DIGEST - Bagaporo v. PP Case (BIGAMY) JAN 2019
DIGEST - Bagaporo v. PP Case (BIGAMY) JAN 2019
PEOPLE
G.R. No. 211829, January 30, 2019
FACTS:
Petitioner was indicted for Bigamy in an Information4 dated May 31, 2006, worded as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of September 1991, in the Municipality of Calauag,
province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Jacinto Bagaporo, being then legally married to one Dennia Dumlao in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on March 10, 1986 at Quezon City by Judge Perfecto
Laguio, Jr., and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did
then and there willfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously contract a second and subsequent
marriage with Milagros Lumas. Contrary to law.5
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy.
Petitioner appealed his conviction. According to the petitioner, his then counsel of record, Atty. Cerdon,
broached the idea that he might want to engage a new lawyer based near in Manila to henceforth handle
the appeal. This allegedly prompted the petitioner to consult his present counsel, Atty. Causing, in January
of 2013. Atty. Causing advised the petitioner to secure first Atty. Cerdon's formal withdrawal as counsel.
Nonetheless, upon Atty. Causing's advice and assistance, ostensibly as collaborating counsel, petitioner
filed a Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC. Copies of
both motions were allegedly furnished to Atty. Cerdon when the petitioner visited the former's office. It was
then that petitioner supposedly clarified with Atty. Cerdon's secretary that Atty. Cerdon remained to be his
counsel of record to take charge of the appeal before the CA, notwithstanding Atty. Causing's engagement
to pursue post-judgment remedies before the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner was, thus, required by the CA to file an appeal brief. The notice was received by
Atty. Cerdon. The CA dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to file the required appellant's brief. Entry of
Judgment then followed after the dismissal became final.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed in the same case a "Petition for Relief from Resolution or Judgment in Case
Entry was Already Ordered", alleging gross negligence on the part of Atty. Cerdon. Treated as a petition
for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the petition was denied by the CA. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration8 which the CA denied for utter lack of merit. Hence, petitioner's present recourse.
The OSG was required to file its Comment, which it complied with. The OSG points out that petitioner's
conviction had already attained finality and is, thus, no longer subject to review; the negligence of
petitioner's counsels binds him; and that, the elements of the crime of bigamy were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
The present petition essentially seeks the reopening of petitioner's lost appeal and reasserts the merits of
his case. Framed as one raising questions of law,11 petitioner argues that Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly the last clause,12 violates the equal protection clause and the due process clause. The
petitioner also claims that he was convicted on facts not stated in the Information.
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS AN AVAILABLE REMEDY BEFORE
THE CA; AND
(2) WHETHER BAGAPORO IS GUILTY OF BIGAMY
(1) NO.
Citing Spouses Mesina v. Meer15, the CA reasoned that a petition for relief is not the proper remedy from a CA
Resolution dismissing an appeal. As explained in Mesina:
x x x While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules
of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.16 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner nonetheless insists that his petition for relief is different from that under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court. As his petition was based on the alleged gross negligence of his counsel, he asserts that there
exists a distinct remedy provided by jurisprudence and not by the Rules of Court. There is, however, no
such mode that is independent of the Rules.
While the Court indeed provides relief to litigants when gross negligence of counsel is manifest, in such cases,
petitioners go to court through modes specifically provided by law and the Rules.
As to petitioner's vain attempt to withdraw his notice of appeal to give way to a motion for reconsideration before
the RTC, without manifesting such fact before the CA, the same smacks of forum shopping. The allegation that
Atty. Causing was consulted so that the handling lawyer at the appeal stage would be based near in Manila
contradicts petitioner's feigned expectation that Atty. Cerdon would continue to represent him before the CA. It
puts into doubt the claim that petitioner left word with Atty. Cerdon's secretary that Atty. Cerdon shall continue to
be his counsel of record to take charge of the appeal. While Atty. Causing ostensibly signed on as collaborating
counsel, as Atty. Cerdon has not formally withdrawn from the case, there was in fact no collaboration between the
two counsels. At any rate, it remains incumbent upon the petitioner to manifest before the CA the engagement of
present counsel, the filing of motions before the RTC, and to follow-up the status of the case at the appellate stage.
Even if we were to presume good faith, petitioner cannot avoid responsibility for any confusion caused by his
engagement of a new lawyer without securing the written withdrawal or conforme of the lawyer who handled his
case during the trial stage. Furthermore, on petitioner's averments alone, this Court does not have sufficient basis
to conclude that Atty. Cerdon was grossly negligent, especially without having heard Atty. Cerdon's side on the
matter. Petitioner must, therefore, bear the loss of his appeal.
To emphasize: x x x The doctrinal rule is that negligence of the counsel binds the client because, otherwise, there
would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and [prove] that prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned. x x x Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case.
There can be no quibbling over whether or not the elements of bigamy were successfully proven by the
prosecution. Petitioner does not deny that he contracted a second marriage without a judicial declaration that his
absent spouse from a prior marriage may be legally presumed dead. The gist of petitioner's claim is alleged good
faith and that there is no need for a judicial declaration of a disputable presumption (of death of the absent spouse)
that has already been provided by law.
The legal questions raised are not novel. As discussed in Manuel v. People of the Philippines:23
x x x Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held
guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse
present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could
be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
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