Macalintal v. Commission On Elections
Macalintal v. Commission On Elections
SYNOPSIS
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition led by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 ) 1 suffer from
constitutional in rmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the
subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used
and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
HaTISE
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right
of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by
the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or
before a government o cial exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as
required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. In Tañada vs. Angara, 7 the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation
of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide."
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed that
it is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. 8 In yet another case, the Court said
that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
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convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion
will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations
are irrelevancies that cannot in uence its decisions. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and
Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the
acts of these departments, or of any o cial, betray the people's will as expressed
in the Constitution . . . 9
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further
buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fteen years since the rati cation of the
1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by quali ed
Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the
instant petition 10 and determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the
Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it. 11
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere
act of executing an a davit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives
including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C . May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that
the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution speci cally provides that suffrage may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disquali ed by law, (3) at
least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disquali ed from voting is
an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless
he/she executes an a davit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration
under said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an a davit to
qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He
focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional
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in rmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2
empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by quali ed Filipinos
abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants
and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the
Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in the law
enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by
the mere act of executing an a davit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines
within a given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more
apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. 23 Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs.
COMELEC, the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be
within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution
rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the
validity of every statute is rst determined by the legislative department of the
government itself. 24
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other
than his residence of origin has not been deemed su cient to consider
abandonment or loss of such residence of origin.
In other words, "residence" in this provision refers to two residence
quali cations: "residence" in the Philippines and "residence" in the place where he
will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word "residence"
means domicile, but as far as residence in the place where he will actually cast
his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He could have a
domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and he
is allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to
absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will
be considered as cast in the place of his domicile.
MR. OPLE.
Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of
Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no
small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as
the choice of this country's leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and
considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting
overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially
because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO.
Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if the term
"absentee voting" also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us
say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for
instance, in Mindanao, to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD.
I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO.
How about those people who cannot go back to the places where they are
registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for
allowing students and military people who are temporarily in another place to
register and vote. I believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus
Election Code. The reason we want absentee voting to be in the
Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be
inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation
by Congress . So, by allowing it and saying that this is possible, then
legislation can take care of the rest . 34 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to
the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the
largest number of quali ed Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the
Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for
overseas absentee voting.
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The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency
requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed system
of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ.
May I just be recognized for a clari cation. There are certain quali cations
for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory requirements on
the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee voters like
Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect
to registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to
require where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who
may be continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of
registration in the embassies. However, we do not like to preempt the legislative
assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod's amendment is
only to provide a system.
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee
voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. — All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disquali ed by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the
assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disquali ed from voting
under this Act:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an
immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's
residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and
permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an a davit
to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disquali ed by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that
Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. AISHcD
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the a davit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The a davit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more signi cantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
a davit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be quali ed to vote in a
political exercise."
To repeat, the a davit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished
their intent to return to this country; thus, without the a davit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another
reason why the Senate required the execution of said a davit. It wanted the a ant to
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exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of origin
and not to preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: "For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired
permanent resident status abroad," a requirement for the registration is the
submission of "a Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any
Philippine embassy or consulate official authorized to administer oath. . . "
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose
of this Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of
returning to be quali ed to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino
immigrant has no purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from
exercising this right to suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be
expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no matter
whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be authorized to vote.
But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired permanent
residency in the United States, then he must indicate an intention to return. This is
what makes for the de nition of "domicile." And to acquire the vote, we thought
that we would require the immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr.
President, the three administration senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a
vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The
rationale for the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should le
an a davit that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an
immigrant or a green-card holder, that means he may not return to the country any
more and that contradicts the definition of "domicile" under the law.
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders
are disquali ed to run for any elective o ce nds no application to the present case
because the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights
of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189 , they may
still be considered as a "quali ed citizen of the Philippines abroad" upon ful llment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of
suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an a davit or a
promise to "resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three years from approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare
that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the
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Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the removal" of their names
"from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disquali cation to
vote in absentia."
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter
permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disquali ed
by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually
abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is
allowed to register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service
establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has
indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to
a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia. —
11.1. Every quali ed citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application
for registration has been approved, including those previously registered under
Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, le with the o cer of the
embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the
Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the
Commission. The authorized o cer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign
service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said application to
vote within ve (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be
accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her
overseas absentee voter certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by
mail to, the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has
jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for
purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the
overseas absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the
overseas absentee voter.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the
canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president,
is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4. . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certi ed
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certi cates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certi cates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes,
one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph
4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can
only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and
Vice-President. 41
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No.
9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of
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the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or
any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certi cates of
Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Italics supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that
the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certi ed by the
board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim
the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A
(Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit. (Italics supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the
executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority
of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any
law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It
agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional.
Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said
Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of
the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to
formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. 42 where this
Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in
its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C 43 of the
Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent
constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any government
instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of
grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis-à-vis its rule-making power,
to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. —
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting
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by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries
that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure
to prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identi cation
system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots
in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments
concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
xxx xxx xxx (Italics supplied)
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO , J.: concurring
It has been suggested by certain quarters that all Filipino citizens who are
immigrants and permanent residents abroad are considered to have abandoned their
Philippine domicile and therefore cannot vote in Philippine elections, since they are not
within the constitutional contemplation of "quali ed Filipinos abroad" who are eligible to
vote.
In this jurisdiction, it is well settled that "domicile" and "residence" as used in election
laws are synonymous terms which import not only an intention to reside in a xed place
but also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. 2
Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. There are three (3) rules that must
be observed in the consideration of circumstances: first, that a man must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; second, domicile is not easily lost, once established it is retained
until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a
time. 3 The principal elements of domicile, i.e., physical presence in the locality involved
and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile.
No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire
a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in the acquisition of
domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. 4
The mere acquisition of an immigrant or permanent resident status by a Filipino
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citizen in a foreign country does not ipso jure result in the automatic severance of his
domiciliary link to the Philippines, nor the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.
Different jurisdictions vary in their legal characterization of the terms immigrant and
permanent resident, with dissimilar requirements, conditions and restrictions for the
acquisition and maintenance of those statuses. Territories with conservative policies on
immigration tend to be restrictive and exclusive, especially on matters relating to
residency (or domiciliary); while more open societies tend to be liberal and inclusive.
To illustrate: In the United States, an overwhelming majority of our compatriots are
now enjoying the rights and privileges of permanent residents and immigrants. The U.S.
Immigration and Nationality Act de nes the term permanent as "a relationship of
continuing and lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be
permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of
the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law;" 5 and residence as "a place
of general abode; and the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual
dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent." 6
Thus, considering that intent is not necessary in establishing permanent residency in
the U.S., it is entirely possible for a Filipino citizen to be a permanent resident in the U.S.,
i.e., the U.S. may be his general place of abode, "his principal, actual dwelling place in fact,"
for an inde nite period of time, without however abandoning his Philippine domicile to
which he intends to return later.
Immigrants, on the other hand, have been loosely de ned as referring to "every alien
in the United States, except an alien who is within one of the non-immigrant aliens
enumerated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States. " 7 They are
classi ed into the non-quota immigrants and the quota immigrants. The quota immigrants
may fall in either of two (2) categories: the family-based preferences and the employment-
based preferences.
Particularly interesting is the last mentioned category, the employment-based
preferences. These immigrants are conferred the status as such on the basis of their
occupational skills and the employment demands in the host country. To this class
belongs the professionals, investors, managers and executives, skilled workers, health
workers, professors and researchers. Many Filipino citizens fall under this category, and
most of them opt for immigrant status solely for the purpose of securing permanent
employment in the U.S., and intend to return to the Philippines after their purpose is
accomplished.
The diaspora of Filipinos in foreign lands started in the wake of the bludgeoning
economic crisis in the 80's and its resulting acute shortage of employment opportunities.
This phenomenon has continued to the present day as the steadily rising cost of living and
intermittent economic crises — worldwide in their effects — weighed most heavily on the
ordinary Filipino. He does not have much choice: leave or starve. The lure of the proverbial
greener pastures in foreign lands is certainly a potent incentive for an exodus.
In most cases, the decision to migrate is borne out of the dire necessities of life
rather than a conscious desire to abandon the land of birth. Most immigrants and
permanent residents remain bound very strongly by intimate ties of filial, racial, cultural and
social relationships with the Philippines. They travel back periodically to be with their
friends and loved ones; some even own, maintain and manage their properties here; and,
they continue to show keen interest in, and keep themselves abreast with, political and
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social developments in the country through the mass media. They make signi cant
contributions to the nation, through their regular dollar remittances that have tremendously
shored up our sagging national economy.
In the face of these realities, I am convinced more than ever that actual and physical
residence abroad should not automatically be equated with abandonment of Philippine
domicile. The circumstances enumerated in the immediately preceding paragraph are valid
indicia of animus manendi (intent to remain) and animus revertendi (intent to return), which
should not simply be brushed aside in determining whether the right to vote should be
denied the immigrants and permanent residents. Indeed, there is no rhyme nor reason to
unduly marginalize this class of Filipinos.
It is significant to stress, however, that Sec. 5, par. (d), of the Absentee Voting Law in
fact disqualifies immigrants and permanent residents from voting as a general rule. This is
precisely in recognition of the fact that their status as such may indeed be a badge of their
intent to abandon their Philippine domicile and settle permanently in their host country. But
at the same time, the legislature provided for a mechanism in the law for ascertaining real
intent: an immigrant or permanent resident who wishes to exercise his right of suffrage is
required as a condition sine qua non to execute an a davit declaring that he shall resume
actual, physical and permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from his registration under the law; and that he has not applied for citizenship in another
country.
The law in effect draws a distinction between two (2) classes of immigrants or
permanent residents — those who have renounced their old domicile in the Philippines, and
those who still consider the Philippines as their domicile of origin. The execution of the
a davit is an a rmation on the part of the immigrant or permanent resident that his stay
abroad should not be construed as a relinquishment of his old domicile.
I am not unaware of the possibility that the immigrant or permanent resident may
renege on his undertaking in the a davit to resume actual, physical and permanent
residence in the Philippines. But the law contains proper and adequate safeguards against
the misuse or abuse of this privilege, i.e., his name will be purged from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and he will be permanently disquali ed from voting in
absentia.
As a closing observation, I wish to emphasize that the absolute disquali cation of
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents, without distinction, from participating in the
Philippine electoral process would invariably result, as in the past, in a massive
disenfranchisement of quali ed voters. It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the
Absentee Voting Law would founder on the rock by reason of an unduly restrictive and
decidedly unrealistic interpretation given by the minority on the residency requirement in
the Constitution.
I vote to sustain the constitutionality of Sec. 5, par. (d), of RA 9189, and on the other
hand, to declare unconstitutional Sec. 18.5 of the same law insofar as it authorizes
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President it being
clearly violative of Sec. 4, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as well as Secs. 17.1, 19 and 25 of RA
9189 insofar as they subject COMELEC implementing rules and regulations to review and
approval by the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for being likewise violative of
Sec. 1, Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
VITUG , J.:
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Indeed, the mandate of the Constitution is explicit — one must be a resident in order
to vote in the country's elections. 1 But, equally compelling is its other provision that
directs Congress to adopt a system that would allow absentee voting by quali ed Filipinos
abroad. 2 The deliberations by members of the Constitutional Commission on the subject
are instructive. 3
"MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clari cation. There are certain
quali cations for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory
requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee
voters like Filipinos abroad?
"THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
In election cases, the Court, more than once, has treated residence and domicile as
being synonymous terms. In Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court of Tacloban , 4 this
Court has said:
"The term 'residence' as used in the election law is synonymous with
'domicile,' which imports not only an intention to reside in a xed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
'Domicile' denotes a xed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in
turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an inde nite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual."
PANGANIBAN , J.:
The deliberations on this case have been blessed with extensive and exhaustive
discussions by the Justices. The ponencia itself as well as the separate, the concurring
and the dissenting opinions ably written by my esteemed colleagues scrutinized its many
aspects and rami cations. Their thoroughness and scholarship helped distill the issues
and enabled the Court to arrive at an informed judgment.
It is quite clear that there is unanimity of opinion in declaring unconstitutional those
portions of RA 9189 (1) granting Congress oversight powers over the Comelec
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR); and (2) giving Comelec authority to proclaim
presidential and vice-presidential winners — a power expressly lodged in Congress by the
Constitution.
Obviously, however, there is diversity of opinion on the question of whether Filipinos,
who have become permanent foreign residents, may be allowed to vote after executing an
affidavit showing an intent to reside in the Philippines within three years therefrom.
I will no longer belabor the penetrating legal pros and contras discussed by the
justices in connection with this important issue. Let me just add one more point in favor of
the constitutionality of the aforementioned provision in Section 5(d) of RA 9189. 2 It is a
point that is borne, not of strict legalese, but of practical common sense that even lay
persons will understand. 3 The Information Age has shrunk the world, enabled Filipinos
abroad to keep abreast with current events in our country, and thus empowered them to
be able to vote wisely for our national leaders.
Qualifications
of Voters
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Let me start my explanation of my position by recalling that our Constitution 4
requires voters to possess, on the day of the election, a minimum of three qualities or
attributes relating to (1) citizenship, (2) age and (3) residence. In addition, our fundamental
law says that the citizen must "not otherwise be disqualified by law" from voting.
On the rst , only those who owe allegiance to a country have the right to select its
leaders and determine its destiny. This is a worldwide phenomenon. Thus, only Filipinos
may vote in the Philippines; aliens cannot. By the same token, only Americans may vote in
America, 5 and only Indians may vote in India. 6
The second quali cation, age, assures that only those who have reached the natural
mental maturity are enfranchised to choose independently and sensibly. Hence, only those
who have reached 18, the age of majority, are allowed to vote; only those capacitated by
the law to enter into binding obligations and contracts 7 are allowed to elect the persons
who would make and execute the law.
On the third, residence of at least one year in the Philippines — of which six months
must be in the place where the ballot is cast — is required of voters. In our case today, this
residence requirement is the crux or centerpoint. I respectfully submit that to understand
how to interpret this quali cation in relation to the Overseas Absentee Voting Law, it is
necessary to inquire into the reason for requiring it as a condition for suffrage. Why does
the Constitution insist on residence as a prerequisite to voting?
Reason for
Residence Requirement
I believe that, traditionally, the law requires residence 8 because presence in a
certain locality enables a person to know the needs and the problems of that area. Equally
important, it also makes one become acquainted with the candidates — their
qualifications, suitability for a particular office and platform of government.
Thus, the fundamental law requires, not just that there be a minimum of one-year
residence in the country, but also that six months of that period be spent in the place
where the ballot is to be cast. Such detailed requirement will hopefully give the voters
su cient knowledge about a speci c town as to help them choose its local o cials
wisely, quite apart from understanding enough of the entire country so as to prepare to
vote sagaciously for national leaders.
The Supreme Court had occasions to discuss this common-sense reason for the
residence requirement, in this wise:
"We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that
o cials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and
bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents
themselves — their needs, di culties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period
would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired
constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's
qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek." 9
"[T]he purpose of the residency requirement [is] to ensure that the person
elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency[.]" 10
Although the foregoing discussions were used to justify the residence requirement
vis-à-vis candidates for elective public o ces, I believe that their rationale can easily and
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analogically fit the needs of voters as well.
The Essence
of My Opinion
The de ning essence of my position is this: in the midst of the now available e-age
communications facilities, actual presence in the Philippines is no longer indispensable to
make discerning Filipinos know the problems of their country and to decide who among
candidates for national positions deserve their mandate.
Indeed, the Information Age has given overseas Filipinos convenient means to
inform themselves of our country's needs, as well as of the suitability of candidates for
national o ces. After all, many of them live abroad, not because they want to abandon
their land of birth, but because they have been constrained to do so by economic,
professional, livelihood and other pressing pursuits. Ineluctably, they remit their hard-
earned money to help their relatives here and their country as a whole.
Verily, their easy access to Philippine mass media keep them constantly aware of
happenings in their native country. National dailies and other periodicals are sold regularly
in Filipino enclaves in foreign shores. Several local and community publications in these
areas cater mainly to Filipino expatriates, publishing news and opinions not only about
their alien neighborhoods, but also quite extensively about their homeland. 11
So, too, Philippine news and magazine-type broadcasts are available to overseas
Filipinos on a daily basis over cable television, giving them the feeling and the and
intellectual status of being home. Interactive TV talk shows are now routinely participated
in via long distance phones and cell phone text messages by people everywhere. Even
more conveniently available are the websites of major dailies. Whatever news and views
they print locally are instantly accessible everywhere on earth via the Internet.
Truly, the e-age has opened windows to the Philippines in a pervasive and thorough
manner, such that actual presence in the country is no longer needed to make an intelligent
assessment of whom to vote for as our national leaders.
I make this emphasis on national o cials, because the Absentee Voting Law allows
overseas voting only for President, Vice President, senators and party-list representatives.
12 This distinction is important, because the information available through websites and
other modern media outlets is addressed mainly to national concerns.
To insist that only those who can demonstrate actual physical residence in the
country for one year — or only those who complied with the more di cult-to-understand
concept of domicile — would be entitled to vote would be to cling adamantly and
unreasonably to a literal interpretation of the Constitution without regard for its more
liberating spirit or rationale. Such insistence would result in rendering inutile any
meaningful effort to accord suffrage to Filipinos abroad. 1 3 Such proposition would make
the constitutional interpretation anachronous in the face of the refreshing and pulsating
realities of the world. In my view, it would be thoroughly unreasonable to expect foreign-
based Filipinos to come back here for one year every three years and abandon their jobs
just to be able to comply literally with the residential requirement of suffrage.
On the other hand, the advances of science and technology — especially in the elds
of computerization, miniaturization, digitization, satellite communications and ber optics
— has so expanded the capabilities of our brothers and sisters abroad as to enable them
to understand our national needs, without having to sit back and stay here for one
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continuous year. They are now able to help us bridge those needs, not only by remitting
their hard-earned currency, but also by assisting locally based Filipinos to choose national
leaders who will steer the country in the perilous new paths of development and peace.
Conclusion
In sum, I respectfully submit that physical presence in the country is no longer
indispensable to arm Filipinos abroad with su cient information to enable them to vote
intelligently. The advent of the Information Age and the globalization of knowledge have
empowered them to know enough about the Philippines to enable them to choose our
national o cials prudently and, in the process, to have a signi cant voice in the
governance of the country they love and cherish.
I maintain that the constitutional provision on voter residence — like every other law
— must be interpreted "not by the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life." As
heralded by the quotation from Tañada v. Angara cited at the opening of this Opinion, our
Constitution should be construed so it may "bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events."
Finally, may I stress that when the reason for the law is accomplished, then the law
itself is ful lled. Since the law requiring residence is accomplished by the globalization of
information, then the law itself is ful lled. It is time to empower our overseas brothers and
sisters to participate more actively in nation building by allowing them to help elect our
national leaders.
WHEREFORE, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Section 5 (d) of RA 9189. I also
vote to declare as unconstitutional portions of Section 18.5 thereof insofar as they
authorize Comelec to proclaim presidential and vice-presidential winners; and of Sections
17.1, 19 and 25 insofar as they subject to congressional oversight, review and approval the
implementation of voting by mail and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Comelec.
The case before this Court is historic and momentous. Historic because the right of
suffrage, which through the centuries painstakingly evolved into universal right, 1 stands at
the crossroads in this country. Should the right of suffrage continue its march forward and
reach overseas Filipinos, or should this Court turn back this historic march here at our
gates?
Momentous because the core issue is the enfranchisement or disenfranchisement
of some 7 million overseas Filipinos. The annual contribution of these overseas Filipinos to
the national economy, in terms of hard-earned foreign exchange remitted through the
banking system, equals almost 50 percent of the country's national budget. 2 The total
remittances, recorded and unrecorded, of overseas Filipinos may even reach 18 percent of
GNP, almost the same percentage that agriculture at 20 percent contributes to the GNP. 3
The nation has hailed the overseas Filipinos as the modern-day heroes and saviors
of the economy. Their blood, toil, tears and sweat have propped up the Philippine peso
through all the recurring nancial crises that have battered the nation. Although scattered
in foreign lands across the globe, these overseas Filipinos keep abreast with
developments in the Philippines through the Internet, 4 cable and satellite TV, and even
texting.
In recognition of the immense contribution of overseas Filipinos to the nation, the
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framers of the 1987 Constitution introduced the absentee voting system, novel in this
country, purposely to enfranchise the overseas Filipinos. Commissioner Blas Ople, the
former Minister of Labor who started deploying abroad large numbers of Filipino workers,
triggered the introduction of the absentee voting with this discourse during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. OPLE: . . .
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said
that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage
for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship
notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient
foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure of economic
necessity here, nd that they have to detach themselves from their families to
work in other countries with de nite tenures of employment. Many of them are on
contract employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of
changing their residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disquali ed
from exercising the right of suffrage to their countries of destination by the
residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disquali ed by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might
entertain an amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad
for Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this
proposed Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who
should enjoy the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these
overseas Filipino communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this
Article of the Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of
effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of
global proportions. In effect, this will require budgetary and administrative
commitments on the part of the Philippine government, mainly through the
COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive
elaboration of this mechanism that will be put in place to make effective the right
to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise jurisprudence of the past
may not be su cient to meet the demands of the right of suffrage for
Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I want to thank the
Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be
entertained at the proper time . 5 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
From the start, the framers of the Constitution knew that the absentee voting
system for overseas Filipinos would have to be an exception to the double residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. This was the basic premise for
introducing an express provision on absentee voting in the Constitution. Unless there is
such an exception in the Constitution itself, overseas Filipinos could never vote as
absentee voters in view of the double residency requirement in Section 1. Because of this
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double residency requirement, Congress could not enfranchise through ordinary legislation
overseas Filipinos who do not comply with the double residency requirement.
Thus, the framers of the Constitution, by an overwhelming vote of 28 in favor and
only one against, approved Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, as follows:
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by quali ed
Filipinos abroad. (Italics supplied)
After sixteen long years of debates, Congress nally enacted RA No. 9189 (the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), precisely to implement the constitutional
mandate to enfranchise overseas Filipinos. Petitioner now asks the Court to strike down
this law as unconstitutional mainly because it enfranchises overseas Filipinos who do not
comply with the double residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution, as follows:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disquali ed by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. (Italics supplied)
Like the 1973 Constitution, Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution imposes a
double residency requirement before a Filipino 18 years or over may exercise the right to
vote, namely: (1) one year residence in the Philippines; and (2) six months residence in the
locality in the Philippines where he proposes to vote.
The threshold issue is whether overseas Filipinos should comply with the double
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V to vote under the absentee voting system in
Section 2 of the same Article. Stated another way, the issue is whether overseas Filipinos,
many of whom are not registered voters in the Philippines, should come home twice to the
Philippines just so they could vote in a foreign country as absentee Filipino voters. The rst
time they should come home is one year before the elections to establish residence in the
Philippines. The second time is six months before the elections to establish residence in
the locality in the Philippines where they propose to vote.
Did the framers of the 1987 Constitution intend to in ict on overseas Filipinos such
a burdensome requirement as an essential feature of the absentee voting system in
Section 2 of Article V? To require absentee voters to comply with the double residency
requirement is to impose an impractical and even an impossible condition to the exercise
of the constitutional right to vote. In the rst place, the second residency requirement of
establishing residence in a locality in the Philippines where the voters propose to vote is
impossible to comply since overseas Filipinos will obviously not vote in any locality in the
Philippines. Imposing the double residency requirement makes the absentee voting an
empty right of overseas Filipinos. Certainly, the wise framers of the Constitution were
incapable of such absurd scheme.
If the framers of the Constitution did not intend such an absurd requirement, should
this Court now impose such absurdity on overseas Filipinos? How many overseas Filipinos
would comply with the double residency requirement just to vote in Presidential and
Senatorial elections? How much will overseas Filipinos spend just to come home twice
within 12 months just so they could vote when they go back abroad?
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The concept of absentee voting negates a residency requirement in the country of
citizenship of the voter. By de nition, an absentee voter is a non-resident voter. Obviously,
the double residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V applies only to resident or non-
absentee Filipino voters. To impose the double residency requirement on absentee Filipino
voters is an egregious anomaly for it will require absentee Filipino voters to comply with
the same residency requirement imposed on resident or non-absentee Filipino voters. If
absentee Filipino voters are required to reside in the Philippines just like resident or non-
absentee Filipino voters, why create an absentee voting system for overseas Filipinos in
the rst place? Applying the double residency requirement on absentee voters will render
the provision on absentee voting in Section 2 a surplusage, a constitutional mandate
devoid of meaning.
Even without the absentee voting provision in Section 1, Congress can validly enact
a law allowing resident or non-absentee Filipino voters — those who comply with the
double residency requirement — to vote abroad in Philippine embassies or consulates.
There is no constitutional prohibition on registered Filipino voters who comply with the
double residency requirement to cast their ballots at a Philippine embassy or consulate
abroad where they happen to be on election day. If the absentee voting system in Section
2 were for the bene t only of resident or non-absentee Filipinos, then there would be no
need to provide for it in the Constitution.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution speci cally introduced the absentee voting
provision in Section 2 precisely to enfranchise overseas Filipinos who do not comply with
the double residency requirement in Section 1. Without the absentee voting provision in
Section 2, Congress could not validly enact a law enfranchising overseas Filipinos who do
not comply with the double residency requirement. As succinctly explained by
Commissioner Christian Monsod during the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. MONSOD: . . . The reason we want absentee voting to be in the
Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be inconsistency
on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by Congress. So, by
allowing it and saying that this is possible, then legislation can take care of the
rest. 6
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution intended the absentee voting provision as an
exception to the double residency requirement.
The question of how a Filipino, who has become a permanent resident or immigrant
in a foreign country, may reacquire his domicile or residence in the Philippines is a matter
for ordinary legislation. The reacquisition of the Philippine domicile or residence that a
Filipino had lost is within the power of Congress to legislate. The Constitution does not
de ne what domicile or residence means. There is also no constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of legislation prescribing the reacquisition of domicile or residence
in the Philippines, just as there is no constitutional prohibition against the enactment of
legislation prescribing the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Thus, RA No. 8171 7 allows a former natural-born Filipino who became a foreigner to
reacquire Philippine citizenship by ling a simpli ed administrative petition and taking an
oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189, which prescribes the
reacquisition of residence by a Filipino through the execution of an a davit stating he is
resuming residence in the Philippines, is similarly well within the power of Congress to
enact and is thus constitutional.
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While the absentee voting system is new in this country, it is well established in
other countries. In the United States, all U.S. citizens 18 years or over who reside outside
the United States during an election are eligible to vote as absentee voters. 8 The trend in
the United States is to allow "no-excuse" absentee voting, 9 that is, a quali ed or registered
voter may avail of absentee voting for any reason. Absentee voting is understood in other
jurisdictions as voting by a quali ed or registered voter without anyresidency requirement.
In the present case, petitioner wants a double residency requirement imposed on absentee
Filipino voters.
The right of suffrage is the cornerstone of a representative government like that
established in the 1987 Constitution. A representative government is legitimate when
those represented elect their representatives in government. The consent of the governed
is what stamps legitimacy on those who govern. This consent is expressed through the
right of suffrage. It is a precious right for which many have fought and died so that others
may freely exercise it. A government that denies such right on imsy or meaningless
grounds does so at its peril.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, requires the Philippines to respect the people's right of suffrage " without
unreasonable restrictions." Thus, Article 25 of the Covenant provides:
Article 25. Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions;
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The Philippines is duty bound under international law to comply in good faith with its
treaty obligations under the Covenant. To require overseas Filipinos to return to the
Philippines twice within 12 months so they may vote abroad as absentee voters is plainly
an unreasonable restriction outlawed by the Covenant.
When the framers of the Constitution introduced absentee voting in Section 2 of
Article V, they were aware of the country's obligations under the Covenant. In their
discussions on the death penalty, human rights and the Bill of Rights, the framers of the
Constitution often referred to the country's obligations under the Covenant. 10 It is
inconceivable that the framers intended overseas Filipinos to comply with the double
residency requirement, an unreasonable restriction that would patently violate Article 25 of
the Covenant and practically negate the overseas Filipinos' right of suffrage.
There are some 40 countries in the world, including our Asean neighbors Indonesia
and Thailand, which grant their overseas citizens the right to vote while residing abroad. 11
The inexorable direction of history is to bestow on every person the right to vote wherever
he may be in this global village. Modern technology and telecommunications are making
this happen even now. 1 2 Those who insist on the double residency requirement as an
essential condition for absentee voting by overseas Filipinos are turning back in vain the
clock of history.
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The framers of the Constitution expressly mandated Congress to enact an absentee
voting law to enfranchise overseas Filipinos. Congress has enacted such a law after a long
and di cult struggle by overseas Filipinos who patiently waited for 16 years for the
enactment of the law. That struggle is now part of the world history of the evolution of the
right of suffrage as a universal right. No frivolous, absurd or impractical conditions should
stand in the way of enfranchising overseas Filipinos whose contribution to the national
economy is immeasurable.
Like the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the members of Congress, I vote to
enfranchise our 7 million overseas Filipinos. This is an explicit constitutional mandate that
the Court, like Congress, must honor and respect. I therefore concur entirely with the
ponencia of Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.
In the assault against the validity of certain provisions of the newly enacted Republic
Act No. 9189 or The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, the pivotal issue centers on
the constitutionality of the grant, under Section 5(d) of the law, of voting rights to Filipino
immigrants or permanent residents in foreign countries, conditioned on their execution of
an a davit declaring that they shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines within three years from the approval of their registration as absentee voters.
The controversy arises because the Constitution prescribes, among other
requirements for the exercise of suffrage, that a Filipino citizen must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he is to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. 1
Residence for purposes of ascertaining the right to vote and be voted for in public
o ce has been jurisprudentially interpreted to mean domicile which is an individual's
permanent home or the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return, the domicile of a person being dependent on facts and circumstances
disclosing intent. 2
While there is no question that Filipinos who are temporarily abroad for various
reasons are still quali ed to vote for they still retain their domicile in the Philippines,
immigrants are generally deemed to be permanent settlers of the country where they are
such, 3 thereby giving rise to the conclusion that they have relocated their domicile
elsewhere.
Republic Act No. 9189 was passed by mandate of the Constitution that "The
Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well
as a system for absentee voting by quali ed Filipinos abroad" 4 but this did not exempt the
mechanics for absentee voting from the reach of the basic requirements imposed by the
Constitution on suffrage. It is clear from the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission that their intent was to limit absentee voting to Filipinos
abroad who have all the quali cations and none of the disquali cations of a voter,
including the residency requirement.
A Filipino who is or has already become an immigrant or permanent resident in
another country can, I am convinced, by a mere sworn undertaking to return to the
Philippines for the purpose of establishing permanent residence here within the statutorily
xed three-year period, be allowed by law to vote in Philippine elections without
transgressing the rules laid down by the Constitution on suffrage. For a Filipino immigrant
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or permanent resident of a foreign country unquestionably has the Philippines as his
domicile of origin, that which he acquires at birth and is the domicile of his parents or of
the person or persons upon whom he was legally dependent at the time of his birth. 5 A
domicile, once acquired, whether by origin or choice, continues until a new domicile is
actually acquired. 6 And to acquire a new domicile by choice, the following must concur:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there
(animus manendi); and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non
revertendi). 7
It is my view that the a davit executed in accordance with Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189
by a Filipino immigrant or permanent resident of another country expressing his intent to
resume physical permanent residence in the Philippines is an eloquent proof of his
intention not to abandon his domicile of origin in the Philippines. It is a statement under
oath of what a Filipino seeks to do for the future of his membership in a political
community. Why should this a davit be discredited on the mere speculation that the
immigrant might not ful ll his undertaking to return to the Philippines for good? If Filipinos
who are temporarily residing in foreign countries are accorded full faith and credit as to
their domiciliary ties no matter how inde nite their absence from the Philippines, what
more in the case of Filipino immigrants who have formally declared their intent to settle in
their homeland?
While he may have stayed on a more or less permanent basis in the host country
which conferred on him the status of an immigrant and may be animated with all the desire
to remain there, until and unless a Filipino immigrant had categorically expressed by words
or by deeds his intent to no longer return to his domicile of origin, no conclusion can be
reached as to a change in domicile from one of origin to one of choice, hence, the old
domicile subsists. For at the core of every Filipino immigrant's being is the fact of his
Philippine citizenship. He is, after all, still a Filipino.
The acquisition of a new domicile must be completely perfected by a concurrence
of the factum of removal to a new locality, the animus to remain there, and abandonment
of and intent not to return to the former domicile, for if there is a purpose to return,
whether secret or open, no loss or change of domicile will result. 8
Two types of Filipino immigrants must then be distinguished. The rst, a Filipino
who has opted not to execute the required a davit under Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189, is
clearly disquali ed to exercise suffrage for he has manifested the animus non revertendi
with respect to his domicile in the Philippines, thereby effectuating his acquisition of a new
domicile. The second, a Filipino who declares his wish to be reunited with his homeland
has, without doubt, shown that his residence of origin remained unchanged and so he is
entitled to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Law. Therefore, until that opportunity
to execute the a davit has been totally foregone by a Filipino immigrant, in the absence of
any conclusive evidence of his acquisition of a new domicile, the Filipino immigrant's
domicile of origin is intact, his presence abroad and his desire to remain therein
notwithstanding.
I, therefore, vote in favor of the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189. I vote
to declare as unconstitutional parts of Section 18.5 of the subject law insofar as they
authorize COMELEC to proclaim presidential and vice-presidential winners; and of
Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 insofar as they are subject to congressional oversight, review and
approval the implementation of voting by mail and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of COMELEC.
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AZCUNA , J.: concurring
I concur with the ponencia, but wish to state an additional basis to sustain Section 5
(d) of Republic Act No. 9189, which provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disquali ed from voting
under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in
the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
a davit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such a davit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant
or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner contends that Filipinos who establish permanent residence abroad have
thereby abandoned their Philippine domicile of origin and replaced it with a domicile of
choice in a foreign country. This may indeed be true, but with the execution of the a davit
provided for under Section 5 (d) aforementioned, the a ant expressly states an
abandonment of said domicile of choice. The legal effect of this expression is to revive the
domicile of origin. For unlike a domicile of choice, which requires both intention and
physical presence to be established or maintained, the domicile of origin can be revived by
an intention properly expressed. Thus, the abandonment of the present domicile of choice,
by the execution of the a davit, operates to revive the domicile of origin to replace it,
because of the principle that no person can be without a domicile at any time.
The moment a foreign domicile is abandoned, the native domicile is reacquired. 1
When a person abandons his domicile of choice, his domicile of origin immediately
reverts and remains until a new domicile of choice is established. 2
On the abandonment of a domicile of choice, the domicile of origin immediately
reverts, without regard to any de nite intent to return to such original domicile, provided
there is a definite intent finally to abandon the acquired domicile of choice. 3
Through the execution of the a davit, the a ant does the operative act that makes
said a ant once more a Philippine domiciliary. The requirement of resuming actual
physical presence within three (3) years is only a test of such intention, but is not needed
to effect the change or reversion of domicile. If the a ant does not resume the residence
physically within said period, then the intent expressed in the a davit is defective and the
law will deem it inoperative, thereby allowing removal of a ant's name from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters.
With all due respect, I would like to offer my humble views on the constitutional
issues presented by the petitioner, viz:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
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voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries
by their mere act of executing an a davit expressing their intention to
return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section
1 of Article IV of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national o ces and party-list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate
the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C . May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution?
To start off, let me stress the signi cance of the case at bar. Rep. Act No. 9189, 1
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" is a historic attempt to
translate to reality a long awaited dream: the enfranchisement of millions of overseas
Filipinos. Undoubtedly, the efforts of Congress to give esh to Section 2, Article V of the
1987 Constitution mandating it to devise "a system for absentee voting for quali ed
Filipinos abroad," deserves the highest commendation. However, Rep. Act No. 9189 poses
far reaching constitutional issues that merit more than an invocation of abstract legal
principles or a simplistic construction of the Constitution. For one, the petition affects the
value of the right of suffrage, a right that is the cornerstone of our democratic government.
It is the responsibility of this Court to strike a balance between the need to expand the
right of suffrage in favor of those who cannot exercise it and the need to prevent the
dilution of the right of suffrage of those already exercising it. For another, the petition
compels this Court to de ne the extent and the limits of Congress' oversight powers or
legislative veto over "subordinate legislations" or the rules and regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies of government. Undoubtedly, this oversight power is
indispensable for Congress to discharge its broad power to legislate. Thus, it again
behooves this Court to draw the precise parameters of the oversight power sought to be
exercised by Congress to preserve the delicate balance of powers allocated to the
different branches of our government in the Constitution. AcSHCD
The majority further holds that if actual physical residence in the Philippines is
required, "there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
establish a system for absentee voting." 8
The majority a rms our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals 9 that an immigrant or
permanent resident of a foreign country is deemed to have relinquished his residence in
his country of origin. However, it rules that this presumption is overturned by the execution
of the affidavit required under the challenged provision of Rep. Act No. 9189. Allegedly, the
a davit is an explicit expression that an immigrant or permanent resident has not
relinquished his domicile in the Philippines, to wit:
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Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residence in the Philippines, but more signi cantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the a davit under Section 5(d) violates the
Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the a davit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain. 10 (italics
ours)
The majority further rules that "the act of the immigrant or permanent resident in
executing an a davit pursuant to Section 5(d) may be considered as an express waiver of
his status as an immigrant or permanent resident." Thus, the majority concludes that
Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is not unconstitutional.
With all due respect, I disagree with the majority. But before discussing the reasons
for my dissent, let me put the issue in its proper historical perspective.
Suffrage is an attribute of citizenship 11 and is ancillary to the principle of
republicanism enshrined in Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. 12 The right of
suffrage, however, is not absolute. No political system in the whole world has literally
practiced "universal" suffrage, even among its citizens. 13 The scarlet history of the right of
suffrage shows that restrictions have always been imposed on its exercise.
In England, for instance, suffrage originated as a political privilege granted to land
owners by the monarchs. 14 The grant arose from the theory that in the formation of the
state, the people agreed to surrender to the King all political sovereignty. In return, the King
extended suffrage to the freeholders as a vested right. The origin and character of
suffrage in England is chronicled by Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v. White, et al., 15 viz:
The election of knights belongs to the freeholders of the counties, and it is
an original right vested in and inseparable from the freehold, and can be no more
severed from the freehold than the freehold itself can be taken away. Before the
statute of 8 Hen. 6, ch. 7, any man that had a freehold, though never so small, had
a right of voting; but by that statute the right of election is con ned to such
persons as have lands or tenements to the yearly value of forty shillings at least,
because, as the statute says, of the tumults and disorders which happened at
elections by the excessive and outrageous number of electors; but still the right of
election is an original incident to and inseparable from freehold. As for citizens
and burgesses, they depend on the same rights as the knights of shires differ only
as to the tenure; but the right and manner of their election is on the same
foundation. 16
The economic theory of suffrage is also evident in the early history of the United
States. The 1787 U.S. Constitution, as originally adopted, did not expressly provide the
right to vote. 17 The States were left to determine who should have the right to vote in
national as well as local elections. Most States restricted the right of suffrage to white
males over twenty-one years of age with a certain amount of property. 18 Other States also
required religious, 19 literacy, and moral qualifications. 20
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Some legal scholars, however, contend that the right of suffrage is presumed from
the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing each state a "republican form of
government." 21 Veering away from the economic theory of suffrage prevalent in England,
these scholars argue that in forming the state, the people did not give up all their sovereign
powers but merely delegated the exercise of these powers to some chosen
representatives. The right of suffrage is one of these delegated powers, viz:
The people, in their original sovereign character are the fountainhead of
governmental authority, and all the powers necessary to be exercised in the
continued administration of a representative government originated and are
delegated by exertion of their sovereign will. These propositions, founded on
necessity, and illustrated by long continued practice, have become the received
doctrines of the American people . . . The people, in clothing a citizen with the
elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance
of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercised, not exclusively for the bene t of the citizen or
class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the
general benefit and welfare of the State . . . 22
On November 9, 1933, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 4122 extending
the right of suffrage to Filipino women starting January 1, 1935. However, before they
could exercise their new right, the 1935 Constitution was adopted, once again, limiting the
right of suffrage to male citizens, viz:
Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disquali ed by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are
able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage
to women, if in a plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years
after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand
women possessing the necessary quali cations shall vote a rmatively on the
question.
The proponents of woman suffrage in reply argued that it would be unfair to deprive
Filipino women of the right of suffrage already granted to them by the legislature without
giving them the chance to prove whether they deserved it or not. They also submitted that
the right would make them more interested in the management of the affairs of
government and that "it was necessary as a matter of justice to extend the frontiers of our
democracy to our women who had labored hard side by side with our men for the
progress and development of the country." 29 In a last ditch attempt to save the cause of
woman suffrage, women leaders distributed a petition to individual delegates that reads:
We, the undersigned, duly elected representatives of women who believe in
the justice and wisdom of the enfranchisement of the Filipino women, protest
most solemnly against women being deprived of the vote in the Constitution of
the Commonwealth and against any change in the existent Law, No. 4112,
passed by the Ninth Philippine Legislature on November ninth, 1933, and signed
by Governor-General Frank Murphy on December seventh, 1934.
We call the attention of the Constitutional Assembly and the Legislature to
the plea for liberty made before the Congress and the President of United States
for thirty-seven years by the Filipinos; a plea based on the fact that we are a
liberty-loving people equipped and capable of self-government. Such government
cannot exist "half-slave and half-free." The women of this Christian land, serene in
the knowledge that in peace or war they have never failed their men or their
country, in this crucial hour of the realization of the sacri ce and devotion of the
years, insist upon their political recognition and their share in the triumph of the
cause of liberty.
Under the law women suffer penalties, are summoned before the courts by
law — laws they have had no voice in making — and pay taxes. "Taxation without
representation is tyranny" and more so in 1934 than in 1776.
So con dent of the unalterable righteousness of this cause, to you,
gentlemen of the Constitutional Assembly, we appeal for justice believing and
knowing that our cause is a just one, and that our rights have been won thru years
of sacri ce, devotion and service to our common cause — the cause of men and
women alike — the welfare and progress of our native land — the Philippines. 30
In the end, a compromise was reached limiting the right of suffrage to male citizens
and leaving the issue of women suffrage for the women to decide. In the plebiscite held on
April 30, 1937, more than three hundred thousand women voted for woman suffrage.
Thenceforth, Filipino women were allowed to vote, thus, paving the way for women
participation in the government.
To broaden the mass base of voters, the 1935 Constitution lowered the age
requirement from 23 years to 21 years. The literacy requirement was also relaxed. It is to
be noted that from the opening days of the Convention, there was a prevalent sentiment
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among the delegates to bar illiterates from exercising the right of suffrage. It was
proposed that only those who can read and write English, Spanish, or other local dialects
should be allowed to vote. This proposal was defeated for the drafters felt that while the
ability to read and write was necessary, 31 the speci cation of any language or dialect
would be discriminatory against the Mohammedans:
It is discriminatory against a respectable minority of the population of the
Philippines. It would serve to discriminate against the Mohammedan population
of the Philippines for which I am one of the humble representatives. It is the
opinion of this Convention, I think, to emancipate, to enfranchise our backward
elements, especially the Mohammedan population. And you would like to curtail
that right and that privilege by inserting a provision that only those who can read
and write either English, Spanish, or any of the local dialects shall be allowed to
vote. This amendment would preclude the Mohammedans because their Arabic
writing is not included under local dialects. Because when you say, local dialects,
you refer to the dialect and not to the system of writing. The system of writing is
either Arabic or Roman. In view of this fact, Mr. President, I hope that you will be
liberal and tolerant enough to reject this proposed amendment because it is
unnecessary and because it is discriminatory. 32
Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution removed the property quali cations under Act
No. 1582. We explained the reason for this removal in Maquera v. Borra, 33 viz:
. . . property quali cations are inconsistent with the nature and essence of
the republican system ordained in our constitution and the principle of social
justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet
that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned,
whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike,
and that, accordingly, no person shall by reason of poverty, be denied the chance
to be elected to the public office. . . 34
In sum, the 1935 Constitution gave a constitutional status to the right of suffrage.
Thus, suffrage is not anymore a privilege granted by the legislature, but a right granted by
the sovereign people to a de nite portion of the population possessing certain
quali cations. To be sure, the right of suffrage was still subject to regulation by the
legislature but only in accordance with the terms of the Constitution. SDHETI
The march towards liberalization of the right of suffrage continued with the 1973
Constitution. The literacy requirement was removed while the age bar was further lowered
from 21 years to 18 years. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1973 Constitution reads:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disquali ed by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy,
property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage. The National Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote. (italics ours)
The rationale for these changes was expressed in the Explanatory Note of
Resolution No. 03 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, viz:
In keeping with the trend for the broadening of the electoral base already
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begun with the lowering of the voting age to 18 and in keeping with the
committee's desire to continue the alienation and exclusion of millions of citizens
from the political system and from participation in the political life in the country,
the requirement of literacy for voting has been eliminated. It is noted that there are
very few countries left in the world where literacy remains a condition for voting.
There is no Southeast Asian country that imposes this requirement. The United
States Supreme Court only a few months ago declared unconstitutional any state
law that would continue to impose this requirement for voting.
Although there were more resolutions submitted proposing the increase of
educational requirements for voting than those advocating the elimination of the
literacy requirement, the committee felt that favoring the elimination of the
requirement would be more in keeping with its objective and that of the
Constitutional Convention encouraging popular participation and equalizing the
privileges and rights of the people. . .
According to the Bureau of Census and Statistics, the projection for the
population of the Philippines over 18 years old for 1970 is 17,659,000. Of this,
12,384,000 are considered literates. However, the same Bureau admitted that
there is no real scienti c literacy test in counting literates. All that is done is to ask
each member of the population the question whether he is able to read and write
and to take his answer at its face value.
These circumstances plus the well-known practice in all elections in which
political leaders spend their time in the barrios showing the prospective voters to
write the name of the candidates instead of explaining the political issues to
them, strengthened the conviction of the committee that present literacy
requirement is more of a joke, and worse, a deterrent to intelligent discussions of
the issues. Finally, the committee took note of the convincing argument that the
requirement to read and write was written into our constitution at a time when the
only medium of information was the printed word and even the public meetings
were not as large and successful because of the absence of amplifying
equipment. It is a fact that today the vast majority of the population learn about
national matters much more from the audio-visual media, namely, radio and
television, and public meetings have become much more effective since the
advent of amplifying equipment.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clari ed with regard to the
residence requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding
is that it is exible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled
therein, but he satis es the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to
vote in Manila.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new
qualifications for these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the quali cations and none
of the disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President. 45
In the course of the deliberations, Fr. Bernas perceived a problem that may arise
from the meaning of the second residence requirement on the place of registration and
voting. As noted, a quali ed voter normally registers and votes in the place where he is
domiciled or has resided for six months. Fr. Bernas feared that the second residence
requirement may pose a constitutional obstacle to absentee voting "unless the vote of the
person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his
domicile," viz:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of
suffrage, which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens
temporarily residing or working abroad. Based on the statistics of the government
agencies, there ought to be about two million such Filipinos at this time.
Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these provisions are really lifted
from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of the
last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen at that time the
phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract
workers and employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate
communities of workers are found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177
countries in the world.
In previous hearings of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that
there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for
Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship
notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient
foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure of economic
necessity here, nd that they have detached themselves from their families to
work in other countries with de nite tenures of employment. Many of them are on
contract employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of
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changing their residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disquali ed
from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of destination by residential
requirement in Section 1 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time, they might
entertain an amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad
for Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this
proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than
just saying that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of "residence" in
the Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various
decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a
1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of "residence" in the Election
Law. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home. 47 (italics ours)
It is crystal clear from the foregoing deliberations, that the majority erred in ruling
that Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution dispensed with the residence requirements
provided under Section 1 of the same Article.
(2) Whether an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" of a foreign
country has lost his domicile in the Philippines.
The next question is whether an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" of a foreign
country has abandoned his domicile in the Philippines. I respectfully submit that he has.
There are three classes of domicile, namely: domicile of origin, domicile of choice,
and domicile by operation of law. At any given point, a person can only have one domicile.
Domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth and continues until replaced
by the acquisition of another domicile. More speci cally, it is the domicile of the child's
parents or of the persons upon whom the child is legally dependent at birth. Although also
referred to as domicile of birth, domicile of origin is actually the domicile of one's parents
at the time of birth and may not necessarily be the actual place of one's birth. 48 Domicile
of choice is a domicile chosen by a person to replace his or her former domicile. An adult
may change domicile at will. The choice involves an exercise of free will and presumes
legal capacity to make a choice. While intention is a principal feature on domicile of choice,
a mere intention without the fact of actual presence in the locality cannot bring about the
acquisition of a new domicile. Domicile of choice generally consists of a bodily presence in
a particular locality and a concurrent intent to remain there permanently or at least
indefinitely. 49 Domicile by operation of law is a domicile that the law attributes to a person
independent of a person's residence or intention. It applies to infants, incompetents, and
other persons under disabilities that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of choice. 50
In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC , 51 we ruled that domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile , one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona de intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond with purpose. 52 This
change of domicile is effected by a Filipino who becomes an "immigrant" or a "permanent
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resident" of a foreign country. Thus, we held in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, 53 viz:
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to
the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as
his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of
that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S.
authorities before he ran for mayor . . . 54
The doctrine in Caasi is by no means new. Our election laws have continuously
regarded "immigrants" or "permanent residents" of a foreign country to have lost their
domiciles in the Philippines and hence are not quali ed to run for public o ce. 55 There is
no reason not to apply the Caasi ruling in disputes involving the quali cation of voters. In
essence, both cases concern fulfillment of the residence requirements.
Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 itself reinforces the applicability of the Caasi
doctrine. As observed by the majority, Rep. Act No. 9189 disquali es an immigrant or a
permanent resident who is recognized as such in another country "because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his
country of origin." 56
We now slide to the legal significance of the affidavit to be executed by "immigrants"
or "permanent residents" to remove them from the class of disqualified voters. EaISDC
Again, with due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on the nature of the affidavit
to be executed by an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" is inconsistent. On one hand, it
theorizes that the act "serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned
his domicile of origin." 57 This concedes that while an "immigrant" or a "permanent
resident" has acquired a new domicile in a foreign country by virtue of his status as such,
Rep. Act No. 9189 would consider him not to have abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines. On the other hand, the majority also theorizes that the a davit constitutes an
"express waiver of his status as an immigrant or permanent resident," and upon ful llment
of the requirements of registration, "he may still be considered as a 'quali ed citizen of the
Philippines abroad' for purposes of exercising his right of suffrage." 58 This presupposes
that the "immigrant" or "permanent resident" abandoned his domicile in the Philippines, but
seeks to reacquire this domicile by the execution of the affidavit.
The rst theory is untenable. Its inevitable result would be the establishment of two
domiciles, i.e., domicile in the Philippines and domicile in a foreign country where he is
considered an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident." This ruling will contravene the
principle in private international law that a person can be domiciled only in one place at a
given time. 59
The second theory is equally untenable. A person who has abandoned his domicile
of origin by establishing a domicile of choice cannot just revert back to his domicile of
origin. 60 He must satisfy the same requisites for acquiring a new domicile, i.e., an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona de intention of abandoning the former
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place of residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond with the
purpose. An existing domicile cannot be lost by abandonment alone, even if there is an
intent to acquire a new one; the existing domicile continues until a new one is in fact
gained. To abandon domicile, a person must choose a new domicile, actually reside in the
place chosen, and intend that it be the principal and permanent residence. That is, there
can be no change of domicile without the concurrence of act and intent. 61
The doctrine established in England that the domicile of origin is revived upon the
abandonment of a domicile of choice has long been rejected in the United States. 62 Even
in England, "the mobility of modern society has fostered both criticism of the rule and
recommendation for its change." 63 Thus, the prevailing view at present is that if a domicile
of choice is abandoned without acquiring a new domicile of choice, "the domicil[e] of origin
is not thereby revived, but the last domicil[e] of choice continues to be the domicil[e]." 64
In his Separate Opinion, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Azcuna, opines that the
execution of the a davit is the operative act that revives the domicile of origin, and "the
requirement of resuming actual physical presence within three (3) years is only a test of
such intention." He further opines that "if the a ant does not resume the residence
physically within said period, then the intent expressed in the a davit is defective and the
law will deem it inoperative."
With due respect, I submit that the a davit merely proves the intent to return but
not the other requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin. Intent, which is not coupled
with actual physical transfer, is not su cient either to abandon the former domicile or to
establish a new domicile. 65 Thus, the view that domicile could be established as soon as
the old is abandoned even though the person has not yet arrived at the new domicile, has
not been accepted. In his latest work on the subject, Scoles, an acknowledged expert in
Conflict of Laws stated as follows:
The element of physical presence is essential to con rm the requisite
attitude of mind contemplated by the concept of domicile. As a consequence, a
person who is to acquire a domicile of choice at a place must actually be present
at that place during the time in which the intention to make it his home exists. For
most people, intention is con rmed by the physical presence of considerable
duration looking toward an inde nite period of time. However, in light of the
function that domicile serves, i.e., to identify a settled relationship with a place for
a particular legal purpose, it is sometimes necessary to make a determination
when the physical presence has been very brief. Consequently, no particular
length of time is necessary in order to satisfy the requirement of physical
presence if that stay at a place verifies the intention to make it a home.
Beale also states that with the rejection of the English "automatic reversion"
doctrine, physical presence is required before the person can reacquire his domicile of
origin, viz:
The doctrine in England is that the domicil[e] of origin revives upon the
abandonment of a domicil[e] of choice. . . Inspite of a few English cases to the
contrary, this has become thoroughly established as the doctrine of the English
courts, the court being especially emphatic in cases where a person has left his
domicil[e] of choice without intent to return and has started to return to his
domicil[e] of origin. Here, evidence must of course be introduced to show a
de nitive abandonment of domicil[e] of choice by actually leaving the country
without intent to return. The English doctrine has been approved in this country in
several cases, in most of which the approval was a mere dictum, but in the United
States, generally, the opposite view is held, and upon the abandonment of a
domicil[e] of choice there is no change of domicil[e] until a new domicil[e] is
obtained. . .
On the other hand, a few American cases follow the English decision in so
far as to declare that a domicil[e] of origin revives when a person having
abandoned a domicil[e] of choice is on his way to make a home at his domicil[e]
of origin, but the better opinion in this country does not allow the reacquisition of
the domicil[e] of origin until the fact of presence at the place of domicil[e] of origin
exists, as well as the intent to return there. 68 (italics ours)
To stress, the burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who
asserts it. 69 A person's declarations as to what he considers his home, residence, or
domicile are generally admissible "as evidence of his attitude of mind." 70 However,
whatever the context, "their accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving nature,
particularly when they are made to achieve some legal objective." 71
In the case at bar, the burden rests on an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" to
prove that he has abandoned his domicile in the foreign country and reestablished his
domicile in the Philippines. A self-serving a davit will not su ce, especially when what is
at stake is a very important privilege as the right of suffrage. I respectfully submit that
what makes the intent expressed in the a davit effective and operative is the ful llment of
the promise to return to the Philippines. Physical presence is not a mere test of intent but
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the "principal con rming evidence of the intention of the person." 72 Until such promise is
ful lled, he continues to be a domiciliary of another country. Until then, he does not
possess the necessary requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a qualified voter.
(4) Whether counting the votes of immigrants or permanent residents
who fail to return to the Philippines will dilute the valid votes of our
fully qualified electors.
The only consequence imposed by Rep. Act No. 9189 to an "immigrant" or a
"permanent resident" who does not ful ll his promise to return to the Philippines is the
removal of his name from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his permanent
disquali cation to vote in absentia. But his vote would be counted and accorded the same
weight as that cast by bona de quali ed Filipino voters. I respectfully submit that this
scheme diminishes the value of the right of suffrage as it dilutes the right of quali ed
voters to the proportionate value of their votes. The one person, one vote principle is
sacrosanct in a republican form of government. The challenged provision which allows the
value of the valid votes of quali ed voters to be diminished by the invalid votes of
disquali ed voters violates the sovereignty of our people. The validation by the majority of
this unconstitutional provision may result in the anomaly where the highest public o cials
of our land will owe their election to "immigrants" or "permanent residents" who failed to
fulfill their promise to return to our country or who repudiated their domicile here.
The majority downplays the effect of the challenged provision on those who are
already quali ed prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9189. It is opined that the removal
of an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" from the list of the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his permanent disquali cation "would su ce to serve as deterrence
to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the a davit." The majority misses the
point. Without Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident"
has no right to vote. Thus, even assuming that he becomes quali ed after executing the
a davit, he does not stand to lose anything when he is subsequently disquali ed for his
failure to comply with his undertaking under the a davit. He will just return to his original
status.
B.
Is Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Petitioner contends that Section 18.5 in relation to Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 9189
violates Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution giving Congress the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President,
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certi ed
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certi cates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all certi cates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
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provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes,
one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 allows all quali ed Filipinos overseas to vote for
President, Vice-President, Senators and party-list representatives while Section 18.5
thereof empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates, viz:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. —
xxx xxx xxx
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of
a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the
results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to
order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact the scheduled
election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of
elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.
On its face, Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It gives the impression that Congress abdicated to
COMELEC its constitutional duty to canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President. I agree with the majority that the impugned provision should
be given a reasonable interpretation that would save it from a constitutional in rmity. To
be sure, Congress could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a power exclusively
bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates should be construed as
limited to the positions of Senators and party-list representatives. In like manner, I agree
with the majority that Section 18.4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of
the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or
any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certi cates of
Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . (italics supplied)
should be construed in harmony with Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Hence, with respect to the position of the President and the Vice-President, the
Certi cates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes must be submitted to Congress
and directed to the Senate President.
C.
Does Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, have the power to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
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Constitution?
Both the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the O ce of the Solicitor
General (OSG) agree with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 are
unconstitutional on the ground that they violate the independence of the COMELEC. 73 The
impugned provisions require the public respondent COMELEC to submit its Implementing
Rules and Regulations to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for review, revision,
amendment, or approval, viz:
Sec. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. — The
Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from effectivity of this
Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
In the formulation of the rules and regulations, the Commission shall
coordinate with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and
Employment, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers'
Welfare Administration and the Commission on Filipino Overseas. Non-
government organizations and accredited Filipino organizations or associations
abroad shall be consulted.
At the time of the American Revolution, the more in uential political leaders in the
new states subscribed to Montesquieu's concept of separation of powers. 91 Some
constitutions of the early state governments even referred to the principle. But the concept
espoused at that particular time was a lot different. As then understood, separation of
powers requires a watertight compartmentalization of the executive, judicial, and
legislative functions and permits no sharing of government powers between and among
the three branches of government. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for instance,
provides:
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In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men. 92
The 1787 U.S. Constitution did not contain a similar provision like that found in the
Massachusetts Constitution or any principle proclaiming the adherence of the Framers to
the principle of separation of powers. But legal scholars are of the view that the Framers
essentially followed Montesquieu's recommendation for the division of powers, noting
that the U.S. Constitution vests "all legislative powers" in the Congress of the United States,
93 the "executive power" in the President, 9 4 and the "judicial power" in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as Congress may provide. 95
These legal scholars also note that the U.S. Constitution allows the "sharing" of the
three great powers between and among the three branches. The President, for instance,
shares in the exercise of legislative power through his veto power, and the courts through
their power to make rules of judicial procedure and especially through their right to
interpret laws and invalidate them as unconstitutional. Congress shares in the exercise of
executive power through its con rmation of appointments and assent to treaties, and in
the judicial power through its power to create inferior courts and regulate the number and
pay of judges. 96 Thus, they postulate that the Framers established a government guided
not by strict separation of powers but one of checks and balances to prevent the separate
branches from "running wild" and to avert deadlocks and breakdowns, viz:
The Framers expected the branches to battle each other to acquire and
defend power. To prevent the supremacy of one branch over any other in these
battles, powers were mixed; each branch was granted important power over the
same area of activity. The British and Conference experience has led the Framers
to avoid regarding controversy between the branches as a con ict between good
and evil or right or wrong, requiring de nitive, institutionally permanent resolution,
Rather, they viewed such con ict as an expression of the aggressive and perverse
part of human nature that demanded outlet but has to be kept from nding
lasting resolution so that liberty could be reserved. 97
Even then, some legal luminaries were of the view that the concept of checks and
balances is diametrically opposed to the principle of separation of powers. James
Madison, however, explained that Montesquieu's concept of separation of powers did not
require a strict division of functions among the three branches of government. Madison
defended the Constitution as having su cient division of functions among the three
branches of government to avoid the consolidation of power in any one branch and also
stressed that a rigid segregation of the three branches would undermine the purpose of
the separation doctrine. 98 He noted that unless the three branches "be so far connected
and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in
practice be duly maintained." 99 Madison's view has since then been the accepted
interpretation of the concept of separation of powers under the Constitution. Thus, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 100 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[I]n
designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power
among the three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a
comprehensive system but the separate powers were not intended to operate with
absolute independence." In Buckley v. Valeo, 101 the Court ruled that the Constitution by no
means contemplates total separation of each of these essential branches of government
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and the framers viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against
tyranny. It likewise warned that the "hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively." 102 Thus, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services , 103 the
Court rejected the "archaic view of separation of powers as requiring three airtight
departments of government." In determining whether an act disrupts the proper balance
between the coordinate branches, the Court suggested that the proper inquiry should
focus on the extent to which it prevents the other branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions. 104
In this jurisdiction, our adherence to the principle of separation powers was
succinctly discussed by Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission 105 decided in
1936, less than a year after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Laurel
emphasized that "[T]he separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution." 106 Thus:
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check
that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in
special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly
operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent though its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain o cers;
and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion
of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to de ne their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to
a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the nal
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution. 107
I n Planas v. Gil, 108 Justice Laurel further discussed the intricate interplay of the
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances, viz:
The classical separation of governmental powers, whether viewed in the
light of political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke or Montesquieu, or to the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government.
There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine
origin, we cannot lay down "with mathematical precision and divide the branches
in watertight compartments" not only because "the ordinances of the Constitution
do not establish and divide elds of black and white" but also because "even
more speci c to them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually
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from one extreme to the other." 109
It is now beyond debate that the principle of separation of powers (1) allows the
"blending" of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers in one body; (2) does not
prevent one branch of government from inquiring into the affairs of the other branches to
maintain the balance of power; (3) but ensures that there is no encroachment on matters
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other branches.
For its part, this Court checks the exercise of power of the other branches of
government through judicial review. It is the nal arbiter of disputes involving the proper
allocation and exercise of the different powers under the Constitution. Thus:
The Constitution is a de nition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine con icting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. 110
The power of judicial review is, however, limited to "actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented," for "any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 111 Courts are also enjoined
to accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, "not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must re ect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government." 1 1 2
The role of the judiciary in mapping the metes and bounds of powers of the different
branches of government was rede ned in the 1987 Constitution which expanded the
jurisdiction of this Court to include the determination of "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." 113 The expansion was made because of the dissatisfaction with the
practice of this Court in frequently invoking the "political question" 114 doctrine during the
period of martial law to dodge its duty. 115 Be that as it may, the expanded power
"definitely does not do away with the political question doctrine itself." 116
Thus, in Marcos v. Manglapus, 117 the Court held:
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
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broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination
of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people
themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question
the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon
though it may appear to us that the bene ciary is totally undeserving of the grant.
Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought
before us because the power is reserved to the people. 118
Since then, the Court has used its expanded power to check acts of the House of
Representatives, 119 the President, 120 and even of independent bodies such as the
Electoral Tribunal, 121 the Commission on Elections 122 and the Civil Service Commission.
123
Congress checks the other branches of government primarily through its law
making powers. Congress can create administrative agencies, de ne their powers and
duties, x the terms of o cers and their compensation. 124 It can also create courts,
de ne their jurisdiction and reorganize the judiciary so long as it does not undermine the
security of tenure of its members. 125 The power of Congress does not end with the
nished task of legislation. Concomitant with its principal power to legislate is the auxiliary
power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. As well stressed by one
scholar, the legislature " xes the main lines of substantive policy and is entitled to see that
administrative policy is in harmony with it; it establishes the volume and purpose of public
expenditures and ensures their legality and propriety; it must be satis ed that internal
administrative controls are operating to secure economy and e ciency; and it informs
itself of the conditions of administration of remedial measure." 126
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly de ned, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and in uence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. 127 Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives,
(b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d)
to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. 128
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. 129 Among the most quoted justi cations for this power are the writings of
John Stuart Mill and Woodrow Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative Government,
130 Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is "to watch and control the government; to
throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justi cation of all of
them which any one considers objectionable; and to censure them if found condemnable."
131 Wilson went one step farther and opined that the legislature's informing function
should be preferred to its legislative function. He emphasized that "[E]ven more important
than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might
receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of
discussion." 132
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency
to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. 1 3 3
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By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of
legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress,
thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their
functions within the authority delegated to them. 134
The oversight power has also been used to ensure the accountability of regulatory
commissions like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve
Board, often referred to as representing a "headless fourth branch of government." 135
Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies, these bodies are independent from the
executive branch and are outside the executive department in the discharge of their
functions. 136
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may
be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision. 137
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. 138 Its primary purpose is to determine economy and e ciency
of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress
may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress.
Under the Constitution, the "power of the purse" belongs to Congress. 139 The President
may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the nal say on appropriations.
Consequently, administrative o cials appear every year before the appropriation
committees of Congress to report and submit a budget estimate and a program of
administration for the succeeding scal year. During budget hearings, administrative
officials defend their budget proposals.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity
to be funded. 140 Hence, the holding of budget hearing has been the usual means of
reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous appropriation to ascertain whether
they have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an appropriation act. The
consideration of the budget is also an opportunity for the lawmakers to express their
con dence in the performance of a Cabinet Secretary or to manifest their disgust or
disfavor of the continuance in o ce of a bureaucrat. 141 Congress can even curtail the
activities of the administrative agencies by denial of funds. 142 In the United States, for
instance, Congress brought to end the existence of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the
National Youth Administration and the National Resources Planning Board, simply by
denying them any appropriation. 143
But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask the
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining
to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
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Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
This provision originated from the Administrative Code 144 and was later elevated to
the level of a constitutional provision due to its "great value in the work of the legislature."
1 4 5 In drafting the 1935 Constitution, some delegates opposed the provision arguing that
it is a feature of a parliamentary system and its adoption would make our government a
"hybrid system." 146 But mainly attacked was the provision authorizing the department
secretaries on their own initiative to appear before the legislature, with the right to be
heard on any matter pertaining to their departments. It was pointed out that this would
"give a chance to the department secretaries to lobby for items in the appropriation bill or
for provisions of other bills in which they had special interest, permitting them to bear
in uence and pressure upon Members of the law-making body, in violation of the principle
of separation of powers underlying the Constitution." 1 4 7 Despite the objections, the
provision was adopted to "prevent the raising of any question with respect to the
constitutionality of the practice" and "to make open and public the relations between the
legislative and the executive departments." 1 4 8 As incorporated in the 1935 Constitution,
the provision reads:
The heads of departments upon their own initiative or upon the request of
the National Assembly on any matter pertaining to their departments unless the
public interest shall require otherwise and the President shall state so in writing.
149
The whole tenor of the provision was permissive: the department heads could
appear but the legislative was not obliged to entertain them; reciprocally, the legislature
could request their appearance but could not oblige them especially if the President
objected. 150 The rule radically changed, however, with the adoption of the 1973
Constitution, establishing a parliamentary system of government. In a parliamentary
system, the administration is responsible to the Parliament and hence, the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet Members may be "required to appear and answer questions and
interpellations" to give an account of their stewardship during a "question hour," viz:
Sec. 12 (1) There shall be a question hour at least once a month or as
often as the Rules of the Batasang Pambansa may provide, which shall be
included in its agenda, during which the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister
or any Minister may be required to appear and answer questions and
interpellations by Members of the Batasang Pambansa. Written questions shall
be submitted to the Speaker at least three days before a scheduled question hour.
Interpellations shall not be limited to the written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. The agenda shall specify the subjects of the question hour. When
the security of the State so requires and the President so states in writing, the
question hour shall be conducted in executive session.
The "question hour" was retained despite the reversion to the presidential system in
1981. During the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, the report of the legislative
'committee called for the adoption of the "question hour" or the following reasons:
. . . Its purposes are to elicit concrete information from the administration,
to request its intervention, and when necessary, to expose abuses and seek
redress. The procedure provides the opposition with a means of discovering the
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government's weak points and because of the publicity it generates, it has a
salutary in uence on the administration. On the whole, because of the detailed
facts elicited during the interpellation or in the written answers, it will help
members to understand the complicated subject matter of bills and statutory
measures laid before the Assembly. It may be added that the popularity of this
procedure can be attributed to the fact that in making use of his right to ask
questions, the member is a completely free agent of the people. The only limits on
his actions are the rules governing the admissibility of questions concerned with
matters of form and not with the merits of the issue at hand. The fact that we
also impose a time limit means that the government is obliged to furnish the
information asked for and this obligation is what gives the procedure its real
strength. . . . 151
The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a witness for
contempt does not terminate upon the adjournment of the session. 172 It held that the
investigation was within the power of the Senate since the "transaction involved a
questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than
P5,000,000.00 of public funds, of which the Congress is the constitutional guardian." 173
The investigation was also found to be "in aid of legislation." As result of the yet un nished
investigation, the Court noted that the investigating committee has recommended, and the
Senate has approved three bills. 1 7 4
The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within
the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry must be material or necessary to
the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. Hence, a witness can not be
coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
But the Court explained that "the materiality of the question must be determined by its
direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation." The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of
the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question. 175
Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which Arnault invoked the right against
self-incrimination "is too shaky, in rm, and slippery to afford him safety." 176 It noted that
since Arnault himself said that the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000.00
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to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, there is
therefore no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person
would incriminate him. 177 It held that it is not enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of his liability, thus:
. . . [T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to
the court, from all the circumstances and from the whole case, as well as from his
general conception of the relations of the witness . . . The fact that the testimony
of the witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not su cient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment
for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some
fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure
immunity to a third person. 178
The conduct of legislative investigation is also subject to the rules of each House. In
the House of Representatives, 180 an inquiry may be initiated or conducted by a committee
motu proprio on any matter within its jurisdiction upon a majority vote of all its Members
181 or upon order of the House of Representatives 182 through:
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon
the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by
the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond
that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. 203 They
contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President's veto
authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of
government. 204 Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers
as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too
much power. 205 They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee
investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making
authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take
effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of
congressional intent. 206 In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate
prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue
that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy
control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out
that legislative veto "is the most e cient means Congress has yet devised to retain
control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute." 2 0 7
I n Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha , 208 the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the
immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a
resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge reopened
the deportation proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien's appeal, holding that it
had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of
Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to order
the alien's deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on
separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the
Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the
provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house
veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the
procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of
both Houses and presentment to the President. Thus:
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2)
reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to
exercise power de ned in Art I, § 8, cl 4, to "establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering
the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General,
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Executive Branch o cials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch. Section
244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House Congress to require the Attorney
General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would be
canceled under § 244. The one-House veto operated in these cases to overrule the
Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House action,
Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action
altered Chadha's status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is con rmed
by the character of the congressional action it supplants. Neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in §
244(c)(2), either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require
the Attorney General, in exercise of legislatively delegated authority, had
determined the alien should remain in the United States. Without the challenged
provision in § 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only by legislation
requiring deportation. Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)
(2) cannot be justi ed as an attempt at amending the standards set out in §
244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal
of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art I.
The nature of the decision implemented by one-House veto in these cases
further manifests its legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy,
time-consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to
delegate to the Executive Branch, and speci cally to the Attorney General, the
authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain speci ed
circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely
the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the
procedures set out in Art I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on
Chadha's deportation — that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha — no less
than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to
make decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in
only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.
Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is
legislatively altered or revoked. 209
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum
decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 210 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act of 1980. 211 Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes
containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the
approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of
Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised. 212
Given the concept and con guration of the power of congressional oversight, the
next level of inquiry is whether congress exceeded its permissible exercise in the case at
bar. But before proceeding, a discussion of the nature and powers of the Commission on
Elections as provided in the 1987 Constitution is decisive to the issue.
Congressional Oversight and COMELEC
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional body exclusively
charged with the enforcement and administration of "all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall," 213 and is invested
with the power to decide all questions affecting elections save those involving the right to
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vote. 214
Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage, 215 the
COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government. 216 Originally, the power to enforce our election laws
was vested with the President and exercised through the Department of the Interior.
According to Dean Sinco, 217 however, the view ultimately emerged that an independent
body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of
our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.
T h e shift to a modi ed parliamentary system with the adoption of the 1973
Constitution did not alter the character of COMELEC as an independent body. 218 Indeed, a
"de nite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as
the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and
honest elections" has been observed. 219 The 1973 Constitution broadened the power of
the COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all election contests relating to the election,
returns and quali cations of members of the national legislature and elective provincial
and city o cials. 220 Thus, the COMELEC was given judicial power aside from its
traditional administrative and executive functions.
The trend towards strengthening the COMELEC continued with the 1987
Constitution. Today, the COMELEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election
contests involving regional, provincial and city elective o cials are under its exclusive
original jurisdiction while all contests involving elective municipal and barangay o cials
are under its appellate jurisdiction. 221
Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the independence of the
COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of government. While
the President appoints the Commissioners with the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the President in the discharge
of their functions. They have a fixed tenure and are removable only by impeachment. 222 To
ensure that not all Commissioners are appointed by the same President at any one time, a
staggered system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the Commissioners rst
appointed, three shall hold o ce for seven years, three for ve years, and the last three for
three years. 223 Reappointment and temporary designation or appointment is prohibited.
2 2 4 In case of vacancy, the appointee shall only serve the unexpired term of the
predecessor. 2 2 5 The COMELEC is likewise granted the power to promulgate its own rules
of procedure, 226 and to appoint its own o cials and employees in accordance with Civil
Service laws. 227
The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. This
Court has no general power of supervision over the Commission on Elections except those
speci cally granted by the Constitution. 228 As such, the Rules of Court are not applicable
to the Commission on Elections. 229 In addition, the decisions of the COMELEC are
reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of discretion, 230 viz:
Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the
sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed
concomitant powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest
measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means
in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the
democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its members should be free from all
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suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have
had stints in the arena of politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve
as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and consideration that the
Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same manner that the
Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members drawn from the
political ranks or even from the military is at all times deemed insulated from
every degree or form of external pressure and in uence as well as improper
internal motivations that could arise from such background or orientation.
We hold, therefore, that under the existing constitutional and statutory
provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings and decisions
of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be con ned to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial
denial of due process. 231
This statutory power was elevated to a constitutional status with the insertion of the
word "regulations" in Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law" and had the power to
deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government
for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and under the 1973
Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the consent or at the
instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform such other
functions as may be provided by law," it was not expressly vested with the power
to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That power could
only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the necessary
implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "
[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law."
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the
power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section
2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." ( italics
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions.
It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into
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account the Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said Constitution was
drafted and ratified, to:
xxx xxx xxx
"Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this
Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer. .
. ."
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the
aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more exible
powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative
intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes,
Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution
envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of
the people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a
peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
237
The elevation of the COMELEC's power to promulgate rules and regulations in the
1987 Constitution is suffused with signi cance. Heretofore, it was Congress that granted
COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations, and hence, Congress can
withdraw or restrict it by the exercise of its veto or oversight power. Under the 1987
Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations has been directly granted by
the Constitution and no longer by Congress. Undoubtedly, the power was granted to
COMELEC to strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by
Congress. Under any lens, Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 constitute undue
restrictions on the constitutional power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and
regulations for such rules are made subject to the prior review and approval of Congress.
The impugned provisions can result in the denial of this constitutionally conferred power
because Congress can veto the rules and regulations the COMELEC has promulgated.
Thus, I respectfully submit that Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting
Congress the power to review, revise, amend and approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known as subordinate legislations in other
countries, are unconstitutional.
I now come to Section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:
Sec. 17. Voting by mail. —
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting
by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries
that satisfy the following conditions:
(d) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to
prevent occasion of fraud;
(e) Where there exists a technically established identi cation system
that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
(f) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments
concerned are adequate and well-secured.
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Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Oversight Committee. (italics supplied)
From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has already set the necessary standards
to guide the COMELEC in identifying the countries where voting by mail may be allowed,
viz: (1) the countries must have a mailing system which is fairly developed and secure to
prevent occasion of fraud; (2) there exists a technically established identi cation that
would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and (3) where the system of reception and
custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service
establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Since the legislative standards have been de ned, all that remains is their
enforcement. Our Constitution has speci cally given the COMELEC the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The power is
exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be subject to review and revision or
veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight power. Again, the reason for the
exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this
exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded considerable latitude. Unless the
means and methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of
discretion, they should not be interfered with. 238 Thus:
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and
experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good
government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct
of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we must not by
any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to
the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution,
requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but rmly in appropriate cases. We are not
satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases. 2 3 9
I join the majority in holding that Section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 is
unconstitutional for it allows Congress to negate the exclusive power of the COMELEC to
administer and enforce election laws and regulations granted by the Constitution itself.
This is not to maintain that the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the COMELEC, or the system it devised to implement voting by mail cannot be challenged.
If they are illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the courts can strike them down
in an appropriate case. This power is vested to the courts under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution de ning the scope of judicial power, and more speci cally under Section
5, Article VIII empowering this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or a rm on appeal
or certiorari, "all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question." Again, this power is exclusive and is not meant to be shared by
any other branch or agency of the government.
In sum, it is my humble view that in the case at bar, Congress exceeded the
permissible exercise of its oversight powers for the following reasons: (1) it restricts the
COMELEC's constitutional grant of power to promulgate rules and regulations; and (2) it
invades COMELEC's exclusive constitutional domain to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
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I wish to stress, however, that granting the petition will not invalidate the entire Rep.
Act No. 9189. It does not also mean that all overseas Filipinos cannot vote. The law affects
two classes of overseas Filipinos: (1) those who remain a domiciliary of the Philippines but
were absent at the time of the elections either brie y or for a long time; and (2) those who
are now considered domiciled in foreign countries. To the rst class of overseas Filipinos
belong the contract workers, students, members of the diplomatic corps and their
families, businessmen, and the like. To the second class belong Filipinos who are
considered immigrants or permanent residents of foreign countries. The constitutional
challenge in the case at bar appertains only to the inclusion of the second category of
overseas Filipinos in the coverage of Rep. Act No. 9189. Likewise, the challenge on the
exercise of Congressional oversight power over the COMELEC does not taint the core of
the law. It merely affects the procedure in adopting the mechanisms to implement the law.
It cannot void the whole law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I dissent from the majority's ruling upholding the
constitutionality of Section 5 (d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a
permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators
and Party-List Representatives after executing the required a davit. I concur, however,
with the majority's ruling upholding the constitutionality of Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No.
9189 with respect to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for Senators and Party-List Representatives but not as to the power to canvass
the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I also
concur with the majority with respect to the unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25
of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail, and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by
COMELEC, to prior review and approval by Congress.
I so vote.
R.A. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, has
spurred quite a debate among various sectors of Philippine society, both locally and
abroad. Scholarly arguments on the ne legal points of the issues presented by this
disputed law have been presented by sides both for and against it, saddled, unfortunately,
with a heavy dose of bitter emotion.
The paramount consideration in any legal debate over this contentious piece of
legislation is its constitutional validity. Signi cantly, the short article on suffrage in the
Constitution concentrates on who may exercise the right to vote. 1 The Constitution
underscores three categories on the quali cations required of voters — citizenship, age
and residence. 2 Congress is authorized to limit the number of citizens who may exercise
the right to vote by prescribing reasonable disquali cations. It is elementary, however, that
Congress cannot expand the right of suffrage by including those who do not possess the
constitutional requirements. To do so would defeat the very purpose why quali cations
are singled out for constitutional attention. The sovereign will has determined that only
those with the requisite citizenship, age, and residence may vote. Congress cannot water
down or change the constitutional requirements.
The controversial issue in this case revolves around the constitutional provision on
absentee voting which states:
Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
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sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by quali ed
Filipinos abroad. 3
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion because R.A. 9189 grants the
right of suffrage to a category of voters who do not possess the constitutional
requirement of residence. These are men and women who are still Filipino citizens but who
have voluntarily and unambiguously chosen actual, physical, and permanent residence in a
foreign country. In other words, the questioned law allows non-residents to vote.
As phrased, Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189 grants to Filipinos who are immigrants or
permanent residents of another country, and who are considered as such by their host
country, the option to exercise their right of suffrage. This would be accomplished by the
mere expedient of:
1. Registering as voters.
2. Execution of an affidavit declaring that:
a. She shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of her
registration;
b. She has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Proponents of R.A. 9189 are trying to construe Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution as a proviso which expands and enlarges the scope of the preceding section.
They overlook the fact that while Section 2 provides a system for absentee voting, any
absentee who votes must rst meet the quali cations found in Section 1 of the same
article.
As stated by the petitioner, 4 if the framers of the Constitution intended to make
Section 2 of Article V a proviso or exception to its rst section, they should have added it
to the latter.
Section 1 would have incorporated as its last clause the following proviso:
Provided, the Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by
Filipino citizens who are residing abroad.
The Constitution does not make the absentee voting provision a mere proviso of the
rst section on residence quali cations. Together with the system which secures the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, the provision on absentee voting is an entirely distinct
and separate section which allows only those quali ed under Section 1 to take advantage
of the privilege under Section 2.
The o ce of a proviso is to limit the application of a section or provision or to
qualify or restrain its generality. 5 However, a proviso may also enlarge what otherwise is a
phrase of limited import had there been no proviso qualifying it. 6
Since the provision on absentee voting in R.A. 9189 neither limits nor enlarges a
provision of which it is a part, the phrase "quali ed Filipinos abroad" can be interpreted
only to mean that those who are quali ed to vote under the preceding section may
become absentee voters. They must possess on election day the constitutional
requirements as to citizenship, age and residence.
Proponents of R.A. 9189 try to go around the statute's constitutional in rmity by
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giving the word "resident" or "resided" a labored and far-fetched meaning. They use the
fanciful interpretation that immigrants who have moved lock, stock, and barrel to
permanently live in another country are still domiciled in the Philippines.
The tens, if not hundreds of millions of overseas Chinese who have migrated to
other lands may be cited as examples. Even after living in their countries of choice for two
or three generations, they maintain their Chinese identities through clannishness and
language. They take pride in the slow emergence of the old country into a democratic and
powerful economic force in world affairs. By no stretch of legal ction, however, can they
be deemed residents of mainland China. They have chosen to live in adopted homelands,
have become integral and, many times, leading members of their communities, and will be
buried there when the time comes. Unless the Chinese basic law allows non-residents to
vote in China, they cannot vote there. A similar diaspora caused by economic, population,
and other pressures has led millions of Filipinos to move to other countries. Considering
the constitutional provision on who may vote in Philippine elections, a distinction has to be
made between those temporarily living and working abroad and those who have opted to
permanently reside there. This Court must hew to reality. It should not engage in fanciful or
strained interpretations to try to pass off as Philippine residents the more than 2,000,000
immigrants who have chosen to permanently reside in other countries. Only a
constitutional amendment, not an enactment of Congress, can lift the consequences of the
distinction.
It is well-settled that in election law, the terms "residence" and "domicile" are used
interchangeably. 7 Having in mind the meaning of these terms as they are understood in
jurisprudence, we can close our eyes and easily conclude that the exercise of the right of
suffrage by Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents abroad is warranted
and that the process provided for in R.A. 9189 is sound. Unfortunately, such a conclusion
would be erroneous.
"Domicile" denotes a xed permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. 8 On the other hand, we have held
that the residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or abode. It does not mean xed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning. 9 This last, of course, refers to the animus
revertendi which is determinative of domicile.
We must de ne another term: immigrant. According to Caasi v. CA , 10 an immigrant
is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. 11 This is
why it was held therein that, having taken up such permanent residence in a country other
than the Philippines, the immigrant abandons his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
In its common usage "immigrant" is one who comes to settle in a country which is
not one's own. "Immigration" is entrance into a country for the purpose of settling there.
"Migrate" means to move from one place of abode to another; to leave one's country to
settle in another. 12
There is always the concept of permanent movement inherent in the word
"immigration." From as early as 1572 to the present, the meaning of "settle" has been to x
or establish permanently one's abode, residence, etc. 13
Taking these de nitions into account, we must now turn to the rst tool we have to
aid us in our quest to understand this vague provision of our fundamental law; the
proceedings and debates of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It can be seen from the
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records thereof that only Filipino citizens temporarily residing abroad can avail of the
option to vote as absentee voters.
With all due respect, it is not accurate to conclude that the debates, interpellations,
and opinions on absentee voting expressed in the records of the Constitutional
Commission easily and unequivocally show that Congress is empowered to enact a law
allowing immigrants to continue to vote in Philippine elections. Much less is there any
room for interpretation that an immigrant who makes the facile promise to return and
permanently reside in the Philippines not later than three years from voting, may be
deemed a permanent resident or domiciled both in this country and in the city or
municipality where he will vote.
During the deliberations on the subject provision, Commissioner Blas Ople had this
to say:
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said
that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage
for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship
notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient
foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure of economic
necessity here, nd that they have to detach themselves from their families to
work in other countries with de nite tenures of employment. Many of them are on
contract employment for one, two or three years. They have no intention of
changing their residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disquali ed
from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of destination by the
residential requirement in Section 1 . . . (Italics supplied) 14
When the term "absentee voting" was introduced into the provision, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado made sure that the provision's intended meaning was not lost:
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MR. REGALADO: When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my
proposed amendment, I speci cally stated that the National Assembly shall
prescribe a system which will enable quali ed citizens, temporarily absent from
the Philippines, to vote. According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the
phrase "absentee voting" already took that into account as its meaning. That is
referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD: Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect
to registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to
require where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who
may be continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of
registration in the embassies. However, we do not like to preempt the legislative
assembly. (Italics supplied) 17
Ultimately, the Commissioners' deliberations and debates left little doubt as to who
will be allowed to exercise the option to vote as an absentee voter. We can glean as much
from the following exchange:
MR. REGALADO: I just want to make a note on the statement of
Commissioner Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The
understanding in the amendment is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He
may not be actually residing abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It
just so happens that the day before the elections he has to y to the United
States, so he could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing
there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back. This is not limited only to
Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on
the date of the elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in
that situation.
MR. SUAREZ: I thank the Commissioner for his further clari cation on
record.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, to clarify what we mean by temporarily
abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is
possible that his residence is in Angeles and he would be able to vote for the
candidates in Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure
for registration, like listing one's name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad.
That is still possible under this system. (Italics supplied) 18
It is patent from the foregoing excerpts that the Commissioners took pains to
ensure that the reasoning behind Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution would not be
misunderstood. They never intended to accord a special status nor give special
consideration to Filipinos who have become permanent residents of their host countries.
These necessarily include immigrants.
Juxtaposing these de nitions found in our jurisprudence with the evident intent of
the framers of our Constitution, it is plain to see that Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189, in its
current form is unconstitutional. It seeks to grant the bene ts of absentee voting to those
for whom it was never intended: Filipinos who are permanent residents, necessarily
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including immigrants, of countries other than their own.
The majority claims that striking down Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189 would deprive
Filipinos abroad of a very important choice. On the one hand, they can waive their right to
vote and continue to enjoy their status as immigrants or permanent residents of their host
country. On the other, they can manifest their intent to return to the Philippines in a sworn
statement within 3 years from the approval of their registration as absentee voters. This is,
of course, a super uous exercise. What needs to be decided? "These immigrants and
permanent resident of their host countries have already made their choice. They decided
to move on to "greener pastures" rather than to cast their lot here with their countrymen.
The long lines of applicants patiently and meekly waiting for months or years to be
granted immigrant visas by foreign embassies is strongly indicative of their determination
to permanently reside abroad. Granted, they had very good reasons, even downright
pressing or urgent ones, to leave their homes for cold, far-off lands. However, they made
their choices willingly and, undoubtedly, with full knowledge that they sacri ce some of
their rights and privileges as citizens and residents of our republic.
We know all too well the sacri ces our overseas brothers and sisters have endured
to make better lives for themselves and their families, and if they are happy where they are,
then we are genuinely happy for them. The sincerity of their concern for the motherland, as
well as the nobility of their sentiments, have never been in question. However, if they feel
they have to manifest such concern for the welfare of their country by casting their votes in
our country's elections, then they should do what the Constitution commands. They should
come home.
I also take issue with the majority's claim that the threat of disenfranchisement will
be a su cient deterrent against the possibility of any absentee voter reneging on his
promise to return to the Philippines within 3 years from registration as an absentee voter.
However, as I mentioned above, is it not conceivable that these immigrants or permanent
residents of their host countries knew fully well that they would never again be able to
exercise the right of suffrage when they sought permanent residence abroad? If they were
willing to sacri ce the exercise of this right then, what is to stop them from doing so in the
future? Not much, for if they register as absentee voters and participate in our electoral
process, they have nothing to lose. They can decide to hold true to their oath and come
home to permanently reside here within three years of their registration as absentee
voters. Alternatively, they can vote during the elections and never set foot on Philippine soil
ever again. What will they lose by exercising this second option? They risk losing the right
to vote in Philippine elections; a right which they forfeited a long time ago.
It is unfortunate that R.A. 9189, in its present form, is saddled with so many
in rmities. Sadder still is the fact these problems could have been avoided at the drafting
stage. Evidently, these issues were brought to the attention of the Senate by Senator Joker
Arroyo, as far back as the period for committee amendments. Although the eminent
Senator's remarks were originally in response to the proposal to provide for voter
registration by mail, his parting words on the subject for his colleagues in the Senate
capture the true intent behind the Constitutional provision on absentee voting. Fortunately,
the Record of Senate has chronicled them for posterity, thus:
Now my concern here is this; that while we would like absentee voting, we
do not want the process to be used by some enterprising people to alter the vote.
What am I trying to say? All our compatriots abroad, well, they cannot be bought.
They will vote honestly. The question is, just like here, after casting their votes, will
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the results be honest and re ective of the honest vote made by the absentee
voters? That is really the question.
xxx xxx xxx
In our over-eagerness to follow the Constitutional provision, we nd gaps
in the process. So I agree with Senator Angara when I say that the registration
must be here, they must first register, and it is not really that difficult because they
come home every now and then. These are Filipinos who come every now and
then. But for Filipinos, for instance, who have lived 20 years abroad, is that
difficult to figure out?
Must we really solicit and ask them to vote when they have lived there
already for 20 years? We have dual citizenship. While we grant them the dual
citizenship, ne. But for a person who has been there for 20 years and has not
even come back here, that is too much.
It is like that. How can we grant the right to vote to those who do not care
to come home and visit? Come home and visit, then they get the right to vote. But
if they do not even visit and then they will say they will le their application to
vote, having grown up all these years in the United States, how is that? I mean,
these are the things that we have to consider because I, for one, cannot go
against the Constitutional command because that is what the Constitution says
— we must provide for absentee voting.
So, the proposition that I have offered is that when they come home, it is
very easy. They just go up to the election registrar; they register there. They do not
even have to ask so many questions. But at least, they are thumbmarked, their
signatures are there, then the details are there.
These are the things. Because, Mr. President, if some of our overseas
brothers commit election crimes abroad, they cannot be prosecuted in the
Philippines. Let us face that. Why? Because all they have to do is not come home.
Then we will have another Mark Jimenez, perhaps, I do not know. But when they
come here and register, there is a certain attachment to us, and it is not too
difficult.
Look at our overseas workers, for instance, in the Middle East. Everyday,
we go to the airport and we see their groups of overseas workers coming home.
So, all we are telling them is: "All right, you go to your respective towns.
When you go there, just spend 15 minutes."
Mr. President, if these overseas workers or compatriots of ours do not want
to go there and spend 15 minutes, how can we give them the right to vote? I
mean, there must also be some external manifestation on the part of our overseas
friends that they do want to vote. And they do so because they take time, they
take pains to register. If they do not want to take time and pains to register, they
just say: "Oh, no. We give you money there, so you better give us the ballots." I
mean, it is not fair.
What we want is to fashion a bill that would also show that the overseas
voter has some attachment to the Philippines. (Italics supplied). 21