The petitioners are liable for the crime of frustrated homicide.

The elements of frustrated homicide are:

(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is present.

In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following
factors:
(1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
and
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.

In the case at bar, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was attacked, by
the concerted actions of the accused, the weapon used and the nature of wounds sustained by
Rodolfo. The kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and the vital parts of
Rodolfo's body at which he was undeniably stabbed demonstrated petitioners' intent to kill. The
medico-legal certificate revealed that Rodolfo sustained multiple stab wounds in the epigastrium,
left upper quadrant of the abdomen resulting to internal injuries in the transverse colon (serosal),
mesentery and left kidney. Given these injuries, Rodolfo would have succumbed to death if not
for the emergency surgical intervention. Therefore, the petitioners are liable for frustrated
homicide.

No, Franco is not liable for theft. In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove
two things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or
the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the
perpetrator of the crime. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of
the crime of theft are:
(1) the taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking away was done with intent to gain;
(4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon
things.

Not all the facts on which the inference of guilt is based were proved. The matter of what and
whose cell phone Franco took from the altar still remains uncertain. The facts and circumstances
proven by the prosecution, taken together, are not sufficient to justify the unequivocal
conclusion that Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's cell phone. No other convincing evidence
was presented by the prosecution that would link him to the theft. The fact that Franco took a
cell phone from the altar does not necessarily point to the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's cell
phone that he took. Not all of the elements of theft are present at instant case which can convict
Franco for the said crime.

Yes, the accused-appellant is guilty of rape. The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not expected to be
knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The fact that she claimed that
accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not mean that there was no
penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman. This explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape. In the present case, AAA testified that
she felt pain when accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina and that she still felt
severe pain in that area when she was being given a bath by her mother after her molestation.
Such kind of pain could not have been the result of mere superficial rubbing of accused
appellant's sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result of penile
penetration sufficient to constitute rape. Thus, these facts alone prove that there was indeed a
penetration of the accused’s penis on the victim’s vagina, thereby consummating the crime of
rape.

Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides that the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs is
committed when all the following elements are proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, as
evidence.

Since the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drugs itself, then
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the seized item is the very same object tested to be positive
for dangerous drugs and presented in court as evidence is essential in every criminal prosecution
under R.A. 9165. To this end, the prosecution must establish the unbroken chain of custody of
the seized item.

The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are as follows:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
(2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer;
(3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
(4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. In the
instant case, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the first three links in
the chain of custody.

The prosecution evidence failed to convincingly show who between P/Insp. Bañares, as poseur-
buyer, and P/Insp. Demauro, as back-up and arresting officer, marked the bag of marijuana seized
from appellant with the initials "LQE" dated "08-14-2005" at the PDEA Office. Anent the second
link in the chain of custody, there is no showing who between P/Insps. Bañares and Demauro
turned over to the investigating officer the drugs seized from appellant. With respect to the third
link in the chain of custody, there is likewise no indication as to the identity of the investigating
officer who then turned over the drugs to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.

The instant case failed to(a) to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the bag of marijuana
seized from appellant, (b) to prove that the specimen found to be positive for marijuana upon
laboratory examination, was the same dangerous drugs seized from him, and (c) to proffer any
justifiable ground for the non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. These flaws cast serious
doubt on whether the specimen found to be positive of marijuana upon laboratory examination
was the same drugs seized from appellant and offered in evidence before the trial court. With
the failure of the prosecution to prove with moral certainty the identity and the unbroken chain
of custody of the dangerous drugs seized from him, appellant deserves exoneration from the
crime charged. therefore, the appellant is not liable beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

Yes, accused-appellant Ricardo Lagbo is liable for qualified rape. Rape under paragraph 1, Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code is committed by:
(1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

In this case, AAA's recollection of the heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward.
She was able to positively identify the accused-appellant as her sexual assailant. While there are
minor inconsistencies, her testimony was given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and candid manner. Thus, the accused is liable for the crime of rape.

Accused-appellant is liable for murder of Severino Manalo. Treachery exists when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in its execution
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
any defense which the offended party might make. At this point, it bears to emphasize that the
stabbing was not preceded by any argument between the victim and the accused-appellant and
that Severino was just casually conversing with Vicente at that time. So, when the accused-
appellant surreptitiously approached the victim from behind, the latter had no inkling nor reason
to believe that his life was in danger and his defenses were down. Therefore, it is clear from the
facts of the case that accused appellant is liable for murder with treachery as qualifying
circumstance.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of murder
qualified by treachery is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there were no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed on the accused-appellant in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the
same Code.

Yes. Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who:

(a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and
(b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers. It is committed in large scale when it is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.

The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment against at
least three persons despite her not having been duly licensed or authorized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for that purpose.

The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not
preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code on the
ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy.

The elements of estafa as charged are, namely:

(1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.

The active representation by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy Miparanum
abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as
the first element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his money,
resulting in damage that is the second element of the estafa. Considering that the damage
resulted from the deceit, the CA's affirmance of her guilt for estafa as charged was in order.

Doctrine: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make," "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.

Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. Here, the evidence on record conclusively showed that the appellants
assaulted and killed Ilao while he was face down on the ground. Camposano took advantage of
their victim's defenseless and helpless position to inflict the fatal stab wounds, giving their victim
no chance at all to retaliate or defend himself.

Doctrine: Article 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code, reads as follows:

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising and advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Yes. All the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment-in large scale are present, namely:
(1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers;
(2) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" under Article 13 (b)6 of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and
(3) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

More importantly, all the said elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt. In this
case, it is clear that Molina failed to actually deploy the complainants without any valid reason
and without the latter’s fault. Further, said accused also failed to reimburse the expenses
incurred by the said private complainants to their damage and prejudice contrary to law.

Doctrine: The crime of rape, defined under Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the three circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; and, (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. And penalized under Article 266-B by reclusion perpetua or death.
Yes. The accused is guilty as he admitted that he used force and violence against the victim AAA.
Force as an element of rape is that which is needed to overpower the' resistance of the offended
party and to consummate the offense. In this case, the three (3) blows to the head with a stick
and several blows using his fist that caused AAA's unconsciousness definitely enabled accused-
appellant to carry out his evil deed without any defense on the part of AAA. Further, it has been
established that the accused boxed AAA and when she fell, he sat on her stomach and boxed her
again. It proved the element of rape in the case at bar, namely: (a) through force, threat or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; (c)
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and, (d) when the offended
party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. Hence, a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence
which is indirect or presumptive evidence that refers to a set of facts from which the existence
of the allegation sought to be proved may be inferred. The pieces of evidence adduced by the
prosecution constitute an unbroken chain of events which clearly points to the accused as the
guilty person.

Doctrine: The crime of kidnapping, defined under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is committed when any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death through the following circumstances: (a) If the kidnapping or
detention shall have lasted more than five days. (b) If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority. (c) If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. (d) If the person kidnapped
or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom under Article 267 of RPC? (2) Whether or not the accused should be punished with death
penalty and be eligible for parole?

Ruling: (1) Yes. The court ruled that there was conspiracy among all five accused-appellants, thus,
they should all be equally liable as principals for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The
appellate court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellants taking into
account the enactment in 2006 of R.A. No. 9346. The prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom as embodied
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, giving weight and credence to the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies having been sufficiently proven, and the appellants, being private
individuals, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victim, this Court affirms the finding of
appellants' guilt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The law is indeed hard, but even in the
case of the herein five (5) accused who are not that hardened but even seemingly amateurish in
perpetrating their crime without unnecessary maltreatment to their victim, it is still the law on
kidnapping for ransom. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as its amending Republic Act
No, 7659, provides, that, "The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person". The
kidnappers found guilty as principal cannot avoid the imposition of this supreme penalty.

(2) Yes. The elements of kidnapping, since accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of kidnapping
for ransom had been established beyond reasonable doubt, they should be meted the penalty of
death under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. However, Republic Act No.
934635 already prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals correctly sentenced accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, without
eligibility for parole. The accused having been convicted offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of Republic Act No.
9346 enacted on June 24, 2006, amending Republic Act No. 7659 dated January 1, 2004 punished
with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is disqualified to parole.

Doctrine: The crime of robbery with rape is defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentencing them to death. It is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery. When
robbery is accompanied by rape, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Although the trial
court imposed the death penalty, the CA correctly modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, pursuant to RA 9346.

Yes. The court gave judgment finding both Gabuya and Giron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with rape as defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
RPC. This judgment was based on the positive identification by the victim "AAA" and the
corroborating medical examination conducted on her. The arresting officers were able to seize
from them the calculator owned by the victim and the two fifty-peso bills which is the amount
left of the P480.00 cash money taken from her. It is established in evidence that there was
forceful penile penetration as shown by the medical certificate and presence of spermatozoa.
The abrasions and hematoma found in the body of the victim are consistent with the struggle put
up by the rape victim, as evidence of rape abound. Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to
the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
ruled that due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often
than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim's
credibility becomes the primordial consideration. Indeed, the State in this case had satisfactorily
established the following essential elements of that felony: "a) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; b) the property taken belongs to
another; c) the taking is done with animolucrandi, and d) the robbery is accompanied by rape.

Doctrine: The mitigating circumstances defined in Chapter 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code
are those which, if present in the commission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from
criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty. One single fact cannot be made the basis
of more than one mitigating circumstance. Hence, a mitigating circumstance arising from a single
fact, absorbs all the other mitigating circumstances arising from the same fact. It is based on the
diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or on the lesser perversity of the
offender. Under paragraph 6, Passion and Obfuscation laid down its elements whereas follows:
(a) The accused acted upon an impulse (b) The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally
produced passion or obfuscation. However, it is not mitigating when committed: (a) In the spirit
of lawlessness (b) In the spirit of revenge. And it cannot co-exist with (a) Vindication of grave
offense (b) Treachery.

Yes, in imposing the correct penalty, the Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6) of the RPC, because, Jabalde lost his reason and self-
control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. There is passion obfuscation when
the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.

For passion and obfuscation to be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that:
(1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended
victim;
(2) the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the
unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's mind; and
(3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness
or revenge.
With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her daughter, Jabalde is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

Doctrine: In drug-related prosecutions, the State should not only establish all the elements of the
sale and possession of shabu under RA 9165, but also prove the corpus delicti, the body of the
crime, to discharge its overall duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is
vital for the conviction of the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride or

"shabu" under Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

No. Even if PO2 Repompo did see clearly the alleged transaction, still the substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized illegal drug raise doubts on the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court. In drug-related prosecutions, the State should not only establish all the
elements of the sale and possession of shabu under RA 9165, but should also prove the corpus
delicti, the body of the crime, to discharge its overall duty of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital for the conviction of the accused.

To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drug are preserved, the chain
of custody rule requires the prosecution to be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
of the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was
presented in court. Testimony must be presented on every link in the chain of custody, from the
moment the dangerous drug was seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. After testifying
about the poseur buyer buying the shabu from appellant, PO2 Repompo no longer mentioned
the succeeding actions of the poseur buyer, particularly to whom the poseur buyer gave the
shabu for custody. The only conclusion from this omission is that PO2 Repompo did not witness
the subsequent acts of the poseur buyer, especially with regard to the custody of the shabu.

Doctrine: To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be
proven with certainty. Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. No.
533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Act of 1974.

Ruling: No, the prosecution failed to prove one of the elements of cattle-rustling, specifically, that
the lost carabao of Mario and Teresita Perez is the same carabao allegedly stolen by petitioner.

The elements of cattle-rustling are:

(1) large cattle is taken;
(2) it belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser;
(4) the taking is done by any means, method or scheme;
(5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and
(6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things.

In this case, not all of the elements of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The carabao
transported by petitioner and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao
owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.

Doctrine: In this jurisdiction, the defense of denial and frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with
disfavor for it can be easily concocted and is a common defense ploy in drug cases. These
weaknesses, however, do not add any strength nor can they help the prosecution's case because
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight

Issue: (1) Whether or not there had been a buy-bust operation where Cayas was caught red-
handed selling prohibited drugs. (2) Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Ruling: (1) No. The defense evidence must likewise be so regarded without being hobbled by the
presumption of regularity. From the perspective of the defense, we cannot but note that the
evidence for the defense is not strong as Cayas merely claimed that she was framed, and implied
that the plastic sachets confiscated from her were planted. (2) The conditions set by Section 21
(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 were not met in the present case. In People v. Kamad,
we recognized the following links that must be established to ensure the preservation of the
identity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug should there be no strict compliance with
the procedure provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The procedural lapses in the handling and
identification of the seized drugs, as well as the unexplained discrepancy in the marking,
collectively raise doubts on whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that
were taken from Cayas when she was arrested. These constitute major lapses that, standing
unexplained, are fatal to the prosecution's case.

Doctrine: In prosecutions for illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

Facts: Siaton, the appellant, was charged and convicted by the lower courts for selling shabu, in
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. He was caught in a buy-bust operation selling to the police officer acting as the poseur-
buyer a small pack of shabu. For the defense, appellant denied that he was caught in a buy-bust
operation and claimed that he was playing a computer game at the store of his aunt when a
chubby and curly haired person approached him asking where he could obtain shabu. The
unknown person asked him where he could obtain shabu. Appellant replied that he did not know.
Said person briefly left him and entered a house about 100 meters away from the store of his
aunt. While he was still playing, the unknown person came back, sat beside him and asked him
what game he was playing. Three more unknown persons, who turned out policemen, arrived.
The policemen forced him to go with them. The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense
charged. Aggrieved, appellant sought the reversal of the decision. The CA affirmed the judgment
of conviction of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165 or the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs

Ruling: No. For a prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following elements
must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The dangerous
drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and to sustain a conviction, the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the "illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either
by accident or otherwise." In drugs cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond reasonable doubt. The mere fact of unauthorized possession or sale is not
sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt. The fact that the substance said to be illegally sold is the
very same substance offered in court as exhibit must be established. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function. In the case at bar, the court found several glaring gaps in
the chain of custody. The prosecution failed to establish an important element of the offense,
which is the identity of the object.

Doctrine: There is treachery when the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the
execution of the killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend
themselves.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder.

Ruling: The Supreme Court see no reason to grant the appeal. Both lower courts correctly found
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The attending circumstance
of treachery was likewise properly appreciated. Treachery is present when the following
conditions are present:
(1) the employment of such means of execution that gave the one attacked no opportunity to
defend oneself or to retaliate and
(2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.

In People v. Osianas, we held there is treachery when "the means used by the accused-appellants
to insure the execution of the killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to
defend themselves was the tying of the hands of the victims." In this case, it was correctly pointed
out by the trial court that the fact that "the arms of the [victim] were held he was stabbed in the
back by accused Toto Morales is enough to qualify the killing to murder. “Further, the Court of
Appeals added that "appellants' attack and their co-accused came without warning and without
the slightest provocation from the victim." Hence, decision of the CA was affirmed with
modifications by the Supreme Court.
Doctrine: Even absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor
has moral ascendancy over the victim. We emphasized that in rape committed by a close kin,
such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral
influence or ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
(2) Whether or not the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant reliable.

Ruling: (1) Yes. Based on the testimony of AAA, there was carnal knowledge between her and
appellant. This was further corroborated by medical findings which showed vaginal lacerations.
It was further stipulated during pre-trial that the appellant is AAA's uncle by affinity and that she
was fourteen years old at the time of the rape incident. It was ruled in People v. Ofemiano that
"even absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has moral
ascendancy over the victim. We emphasized that in rape committed by a close kin, such as the
victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or
ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation." The prosecution was able to show evidence
that all the circumstances necessary to convict appellant under the above provisions were
present in the case. The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
(2) No. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because
it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be
repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. The Court finds the Affidavit
of Desistance executed by AAA is highly suspect. The document was a product of compulsion and
influence on the part of appellant's wife to force AAA to sign the document.

DOCTRINE: Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that an extra-judicial confession
shall not be a sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
In the case at bar, the confession made by accused-appellant was corroborated by other
evidence. While there was no prosecution witness who positively identified accused-appellant as
the assailant, his culpability was nonetheless proven through circumstantial evidence.

To warrant a conviction for Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution must prove the confluence
of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(2) the property thus taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(4) on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in a
generic sense, was committed

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not CA erred in admitting as evidence the extrajudicial confession of
accused (2) Whether or not CA erred in proving that accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING: (1) NO. The court agrees that extra-judicial confession given by accused-appellant during
the interview conducted by the field reporter is admissible in evidence. It has been consistently
held that the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with relations between private individuals. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents; thus, accused appellant's
confession to field reporter Tacason is not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.

(2) No. To warrant a conviction for Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution must prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(2) the property thus taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(4) on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in a
generic sense, was committed.

In proving Robbery with Homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established
conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. In the instant case, the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, the extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant and the Investigation
Report of Urdaneta City Police Station support the charge of the component offense of Robbery.
It should also be noted that in Robbery with Homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery; thus, the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life.

In previous cases, this Court had occasion to explain that intent to rob is an internal act but it
may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property, and when the fact of
asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is justified even if the
subject property is not presented in court. "After all, the property stolen may have already been
abandoned, thrown away or destroyed by the robber. “Considering that the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved, the prosecution is not expected to
prove the actual value of the property stolen. More importantly, accused-appellant's extrajudicial
confession glaringly reveals his intention to rob the deceased.

DOCTRINE: The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the

corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved
from the accused or from the crime scene.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs embodied in Section 21 of R.A. 9161
also ensures the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. The provision requires that
upon seizure of the illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs
shall:
(a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and
(b) take photographs thereof
(c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and
(d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official
(e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.

The Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that mandates
strict compliance. The Congress laid it down as a safety precaution against potential abuses by
law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those
suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs. Under the principle that
penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith is fully
justified.

ISSUE: Whether or not there were gaps on the chain of custody.

RULING: Yes. After due consideration, the Court resolves to acquit appellant on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the break in the chain of
custody of the seized drugs and the serious infirmity of the buy-bust team's non-observance of
the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of
authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and
the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene.
The substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs put into question the
reliability and evidentiary value of their contents - whether these drugs are the same ones
brought to the laboratory for examination, found positive for shabu and then presented before
the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus gravely erred in ruling that there was an unbroken chain of
custody simply because the illegal drugs have been marked, sent to the crime laboratory for
analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated items
throughout the entire process had never been established.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs embodied in Section 21 of R.A. 9161
also ensures the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. The provision requires that
upon seizure of the illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs
shall:
(a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and
(b) take photographs thereof
(c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and
(d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official
(e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.

The Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that mandates
strict compliance. The Congress laid it down as a safety precaution against potential abuses by
law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those
suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs. Under the principle that
penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith is fully
justified.

DOCTRINE: In rape cases failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and the
victim's lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender into submission does not
signify voluntariness or consent. Moreover, delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of
threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim because delay in reporting an
incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt
on the credibility of the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.

RULING: YES. The appeal is dismissed. The RTC found AAA's testimony to be credible and noted
that it was positive, direct and straightforward. The Court of Appeals agreed that AAA's testimony
was straightforward and categorical.

For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
The prosecution in the present case positively established the elements of rape required under
Article 266-A of the RPC. First, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA was positive
and categorical in asserting that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Her testimony was
corroborated by the medical evaluation which is suggestive of sexual abuse. Second, appellant
employed threat and force. Fie used a long blade to threaten AAA to submit to his desire. At the
time of the rape incident, AAA was only 14 years old. However, the qualifying circumstance of
relationship was not proven. Thus, appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of simple rape.
Both courts correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

DOCTRINE: The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently, Remedios's death on March 7, 2014
renders the Court's July 7, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her, and is therefore
set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Remedios is dismissed.

FACTS: Remedios was convicted for sale of illegal drugs. While the Supreme Court was hearing
her motion for reconsideration for her appeal on the decision to uphold the RTC and CA decisions,
the Court received a letter from the Correctional Institution for Women informing the Court
informing Remedios’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a person extinguishes criminal liability.

RULING: YES. As Remedios's death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's July 7, 2014
Resolution in this case, i.e., when her appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, her
criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code which states: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Doctrine: In order to convict the offender under RA 7080, the identification of the main plunderer
sought to be prosecuted as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main
plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because
it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the
charges they were being made answerable for.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of RA 7080 to convict
Aroyo and Aguas and whether they conspire to do the crime.

Ruling: No, in this case the court ruled that the prosecution did not sufficiently prove that a
conspiracy between Arroyo and Aguas for the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the
prosecution failed to properly allege the main plunderer in this case. Then, there was no proof of
amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was adduced
against GMA and Aguas. Finally, The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the
public treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended). Therefore, the
court annuls and set aside the decision rendered in connection the criminal case.

Doctrine: When the killing is committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, the
qualifying circumstances attendant to the killing would be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength serves to aggravate the
crime.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the trial court and the CA committed error in convicting the accused-
appellant in this instant case with Robbery with Homicide. (2) Whether or not the trial court and
CA properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength in this instant
case.

Ruling: (1) The trial and appellate courts committed no error in convicting the accused-appellant
of Robbery with Homicide Section 9, Article 294, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, reads:" Art. 294 - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed,
or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. In
proving Robbery with Homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established conclusively
as any other essential element of the crime.

(2) The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever
there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and
obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely
used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The felonious acts of accused-appellant and the other malefactors of robbing and killing
the victim were clearly executed with abuse of superior strength. Their combined force and
physical strength overwhelmed the victim and left him defenseless. Accused-appellant struck
with his knife the unarmed victim. The multiple stab wounds sustained by the victim indisputably
show that the group of accused-appellant took advantage of their superior strength to perpetrate
the crime.

Doctrine: In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, to prove the
complicity of the accused to illegal possession of a dangerous drug, there must be proof that (1)
the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court as well as the CA properly convicted the appellant in violation
of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Ruling: Yes, the Court in this case affirmed the decisions rendered by the trial court and CA, for
the prosecution established the elements of RA 9165 (both the illegal sale of shabu and illegal
possession of a dangerous drug). Without hesitation, the said appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and his appeal was dismissed.

Doctrine: Rape is qualified when paragraph d of Article 266-A of the RPC is present. However, the
relationship of the offender and the victim shall be taken into consideration. In this instant case,
the offender is the common-law husband of the victim such relationship or circumstance shall
not qualify the rape but only a simple one.

Doctrine: The illegal sale of dangerous drugs is not consummated when the seller fails to deliver
the illegal drug to the buyer. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller. What is important is that the poseur-buyer received the
drug from the accused.

As provided, a crime is attempted when the offender commences the commission of the of crime
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the acts of the herein appellant is enough to make guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
(2) Whether or not the RTC and CA properly imposed the penalty and convicted the appellant
the crime of consummated safe of prohibited drugs.

Ruling: (1) Yes, she was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for her acts constitutes violation of RA
9165.
(2) No, in this case the Court modified the decisions made by the lower court and CA convicting
the appellant for consummated sale of prohibited drugs to conviction of crime of attempted sale
of prohibited drugs for reason that the evidence fails to establish the consummation of the said
crime for the element of receiving the prohibited drugs by the buyer lacks in this case.

Doctrine: To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

Ruling: No, the petitioner Jesusa T. Dela Cruz is acquitted of the crime of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 on twenty-three (23) counts on the ground that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

As between the parties to this case, the dispute only pertains to the presence or absence of the
second element. In order to support her plea for an acquittal, the petitioner particularly insists
that she failed to receive any notice of dishonor on the subject checks, which rendered absent
the element of knowledge of insufficient funds. Although a notice of dishonor is not an
indispensable requirement in a prosecution for violation of B.P. Big. 22 as it is not an element of
the offense, evidence that a notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the accused is
actually sought as a means to prove the second element. Jurisprudence is replete with cases that
underscore the value of a notice of dishonor in B.P. Big. 22 cases, and how the absence of
sufficient proof of receipt thereof can be fatal in the prosecution's cause.

Issue: Whether or not Dario is guilty of rape.

Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that the discrepancies in AAA's testimony regarding the exact date
of the alleged rape subject of this case are inconsequential, immaterial, and cannot discredit her
credibility as a witness. We held that the date of the rape need not be precisely proved,
considering that it is not a material element of the offense. It is sufficient that the Information
alleges that the crime was committed on or about a specific date. The date is not an essential
element of the crime of rape since the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.
What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission thereof by the accused-appellant has
been sufficiently proven.

On the matters of the medical examination result, it has been invariably held that an intact hymen
does not negate a finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by entry into the
lips of the vagina, even the briefest of contacts and without rupture or laceration of the hymen,
is enough to justify a conviction for rape. In addition, a medical examination and a medical
certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts had erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Ruling: No. The trial and appellate courts committed no error in convicting appellant of Robbery
with Homicide. Article 294, paragraph (1) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, reads: to
warrant a conviction for Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution must prove the confluence of
the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(2) the property taken thus belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(4) on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in a
generic sense, was committed.

Furthermore, the SC had held that homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the
robbery, as what is essential is that there is a direct relation, an intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing.

No doubt exists that all the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar. Appellant's
coaccused admitted the taking of the cash, checks, and pieces of jewelry of Spouses Ganzon. In
fact, some of which were even found in the houses of his co-accused.

Even though the appellant only acted as a lookout he is also guilty for the crime of Robbery with
homicide because there is a conspiracy between him and his co-accused. According to Article 8
of the RPC, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves
when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.
There should be a proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same
purpose.

In the case at bar, Jessie and Rex (the co-accused of the appellant) also testified that appellant
was present when they planned to rob the Ganzon's residence the day before the incident.
Furthermore, in robbing the Ganzon's residence, appellant served as a look out while the others
were robbing and ransacking the house. Danilo even testified that it was appellant who forcibly
brought Mr. Ganzon from the bedroom to the sala of the house before tying his hands and feet.
Thus, the foregoing circumstances prove beyond reasonable doubt that all of the accused acted
in concert to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in not considering the meritorious ground raised by the
petitioner, stating that the prosecution failed to prove: (1) the second element of the crime
charged; (2) she had knowledge when she issued the subject checks; and (3) she does not have
sufficient funds for payment thereof.

Ruling: The Court found that the petition is meritorious, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
the prosecution must prove the following essential elements, namely: (1) The making, drawing,
and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.

There is no dispute that the first and the third elements are present in this case. It was proven
that petitioner issued the subject Landbank checks in favor of Aurelio Tapang as payment for the
balance of the purchase of the house and lot owned by Elsa Alburo-Walter and when presented
for payment, the same checks were dishonored for the reason of being drawn against insufficient
funds.

The remaining issue is whether or not the second element is present.

A perusal of the records of the case, shows the absence of any indication that petitioner received
the notices of dishonor allegedly sent by Landbank. The absence of proof that petitioner received
any notice informing her of the fact that her checks were dishonored and giving her five banking
days within which to make arrangements for payment of the said checks prevents the application
of the disputable presumption that she had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the
time she issued the checks
Anent the demand letter sent through registered mail, the same was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner received the same. Although the Registry Return Card shows
that the letter was received and signed for by a Jennifer Mendoza who identified herself as a
house helper of petitioner, it was not proven that the same person is a duly authorized agent of
the addressee or the petitioner. For notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on
the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee.

Thus, there being no clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks,
this Court cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. 22. The failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground
for her acquittal

Doctrine: There is no complex crime of arson with homicide because the crime of arson absorbs
the resultant death or is a separate crime altogether.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the accused be liable for arson with multiple homicide. (2) Whether
or not the elements of simple arson be established through circumstantial evidence

Ruling: (1) No. The Supreme Court ruled that in cases where both burning and death occur, in
order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson
and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:
(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or
on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building
or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done
so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson. In accordance to Section 5 of P.D. No.
1613, Abayon is charged with the crime of arson because his intent was merely to destroy his
family's apartment through the use of fire. The resulting deaths that occurred, therefore, should
be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increases the imposable penalty.

(2) Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that simple arson, defined and punished as explained in Section
1 of P.D. No. 1613, is essentially the destruction of property by fire that is not under the
circumstances enumerated under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659. In prosecuting arson, whether destructive or simple, the corpus delicti rule is generally
satisfied by proof that a fire occurred, and that it was intentionally caused.

Doctrine: When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even
if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with
the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Mabunot be convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of
R.A. No. 7610, a special penal law.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court reiterated the jurisprudence in the case of Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals saying that: “when the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala
in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.”
Accordingly, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a
criminal intent on the part of the offender. In the case at bar, the petitioner's claim that he had
no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly
intended to injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a
fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.

No. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the prosecution was able to establish with moral
certainty and prove to the Court beyond reasonable doubt that there is an unbroken chain of
custody over the confiscated illegal drug, from the time it was lawfully seized and came into the
possession of the apprehending officers up to the time it was presented and offered in evidence
before the trial court. As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of an illegal drug were not
compromised, non-compliance with R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR may be excused. Accordingly, the
prosecution presented every person who touched the exhibit. They described how and from
whom the seized marijuana was received, where it was and what happened to it while in their
possession, the condition in which it was received, the condition it was delivered to the next link
in the chain, and the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

Doctrine: For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act.

For this aggravating circumstance to be considered, it is indispensable to show how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In order to
be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
"premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation. “The essence of evident premeditation is
that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.

Issue: Whether or not there is an evident premeditation.

Ruling: No. The Court views that the prosecution was unable to establish the element of evident
premeditation to qualify the crime to frustrated murder. First, the circumstance must not merely
be “premeditation” but must be “evident premeditation”. Second, the prosecution failed toshow
a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow Dorado to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act. Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when
he shot Ronald, rather he was obscured by the heat or anger of the moment.

Doctrine: Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated
by the performance of an overt act which produces the crime. In proving conspiracy, direct
evidence is not indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime.

Issue: Whether or not appellant conspired with the other accused for the execution of their plan
to rob.

Ruling: Yes. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.” In the instant case, there is conspiracy when there is an act of planning with the
other accused the conduct of robbery, by accompanying them during its commission and hasty
getaway, as well as providing payment for their getaway vehicle and even threatening their driver
with mortal harm should he reveal what they had committed.

Doctrine: The elements if the crime penalized under Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised
Penal Code are all present in this case, namely: the documents is false; the offender had
knowledge that such document was false; and, the offender introduced in evidence in any judicial
proceeding such false or falsified document.

Issue: Whether or not there is a falsification of documents.

Ruling: Yes. The Court was not convinced that defendants had a lack of knowledge of the falsity
of complainant’s signature on it. Moreover, the falsified deed was presented in support of a
motion to dismiss filed by complainant in civil case, which is a judicial proceeding. Therefore,
the defendants are criminally liable under Article 172(3) of the Revised Penal Code for presenting
a false document, for having knowledge of the falsity of the document, and for introducing in
evidence in any judicial proceeding such false or falsified document.

Doctrine: The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there
is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and
obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime. The appreciation of this qualifying circumstance in the
commission of the crime of Murder depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated,
or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. Action in concert to achieve a common
design is the hallmark of conspiracy. Where conspiracy is proven, all the conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because, in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate
in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the
co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal act.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the CA erred in appreciating abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance. (2) Whether or not conspiracy is present in the instant case.

Ruling: (1) Yes. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and
obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the
presence of this circumstance. The appreciation of this qualifying circumstance in the commission
of the crime of Murder depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. The prosecution
failed to prove that there is disparity in age, size, and strength, except showing that there are
three assailants, and of them armed with a pointed object, attacked the victim. Neither did it
present evidence that the victim suffered from inferior physical condition. In fact, there is
evidence that the victim was able to parry the fist blows.

(2) Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. A co-conspirator does not
have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact part
performed by the coconspirator in the execution of the criminal act. The combined efforts of the
accused were perpetrated with concerted coordination indication a common objective. Thus,
conspiracy is present. Action in concert to achieve a common design is the hallmark of conspiracy.
Where conspiracy is proven, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the
act of all.

Doctrine: The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia for or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law.

Issue: Whether or not the elements of illegal possession of equipment and other drug
paraphernalia are present.

Ruling: The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 are:
(1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia for
or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. These elements
are present in the case since the prosecution was able to convincingly establish that appellant
was in possession of drug paraphernalia such as three (3) empty plastic sachets, one (1)
improvised tooter, and one (1) orange plastic straw, all of which were found positive for traces
of shabu. Appellant also did not present any proof that he was authorized to possess the same.

Doctrine: Chain of custody is defined as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. Marking
the seized drugs or other related items immediately after being seized from the accused is a
crucial step to establish chain of custody. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized to identify it as
the subject matter of the prohibited sale. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link and is vital to be immediately undertaken because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they
are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in its conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs had been preserved
Ruling: Yes. In the present case, the prosecution presented conflicting testimonies on who made
the actual markings. PO3 Salazar claimed it was the investigator who marked the sachets.
However, PO2 Ilagan claimed in his direct testimony that it was he who made the markings. The
prosecution simply failed to reconcile its witnesses’ conflicting. Inevitably, these contradictions
create doubt as to the integrity of the evidence against the accused. The totality of evidence
against Ameril cannot support his conviction. The failure of the prosecution to comply with
Sec.21, Art. II of RA No. 9165 and with the chain of custody requirement compromised the
identity and evidentiary value of the seized packs of shabu.

Doctrine: Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its
integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. The IRR of RA 9165 adds that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure.

As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. This applies only where the prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the
part of the police officers or PDEA agents, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds;
after which, the prosecution must show that' the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items have been preserved.

Doctrine: The elements of frustrated homicide are: first, the accused intended to kill his victim,
as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; second, the victim sustained a fatal
or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and third, none of the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.

Intent to kill may be proved by:

(a) the means used by the malefactors;
(b) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(c) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim;
(d) the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and
(e) the motives of the accused.
Under Article 12 (4), Book I of the Revised Penal code which gives the circumstances which are
exempt from criminal liability. There must be a complete absence of negligence and intent. An
accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove by clear and convincing
evidence.

To successfully claim the defense of accident, the accused must show that the following
circumstances are present:
(1) a person is performing a lawful act;
(2) with due care;
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) he had no fault in or intention of causing the injury.

Issue: (1) Whether or not, the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Nieva. (2) Whether or not
Nieva is eligible for the defense under Circumstances which exempt criminal liability.

Ruling: (1) No, Nieva is guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide. All the elements attending the
crime of frustrated homicide are all met. First, Nieva intended to kill Judy for persisting to shoot
the victim continuously even when the gun was jammed. Second, Judy has sustained a gunshot
wound where the doctor who attended to her wound said it could have led to Judy’s death were
if not for the timely medical assistance. And third, there were no treachery or evident
premeditation, which are qualifying circumstances of murder.
(2) No, Nieval is not eligible to claim the defense under Article 12 (4), Book 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was found by the court that Nieva was not performing a lawful act nor was the injury he
caused was an accident. It was also found by the court that Nieva had intention to kill the victim
for he did not stop shooting until he hit the victim.

Doctrine: Illegal recruitment is a crime committed by a person who, not having the valid license
or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers, undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
mentioned in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated in
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers' Act), against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:
(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers;
(b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the same Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and,
(c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group.

Issue: whether or not the accused- appellant spouses are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: Yes, accused- appellant spouses are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements
attending the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are met, namely: (1) Owen and Beatriz
Cagalingan do not have a valid license or authority for the recruitment and placement of workers,
(2) such recruitment is within the meaning of the term “recruitment and placement” under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Article 6 of RA 8042, (3) and such illegal recruitment was done
to five (5) private complainants.

Mayor Amado Corpuz, Jr. Vs. People of the Philippines November 23, 2016 G.R. Nos. 212656-57
PEREZ, J.

Doctrine: It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi
in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet
ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification
of public documents.

Ruling: No, petitioner is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to
warrant petitioner's conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. In the instant case,
petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171. By way of reiteration, it is a fundamental
rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui
dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a
means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock
for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification
of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the
participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable
doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That
the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State
has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.

The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and
not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent,
carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. Not only that, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction. Accordingly,
the prosecution failed to establish the elements of falsification of public documents. With the
prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt
persists, to acquit him.
Doctrine: To convict a person of malversation, these elements must be proved:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is
accountable; and
(d) The offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.

Issue: (1) Whether or not SB erred in finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Malversation
through Falsification by feigning a signature. (2) Whether or not there is the existence of
conspiracy between Petitioners.

Ruling: (1) Yes. SB erred in finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Malversation through
falsification The crime of Malversation of Public Funds is punished under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, to be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to
prove the following essential elements: (a) The offender is a public officer; (b) The offender has
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) The funds or
property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is accountable; and (d) The
offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.
In sum, what is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was
made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Here, while the records
support the presence of the first three (3) elements, we find that the Prosecution was unable to
satisfactorily prove the fourth element.

(2) No. The Prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of conspiracy between the
Petitioners. In countless decided cases, this Court has consistently held that conspiracy must be
established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence and that the same degree
of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a
criminal conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Apart from petitioner's signature on
the treasury warrant, nothing else of real substance was submitted to show petitioner's alleged
complicity in the crime. A mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher, check or warrant
is not enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among public officials and employees charged
with fraud.

Doctrine: The shooting of the unsuspecting victim was sudden and unexpected which effectively
deprived her of the chance to defend herself or to repel the aggression, insuring the commission
of the crime without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.
Once there is a qualifying circumstance, the suspect is guilty of murder and not homicide.

Issue: Whether or not Berk is guilty of a qualifying circumstance.

Ruling: Yes, Samson Berk is guilty of murder because of a qualifying circumstance. The
prosecution ably established the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. The shooting of the unsuspecting victim was sudden and unexpected which
effectively deprived her of the chance to defend herself or to repel the aggression, insuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part
of the victim.

Doctrine: Syndicated estafa is but the commission of any kind of estafa under Article 315 of the
RPC (or other forms of swindling under Article 316) with two (2) additional conditions: one, the
estafa or swindling was perpetrated by a "syndicate “and two, the estafa or swindling resulted in
the "misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, samahang nayons, or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa.

Ruling: No, the petitioners are not guilty of estafa. The petitioners were the directors of BA TELEC
II that approved, for the said cooperative, the contracts with ITI and Supertrac. The contracts
required BATELEC II to pay a total of P81,000,000.00 to ITI and Supertrac in exchange for the
system-wide computerization of the cooperative and for ten (10) boom trucks. It was, however,
alleged that petitioners-in approving the ITI and Supertrac contracts-have committed undue
haste, violated various NEA guidelines and paid no regard to the disadvantageous consequences
of the said contracts to the interests of BA TELEC II in general. Our review of the established facts
vis-a-vis the applicable laws and jurisprudence had made it clear that such indictment could not
have been based on any valid finding of probable cause: first, as the petitioners cannot be
regarded as a "syndicate" under PD No. 1689 and second, as they could not even be considered
to have committed simple estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC. Any person who causes
pecuniary damage upon another through any of the acts of abuse of confidence or of deceit, as
enumerated in Article 315 of the RPC, commits the crime of estafa or swindling.

Doctrine: The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that
an unlawful activity and/or money laundering offence is about to be, is being or has been
committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought
to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."

Issue: Whether or not Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act is constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. Section 11 of RA 9160 is constitutional. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative
body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a
Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of
Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation
stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request
to be furnished copies of the counter affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's
constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of probable cause for the
purpose of determining whether an information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada
from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his correspondents during the pre-trial or
even during trial. Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its
determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank
accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising
quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order,
cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Juan Richard Marquez guilty of rape.

Ruling: The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court. All the elements of rape must
be present to overcome the presumption of appellant’s innocence, to wit: (1) that the offender
is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act was
accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove
the presence of force, threat, or intimidation. There was no evidence that the knife nearby was
intended to threaten or intimidate AAA. Appellant did not even utter any word to such effect and
AAA did not show any hint of rejecting him. Marquez immediately desisted when the alleged
victim tried to move after feeling a slight pain during their sexual congress. Prosecution also failed
to establish the absence of will power due to drunkenness. AAA was even able to stand up and
go home immediately after the alleged rape.

The SC reiterated that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defence. The burden of proof
rests on the State. Thus, failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case
entitles appellant to an acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that
Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

RULING: Yes. The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as
amended are the following: 1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the vehicle
belongs to a person other than the offender himself; 3. That the taking is without the consent of
the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and 4. That the offender intends to gain
from the taking of the vehicle.

In this case, records show that all the elements of carnapping in the instant case are present and
proven during the trial. The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal
effects belonging to the person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the
death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where
such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible
in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. The said principle may be applied in this
case as the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. Here,
Donio failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the victim
before the police officers when his identity was asked, and left under the guise of getting the said
documents. It was also established that he and the others were strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's
unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the
presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the
vehicle and Raul's death.

Doctrine: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

Doctrine: Under the said RA 9287, a collector or agent is "any person who collects, solicits or
produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in
possession of gambling paraphernalia." On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or
supervisor is defined as, ''any person who exercises control and supervision over the collector or
agent."

Issue: Whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under
Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor m1der Section 3(d) for
Bonaobra, should be upheld.

Ruling: The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound
without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently,
the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same
having been obtained in violation of the said right. Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant
distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the
police officers were able to determine that a cRiminal activity was ongoing to allow them to
validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless
arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a
bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the
compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received
from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been
committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The
Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private
home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his
position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet,
upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the
same to be gambling paraphernalias. In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the
acts that constitute the offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c),
and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. The prosecution
merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the
house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the offense.Verily, the
warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same does not
satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and seizure
of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be no valid
search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house is
inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.

Doctrine: The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows:

(a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and
(c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are present in the case at bar
namely: (1) it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel,
Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of; (2) Fuentes's acts were not only
committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith; and (3) Fuentes's acts of refusing to
issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered
Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations
without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela.

Doctrine: The concept of civil liability ex delicto in Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
RPC states that when the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no
estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist. In this kind of estafa, the
fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or conversion. When the
element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case,
applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there
is no act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced.

Issue: Whether or not Manzano is guilty of Estafa.

Ruling: No. Manzano is not guilty of estafa. Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage
capable of pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In
general, the elements of estafa are: that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. In this case, the Court agrees with the
findings of both the RTC and the CA that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa
through misappropriation as defined in, and penalized under, paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
RPC. Petitioner failed to show that Manzano personally received the P2,800,000 from petitioner
with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to the latter. In fact, Rafael admitted that
he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that Manzano’s name did not
appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary
stamp tax.

Doctrine: The Anti-Carnapping Law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft
included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special
law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and
characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to
another is taken without the latter’s consent. However, the Anti-Carnapping Law particularly
deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been
carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner’s consent, whether
the taking was done with or without the use of force upon things. Without the Anti-Carnapping
law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or
robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping.
Ruling: Yes. Accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of carnapping. The elements of carnapping
as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended are the following: that there is an
actual taking of the vehicle; that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
that the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and that the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to
prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and
more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. “In other words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it
was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence show that there
were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the appellant who
approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation upon them
and thereafter forcibly took the victim’s motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing
his death. There was indeed a positive and unequivocal identification of the accused. It has long
been settled that where the witnesses of the prosecution were not actuated by ill motive, it is
presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

Doctrine: It is well-settled in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both
illegal recruitment and estafa. Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se.
In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such
intent is imperative.

Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be
a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business of imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (c) that the offended party relief on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded private
complainants by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them to South Korea
for work. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants delivered various amounts
for purportedly travel expenses and visa assistance to appellant. As a consequence of appellant’s
false pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad
never materialized and the money they paid were never recovered. All there representations
were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable under paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Doctrine: The rule is well-settled that youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. It
is highly improbable for an innocent girl such as private complainant, who is very naïve in the
ways of this world, to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but to her family.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the accused was correctly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (2)
Whether or not the testimony of the daughter is convincing and credible?

Ruling: (1) The CA's verdict is in full accord with the evidence on record. It is beyond cavil that
appellant had carnal knowledge of his daughter on three separate occasions and the same were
committed through force, threat, or intimidation. Appellant also used his moral ascendancy to
cow his daughter to submit to his bestial desires. It is also undisputed that it was properly alleged
in the three Informations and proved during trial that appellant is the father of the victim, a 13-
year-old minor at the time of the rape incidents. Undoubtedly, appellant committed the crime of
qualified rape (three counts). Both the trial court and the CA therefore properly sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape but without eligibility
of parole.

(2) The rule is well-settled that youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. It is highly
improbable for an innocent girl such as private complainant, who is very naïve in the ways of this
world, to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but to her family. With that in mind,
the Court finds no cogent reason to discredit the above-quoted testimony of private complainant.
The fact remains that there was a categorical declaration from the victim that she was ravished
by her father several times. It should be emphasized that this alone is already enough to sustain
the charges against accused-appellant Panes.

Doctrine: It is well-settled that the “chain of custody” procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a

matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

Ruling: No. In cases involving sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the
chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the
seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under this section, the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination. In this
case, the subject drug was not marked upon its confiscation by the apprehending officer. Thus,
there is a clear violation of the chain of custody rule.