MECANO v COA G.R. No.

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992 The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?

It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization
Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that
expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the service of the
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to
receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of disability 2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier
thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the law.
payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the
case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be. Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
xxx xxx xxx public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees. government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired
in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-connected, the
Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim. Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the
petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter”.
NOTES:
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded
petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on 1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the
the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed
with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified
Administrative Code of 1987. document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and

Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
“elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires”.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an
Hence this petition for certiorari. implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is
a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
ISSUE: WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees’
HELD: NO. The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’
benefits. Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”
lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing
clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied
repeals

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to
supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is
found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
AGBAYANI V PNB G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971 The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959,
when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The
prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13
decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had
1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance
extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a
of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had
defense.
long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity.

PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was
declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of
the loan.

o E0 32 was issued in 1945 – providing for debt moratorium

The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified.

Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could
not pass the test of validity. (Possibly what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it
violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution).

The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before the same were declared invalid
tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)

HELD:
YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental
response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their
number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the
courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with.
This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such
legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the
meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.