Liyao Jr. v. Tanhoti Liyao - TAN 4D
Liyao Jr. v. Tanhoti Liyao - TAN 4D
GROUNDS FOR IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE
HUSBAND OR BY HEIRS IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper
cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy (Liyao Jr., vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7,
2002).
GROUNDS FOR IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY
THE HUSBAND OR BY HEIRS IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed
the decision of the RTC in declaring William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate son of the deceased William
Liyao and ordering the heirs of the latter to recognize and acknowledge Liyao Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased.
As alleged by petitioner, Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M.
Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited
with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975.
They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital.
During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born
baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the
account of William Liyao. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking
son and had their pictures taken together. During one of William's birthday, he expressly acknowledged
Billy as his son in the presence of his friends. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct
and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.
On November 29,1976, a year after the death of William Liyao, William Liyao Jr., represented by his
mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed a Civil Action in RTC of Pasig for compulsory recognition as "the
illegitimate child of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents.
Respondents (heirs/children of William Liyao from his subsisting marriage) refute the claim that William
Liyao Jr. is the illegitimate son of their father, William Liyao. They alleged that their parents were legally
married and had never been separated.
RTC: declared the minor William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate son of the deceased William Liyao and
ordered defendants(herein respondents) to recognize and acknowledge the minor as a compulsory heir
of the deceased and be entitled to all successional rights.
CA: reversed RTC's ruling saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the
child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ground and by proof that marital intimacy
between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to
Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for
the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not
secured legal separation, were seen in each other’s company during the supposed time that Corazon
cohabited with the deceased William Liyao.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues
which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation
with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this
litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed
father, William Liyao?
ISSUE:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
HELD:
NO. The petitioner could not impugn his own legitimacy.
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper
cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the
simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in
view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed
to contest such legitimacy.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and
conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of the
child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage,
and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of
the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the
then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the
illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition
and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his
heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy
of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.