagot — Opo.

Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang abogado na sumusubaybay sa

iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng anomang uri ng
karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong sarili?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng

salaysay?

Sagot— Opo.

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.

18
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial statement, ​
the latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal
and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The Identical manner by which the
police sought to inform Escober and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard
for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level, educational
background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to see to it that Punzalan really
understood what was being told, considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary
level. The so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more than a
superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental
law as to give a semblance of compliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police
respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the impression
that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the court
proceedings, not during the custodial investigation.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's
extrajudicial statement cannot be considered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact
that it was done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid.Needless to say, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary
investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an absence of preliminary
investigation, should have been raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and
consistent in ruling that:

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court
below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that
the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs.
Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper procedure since the 'absence of such investigation
did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable
does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to
remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.

... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the
Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be
inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate court.

While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to appoint a
counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such
failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against
Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of
Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor
and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having
knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have
suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony
regarding Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime. Escober's testimony, however, was merely
corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution
who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano.

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery and we are
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three
companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of
crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the
scene of the crime with his companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the
police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate his
knowledge of the plan.

While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and
as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims, he cannot evade
responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has
been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from
confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused- appellant Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of ​reclusion
perpetua ​and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.