GR No. L-47362 December 19, 1940 G.R. No.

G.R. No. 46274 November 2, 1939 detail the critical condition of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and
JUAN F. VILLARROEL, appellant-appellant, A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee, outlining his plans to save the properties and assets of the plaintiff-appellee
vs. vs. that he felt morally responsible to the stockholders who had paid their
BERNARDINO ESTRADA, appealed-appealed. JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant. second installment (Exh. C). In answer to said letter, the plaintiff-appellee
ADVANCE, Pres .: Marcial P. Lichauco and Manuel M. Mejia for appellant. wrote the defendant-appellant requiring him to return the entire amount
Wolfson, Barrion and Baradi and Ignacio Ycaza for appellee. paid by him to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., (exhibit E). Upon
On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, mother of the defendant Juan F. VILLA-REAL, J.: receiving this letter, the defendant-appellant answered the plaintiff-
Villarroel, obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan appellee for any loss which he might have suffered in connection with the
of P1,000 payable after seven years (Exhibit A). Alejandra passed away, The defendant John C. Robb appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the same way that he could not expect
leaving the defendant as the only heir. The husbands Mariano Estrada and Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads: anyone to reimburse him for his own losses which were much more than
Severina also died, leaving the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada as sole heir. On those of the plaintiff-appellee (Exh. B).
August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibit B) declaring the Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
amount of P1,000 owed to the plaintiff, with an interest of 12 percent per the defendant, who is ordered to pay to the former the sum of The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the
year. This action is about the collection of this amount. P2,000, with interest at the legal rate from March 11, 1938, until trial court erred in holding that there was sufficient consideration to justify
paid, plus costs. the promise made by the defendant-appellant in his letters Exhibits B and C.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna, in which this action was filed, ordered
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the claimed amount of P1,000 with his The facts established at the trial without discussion are the following: In the fifth paragraph of the letter Exhibit B, dated March 16, 1936,
legal interest of 12 percent per year from August 9, 1930 until its complete addressed by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-appellee, the former
payment. He appealed this sentence. said: "I feel a moral responsibility for these second payments, which were
In September, 1935, the board of directors of the Philippine Greyhound
Club, Inc., told the herein defendant-appellant John C. Robb, to make a made in order to carry out my plan (not the first payments, as you have it in
It will be noted that the parties to the present case are, respectively, the business trip to Shanghai to study the operation of a dog racing course. In your letter), and Mr. Hilscher and I will see to it that stockholders who made
only heirs of the original creditors and debtor. This action is exercised by Shanghai, the defendant-appellant stayed at the American Club where be second payments receive these amounts back as soon as possible, out of
virtue of the obligation that the defendant as the only son of the debtor became acquainted with the plaintiff-appellee, A. O. Fisher, through their our own personal funds. "As it is, I have had to take my loss along with
primitive contracted in favor of the plaintiff, the sole heir of the primitive mutual friends. In the course of a conversation, the defendant-appellant everyone else here, and so far as I can see that is what all of us must do. The
creditors. It is admitted that the amount of P1,000 to which this obligation came to know that the plaintiff-appellee was the manager of a dog racing corporation is finally flat, so it is out of the question to receive back any of
is contracted is the same debt of the defendant's mother to the plaintiff's course. Upon knowing the purpose of the defendant-appellant's trip, the your investment from that source; the only salvage will be the second
parents. lawphil.net plaintiff-appellee showed great interest and invited him to his payment that you made, and that will come from Hilscher and me
establishment and for several days gave him information about the personally, as I say, not because of any obligation, but simply because we
Although the action to recover the original debt has already prescribed business. It seems that the plaintiff became interested in the Philippine have taken it on ourselves to do that. (And I wish I could find someone who
when the lawsuit was filed in this case, the question raised in this appeal is Greyhound Club, Inc., and asked the defendant if he could have a part would undertake to repay a part of my own losses in the enterprise!)" And
mainly that of whether, despite such a prescription, the action filed is therein as a stockholder. As the defendant-appellant answered in the in the seventh paragraph of the letter Exhibit C, dated February 21, 1936,
appropriate. However, this action is not based on the original obligation affirmative, the plaintiff-appellee thereupon filled a subscription blank and, addressed by the same defendant-appellant to the same plaintiff-appellee
contracted by the mother of the defendant, which has already prescribed, through his bank in Shanghai, sent to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the former said the following:
but on the one contracted by the defendant on August 9, 1930 (Exhibit B) Manila telegraphic transfer for P3,000 in payment of the first installment of
when assuming compliance with that obligation, already prescribed. The his subscription. Later on the defendant-appellant returned to Manila from However, Mr. Fischer and I feel a personal responsibility to those few
defendant being the only blacksmith of the primitive debtor, with the right Shanghai. stockholders who made their second payments, including yourself, and it is
to succeed it in his inheritance, that debt brought by his mother legally, our intention to personally repay the amounts of the second payments
although he lost his effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for him Some months thereafter, when the board of directors of the Philippine made by those few.
a moral obligation, Greyhound Club, Inc., issued a call for the payment of the second
installment of the subscriptions, the defendant-appellant sent a radiogram . . . And, finally, paragraph 8 of the same letter Exhibit C states:
The rule that a new promise to pay a pre-written debt must be made by the to the plaintiff-appellee did so and sent P2,000 directly to the Philippine "We are to receive a certain share of the new Philippine Racing
same obligated person or by another legally authorized by it, does not apply Greyhound Club, Inc., in payment of the said installment. Due to the Club for our services as promoters of that organization, and as
to the present case in which compliance with the obligation of the obligor is manipulations of those who controlled the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., soon as this is received by us, we will be in a position to
not required, but instead from which you then voluntarily wanted to during the absence of the defendant-appellant undertook the organization compensate you and the few others who made the second
assume this obligation. of a company called The Philippine Racing Club, which now manages the payments. That, as T have said, will come from us personally, in
race track of the Santa Ana park. The defendant immediately endeavored to an effort to make things easier for those who were sportsmen
The sentence appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the appellant. That's save the investment of those who had subscribed to the Philippine enough to try to save the Greyhound organization by making
how it is ordered. Greyhound Club, Inc., by having the Philippine Racing Club acquire the second payments.
remaining assets of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. The defendant-
appellant wrote a letter to the plaintiff-appellee in Shanghai explaining in Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
 A contract exists from the moment one or more persons consent Considering the concept of the consideration as the explanation As to whether a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration, read in
to be bound with respect to another or others to deliver and motive of the contract, it is related to the latter's object and volume 12 of the American Jurisprudence, pages 589-590, paragraphs 96,
something or to render some services. even more to its motives with which it is often confused. It is 67, the following:
differentiated from them, however, in that the former is the
And article 1261 of the same Civil Code provides the following: essential reason for the contract, while the latter are the SEC. 96. Moral obligation. — Although there is authority in
particular reasons of a contracting party which do not affect the support of the board proposition that a moral obligation is
other party and which do not preclude the existence of a sufficient consideration, such proposition is usually denied. . . . .
ART. 1261. There is no contract unless the following requisites exists: different consideration. To clarify by an example: A thing
purchased constitutes the consideration for the purchaser and
1. The consent of the contracting parties; not the motives which have influenced his mind, like its The case presenting the question whether a moral obligation will
usefulness, its perfection, its relation to another, the use thereof sustain an express executory promise may be divided into five
which he may have in mind, etc., a very important distinction, classes: (1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from
2. A definite object which is the subject-matter of the contract; ethical considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations,
which precludes the annulment of the contract by the sole
influence of the motives, unless the efficacy of the former had perfect or imperfect, and without the receipt of actual pecuniary
3. A consideration for the obligation established. been subordinated to compliance with the latter as conditions. or material benefit by the promisor prior to the subsequent
promise; (2) cases in which the moral obligation arose from a
In the present case, while the defendant-appellant told the plaintiff- legal liability already performed or still enforceable; (3) cases in
The jurisprudence shows some cases wherein this important which the moral obligation arose out of, or was connected with, a
appellee that he felt morally responsible for the second payments which distinction is established. The consideration of contracts, states
had been made to carry out his plan, and that Mr. Hilscher and he would do previous request or promise creating originally an enforceable
the decision of February 24, 1904, is distinct from the motive legal liability, which, however, at the time of the subsequent
everything possible so that the stockholders who had made second which may prompt the parties in executing them. The
payments may receive the amount paid by them from their personal funds express promise had become discharged or barred by operation
inaccuracies committed in expressing its accidental or secondary of a positive rule of law, so that at that time there was no
because they voluntarily assumed the responsibility to make such payment details do not imply lack of consideration or false consideration,
as soon as they receive from the Philippine racing Club certain shares for enforceable legal liability; (4) cases in which the moral obligation
wherefore, they do not affect the essence and validity of the arose from, or was connected with, a previous request or promise
their services as promoters of said organization, it does not appear that the contract. In a loan the consideration in its essence is, for the
plaintiff-appellee had consented to said form of reimbursement of the which, however, never created any enforceable legal liability,
borrower the acquisition of the amount, and for the lender the because of a rule of law which rendered the original agreement
P2,000 which he had directly paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in power to demand its return, whether the money be for the
satisfaction of the second installment. void, or at least unenforceable; and (5) cases in which the moral
former or for another person and whether it be invested as obligation arose out of, or was connected with, the receipt of
stated or otherwise. actual material or pecuniary benefit by the promisor, without,
The first essential requisite, therefore, required by the cited article 1261 of however, any previous request or promise on his part, express or
the Civil Code for the existence of a contract, does not exists. The same distinction between the consideration and the motive implied, and therefore, of course, without any original legal
is found in the decisions of November 23, 1920 and March 5, liability, perfect or imperfect.
As to the third essential requisite, namely, "A consideration for the 1924.
obligation established," article 1274 of the same Code provides:lawphi1.net SEC. 97. Moral obligation unconnected with legal liability or legal
The contract sought to be judicially enforced by the plaintiff-appellee benefit. — Although, as subsequently shown was formerly some
In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of the parties is against the defendant-appellant is onerous in character, because it doubt as to the point, it is now well established that a mere moral
the delivery or performance or the promise of delivery or supposes the deprivation of the latter of an amount of money which impairs obligation or conscience duty arising wholly from ethical motives
performance of a thing or service by the other party; in his property, which is a burden, and for it to be legally valid it is necessary or a mere conscientious duty unconnected with any legal
remuneratory contracts the consideration is the service or benefit that it should have a consideration consisting in the lending or or promise of obligation, perfect or imperfect, or with the receipt of benefit by
for which the remuneration is given, and in contracts of pure a thing or service by such party. The defendant-appellant is required to give the promisor of a material or pecuniary nature will not furnish a
beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the benefactors. a thing, namely, the payment of the sum of P2,000, but the plaintiff- consideration for an executory promise. . . . .
appellee has not given or promised anything or service to the former which
may compel him to make such payment. The promise which said defendant- In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold,
And article 1275 of the same Code provides:
appellant has made to the plaintiff-appellee to return to him P2,000 which that the promise made by an organizer of a dog racing course to a
he had paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., as second installment of stockholder to return to him certain amounts paid by the latter in
ART. 1275. Contracts without consideration or with an illicit the payment of the amount of the shares for which he has subscribed, was satisfaction of his subscription upon the belief of said organizer that he was
consideration produce no effect whatsoever. A consideration is prompted by a feeling of pity which said defendant-appellant had for the morally responsible because of the failure of the enterprise, is not the
illicit when it is contrary to law or morality. plaintiff-appellee as a result of the loss which the latter had suffered consideration rquired by article 1261 of the Civil Code as an essential
because of the failure of the enterprise. The obligation which the said element for the legal existence of an onerous contract which would bind the
Manresa, in volume 8, 4rth edition, pages 618-619 of his Commentaries on defendant-appellant had contracted with the plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, promisor to comply with his promise.
the Civil Code, has this to say: purely moral and, as such, is not demandable in law but only in conscience,
over which human judges have no jurisdiction.1awphi1.net
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the costs to the plaintiff. of communication involved encountered radio noise and interferences such the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
that subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the receiving Chapter.
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006 teleprinter machine.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner, Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the
vs. Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a "omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, repeat transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected. and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, or the
ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents. (Underscoring supplied) place."
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of July In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the 23, 1991,7 requesting for a conference on a specified date and time, but no to the addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery of
Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter representative of RCPI showed up at said date and time. the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its
Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time
the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she making it liable for damages under Article 2176.
engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon City1 reading: "Send
check money Mommy hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.502 for On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption
which she was issued a receipt.3 Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before of negligence on the part of the employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint,
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed:
response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and
thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid. prejudice,8 for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
damages9 and attorney’s fees.10 rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, to wit:
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her
husband Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram. denied12 by Branch 5 of the RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer, alleging
that except with respect to Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no privity of
contract with it; any delay in the sending of the telegram was due to force 1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother majeure, "specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and interferences moral damages;
Editha left for Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the
Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from telegraphic message";14 the clause in the Telegram Transmission Form 2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as
January 30, 1991 to March 21, 1991. signed by Grace absolved it from liability for any damage arising from the attorney’s fees; and
transmission other than the refund of telegram tolls;15 it observed due
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; and at all events, 3. To pay the costs.
15, 1991.4 On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a any cause of action had been barred by laches.16
messenger of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery
thereof as it was another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver SO ORDERED.18
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the
the same but the address could not be located, hence, the telegram was questioned telegram was not apparently the proximate cause of the death
resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found the of Editha," ruled out the presence of force majeure. Respecting the clause in On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27,
address on February 15, 1991. the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it partakes of the 2004,19 affirmed the trial court’s decision.
nature of a contract of adhesion.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5, Hence, RCPI’s present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the
1991,5 demanded an explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the following questions: (1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if the
Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by letter telegram to the addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not in trial court found that there was no direct connection between the injury
of March 13, 1991,6 as follows: view of the negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and and the alleged negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the stipulations in the
the concomitant delay in delivering the telegram on time, the trial court, ‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature "contracts of adhesion" (sic)?21
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly upon the following provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
processed in accordance with our standard operating procedure. However, RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between
delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there its delay in transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22
circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI. Among being at fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
others, during the transmission process, the radio link connecting the points fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have concurred The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the
contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, existence of urgency that private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was of
regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents. showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury the essence’ imports. A check drawn against a Manila Bank and transmitted
was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the to Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to be deposited in a bank in Sorsogon and
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation – whether pass thru a minimum clearing period of 5 days before it may be encashed or
by active intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check to Sorsogon took 1 day
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. – private respondents could therefore still wait for 6 days before the same
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, may be withdrawn. Requesting a check that would take 6 days before it
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor could be withdrawn therefore contradicts plaintiff’s claim of urgency or
thereof, are liable for damages. (Underscoring supplied) xxxx
need.28

Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained: Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace
inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human Verchez was able to communicate to Manila via a letter that she sent to the
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract intervention from the cause of injury or loss.24 (Emphasis and underscoring same addressee in Manila thru JRS.29
and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of supplied)
relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit xxxx
a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from
upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages is concerned, the
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she same has no basis whatsoever since private respondent Alfonso Verchez did
preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his "expectation could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies the not accompany his late wife when the latter went to Manila by bus. He
interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being fault or negligence. stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he proceeded to
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been Manila. 30
performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso Verchez
good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual could not give any plausible reason as to the reason why he did not
or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him obligation to transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to accompany his ailing wife to Manila.31
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the given address
can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are and should provide a system whereby in cases of undelivered messages the xxxx
made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent by cable or wireless
duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the means are usually more important and urgent than those which can wait
failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents’ claim for
for the mail.25 moral damages that private respondent Grace Verchez did not accompany
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x
or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing her ailing mother to Manila.32
liability.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) xxxx
xxxx
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep
shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. emotional stress or pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages about It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as
the illnesses or deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a family, much as possible. The fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed
important business transactions, and notices of conferences or meetings as behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates that he
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and in this case, are coursed through the petitioner and similar corporations, it
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of himself knew that his wife was not in critical condition.33
is incumbent upon them to exercise a greater amount of care and
the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to inform
locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he senders of the non-delivery of messages should be undertaken.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
was able to deliver the telegram.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, is, it bears repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the
presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut
RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of the this presumption.
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus:27
that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents following Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides: respondents was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise: action for damages, prevention, and other relief:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of xxxx
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, appellees on time, disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved the (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.35 another. (Emphasis supplied)
(Underscoring supplied)
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove present. disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents.
that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity"
damage. Article 2180 of the Civil Code so provides: On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides: among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an
emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may
responsible. damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
xxxx faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is
in order, as is the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform compelled to litigate to protect their rights.
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the Grace of the non-delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their deliver it again, knowing – as it should know – that time is of the essence in Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the
functions. the delivery of telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to deliver "Telegram Transmission Form" is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it argues:
the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for another 12 days before
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even obligation indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth adhesion as held by the respondent court. The said stipulations were
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. requisite is thus also present. all written in bold letters right in front of the Telegram Transmission Form.
As a matter of fact they were beside the space where the telegram senders
xxxx In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral write their telegraphic messages. It would have been different if the
damages in cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of stipulations were written at the back for surely there is no way the sender
gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his will easily notice them. The fact that the stipulations were located in a
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons contractual obligation.36 particular space where they can easily be seen, is sufficient notice to any
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante) where she could manifest her
father of a family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied) disapproval, leave the RCPI station and avail of the services of the other
As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the
readability of the stipulations nor their physical location in the contract
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the xxxx determines whether it is one of adhesion.
presence of the following requisites to justify the award is in order:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or and 35. (Emphasis supplied) a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may accept or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares the
or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides: stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages sustained by or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation and depriving the
the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.38 (Emphasis and
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, underscoring supplied)
Civil Code.34
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable,
since it is construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to
any ambiguity therein, it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or
subversive of public policy when the weaker party is imposed upon in
dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the
alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity
to bargain on equal footing.39

This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’ contract
is one of adhesion which is void is, given the facts and circumstances of the
case, thus well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the

Costs against petitioner.