Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Laureano vs. CA
Laureano vs. CA
114776 February 2, 2000 On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300
conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course,
vs. plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
respondents. commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D",
"E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting
seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were
1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11).
28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration. Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of
the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466,
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are Rec.)
as follows:
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did
Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17
its Area Manager in Manila. excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant
wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective
captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu
1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not
1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month
was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo). notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment, Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.). before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction
grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp.
Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.). 1-10, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging
tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board headed by case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded. case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal
together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs
employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since Costs against defendant.
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant SO ORDERED.2
postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.). Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised
the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial
a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a court, thus,
civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of
specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on . . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four
the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.) Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
(pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
95 ibid.)
SO ORDERED.3
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration
barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and were denied.
that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of
plaintiff. The dispositive portion of which reads: 1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO
Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR
defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of — YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate 2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
of exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT
of exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9.
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show claim was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining
which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially Agreement, the Court held:
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the . . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application
applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. only to "money claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers
The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
applied.4 Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its
appeal before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special
when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of law applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations;
jurisdiction.6 thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general
law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's
appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination
years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective
dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial
Court, had already prescribed. In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz: plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee- We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which
employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which governs under this
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise jurisdiction.
they shall be forever barred.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when
xxx xxx xxx he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc.,
been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten- vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil
year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its
invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the
while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12
Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-
employer relations.9 Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to
retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the employment
contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree
with the Court of Appeals when it said, ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties.
From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to SO ORDERED.
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer
of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision
is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation.
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent
court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its
findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude
that petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause,
for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by
respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt