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FM DS 7-14 - Fire Protection For Chemical Plants
FM DS 7-14 - Fire Protection For Chemical Plants
Table of Contents
Page
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7-14 Fire Protection for Chemical Plants
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 1. Indoor processing structures: example of fire protection with grated floors .................................... 10
Fig. 2. Indoor processing structures: example of fire protection with grated and solid floors ..................... 11
Fig. 3. Sprinkler operating areas for indoor chemical plants ....................................................................... 12
Fig. 4. Outdoor processing structure: example of area-level deluge protection ......................................... 13
Fig. 5. Outdoor processing structure: example of directional water spray protection of vessels ............... 14
Fig. 6. Single deluge protection level for outdoor process structures with water/miscible ignitable liquids . 16
Fig. 7. Water spray protection for steel columns .......................................................................................... 18
Fig. 8. Fire protection of pipe racks .............................................................................................................. 19
Fig. 9. Fire protection of fin-fan coolers ....................................................................................................... 20
Fig. 10. Accidental release control systems and valves .............................................................................. 22
Fig. 11. Typical site layout ............................................................................................................................ 27
Fig. 12. Typical layout of process structures, tanks, and vessels ............................................................... 27
Fig. 13. Example of suitably arranged emergency drainage ....................................................................... 29
Fig. 14. Example of less-desirable emergency drainage design ................................................................. 29
Fig. 15. Process structure test, ethanol fire in 25 ft x 25 ft (7.6 m x 7.6 m) pan with one level of sprinklers . 31
Fig. 16. Ethanol spill in process structure prior to ignition ......................................................................... 32
Fig. 17. Three-dimensional spill fire before sprinkler activation (22 gpm [83 L/min] ethanol flow rate) ..... 33
List of Tables
Table 1a. Approximate Spacing Guide (ft) ..................................................................................................... 5
Table 1b. Approximate Spacing Guide (m) ..................................................................................................... 6
Table 2. Losses by Peril, 2003-2014 ............................................................................................................ 37
Table 3. Mechanical and Electrical Breakdown Losses, 2003-2014 ........................................................... 37
Table 4. Fire and Explosion Losses by Equipment, 2003-2014 ................................................................... 38
Table 5. Fire Losses by Equipment, 2003-2014 ........................................................................................... 39
Table 6. Explosion Losses by Equipment, 2003-2014 ................................................................................. 40
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet addresses fire and explosion hazards at chemical-manufacturing plants and similar
processing facilities. In particular, it focuses on the hazards associated with ignitable liquid, flammable gas,
and liquefied flammable gas where a release could result in a fire of long duration. It also covers operations
involving reactive chemical hazards.
This data sheet also provides guidance on determining appropriate space separation between chemical
process units, and recommendations for the construction of process areas. It also presents recommendations
for protecting indoor and outdoor process areas, supporting structures, and processing equipment that
handles ignitable liquid, flammable gas, and liquefied flammable gas.
For the purposes of this document, the term “ignitable liquid” is defined as any liquid that has a measurable
fire point. Also, the term “flash point” refers to the closed-cup flash point unless otherwise indicated.This
data sheet does not address the following subjects:
A. Dispensing of ignitable liquid: Use Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations.
B. Distilleries: Use Data Sheet 7-74, Distilleries.
C. Small waste solvent recovery units: Use Data Sheet 7-2, Waste Solvent Recovery.
D. Ignitable liquid storage: Use Data Sheet 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable Containers, or Data
Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks.
E. Aerosol storage: Use Data Sheet 7-31, Storage of Aerosol Products.
F. Compressed gas storage: Use Data Sheet 7-50, Compressed Gases in Portable Cylinders.
G. Flammable gas storage: Use Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations.
1.2 Changes
Jully 2019. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
July 2015. This entire data sheet has been revised. The following major changes were made:
A. Redefined the scope of the data sheet, including differentiating between Data Sheet 7-14 and Data
Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations.
B. Redefined where passive steel protection is needed, including elimination of a previous reference to
a “greater than average explosion hazard or severe three-dimensional fire hazard” in determining the need
for fireproofing.
C. Incorporated guidance on facility siting from Data Sheet 7-44, Spacing of Facilities in Outdoor Chemical
Plants, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study to determine appropriate separation between
process units and other areas of a plant.
Service/Administration Buildings
Tank Farms,
atmospheric
The spacing in this table is related to fire and
explosion protection only, not for the hazards of
toxic or corrosive releases.
Tank Farms, atmospheric C
Tank Farms, Pressurized Flammable B 100
Process Unit, Low Hazard 100 200 C
Process Unit, High Hazard 200 200 200 C
Main Pipe Racks NA 100 50 A 100
Control Rooms, Central A 100 200 100 200 150
Fire Protection Water Sources NA A 200 200 100 200 150(D)
Underground High Pressure Flammable Gas Lines NA 300 300 A 150 150 150 100
Service/Administration Buildings NA 300 A A 100 200 200 200 C
Electric Substations, Main A 100 300 100 100 100 200 100 200 C
Boiler Houses, Power Generation A A 100 300 A 100 100 200 100 200 C
A = Space as needed for operation and maintenance.
B = Refer to Data Sheet 7-55 for limitations on LPG storage and Data Sheet 7-91 for limitations on hydrogen storage.
C = Refer to Data Sheet 7-88, Tables 2, 3, and 4. No multi tank quantity limit at chemical plants.
D = One of multiple sources; single source at least 200 ft.
Pressurized Flammable
Service/Administration
Tank Farms,
Tank Farms,
atmospheric
Buildings
Sources
The spacing in this table is related to fire and
explosion protection only, not for the hazards of
toxic or corrosive releases.
Tank Farms, atmospheric C
Tank Farms, Pressurized Flammable B 30
Process Unit, Low Hazard 30 60 C
Process Unit, High Hazard 60 60 60 C
Main Pipe Racks NA 30 15 A 30
Control Rooms, Central A 30 60 30 60 45
Fire Protection Water Sources NA A 60 60 30 60 45 (D)
Underground High Pressure Flammable Gas Lines NA 90 90 A 45 45 45 30
Service/Administration Buildings. NA 90 A A 30 60 60 60 C
Electric Substations, Main A 30 90 30 30 30 60 30 60
Boiler Houses, Power Generation A A 30 90 A 30 30 60 30 60 C
A = Space as needed for operation and maintenance.‘
B = Refer to Data Sheet 7-55 for limitations on LPG storage and Data Sheet 7-91 for limitations on hydrogen storage.
C = Refer to Data Sheet 7-88, Tables 2, 3, and 4. No multi tank quantity limit at chemical plants.
D = One of multiple sources; single source at least 60 m.
2.1.1.1.2 Use a consequence-based evaluation to finalize site-specific spacing distances. Use current best
practices in conducting this evaluation, such as those outlined in API RP 752, Facility Siting Requirements and
How They Affect Your Company, and CCPS, Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External
Explosions and Fires. Items to consider in the study include, but are not limited to, the following:
A. Drainage, containment, and slope of land.
B. Location of flares (see API 537, Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Service, for
guidance).
C. Potential for explosion or blast overpressure from high hazard operations such as ethylene oxide,
hydrogen peroxide, organic peroxides, energetic materials (explosives), ammonium nitrate, etc. (see other
applicable FM Global data sheets).
D. Potential for pressure vessel rupture (see Data Sheet 7-0, Causes and Effects of Fires and Explosions).
E. Potential for a vapor cloud explosion (see Data Sheet 7-42, Evaluating Vapor Cloud Explosions Using
a Flame Acceleration Method).
B. Provide solid floors with curbing and drainage rather than open steel grating beneath equipment located
at upper levels.
2.2 Occupancy
2.3 Protection
2.3.1 General
2.3.1.1 The recommendations in this section are applicable to 3D spill and pool fire scenarios involving
ignitable liquids and liquefied flammable gases.
2.3.1.2 This section does not apply where the only hazard present is flammable gas. Facilities processing
only flammable gas may require local levels of passive or active fire protection, but the higher levels of
sprinkler and water spray protection outlined in this section are not applicable. Refer to Section 2.1.5.
Ceiling
2
0.3 gpm/ft
(12mm/min)
Grate
2
0.15 gpm/ft
(6mm/min)
Grate
2
0.15 gpm/ft
(6mm/min)
Grate
2
0.3 gpm/ft
Up to (12mm/min)
30 ft
(9.1m)
See
note 2
2. Install pilot sprinklers on the same spacing as the sprinklers. For design purposes, treat preaction
systems with this pilot sprinkler spacing the same as wet systems. If a preaction system has a pilot
sprinkler spacing greater than the sprinkler spacing, consider it a dry system for design purposes.
J. In addition to automatic activation of deluge systems, provide capability for remote manual activation,
preferably in the process control room or similar areas that will be accessible in the event of a fire.
2.3.2.2.2 Design sprinkler or water spray systems for the protection of other structures or equipment as
follows:
• Process vessels: Section 2.3.4
• Skirts: Section 2.3.5
• Structural steel: Section 2.3.6
• Other equipment (pipe racks, pumps, air-fin coolers, etc.): Section 2.3.7
Ceiling
2
0.3 gpm/ft
(12mm/min)
Grate
2
0.15 gpm/ft
(6mm/min)
Grate
2
0.3 gpm/ft
(12mm/min)
Solid
2
0.3 gpm/ft
Up to (12mm/min)
30 ft
(9.1m)
See
note 2
• Where small (<400 ft2 [37 m2]), liquid tight openings exist in solild floors, design for a 10,000 ft2 (929 m2)
operating area on the hydraulically most remote level. In addition, design for sprinklers with 20 ft (6.1 m)
of each opening to operate on all other connected levels. See Figure 3d.
• Where small (less than 6 in. [15 cm] wide), liquid-tight openings exist around vessels, there is no need
to adjust for the opening of scattered individual sprinklers that may occur beyond that stated above.
2 2 2
2
10,000 ft (929 m )
1 2 2
1
10,000 ft (929 m )
2 2
a. Operating Area = 10,000 ft b. Operating Area = 10,000 ft
2 2
(929 m ) on all levels (929 m ) on one level
2 2 2 2
Openings > 400 ft (37 m ) Openings < 400 ft (37 m )
3 2 2
3 2 2
10,000 ft (929 m ) 10,000 ft (929 m )
2 2
20 ft (6.1 m) 20 ft (6.1 m) 20 ft 20 ft
(6.1 m) (6.1 m)
1 1
2 2
10,000 ft (929 m )
20 ft 20 ft
(6.1 m) (6.1 m)
2 2 2
c. Operating Area = 10,000 ft (929 m ) d. Operating Area = 10,000 ft
2
on levels 1 and 3, plus sprinklers (929 m ) on one (hydraulically
within 20 ft (6.1 m) of opening most remote) level, plus sprinklers
on level 2 within 20 ft (6.1 m) of openings
on other two levels
2.3.2.3.2 Where deluge systems are provided, determine the demand flow based on the largest number of
systems expected to operate. Assume simultaneous operation of all systems in the room or building within
a 50 ft (15 m) distance of the extent of fire spread, as defined by containment and drainage systems. Where
pneumatic, fixed temperature/rate-of-rise type heat actuated devices (HADs) are used to actuate deluge
systems, increase this distance to 100 ft (30.5 m).
2.3.2.3.3 Include the flow for all local sprinklers (e.g., protection of equipment or structural steel, beneath
vessels or other obstructions, inside skirts, etc.) in the demand specified in Sections 2.3.2.3.1 and 2.3.2.3.2.
2.3.2.3.4 In addition to the above, include any hose streams likely to be used, as well as other water demands
expected during a fire emergency, to determine the total water demand. At a minimum, provide a hose
stream allowance of 500 gpm (1900 L/min).
Grate
2
0.3 gpm/ft
(12mm/min)
See note 2
Grate
2
Up to 0.3 gpm/ft
30 ft (12mm/min)
(9.1m) See
note 3
2.3.3.1.2 Provide protection for all important outdoor process structures and equipment wherever ignitable
liquids can flow following a release. Extend the protection at least 20 ft (6.1 m) beyond the limits of the
expected ignitable liquid release. Base the extent of protection on the layout of the process structure, the
presence of features such as containment and emergency drainage, and the location of equipment containing
ignitable liquids.
Fig. 5. Outdoor processing structure: example of directional water spray protection of vessels
2.3.3.1.3 Where fire protection is deemed necessary to protect the ignitable liquid fire hazard, locate and
arrange the protection as follows:
A. Provide protection at least to a height of 10 ft (3.0 m) above normal ignitable liquid levels within the
vessels, or up to 30 ft (9.1 m) above the height where an ignitable liquid pool fire may develop, whichever
is higher (see Figure 5). Physical arrangement of the process structure and equipment will determine
which protection arrangement (i.e., area protection, directional water spray, or a combination of the two)
is most practical.
B. Do not consider ignitable liquid holdup in distillation column trays when determining normal ignitable
liquid levels.
C. Where the distance between a solid floor elevation and area-level protection exceeds 30 ft (9.1 m),
additional local directional water spray protection may be needed for important vessels and equipment that
are exposed to extended 3D spill or pool fires.
D. Provide protection below any obstruction to water distribution that exceeds 3 ft (0.9 m) in width or
diameter and 10 ft2 (0.9 m2) in area. Install sprinklers below vessels on a maximum 50 ft2 (4.6 m2) spacing.
Important structural members or equipment below obstructions may need additional passive or active
protection against flame impingement.
E. Provide protection inside nonfireproofed skirts of columns or similar self-supporting vessels where
valves or flanged connections are present inside the skirt enclosure, or where ignitable liquids could enter
the skirt enclosure through skirt openings following an external release.
F. Where active or passive protection of critical steel elements (including structural elements and
equipment supports) is necessary in accordance with Section 2.1.5, provide active fire protection for
elements where fireproofing is not applied.
Grate
Grate
2
Up to 30 ft 0.4 gpm/ft
(9.1 m) (16mm/min)
Fig. 6. Single deluge protection level for outdoor process structures with water/miscible ignitable liquids
2.3.4 Directional Water Spray Protection of Process Vessels and Similar Structures
2.3.4.1 Provide directional water spray coverage for the entire protected surface using direct impingement
or rundown design.
Section 3.4.4.2 provides a comparison of rundown and direct impingement design concepts.
2.3.4.2 Design systems to provide 0.25 gpm/ft2 (10 mm/min).
A. For indoor locations, provide the application rate listed above at a minimum discharge pressure of 10
psi (0.7 bar), but not less than the minimum pressure specified by the directional water spray nozzle
manufacturer’s data.
B. For outdoor locations, provide the application rates listed above at a minimum discharge pressure of
30 psi (2.2 bar) for nozzles less than 0.5 in. (12 mm) in diameter. For nozzles equal to or greater than
0.5 in. (12 mm) in diameter, provide a minimum discharge pressure of 20 psi (1.4 bar).
2.3.4.3 Arrange direct impingement system nozzles with proper radial and axial spacing distances per the
nozzle manufacturer’s spray profiles design tables and figures.
2.3.4.4 Arrange rundown system nozzles as follows:
A. Horizontal spacing for overlapping spray patterns from adjacent nozzles, based on radial spray
distances per the nozzle manufacturer’s design tables and figures.
B. Vertical spacing no more than 12 ft (3.7 m) between adjacent levels of nozzles.
C. Where obstructions to rundown are present, provide nozzles below the obstructions to cover the
shielded areas.
2.3.4.5 Actuate directional water spray systems using pilot sprinklers, flame detection, or heat detection
devices installed in accordance with Data Sheet 5-48, Automatic Fire Detection. Design any installed
detection systems to transmit an alarm to a constantly attended location, preferably in the process control
room.
2.3.4.6 Refer to Data Sheet 4-1N, Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection, for piping and other
general recommendations for directional water spray systems.
2.3.4.7 In addition to automatic activation of directional water spray systems, provide capability for remote
manual activation, preferably in the process control room or similar areas that will be accessible in the
event of a fire.
12 ft (3.7 m)
24 ft (7.3 m)
Top View
Reentrant Space
Side View
2.3.7.2 Pumps
2.3.7.2.1 Provide fire protection for pumps that are important to continued operations, high-value or long
lead time pumps, or those exposed to pool fire engulfment. Where needed, protect pumps as follows:
A. Provide water spray or automatic sprinklers designed to provide 0.5 gpm/ft2 (20 mm/min).
B. Extend the coverage to protect the pump shaft and seals, as well as high-value or long-lead-time drivers
associated with the pump.
C. Locate protection within 2 ft (0.6 m) vertically of the pump.
2
0.15 gpm/ft (6mm/min) spraying upwards
Up to 30 ft
(9.1 m)
2
0.15 gpm/ft (6mm/min) spraying upwards
2
0.25 gpm/ft (10mm/min) spraying upwards
C. Fin-fan coolers that are potentially exposed to fire from adjacent process equipment.
2.3.7.3.2 Protect fin-fan coolers as follows:
A. Provide directional water spray designed to provide 0.25 gpm/ft2 (10 mm/min) over the area of the
tubes.
B. Direct the water spray upward to impinge on the air-fan tubes.
C. For forced draft fin-fan coolers, locate the water spray nozzles in the plenum between the tubes and
the fan casing (see Figure 9).
D. Interlock the fan motor to shut down upon activation of the water spray.
E. If applicable, provide steel protection for the cooler’s vertical supports (refer to Section 2.1.5).
Fin-fan tubes
Manual isolation
valve on each bank
of fin-fan coolers for
maintenance & repair
G. Where only a pool fire hazard exists, AFFF and AFFF-AR combination foam may be provided only at
the bottom level above where ignitable liquids can accumulate (e.g., ground level or intermediate solid
mezzanines). This does not apply to AR foam.
2.3.9 Protection of Piping, Valves and Fittings Against Damage from Explosion Hazards
2.3.9.1 Bury and loop water supply mains to hazardous process areas. Provide divisional valves so any breaks
due to explosion damage can be isolated.
2.3.9.2 Locate risers in areas cut off by pressure-resistant walls or shielded by structural columns.
2.3.9.3 Provide a readily accessible manual shutoff valve and sprinkler control valve (alarm check, deluge,
etc.) for each system.
2.3.9.4 Locate feed and cross mains away from reactors or pressure vessels (e.g., in the aisles or to the
sides of reactors or pressure vessels, but never directly above this equipment).
2.3.9.5 Support piping from the building or structural framework. Do not attach piping to pressure relieving
walls.
2.3.9.6 Ensure all piping over 2 in. (51 mm) is welded or has welded flanged fittings conforming to applicable
ANSI/ASME standards (e.g., ANSI/ASME B31.1, Power Piping, ANSI/ASME B16.9, Factory-Made Wrought
Steel Buttwelding Fittings, and ANSI/ASME B16.25, Buttwelding Ends) or international equivalents.
2.3.9.7 Piping 2 in. (51 mm) or smaller may be welded. Alternatively, use malleable iron-on-steel fittings of
150 lb steam rating (300 lb W.O.G. rating) conforming to applicable ANSI/ASME standards (e.g., ANSI/ASME
B16.3, Malleable Iron Threaded Fittings 150 and 300 lb, and ANSI/ASME B16.5, Steel Pipe Flanges and
Flanged Fittings) or international equivalents.
2.3.9.8 Do not use flexible couplings where an explosion hazard exists.
Shutoff valves
Product lines with block valves
Depressurization system
Dump system
Relief valve
To flare stack
burning pit, or
Condenser incinerator
Accumulator
Knockout tank
Column
Rupture
disc
To user
Raw materials
tanks Product tanks
Reactor
To user
To dump tank or
burning pit
2.7 Utilities
2.7.1 Identify critical utilities and develop load shedding procedures to allow for the controlled shut down of
chemical processes in the event of an emergency.
2.7.2 Include utilities in Process Hazard Reviews. See Data Sheet 7-43/17-2, Process Safety, for further
information.
2.7.3 Provide separate process water and fire protection water supplies. Where a common source is provided,
such as a river or large reservoir, provide separate process water and fire protection water suction lines.
Locate the process water suction line at a higher level than the fire water line to ensure an adequate fire water
reserve.
2.7.4 Limit use of fire protection water to fire protection systems, with the exception that fire protection water
connections may be provided for safety critical applications such as flare seal water, emergency scrubbing,
or backup reactor cooling.
3.1 General
Processing facilities where ignitable liquid, flammable gas, and liquefied flammable gas are used in quantity
present significant protection challenges. Fire damage can be minimized by using fireproofing and fixed
protection such as automatic sprinklers, water spray, and monitor nozzles. Explosion damage can be
minimized by using open construction or damage-limiting construction (DLC) and by providing adequate
spacing or separation.
Fires within chemical processing facilities may be open tank fires, pool fires from released liquids, spray
fires from liquids under pressure, jet fires from escaping gases or vaporizing liquefied flammable gases, or
combinations of these. Liquids escaping from elevated equipment will gravitate to lower levels, exposing other
equipment in the structure; multilevel, three dimensional spill fires are possible. Equipment failure may also
result in an ensuing fire.
Explosions within chemical processing facilities may occur due to handling of unstable materials, runaway
chemical reactions, or from escaping gas or vapor, particularly within an enclosed area. Vapor cloud
explosions are possible in congested open process facilities where large quantities of ignitable liquid are
handled at elevated temperatures and pressures. For more detailed information on vapor cloud explosions,
see Data Sheet 7-42, Evaluating Vapor Cloud Explosions Using a Flame Acceleration Method.
3.3.1.3 Detonations
Sometimes detonable materials such as acetylides or organic peroxides are accidently produced or
accumulated in a process. If these can be anticipated and predicted, it may be possible to provide safe
isolation for such hazardous processes. See Data Sheet 7-0.
3.3.2.1 General
Chemical plants are typically laid out in blocks over the site area (see Figures 11 and 12; these figures
represent very broad, general concepts. The outer boundary of Figure 11 only represents property boundaries
and, within each block, an imaginary footprint of the operation). Ideally, major blocks are devoted to
operations of similar hazard or function. Typical blocks could be process areas, storage tanks, utilities,
administration/office buildings, maintenance shops/buildings, warehouses and waste handling operations.
Major blocks are commonly defined by roadways and open space while within blocks there may be smaller
unit blocks with smaller access ways and clear space.
Chemical plant spacing and layout is often a compromise between many factors such as geographical
limitations, material transfer considerations, plant operability, plant maintenance, on-site utilities, off-site
utilities, off-site exposures and emergency access.
Sufficient spacing between major process blocks, tank farms, important buildings, and major plant utilities
is needed to prevent an event from escalating to nearby areas from the unit of origin. Spacing tables and
suggestions for equipment arrangement in this data sheet may be used as starting points for site layout, but
site-specific analyses should be conducted.
Within process units, spacing should be arranged in blocks with access for operation, maintenance and fire
fighting considered. These access ways should be approximately 20 ft (6 m) wide and arranged so the
shortest block dimension would be 100 ft (30 m). The largest dimension is limited mainly by water supply
considerations (i.e., the volume of fire protection water needed to protect the largest area that can be involved
in a projected incident). The hazard of the occupancy/process and physical barriers that limit fire spread
should be considered.
Within the unit, operations such as reactors, distillation towers, large pumps and compressors and fired
process heaters should preferably be located on the perimeter. Equipment stacking (one piece of equipment
supported directly on a lower one) is common for space economy and other reasons; however, this can
increase fire involvement.
Equipment stacking outside of process structures should not exceed three high. Pumps and compressors
handling flammable materials, air fin exchangers and heat exchangers, or in process tanks with operating
temperatures over 600°F (315°C) should not have other equipment stacked above. In open steel process
structures, large amounts of ignitable liquid holdup should be kept near ground level to reduce the potential
for a three dimensional fire.
The control room should be situated beyond battery limits and may need to be structurally reinforced or
provided with blast resistance.
Again, site-specific analyses should be conducted in the initial design phase. Modifications to existing facilities
are rarely practical except during major upgrade projects.
A. The following facilities may present an unacceptable exposure to nearby operations:
1. Large quantities of ignitable liquids or flammable gases in tanks, tank farms, process areas,
processing buildings, ignitable liquid spill containment from process areas or tanks or flare stacks.
2. Centralized, multi vehicle railcar or truck stations for shipping or receiving of large volume liquids.
3. Large quantities of ordinary combustibles in a building or in yard storage.
B. The following facilities may be sources of blast or missile damage:
1. Processes or storage containing unstable or explosive materials.
2. Process with exothermic chemical reactions where multiple controls are needed to prevent a runaway
reaction
3. Processes using equipment with a volume exceeding 5000 gal (35 m3) whose vapor space must
be taken through the explosive range at periodic intervals for operation or maintenance purposes.
4. Processes at pressures over 500 psig (35 barg).
Low hazard
process units
Utilities
Warehouses
Maintenance areas
Administration
offices
Tank
farm
C
o
o
I
i
n
g
t
o
w
e
r
Reactors operating with unstable reactions or products, and highly exothermic reactions requiring
considerable controls may need isolation. Where large energy releases would cause widespread damage,
blast-resistant barricades may reduce loss potential.
Reactors of low hazard need spacing primarily related to their potential for large ignitable liquid releases.
3.3.2.2.2 Fired Process Heaters
Fired equipment presents a ready ignition source and should be upwind (i.e., in the direction of the prevailing
wind) from related equipment and operational facilities.
3.3.2.2.3 Compressors
For process gas compressors, separation from operational facilities will reduce related fire exposures.
Grouping of compressors for maintenance and operation is acceptable with proper consideration for
lubrication oil system fires, massive mechanical failures, and accessibility for manual firefighting from at least
two sides.
Air compressors for process use should be located so as to minimize intake of flammable gases. Intakes
elevated 10 ft (3 m) or more and located away from vapor sources can help alleviate this problem.
Other air compressors would normally be in the unit utility area.
3.3.2.2.4 Cable Trays
Exposed cables will be damaged quickly by ignitable liquid spill and pool fires, even if adequate sprinkler
or water spray protection is provided. This is particularly important for safety critical cables required for a safe
shutdown, and relative to potential business interruption due to the loss of critical cables. While sprinklers
or water spray may reduce the extent of fire spread, the protection may not be sufficient to avert loss of the
cable. Only proper routing of cables away from the ignitable liquid exposure or the application of an FM
Approved fire wrap will ensure continued operation of the cables in the event of an ignitable liquid fire.
Cable trays or
fin fan coolers Condensers/exchangers
Receiver/drums/exchangers
Pumps
Exchangers/receiver drums
Sloped surface
> 1% Pumps
Column, Pipe Process
vertical rack structure
Drainage outside vessel, or Drainage outside
equipment and pipe rack tank equipment and pipe rack
Note: Pitch exaggerated for illustration.
Cable trays or
fin fan coolers
Condensers/exchangers
Receiver drums/vessels/
exchangers/pumps/reactors
B. Overpressure caused by a vapor-air deflagration inside ordinary industrial buildings can easily result
in severe structural damage, loss of contents due to collapse and subsequent fire, and extended production
outage during the cleanup and rebuilding/repair period.
C. By maintaining overall structural integrity following a deflagration, DLC will often help to prevent much
additional loss of equipment, as well as shorten the restoration period.
DLC, as described in Data Sheet 1-44, Damage Limiting Construction, consists of an engineered combination
of explosion-venting and pressure-resistant walls that are provided in order to limit the extent of structural
damage in case a deflagration occurs inside a room or main building.
Severity and likelihood of deflagration damage are subject to many random contributing factors, but DLC
can be designed to preserve structural integrity for the majority of foreseeable events.
structures should emphasize locating equipment with ignitable liquid holdup at ground level and providing
solid floors with curbing and drainage rather than open steel grating beneath such equipment when located
at upper levels.
These test results also validate the need to provide a high level of fire protection where the potential for 3D
spill fires exists. While the protection criteria listed in this data sheet will not extinguish a 3D spill fire, it will
ensure adequate cooling and prevent collapse due to overheated steel until the fuel is removed (either by
drainage or due to fuel consumption).
Fig. 15. Process structure test, ethanol fire in 25 ft x 25 ft (7.6 m x 7.6 m) pan with one level of sprinklers
As a reference case, one test was conducted with the structure sprinklered on each mezzanine level.
Additional tests were conducted with the same fire size as the reference case, but with a missing level of
sprinkler protection. The findings confirmed that the process structure sprinkler protection recommended in
this data sheet, in combination with good emergency drainage and prompt process shutdown, is appropriate
for cooling the mezzanine level structural steel when exposed to large ethanol spill and pool fires. In contrast,
excessive steel temperatures were reached when protection was provided at a density of 0.3 gpm/ft2 (12
mm/min) under one mezzanine only.
3.4.1.2.2 Three-Dimensional Spill Fire
An additional test was conducted using the same process structure as described above, but with an
approximately 22 gpm (84 L/min) ethanol spill fire originating at the lower mezzanine level (20 ft [6.1 m]) and
cascading down to the floor. For this test, a simulated process column was located inside the process
structure (Figures 16, 17). Sprinkler protection (0.3 gpm/ft [12 mm/min]) was provided at the 20 ft (6.1 m)
mezzanine level.
Excessive steel temperatures were reached at both mezzanine levels and on the simulated process column
above and below the sprinkler level.
Release point at
20 ft (6.1 m)
elevation
Mock process
column
Release point at
20 ft (6.1 m)
elevation
Fig. 17. Three-dimensional spill fire before sprinkler activation (22 gpm [83 L/min] ethanol flow rate)
Conversely, pneumatic heat actuated devices (HADs) that operate on a fixed temperature and rate-of-rise
method are much more sensitive and may actuate at significant distances from a fire. A pneumatic HAD is a
spot-type detection device attached to a length of pneumatic tubing. When exposed to the heat or temperature
increase from a fire or explosion, the pressure inside the HAD increases. This pressure increase is
transmitted through the pneumatic tubing to a control panel to actuate the deluge system.
Gas-filled (tube side) fin-fan coolers generally do not warrant protection unless exposed by fire from nearby
equipment or if the gas is being condensed to a liquid within the tubes.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 1-21, Fire Resistance of Building Assemblies
Data Sheet 1-44, Damage-Limiting Construction
Data Sheet 2-81, Fire Protection System Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
Data Sheet 3-10, Installation/Maintenance of Private Service Mains and their Appurtenances
Data Sheet 4-1N, Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection
Data Sheet 4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems
Data Sheet 5-1, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous (Classified) Locations
Data Sheet 5-8, Static Electricity
Data Sheet 5-31, Cables and Bus Bars
Data Sheet 5-48, Automatic Fire Detection
Data Sheet 7-0, Causes and Effects of Fires and Explosions
Data Sheet 7-2, Waste Solvent Recovery
Data Sheet 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable Containers
Data Sheet 7-31, Storage of Aerosol Products
Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations
Data Sheet 7-42, Evaluating Vapor Cloud Explosions Using a Flame Acceleration Method
Data Sheet 7-43/17-2, Process Safety
Data Sheet 7-45, Instrumentation and Control in Safety Applications
Data Sheet 7-49, Emergency Venting of Vessels
Data Sheet 7-50, Compressed Gases in Portable Cylinders
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations
Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment
Data Sheet 7-74, Distilleries
Data Sheet 7-83, Drainage and Containment Systems for Ignitable Liquids
Data Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks
Data Sheet 7-91, Hydrogen
Data Sheet 10-0, The Human Factor of Property Conservation
4.2 Other
D. A piece of equipment with a defined equipment explosion hazard occupies more than 10% of the
room/building’s volume and is not protected for explosion by venting, containment, inerting, or suppression.
FM Approved: Products or services that have satisfied the criteria for Approval by FM Approvals. Refer to
the Approval Guide, an online resource of FM Approvals, for a complete list of products and services that are
FM Approved.
Ignitable liquid: Any liquid or liquid mixture that is capable of fueling a fire. Whether described as flammable,
inflammable, or combustible, any liquid that has a fire point is an ignitable liquid.
Pool fire: An ignitable liquid fire that takes the form of a spreading pool on a solid floor or intermediate level.
Examples include a leak from a flange at the bottom of a vessel near ground level, leaks from vessels where
solid intermediate floors are present to capture the spilling leak, and elevated incoming raw material lines.
Process unit: Refers to the area and equipment which are dependent upon one another in the production of
a single product or related group of products. This could include self supported or steel supported equipment
on open pads or in groups of inter exposed buildings. Commonly this would be referred to as ″inside the
battery limits″.
Process unit, high-hazard: Processes involving unstable chemicals, or operating pressures greater than 1000
psig (69 bar), or an explosion hazard which could result in wide spread damage. This could also include
units with potential for the rapid release of more than about 5000 gals (20 cu m) of ignitable liquids by a single
initial incident.
Process unit, low-hazard: Processes that are not high hazard.
Three-dimensional (3D) spill fire: An ignitable liquid fire that initiates from a leak at an elevated source and
continues for an extended period without a means to shut down the release. In Data Sheet 7-14, a 3D spill
fire typically involves a multilevel process structure with primarily open grated construction, as well as large
liquid holdup or high process flow rates at elevations above ground level with the potential for an extended
uncontrolled release of ignitable liquids. Given this context, an indoor tank room with feed pipes at roof level
may not qualify as a 3D spill fire.
Total constructive loss: A condition were the cost of the repair exceeds the actual value of the item damaged.
In a normal loss scenario, the cost of labor, scaffolding, expedited crews, etc. can result in losses approaching
the average per square foot (square meter) monetary value for the fire area. This does not mean that all
of the equipment will be damaged beyond repair.
Unstable material: A material that, in the pure state or as commercially produced, will vigorously polymerize,
decompose or condense, become self-reactive, or otherwise undergo a violent chemical change under
conditions of shock, pressure, or temperature. Some raw materials like styrene are stored with inhibitors
present and are not considered as unstable in storage.
Water-miscible liquid: A water miscible liquid mixes in all proportions with water. When water-miscible ignitable
liquids are mixed with water, a homogeneous solution is formed. The flash point, fire point, heat of
combustion, and heat release rate of the solution will be different from that of the pure ignitable liquid. The
flash point and fire point of the solution will increase as the water concentration increases. At a certain water
concentration (which varies for different ignitable liquids), the fire point will no longer exist and the solution will
no longer present a fire hazard (e.g., 15% ethyl alcohol in water).
There are only a small number of ignitable liquids that meet the definition of water miscible. These include
alcohols (including methyl alcohol, ethyl alcohol, n-propyl alcohol, isopropyl alcohol, tert-butyl alcohol, and allyl
alcohol), ethylene glycol, propylene glycol, acetic acid, and acetone. Acetone, however, creates a more
severe fire than the other water-miscible liquids. Therefore, for the purposes of this data sheet, acetone should
be treated the same as other non-water-miscible liquids. For additional information on water-miscible
ignitable liquids, see Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations.
A. Redefined the scope of the data sheet, including differentiating between Data Sheet 7-14 and Data
Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations.
B. Redefined where passive steel protection is needed, including elimination of a previous reference to
a “greater than average explosion hazard or severe three-dimensional fire hazard” in determining the need
for fireproofing.
C. Incorporated guidance on facility siting from Data Sheet 7-44, Spacing of Facilities in Outdoor Chemical
Plants, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study to determine appropriate separation between
process units and other areas of a plant.
D. Added information on the use of sprinklers over water-reactive materials.
E. Added guidance on proper routing and protection of process safety critical cables.
F. Deleted the ignitable liquid volume thresholds for indoor locations (200 gal [0.8 m3] for any one container
or 2000 gal [7.6 m3] in separate containers) and outdoor locations (400 to 500 gal [1.5 to 1.9 m3] for any
one container or 4000 to 5000 gal [15.1 to 18.9 m3] in separate containers), instead relying on the revised
scope of the document to determine fire protection needs.
G. Modified the vertical distance that area protection sprinkler design will effectively protect from
15 ft (4.6 m) to 30 ft (9.1 m).
H. Added specific guidance on the design of water spray systems rather than referring to Data Sheet
4-1, Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection. This includes information on the protection of the
following components:
1. Below obstructions
2. Within vessel skirts
3. Vertical and horizontal structural steel
4. Process vessels and similar structures
5. Specific equipment such as pipe racks, pumps, fin-fin coolers, cable trays, and loading/unloading
stations
I. Changed the demand for indoor sprinkler systems from simultaneous operation of all sprinklers over
an area of 10,000 ft2 (929 m2) to a demand area based on the interconnectivity of levels (i.e., solid vs.
grated floors, the presence of openings in levels, etc.)
J. Changed the demand for deluge systems from simultaneous operation of all systems within 100 ft
(30.5 m) of the first involved deluge or water spray system to all systems within 50 ft (15 m). Where
pneumatic heat actuated devices (HADs) are used to actuate deluge systems, the 100 ft (30.5 m) distance
remains unchanged.
K. Incorporated information from Data Sheet 7-38, Loss Prevention in Ethanol Fuel Production Facilities,
regarding the protection of processes using water miscible ignitable liquids.
L. Incorporated information from Data Sheet 7-47, Physical Operations in Chemical Plants.
M. Added guidance on the use of foam-water sprinkler systems and compressed air foam.
N. Deleted a recommendation for the use of automatic sprinklers in conjunction with draft curtains for
outdoor locations.
O. Added new figures to assist in developing fire protection for indoor and outdoor facilities.
P. Added basic guidance on the design of process controls and process vessels, with reference to other
data sheets for additional details.
Q. Provided additional information on the objectives of equipment to limit accidental releases of ignitable
liquids, liquefied flammable gases, and flammable gases, including the need for facility specific standards
and emergency response plans for isolation of such releases.
R. Added basic information on human factors (e.g., safety culture, emergency response, safe work
permitting), with reference to other data sheets for additional details.
S. Added basic information on utilities (e.g., types of utilities, integrity of fire protection water supplies,
load shedding), with reference to other data sheets for additional details.
T. Added basic information on contingency planning, including the integrity and reliability of deluge pilot
systems, and the reliability of water supply pumping systems.
U. Expanded the guidance on ignition source control, with reference to other data sheets for additional
details.
V. Expanded the information in Section 3, Support for Recommendations, including background information
on passive fire protection (e.g., spacing and layout of chemical plants, drainage and containment, damage
limiting construction, fireproofing), active fire protection (e.g., inclusion of recent fire test results for ethanol
process structures, design of directional water spray systems), and information on the cost to complete
installations of fire protection systems at chemical plants.
January 2013. Terminology and guidance related to ignitable liquids has been revised to provide increased
clarity and consistency with FM Global’s loss prevention recommendations for ignitable liquid hazards. In
addition, the following significant changes have been made:
A. Changed the name of the data sheet from “Fire and Explosion Protection for Flammable Liquid,
Flammable Gas, and Liquefied Flammable Gas Processing Equipment and Supporting Structures” to “Fire
Protection for Chemical Plants.”
B. Reorganized the document to be consistent with other data sheets.
C. Replaced references to “flammable” and “combustible” liquids with “ignitable liquids” throughout the
document.
May 2004. References to various applicable ANSI/ASME standards were updated.
January 2000. This revision of the document has been reorganized to provide a consistent format.