Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 107737 October 1, 1999

JUAN L. PEREZ, LUIS KEH, CHARLIE LEE and ROSENDO G. TANSINSIN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS CRISOSTOMO and VICENTE ASUNCION, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9 2 that disposed of Civil Case No. 5610-M
(Luis Crisostomo v. Luis Keh, Juan Perez, Charlie Kee and Atty. Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr.) as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) directing defendant JUAN PEREZ to allow plaintiff LUIS

CRISOSTOMO to occupy and operate the "Papaya Fishpond" for a
period of 5 1/2 years at the rental rates of P150,000.00 for the first six
months and P175,000.00 for the remaining five years (the same rates
provided for in Exh. 4);

b) ordering defendants LUIS KEH, CHARLIE LEE, JUAN PEREZ and

Atty. ROSENDO TANSINSIN, JR. to pay unto the plaintiff the
amounts of P150,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral
damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit;

c) directing the release, delivery or payment directly to plaintiff LUIS

CRISOSTOMO of the amounts of P128,572.00 and P123,993.85,
including the interests which may have already accrued thereon,
deposited with the Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank (Paombong,
Bulacan Branch) in the name of the Clerk of Court and/or Deputy
Clerk of Court Rodrigo C. Libunao under this Court's Order dated
February 14, 1980; however, the plaintiff is required to pay defendant
Perez the corresponding rental on the fishpond for the period June
1979-January 1980 based on the rate of P150,000.00 per annum,
deducting therefrom the amount of P21,428.00 already paid to and
received by then co-usufructuary Maria Perez (Exh. E);

d) dismissing the defendants' separate counter-claims for damages,

for lack of merit; and
 e) dismissing the Pleading in Intervention Pro Interesse Suo filed by
VICENTE ASUNCION on the ground of lis pendens.

SO ORDERED.

The facts upon which the Court of Appeals based its Decision are the following:

Along with Maria Perez, Fructuosa Perez, Victoria Perez, Apolonio Lorenzo and Vicente Asuncion,
petitioner Juan Perez is a usufructuary of a parcel of land popularly called the "Papaya Fishpond."
Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8498 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Bulacan, the fishpond is located in Sto. Rosario, Hagonoy, Bulacan and has an area of around 110
hectares. On June 5, 1975, the usufructuaries entered into a contract leasing the fishpond to Luis
Keh for a period of five (5) years and renewable for another five (5) years by agreement of the
parties, under the condition that for the first five-year period the annual rental would be P150,000.00
and for the next five years, P175,000.00. Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that the lessee
"cannot sublease" the fishpond "nor assign his rights to anyone." 3

Private respondent Luis Crisostomo, who reached only the 5th grade, is a businessman engaged in
the operation of fishponds. On September 20, 1977, while he was at his fishpond in Almazar,
Hermosa, Bataan, his bosom friend named Ming Cosim arrived with petitioner Charlie Lee. The two
persuaded private respondent to take over the operation of "Papaya Fishpond" as petitioner Lee and
his partner, petitioner Luis Keh, were allegedly losing money in its operation. Private respondent
having acceded to the proposal, sometime in December of that year, he and petitioners Lee and Keh
executed a written agreement denominated as "pakiao buwis" whereby private respondent would
take possession of the "Papaya Fishpond" from January 6, 1978 to June 6, 1978 in consideration of
the amount of P128,000.00 broken down as follows: P75,000.00 as rental, P50,000.00 for the value
of milkfish in the fishpond and P3,000 for labor expenses. Private respondent paid the P75,000.00 to
petitioner Keh at the house of petitioner Lee in Sta. Cruz, Hagonoy, Bulacan in the presence of Lee's
wife, brother-in-law and other persons. He paid the balance to petitioner Lee sometime in February
or March 1978 because he was uncertain as to the right of petitioners Keh and Lee to transfer
possession over the fishpond to him. Private respondent made that payment only after he had
received a copy of a written agreement dated January 9, 1978 4 whereby petitioner Keh ceded,
conveyed and transferred all his "rights and interests" over the fishpond to petitioner Lee, "up to
June 1985." From private respondent's point of view, that document assured him of continuous
possession of the property for as long as he paid the agreed rentals of P150,000.00 until 1980 and
P.175,000.00 until 1985. 1âw phi 1.nêt

For the operation of the fishpond from June 1978 to May 1979, private respondent, accompanied by
Ming Cosim and Ambrocio Cruz, paid the amount of P150,000.00 at the Malabon, Metro Manila
office of petitioner Keh. The following receipt was issued to him:

RECEIPT

June 6, 1978

P150.000,00

Received from Mr. LUIS KEH the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P150,000.00), Philippine Currency, as full payment of the yearly leased
rental of the Papaya Fishpond for the year beginning June 1978 and ending on May
1979. The next payment shall be made on June 6, 1979.
 Said sum was paid in Producers Bank of the Philippines Check No. (illegible) 164595
dated June 6, 1978.

Mr. Luis Keh has not transferred his rights over the fishpond to any person.

Caloocan City, June 6, 1978.

JUAN L. PEREZ ET AL.

By:

(Sgd.)

Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr.

CONFORME TO THE ABOVE:

(Sgd.)

LUIS KEH

Handwritten below that receipt but above the signature of petitioner Charlie Lee, are the
following: "Rec'd from Luis Crisostomo sum of one hundred fifty-four thousand P154,000.00
for above payment. 5

Private respondent incurred expenses for repairs in and improvement of the fishpond in the total
amount of P486,562.65. 6 However, sometime in June 1979, petitioners Tansinsin and Juan Perez,
in the company of men bearing armalites, went to the fishpond and presented private respondent
with a letter dated June 7, 1979 showing that petitioner Luis Keh had surrendered possession of the
fishpond to the usufructuaries.

Because of the threat to deprive him of earnings of around P700,000.00 that the 700,000 milkfish in
the fishpond would yield, and the refusal of petitioners Keh, Juan Perez and Lee to accept the rental
for June 5, 1979 to June 6, 1980, private respondent filed on June 14, 1979 with the then Court of
First Instance of Bulacan an action for injunction and damages. He prayed for the issuance of a
restraining order enjoining therein defendants Keh, Perez and Lee from entering the premises and
taking possession of the fishpond. He also prayed for actual damages of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P20,000.00, exemplary damages in an amount that the court might award, and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00. 7

That same day, June 14, 1979, the lower court granted the prayer for a restraining order. On
November 13, 1979, Crisostomo paid one of the usufructuaries, Maria Perez (who died in 1984), the
amount of P21,428.00 as her 1/7 share of the annual rental of the fishpond for 1979-80. Maria Perez
issued a notarized receipt for that amount. 8

On January 11, 1980, the court lifted the restraining order thereby effectively depriving private
respondent of possession over the fishpond. On February 14, 1980, the parties submitted a partial
compromise agreement with the following stipulations:

1. The amount of P128,572.00 that private respondent deposited as

rental with the Office of the Clerk of Court under O.R. No. 21630
 dated November 15, 1979 be withdrawn from that office and
deposited with the Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings & Loan Association,
Inc. (Paombong, Bulacan branch) and which deposit shall not be
withdrawn unless authorized by the court; and

2. The plaintiff could personally harvest milkfish "with commercial

value" in the presence of Perez and under the supervision of the
deputy clerk of court within the appointed period and that the net
proceeds of the sale (P123,993.85 per the Report dated March 4,
1980 of the deputy clerk of court) be deposited in the name of the
deputy clerk of court of Branch 6 of the then Court of First Instance of
Bulacan with the same branch of the Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings &
Loan Association, Inc. and which deposit shall not be withdrawn
unless upon order of the court after hearing.

The court approved that agreement on that same date.

Thereafter, the usufructuaries entered into a contract of lease with Vicente Raymundo and Felipe
Martinez for the six-year period of June 1, 1981 to May 30, 1987 in consideration of the annual
rentals of P550,000.00 for the first two years and P400,000.00 for the next four years. Upon
expiration of that lease, the same property was leased to Pat Laderas for P1 million a year.

The complaint was later amended to include petitioner Tansinsin, the alleged administrator of the
fishpond, as one of the defendants. 9 Except in the joint answer that the defendants had filed,
petitioners Keh and Lee did not appear before the court. Neither did they testify.

In their defense, petitioners Juan Perez and Tansinsin presented evidence to prove that they had
negotiated for the lease of the property with Benito Keh in 1975. However, they averred, for reasons
unknown to petitioner Perez, in the contract of lease that petitioner Tansinsin prepared, petitioner
Luis Keh was named as lessee. Petitioner Perez had never met Keh or Lee but according to
petitioner Tansinsin, petitioner Luis Keh was substituted for Benito Keh because the latter was
preoccupied with his other businesses. Sometime in 1979, petitioner Keh's agent named Catalino
Alcantara relayed to petitioner Perez, Keh's intention to surrender possession of the fishpond to the
usufructuaries. Because petitioner Perez demanded that said intention should be made in writing, on
June 5, 1979, Perez received from Keh a letter to that effect.

When private respondent received a copy of that letter of petitioner Keh, he took the position that
petitioner Perez had no right to demand possession of the fishpond from him because Perez had no
contract with him. Private respondent was allowed four (4) months within which to vacate the
premises but he immediately filed the complaint for injunction and damages. Thereafter, private
respondent's counsel, Atty. Angel Cruz and other persons tried to prevail upon petitioner Perez to
allow private respondent to occupy the property for three (3) more years. Petitioner Perez declined
that proposition.

On September 6, 1989, the lower court rendered the aforesaid decision. It arrived at the conclusion
that the defendants therein "conspired with one another to exploit the plaintiff's naivete and
educational inadequacies and, in the process, to defraud him by inducing him into taking possession
of the "Papaya Fishpond" in their fond hope that, as soon as the plaintiff — applying his known
expertise as a successful fishpond operator — shall have considerably improved the fishpond, they
will regain possession of the premises and offer the lease thereof to other interested parties at much
higher rental rates as laid bare by supervening realities." That conclusion was founded on the
following:
1. The plaintiffs (private respondent Crisostomo's) testimony bears
the "hallmarks of truth: candid, straightforward and uncontrived." He
had proven himself a "much more credible witness than his
opponents."

2. The notarized receipt of Maria Perez of her share as a usufructuary

in the rental for 1979-80 is a "clear avowal of plaintiffs legitimate
operation of the "Papaya Fishpond" as assignee or transferee
thereof." It was impossible for the other usufructuaries, especially
Juan Perez who was residing in the same locality and actively
involved in the "affairs of the fishpond," not to have known that
plaintiff occupied the fishpond for one and a half years as assignee of
Keh and Lee. It was unbelievable that both Tansinsin and Perez
would only perceive the plaintiff as a mere encargado of Keh and
Lee.

3. The receipt whereby Tansinsin acknowledged payment of

P150,000.00 as rental for June 1978-May 1979 bears "tell-tale signs"
of the conspiracy. Firstly, the statement "Mr. Luis Keh has not
transferred his rights over the fishpond to any person" is entirely
irrelevant to that receipt unless it was intended "to preempt plaintiff's
claim of rights and interests over the said property as either sub-
lessee or assignee." Secondly, Keh's having signified "Conforme to
the above" is a gratuitous notation as it actually indicates that the
money came from the plaintiff. Thirdly, Atty. Tansinsin's receipt of the
amount for and in behalf of "JUAN L. PEREZ ET AL." illustrates his
"active and dominant role in the affairs" of the fishpond whether as
administrator thereof or as beneficiary of a share from its fruits.

4. Service upon plaintiff of Keh's letter surrendering possession of the

fishpond implied that defendants knew that plaintiff was in possession
thereof. That they resorted to the intimidating presence of armed men
is proof that they expected the plaintiff to refuse to give up
possession of the property. These circumstances "completely belie
the protestations of Perez and Tansinsin of lack of knowledge of the
contract entered into" between the plaintiff, and Lee and Keh.

5. The nonpresentation of Lee and Keh on the witness stand by Atty.

Tansinsin "can very well be construed as a smart maneuver to cover
up the sinister cabal for deception inferrable from the attendant facts
and circumstances." In their joint answer, Keh and Lee tried to relieve
Perez of any liability in favor of the plaintiff. That is understandable
"because, should the Court disregard the reliance of Perez on the
prohibition against sub-lease or assignment of the "Papaya
Fishpond", then all the defendants shall have exposed themselves to
unavoidable liability for the acts complained of by the plaintiff."

6. Atty. Tansinsin was the common legal counsel of all the

defendants and, by his testimony, even the plaintiff. Atty. Tansinsin's
denial that he was plaintiffs counsel was his way of "deflecting
plaintiffs imputations of professional improprieties against him."
Plaintiff must have assumed that Atty. Tansinsin was also his lawyer
 considering that they were "on very friendly terms" and therefore Atty.
Tansinsin might have been instrumental in dispelling whatever fears
plaintiff had entertained as regards the business transactions
involved.

7. The fact that the fishpond was subsequently rented out for
astronomical amounts is proof that the plaintiff had considerably
improved the fishpond. 10

The lower court added:

Bluntly yet succinctly put, the foregoing circumstances when viewed collectively with
other cogent aspects of the instant case inexorably lead to the Court's well-
considered view that the defendants — tempted by the bright prospect of a lucrative
business coup — embarked themselves in an egregious scheme to take undue
advantage of the gullibility of the plaintiff who, as borne by ensuing events, proved
himself an ideal victim to prey upon: pathetically unsuspecting yet only too eager to
invest his material resources and self-acquired technical know-how to redeem what
was then a dwindling business enterprise from total collapse. Plaintiffs impressive
performance, alas, only redounded ultimately to the supreme benefit exclusively of
the defendants. A classic case of "ako ang nagsaing, iba ang kumain!"

The defendants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier mentioned, affirmed the
decision of the trial court and disposed of the appeal on February 18, 1992 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment appealed from, is hereby

AFFIRMED.

However, intervenor-appellant is hereby declared co-usufructuary of the Papaya

fishpond, and is, therefore, entitled to all rights and interest due to the usufructuaries
of the said fishpond.

SO ORDERED.

On the defendant-appellants' contention that the principle of res judicata should be applied because
the Court of Appeals had ruled on the issue of possession in CA-G.R. No. 10415-R, a petition
for certiorari and injunction with preliminary mandatory injunction, the Court of Appeals held that said
principle was unavailing. The petition in CA-G.R. No. 10415-R involved a writ of injunction "which
presupposes the pendency of a principal or main action." Moreover, the decision in that case did not
resolve the issue of who should be in possession of the Papaya Fishpond as findings of fact of the
trial court cannot be reviewed in a certiorari proceeding.1âw phi 1.nêt

The Court of Appeals ruled further that appellee Crisostomo "cannot be considered a possessor in
bad faith, considering that he took possession of the fishpond when appellants Keh and Lee
assigned to him appellant Keh's leasehold right." It held that appellant Perez knew of the transfer of
possession of the fishpond to appellee and that the receipt evidencing payment of the 1978-1979
rental even bears an expressed admission by Lee that the payment came from appellee Crisostomo.

Agreeing with the court a quo that "defendants-appellants employed fraud to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiff-appellee," the Court of Appeals held that appellants should be held liable for
damages. As regards the intervention pro interesse suo, the appellate court ruled that the same
should be allowed because, even if the litigation would not be technically binding upon him,
complications might arise that would prejudice his rights. Pointing out that a usufruct may be
transferred, assigned or disposed of, the Court of Appeals ruled that the intervenor cannot be
excluded as a usufructuary because he had acquired his right as such from a sale in execution of
the share of Jorge Lorenzo, one of the usufructuaries of the fishpond.

Herein petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Decision of the Court of Appeals.
They alleged that the Decision was premature because it was rendered when they had not yet even
received a copy of the intervenor's brief wherein assignments of errors that directly affected their
rights and interests were made. They insisted that the principle of res judicata was applicable
because in G.R. No. 64354, this Court upheld the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
10415. They added that appellee Crisostomo was guilty of forum shopping because the issue of
possession had been "squarely decided" in CA-G.R. No. 10415. They stressed that the contract of
lease between Keh and the usufructuaries prohibited subleasing of the fishpond; that by the receipt
dated June 6, 1978, it was Keh who paid the rental; that appellee Crisostomo was a perjured witness
because in the notebook showing his expenses, the amount of P150,000.00 for rentals does not
appear; that the term of the contract had expired and there was no renewal thereof, and that the
consideration of P150,000.00 was grossly inadequate. They averred that the Court of Appeals erred
in awarding damages that were not prayed for in the second amended complaint and that amounts
not specified in the complaint were awarded as damages. They disclaimed that Atty. Tansinsin was
the administrator of the fishpond.

On October 30, 1992, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It
ruled that the Decision was not prematurely promulgated "considering that the intervention
proceeding is solely between intervenor and defendants-appellants, which is completely separable
and has nothing to do with the merits of the appeal."

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioners raise six (6) grounds for giving due course
to it. 11 Those grounds may be distilled into the following: (a) the applicability of the principle of res
judicata; (b) the premature promulgation of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and (c) private
respondent was not a sublesee of the fishpond under the law.

In arguing that the principle of res judicata applies in this case, petitioners rely on the portion of the
Decision 12 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10415 that states:

We find no basis for declaring respondent Judge guilty of grave abuse of discretion
on this regard. The trial court's finding that petitioner does not appear entitled to any
contract or law to retain possession of the fishpond in question since he is neither an
assignee or sub-lessee and, therefore, merely a stranger to the contract of lease is a
finding of fact review of which is not proper in a certiorari proceedings. Not only is
petitioner not a party to the lease agreement over the fishpond in question but also
the very authority upon which he predicates his possession over the fishpond — that
the leasehold right of Luis Keh had been assigned to him — undoubtedly lacks basis
for the very contract between Luis Keh and the lessors expressly provides —

That the lessee cannot sub-lease above-described fishpond nor

assign his rights to anyone.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied by petitioners.) 13

Petitioners assert that said Decision of the Court of Appeals which was in effect upheld by this Court
when it denied the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 64354 (Luis Crisostomo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court), 14 is "res judicata to the issue of possession in this case." 15 However,
as expressed in that quoted portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415, the issue of whether
private respondent is an assignee or a sub-lessee "is a finding of fact review of which is not proper in
a certiorari proceeding" or the proceeding in that case.

CA-G.R. No. 10415 was spawned by the lifting on January 11, 1980 of the restraining order
previously issued by the trial court on June 14, 1979. Private respondent filed a special civil action
of certiorari and injunction with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or mandatory restraining order
to question the order of January 11, 1980. Thus, the issue in that petition was whether or not the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in lifting the restraining order. The statement in that Decision of
the Court of Appeals that a writ of preliminary injunction may be denied "if the party applying for it
has insufficient title or interest to sustain it and no claim to an ultimate relief (is) sought" by no means
resolved the issue of who is entitled to possess the fishpond. In denying the petition for certiorari, the
Court of Appeals was simply saying that there was no reason to restore private respondent to the
possession of the fishpond pursuant to the restraining order that he had earlier obtained. The issue
of possession was collaterally discussed only to resolve the propriety of the lifting of the restraining
order based on evidence available at that time. Hence, there was no judgment on the merits in the
main case or in Civil Case No. 5610-M. Simply put, the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 involves an
interlocutory order on the propriety of the lifting of the restraining order and not a judgment on the
merits of Civil Case No. 5610-M.

For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the
judgment must be on the merits, and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 16 The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having
resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case.
There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment
determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order
because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. 17 In this case, the lifting
of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners
and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words,
the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee
of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be
resolved when the restraining order was lifted.

Petitioners assail the Court of Appeals' Decision as "premature" and therefore null and void,
because prior to the promulgation of that Decision, private respondent-intervenor Vicente Asuncion
failed to furnish them with a copy of his brief the assignment of errors of which allegedly "directly"
affected their rights and interests. 18 While it is true that petitioners were deprived of the opportunity
to contravene the allegations of the intervenor in his brief, that fact can not result in the nullity of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. 19 Vicente Asuncion intervened pro interesse suo or "according to
his interest." 20 Intervention pro interessse suo is a mode of intervention in equity wherein a stranger
desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right in the res, or thing, which is the
subject matter of the litigation, without becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant, and without
acquiring control over the course of a litigation, which is conceded to the main actors therein. 21 In
this case, intervenor Vicente Asuncion aimed to protect his right as a usufructuary. Inasmuch as he
has the same rights and interests as petitioner Juan Perez, any judgment rendered in the latter's
favor entitled him to assert his right as such usufructuary against his co-usufructuary. Should said
intervenor claim his share in the usufruct, no rights of the petitioners other than those of Juan Perez
would be prejudiced thereby.
Worth noting is the fact that after the trial court had allowed Vicente Asuncion's intervention pro
interesse suo, petitioner Juan Perez filed a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13519 to
set aside the order denying his motion to dismiss the pleading in intervention. In its Decision of
January 27, 1988, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals 22 denied the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. It upheld the trial court's ruling to allow the intervention pro interesse suo to protect
Vicente Asuncion's right as a co-usufructuary in the distribution or disposition of the amounts
representing the rentals that were deposited with the court. That Vicente Asuncion had filed Civil
Case No. 8215-M seeking recovery of his alleged share in the fruits of the Papaya Fishpond from
1978 would not be a reason for the dismissal of the motion for intervention pursuant to Rule 16, Sec.
1 (e) of the Rules of Court. 23 The Court of Appeals explained as follows:

Indeed, if by means of intervention a stranger to a lawsuit is permitted to intervene

without thereby becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant (Joaquin v. Herrera, 37 Phil.
705, 723 [1918]), then there is in the case at bar no identity of parties to speak of. Lis
pendens as a ground for a motion to dismiss requires as a first element identity of
parties in the two cases.

Nor is there an identity of relief sought. Civil Case No. 8295-M seeks an accounting
of the proceeds of the fishpond while Civil Case No. 5610-M is for injunction to
prevent the petitioner from retaking the fishpond from Luis Crisostomo. The herein
private respondent sought to intervene in the latter case simply to protect his right as
usufructuary in the money deposited in the court by the plaintiff Luis Crisostomo. We
hold that in allowing the intervention in this case the trial court acted with prudence
and exercised its discretion wisely. 24

Unconvinced by the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 13519, petitioner Juan Perez filed
a petition for review on certiorari with this Court under G.R. No. 82096. On May 9, 1988, this Court
denied the petition on the grounds that the issues raised are factual and that there is no sufficient
showing that the findings of the respondent court are not supported by substantial evidence or that
the court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. 25 The Resolution of the
Court dated May 9, 1988 became final and executory on August 26, 1988. 26

Moreover, granting that the intervention be considered as Vicente Asuncion's "appeal," a litigant's
failure to furnish his opponent with a copy of his appeal does not suffice to warrant dismissal of that
appeal. In such an instance, all that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to furnish his
opponent with a copy of his appeal. 27 This is precisely what happened in this case. On May 13,
1992, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing counsel for intervenor to furnish herein
petitioners with a copy of intervenor Vicente Asuncion's brief within a 10-day period. It also granted
petitioners an opportunity to file a reply-brief or memorandum and the intervenor, a reply to said
memorandum. 28 That Resolution is proper under the premises because, by the nature of an
intervention pro interesse suo, it can proceed independently of the main action. Thus, in the
Resolution of October 30, 1992, in resolving the issue of the alleged prematurity of its Decision, the
Court of Appeals held that "the proceeding is solely between intervenor and defendants-appellants,
which is completely separable and has nothing to do with the merits of the appeal." 29

At the hearing of Civil Case No. 5610-M, petitioner Juan Perez attempted to establish the death on
October 14, 1979 of Jorge Lorenzo, 30 the usufructuary from whom Vicente Asuncion derived his right
to intervene pro interesse suo. Since under Article 603 of the Civil Code a usufruct is extinguished
"by the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears," there is no basis by
which to arrive at the conclusion that the usufruct originally exercised by Jorge Lorenzo has indeed
been extinguished or, on the contrary, has survived Lorenzo's demise on account of provisions in the
document constituting the usufruct. That matter is best addressed in Civil Case No. 8215-M wherein
Vicente Asuncion seeks his share as a transferee of the usufruct established for Jorge Lorenzo. All
that is discussed here is the matter of intervention pro interesse suo vis-a-vis the issue of
prematurity of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners' principal argument against the Court of Appeals' Decision in favor of private respondent
Crisostomo is that he could not have been an assignee or sub-lessee of the fishpond because no
contract authorized him to be so. Petitioners' argument is anchored on factual issues that, however,
have no room for discussion before this Court. It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact
are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of
appeal is confined to questions of law. 31 Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and carry even more weight when said court affirms the factual findings of the trial
court. 32 Accordingly, this review shall be limited to questions of law arising from the facts as found by
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

Admittedly, the contract between the usufructuaries and petitioner Keh has a provision barring the
sublease of the fishpond. However, it was petitioner Keh himself who violated that provision in
offering the operation of the fishpond to private respondent. Apparently on account of private
respondent's apprehensions as regards the right of petitioners Keh and Lee to transfer operation of
the fishpond to him, on January 9, 1978, petitioner Keh executed a document ceding and
transferring his rights and interests over the fishpond to petitioner Lee. That the same document
might have been a ruse to inveigle private respondent to agree to their proposal that he operate the
fishpond is of no moment. The fact is, petitioner Keh did transfer his rights as a lessee to petitioner
Lee in writing and that, by virtue of that document, private respondent acceded to take over
petitioner Keh's rights as a lessee of the fishpond.

Although no written contract to transfer operation of the fishpond to private respondent was offered
in evidence, 33 the established facts further show that petitioner Juan Perez and his counsel,
petitioner Tansinsin, knew of and acquiesced to that arrangement by their act of receiving from the
private respondent the rental for 1978-79. By their act of receiving rental from private respondent
through the peculiarly written receipt dated June 6, 1978, petitioners Perez and Tansinsin were put
in estoppel to question private respondent's right to possess the fishpond as a lessee. Estoppel in
pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if
the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 34

Nevertheless, we hesitate to grant private respondent's prayer that he should be restored to the
possession of the fishpond as a consequence of his unjustified ejectment therefrom. To restore
possession of the fishpond to him would entail violation of contractual obligations that the
usufructuaries have entered into over quite a long period of time now. Supervening events, such as
the devaluation of the peso as against the dollar as well as the addition of improvements in the
fishpond that the succeeding lessees could have introduced, have contributed to the increase in
rental value of the property. To place private respondent in the same position he was in before the
lifting of the restraining order in 1980 when he was deprived the right to operate the fishpond under
the contract that already expired in 1985 shall be to sanction injustice and inequity. This Court, after
all, may not supplant the right of the usufructuaries to enter into contracts over the fishpond through
this Decision. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of the case, it is but proper that private
respondent should be properly compensated for the improvements he introduced in the fishpond. 1âwphi 1.nêt

Art. 1168 of the Civil Code provides that when an obligation "consists in not doing and the obligor
does what has been forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense." The lease contract
prohibited petitioner Luis Keh, as lessee, from subleasing the fishpond. In entering into the
agreement for pakiao-buwis with private respondent, not to mention the apparent artifice that was his
written agreement with petitioner Lee on January 9, 1978, petitioner Keh did exactly what was
prohibited of him under the contract — to sublease the fishpond to a third party. That the agreement
for pakiao-buwis was actually a sublease is borne out by the fact that private respondent paid
petitioners Luis Keh and Juan Perez, through petitioner Tansinsin the amount of annual rental
agreed upon in the lease contract between the usufructuaries and petitioner Keh. Petitioner Keh led
private respondent to unwittingly incur expenses to improve the operation of the fishpond. By
operation of law, therefore, petitioner Keh shall be liable to private respondent for the value of the
improvements he had made in the fishpond or for P486,562.65 with interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the rendition of the decision of the trial court on September 6, 1989. 35

The law supports the awards of moral and exemplary damages in favor of private respondent and
against the petitioners. Their conspiratorial scheme to utilize private respondent's expertise in the
operation of fishponds to bail themselves out of financial losses has been satisfactorily established
to warrant a ruling that they violated Article 21 of the Civil Code and therefore private respondent
should be entitled to an award of moral damages. Article 21 states that "(a)ny person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage." Exemplary damages shall likewise be awarded
pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. 36 Because private respondent was compelled to litigate to
protect his interest, attorney's fees shall also be awarded. 37

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
insofar as it (a) directs the release to private respondent of the amounts of P128,572.00 and
P123,993.85 deposited with the Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank in Paombong, Bulacan and (b)
requires private respondent Crisostomo to pay petitioner Juan Perez the rental for the period June
1979 to January 1980 at the rate of P150,000.00 per annum less the amount of P21,428.00 already
paid to usufructuary Maria Perez. It should, however, be subject to the MODIFICATIONS that:

1. Petitioner Luis Keh shall pay private respondent Luis Crisostomo in

the amount of P486,562.25 with legal interest from the rendition of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 5610-M or on September 6, 1989, and

2. Petitioners be made liable jointly and severally liable for moral

damages of P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000 and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.