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ECMC Appeal
ECMC Appeal
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Debtor.
Plaintiff,
v.
Defendants.
Bankr.Proc.Rule 8004, hereby applies for leave to appeal the interlocutory portion of the “Order
Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff and Discharging Debtor’s Student Loan Under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)” dated January 7, 2020 [Docket No. 68] (the “Bankruptcy Court Order”).
Plaintiff Kevin Jared Rosenberg and ECMC brought cross-motions for summary judgment
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before the Honorable Cecelia G. Morris, Chief United States Bankruptcy Court Judge. The
Bankruptcy Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denied ECMC’s motion
for summary judgment. The denial of ECMC’s summary judgment motion is the interlocutory
portion of the Bankruptcy Court Order that is the subject of this motion.
The facts underlying ECMC’s summary judgment motion are not in dispute. Plaintiff is a
46-year-old, healthy individual with no dependents. He is college-educated, with B.A. and J.D.
degrees – the latter of which was financed through federal student loans currently held by
ECMC. Plaintiff is licensed to practice law in the states of New York and New Jersey. He
voluntarily left his first job as an associate attorney at a law firm after only 2 ½ months because
he did not find the work interesting. Plaintiff, with the exception of a brief period of working as
a part-time contract attorney, has not sought any other employment in the legal profession and
has no intention of ever doing so. The record contains an uncontroverted vocational expert
evaluation which demonstrates that earning opportunities abound for Plaintiff in the legal
profession. Instead of pursuing those opportunities available to him, and paying back his
taxpayer-backed federal student loans, Plaintiff, for the past 10 years, has held various positions
in the outdoor adventure industry, including starting up and running his own tour guide business.
Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a student loan debt is not
dischargeable unless “excepting such debt from discharge…will impose an undue hardship on
the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The Second Circuit adopted the
Brunner standard for “undue hardship.” Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re
Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Under the Brunner test, a debtor claiming
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal”
standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that
additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor
Id. at 396. Over the next twenty years, seven other federal circuits followed suit, adopting
Brunner as the test for determining undue hardship. Along the way, a breadth of case law has
emerged. Because Congress selected the word ‘undue,’ the required hardship under Section 523
must be more than the usual hardship that accompanies bankruptcy. Inability to pay one’s debts
by itself cannot be sufficient to establish an undue hardship; otherwise all bankruptcy litigants
would have an undue hardship. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d
The Bankruptcy Court in the case at hand rejected 32 years of case law applying the
Brunner test in order to determine, on summary judgment, that Plaintiff met his burden to
establish an undue hardship, thereby discharging Plaintiff’s entire student loan debt of
approximately $221,385.
Should ECMC be granted leave to appeal the interlocutory portion of the Bankruptcy
Court Order; namely, the portion of the order denying ECMC’s motion for summary judgment?
ECMC seeks reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of its motion for summary
judgment.
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Plaintiff and ECMC brought cross-motions for summary judgment on the same statute,
Review of the cross-motions for summary judgment require analysis of the same statute, the
same set of caselaw, and application of the same test. The issues presented by both motions are
inextricably bound.
While the portion of the order denying ECMC’s motion for summary judgment is not a
final decision of the bankruptcy court, and not generally appealable under normal circumstances,
in situations where the reviewing court is reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, the
district court may exercise its discretion to review the otherwise unappealable order in the
interests of judicial economy. See Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 1988), Gary
Friedrich Enterprises, LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 320 (2d Cir. 2013).
Kenneth L. Baum
Law Offices of Kenneth L. Baum LLC
167 Main Street
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Telephone: (201) 853-3030
Facsimile: (201) 584-0297
[email protected]
EXHIBIT A
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FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------X
: Chapter 7
In re: :
: Case No. 18-35379 (CGM)
Kevin Jared Rosenberg, :
:
Petitioner. :
:
--------------------------------------------------------------X
:
Kevin Jared Rosenberg, : Adv. No. 18-09023 (CGM)
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
:
N.Y. State Higher Education Services Corp., et. al, :
:
Defendants. :
:
--------------------------------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
CECELIA G. MORRIS
CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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The Petitioner, Kevin Jared Rosenberg, brings this summary judgment asking the Court
dischargeable, pursuant to § 523(a)(8). For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Decision,
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary
judgment is denied.
Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), 28 U.S.C. §
157(a) and the Standing Order of Reference signed by Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska dated
January 31, 2012. This is a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) (determinations as
Background
Petitioner filed a petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 12,
2018. Vol. Pet., No. 18-35379-cgm, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2018), ECF No. 1. The
Petitioner received a discharge of his debts on July 26, 2019. Order Dischrg., No. 18-35379-cgm,
On June 18, 2018, the Petitioner 1 filed this adversary proceeding to have his student loan
debt declared dischargeable, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Complt., Adv. No. 18-09023-
cgm, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2018), ECF. No. 1. 2 On November 14, 2018, the parties
entered into a consent order, which authorized ECMC to intervene in this adversary proceeding
as the “holder[] of one … federal consolidation loan owed by Plaintiff” (“Student Loan”) ECF
No. 18.
1
Petitioner is pro se. As such, this Court will “liberally construe” his documents as required by the Supreme Court
in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
2
All citations to ECF that do not contain a case number are to the docket of this adversary proceeding, No. 18-
09023-cgm.
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Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgement (the “Motion,” ECF No. 44) on August
27, 2019. ECMC filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgement and opposition to Petitioner’s
motion (the “Cross Motion,” ECF No. 49) on October 8, 2019. The parties agree that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that this issue is ripe for summary judgment. See Motion;
The Court held a hearing on October 29, 2019 and asked the parties to provide the Court
with evidence as to the current promissory note, the current terms of the loan, the current
principal balance, and a payment history. ECMC filed a response which contains payment
history since consolidation of the loan. “Supp. Resp.”, ECF No. 58.
Petitioner began borrowing money to fund his education in August 1993. Supp. Resp.,
Ex. B (loan history). From 1993 until 1996, Petitioner continued to borrow money to pay for his
undergraduate education at the University of Arizona. Id. After obtaining a Bachelor of Arts
degree in History, he served in the United States Navy on active duty for five years. Counter-
Statement of Mat. Facts ¶ 5, ECF No. 49, Ex. 3. After completing his tour of duty, Petitioner
attended Cardozo Law School at Yeshiva University where he applied for and received
additional student loans to cover his tuition and board from 2001 through 2004. Supp. Resp., Ex.
B (loan history). After graduating from law school, Petitioner consolidated his Student Loan on
April 22, 2005 in the original principal amount of $116,464.75. The total outstanding balance of
this Student Loan as of November 19, 2019 was $221,385.49 with an interest rate of 3.38% per
annum. Id. ¶ 12. The dischargeability of this Student Loan is the subject of these summary
judgment motions.
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Discussion
Summary Judgment Standard
proceeding, summary judgment should be granted to the moving party if the Court determines
that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The materiality of facts must be determined with reference to the
governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact
is material only if it affects the result of the proceeding and a fact is in dispute only when the
opposing party submits evidence such that a trial would be required to resolve the differences.”
A movant has the initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. A moving party may obtain summary judgment by
showing that little or no evidence may be found in support of the nonmoving party’s case. Gallo
v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223–24 (2d Cir.1994). The non-
moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
material facts.” Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir.1997). The nonmoving party should
oppose the motion for summary judgment with evidence that is admissible at trial. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)(1); Crawford v. Dep’t of Investigation, 324 F. App’x 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2009)
testimony from uncorroborated source, as well as “speculation, hearsay and other inadmissible
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A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt—unless excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents, for—
(A)
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in
section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who
is an individual.
Both the Petitioner and ECMC agree that the proper test to be applied in this instance is
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a
“minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to
repay the loans;
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and
(3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.
Id.
Brunner has received a lot of criticism for creating too high of a burden for most
bankruptcy petitioners to meet. For petitioners like Brunner, who filed for bankruptcy
approximately seven months after receiving a degree, the Brunner test is difficult to meet. See,
e.g., Gesinde v. U.S. Dep’t. of Ed. (In re Gesinde). 2019 WL 5090080, No. 18-01434 (Bankr.
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S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2019) (denying discharge of student loans where petitioner files for
bankruptcy less than one year after graduating from school). However, for a multitude of
petitioners like Mr. Rosenberg, who have been out of school and struggling with student loan
debt for many years, the test itself is fairly straight-forward and simple.
The harsh results that often are associated with Brunner are actually the result of cases
interpreting Brunner. Over the past 32 years, many cases have pinned on Brunner punitive
standards that are not contained therein. See Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 B.R.
128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (coining the infamous and oft-repeated term “certainty of
hopelessness” 3 but not applying the Brunner test, which was established six years later); see also
Jean-Baptiste v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Jean-Baptiste), 2018 WL 1267944, *10
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2018) (requiring proof of a “certainty of hopelessness” despite the
plain and straightforward language of Brunner). Those retributive dicta were then applied and
reapplied so frequently in the context of Brunner that they have subsumed the actual language of
the Brunner test. They have become a quasi-standard of mythic proportions so much so that
To this end, some courts have even called it “bad faith” when someone struggling with
repaying a student loan attempts to discharge that debt in bankruptcy court. 4 See In re L.K., 351
B.R. 45, 55-56 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying discharge to debtor whose student loan debt
constituted 70% of debt scheduled in bankruptcy case); Holzer v. Wachovia Servs., Inc. (In re
3
Of course, a harsh standard made sense when student loans were fully dischargeable after making only five years
of payments and when the total due on the loan was approximately $9,000 for both undergraduate and graduate
student loans. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Ed. Serv’s. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R.753, 753 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
4
The Court is not insinuating that filing a bankruptcy petition in order to rid oneself of a crushing $300,000+ of
student loan debt could ever be considered “bad faith.” Bankruptcy is an available and beneficial option for anyone
struggling with debt and a petitioner under the Bankruptcy Code always has the option to come before the Court and
ask, in good faith, that a debt be discharged—no matter what kind of debt it is.
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Holzer), 33 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (good faith prong not satisfied where student
loans were only debts listed in debtor’s schedules); D’Ettore v. DeVry Inst. of Tech. (In re
D’Ettore), 106 B.R. 715, 719 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (dismissing debtor’s complaint where
This Court will not participate in perpetuating these myths. See Krieger v. Educs. Credit
Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2013) (“It is important not to allow judicial glosses . . .
to supersede the statute itself.”). Rather, this Court will apply the Brunner test as it was
originally intended.
Brunner Test
1. Whether the Petitioner cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a
“minimal” standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay the
loans.
Under the first prong of the test, the Court must determine “that the debtor cannot
maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for [him]self
and h[is] dependents if forced to repay the loans.” Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
It should be noted that the test asks the Court to base its determination as to whether Petitioner
can maintain a “minimal” standard of living using only Petitioner’s “current income and
expenses.” Id.
Section 707(b)(2) codifies the “means test,” which is a formula that calculates a
deducting statutorily specified allowable expenses, secured debt payments, and priority debt
payments from current monthly income. In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2009). “Current monthly income” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) as the average monthly
income of a debtor from all sources in the six-month period prior to commencement of the
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bankruptcy case. The authorized deductions from current monthly income are detailed in §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii-iv).
Here, Petitioner’s means test lists his monthly income as $3,136.24 and his annual
income as $37,634.88. Ch.7 Stmt. Current Monthly Income, No. 18-35379-cgm (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y), ECF No. 1. Petitioner lists his income and expenses on schedules I &J as: $2,456.24
(income) and $4005.00 (expenses). Sched. I & J, No. 18-35379-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y), ECF
No. 1. Leaving the Petitioner with a current monthly income of -$1,548.74 at the time of filing.
Thus, Petitioner has declared under penalty of perjury that he has negative income each month.
Id.
The Bankruptcy Code presumes that a petitioner who seeks its protection “will deal
honestly and fairly with creditors by furnishing a complete and accurate schedule of assets.”
Banc. One, Texas, N.A. v. Braymer (In re Braymer), 126 B.R. 499, 503 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he bankruptcy schedules and statement of
financial affairs of a debtor serve a vital role for creditors in a bankruptcy case, in that they
ensure that adequate and truthful information is available to trustees and creditors, not just an
objecting creditor, without the need for further investigation to determine whether or not the
information is true and correct.” Mullen v. Jones (In re Jones), 445 B.R. 677, 726–27
the privilege of discharge.” Schechter v. Hansen (In re Hansen), 325 B.R 746, 757 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2005); see also First United Bank & Trust Co. v. Buescher (In re Buescher), 491 B.R. 419,
432 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2013) (“[C]omplete financial disclosure is a condition precedent to the
privilege of discharge.”). Neither ECMC nor any other party in interest has objected to
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Petitioner’s schedules or means test and Petitioner has received a discharge. Therefore, the
As of the filing of this bankruptcy case, Petitioner’s Student Loan “is currently in
default.” Supp. Resp. ¶ 13. As such, his Student Loan is currently due and payable in the full
amount of $221,385.49, plus interest and costs. Petitioner has successfully proven that he cannot
Petitioner is not currently in a repayment plan nor is he eligible for one. To become
eligible for a monthly repayment plan, Petitioner would have to rehabilitate his loan by agreeing,
in writing, “to make nine voluntary, reasonable and affordable monthly payments within 20 days
of the due date, and make all nine payments during a period of 10 consecutive months.
[Petitioner]’s rehabilitation payment would depend on his current monthly income.” Id. Such an
agreement is not currently before the Court. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672
(2016) (“[A]n unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff's
case.”). And the question of whether the Petitioner could maintain a minimal standard of living
while rehabilitating his Student Loan “is appropriately reserved for a case in which it is not
hypothetical.” Id.
As the Petitioner has a negative income each month, he has no money available to repay
his Student Loan and maintain a “minimal” standard of living. This prong of the test is met.
2. Whether additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely
to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans?
Next, the Court must consider whether “additional circumstances[ 5] exist indicating that
this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
5
In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “the second prong was not
satisfied where the debtor was not disabled or elderly, had no dependents, and no evidence was presented indicating
a total foreclosure of job prospects in her area of training.” Traversa v. Education Credit Management Corp. (In re
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student loans.” Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Brunner
test does not require the Court to make a determination that the Petitioner’s state of affairs are
going to persist forever, as ECMC argues was required in the case of Norasteh v. Boston Univ.
(In re Norasteh), 311 B.R. 671, 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). Nor does the test require that the
Court make a determination about whether the Petitioner’s “state of affairs” was created by
The Court need only consider whether the Petitioner’s present state of affairs is likely to
persist “for a significant portion of the repayment period of the [current contractual] student
loans.” See ABI Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, Final Report of the ABI Commission
Lawless (2019) (recommending that “the court consider ‘the debt’ and not some different
contract the debtor and the creditor might have made under different circumstances.”).
Here, the repayment period has ended. Petitioner is in default and his loan was
accelerated. As of November 19, 2019, Petitioner is responsible for the repayment of the full
amount of $221,385.49. His circumstances will certainly exist for the remainder of the
repayment period as the repayment period has ended and the loan is due and payable in the full
amount. The second prong of the Brunner test is, therefore, satisfied.
3. Whether the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans?
Turning to the third and final prong, the Court must determine whether “the debtor has
made good faith efforts to repay the loans.” Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added). The
Brunner test asks the Court to look at whether the Petitioner “has made” good faith efforts to
repay the loan, which indicates that the Court should only consider Petitioner’s past (i.e.
Traversa), 444 Fed. Appx. 728 (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2011). Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor Brunner requires that a
Debtor be disabled or elderly. Section 523(a)(8) requires only that a bankruptcy court find that excepting a student
loan debt from discharge would impose an “undue hardship” on a bankruptcy petitioner.
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reasons for filing bankruptcy; how much debt he has; or whether the Petitioner rejected
repayment options. But see Kelly v. Sallie Mae Serv. (In re Kelly), 351 B.R. 45, 54-55 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding debtor failed to show good faith because she rejected consolidation
options).
Based on the loan history provided by ECMC, Petitioner missed only 16 payments in the
almost 13 years since this Student Loan originated in April 2005. Supp. Resp., ECF No. 58. Ex.
E. From April 2005 until April 5, 2015, the loan was in deferment or forbearance. Id. No
payments were due and no late fees were charged. See id. at Exs. E & F. Thus, until April
2015—Petitioner was fully current on this debt and no payments were due. Id.
On April 6, 2015, the loan went into income-based repayment for one year. Id. at Ex. F.
Debtor testified at his deposition that he was to make payments of “$300 a month for the first
year, and it was going to increase by a hundred dollars a month every year thereafter with a
maximum of a thousand dollars a month until it was repaid.” Response, Ex. 2 (Deposition at 154,
¶ 15-19). This has not been refuted by ECMC and matches the Student Loan payment history
provided by ECMC. During the first year of the repayment plan period, Petitioner made six
payments of varying amounts. Supp. Resp., Ex. E. (On May 26, 2015, Petitioner makes a
payment of $229.31; $500 on August 14, 2015; $300 on October 14, 2015; $346.55 on
His income-based repayment plan ended in April 2016 and the account was in
forbearance again from April 6, 2016 through October 5, 2016. Id. Despite the fact that no
payments were due, Petitioner continued making payments. Id. (On April 19, 2016, Petitioner
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makes a payment of $700; On July 18, 2018, Petitioner makes a payment of $50; On September
The Petitioner’s Student Loan entered into standard repayment period on October 6, 2016
and the Petitioner made one additional payment of $100 on February 19, 2017. Id. On January 8,
2018, account entered default and was paid in full by the guarantor. Id.
Petitioner made 10 payments, in varying amounts, during the 26 months that the
Petitioner was responsible for making payments, which is approximately a 40% rate of payment
over a thirteen-year period. Additionally, the Petitioner did not sit back for 20 years but made a
good faith effort to repay his Student Loan. He actively called and requested forbearance on at
least five separate occasions, all of which were granted by the servicer. See Ex. F.
The Petitioner has demonstrated a good faith effort to repay the loan and has satisfied the
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has satisfied the Brunner test. Based on the
foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Student Loan imposes an undue hardship on the