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Complaint in Sizemore v. Morris, Young, Fayette County Comm'n, and Oak Hill
Complaint in Sizemore v. Morris, Young, Fayette County Comm'n, and Oak Hill
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
Amendment to the United States Constitution, arises out of the Defendants’ commission
in Fayette County, West Virginia, within the Southern District of West Virginia.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343.
PARTIES
1. The Plaintiff, Keith Allen Sizemore, was at all times relevant hereto a
resident of Oak Hill, Fayette County, West Virginia, within the Southern District of West
Virginia. Plaintiff Shane Allen Sizemore is the son of Keith Allen Sizemore, and
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currently is enrolled in college in Morgantown, West Virginia, but still resides with his
2. Defendant S.R. Morris is and was at all times relevant hereto, a resident of
Fayette County, West Virginia, PO Box 974, Summersville, WV 26651 and is employed
by the Fayette County Sheriff’s Department, and assigned to the Central West Virginia
3. Defendant C.A. Young is and was at all times relevant hereto, a resident of
Fayette County, West Virginia, PO Box 974, Summersville, WV 26651 and is employed
by the Oak Hill Police Department, and assigned to the Central West Virginia Drug Task
the State of West Virginia, and as such, is liable for the negligent conduct of its agents
and employees, including the Sheriff, the Sheriff’s Department, and the employees of
the Sheriff’s Department, so long as that conduct was carried out within the scope of
their employment. See West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform
Virginia, and as such, is liable for the negligent conduct of its agents and employees,
including the employees of the Oak Hill Police Department, so long as that conduct was
carried out within the scope of their employment. See West Virginia Governmental Tort
FACTS
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West Virginia, Sheriff’s Department, while assigned to the Central West Virginia Drug
Task Force, received a tip that the plaintiff was transporting heroin in a pickup truck.
7. The officers conducted a traffic stop on the plaintiff’s truck. They found a
small quantity of marijuana, for which passenger Melissa Figueroa admitted ownership.
A search of the truck did not uncover the expected presence of heroin. Melissa Figueroa
was the significant other and friend of the plaintiff’s daughter, Amber Evans.
8. Officers then obtained a search warrant for the plaintiff’s truck, and towed
the vehicle to the City of Oak Hill service garage, and conducted a further search. No
9. Following the fruitless search, Defendant Morris, and two DEA agents,
traveled to the plaintiff’s residence in Oak Hill, West Virginia, to interview him. One of
them knocked on the door, and when the plaintiff answered, Defendant Morris observed
Melissa Figueroa and Amber Evans, inside the plaintiff’s residence, but did not speak to
them. Morris spoke to the plaintiff on the porch of the home, but did not enter.
10. No further investigation of the matter was undertaken, and the truck was
11. Nearly two months later, on September 7, 2017, Defendants Morris and
Young observed Melissa Figueroa at the Dollar Tree parking lot in Oak Hill, and
observed her hand something to an individual, for which she received money in return.
The two officers then observed Figueroa leave the parking lot in a gold Ford Taurus.
12. Morris then approached the buyer and questioned him, resulting in the
buyer admitting that he had purchased $80.00 of heroin from Figueroa, which is
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13. Morris and Young were planning to set up a second buy from Figueroa
later that day. At some later point, but prior to the second buy, the officers were driving
by the plaintiff’s residence, and they saw the same gold Ford Taurus parked on the
street in front of the plaintiff’s home. They did not see Melissa Figueroa.
14. The officers equipped the new confidential informant posing as a buyer
with recording devices, prerecorded money, and arranged the buy. They positioned
themselves outside of the plaintiff’s residence. They observed Melissa Figueroa and
her sister, Christine Figueroa, come out of the residence and get into a dodge Neon.
The Neon was parked in the same location they had seen the gold Ford Taurus earlier
that day.
15. The Neon drove to the Dollar Tree parking lot, with Melissa Figueroa as a
passenger, where the transaction took place as anticipated. Following the buy, the
officers observed the Dodge Neon return to the plaintiff’s residence, but did not observe
16. Defendant Morris then went to the Fayette County Sheriff’s Department to
17. In his affidavit in support of the search warrant, Defendant Morris attested
18. Morris attested that he had observed the gold Ford Taurus in front
of the plaintiff’s residence soon after the first buy, and that they had prior knowledge that
Melissa Figueroa lived or stayed at the plaintiff’s residence. The affidavit then referred
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to their alleged “prior knowledge” a second time in the affidavit. According to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, “[i]n reality, neither of those two
officers had any such prior knowledge.” (Case 2:18-cr-00198, Document 58, at 6).
19. Morris attested that he and Young witnessed Figueroa come out of the
plaintiff’s residence and get into the Dodge Neon to travel to the Dollar Tree parking lot
for the second buy, after which he and Young followed Figueroa and her sister, who
were in the Neon, back to the location of the plaintiff’s residence. However, according
to the U.S. District Court, “[t]he officers simply made another drive-by. They did not see
Figueroa exit that vehicle or enter the residence.” (Case 2:18-cr-00198, Document 58,
at 6).
20. The search warrant was signed by the magistrate around 9:00 p.m. that
night, and the defendant officers immediately executed the warrant at the plaintiff’s
residence. Plaintiff was sitting in his living room when the officers arrived. His 16 year
old son was in the home with him. Officers threw a concussion grenade through his
living room window, then busted through his door with a sledgehammer. They
handcuffed plaintiff, and put him on his porch, took his son from him, and proceeded to
21. In the search, they found heroin, two firearms, about $2,000.00 in
currency, and arrested the plaintiff. What they did not find, however, was Melissa
Figueroa - nor any of her possessions. Nor did they find the prerecorded money from
22. According to the U.S. District Court, Defendant Morris’ affidavit, in which
twice he claimed that he and defendant Young had prior knowledge that Figueroa “lived
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and stayed at ‘the defendant’s Wood Avenue address,’” is not supported by the limited
23. According to the U.S. District Court, “the officers had no basis whatever
from those bare observations to conclude that Figueroa “lived or stayed at” the plaintiff’s
24. According to the U.S. District Court, “Sgt. Morris’ false statement that the
officers had prior knowledge that Figueroa “lived or stayed at” the [plaintiff’s] residence
was calculated to mislead the magistrate into the belief that there was probable cause
to believe heroin could be found at that location.” (Case 2:18-cr-00198, Document 58, at
9).
25. Morris further omitted from his warrant affidavit that there was a small
amount of heroin involved in the two transactions involving Figueroa. The initial buy
was $80.00 of heroin, which is approximately a fraction of a gram, and the second buy
of $80.00 indicates the same small amount. The factual implication of the small
amounts is that Morris had knowledge that such a small amount of heroin could have
easily been transported on Figueroa’s person in her clothing, rather than having utilized
26. According to the U.S. District Court, the affidavit by Morris “states that ‘we’
had prior knowledge where Figueroa lived or stayed when neither knew that to be true.
The use of ‘we’ was designed to fortify the false allegation being made.” (Case 2:18-
27. At the time the affidavit was presented to the magistrate, neither
defendants Morris nor Young knew from whence Figueroa had come when she made
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the first sale at the Dollar Tree parking lot. She had been driving her ex significant
other’s (Amber Evans) Ford Taurus, because her vehicle was in the shop for repairs.
Amber Evans is the plaintiff’s daughter, which provides numerous legitimate reasons for
28. The officers knew only that the Dodge Neon was driven back to the
plaintiff’s residence, but they did not know whether Figueroa entered the residence.
What they would learn some two and a half hours later when the search warrant was
executed, was that Figueroa was not there and neither were any of her belongings.
Moreover, none of the $2,282.00 seized in the plaintiff’s home was prerecorded money
29. The sole supporting basis for the affidavit turns on the sale of a meager
amount of heroin by one who, in the course of making the sale, has paid a visit to the
home of another. Armed only with that limited circumstance, defendant Morris sought a
search warrant of the place visited by the small time dealer. Doubtless recognizing the
weakness of the premise for a search of the home, Morris added the following
unsubstantiated paragraph:
Members of the Central West Virginia Drug Task Force have received numerous
complaints about the sale and distribution of heroin from this residence.
Members of the Task Force have received numerous complaints about other
subjects who are known to live or stay at the residence described. Those
subjects are Keith Sizemore and Amber Evans.
(Case 2:18-cr-00198, Document 58, at 10-11). According to the U.S. District Court,
“[t]here is not an iota of evidence to support that gratuitous allegation.” Moreover, the
allegation that there were complaints about the plaintiff and Amber Evans, “[t]hat too, is
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30. The U.S. District Court also noted that, “just as Figueroa was falsely
stated by Sgt. Morris to have lived or stayed at the Sizemore residence, so too is the
unproved allegation that Amber Evans lived or stayed there. She did not. Sgt. Morris
has since admitted that he did not know where Evans lived or stayed and, as with
Figueroa, he had made no investigation to find out. Rather, he simply saw Evans there
on the evening of July 12th and made the same unwarranted assumption about Evans
31. In an order finding that the search warrant for the plaintiff’s residence was
Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the only facts of which Sgt. Morris
had knowledge that were in any sense relevant to the issuance of the search
warrant sought, were the two small-time sales in the Dollar Tree parking lot. Only
one of those sales significantly related, however obscurely, to the Sizemore
house in that the officers witnessed Figueroa leave from that point while on her
way to make the second sale.
In particular, without the false statement that Figueroa lived or stayed at the
Sizemore house, coupled with the false statement that the officers had prior
knowledge of that allegation, there was simply no adequate ground on which to
base the search of another man’s house.
The [plaintiff] was the sole owner of that residence searched. It was his home,
as well as that of his 16-year-old son, and he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in it. The search warrant obtained for his residence was sought without
any basis for it, and its execution was a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution as an unreasonable search and seizure . . . .
32. Following the District Court’s finding that the search was illegal, the
criminal charges against the plaintiff were dropped. However, by that time, plaintiff had
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already lost everything he owned due to civil forfeiture proceedings, which shockingly
had been filed and prosecuted prior to the plaintiff even being indicted criminally.
33. As a result of the illegal search and the ensuing civil forfeiture
proceedings, the plaintiff lost his home, which was confiscated; he lost his 2017 pickup
truck, which was confiscated; and he spent a substantial amount of time incarcerated.
restated herein.
35. Defendants Morris and Young caused a search of the plaintiff’s home and
a seizure of the plaintiff’s person pursuant to a legal process when they submitted an
affidavit, utilizing both of their names, experience, and testimony, signed by Defendant
Morris, to the Magistrate Court of Fayette County, and signed by Magistrate Young, who
36. The said legal process was unsupported by probable cause due to the fact
a. They falsely swore twice that they had “prior knowledge” that
b. They also falsely swore that they observed Melissa Figueroa return
to the plaintiff’s residence following the second buy, when in fact, the
officers simply performed a drive-by, and did not actually witness Figueroa
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regarding the small amount of heroin involved in the two Dollar Tree
parking lot buys, which was relevant to establishing a connection with the
both Morris and Young - was designed to fortify the false allegation being
made - especially in light of the fact that the magistrate who received the
affidavit stating that they had received numerous complaints about drug
activity at the residence, and drug activity involving the plaintiff and his
daughter, Amber Evans. However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
made the finding that these statements were false, and where wholly
against the plaintiff were dismissed favorably to the plaintiff. The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia noted that, “The search warrant obtained for
[plaintiff’s] residence was sought without any basis for it, and its execution was a clear
38. No objectively reasonable police officer would have believed that probable
cause existed to charge the plaintiff with a crime, or that there was illegal drugs in the
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plaintiff’s home, based on the information available to Morris and Young at the time they
submitted the warrant application. As the District Court noted, “[t]he sole supporting
basis for the affidavit turns on the sale of a meager amount of heroin by one who, in the
course of making the sale, has paid a visit to the home of another.”
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements, as described above in detail, in
their affidavit which would have informed the magistrate of facts she knew would have
negated probable cause. Although Morris signed the affidavit, his use of the word, “we”
as well as knowledge allegedly held by Young being alleged therein, implies that both
fact that both officers subsequently participated in the execution of the warrant at the
plaintiff’s residence.
40. The said false statements and omissions were material and necessary to
the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. As the District Court noted in finding a
constitutional violation, “[i[n particular, without the false statement that Figueroa lived or
stayed at the Sizemore house, coupled with the false statement that the officers had
prior knowledge of that allegation, there was simply no adequate ground on which to
attempt to mislead the otherwise neutral and detached magistrate. The District Court
found that, “Sgt. Morris’ false statement that the officers had prior knowledge that
Figueroa “lived or stayed at” the [plaintiff’s] residence was calculated to mislead the
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magistrate into the belief that there was probable cause to believe heroin could be
42. The said false statements and omissions were material and necessary to
43. Defendant Morris and Young’s actions as alleged herein were performed
under color of law, objectively unreasonable, willful, wanton, intentional and done with a
callous and reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free
restated herein.
46. The defendant political subdivisions, the FCC and the Town of Oak Hill,
who were the employers of the defendant police officers at the relevant times while they
were acting within the scope and course of their employment, specifically owed the
plaintiff a duty of reasonable care. It was reasonably foreseeable to the said political
subdivisions that plaintiff and other individuals would be damaged by being subjected to
providing false information to the Magistrate Court of Fayette County in order to secure
the defendants that allowing police officers to operate outside the bounds of the U.S.
Constitution, with little to no supervision and training, in order to seize assets for profit,
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through misuse of the West Virginia state civil forfeiture statute, is going to harm citizens
employees, Morris and Young, respectively, as detailed above and incorporated herein,
committed an unreasonable search and seizure of the plaintiff and his home on
making false statements and material omissions in their affidavit to the Magistrate Court
of Fayette County. In so doing, the officers were acting in accordance with their training
practice, and activity of acting outside the law for purpose of pecuniary gain via the state
civil forfeiture statute. Effectively unsupervised and undertrained by their employers, the
defendant officers were operating outside the bounds of the U.S. Constitution, in a
scheme primarily concerned with seizing assets to be converted to their own ownership
(the FCC and Town of Oak Hill) through the civil forfeiture statute. Since the political
subdivision defendants themselves were profiting from the scheme, they instituted an
official policy of “turning a blind eye” to the officers’ activities, and allowed an
training.
48. Indeed, the plaintiff’s assets were seized and converted to the defendant’s
ownership through the civil forfeiture statute, prior to the criminal indictment of the
defendant. Such a practice shows the primary motive of the defendant political
subdivisions is profit, rather than law enforcement. Such a practice and motive directly
caused substantial damage to the plaintiff, including the loss of his home and truck.
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49. As a direct result of FCC and the Town of Oak Hill’s negligence, plaintiff
PRAYER
determined at trial;
h. Any other relief that this Court deems is just and fair;
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/s John H. Bryan
John H. Bryan (WV Bar No. 10259)
JOHN H. BRYAN, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
611 Main Street
P.O. Box 366
Union, WV 24983
(304) 772-4999
Fax: (304) 772-4998
[email protected]
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