1. TAÑADA et al. vs. TUVERA et al.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

Subject Matter: Art 2, NCC. Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication, either in the OG or in a newspapers of general circulation in the Phil.,
unless it is otherwise provided.

Nature of the Case: Petition to review decision of Executive Assistant to the President

SC Decision: Petition is GRANTED. Court ordered respondents to publish in the OG all

unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
shall have no legal binding force and effect.

Legal Doctrine: All laws are required to be published in full. The reason for this rule is that the
basic constitutional requirement of due process must be satisfied. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis non excusat.

Facts:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause publication in the Official Gazette of various PDs, LoIs, GOs, proclamations, EOs,
etc. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of petitioners’ lack of legal personality. They are not “aggrieved parties”.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.

ISSUE HELD RATIO

Whether or not YES The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
the petitioners applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before
has legal a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
standing in the informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
case? general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
Moreover, When the question is one of public right and the object of
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real part in interest. It is sufficient that petitioners are
citizens.

Therefore, the petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not YES Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
publication in the the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
Official Gazette effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
is required adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
before any law conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
or statute basis for the application of Art. 3, NCC. It would be the height of injustice to
becomes valid punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he
and had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
enforceable?
Therefore, publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.

No Dissents, Opinions only relate to the issue on publication, not to citizens’ standing.

Page 1 of 130
Fernando, C.J., concurring with qualification
 Publication need not be in the Official Gazette. With regards to due process, it is true that
notice is required before laws became effective but that notice need not be in the Official
Gazette
 The civil code rule on publication of statutes can be fixed by a later executive or legislative
act because it does not have a force of a constitutional command.
 The declaration that unpublished decrees are devoid of legal character would result to
undesirable consequences

Teehankee, J. concurring
 “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the effectivity date
and does not preclude the requirement of publication of statutes

Melencio-Herrera, J. concurring
 When a date of effectivity is mentioned in the Decree, but becomes effective only 15 days
after the publication, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the
expressed date of effectivity

Plana, J. separate opinion

 Publication of laws for them to be effective is not in the Constitution but due process
requires it. Nevertheless, it need not be in the Official Gazette
 Not all laws are to be published for them to become effective – only those that are
“important,” “of public nature,” or “of general applicability”

Page 2 of 130
2. GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM,
FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN
MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE
OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION
FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition on the resolutions of the House Committee on
Justice

Facts:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for
certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred 2 impeachment complaints to public respondent. After
hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient
in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress

was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to
reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent and the latter refused to accept
the motion. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
Petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules
was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article
XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 is unconstitutional because the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010?

Ruling:
No, both Resolution of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 was not
unconstitutional. The promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of
information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation &
Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of
Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing.
Therefore, Resolution of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 was not unconstitutional eve
though the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010.

Page 3 of 130
3. RP-DOE vs. SHELL
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), Petitioner, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:
On October 10, 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under
Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about
by exchange rates adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported
petroleum products.
The decree mandated payment of ad valorem tax for manufactured oils and other fuels from
petroleum corporations accrued on a general fund.

The same law also mandates that the Ministry of Finance shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to implement the said decree.

MOF Circular No. 11-85 requires remittance of payment shall be made not later than every
20th of month while MOF Circular No. 1-85, amended by DOF Circular No. 2-94 provides a
surcharge of 15% of the amount if paid within 30 days and additional 2% per month if paid after 30
days.

Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted requiring that “rules in force of the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within 3 months shall not thereafter be basis of any
sanction against any party persons.”
On February 27, 1987, Executive Order No. 137 amended Presidential Decree No 1956
and expanded the sources and utilization of the OPSF to further serve its purpose.
On December 4, 1991, the Office of the Energy Affairs Now DOE, informs the respondent of the
underpayment for contribution to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk fee together with the
surcharges as stipulated on MOF Circular No. 1-85:

Underpayment
1. December 1989 to March 1990 – P14, 414, 860. 75
2. April 1991 to October 1991 – P10, 139, 525.56
Surcharges
1. P11, 654, 782.31
2. P2, 806, 656.65

Shell justified the calculations basing on MOF Circular No. 11-85 and paid the full principal amount
of P24, 554, 387.31 but did not the surcharges.

DOE informed and required Shell to pay the surcharges.

Shell appealed to the Office of the President but DOE decision was affirmed.
Respondent appealed before the CA and decision was reversed citing a certification presented
by respondent issued by Office of National Register (ONAR) which rendered MOF Circular No. 1-
85 as ineffective for failure to comply to Section 3, of Chapter 2, Book 7 of Administrative code of
1987.

Page 4 of 130
DOE raised the case to SC and argues that Circular No. 1-85 has been affirmed and received
vitality from EO No. 137 from legislative enactment. That Respondent waived its objection on no-
registration when the principal amount was settled.

Issue: WON Circular No. 1-85 is effective?

Held: No

Ratio:
Citing Tanada vs. Tuvera, SC enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that statutes,
including administrative rules intended to implement existing laws to attain binding force and
effect:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis
provided.)

Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85,
as amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31,
is specious. MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents’
underpayment is based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.

Page 5 of 130
4. HONASAN vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT JUSTICE et al.
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, Petitioner, vs. HE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F.
DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP-P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO MATILLANO, AND THE HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
MARCELO, Respondents.

Facts:
Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan is being investigated to his involvement in the
Oakwood Mutiny as allegedly presided a meeting for destabilization of the government. He
contested that the Ombudsman and not the Department of Justice has the jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation to public officers with salary grade 31.

Issue:
Whether or not the Department of Justice has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation to public officials and employees.

Ruling:
Yes.

According to paragraph three of Article 7 of the Civil Code, “Administrative or executive

acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.”

In this case, the questioned 1987 Administrative Code and Ombudsman Act of 1989, and
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 are not in contrary to the Constitution as it only lay down
procedural guidelines to compliment the provisions of the Constitution.

Therefore, Department of Justice has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation

to public officials and employees.

Page 6 of 130
5. CO vs. CA
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Albino S. Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizen's Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00
in payment of his share to the expenses of the salvage operations of a sunken vessel. The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984 and was dishonored two days later, the reason being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Co with the RTC of Pasay City which evaluated his conviction of the crime
charged on the basis on the Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by BP Blg. 22. Petitioner
appealed to the CA arguing that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983,
some four years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que vs. People on September 21,
1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense as official pronouncement made in Circular No. 4 of the Ministry
of Justice.

Issue: WON the decision issued by the Court on Que v. People be applied retroactively to the
prejudice of the accused.

Ruling: No. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, unconstitutional. The Court's
decision in Que v. People should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of the petitioner.

Page 7 of 130
6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, et al.

FACTS:
On August 11, 1984, Patalin, Mijaque and Ras, armed with firearms and bladed weapons,
willfully steal cash and some personal properties of Aliman and Carcillar Family. The accused-
apellants, also, by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with Josephine Belesario and her cousins Perpetua, Juliana, and Rogelia
Carcillar. The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape and sentenced
to a death penalty. By virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1),
Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. However, it was restored on
January 1, 1994 by virtue of Republic Act 7659. Accused-appellants contended that since the
Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused,
the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them
notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when
the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Patalin, et.al, can be subjected to the restoration of the punishment of
Death Penalty.

RULING:
No. Under Article 3 of the Civil Code, Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. A subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right
that accrued under the old law.

Page 8 of 130
7. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION

Subject Matter:
Article 4 of NCC - Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Nature of the case:

Petition for Review on Certiorari on the assailed two Resolutions (dated March 8, 1999 and
the June 4, 1999) of the Court of Appeals (CA).

SC Decision:
The Petition is DENIED and the assailed two (2) Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner

Legal Doctrine:
Article 4 - LAWS SHALL NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT EXCEPT (NICE PPUPT)
1.) New rights created by laws
2.) Interpretative statutes
3.) Curative statues
4.) Emergency Laws
5.) Procedural or Remedial Laws
6.) Unless the law other provides
7.) Penal Laws favorable to the accused provided that the accused is not a habitual
delinquent
8.) Tax Laws when expressly declared or clearly the legislative intent

FACTS:
In July 1993, a fire destroyed a major portion of the properties inside the factory of Wear
Me Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me) of which the Petitioner Oriental Assurance
Corporation is the insurer under the following policies:

a. Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D covering one year from March 20, 1991 to March 20,
1992 and was subsequently renewed for another year from March 20, 1992 to March 20, 1993
under Renewal Receipt No. 40948 of which a typewritten statement was stated on the face of
the receipt to read: the policy was "made further subject to MORTGAGEE CLAUSE in favor
of SOLIDBANK CORPORATION; and

b. Fire Insurance Policy No. F-93-40690-D covering the period from March 20, 1993 to March
20, 1994 on the same properties.

However, upon claiming of proceeds of insurance policy, the petitioner and co-insurers
denied the claims of Wear ME as well as the claims of the Solidbank Corporation, the holder of
trust receipts over the burned goods, because the Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D itself
(not the Renewal Receipt) did not contain a mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank.

Thus, a civil case was instituted by the respondent to Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC)
against petitioner, Wear Me and co-insurers (Angelita Amparo Go and Arnold A. Go, Leonila Cui,
and Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc.). And a favorable RTC judgment was rendered to
the respondent-plaintiff and against the defendants.

In August 1995, a Motion for Execution pending appeal was filed by respondent and was
opposed by petitioner by filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision. The trial court,

Page 9 of 130
by its Omnibus Order, granted the motion of the respondent and denied the motion of the
petitioner.

In October 1995, the petitioner appealed the trial court decision and Order to the Court of
Appeals.

In July 1, 1997, The 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED becomes

effective. This was adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of
section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the Constitution, concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

After more than three years, due to the negligence of the petitioner's counsel who was not
able to check the status of a pending appeal to CA, the said appeal and subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were abandoned and dismissed by CA on its resolutions dated March 8,
1999 and the June 4, 1999, on the grounds of the petitioner and co-insurers’ failure to pay the
required docket fees of the appeal as required under Section 1 [c], Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.

Indeed, the CA, in rendering the judgment, has retroactively applied 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requirements on docket fees of appeal to the pending case.

Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the retroactive application of procedural rules to pending cases is lawful
and valid?

RULING:

Yes, retroactive effect of procedural (remedial) laws or rules of court is lawful and valid.

When a law or rules deal with procedures only, prima facie, it applies to all actions as there
are no vested rights in rules of procedures. Moreover, this is undoubtedly well settled in the past
cases that while changes in substantive law (i.e. Criminal Law) or Supreme Court jurisprudences
interpreting the application of a particular law may not be applied retroactively, especially when
prejudice will result to the party that has followed the earlier law or jurisprudence, that principle
does not obtain in remedial or procedural law as this is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that all laws shall have no retroactive effect.

Applying to the case at bar, new rules of court adopted by the courts or Section 1 [c], Rule
50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in particular, can apply to all pending cases
on appeal so that he failure of petitioner and the negligence of its counsel to check the status of
its appeal more particularly the nonpayment of the required Appellate court docket and other
lawful fees can be a ground for dismissal of appeal.

Therefore, the appellate court denial on the Petition and Motion for Reconsideration
is VALID.

Page 10 of 130
8. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT AND
RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK

FACTS:
 A contract of depositum was entered by COMTRUST (BPI), under the signature of Virgilio
Garcia, assistant branch manager, and Rizaldy Zshornack, amounting to US$3,000 for
safekeeping.
 Over five months later, Zshornack demanded the return of the money but the bank refused
alleging that the amount was sold and transferred to Zshornack's account.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract entered into by the parties was void under Article 5 of the Civil
Code.

RULING:
Yes. Article 5 of the Civil Code states that acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void... The contract entered by the parties falls under Article
1962, "A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another,
with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing
delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract."
However, the fact that the amount deposited is foreign exchange, it now falls under Central Bank
Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions. Hence, pursuant to
Article 5 of the Civil Code, the contract is void, having been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law.

Therefore, the contract entered into by the parties was void under Article 5 of the Civil
Code. Both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action against each other.
Petitioner is ordered to restore to the dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of
US$1,000

Page 11 of 130
9. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Imelda Marcos, filed a Certificate of Candidacy with the provincial
COMELEC of Leyte vying for a seat at the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman for
the 1st District of Leyte for May 1995 election. In said certificate which she executed on May 8,
1995, she indicated her period of residence in Tolosa, Leyte where she is registered as a voter of
seven (7) months.
Meanwhile, Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution dictates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives must be a resident of the district of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the election or 1-year residency requirement.
Nine days after the deadline for filing of candidacy, the petitioner filed an
Amendment/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy to rectify what she averred as an honest mistake
when she indicated “seven months” in the certificate, and, added therein “since childhood”.
The provincial COMELEC of Leyte denied acceptance of said amended certificate,
likewise, the COMELEC’s head office in Intramuros. After garnering an overwhelming win in the
election, the petitioner sought the relief of the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has satisfied the one-year residency requirement prescribed
under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
YES. Article 50 of the Civil Code states: “For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfilment
of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence”. In
election cases, the term residence is almost always used synonymously with domicile. The former
implies factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. Domicile imports not only the
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, with conduct
indicative of such intention. It is a place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. If the intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established or accomplished,
it is residence. So it is normal for an individual to have different residences in various places, but
he can only have one domicile.

In the case at bar, since it was established by factual bases that the petitioner has always
maintained her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte and never expressly intended to abandon her domicile
in said place, thus, possesses the necessary residence qualification. The Court ordered
COMELEC to proclaim the petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the 1st District of Leyte.

Page 12 of 130
10. FAR EAST BANK TRUST CO. vs. ARTURO L. MARQUEZ

Facts:
On 13 March 1989, respondent Arturo Marquez entered into a Contract to Sell with Transamerican
Sales and Exposition (‘TSE’) involving a 52.5 sq. m. lot in Diliman, Quezon City with a three-storey
townhouse unit denominated as Unit No. 10 to be constructed thereon for a total consideration of
₱800,000.00.

The parcel of land in question is a portion of that property covered by TCT No. 156254. On 22
May 1989, TSE obtained a loan from petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) in the
amount of ₱7,650,000.00 and mortgaged the property covered by TCT No. 156254.

For failure of TSE to pay its obligation, petitioner FEBTC extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage and became the highest bidder (₱15.7 million) in the auction sale conducted for the
purpose.

After the respondent had already paid a total of ₱600,000.00, he stopped payment because the
construction of his townhouse unit slackened. He discovered later on that this was due to the
foreclosure.

The instituted a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (‘OAALA’) of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (‘HLURB’) on 29 January 1991 entitled ‘Arturo Marquez
vs. Transamerican Sales, et al’ docketed as HLRB Case No. REM-012991-4712 to compel TSE
to complete the construction of the townhouse and to prevent the enforceability of the extra-judicial
foreclosure made by petitioner FEBTC and to have the mortgage between TSE and petitioner
FEBTC declared invalid, said mortgage having been entered into by the parties in violation of
section 18 of P.D. 957.

Issue:
Whether or not the mortgage contract violated Section 18 of P.D. 957, hence, void insofar as third
persons are concerned.

Ruling:
Yes, the lot was mortgaged in violation of Section 18 of PD 957. Respondent, who was the buyer
of the property, was not notified of the mortgage before the release of the loan proceeds by
petitioner. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void.

Under PD 957, the mortgage of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit is void, if executed by a
property developer without the prior written approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). That an encumbrance has been constituted over an entire property, of which the
subject lot or unit is merely a part, does not affect the invalidity of the lien over the specific portion
at issue. Hence, the mortgage over the lot is null and void insofar as private respondent is
concerned.

Page 13 of 130
11. PNB VS. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC., et al.,

Facts:
On November 28, 1973 respondents Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., et al., received a 4 Million
Pesos (P4,000,000.00) loan from Philippine National Bank (PNB) to finance the filming of the
movie "Pacific Connection". The loan was secured by mortgages on respondents’ real and
personal properties:
1. Malugay Property - 7,623 square meters parcel of land - Malugay Street, Makati
2. Forbes Property - 3,000 square meters parcel of land - North Forbes Park, Makati
3. Several motion picture equipment
On January 14, 1974, loan amount was increased to 6 Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) and to 7.5
Million Pesos (P7,500,000.00) on September 8, 1974.
Respondents defaulted in their obligation. The auction sale was rescheduled several times upon
request of the respondents without need of republication of the notice of sales as stipulated in the
“Agreement to Postpone Sale”.
On December 20, 1976, the auction proceeded and had a proceed of P10,432,776.97. The
respondents then filed an action for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages for injunction on
the following grounds:
1. The obligation is yet to mature as there were negotiations for an additional loan amount of
P5,000,000.00
2. Lack of publication
3. Purchase price was grossly inadequate and unconscionable
4. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated by petitioner in bad faith
The trial court ordered the annulment of the foreclosure sale petitioner to pay P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Case was raised to CA and decision by the lower was affirmed.
Hence, petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner argues the following:
I. CA erred in declaring foreclose sale as void due to lack of republication knowing that
the respondents agreed to waive the such as stipulated on “Agreement to Postpone
Sale” given that republication is required in Section 3 of Act 3135.
II. Respondents should be declared in Estoppel as they requested and agreed with PNB
to postpone the foreclosure sale.

Issue: WON the parties can validly waive the posting and publication requirements mandated by
Act 3135?

Held: No

Ratio:
Section 3 of Act 3135 is a statutory provision and requirement and concerns not only the parties
involved but also the public and the state itself. Therefore cannot be waived by both parties alone.
Citing People vs. Donato; although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by
statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is
not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would
be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold,
and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication

Page 14 of 130
of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at the very least voidable.

Page 15 of 130
12. BARTOLOME VS. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Facts:
Bernardina Bartolome, being the biological mother of John Colcol is claiming the death
benefits of her son. He was unmarried and childless. John was legally adopted by his grandfather
Cornelio Colcol. But, the adopter died while John was still a minor. The respondent Social Secuity
System contends that the petitioner was no longer the legitimate parent of John.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a legitimate beneficiary of the deceased.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is a legitimate beneficiary of her son’s death benefits.

According to third paragraph of Article 7 of the Civil Code, “Administrative or executive

acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.”
And in the Article 167(j) of Presidential Decree No. 626 states that, “dependent spouse until he
marries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
or legitimate descendant who are secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.”

In this case, the adoptee died while the adopted child was still a minor, this restored the
parental authority to the biological mother. Aside from that, the deceased specifically named his
mother as his beneficiary. The SSS cannot deprive the petitioner of her rights to claim the death
benefits as it would be contrary to law and the Constitution.

Therefore, the petitioner is legitimate to claim the death benefits.

Page 16 of 130
13. DE MESA vs PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC

FACTS:
Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps bearing the number “349,” allegedly a winning
combination in a contest sponsored by respondents.
Initial promotional campaign was a success so Pepsi decided to extend the promo.
However, due to some security code problems a mistake had been made in the announcement
of number “349” as the winning number.
Numerous holders of the supposedly winning “349” crowns were not honored and paid by
respondents, which led these rejected crown holders to file separate complaints for specific
performance and damages.
In the Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed against herein respondents
for specific performance and damages in connection with the Number Fever fiasco.
Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860, which was
dismissed for lack of merit. Unfazed, Mendoza filed with this Court a petition for review,
which was denied for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.
In the Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed the complaint against herein respondents
for specific performance and damages arising from the said promotion. On appeal,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 62837, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. A
petition for review was subsequently filed with this Court, which was denied for failure to
show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied with finality and entry of judgment was made.
Prior to the resolution of the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, petitioners filed a motion for leave to:
(1) adopt the previous testimonial and documentary evidence in
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases; or
(2) archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases, which were then pending
with the Court of Appeals.
The RTC granted the said motion on January 8, 2001 and the case was accordingly archived.
Rodrigo case became final and executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of therein
petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari and motion for reconsideration.
February 20, 2002, respondents filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss the complaints filed by
petitioners herein invoking the principle of stare decisis. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed a petition for review claiming that:
(1) the principle of res judicata does not apply; and
(2) the dismissal of the complaint was premature as petitioners’ motion to archive the case
and the grant thereof was based on the condition that there be a final resolution in the
Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the present case is barred by the Court’s ruling in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.
Held: Yes
Rationale:
Findings of fact in the said two cases are the same.
(i) Respondents did not breach any contract since the “349” crowns with security code
“L-2560-FQ” are not winning crowns; and
(ii) Respondents were not negligent in the conduct of their promotion and they exerted
efforts to ensure the integrity and smooth conduct of the same.
The instant petition must be denied.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Page 17 of 130
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the
causes of action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be argued.

Note:
stare decisis et non quieta movere – stand by the decision and do not disturb what is settled.

Page 18 of 130
14. DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), petitioner, vs. JOSE LIM, CHUY
CHENG KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 134241 August
11, 2003

FACTS:
Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell ("Contract to Sell") a parcel
of land ("Property") located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison Lumber occupied the
Property as lessee with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The Contract to Sell provided that the total cost of P28,000,000.00 shall be paid thru a
down payment of P10,000,000.00 upon signing the contract and the remaining P18,000,000.00
shall be paid on or before March 8, 1995 at 9:30 A.M upon the complete vacation of all the tenants
or occupants of the property and execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. If the occupants shall
not vacate, the vendee shall withhold the balance and the vendor agrees to pay penalty of Four
percent (4%) per month to the herein VENDEE based on the amount of the downpayment of TEN
MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS until the complete vacation of the premises by the tenants
therein.
The condition of the contract regarding the complete vacation of the premises was not
met, the petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against
Jose Lim, Chuy Cheng Keng and Harrison Lumber, Inc. alleging that Lim connived with Harrison
Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalties would have accumulated
and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the
purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing
of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their
meeting.
Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation. Lim
amended his answer and prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell. Lim requested in
open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted
the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion. In the
same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk
of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Reyes filed petition for review. Reyes points out that deposit is not
among the provisional remedies enumerated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Reyes stresses
the enumeration in the Rules is exclusive. Reyes invokes the principle that equity is "applied only
in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or x x x judicial rules of procedure."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial court could issue the questioned
Orders on grounds of equity when there is an applicable law on the matter, that is, Rules 57 to 61
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.17

RULING:
The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and in the
Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of
Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which is a precondition to the rescission of the
Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of equity overruling a positive
provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that governs this particular case. This is a case of
silence or insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code

Page 19 of 130
expressly mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the "silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the laws." This calls for the application of equity,22 which "fills the open spaces in the law."

Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit of
the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this
case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. 24Equity is
the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.

Page 20 of 130
15. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.

Subject Matter:
Article 9 - No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

Nature of the Case:

Petition invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the correct
penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply.

SC Decision:
The petition is GRANTED. REMAND to trial court for proper penalty.

Legal Doctrine:
Judge must not impose penalty different from what law provides.

Facts:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped
in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from
it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr., Jeofrey, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a “Booster,”
Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. “Lando,” Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. “Curimao,” Catalino
Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. “Joel,” and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were charged with the crime of Rape
with Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Information: “taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into
a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse, covering her mouth,
slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person, caused her
fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.”

The trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry
Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the “penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessories provided for by law.”

Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8,
1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be “modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed” against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original
penalty (reclusion perpetua).

Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge,
on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under

Page 21 of 130
Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

Ruling:
YES, since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent
judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.

Article 335, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, as amended, plainly and unequivocably
provides that “when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.” The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of
the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a
sentence of death.

As stated in the case, the trial judge’s misgivings in imposing the death sentence is
because of his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its
bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality
or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty
in specific and well-defined instances.

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges,
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law
becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought “to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,” resist encroachments
by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. Courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.

This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully
aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees.
In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where
the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

Therefore, respondent judge has acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under
Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

Page 22 of 130
16. CESARIO URSUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
In 1983, Cesario Ursua, a COmmunity Environment and Natural Resources Officer, was
charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer, Atty. Palmones, asked for a copy of the
complaint from the Office of the Ombudsman, then asked Ursua to take his letter-request to the
Ombudsman, because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters. Ursua expressed his reluctance to Oscar Perez, to ask the document, since he was one
of the respondent before the Ombudsman. Perez advised him to sign with his name, Oscar Perez.

At the Ombudsman, Ursua signed on the logbook under the name "Oscar Perez," as well
as on the complaint copy. Loida Kahulugan, a staff of the Ombudsman, however, recpgmozed
him as Cesario Ursua, and recommended that a criminal case be filed against him.

Ursua was found guilty by the trial court of violating Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6085. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed his conviction and sentenced him to three years in prison.

Ursua contends that he has not violated CA No. 142, as he never used any alias name,
that "Oscar Perez" is not his alias, and that he only used such name on one occasion and with
the consent of Oscar Perez himself.

Issue:
Whether or not Cesario Ursua violated CA No. 142.

Ruling:
No. Ursua should be acquitted.

Under CA 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use a
name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.

In this case, Ursua merely used the name "Oscar Perez" once, and was not used in a
business transaction. Such use was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used
a different name, he was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman,
because the complaint is a record open to the public.

Therefore, Ursua is not in violation of CA No. 142, as amended.

Page 23 of 130
17. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY
OF ASIA, INC., respondent.

FACTS:
The respondent, Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a duly organized and recognized
VAT-registered corporation under the laws of the Philippines which is engaged in steel
manufacturing, applied with the Commissioner on Internal Revenue on September 30, 2004, for
refund of creditable input VAT derived from its zero-rated sale transactions covering the period
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002.
The respondent also filed with Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review, which the
latter granted refund in adherence to Section 112 (A) of NIRC of 1997, which states: “Any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) year
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due xxx”
The petitioner objected to said decision, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
interposing that the prescribed 2-year period has not been satisfied since 2004 is a leap year,
making September 29, 2004 as the last day of the 2-year period and not September 30, 2004, but
was denied. The case was elevated to CTA en banc which was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prescriptive period of two (2) year as a requirement for the claim of
refund has been satisfied.

RULING:
YES. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that “years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each”, whether it be a regular year or a leap year. The reckoning date provided for in Section 112
(A) of NIRC of 1997 is the last day of the taxable quarter when the attributable sales were made,
which in this case is September 30, 2002, being the sales period applied for is July 1-Sept.30,
2002. So applying the legal computation of period, the two-year period required in filing for refund
expires on Sept.30, 2004. Hence the respondent’s claim was timely filed.

Page 24 of 130
18. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

Facts
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue
of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son
came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst
never gave support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

Issue
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for unjustified
failure to support his minor child.

Ruling
Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in
the Philippines and committed the offense here. Article 14 of the New Civil Code states that penal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Therefore, the respondent, who is living in the Philippines, can be held liable for the deprivation
or denial of financial support to the child and is considered an act of violence
against women and children.

Page 25 of 130
19. BELLIS VS BELLIS

Facts:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he
made two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties.
In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not given any share. His distributable estate
are divided as follows:

(a) $240, 000.00 to his first wife Marry Mallen

(b) P120, 000.00 equally divided to his recognized illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Ma. Cristina
Bellis & Miriam Palma Bellis
(c) Residuary estate be equally divided among his 7 surviving children by his first and second wife

Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights.
Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.

Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Lower court overruled their case, hence, directly
appealed to SC.

Issue: WON such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional rights.

Held: No
Ratio:
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law, there are
no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern
the properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by the
Philippine law.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

NOTES: See Par. 2 Article 16, 17 & 1039 Civil Code.

Page 26 of 130
20. AZNAR vs GARCIA
Jose B. Aznar (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs. Commission on Elections and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña, respondents

Legal Action: Petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC Resolution dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province.

Facts:
 November 19, 1987 – Osmeña filed certificate of candidacy for January 18, 1988 local
elections
 January 22, 1988 – Cebu-PDP Laban, represented by Aznar, filed for petition of
disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is a US citizen
 January 27, 1988 - petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued
by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
certifying that respondent is American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)
 Petitioner filed Supplemental Urgent Ex-parte Motion for issuance of TRO to temporarily
enjoin Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing votes cast in favor
of respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition
 January 28, 1988 – COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation
 At the hearing before COMELEC (1st Division) petitioner presented the following exhibits:
o Exhibit B: Application for Alien Registration Form signed by respondent dated
November 21, 1979
o Exhibit C: ACR in the name of respondent dated November 21, 1979
o Exhibit D: Permit to Re-enter Philippines dated November 21, 1979
o Exhibit E: Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980
 Respondent alleged:
o that he is a legitimate son of a Filipino son of late President Sergio Osmeña Sr.
o that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport issued March 2,
1987
o that he has been continuously residing in country since birth and has not gone out
of the country for more than 6 months
o that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965
 March 3, 1988 – respondent proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu
 June 11, 1988 – COMELEC 1st Division dismissed petition for not having been timely filed
and lack of sufficient proof

Issue Held Ratio

Whether or No  Petitioner failed to present direct proof that respondent lost his Filipino
not citizenship
respondent  By virtue of being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that the
is not a respondent is Filipino remains.
Filipino  Unlike in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC and Labo vs. COMELEC, respondent
citizen. vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance to US.
 The mere fact that the respondent has a certificate stating he is American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino
 There can be no loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation
either express or implied.
 Art IV Sec 5 of the 1987 Constitution has no retroactive effect. Future law that
will deal with dual citizenship or allegiance has not yet been enacted.

Page 27 of 130
Decision: Petition DENIED. Resolution of COMELEC AFFIRMED.
Dissents:
 Padilla, J.:
o Exhibit B is an express renunciation of respondent’s Philippine citizenship
o Exhibits C, D and E were issued because of a distinct and explicit manifestation of
desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines.
o If respondent, believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed
Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return
to his country.
o Respondent registered himself as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration twice, in
1958 and 1979.
 Cruz, J.:
o When a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is
not a citizen.
o Do not agree with the finding that respondent expressly renounced Philippine
citizenship. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship
under CA No 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its
significance and consequences. Do not think commercial documents signed
suggest such categorical disclaimer.
o Respondent registered himself as alien presumably so he could be insulated from
the jurisdiction the Philippine government exercises over its nationals.
 Melencio-Herrera, J.:
o Registration as an alien is a clear unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a
citizen.

Page 28 of 130
21. DIAZ VS ENCANTO

Facts: Petitioner has been in the service of the UP since 1963 as a member of the faculty in the
College of Mass Communication. On May 3, 1988, she filed for a sabbatical leave with pay for
one year effective June 1988 to May 1989 which was denied due to the shortage of teaching staff.
While the petitioner was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not
able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty form. On July 18, 1989,
Petitioner Diaz instituted a complaint against the respondents with the RTC, Pasig which ruled in
her favor in a Decision dated April 17, 1996. Respondents appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.
The CA found neither negligence nor bad faith on the part of the respondents in their denial of
petitioner’s sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari by Diaz.

Issue: WON the respondents were negligent or acted in bad faith in denying the petitioner’s
application for sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries.

Ruling: No. A sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore Petitioner Diaz cannot demand its
grant. On the part of the respondents, they were not abusing their rights as officials of the UP by
exercising bad faith for the sole intent of prejudicing the petitioner.

Page 29 of 130
22. GF EQUITY, INC., petitioner, vs. ARTURO VALENZONA, respondent. G.R. No. 156841
June 30, 2005

FACTS:

GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska team in Philippine Basketball
Association under contract. Under the contract Valenzona will receive a monthly salary of
P35,000, net of taxes, a service vehicle with gasoline allowance. Although, he had consulted his
lawyer for the stipulations in the contract and was pointed by his counsel that there is a one-
sidedness face still he agreed to the contract. Later on, he was terminated from being the Head
Coach on grounds that the management believes he did not comply of all his duties as coach.
Valenzona filed in RTC of Manila against the GF Equity of breach of contract with damages. The
RTC dismissed the complaint stating that the contract was valid and that he is aware of the bad
bargain. In the CA, where he appealed, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision and thus
ordered GF Equity liable for damages. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract violated the rules on mutuality of contract resulting from breach
of contract and therefore a recovery of damages can be awarded?

RULING:

The CA bases their judgment on Article 19 of the Civil Code, or the principle of abuse of
rights. The same code also provides for the mutuality of contracts where both parties are bound
and must adhere to the contract. The stipulation wherein, the management, on its sole opinion
can terminate the employment of the defendant is violative and thus is null and void. GF Equity
failed to consider the principle of abuse of right clearly stated in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
pre-termination is anchored which is contrary to law and thereby abusing the right of Valenzona,
entitles him of damages in consonance with Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the CC.

Page 30 of 130
23. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, PETITIONER, VS. ROMEO A. JADER, RESPONDENT.

Subject Matter:
Art. 19 of NCC - Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal (CA) arguing that the petitioner
has no civil liability to respondent.

SC Decision:
The CA’s decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is to PAY respondent
the sum of P35,470.00, with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of
the complaint until fully paid, P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. The award
of moral damages is DELETED.

Legal Doctrine:
Moral damages may be recovered in certain cases enumerated in the New Civil Code but
not if the offended party is also at fault.

FACTS:
Respondent was enrolled in the petitioner’s College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the
1st semester of his last year (4th year), he failed to take the regular final examination
in Practice Court I for which he was given an INC grade. He enrolled for the 2nd semester as
fourth year law student and filed an application for the removal of the INC grade which was
approved by Dean after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988.
On May 30, 1988, without the knowledge of the respondent, his Practice Court I Professor
submitted his grade of 5 or FAILURE.

In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the
fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. Respondent’s name appeared on the tentative
list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies on April 16, 1988 and later he gave blowout
celebrations. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to
September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having
learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence.
He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees,
and costs of suit.
RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the
latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P35,470.00 with legal interest of 6% per annum from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid, P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit, which on appeal
by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification by having additional
sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages in favor of the respondent.
Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not UE has civil liability to Jader by misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?

Page 31 of 130
RULING:
Yes, UE is civilly liable and acted in bad faith from its failure to promptly inform respondent
of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied
all requirements for the course, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing
for the bar exams.
It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice
and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the
entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among
those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good
faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit
for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing issue, however, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus
liable to respondent for the latter’s actual damages; the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated
that moral damages cannot be awarded to the respondent. It cannot believe that he suffered
shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that
as a 4th year law student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated
by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all
the requirements.
Therefore, the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated
upon any of those specifically enumerated in the provisions of the new Civil Code on moral
damages, the Supreme Court did not err in declining to award moral damages to the respondent.

Page 32 of 130
24. CECILIO PE VS. ALFONSO PE

Facts: The defendant, Alfonso Pe, was a married man working in La Perla Cigar Cigarette Factory
in Gasan Marinduque, who was treated like a relative of Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. In 1952,
the defendant frequented the house of Lolita Pe, daughter of Cecilio, on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. They eventually fell in love with each other. Rumors of
their love affair reached Lolita's parents in 1955, and since then the defendant was forbidden from
seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs brought the case before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover
damages amounting to P94,000, but the trial court found that the defendant cannot be held liable
for moral damages since the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith
tried to win Lolita's affection.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, a married man, is liable for moral damages for having an
illicit affair with an unmarried woman.

Ruling: Yes. Alfonso Pe committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy. According to Article 21, of the Civil Code, "Anyone who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage." The defendant won Lolita's affection through
ingenious scheme and seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him, shown by the
fact that defendant frequented Lolita's house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how
to pray the rosary. By having an illicit affair with Lolita, the defendant committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. Therefore, the defendant
is liable for moral damages, and is sentenced to pay P5,000 as damages and P2,000 as attorney's
fees and expenses of litigations.

Page 33 of 130
25. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner. vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU
T.GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner is an Iranian, single, of legal age, an exchange medical student. The
respondent is likewise single, of legal age, waitress, and with good moral character. After
courtship and proposal of marriage by the petitioner to the respondent, the latter agreed to live
with the former and surrendered her virginity under the strong belief of the promise of marriage.
However, shortly before the agreed month of their marriage, the petitioner began maltreating and
causing injury against the respondent, and repudiated their marriage agreement, which drove her
to leave the house of the petitioner and filed a case against the latter.
The lower court, applying the Art.21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the
respondent. It ruled that because of deceit and machination employed by the petitioner, the
respondent submitted to the sexual advances and allowed herself to be deflowered. And because
of that promise, the parents and relatives had undergone into the wedding preparations. And that
non-fulfilment of the petitioner of his promise of marriage is an offense against morality, good
customs, culture and traditions of the Filipinos. The CA has affirmed the decision of the lower
court, thus, a petition was filed before the SC.

ISSSUE:
Whether or not the act of the petitioner is punishable under Art.21 as well as Art.19 of the
Civil Code.

RULING:
YES. Although the breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, in the light of
Art.21, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of love
by a woman, and his representation to fulfill said promise becomes the proximate cause of giving
herself to him, but he has no intention of marrying her and that his promise is just a scheme or
deceptive device to entice the woman to obtain her consent to sexual act, could justify the award
for damages under said Article. The injury sustained by the respondent is in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
The petitioner likewise committed repugnant acts contrary to Art.19 of the Civil Code,
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
The petition is denied with costs against the petitioner.

Page 34 of 130
26. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES,
a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.

Facts
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden. The party was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at
the party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party,
she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of
exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained
that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet
voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting
at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party. Reyes then sued Lim and
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by another
party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached
him and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by
Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted
out of the party like a common criminal. The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and
that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. Itis true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes
to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.

Issue
Whether or not Lim may be held liable for the damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code.

Ruling.
No, Lim not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 19 provides that “Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. Article 21 states that “Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage. “In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very
close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted.
Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes
simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support any of his
claims. The petitioners can’t be held liable for the damages Reyes brought the injury to himself.

Page 35 of 130
27. PEOPLE VS CASIPIT

Facts:
On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical checkup, the father
of Myra entrusted her to the parents of Guillermo Casipit. On the same day, Guillermo
and Myra went on date and watched a movie in Poblacion instead of going to Alaminos
to buy rice and bananas. On their way home it rained hard that they had to take shelter in
a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. After that, two versions of the event were
presented; Myra was raped in a hut and Myra and Guillermo had a consented sexual
intercourse.

The next day, Myra went on a medico legal and reported the rape to the authorities
and field a case on the court. After the trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and
found appellant guilty of raping Myra by means of force and intimidation. Guillermo
appealed and maintains that the victim's story contained many flaws:

Firstly, even as she had testified that she struggled with him and kicked him twice,
the doctor who examined her found no external physical injuries on her body;

Secondly, the fact that the victim agreed to have a movie date with him shows that
she liked him and was attracted to him; and,

Thirdly, the victim did not leave the hut but slept with him until morning, which is an
unnatural behavior of one who had been raped.

Issue:
WON accused is guilty of rape?

Held:
Yes. Guilty.

Ratio:
Whether what happened is rape, seduction or mutual affection with consent is the
meat of this case, but in the end, the state, acting as parens patriae, comes to aid of the
minor.

We cannot sustain the accused; hence, we affirm his conviction. We cannot argue
against the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Myra that appellant
poked a knife at her neck and sexually abused her despite her resistance as he was
stronger and bigger than she who was only 14 years old. Considering the physical
condition of the victim and the place where the crime was perpetrated, which was in an
isolated hut in an open field, it was not difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and
coerce her into submission.

When the question of credence arises between the conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense on the commission of rape, the answer of the trial court is
generally viewed as correct, hence entitled to the highest respect, because it is more

Page 36 of 130
competent to so conclude having closely observed the witnesses when they testified, their
deportment, and the peculiar manner in which they gave their testimonies and other
evidence in court.

Worth noting is the marked receptively of our courts to lend credence to the
testimonies of victims who are of tender years regarding their versions of what transpired
since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.

NOTES: See Article 24, Civil Code.

Page 37 of 130
28. ST. REALTY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Doctor Conrado J. Aramil’s house have been used without his permission by St. Realty
Corporation in its advertisement entitled “WHERE THE HEART IS”, published in the Sunday
Times. In the said promotional advertisement, the house was depicted as the home of Mr. and
Mrs. Arcadio. It has created confusions for the people who knew the Aramil family and saw the
photograph.
Mr. Aramil asked for an explanation and demanded that the company must correct its
mistake and issue an apology, which they did not complied. Hence, the demand for moral and
exemplary damages.

Issue:
Whether or not St. Realty Corporation is liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes, St. Realty Corporation is liable.
According to Article 26 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “Every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; (2)
Meddling or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another
to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing of humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or another personal condition.”
In this case, Doctor Aramil’s house has been used in a promotional advertisement without
his permission and lost his privacy, he and his family suffered humiliation from their friends and
colleagues. Also St. Realty Corporation failed to publish a public apology to the confusion they
have done.
Therefore, the petitioner is liable for moral and exemplary damages.

Page 38 of 130
29. JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO
DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private respondents), respondents. G.R. No. L-54598
April 15, 1988

Facts: An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West
Visayas College. They elected the late Violeta Delmo as the treasurer who, in such capacity,
extended loans from the funds of the club to some students of the school. The petitioner, as
President of the school, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the
membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the
school. Delmo appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools who, after
due investigation, rendered a decision that Violeta Delmo had acted in good faith in her capacity
as Club Treasurer in extending loans to the officers and members of the club, and that she be not
deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto. Petitioner
Ledesma received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case but returned
by mail, on the same day, all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public
Schools. The next day, the Petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering him to
furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter that he had
sent the decision back and had not retained a copy thereof. On the day of the graduation, the
petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any
honors due her, but the Petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded
the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude. On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her
parents in filing an action for damages against the petitioner. However, during the pendency of
the action, Delmo passed away, thus an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her
parents as her sole and only heirs. The trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner and in
favor of the spouses Delmo. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages
under Article 27 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: No. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but
proper.

Page 39 of 130
30. VAN DORN VS ROMILLO
Alice Van Reyes Van Dorn, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City, and
Richard Upton, respondents

Subject Matter:
Article 15 of the NCC – Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon all citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Br. CX .

SC Decision:
The Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Legal Doctrine:
Absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines if valid
under the national law of such an alien.

Facts:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, petitioner, is a citizen of the Philippines who married Richard Upton,
private respondent, a citizen of the United States, in Hong Kong. After their marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. They got divorced in
Nevada, United States where the petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van Dorn.

One year after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with the RTC, Branch CXV, in Pasay City
stating that Petitioner’s business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that Petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with the right to manage the conjugal property. He further
contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines as it is contrary to local law
and public policy, therefore he has legal standing to claim said property.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property.” The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court is valid and binding in the
Philippines, the same being contrary to law and public policy

Ruling:
No. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which dissolves the marriage.
Hence, he would have no standing to sue in the case as Petitioner’s husband. He is further

Page 40 of 130
estopped by his own representation before the foreign Court in the divorce proceedings from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Page 41 of 130
31. REPUBLIC VS ORBEDICO
Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, Vs. Cipriano Orbecido Iii, Respondent.

Subject Matter:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the NCC – Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Br. 23. (There is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
the SC is unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.)

SC Decision:
Accordingly, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

Legal Doctrine:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva on May 24, 1981 and they were
blessed with two children named Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kim berly V.
Orbecido. In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. Few years
later, he discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American Citizen. Sometime in 2000
he learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove
Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same.
The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that
is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according
to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not can remarry under Paragraph 2 Article 26 of the New Civil Code

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce

Page 42 of 130
decree. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted
and on record, the SC is unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

Page 43 of 130
32. YUCHENGCO VS MANILA CHRONICLE et al.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, petitioner, vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY
P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., respondents

Subject Matter:
Article 19 of the NCC – Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.

Nature of the Case:

MOTION for RECONSIDERATION and SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court

SC Decision:
The Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of this Court, dated November 25, 2009, is MODIFIED

Legal Doctrine:
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code sets standards
which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties;
to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.

Facts:
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993; several allegedly
defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by Chronicle
Publishing Corporation. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1114, under
three separate causes of action, namely: 1. for damages due to libelous publication against Neal
H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula,
Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila
Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; 2. for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto,
Jr., the Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; and, 3. for attorney’s fees
and costs against all the respondents.

On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner. Aggrieved,
respondents sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 18, 2008, the CA
rendered a Decision4 affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. Respondents then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration5 praying that the CA reconsider its earlier decision and reverse the decision
of the trial court. On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered an Amended Decision6 reversing the
earlier Decision.

Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before the Supreme Court.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner’s cause of action based on the abused of rights warrants
award for damages?

Ruling:
Yes. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Article 19 States that “Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,

Page 44 of 130
and observe honesty and good faith”. Moreover, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his
rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous articles in
the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20
which provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same." Therefore, cause of action based on the abused
of rights warrants award for damages.

Page 45 of 130
33. RIVERA VS CA and MIRAMBEL
ESMUNDO B. RIVERA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMY ROBLES, PEREGRINO MIRAMBEL and MERLINA MIRAMBEL, respondents.

Subject Matter:
Preponderance of evidence in a civil case.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in dismissing
the Regional Trial Court ruling on an ejectment case of the herein petitioner.

SC Decision:
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

Legal Doctrine:
A party who has the burden of proof must establish his cause of action by a
preponderance of evidence which means evidence of greater weight, or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it.

FACTS:
On July 19, 1990, petitioner filed complaints for ejectment from a parcel of land which the
former claims ownership against private respondents Amy Robles, Peregrino Mirambel, and
Merlinda Mirambel before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela.

On August 8, 1990, Jose Bayani A. Salcedo filed an urgent motion for intervention on the
ground that he has a legal interest in the subject for he applied for title of the public land, which
was denied on January 2, 1991.
Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Esmundo Rivera on the ground that a title on the
property has been issued to Rivera and ordered the herein respondents to vacate the land and
remove the house built on said land. Dissatisfied, the respondents filed an appeal before the
Regional Trial Court which reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court taking into
consideration that the land where the house of the respondents stand is outside of the area owned
by the petitioner.

Petitioner Esmundo appealed before the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for
failure of petitioner, as plaintiff before the trial court, to prove a cause of action. Also, the courts a
quo failed to make a definitive ruling on the issue of whether or not the houses constructed by the
private respondents are within the private land owned by the petioner or a public land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner who has the burden of proof was able to establish his cause
of action by preponderance of evidence.

RULING:
No. Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. By preponderance of evidence is meant simply
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it. In the present case, the petitioner has the burden of proving that the houses of private
respondents were located within his titled land. To justify a judgment in his favour, petitioner must
therefore establish a preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.

Page 46 of 130
 The aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to determine with
certainty whether the private respondents houses were inside the petitioners titled property.

When the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof fails upon the issue. Therefore, as
neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action and
prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate,
and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts
have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

Page 47 of 130
34. URBANO VS IAC
FILOMENO URBANO vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Nature of the case:

PETITION to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.

SC Decision:
Petition was GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide. Civil liability of the petitioner needs further development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.

Legal Doctrine:
Civil liability may still arise even though the accused in a criminal prosecution has been
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:
Filomeno Urbano, the accused, had a fight with the Marcelo Javier after he found out that
the reason why his palay that has been soaked was because of the latter. The victim has been
wounded on his right palm by the hacking of bolo by the accused. The parties were later on
reconciled by the authorities.

One day, the Javier went home from his farm and complained aches on his right palm
wound. He died of tetanus toxin on the following day. The accused was charged with the crime of
homicide and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim by the Circuit Court of Dagupan City,
and was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court.

However, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused because there is a doubt that the
hacking made by him is the proximate cause of the death of the victim. The court noted that it was
already 22 days since the hacking that is why the question of intervening cause was considered.
It is also reported that the deceased continued with his farming works which exposed his wound
to tetanus germs.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused in a criminal proceeding who is acquitted by reason that his
guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt be held liable for damages.

Ruling:
Yes, the accused can still be held liable for damages. According to the first paragraph of
Article 29 of the Civil Code, when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.

In this case, there is no question that the accused was the one inflicted the wound where
the tetanus made an entry. The accused, though he was acquitted, his civil liabilities are not
extinguished. The accused is still responsible for the injuries he caused. It is in the discretion of
the aggrieved party to file action for damages which requires only a preponderance of evidence
to proceed.

Therefore, the accused can still be held liable for damages.

Page 48 of 130
35. MANANTAN VS CA et al.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

Subject Matter:
Article 29 of NCC. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court in a criminal case, where the petitioner was acquitted by the trial court of
homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability.

SC Decision:
The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as its resolution, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.

Legal Doctrine:
The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”

There is double jeopardy when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

FACTS:
The accused George Manantan, being the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile,
was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin
and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction hit the driver side of
the car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured
while Nicolas died. Trial followed.

The accused was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence
without a ruling on his civil liability. The respondents-heirs filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the lower court’s judgment. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents-
heirs Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the
accident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner’s criminal liability extinguished his civil liability?

RULING:
No. The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Under Article
29 of the New Civil Code, a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the
accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by
preponderance of evidence.

Page 49 of 130
 Moreover, the claim of the petitioner that he was placed on double jeopardy when he was
ordered to pay civil damages to respondents-heirs, did not give merit according to the court. As
the SC ruled that in order the double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be present:
(1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

In the present case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal
Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal
became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by
private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case. Petitioner was not charged anew in
Civil Case with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show
that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower
court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the
filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense.

Therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

Page 50 of 130
36. PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, petitioner, vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

Subject Matter:
Article 36 of NCC. Prejudicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the
Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Nature of the Case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The Petition was denied and the Court of Appeals’ decision was AFFIRMED.

Legal Doctrine:
The civil action must be instituted first before the filing of criminal action.

Facts:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-
7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 holding that the pendency of
the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, the RTC Quezon
City denied the motion

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and
22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City. Where the Court of Appeals dismissed the said
petition in its 20 March 2006 Decision.

Issue:
WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner?

Ruling:

Page 51 of 130
 No. Because, Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
“Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.”

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was
raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the
Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on
14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005. Respondent’s petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed
on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

Page 52 of 130
37. TENEBRO VS CA

Subject Matter:
Requisites of a valid marriage based on the family code: Legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at
least two witnesses)

Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract
marriage.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for the review of the decision of the CA, confirming the decision of the RTC to
convict the petitioner of bigamy. The SC included in their decision, the requisites of valid marriage.

Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990,
until sometime on 1991, the petitioner informed Ancajas that she was previously married to Hilda
Villareyes, in which they were married on November 10, 1986.; On January 25, 1993, petitioner
yet contracted another marriage with Nilda Villeges even though none of the previous marriages
were legally dissolved.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is guilty of bigamy. Though the defense assail the validity of the
marriage contract of her subsistent marriage, the SC affirms that all the requisites of legal marriage
was present when the subsistent marriage was celebrated, and was not been dissolved at the
time the petitioner contracted a marriage to Leticia Ancajas.

Page 53 of 130
38. GRACE POE VS COMELEC
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansarez, petitioner, vs. COMELEC, et al., respondents.

Subject Matter:
Art. 15 of NCC. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Nature of the Case:

Two consolidated petitions with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing
the four (4) different COMELEC resolution for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the candidacy of the petitioner
for President in the National and Local Elections.

SC Decision:
The petition is GRANTED. The various Resolutions of the COMELEC are
hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and
Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

Doctrine:
A foundling is a natural-born citizen based on: a) Circumstantial evidence; b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of international law.

FACTS:
Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally
adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) and Jesus Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based
at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3, 2005. She then quitted her job in the US to
be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on May 24, 2005.

On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of
Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

On May 2016 elections, the petitioner filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for presidency
before the COMELEC and declared in her COC that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.

Thereafter, petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen
since she was a FOUNDLING and that her biological parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

Page 54 of 130
 ISSUE YES/NO HELD
Whether or not Grace Poe- YES a.) Based on circumstantial evidence which is
Llamanzares is a natural- admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules
born Filipino citizen? on Evidence. There is more than sufficient
evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. xxx. [T]here is
a high probability that her parents are Filipinos.
The Solicitor General offered official Statistics
from the Philippine Statistics office that from
1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the
Filipinos born in the country were more than 10
Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that
the child born in the Philippines would be a
Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than
ample probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality

of Poe’s parents are the fact that:

 She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic

Church in Iloilo
 She has typical Filipino features.

There are disputable presumptions that things

have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that
Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To assume
otherwise is to accept the absurd.

b.) Based on various legislations, Foundlings are

as a class, natural born citizens. The
amendment to the Constitution proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as
natural born citizens was not carried out, not
because there was any objection to the notion
that persons of unknown parentage are not
citizens, but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. There was no
intent or language that would permit
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support
the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the
adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. Recent legislation all expressly refer to

Page 55 of 130
 “Filipino children” and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.

c.) Based on Generally accepted principles of

international law, the common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the International Convent on Civil and Political
Rights obligates the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and to ensure that no child
is stateless. The principles stated in the: (a)
Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that
a foundling is presumed to have the nationality
of the country of birth). (b) Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found) bind the Philippines although we are
not signatory to these conventions. Poe’s
evidence shows that at least 60 countries in
Asia, North and South America and Europe
have passed legislation recognizing foundlings
as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept
that foundlings are recognized as citizens.
Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as
having been born and a national of the country
in which it is found.

Whether or not Poe satisfies YES Petitioner satisfied the 10-year residency because
the 10-year residency she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS
requirement? MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not
returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the
Philippines. Starting May 24, 2005, upon returning to
the Philippines, petitioner presented overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship
under RA 9225.

Therefore, the Supreme Court decision, with vote of 9-6, declaring the petitioner a natural-
born Filipino citizen and qualified her as a candidate for Presidency in the National and Local
Elections are just and proper.

Page 56 of 130
39. SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioner's live birth (birth certificate) showed his registered name is Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio and his sex as "male. He filed a petition to change the his name and gender on
his birth certificate from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. On January 27, 2001,
he completed his sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. Following his sexual re-assignment, he
now possesses the physique of a female. On June 4, 2003 The lower court granted the petition
of Silverio stating that the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition and that Office of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) did not file opposition after publication of the initial hearing of the case. On August 18,
2003, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, it alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23,
2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the his name "Rommel Jacinto" should be changed to MELY and gender
from "Male" to FEMALE on his birth certificate

RULING:

No, his name and gender on his birth certificate should not be changed. There is no legal
ground that allows change in name and gender due to sex reassignment. RA 9048 Section 4
only allows changes in name in the following situations: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The
change will avoid confusion. On his gender change, under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant. In this case, it is clear that
there is no factual error on the birth certificate of Silverio and no correction is needed.

Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and denied the
petition of Silverio

Page 57 of 130
40. REPUBLIC V JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan suffers from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), possessing
both male and female characteristics. She grew up with secondary male characteristics.

She filed before the RTC a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name
from Jennifer to Jeff and her gender from female to male.

The lower court ruled in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

Issue:
WON Cagandahan's gender in her birth certificate can be changed.

Ruling:
Yes. The SC considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The SC also held that
they give respect to the diversity of nature and how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. It added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion.

Therefore, Cagandahan's gender in her birth certificate can be changed from female to
male.

Page 58 of 130
41. TSOI VS CA and TSOI

Subject Matter:
Article 36 of FC- A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227).

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.

FACTS:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the respondent Gina Lao married the petitioner Chi Mong Tsoi
at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila. After the celebration of their wedding reception, they
proceeded to the house of the petitioner’s mother. Where they slept together on the same bed, in
the same room, for the first night of their married life. This is contrary to respondent’s expectations,
as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each
other. But the petitioner just went to bed, slept on one side, then turned his back and went to
sleep.

Additionally, in an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
each other during their first week of their marriage, they went to Baguio City. But the petitioner
invited some of their relatives to join them. Wherein, they stayed there for 4 days. But, during this
time, nothing happened to them, since the petitioner avoided the respondent by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.

Furthermore, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. The respondent even claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.

Consequently, the respondent petitioned to nullify their marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity of the petitioner and that he doesn’t consummate their marriage during
that span of time and that he is impotent and a closeted homosexual. This petition was affirmed
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and declared the marriage void.

On the other hand, the husband petitioned to reverse the decision of the nullification of their
marriage on the ground that psychological incapacity doesn’t apply to their marriage but perhaps
with another reason such as physical disorder in which the husband cannot give evidence. The
petitioner said that he doesn’t want to end their marriage because: (1) he loves her very much,
(2) he has no defect on his part and that he is physically and psychologically capable, and (3) the
relationship is very young and they can still reconcile their difference.

Also, the petitioner states that the respondent filed the previous case because of two
reasons: (1)the respondent afraid to be forced to return the pieces of jewelry to his mother, and
(2) that the petitioner will consummate their marriage.

Page 59 of 130
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not, the marriage of Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao- Tsoi should be annulled.

RULINGS:
Yes, the marriage of Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao- Tsoi should be annulled. As the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have a sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.

Accordingly, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage”. It is under Article 36 of the Family Code that states “...psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

Moreover, Article 68 of the Family Code provides that husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. And
it is the sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a function which enlivens
the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

In view of this, the decision of the Court of Appeals to nullify the marriage of Chi Ming Tsoi
and Gina Lao-Tsoi was affirmed because the unwillingness to consummate the marriage is a
serious personality disorder that constitute psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.

Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

Page 60 of 130
42. REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondents

Subject Matter:
Art. 36 of FC or E.O. 209. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Nature of the Case:

Solicitor General’s petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

SC Decision:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of CA and RTC are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity is the utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated, and
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. (Please see Specific
Guidelines in interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code)

FACTS
Respondent Roridel O. Molina, who is separated-in-fact for more than three years to
husband Reynaldo Molina, filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage in the
ground of psychological incapacity, alleging that, among others:

 After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a

husband and a father, preferring to spend more time with his friends and squandering his
money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with
Roridel in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
 Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; and
 Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served.

On the other hand, Reynaldo contended that their frequent quarrels were due to:

 Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage;
 Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
 Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Molina couple’s “opposing and conflicting personalities” equivalent to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

RULING

Page 61 of 130
 No. in Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that psychological
incapacity should refer to a mental, not physical, incapacity. The meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated, and must be characterized by: (a) Gravity, (b)
Juridical antecedence, and (c) Incurability.

In applying to this case, the psychological defect in the present case is not incapacity, but
more a "difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect" in the performance of marital obligations. "Irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
they must be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem, its juridical antecedence, or its incurability. The
expert testimony of pyschiatrist showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Reynaldo’s alleged personality traits were not constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.

Therefore, finding that there was no psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the part of the respondent-husband but more a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations, and that the evidence merely showed
that the parties could not get along with each other, the Supreme Court denial of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner-wife is sustained so the marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Specific Guidelines in interpretating and applying Article 36 of the Family Code (PROBE
PIG)

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

(a) Medically or clinically identified,

(b) Alleged in the complaint,
(c) Sufficiently proven by experts, and
(d) Clearly explained in the decision.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

4) The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

Page 62 of 130
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.

Page 63 of 130
43. KALAW VS FERNANDEZ
Valerio E. Kalaw, petitioner, vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, respondent

Subject Matter:
Article 36 of the Family Code – A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Nature of the Case:

Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court

SC Decision:
The Court grants the Motion for Reconsideration; Reverses and Sets Aside the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and Reinstates the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

Legal Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration
of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.

Facts:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. These experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. They opined that respondent’s
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity devoted to her
duties as a wife and mother, constitute psychological incapacity in the form of Narcissistic
Personality Disorder (NPD).

The Supreme Court, however, in its decision dated September 19, 2011, dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage for lack of merit, and affirmed the Court of
Appeals’ Decision in setting aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

The Petitioner, in his Motion for Reconsideration, implored the Court to take a second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported
by the testimonies of expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both
parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage was void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity

Ruling:
Yes. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this
case.

Page 64 of 130
The Court held that the guidelines set in the Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to
the fate of certain rejections. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
“less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be
on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the
matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis
by experts.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.”

Further, the frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited the
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant
should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at
the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong
sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral
fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. The fact that the respondent
brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental
duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was
a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her
own personal and escapist desires. The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to
safeguard and protect her children.

Page 65 of 130
44. ALMELOR VS RTC and ALMELOR
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, vs. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondent

Subject Matter:
Paragraph 3 of Article 45 of Family Code – That the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabitated with the other husband and wife

Nature of the Case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

SC Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

Legal Doctrine:
A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such
as concealment of homosexuality; It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality
per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party.

FACTS:
Manuel G. Almelor and Leonida Trinidad, medical practitioners, were married on January
29, 2989. Their union bore three (3) children. After eleven (11) years of marriage, his wife filed a
petition to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. His wife described him as a harsh disciplinarian, meticulous, easily
angered. She complained that this was in stark contrast to the lavish affection he has for his
mother. Also, according to her, Manuel concealed to her his homosexuality, she saw several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession, and saw him kissed another man.

Manuel admitted that they had some petty arguments. He, however maintained that their
marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment by Leonida was a
surprise to him. Manuel stated that the true cause of his wife’s hostility was their professional
rivalry. They have competing hospitals in the same vicinity. Manuel also denied maltreating their
children. He also defended his show of affection for his mother especially now that she’s in her
twilight years. Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship
because of her very jealous and possessive in nature. She also fabricated tales about
pornographic materials and about him kissing another man.

The RTC granted the petition for annulment by his wife declaring that the marriage was
null and void from the beginning, dissolving the regime of community property between the same
parties, awarding the legal custody of the children to his wife with visitorial right afforded to him,
and ordering him to give mothly financial support to their children. The RTC nullify the marriage
not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code.

Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due

course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA which was also
denied. The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary
remedy of petition for annulment of judgment, the remedy was an ordinary appeal.

Page 66 of 130
 Manuel filed a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring the marriage null and void by reason of
homosexuality on the part of the husband.

RULING:
No. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their
marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without
the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it
against his sexuality. The law is clear a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality

Page 67 of 130
45. ANTONIO VS REYES
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.

Subject Matter:
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."

Nature of the Case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code,
is REINSTATED

Legal Doctrine:
Jurisprudence has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.

The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our
body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution
of a marriage

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married and their
child was born in April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later. Two (2) years after, petitioner
filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition
for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

The respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante
Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. The
petitioner separated from respondent in August 1991. Nevertheless, the petitioner eventually tried
to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991

The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on
the part of the parties. However, Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.

Issue:

Page 68 of 130
 Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void on the ground of
Psychological Incapacity.

Ruling:
Yes. Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.". It should be considered that the respondent had consistently lied
about many material aspects as to her character and personality and experts, such as psychiatrist
and psychologist examined the parties, stated that based on the test they have conducted the
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to the petitioner is abnormal or pathological. Therefore,
the marriage should be deemed null and void on the ground of Psychological Incapacity.

Page 69 of 130
46. VILLANUEVA VS CA and VILLANUEVA
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Subject Matter:
Art. 45 of FC. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards,
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious
and appears to be incurable.

Nature of the Case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92
dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is
AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan. But on November 17, 1992, the petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for annulment
of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying the private
respondent, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that
he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4

On the contrary, the private respondent argued that the petitioner freely and voluntarily
married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage;
that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent

Page 70 of 130
visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended
in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

In view of this, the decision of the trial court on January 12, 1996, rendered the dismissal
of the case and ordering the petitioner to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount
of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and
the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages
to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. It also denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner raised an instant petition for review of the decision based
on the errors that (1) there is a grave abuse of discretion in not granting the annulment of marriage,
having said that the consent of the petitioner has been obtained by fraud, intimidation and undue
and improper pressure and influence plus the fact that there was no cohabitation whatsoever
between petitioner and private respondent; and (2) the awarded moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorneys fee was unjust and not being allowed by the law.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not, the marriage of Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva should be
annulled on the ground of vitiated consent. Also, whether the petitioner should be liable for moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

RULINGS:
The petition is partly granted. Dismissing the petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his
marriage with private respondent and deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages for
lack of basis.

Accordingly, the petition to nullify the marriage of Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-
Villanueva was dismissed, on the grounds that the court was not convinced on the appellant
apprehension of danger having said that the petitioner worked as a security in a bank and even
more doubtful that he never sought assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the
police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And as for the lack of
cohabitation, it is not a ground of marriage nullification (As stated in Article 45 of the Family Code).
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate
the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. And it becomes relevant only when it arises from the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage.

As to the moral and exemplary damages, both were deleted because of the lack of legal
basis of the former which requires a proof of moral suffering from the respondent for it to be
granted. Stating that “Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof”. While the latter is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral
damages.

Therefore, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Dismissing petitioner’s petition for the
annulment of his marriage with private respondent and award of moral and exemplary damages
is DELETED for lack of basis.

Page 71 of 130
47. FUJIKI VS MARINAY
Minoru Fujiki, petitioner v Maria Paz Galela Marinay et al., respondents

Facts:
Fujiki is a Japanese who married Marinay in the Philippines on 2004. Fujiki's parents were
against the marriage so Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan. Eventually they lost contact with
each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. They were married on May 2008 in the
Phils. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan, but Marinay allegedly suffered physcal abuses from
Maekara. She left Maekara and contacted Fujiki, and they reestablished their relationship.

In 2010 Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

In 2011 Fujiki filed a petition in RTC praying that the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized, and that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Arts. 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code.

RTC dismissed the petition, citing provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).

Issue:
WON the foreign judgment on the marriage of Marinay and Maekara declaring it void
recognizable in the Philippines.

Ruling:
Yes. According to Art. 15 of the Civil Code, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. Also, under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning.

In this case, the Philippine courts recognize the judgment of Japanese court declaring
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void.

Therefore, the declaration of marriage between Marinay and Maekara to be void is

recognized in the Philippine courts, and marriage between them is void from the beginning.

Page 72 of 130
48. REPUBLIC VS TANEDO MANALO

Subject Matter:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of FC. xxx Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the Japanese law on divorce.

Legal Doctrine:
Article 26 of the Family Code on Declaration of Nullity of Marriage applies even if it was
the Filipino spouse who filed for divorce against the foreign spouse because the decree obtained
makes the foreigner no longer married to the Filipino, enabling the foreigner to remarry. Thus, a
foreign divorce secured by a Filipino spouse (NOT THE ALIEN SPOUSE) is also considered valid
in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad.

Facts:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a
Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The petition alleged, among others, that: (a) Petitioner is
previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshido Minoro; and (b)
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce
decree was rendered by the Japanese Court.

RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country
or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage
in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and
duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. In accordance with Navarro, et al. vs. Exec. Secretary, et al., the SC
ruled that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as
still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate

Page 73 of 130
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Hence, the present
petition to Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity
to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code?

Ruling:
Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s
national law.

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based
merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Page 74 of 130
49. ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

Facts:
1. The appellants brutally demolished the stall of Antonio Vergara and his Family
2. ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA was found guilty of grave coercion by the RTC of Camarines Norte and
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of
P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to
pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
3. Appellant file an appeal to the Court of Appeals and the CA acquitted them for the criminal
liability but require them to pay the damages to the Vergara’s.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred maintaining the civil liability of the appellants
when they acquitted them on the criminal act.

Held:
The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the CA that the civil liability will not be
extinguished when the criminal liability is already gone.

Page 75 of 130
50. PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

Facts
 Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted but pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court in dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment
with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
 The Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of Bayotas did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil
liability is based.
 Counsel for Bayotas, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of
the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal
and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court
of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished
if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE HELD RATIO

Whether the civil Yes Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes the criminal
liability persists and liability but it is silent on civil liability however based Article 72
should the court still and 78, final judgement is required for the civil action. This was
rule on the appeal. the basis for the Castillo case. In Torrijos, civil liability continues
if there are other sources of obligation other than delict
(obligations, contracts…) like in Estafa cases. However in
Sendaydiego, the civil liability case continued for malversation of
public funds to pursue the money claims based on Article 30 of
the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil

liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.

In revisiting Sendaydiego, Article only talks about having a

separate civil action and using the evidence in the criminal case.
But since criminal liability is already extinguished the there is no
preponderance of evidence to speak of.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to
serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of
his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:

Page 76 of 130
 "When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). The
implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.

Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil

actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter
category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the
offender. . . .

Decision
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Notes
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

Page 77 of 130
51. ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL
SINGSON, G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

Facts:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports
about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," During these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs
were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,
they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures
and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions
and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, which the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a
resolution granting the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, a motion to set aside the order dismissing
the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs which was
denied by the court in its resolution of September 21, 1984. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court's resolution of
November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984.

Issue:
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution?

Ruling:
No. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are
excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. The
right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended
Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises
from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the
same must be brought within one (1) year.

Page 78 of 130
52. YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of
Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents. G.R. No. 91856

Facts:
On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk
of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by
Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado. Salvado was charged with the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries at the City Court of Manila.
A separate complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father,
David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering defendants to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiff for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills;
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The defendants filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case. In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was
denied on January 30, 1990.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil action brought before
it?

Ruling:
Yes. Even though the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply
retrospectively to the present case. Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute
the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation. In this case, the civil action was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was
duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.
The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a
quasi delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The
purpose of rule on “express reservation” is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages
twice for the same act or omission.

Page 79 of 130
53. MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.
JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati
City, respondents.

Facts:
This petition for review, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999
issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139.
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973, after
twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix, subsequently filed
a criminal complaint for concubinage, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
61. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, petitioner filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued
that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the
foregoing motion in the Order dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998. In view of the
denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August
31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. In an Order dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated
February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against the
petitioner?

Ruling:
No. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity
of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to
be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. Art. 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.

Page 80 of 130
54. CONTINENTAL VS MONTANO ET AL.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation, petitioner, vs. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montaño And Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity Of Unions In The Philippines For Empowerment And Reforms (NMCSC-SUPER), respondents.

Subject Matter:
Art. 40, Chap 2 of NCC - Natural Persons. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of
less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb.
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Resolution of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

SC Decision:
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming
the Resolution of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando
P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED.

Doctrine:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. In case of doubt in the
interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.

FACTS
Rolando P. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy and thereupon, filed a claim from his employer-petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental) based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant
to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Labour
Union. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims
for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

Hortillano, through the Labor Union, sought the reversal of the denial and contended that:

 the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

On the other hand, petitioner posited that:

 the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the

Page 81 of 130
 entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent,
none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one
with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code.

 the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could
not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Montaño chosen by the parties mutually to resolve
the said issue, argued that:

 the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she
was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have
existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE YES/NO HELD

Whether or not only one NO The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and
with civil personality can 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
die? misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42
plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this
case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not
provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may
be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already
has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.

Whether or not a fetus YES Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
can be considered as a Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38 weeks of its
legitimate dependent? gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not
provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that
the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality. Without such qualification, then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

Page 82 of 130
 Whether or not any YES Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in
ambiguity in CBA enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of
provisions shall be any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
settled in favor of the interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA
employee? (NOT and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of
UNDER THE labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning
SUBJECT MATTER) the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy. Bereavement leave
and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved
one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense
of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who,
in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in granting Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement

leave pay and other death benefits grounded on the death of his unborn child are just, proper and
valid.

Page 83 of 130
55. FLOOD VICTIMS and HERNANDEZ et al. VS COMELEC et al.
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., and WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, respondents.

Subject Matter:
Article 44 of the NCC – The following are juridical persons:(1) The State and its political
subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created
by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; and, (3)
Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants
a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member

Nature of the Case:

A special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus asserting that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Minutes Resolution No. 12-0859 with prayer for
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC the said minutes

SC Decision:
The petition was DISMISSED since petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue and have
no standing to file the present petition.

Legal Doctrine:
Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action.

Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and/or Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Minute Resolution No. 12-0859 dated 2 October 2012 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). The COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, among others, (1)
confirmed the re-computation of the allocation of seats of the Party-List System of Representation
in the House of Representatives in the 10 May 2010 automated national and local elections, (2)
proclaimed Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay-Buhay) Party-List as a
winning party-list group in the 10 May 2010 elections, and (3) declared the first nominee [Weslie
T. Gatchalian] of Alay Buhay Party-List as its Party-List Representative in the House of
Representatives

On 28 August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC Resolution SPP 10-013
cancelling the certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List
which won in the party-list elections in the 2010 national elections which resulted in the re-
computation of the party-list allocations in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC then
issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, proclaimed ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
FOUNDATION, INC as a winning party-list group.

On 25 October 2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar

Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No.
12-0859.

In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims "is a non-profit and
non-partisan organization in the process of formal incorporation, the primary purpose of which is
for the benefit of the common or general interest of many flood victims who are so numerous that

Page 84 of 130
it is impracticable to join all as parties," and that petitioner Hernandez "is a Tax Payer and the
Lead Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims."

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are authorized to be a party in a civil action.

Ruling:
No, petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action. Article 44 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons which
provides that “The following are juridical persons:(1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2)
Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; and, (3) Corporations,
partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member”. Petitioner
Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association not endowed with a distinct
personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no
juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the association. Since petitioner
Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner Hernandez.

Page 85 of 130
56. and 57. MAMMALS VS SEC. REYES
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. Secretary Reyes

Subject Matter:
Article 37 of NCC. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Article 40 Of NCC. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified
'in the following article.

Article 44 Of NCC. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.

Nature of the Case:

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and
Injunction.

SC Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service
Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic
Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

Facts:
The human petitioners for the Resident Marine Mammals(comprised of toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait) implead themselves in
a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser asserting their right to enforce
international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui. As they want to create substantive and procedural rights for animals
through their claim that they can speak for them.

Moreover, they assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected
residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the
government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust. It is to
the issue of the activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46), which is an exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in the Tañon Strait with Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), that directly affected the residents source of livelihood, primarily
felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest, as well as the resident mammals in the
affected ecology.
Furthermore, the petitioners also question the illegality of the SC-46 as it violates the
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and
Presidential Decree No. 1234 in which declared Tanon Strait as a protected seascape. Also, its
unconstitutionality as it violates fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Issue(s):

Page 86 of 130
 Whether or not, the petitioners have a legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised
in their pleading regarding the SC-46.

Rulings:
Yes, the petitioners have a legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their
pleading regarding the SC-46.

Accordingly, the rules on standing have already been liberalized to take into consideration
the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. It is not the issue of whether animals by
themselves have legal standing before courts in congruence in the article 37, 40 and 40 about
juridical capacity. And regardless of it, the human petitioners have the power to speak for
themselves and already have legal standing to sue with respect to the environmental issue raised
in their pleading.

Furthermore, the principle of human stewardship over the environment has been
emphasized in a citizen suit under the Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases that allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights
under environmental laws before Philippine courts.

In the light of this matter, it is stated that the petitioner have standing both as real parties in
interest and as representative as their rights were similarly affected and the actual, direct, and
material damage they suffered, will have a potential long-term effects transcending generations
of which is a proper subject in raising a legal suit.

Therefore, the petitioners have a legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in
their pleading regarding the SC-46.

Page 87 of 130
58. EFREN PANA vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. And JOSE JUANITE, JR.

Subject Matter:
Payment of criminal indemnities imposed on the convicted spouse out of the partnership
assets

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals

SC Decision:
The Court affirms with modification the resolutions of the CA. The RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 30 shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of
spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment
on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Legal Doctrine:
Article 121 of the Family Code allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on the
convicted spouse out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.

FACTS:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and others of murder
before the RTC of Surigao City which rendered a decision acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced
them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each heirs of the victims
for civil indemnity and moral and actual damages. On appeal to the Supreme Court, penalty was
modified to reclusion perpetua and deleted the award for actual damages, but made an award for
temperate and exemplary damages per victim. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia that prompted them to file a motion to quash the writ
of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. Efren filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which also
dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Thus this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia's civil liability in the murder case.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia's civil liability in the murder case.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Melecia may be
enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered. Contrary to Efren's contention, Article 121 allows payment of
the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair
since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such (offending) spouse
shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

Wherefore, the Court affirms with modification the resolutions of the CA.

Page 88 of 130
59. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. G.R.
No. 201061 July 3, 2013

Subject matter:
Void marriage, property relations

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
Resolution of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Legal Doctrine:
Article 35. Marriages solemnized without a license are void.
Article 148. Property relations of cohabiting parties without the benefit of marriage.

FACTS:
Benjamin is married to Azucena since 1973, and has 3 children. In 1979 Benjamin
developed a romantic relationship with Sally. They lived together as husband and wife though
Sally’s father was against it. In 1982, to appease her father, Sally and Benjamin signed a purported
marriage contract.

Benjamin and Sally’s relationship ended in 1994. She filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin. Benjamin in turn filed a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and asked the trial court for the partition of properties he acquired with
Sally. A total of 44 properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court.

The trial court ruled in Benjamin’s favor: that his marriage with Sally was not registered,
and that it was not bigamous. Regarding partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim
the 37 properties for she was not married to Benjamin. The 37 properties were also owned by
Benjamin’s parents who gave them to Benjamin and his siblings.

Sally appealed before the Court of Appeals, which partly granted the appeal. CA sustained
the trial court’s ruling that the marriage was void ab initio and non-existent. It also sustained the
trial court’s decision in excluding the 37 properties claimed by Sally.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is void for absence of marriage
license.
(2) Whether Article 148 of the Family Code should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property
relationship.
(3) Whether the marriage was bigamous.

RULING:
(1) Yes. The marriage was void ab initio and at the same time, non-existent. Under
paragraph 3 of Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34, shall be void ab initio. In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was without license. It was found that no marriage license was issued to them, and that
their purported marriage license did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registry of Pasig in February 1982.

Page 89 of 130
 (2) Yes. Their property relations should be governed by Article 148, which states that in
cohabitation not falling under Article 147, “only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

In this case, Benjamin and Sally cohabited without marriage. Thus only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. The 37 properties Sally claimed were given by
Benjamin’s father to Benjamin and his siblings. Regarding the seven properties, only property
TCT No. 61722 was registered in Benjamin and Sally’s names as spouses. Properties TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 were in Benjamin’s name married to Sally; “married to Sally” was merely a
descriptive title, not a proof of co-ownership. Properties CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were in Sally’s
name married to Benjamin. Properties TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual.

Therefore, TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 belong to Benjamin; TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681, and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 to Sally; while TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by both
parties in common and to be shared equally, but Benjamin’s share should accrue to his conjugal
partnership with Azucena.

(3) No, the marriage was not bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states that, “The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.”

In this case, there was no subsequent marriage because Benjamin and Sally merely
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded in the local civil registrar. Thus, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not existent.

Page 90 of 130
60. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by
GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents. G.R. No. 171914
July 23, 2014

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
____________

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in
____________________________________________________________________________
______________.

S.C. Decision:
The Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by C.A.

Legal Doctrine:
In the absence of the marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

FACTS:
Soledad Lavadia, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna appealed the decision
of the Court of Appeals which denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share in a condominium
unit and the law books acquired during their marriage.

Atty. Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna were married on September 10, 1947.
They begot seven children. But after two decades, they eventually agreed to live separately from
each other in February of 1966 and agreed to the separation of property to which they entered
into a written agreement entitled “Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement” dated
November 12, 1975. They agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property. On January 12, 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce of his marriage with
Eugenia from the Court of First Instance in Sto. Domingo, Domican Republic. At the very same
day, he married Soledad Lavadia. In 1978, Atty. Luna’s law firm LUPSICON acquired a
condominium unit which was intended to be their office. The property was registered in the names
of the partners in which he named Soledad as his wife. He died on July 12, 1997.

The petitioner claims that since they have no children, she became the co-owner of the
properties as those were acquired during the existence of their marriage. She further pointed out
that she contributed in the purchase of the said condominium and that the law books were paid
for solely out of her personal funds.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that, (a) the condominium unit property have been acquired
by Atty. Luna through his sole industry, (b) that the petitioner has no right as owner or under any
other concept over the condominium unit, and (c) the petitioner is the owner of the law books
found in the property.

The Court of Appeals modified the ruling of the lower court as regards to the ownership of
the books, declaring the heirs of Atty. Luna in his first marriage the owner of the books.

ISSUE:

Page 91 of 130
 WON the petitioner is entitled to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
and the law books.

RULING:
No. According to Article 148 of the Family Code, “In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article (capacitated to marry each other, living as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage), only the properties by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article (the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children).”

In this case, since the divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino
spouse is not recognized under the Philippine laws, which renders the second marriage void from
the beginning for being a bigamous marriage. The only properties subject for distribution are the
properties acquired through actual joint contributions. The petitioner failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to purchase the properties.
But more importantly, the second paragraph of the above quoted provision, clearly forfeited
Lavadia’s claim to the properties because she is not validly married to Atty. Luna.

Therefore, it is only proper that children of Atty. Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna was declared as the sole owners of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit and the law books, and not Soledad Lavadia.

Page 92 of 130
61. DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Nature of the case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

SC Decision:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Legal Doctrine:
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family
Code

FACTS:
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. Upon
learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24
June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The court awarded all the properties
in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for
judicial separation of conjugal properties. Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for
judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code.

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered its judgment. The absolute community of property of the
parties was declared DISSOLVED and proceed to the distribution of properties. However, the
Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover, with respect to the common children’s presumptive
legitimes, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
₱520,000.00.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the properties situated in
California.
Whether or not the trial court erred in proceeding directly in liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime instead of granting the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property.
Whether or not the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property is proper.

RULING:
NO. Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
limited to the Philippine properties.

YES. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter

Page 93 of 130
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married
in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. As a general rule,
any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage.
An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers
only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.

YES. Under Article 135 of the Family Code, separation in fact for one year as a ground to
grant a judicial separation of property. It was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the
trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately
since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second,
Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who
represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where
David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David
in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it
was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had
actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community
of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family
Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134
to 138.

Page 94 of 130
62. ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY
PERLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Review on Certiorari

SC Decision:
Petition is granted.

Legal Doctrine:
Proof of Paternity and Filiation

FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring filed a Complaint for support on the ground of illegitimate
filiation against petitioner Antonio Perla, who she claimed as the father of her son, respondent
Randy Perla. She alleged that she and Antonio cohabited for 2 years and she became pregnant
and gave birth to Randy on November 11, 1983, but Antonio abandoned them when the latter
landed a job as a seaman. To support her claim, she presented the Randy’s birth certificate and
baptismal certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents, signed only by Mirasol and without
signature of Antonio.

Petitioner denied said cohabitation or any relationship with Mirasol, and likewise having
fathered Randy. He also denied his participation in the preparation of the birth certificate.
Respondent Randy also testified and claimed that he knew Randy to be his mother’s husband
and his father. He met him in 1994 and that he called him ‘Papa’ and kissed his hand while Antonio
hugged him. The latter promised him support and treated him like a family.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Mirasol, thus, this appeal before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the paternity or filiation of Randy to petitioner Antonio was clearly
established to warrant support to the former.

RULING:
No. For Randy to be entitled for support, his paternity or filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty and by clear and convincing evidence. Respondents failed to do so.

The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code,
which states:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

Page 95 of 130
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

In the case at bar, said Certificate of Live Birth has no probative value to establish Randy’s
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. 60It is settled that "a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there
is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.” The several
unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth
certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation.

The meeting of Randy and Antonio cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172(1). There must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity, and it must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist.

Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the
preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.
Baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

Therefore, the petition is proper.

Page 96 of 130
63. ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ,
Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent. G.R. No. 171713
December 17, 2007

Subject Matter:
Article 167 the New Civil Code. The children shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Nature of the Case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The instant petition was denied for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED.

Legal Doctrine:
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy, a
presumption which not only flows out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.

FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne
Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court
formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong
with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio
died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration
with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that
"DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute."

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.

RULING:
Yes. DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio. According the New Rules
on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material
originating from the person's body, i.e., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even
inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing

In applying to this case, DNA Testing can satisfactorily establish proof of filiation or
paternity because it examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent.

Therefore, DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio

Page 97 of 130
64. ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his
mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch
48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondent G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Nature of the case:

Establishing filiation of legitimate children

SC Decision:
The SC dismissed the petition and affirm the decision of the CA.

Legal Doctrine:
Article 172 of the family code

FACTS:
1. On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.
2. Respondent file a motion to have DNA testing to establish paternity and to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, the respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She
was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where
she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the
test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
3. Petitioner opposed the motion.
4. RTC granted the petition of the respondent and directed the petitioner and the respondent to
undergo DNA testing.
5. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that
under the present circumstances, the DNA test would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional. In an Order dated 8 June
2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
6. On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari. On 29
November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the
questioned Orders of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.

RULING:
Yes. DNA analysis is a valid tool to determine filiation. However, in assessing the probative
value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and

Page 98 of 130
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

Page 99 of 130
65. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA
R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners, vs.
DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO
ANTENOR, Respondents. G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010

Subject Matter
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.

Nature of The Case

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision
The Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals was denied.

Legal Doctrine:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

FACTS
The E.M Ramos Electric, Inc., is a company owned by the petitioner. Sometime in year
2005 the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondent and directed the petitioner to pay the
respondents representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay. The property that was subjected for the payment was the property of Petitioner situated
in Pandacan Manila (Pandacan Property). But the issue was raised by the petitioner alleging that
the Pandacan property cannot be subjected of levy, as this property is a Family home.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not, the levying of property in Ramos’ name covered by TCT No. 38978,
situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property) is valid.

RULING
Yes, the levying of the Pandacan property is valid. Accordingly, Article 153 of the FCC
says that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence … ad this said article cannot be applied retroactively.

In this case, the said property is deemed to be constituted prior to the effectively of the
family code. Thus it is necessary that the petitioner should constitute such as a family home either
judicially or extrajudicially. In which he failed to do so, making the Pandacan property not a Family
Home. Plus, the fact that this property address was used as their business address.

Therefore, the levying of the Pandacan property is valid.

Page 100 of 130

66. SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. And MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF
FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondents. 663
SCRA 40, January 16, 2012

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
_____________

Nature of the case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The petition is DENIED

Legal Doctrine:
A family residence that was neither judicially nor extrajudicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code became a family home by operation of
law when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, and was thus prospectively exempt from
execution

FACTS:
The petitioners jointly purchased a parcel of land on April 17, 1984 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M), while they were still merely cohabiting before their
marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter
occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.

Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio)
in the amount of ₱100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. On
March 15, 1993, after Aracelis failure to comply with her obligation to Claudio, a writ of execution
was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte (Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject
property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the
highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him. Consequently, on
March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale4 over the subject property was issued to Claudio and on
April 4, 1995, the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M)
and issued TCT No. T-221755 (M)5 in his favor.

The petitioners filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. They also contend that
the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and,
thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is a family home and may be exempt from execution
in this case.

RULING:
Yes, the subject property is a family home and may be exempt from execution. The
foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could
be summarized as follows:

Page 101 of 130

 First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a

family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled
to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the
subject property was a family home.

However, the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home
and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. The petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied upon and the public sale to
proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of
Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued
under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction
sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from
execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right,
it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and
it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

Page 102 of 130

67. PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Second Division

Subject Matter:
Beneficiaries of a family home enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code; Requisites
to be a beneficiary of the family home.

Nature of the Case:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the complaint for
partition of filed by the petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.

SC Decision:
The Petition is granted; with the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80680 dated December 9, 2005, reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the Regional
Trial Court who is directed to conduct a partition of the subject property, as well as the
improvements that lie therein.

Legal Doctrine:
An action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of
co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition if the properties in
the same action.

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G.
Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary
is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper when a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.

RULING:
No. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: 1) they be among
the relationships enumerated in Art 154 of the Family Code; 2) they live in the family home; and
3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. In the case at bar, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the grandson of the petitioner and son of the respondent only satisfied
requisites 1 and 2 since he is in the care and support of his parents, especially his father. Thus,
he cannot be considered as a beneficiary contemplated in Art 145 because he did not fulfill the
third requisite of being a dependent on his grandmother for support.

Page 103 of 130

68. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Nature of the case:

______________________________________________________________________
______________

Legal Doctrine:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

SC Decision:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie’s mother was Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and surname. Now that petitioner is a widower and qualified
to be her adopting parent, he prayed that Stephanie’s middle name “Astorga”, be changed to
“Garcia”, her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia”, be changed to “Catindig”, his
surname.

The trial court granted the adoption and that the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG. Petitioner filed a motion for clarification/reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA), as her middle
name.

RTC denied the motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted
child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name?

HELD:
The OSG agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle
name, the surname of her natural mother arguing that (1) it is necessary to preserve and maintain
Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother as she remains to be an intestate heir; (2) there is no
law expressly prohibiting her to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name; and
(3) it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother.

SC finds merit in the petition.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The surname identifies the family to which the child belongs and is fixed by law.

Page 104 of 130

And as correctly submitted by both parties, there is not law regulating the use of a middle name.
Law is notably likewise silent as to what the middle name an adoptee may use. The law only
provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters”.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

In order to avoid an injustice, in case of doubt in the interpretation of the law, it is necessary
to tip the scales in favor of right and justice. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
the court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Page 105 of 130

69. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164948,
June 27, 2006

Subject Matter:
Adoption

Nature of The Case:

Review on certiorari

SC Decision:
Petition DENIED

Legal Doctrine:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen who lives in Guam petitioned to adopt the 3 minor
children of her deceased brother. She works as a part-time server and had adult children who do
not need her financial support. The mother of the minor children went to Italy and had another
family.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Landingin is entitled to adopt the minor children.

RULING:
No, she is not entitled to adopt the minors. According to Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

In this case, Landingin failed to present the written consent of the mother. The court also
asserted that although she has adult children who does not need financial support, her job as a
part-time server cannot support 3 minor child.

Therefore, Landingin is not entitled to adopt the minor children.

Page 106 of 130

70. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and
SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, vs RP, G.R.
No. 117209. February 9, 1996

Subject Matter:
Adoption | Names | Actions | Evidence | Change of Name | Civil Register | Actions | Joinder
of Actions | Pleadings and Practice | Words and Phrases | Adoption | Baptism | Parent and Child

Case Nature:
PETITION for certiorari to review a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br.
158.

SC Decision:
The assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of
private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless
a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is
AFFIRMED.

Legal Doctrine:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

FACTS
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their
qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by
reason of which the adoption of the aforementioned minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition,
and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993
when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.3

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change
of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner
reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption

RULING:
The decision of the lower court is modified. Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter
of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surnameto follow that of the adopter which is the natural
and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order
of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also
known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in

Page 107 of 130

the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer
therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

Page 108 of 130

71. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA. LUIS
E. SANTOS, JR. And EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, vs. RP, G.R. No. L-22523 September 29,
1967

Subject Matter:
Adoption among relatives, by blood or by affinity, is not expressly prohibited by law.

Nature of the Case:

An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court dismissing the
petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the
minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.

SC Decision:
The decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the subject
minor, GRANTED.

Legal Doctrine:

Chapter V of the Civil Code – Adoption:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children
by legal fiction;
(2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, before the final approval of his accounts;
(3) A married person, without the consent of the other spouse;
(4) Non-resident aliens;
(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations;
(6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, when the penalty
imposed was six months' imprisonment or more.
Art. 338. The following may be adopted:

(1) The natural child, by the natural father or mother;

(2) Other illegitimate children, by the father or mother;
(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.

Art. 339. The following cannot be adopted:

(1) A married person, without the written consent of the other spouse;
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic
relations;
(3) A person who has already been adopted.

FACTS:
The petitioner-spouses Luis E. Santos, Jr. And Edipola V. Santos, appealed the decision
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court before the Supreme Court praying that the minor
Edwin Villa Y Mendoza, four (4) years old, be declared their son by adoption. The petitioners are
both 32 years of age, Filipinos, married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their
own. They do not have a child of their own blood, nor has any one of them been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude. The petitioner-husband is a lawyer, with business interests in a
textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry

Page 109 of 130

Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by
profession.

Edwin Villa y Mendoza is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the
common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola V. Santos and the minor. The parents of the child
testified that they entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up, resulting to a
deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have
voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their
written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal
consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not adoption among relatives, by blood or affinity in general and in this case,
adoption by the elder sister to her younger brother, are prohibited by law?

RULING:
No, adoption among relatives, by blood or affinity in general and in this case, adoption by
the elder sister to her younger brother are not prohibited by law. Citing Article 335 of the Civil
Code which enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and Article 339 of the same code
which provides names for those who cannot be adopted.

In this case, it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those
prohibited by Article 335 from adopting. Likewise, the minor child whose adoption is under
consideration, is not one of those excluded by the Article 339. Further, Article 338 allows the
adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their
father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This Article 338 is, of course,
necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there
already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature.

To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related
to each other, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes,
being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate
children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who
can properly rear and educate them

Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in setting aside the decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and granting the petition is proper and valid.

Page 110 of 130

72. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM

Subject Matter:
Petition for Adoption

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the RTC

SC Decision:
Petition is denied. RTC decision is affirmed. Costs against petitioner

Legal Doctrine:
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code

FACTS:
Monina P. Lim (petitioner) and her husband, Primo Lim, were childless. Minor children,
whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. The spouses
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children's parents. They reared and
cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, Primo Lim died, and petitioner
married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, petitioner filed separate petitions before the RTC for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
who were already emancipated at the time of the filing of the petitions. Michelle and Michael gave
their consent to the adoption. Petitioner's husband likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for
the adoption of Michelle and Michael. The RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied. Hence, the present
petition.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

RULING:
No, the petitioner, who has remarried, cannot singly adopt.

Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 is clear. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only
by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the RTC was correct in denying petitions
for adoption on this ground. Neither does the petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. Also, the fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. None
of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

Wherefore, the Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the RTC with costs
against petitioner.

Page 111 of 130

73. RP vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY
HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993

Subject matter:
Adoption

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
Petition is granted and RTC decision is reversed and set aside.

Legal doctrine:
Article 184. An alien cannot adopt (with exceptions).
Article 185. Spouses must jointly adopt (with exceptions).

FACTS:
James Hughes, natural-born citizen of USA, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino
who was later naturalized as an American citizen. They filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court to adopt Lenita’s minor niece and two minor nephews.

RTC granted the petition. A petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme
Court assailing the RTC decision, contending that spouses Hughes cannot adopt because they
are not qualified to do so under Philippine law.

ISSUE:
WON spouses James and Lenita Hughes can adopt Lenita’s minor niece and nephews
under Philippine law.

RULING:
No. The spouses Hughes cannot adopt. James Hughes is not qualified to adopt under
Article 184 of the Family Code, which states that aliens cannot adopt. He also did not fall under
the exceptions thereto, paragraph 3 of which reads, “(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his
or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.”

Lenita is qualified to adopt under paragraph 3(a) of Article 184; however, Article 185 states
that “Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse
seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other.”

In this case, since James is an alien, he cannot adopt under Article 184, not falling under
any of its exceptions. Lenita, an alien as well and a former Filipino, may fall under the exception
in paragraph 3(a), but since Article 185 requires husband and wife to jointly adopt, and the parties
not falling under any of the exceptions in Article 185, the spouses cannot adopt Lenita’s minor
nieces and nephews under Philippine law.

Page 112 of 130

74. LAHOM VS. SIBULOG.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
_____________

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br.
20.

SC Decision:
Judgment of the court a quo in
________________________________________________ is AFFIRMED.

Legal Doctrine:
Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child not only in his
new family but also in the society as well; The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind
the adoption decree and gave the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
the adoption.

FACTS:
Mrs. Lahom filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption against her adopted son,
Jose Melvin. On May 5, 1972, the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom legally
adopted the latter’s minor nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo. The Civil Registrar of Naga City changed
the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom”.

In December of 1999, the petitioner commenced the said petition, stating that the
respondent refused to use their surname, that he remained indifferent and would only come to
Naga once a year, that he remained callous and utterly indifferent towards the petitioner which is
not expected of a son, and that his only motive is his rights over the properties of the herein
petitioner and her late husband. She insisted that her right under the Family Code to rescind
should be respected.

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the trail court had
no jurisdiction over the case and that there is no cause of action in view of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8552, also known as Domestic Adoption Act. The new law deleted the right of
the adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. The lower court held that R.A. No. 8552 confers
jurisdiction to the court over the case, and dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can rescind the decree of adoption of her adopted son.

RULING:
No. According to Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552, “Sec. 19. Grounds for
Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if
a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a)
repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

Page 113 of 130

 "Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919
of the Civil Code."

In this case, R.A. No. 8552 shall be applied as it took effect before the filing of the petition.
Actually, even if the provisions of the Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family
Code were to be used, the petition will not push through because the filing was done after five
years from the discovery of the legal grounds for the petition which is prohibited under Rule 100
of the Rules of Court. The new law stripped the rights of the adopter to rescind or revoke the
adoption decree to protect the rights of the adopted child. In the doctrine of Dura Lex Sed Lex,
the law maybe harsh but it is the law, that when the law clear, there is no other recourse but to
apply it. However, as regards to the inheritance, the adopter may disinherit the adopted child for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code as stated in the second paragraph of the above
quoted provision.

Therefore, the petitioner cannot rescind the decree of adoption of Jose Melvin Sibulo.

Page 114 of 130

75. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS VS. CA, ET AL., 205 SCRA 356

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
_____________

Case Nature:
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Legal Doctrine:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder

FACTS:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then
six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before
the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3

On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the minor child, Jason
Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his
natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida
Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner.

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that: The petition for adoption
was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable
was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition
for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court
rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive
Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. The petition for adoption should be dismissed outright
for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185
of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code
must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a
vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted
the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles.

RULING:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the
trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family
Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.

Page 115 of 130

 Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The
Family Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When
Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law
in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed
by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the
affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting
Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to
make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.

Page 116 of 130

76. BOBANOVIC, ET AL., VS. MONTES,ETC.ET AL, 142 SCRA 485

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
_____________

Nature of the Case:

Petition for mandamus.

SC Decision:
Petition is granted.

Legal Doctrine:
Due process of Adoption.

FACTS:
Petitioners are Australian spouses who filed a petition for adoption of the Filipino minor,
Adam Christopher Sales. The Court ordered the hearing on December 27, 1984 and furnished
the Ministry of Social Services Development (MSSD) a copy thereof. The latter was ordered to
conduct a social case study and submit a report 1 week before the date of the hearing or to
intervene in behalf of the child, which the MSSD failed to comply and as a result thereof, the Court
assigned a Social Worker to conduct said requirements. Petition was granted on January 4, 1985
and a certificate of finality of the order granting the adoption was issued by the Court and such
was received by the Ministry of Social Services and Development on January 5, 1985. Petitioners
then applied for travel clearance with MSSD, which the latter declined on the ground that prior to
the initial hearing of the adoption case, their office was not furnished with a copy of the petition for
adoption nor with the court order requiring them to make a case study, thus depriving them of the
opportunity to conduct case study and intervene in the case.

Thus, a petition for mandamus was filed by petitioners, contending that MSSD must be
deemed duly notified of said hearing, and that the receipt by MSSD of the decree of adoption
which is final and executory, the latter can no longer negate its implementation by denying
issuance of clearance to travel for such would render meaningless the rights of adoption granted
by the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decree of adoption is valid to warrant MSSD to issue travel clearance
certificate to the adopting petitioners and their adopted child.

RULING:
YES. The decree of adoption is valid and MSSD should issue travel clearance certificate.
It is undisputed that the Order of November 28, 1984 was duly published in a newspaper of
general publication and that copies of said Order were likewise sent and duly acknowledged by
all government offices concerned including MSSD. When the Order granting adoption was
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court on January 4, 1985, and upon denial of the motion for
reconsideration of said order, filed by the MSSD, no appeal at all was interposed by the Ministry.
By this it may also be presumed that MSSD would have knowledge of the adoption proceedings
and could have intervened.

When respondent MSSD filed on February 25, 1985 its motion to set aside the order of
January 4, 1985 granting adoption, it should have as early as then, challenged or disputed the

Page 117 of 130

fitness of the petitioners to adopt the minor child, if at all MSSD has any reason to be
apprehensive.

By refusing to issue the travel clearance, respondent Minister would in effect take away
from the petitioners what already belongs to them as a vested legal right, and discounts and
negates the effects of a valid and final judgment of the court, regarding which no appeal had even
been taken from.

Adoption statutes being humane and salutary designed to provide homes, love, care and
education for unfortunate children, and wherein interest and welfare of the child is paramount,
should be accorded widest latitude of sympathy and assistance by the courts, and the “the law
should not be made an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy”.

The Court ordered MSSD to issue without delay a travel clearance certificate.

Page 118 of 130

77. SUSAN LIM-LUA, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013

Subject Matter:
Article 194 of New Civil Code.

Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical

attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age
of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from
place of work.

Nature of the Case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
The petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Legal Doctrine:
Support as a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.

FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage
with a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00
per month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies
and businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from
the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and
thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.

The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being
in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.

The husband also asserts that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive
support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent

MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to

P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.

The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum
of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance
and advances are given to the petitioner and his children.

Page 119 of 130

CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered
advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and
the two children.

Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children.

RULING:
-Yes. The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly
support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by
him. Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the
accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered
by the CA).

-According to jurisprudence in Advincula v. Advincula, 10 SCRA 189 (1964): …Judgment

for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or
her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.

-Therefore, certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from
the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children.

Page 120 of 130

78. DAISIE T. DAVID, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
_____________

Nature of the case:

The rightful custody of an illegitimate, minor child.

SC Decision:
The CA decision was reversed and SC ruled in favor of the petitioner.

Legal Doctrine:
Article 176 of family code; Article 213 of family code.

FACTS:
1. Daisy T. David worked as a secretary for private respondent Ramon Villar, a businessman
in Angeles, Pampanga. Private respondent is a married man with four children.
2. The petitioner and the respondent had a relationship which resulted to a son, Christoph J
and two girls, namely Christine and Cathy Mae.
3. The relationship of the petitioner and the respondent were known by the respondent’s wife
and the children were accepted by the legal family.
4. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age,
to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back
the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the
next school year.
5. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. After
hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision in favor
of the petitioner stating that the petitioner should have the rightful custody of Christoph J.
6. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court. The CA ruled that Christoph
J should remain to the respondent because the petitioner cannot properly provide support.
7. Daisy filed a petition to review the CA decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of an illegitimate child should be given to his mother.

RULING:
Yes. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”. Though
the petitioner is not as rich as the respondent, the petitioner has the enough means to support her
children.

Page 121 of 130

79. JOCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO, G.R. No.
154994 and GUALBERTO VS. CA, ET AL, G.R. No. 156254, June 28, 2005

Subject Matter:
FC: ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised
by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise

Nature of the case:

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

SC Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED.

Legal Doctrine:
Art. 363 of NCC. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children,
the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."

FACTS
Crisanto Gualberto and Joycelyn Gualberto was married and begot a child. Thereafter they
were separated. During that time, the child is only almost 4 years old whom allegedly took away
by the petitioner and brought the child in the province of Mindoro. This result to the filing of the
case of the respondent vs the petitioner assailing of having the better right for the custody of the
child. Additionally, contending that the petitioner has a lesbian relationship with some other person
and that she is not entitled to be given the right of their child custody. Furthermore, this was
assailed by the petitioner.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not, a child below seven years of age should be under the custody of the
mother.

RULINGS
Yes, the child below of the parties should be under the custody of the mother. According
to Article 213 (2) of the FC “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”. This was emphasized further by
Article 363 of the NCC saying that “No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds.” In which both articles are said to be mandatory.

Applying to this case, the child which is the subject of the issue raised is only almost 4
years old. Moreover, the contention of the respondent raising that mother is allegedly having
relationship to a lesbian and that the phrase of the FC “unless the court finds compelling reasons
for such measure” applies, has no merit. Having define such compelling reason as neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. Which the sexuality is not part of it
so long as the mother did not neglect her duty as one and it does not affect the child adversely.

Therefore, the child should be under the custody of the mother.

Page 122 of 130

80. ONOG VS. DAGUIMOL, GR No. 122906, Feb. 07, 2002

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
_____________

Nature of the case:

Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2) Resolutions dated August
29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued by the former Second Division1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971.

SC Decision:
The instant petition is hereby DENIED

Legal Doctrine:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child

FACTS:
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith on September 13, 1989, petitioner left for the United
States of America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care
of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.

On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith
in the Regional Trial Court. And on March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing
private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith. However, petitioner filed on
October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.

On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued granting petitioner’s motion for custody of
their child. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.

Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971, questioning the actuations of the trial
court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of merit.
However, after private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, the appellate court issued a
Resolution3 dated August 29, 1995 modifying its decision that the child shall continue under the
petitioner, with whom the said child had been living, since birth.

Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a
matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as
the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she
had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears
that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the temporary custody shall be granted to the Father or the private
respondent.

RULING:
Yes, the temporary custody may be granted to the father. In custody disputes, it is
axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. In arriving at its

Page 123 of 130

decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.

Although, statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision.
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of
the Family Code provides that "[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article
213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.

Since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the
meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court

Page 124 of 130

81. LAXAMANA VS. LAXAMANA, G.R. No. 144763, September 3, 2002

Subject Matter:
Parent and child custody as mentioned in all cases involving care, custody, and control of
minor children, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and
moral situations of the opposing parents.

Nature of the Case:

This is a petition for review on certiorari on a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br, 107.

SC Decision:
The Petition is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 for the
purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and respondent to take
custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with the
respondent but subject to petitioner’s visitation rights.

Legal Doctrine:
The patria potestas has been transformed into a radically different institution where the
obligational aspect is now supreme. There is no power, but a task; no complex rights of parents
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

FACTS:
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met
sometime in 1983.
Petitioner came from a well-to-do family and was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while
respondent, held a degree in banking and finance and worked in a bank. They got married and
had three children. All went well until the petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite several
confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence
worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner
allegedly became violent and irritable, thus, the respondent and her three children abandoned the
petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives and subsequently filed for annulment.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107, and the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children.
Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner.
The RTC ordered that the custody of the three children should remain with the respondent
and where the parties are enjoined to comply with terms and conditions stated in the visitation
agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in
awarding their custody to the respondent.

RULING:
No. As in this case, the parents are already separated; the courts must step in to determine
in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted him by law. The need,
therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of
the records revealed that no such evidence was introduced. This latter court relied merely on the
mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine
the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.

Page 125 of 130

82. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CAPITANOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 143363, Feb 06, 2002

Subject Matter:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Nature of The Case:

______________________________________________________________________
______________

SC Decision:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

Legal Doctrine:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

FACTS:
Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the
campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James
Daniel II, a 15-year-old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a
reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Spouses
William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s
Academy

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

RULING:
No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner
may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the
Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable,
there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause
of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In
order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of
the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it
is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

Page 126 of 130

 In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school,
but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability
of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Page 127 of 130

83. TAMARGO VS. CA, ET AL, G.R. No. 85044 209 SCRA 518 [1992]

Subject Matter:
Parental Authority

Nature of The Case:

Review on certiorari

SC Decision:
Petition GRANTED

Legal Doctrine:
______________________________________________________________________
______________

FACTS:
On 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted to her death. On 18 November 1982, the petition
for adoption was granted. The adopting parent and natural parents filed a case against the natural
parents of Adelberto. The natural parents of Bundoc, insist that the Rapisura should be liable for
his action because at the time of the incident, the Rapisura already filled their petition for adoption
and therefore have the parental authority over Adelberto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural parents of Bundoc, has the parental authority and is liable for
his action

RULING:
Yes, the natural parents of Bundoc, are liable for his action. According to Art. 221 provides
that “Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.”

In this case, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. the decree of adoption has not
been issued and the adopting parents, Rapisura spouses no actual or physically custody over
Adelberto Bundoc.

Therefore, the natural parents of Bundoc has the parental authority and is liable for his
action.

Page 128 of 130

84. JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIETTA NERI
ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI and all persons holding the subject child ARABELLA
SOMBONG in their custody, respondents., G.R. No. 111876, 31 Jan. 1996

Subject Matter:
Constitutional Law | Civil Law | Habeas Corpus | Child and Youth Welfare Code

Case Nature:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Legal Doctrine:
Family Code Article 231

SC Decision:
The court finds that private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better
position to take care of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the
other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody of
petitioner, had the petitioner’s custody rights over Cristina been established.

FACTS:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Signal
Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old,
was brought to the Sir John Clinic, located at 121 First Avenue, Caloocan City, for relief of
coughing fits and for treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital
bill in the amount of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner’s
failure to pay the bill. Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid
the private respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that
the sum payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra.
Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her.
Petitioner claims that the reason for such a refusal was that she refused to go out on a date with
Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of her,
making it difficult for everyone all around.

On the other hand, and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that she
visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go beyond
berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, i.e., in
1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.

Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged
therein that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at No. 121, First Avenue,
Grace Park, Caloocan City. The petition was denied due course and summarily
dismissed,6without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having
been perpetrated in Caloocan City.

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Caloocan City against the spouses Ty. Dra. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioner’s
child, Arabella, had for some time been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in
April, 1989, and was, in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly
identified to be the child’s guardian.

Page 129 of 130

ISSUE:
Whether or not the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration in cases involving child
custody?

RULING:
We do not agree with the lower court that the ground of abandonment of a child has been
repealed by Art. 231 of the Family Code for abandonment can also be included under the phrase
‘cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent’ (par. 2, Art. 231 of the Family
Code). What can be the worst culpable negligence of a parent than abandoning her own child.
This court does not believe petitioner-appellee’s explanation that she had been negotiating for the
discharge of her child for the past five years. That was too long a time for negotiation when she
could have filed immediately a complaint with the authorities or the courts

The court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person,
but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time
appears to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.

Considering that the child’s welfare is an all-important factor is custody cases, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and
custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the same
vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the
parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper
under the circumstances.

Page 130 of 130