Suggested Answers To The 2014-19 Bar Examination Questions in Remedial Law
Suggested Answers To The 2014-19 Bar Examination Questions in Remedial Law
IV.
An order of the court requiring a retroactive re-dating of an order, judgment or document filing be entered or
recorded in a judgment is: (1%)
(B) non pro tunc
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously
rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial
errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously
render, nor to supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been (Filipinas Faroil
Processing v. Dejapa, G.R. No. 167332, February 7, 2011).
V.
Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into contract with Tenant, a resident of Marikina City, over a
residential house in Las Piñas City. The lease contract provided, among others, for a monthly rental of P25,000.00,
plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-payment on its due date. Subsequently, Landlord migrated to
the United States of America (USA) but granted in favor of his sister, Maria, a special power of attorney to manage
the property and file and defend suits over the property rented out to Tenant. Tenant failed to pay the rentals due
for five (5) months.
Maria asks your legal advice on how she can expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests
due. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?
I will advise Maria to immediately send a letter to the tenant demanding the immediate payment of the unpaid
rentals plus interests due. If the tenant refuses, Maria can avail any of the following remedies:
(1) To commence a Small Claims Action in MeTC Las Pinas since the demand arise out of a Contract of Lease
and the amount is less than P400,000.00 (based on the 2019 SC Circular);
(2) A complaint for collection of sum of money under the Rules on Summary Procedure, since Maria is only
claiming the unpaid rentals and interest due from tenant; or
(3) Send a demand to pay and vacate. If lessee fails to comply therewith within 5 days, I would advise Maria to
file an action for Unlawful Detainer within 1 year from last demand to vacate.
(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended?
1. If Maria decides to file a complaint for collection of sum of money under the Rules of Summary Procedure or
Small Claims, the venue is the residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (Section
2, Rule 4, Rules of Court). Hence, it may be in Quezon City or Marikina City, at the option of Maria.
2. If Maria files an action for Unlawful detainer, the same shall be commenced and tried in the Municipal Trial
Court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated (Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court). Therefore, the venue is Las Piñas City.
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the one (1) year period
within which to file the action?
The reckoning point for determining the one-year period within which to file the action is the receipt of the
last demand to vacate and pay (Section 2, Rule 70 Ol the Rule of Court).
VI.
As a rule, courts may not grant an application for provisional remedy without complying with the requirements of
notice and hearing. These requirements, however, may be dispensed with in an application for: (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
1. Writ for preliminary attachment: Under Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, preliminary attachment
may be issued ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing.
2. Writ of Replevin: Under Section 3, Rule 60, the Court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of
replevin, upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond. There are no requirements of prior
notice and hearing.
3. Temporary Restraining Order: If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the
court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order
said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted,
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the
presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours,
VII.
Co Batong, a Taipan, filed a civil action for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City against
Jose Penduko, a news reporter of the Philippine Times, a newspaper of general circulation printed and published in
Parañaque City. The complaint alleged, among others, that Jose Penduko wrote malicious and defamatory
imputations against Co Batong; that Co Batong’s business address is in Makati City, and that the libelous article was
first printed and published in Parañaque City. The complaint prayed that Jose Penduko be held liable to pay
P200,000.00 as moral damages; P150,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees.
Jose Penduko filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
The RTC is without jurisdiction because under the Totality Rule, the claim for damages in the amount of
P350,000.00 falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque
City.
The venue is improperly laid because what the complaint alleged is Co Batong’s business address and not his
residence address.
Are the grounds invoked in the Motion to Dismiss proper? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The ground invoked in the Motion to Dismiss not proper.
Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action for damages in cases of written defamations where the
offended party is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published.
Since the defamatory article was printed and first published in Parañaque City, the venue of the action is properly
laid.
Hence, the dismissal of the Complaint will only be proper if the Complaint failed to allege the residence of the
complainant or the place where the libelous article was printed and first published (Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022,
September 23, 2005).
IX.
Bayani, an overseas worker based in Dubai, issued in favor of Agente, a special power of attorney to sell his house
and lot. Agente was able to sell the property but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani, as agreed upon. On his
return to the Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand letter duly received by Agente, sought to recover the amount
due him. Agente failed to return the amount as he had used it for the construction of his own house. Thus, Bayani
filed an action against Agente for sum of money with damages. Bayani subsequently filed an ex-parte motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment duly supported by an affidavit. The court granted the ex-parte
motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon Bayani’s posting of the required bond. Bayani prayed that
the court’s sheriff be deputized to serve and implement the writ of attachment. On November 19, 2013, the Sheriff
served upon Agente the writ of attachment and levied on the latter’s house and lot. On November 20, 2013, the
Sheriff served on Agente summons and a copy of the complaint. On November 22, 2013, Agente filed an Answer
with Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment alleging that at the time the writ of preliminary attachment was
issued, he has not been served with summons and, therefore, it was improperly issued. (4%)
(A) Is Agente correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Agente is not correct.
Section 2. Rule 57 provides that a writ of attachment may be issued ex parte or upon motion with notice and
hearing by the Court in which the action is pending.
Under the Rules, the applicant of the writ is only required to (i) submit an affidavit; and (ii) post a bond before the
court can validly issue the writ of attachment. The Rules do not require prior service of summons for the proper
issuance of a writ of attachment (Sofia Torres v. Nicanor Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009).
Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of attachment is valid notwithstanding the absence of a prior service of
summons to Agente.
X.
Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a commercial building where the former conducted
his hardware business. The lease contract stipulated, among others, a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for a four (4)-
year period commencing on January 1, 2010. On January 1, 2013, Prince Chong died. Kin II Chong was appointed
administrator of the estate of Prince Chong, but the former failed to pay the rentals for the months of January to
June 2013 despite King Kong’s written demands. Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) an action for rescission of contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals as of June 30, 2013. (4%)
(A) Can Kin II Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is without jurisdiction since the
amount claimed is only P300,000.00?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Kin II Chong cannot move to dismiss the Complaint.
An action for rescission of contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals is considered incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (Ceferina De Ungria v. Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011).
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal trial courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts 1of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King Kong also filed the complaint for sum of
money during that time, will the action be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action will not be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of the case.
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be
enforced under Rule 86 for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.(Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
XIV.
When a Municipal Trial Court (MTC), pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction, renders an adverse judgment in an
application for land registration, the aggrieved party’s remedy is: (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(C) ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals
Under Section 34, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the judgment of the MTC in the exercise of its delegated jurisdiction in
land registration cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the RTC. Thus. an ordinary appeal to
the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy.
XVI.
Plaintiff filed a complaint denominated as accion publiciana, against defendant. In his answer, defendant alleged
that he had no interest over the land in question, except as lessee of Z. Plaintiff subsequently filed an affidavit of Z,
the lessor of defendant, stating that Z had sold to plaintiff all his rights and interests in the property as shown by a
deed of transfer attached to the affidavit. Thus, plaintiff may ask the court to render: (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(B) judgment on the pleadings
When the answer fails to tender an issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or
admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or
omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate (Eugenio Basbas v. Beata Sayson, G.R.
No. 172660, August 24, 2011).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(A) summary judgment
A summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A “genuine issue” means an issue of
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or
which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial (Eugenio Basbas v. Beata Sayson, G.R. No. 172660, August 24,
2011).
XX
Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Debi
Wallis on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. Before filing the petition, Tom Wallis had told Debi
Wallis that he wanted the annulment of their marriage because he was already fed up with her irrational and
eccentric behaviour. However, in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the correct residential address
of Debi Wallis was deliberately not alleged and instead, the residential address of their married son was stated.
Summons was served by substituted service at the address stated in the petition.
For failure to file an answer, Wallis was declared in default and Tom Wallis presented evidence ex-parte. The RTC
rendered judgment declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of Debi Wallis.
Three (3) years after the judgment was rendered. Debi Wallis got hold of a copy thereof and wanted to have the
RTC judgment reversed and set aside.
If you are the lawyer of Debi Wallis, what judicial remedy or remedies will you take? Discuss and specify the ground
or grounds for said remedy or remedies. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Debi Wallis may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, extrinsic fraud and denial of the right to due process (Leticia Diona v. Romeo Balange, G.R. No.
173589, January 7, 2013).
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
appellant and is based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction (Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 156021, September 23, 2005).
Relative thereto, the act of Tom Wallis in deliberately keeping Debi Wallis away from the Court, by intentionally
alleging a wrong address in the complaint constitutes extrinsic fraud.
Moreover, the failure of the Court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, being an indispensable
party, necessitates the annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
Likewise, there is denial of the right to due process when Debi Wallis was not given an opportunity to be heard in
the case. Hence, the judgment rendered by the RTC may be annulled by the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court.
Moreover, it is evident that the ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of Debi Wallis because she was able to obtain a copy of the Decision only three
(3) years after the same was rendered by the Trial Court.
At any rate, the Court erred in declaring the defendant in default because there is no default in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage (Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court). Thus, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court could have been an appropriate remedy within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules.
XXI.
Goodfeather Corporation, through its President, Al pakino, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for
specific performance against Robert White. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Robert White filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of the appropriate board resolution from the Board of
Directors of Goodfeather Corporation to show the authority of Al Pakino to represent the corporation and file the
complaint in its behalf. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the dismissal of the
complaint. Al Pakino filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. As nothing more could be done by Al
Pakino before the RTC, he filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). Robert White moved for dismissal of
the appeal on the ground that the same involved purely a question of law and should have been filed with the
Supreme Court (SC). However, Al Pakino claimed that the appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law because
there must be a factual determination is, indeed, Al Pakino was duly authorized by Goodfeather Corporation to file
the complaint.
Whose position is correct? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Al Pakino is correct in claiming that the appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On
the other hand, there is a question of fact, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts (Mirant Philippines Corporation v. Sario, G.R. No. 197598, November 21, 2012).
Since the complaint was dismissed due to the alleged lack of appropriate board resolution from the Board of
Directors of Goodfeather Corporation, the appeal will nessarily involve a factual determination of the authority to
file the Complaint for the said Corporation. Hence, the appeal before the Court of Appeals is correct.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Al Pakino and Robert White are incorrect.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable.
It is well-settled that an order dismissing an action without prejudice cannot be a subject of appeal (Section 1, Rule
41, Rules of Court).
Since a dismissal based on alleged lack of appropriate board resolution is considered without prejudice which
cannot be a subject of an appeal, the appropriate remedy is a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
XXII.
Which of the following decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court (SC)? (Assume that the issues to
be raised on appeal involve purely questions of law) (1%)
(A) decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
(B) decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
(C) decision of the Civil Service Commission
(D) decision of the Office of the President
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(B) decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition 10 certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
XXIII.
Mr. Humpty filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms. Dumpty for damages. The RTC, after
due proceedings, rendered a decision granting the complaint and ordering Ms. Dumpty to pay damages to Mr.
Humpty. Ms. Dumpty timely filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the RTC decision.
Meanwhile, the RTC granted Mr. Humpty’s motion for execution pending appeal. Upon receipt of the RTC’s order
granting execution pending appeal, Ms. Dumpty filed with the CA another case, this time a special civil action for
certiorari assailing said RTC order.
Is there a violation of the rule against forum shopping considering that two (2) actions emanating from the
same case with the RTC were filed by Ms. Dumpty with the CA? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. There is no violation of the rule against forum shopping.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or special civil action for
certiorari; the act of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration (Roberto S. Benedicto v. Manuel Lacson, G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010).
In Philippines Nails and Wires Corporation v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (G.R. No. 143933, February 14,
2003), the Supreme Court held that one party may validly question a decision in a regular appeal and at the same
time assail the execution pending appeal via certiorari without violating the rule against forum shopping. This is
because the merits of the case will not be addressed in the petition dealing with the execution and vice versa.
Since Ms. Dumpty merely filed a special civil action for certiorari, the same will not constitute a violation of the rules
on forum shopping because the resolution or a favorable judgment thereon will not amount to res judicata in the
subsequent proceedings between the same parties (Roberto S. Benedicto v. Manuel Lacson, G.R. No. 141508, May
5, 2010).
XXIV.
Solomon and Faith got married in 2005. In 2010, Solomon contracted a second marriage with Hope. When Faith
found out about the second marriage of Solomon and Hope, she filed a criminal case for bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila sometime in 2011.
Meanwhile, Solomon filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Faith in 2012, while the case
for bigamy before the RTC of Manila is ongoing. Subsequently, Solomon filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
in the bigamy case on the ground of prejudicial question. He asserts that the proceedings in the criminal case
should be suspended because if his first marriage with Faith will be declared null and void, it will have the effect of
exculpating him from the crime of bigamy.
Decide. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion filed by Solomon should be denied.
The elements of prejudicial question are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In order for a prejudicial question to exist, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action (Dreamwork
Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009).
Since the criminal case for bigamy was filed ahead of the civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage, there is
no prejudicial question.
At any rate, the outcome of the civil case for annulment has no bearing upon the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case for bigamy because the accused has already committed the crime of
bigamy when he contracted the second marriage without the first marriage having being declared null and void.
Otherwise stated, he who contracts marriage during the subsistence of a previously contracted marriage runs the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
XXV.
Mr. Boaz filed an action for ejectment against Mr. Jachin before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Mr. Jachin
actively participated in every stage of the proceedings knowing fully well that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over
the action. In his mind, Mr. Jachin was thinking that if the MeTC rendered judgment against him, he could always
raise the issue on the jurisdiction of the MeTC. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment against Mr. Jachin.
What is the remedy of Mr. Jachin? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A) file an appeal
An appeal from a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court may be taken to the Regional Trial Court
(Section 1, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
Moreover, under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction can be appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
Besides, a Motion for Reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
XXVII.
Mr. Avenger filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint against Ms. Bright for annulment of deed of sale
and other documents. Ms. Bright filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Mr. Avenger filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
State and discuss the appropriate remedy remedies under each of the following situations: (6%)
(A) If the RTC grants Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action, what will be the remedy/remedies of Mr. Avenger?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
Mr. Avenger can choose any of the following remedies:
(1) Mr. Avenger may file a motion for reconsideration. If DENIED:
a. he could file an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 since a dismissal based on lack of
cause of action (under Rule 33) is appealable.
b. he could file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 because a dismissal based on failure to state a
cause of action is considered without prejudice and therefore an interlocutory order which cannot be
a subject of an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
c. he can simply re-file the complaint because an Order granting a Motion to Dismiss based on failure
to state a cause of action is without prejudice to the filing of another Complaint (Section 5, Rule 16,
Rules of Court).
(2) Mr. Avenger may amend his Complaint, as a matter of right, since a Motion to Dismiss is not a responsive
pleading (Irene Marcos Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008).
(B) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss, what will be her remedy/remedies?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(1) Ms. Bright may file a motion for reconsideration. If the same is denied, she could file a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
An Order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case, and, in
effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication by the court. Hence, a special civil action on
certiorari is the appropriate remedy (Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court; Marmo v. Anacay, G.R. No.182585,
November 27, 2009).
(2) Ms. Bright may file an Answer within the balance of the period from the filing of his Motion to Dismiss
but not less than five (5) days, and raise affirmative defenses therein (Sections 4 and 6, Rule 16, Rules of
Court).
(C) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and, further proceedings, including trial on the merits, are
conducted until the RTC renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, what will be the remedy/remedies of Ms.
Bright?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
Ms. Bright may avail of the following remedies before the finality of the decision:
1. a motion for reconsideration (Section 1 Rule 37)
2. a motion for new trial (Section 1 Rule 37)
3. appeal (Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45).
After the finality of the Decision, Ms. Bright can avail of the following:
1. petition for relief (Rule 38)
2. annulment of Judgment (Rule 47)
3. petition for Certiorari (Rule 65)
ΧΧΙΧ.
Estrella was the registered owner of a huge parcel of land located in a remote part of their barrio in Benguet.
However, when she visited the property after she took long vacation abroad, she was surprised to see
that her childhood friend, John, had established a vacation house on her property. Both Estrella and John were
residents of the same barangay.
To recover possession, Estrella filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), alleging that
she is the true owner of the land as evidenced by her certificate of title and tax declaration which showed the
assessed value of the property as P21,000.00. On the other hand, John refuted Estrella’s claim of ownership and
submitted in evidence a Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After the filing of John’s answer, the MTC
observed that the real issue was one of ownership and not of possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a full-blown trial was conducted as if the case was originally
filed with it. The RTC reasoned that based on the assessed value of the property, it was the court of proper
jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment declaring John as the owner of the land and, hence, entitled
to the possession thereof. (4%)
(A) Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? Why or why not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The Metropolitan Trial Court was not correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
It is well settled that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations contained in the complaint. The contention of
defendant in his motion to dismiss has nothing to do in the determination of jurisdiction. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant (Medical Plaza Makati Condominium v.
Cullen, G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013).
Relative thereto, the Municipal Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). Hence, the Metropolitan Trial Court is not correct in
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Besides, the rules allow provisional determination of ownership in ejectment cases when the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership (Section 16, Rule 70. Rules of Court).
Accordingly, the inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership only whenever it is necessary to
decide the question of possession in an ejectment case (Serrano v. Spouses Gutierrez, G.R. No, 162366, November
10, 2006).
(B) Was the RTC correct in ruling that based on the assessed value of the property, the case was within its original
jurisdiction and, hence, it may conduct a full blown trial of the appealed case as if it was originally filed with it?
Why or why not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Assuming that Estrella’s action was really for ownership and not for physical possession, the Regional Trial Court is
correct in ruling that it was the Court of proper jurisdiction.
If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction there over, shall try the case on the
merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings (Section 8, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
Since the RTC affirmed the dismissal by the MTC of Estrella’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, without conducting a trial on the merits, the RTC may conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed
case from the MTC as if the same was originally filed with it.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2015 BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
I.
Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a promissory note. Later, Borrower obtained another
P100,000.00 loan again covered by a promissory note. Still later, Borrower obtained a P300,000.00 loan secured by
a real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500,000.00. Borrower defaulted on his payments when the loans
matured. Despite demand to pay the P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule,
filed against Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a collection suit for P500,000.00.
(A) Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) Yes. The Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action because where the
claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount of the claim shall be
the test of jurisdiction (Section 5 (d), Rule 2, Rules of Court). Here, the total amount of the claim is P500,000.00.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila has jurisdiction over the suit. At any rate, it is immaterial that one of
the loans is secured by a real estate mortgage because the Lender opted to file a collection of sum of money instead
of foreclosure of the said mortgage.
At the trial, Borrower’s lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully elicited an admission from the latter that
the two promissory notes have been paid. Thereafter, Borrower’s lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that as proven only P300,000.00 was the amount due to Lender and which claim is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. He further argued that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
(B) Should the court dismiss the case?(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) No. The court should not dismiss the case. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted (Navida v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011).
Accordingly, even if the defendant is able to prove in the course of the trial that a lesser amount is due, the court
does not lose jurisdiction and a dismissal of the case is not in order (Paadlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March
20, 2013).
II.
Circe filed with the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage against siblings Scylla and
Charybdis, co-owners of the property and cosignatories to the mortgage deed. The siblings permanently reside in
Athens, Greece. Circe tipped off Sheriff Pluto that Scylla is on a balikbayan and is billeted at the Century Plaza Hotel
in Pasay City, Sheriff Pluto went to the hotel and personally served Scylla the summons, but the latter refused to
receive summons for Charybdis as she was not authorized to do so. Sheriff Pluto requested Scylla for the email
address and has number of Charybdis which the latter readily gave. Sheriff Pluto, in his return of the summons,
stated that “Summons for Scylla was served personally as shown by her signature on the receiving copy of the
summons, Summons on Charybdis was served pursuant to the amendment of Rule 14, by facsimile transmittal of
the summons and complaint on defendant’s fax number as evidenced by transmission verification report
automatically generated by the fax machine indicating that it was received by the fax number to which it was sent
on the date and time indicated therein.” Circe, sixty (60) days after her receipt of Sheriff Pluto’s return, filed a
Motion to Declare Charybdis in default as Charybdis did not file any responsive pleading.
A) Should the court declare Charybdis in default? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) No, the Court should not declare Charybdis in default because there was no proper service of summons. Section
12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to a foreign private juridical entity that is not registered in the
Philippines and has no resident agent in the country, and not to individuals (A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC, March 15, 2011).
The service of summons by facsimile under said rule is, therefore, defective. A foreclosure of real estate mortgage
is a quasi in rem action, thus, the court can render a judgment as long as it has jurisdiction over the res and any of
the modes of extra-territorial service of summons under Sec. 15 of Rule 14 is complied with prior leave of court.
There is, unfortunately, no showing in the problem that a prior leave of court was obtained before resorting to
extra-territorial service of summons; hence, the service of summons is defective.
Scylla seasonably filed her answer setting forth therein as a defense that Charybdis had paid the mortgage debt.
(B) On the premise that Charybdis was properly declared in default, what is the effect of Scylla’s answer to the
complaint? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) The court can render judgment upon the evidence presented.
The Rules provides that when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon
the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. (Section 3 (c), Rule 9, Rules of Court).
III.
Juliet, invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children filed with the RTC
designated as a Family Court a petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband Romeo.
The Family Court issued a 30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the expiration of the TPO, Juliet filed a motion
for extension. Romeo in his opposition raised, among others, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1992 (The VAWC
LAW) arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of the TPO violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the 1987 Constitution. The Family Court judge, in granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined
to rule on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that Family Courts are without
jurisdiction to pass upon constitutional issues, being a special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the
law creating the Family Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court judge correct when he
declined to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, the Family Court Judge is not correct when it declined to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. In Garcia
v. Hon. Ray Allan Drilon (G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013), the Supreme Court held that the “Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute. Inspite of its designation as a family court, the
RTC remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether
civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty any or insolvency. This
authority is embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine the valid and binding laws in
conformity with the fundamental law.”
IV
Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title. Wagner moved to dismiss the complaint because
Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as defendant.
(A) Should the complaint be dismissed? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) No. The complaint should not be dismissed because the mere non-joiner of an indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of the action (Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Republic v. Hon. Mangotara, G.R. No.
170375, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 431).
(B) If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as a party to the case, what is his remedy to
protect his interest? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as a party, he may intervene in the action
(Section 1, Rule 19, Rules of Court). He may also file a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court. In Metrobank v. Hon. Floro Alejo (G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001), In a suit to nullify an existing
Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real estate mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable
party. In such suit, a decision cancelling the TCT and the mortgage annotation is subject to petition for annulment of
judgment, because the non-joinder of the mortgagee deprived the court of jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy
VI.
A law was passed declaring Mt. Karbungko as a protected area since it was a major watershed. The protected area
covered a portion located in Municipality of the Province I and a portion located in the City of Z of Province II.
Maingat is the leader of Samahang Tagapag-ingat ng Karbungko (STK), a people’s organization. He learned that a
portion of the mountain located in the City of Z of Province Il was extremely damaged when it was bulldozed and
leveled to the ground, and several trees and plants were cut down and burned by workers of World Pleasure
Resorts, Inc. (WPRI) for the construction of a hotel and golf course. Upon inquiry with the project site engineer if
they had a permit for the project, Maingat was shown a copy of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
issued by the DENR-EMB, Regional Director (RD-DENR-EMB). Immediately, Maingat and STK filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus against RD-DENR-EMB and WPRI with the RTC of Province I, a
designated environmental court, as the RD-DENR-EMB negligently issued the ECC to WPRI. On scrutiny of the
Petition, the Court determined that the area where the alleged actionable or omission subject of the petition took
place in the City of Z of Province II, and therefore cognizable by the RTC of Province II. Thus, the court dismissed
outright the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
(A) Was the court correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
A) No. The court was not correct in motu propio dismissing the petition.
While it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission took place in the City of Z of Province II and,
therefore cognizable by the RTC of Province II, nonetheless, venue is not jurisdictional, and it can be waived in a
special civil action for continuing mandamus (Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013). Besides, under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded in the answer or in the motion to
dismiss are deemed waived. Hence, the Court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper
venue.
Assuming that the court did not dismiss the petition, the RD-DENR–EMB in his Comment moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that petitioners failed to appeal the issuance of the ECC and to exhaust administrative
remedies provided in the DENR Rules and Regulations.
(B) Should the court dismiss the petition? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) Yes, the Court should dismiss the petition because the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to
follow the DENR administrative appeal process in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies (Dolot v. Hon. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013; Paje v. Casiño, G.R. No, 207257, February 3, 2015).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(B) No, the Court should not dismiss the petition because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds
no application when the matter is of extreme urgency that may cause great and irreparable damage to the
environment involving strong public interest. After all, the Court may suspend the rules of procedure in order to
achieve substantial justice, and to address urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of our
nation (Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012; Paje v. Casiño, G.R. No,
207257, February 3, 2015).
VII.
Plaintiff sued defendant for collection of P1 million based on the a promissory note. The complaint alleges, among
others:
1) Defendant borrowed P1 million from plaintiff as evidenced by a duly executed promissory note;
2) The promissory note reads:
Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that defendant’s answer failed to tender an
issue as the allegations therein on his defenses are sham for being inconsistent; hence, no defense at all,
Defendant filed an opposition claiming his answer tendered an issue.
(A) Is judgment on the pleadings proper? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) No, the judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Judgment on the pleadings is proper only when the answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party’s pleading (Section 1, Rule 34,
Rules of Court). When it appears, however, that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in
the answer, because some of them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special
defenses which, it proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action, judgment on the
pleadings cannot be rendered (Philippine National Bank v. Aznar, G.R. No.171805, May 30. 2011).
Clearly, since the defendant’s verified Answer specifically denied the execution of the promissory note, or raised the
affirmative of payment, judgment on the pleadings is not proper.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there are no longer any triable genuine issues
of facts.
(B) Should the court grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment?(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) No, the court should not grant the motion for summary judgment because the defense of payment is a genuine
issue as to a material fact that must be resolved by the court upon presentation of evidence. For a summary
judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any
material fact, except for the amount of damages, and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment
must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.
Relative thereto, when the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn
from the evidence (Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013).
VIII
Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of land. The contract stipulated a P500,000.00 down
payment upon signing and the balance payable in twelve (12) monthly installments of P100,000.00. Aldrin paid the
down payment and had paid three (3) monthly installments when he found out that Neil had sold the same
property to Yuri for P1.5 million paid in cash. Aldrin sued Neil for specific performance with damages with the RTC.
Yuri, with leave of court, filed an answer-in-intervention as he had already obtained a TCT in his name. After trial,
the court rendered judgment ordering Aldrin to pay all the installments due, the cancellation of Yuri’s title, and Neil
to execute a deed of sale in favor of Aldrin. When the judgment became final and executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the
installments but the latter refused to execute the deed of sale in favor of the former. Aldrin filed a “Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution with proper notice of hearing. The petition alleged, among others, that the decision
had become final and executory and he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of execution as a matter of right. Neil
filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked the required affidavit against forum shopping.
(A) Should the court grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) No. The motion to dismiss should be denied because certification against forum shopping is only required in a
complaint or other initiatory pleading (Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court; Arquiza v. CA, G.R. NO 160479, June 8,
2005). Since a petition for the issuance of a writ of execution is not an initiatory pleading, it does not require a
certification against forum shopping.
[Note: The Committee respectfully recommends a liberal approach in checking the answer to Question VIII, should
the examinees consider the “Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution” an initiatory pleading or question the
correct ness of the Trial Court’s decision. The contract with Aldrin is a contract to sell with the purchase price not
fully paid, while that of Yuri is a perfected contract of sale, plus delivery of the public document and issuance of TCT,
making Yuri the owner of the land].
Despite the issuance of the writ of execution directing Neil to execute the deed of sale in favor of Aldrin, the
former obstinately refused to execute the deed.
(B) What is Aldrin’s remedy? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) Aldrin may move for the issuance of a court order directing the execution of the Deed of Sale by some other
person appointed by it. Under Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, if a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform, any other specific
act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to
be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done
shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court
in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may by an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which
shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
The phrase “some other person appointed by the court” may refer to the Branch Clerk of Court, Sheriff or even the
Register of Deeds, and their acts when done under such authority shall have the effect of having been done by Neil
himself.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(B) Aldrin may also move that Neil be cited for contempt because of his obstinate refusal to comply with the
judgment of the court to execute a Deed of Sale.
IX
Hades, an American citizen, through a dating website, got acquainted with Persephone, a Filipina. Hades came to
the Philippines and proceeded to Baguio City where Persephone resides. Hades and Persephone contracted
marriage, solemnized by the Metropolitan Trial Court judge of Makati City, After the wedding, Hades flew back to
California, United States of America, to wind up his business affairs. On his return to the Philippines, Hades
discovered that Persephone had an illicit affair with Phanes. Immediately, Hades returned to the United States and
was able to obtain a valid divorce decree from the Superior Court of the County of San Mateo, California, a court of
competent jurisdiction against Persephone. Hades desires to marry Hestia, also a Filipina, whom he met at Baccus
Grill in Pasay City.
(A) As Hades’ lawyer, what petition should you file in order that your client can avoid prosecution for bigamy if he
desires to marry Hestia? (%)
(B) In what court should you file the petition? (1%)
(C) What is the essential requisite that you must comply with for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts
before the court can hear the petition? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) As Hades’ lawyer, I would file a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce decree, or at least file a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and
include therein a prayer for recognition of the aforementioned divorce decree, CruZ v. Sto. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571,
August 11, 2010), the High declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact”(Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013).
(B)
Petition for recognition of foreign divorce decree should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the place of residence
of any of the parties, at the option of the petitioner; or
Petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108 should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, where the corresponding Local Civil Registry is located.
(c)
In a petition for recognition of foreign judgment, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 in relation to Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(Fujiki v. Marinay G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013).
Before the court can hear the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, Hades must satisfy the following
procedural requirements;(a) filing a verified petition; (b) naming as parties all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected; (c) issuance of an order fixing the time and place of hearing; (d) giving reasonable
notice to the parties named in the petition; and (e) publication of the order once a week for three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation (Rule 108, Rules of Court; Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496,
February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420; Corpuz v. Tirol, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(A) As Hades’ counsel, I will not file any petition because my client is an American citizen, and only Filipino citizens
are required to file a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment. I will advise Hades, nonetheless, to secure a
certificate of legal capacity to marry in the Philippines if he desires to marry Hestia, in order to avoid prosecution for
bigamy.
X.
An information for murder was filed against Rapido. The RTC judge, after personally evaluating the prosecutor’s
resolution, documents and parties’ affidavits submitted by the prosecutor, found probable cause and issued a
warrant of arrest. Rapido’s lawyer examined the rollo of the case and found that it only contained the copy of the
information, the submissions of the prosecutor and a copy of the warrant of arrest. Immediately, Rapido’s counsel
filed a motion to quash the arrest warrant for being void, citing as grounds:
a). The judge before issuing the warrant did not personally conduct a searching examination of the prosecution
witnesses in violation of his client’s constitutionally-mandated rights;
b) There was no prior order finding probable cause before the judge issued the arrest warrant.
May the warrant of arrest be quashed on the grounds cited by Rapido’s counsel? State your reason for each
ground. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, the warrant of arrest may not be quashed based on the grounds cited by Rapido’s counsel. In the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the mandate of the constitution is for the judge to personally determine the existence of
probable cause. The words “personal determination,” was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Soliven v. Makasiar,
(G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406), as the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself, as to the existence of probable cause. What the law requires as personal determination on
the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. Thus, personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses is, thus, not mandatory and indispensable in the determination
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest (People v. Joseph “Jojo” Grey, G.R. No. 10109, July 26,
2010). At any rate, there is no law or rule that requires the Judge to issue a prior Order finding probable cause
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
XI.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge with plunder d probable cause to charge with plunder the
provincial governor, vice governor, treasurer, budget officer, and accountant. An Information for plunder was filed
with the Sandiganbayan against the provincial officials except for the treasurer who was granted immunity when
he agreed to cooperate with the Ombudsman in the prosecution of the case. Immediately, the governor filed with
the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari against the Ombudsman claiming there was grave abuse of discretion in
excluding the treasurer from the Information.
(A) Was the remedy taken by the governor correct? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) The remedy taken by the Governor is correct. A petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy if
the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in granting immunity to the treasurer who agreed to
cooperate in the prosecution of the case.
(B) Will the writ of mandamus lie to compel the Ombudsman to include the treasurer in the Information? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) No. Mandamus will not lie to compel the Ombudsman to include the treasurer in the Information. In matters
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel
respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner
or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken
in the exercise of judgment or discretion (Ampatuan, Jr. v. Secretary De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013).
Evidently, the Ombudsman’s act of granting the treasurer immunity from prosecution under such terms and
conditions as it may deter mine (Section 17, R.A. 6770) is a discretionary duty that may not be compelled by the
extraordinary writ of mandamus.
(C) Can the Special Prosecutor move for the discharge of the budget officer to corroborate the testimony of the
treasurer in the course of presenting its evidence. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(C) No, the special Prosecutor cannot move for the discharge of the budget officer to become a State witness. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman (Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No 105965 70, March
20, 2001). Accordingly, in the absence of any express delegation and authority from the Ombudsman, the Special
Prosecutor does not have the power to move for the discharge of the budget officer to corroborate the testimony of
the treasurer in the course of presenting its evidence (Section 11 (3), R.A. 6770).
I
State at least five (5) civil cases that fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts (RTC’s).
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The Regional Trial Courts inter alia shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in the following civil cases:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Four
Hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) in all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the above-mentioned items
exceeds Four Hundred thousand pesos (P400,000,00)” (Section 1, Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
II
(A) Briefly explain the procedure on “Interrogatories to Parties” under Rule 25 and state the effect of failure to
serve written interrogatories. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) PROCEDURE
1 Any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation
or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf (Section 1, Rule 25, Rules of
Court).
2. The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making
them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file and serve a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service thereof, unless the court on motion and
for good cause shown, extends or shortens the time (Section 2, Rule 25, Rules of Court).
3. Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court
within ten (10) days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be deferred until the
objections are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable (Section 3. Rule 25, Rules of Court).
Should a party fail to file and serve written interrogatories on adverse party, he cannot compel the latter to give
testimony in one court or to give deposition pending appeal, unless allowed by the court for good cause shown and
to prevent a failure of justice (Section 6. Rule 25, Rules of Court; Spouses Vicente Afulugencia and Leticia
Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., et al., G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014).
(B) Briefly explain the procedure on “Admission by Adverse Party” under Rule 26 and the effect of failure to file and
serve the request. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) PROCEDURE
1. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any party a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with
the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished (Section 1, Rule 26, Rules
of Court).
2. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
3. Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within the period
for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding paragraph and his compliance
therewith shall be deferred until such obligations are resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as
practicable (Section 2, Rule 26, Rules of Court).
4. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending action only and shall
not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be used against him in any other
proceeding (Section 3, Rule 26). Unless otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a
failure of justice a party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse party of material and
relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be, within the personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be permitted
to present evidence on such facts (emphasis supplied] (Section 5, Rule 26, Rules of Court).
IV.
Eduardo a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for the
annulment of a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy Bank (Galaxy), and the consequent
foreclosure and auction sale on his mortgaged Makati property. Galaxy filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improper venue alleging that the complaint should be filed with the RTC of Makati since the complaint involves the
ownership and possession of Eduardo’s lot. Resolve the motion with reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The Motion to dismiss should be granted. An action for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of
the mortgaged property is a real action that affects the title to the property; thus, venue of the real action is before
the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies (Jimmy T. Go v. United Coconut Planters
Bank, G.R. No. 156187, November 11, 2004; Chua v. Total Office Products & Services, G.R. No. 152808, September
30, 2005).
In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112191, February 7, 1997), the Supreme Court also held that an
action to annul a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is no different from an action to annul a private sale of
real property. While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property
in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of
ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is
petitioner’s primary objective.
The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate
to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a
real action (Paglaum Management & Development Corporation v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179018,
June 18, 2012).
Being a real action, it shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area where
the real property involved. or a portion thereof, is situated (Section 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court). The complaint should
be filed in the RTC of Makati where the mortgaged property is situated.
V.
(A) What is the “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-
Discovery Measures? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the “2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures,” in
civil cases where no amicable settlement was reached by the parties, the trial judge is directed to determine the
most important witnesses and limit the number of such witnesses to be heard. The court shall also require the
parties and/or counsels to submit the names, addresses and contact numbers of the witnesses to be summoned by
subpoena. The facts to be proven by each witness and the approximate number of hours per witness shall also be
fixed by the trial judge (Section (1)(A) (5) (i) of A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC or the “2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures”, July 13, 2004).
(B) What is the “one day examination of witness” rule pursuant to the said 2004 Guidelines? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) The rule requires that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only. This rule shall be strictly adhered to
subject to the courts’ discretion during trial on whether or not to extend the direct and/ or cross-examination for
justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of
evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his
objection thereto. Thereafter, the judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court, but the judge
has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132
(Section (1)(A)(5)(i) of A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC or the “2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures”, July 13, 2004).
VI.
Pedro and Juan are residents of Barangay Ifurug, Municipality of Dupac, Mountain Province. Pedro owes Juan the
amount of P50,000.00. Due to non-payment, Juan brought his complaint to the Council of Elders of said barangay
which implements the bodong justice system. Both appeared before the council where they verbally agreed that
Pedro will pay in instalments on specific due dates. Pedro reneged on his promise. Juan filed a complaint for sum of
money before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Pedro filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the case did not
pass through the barangay conciliation under R.A. No. 7160 and that the RTC, not the MTC, has jurisdiction. In his
opposition, Juan argued that the intervention of the Council of Elders is substantial compliance with the
requirement of R.A. No. 7160 and the claim of P50,000.00 is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. As MTC
judge, rule on the motion and explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The Motion to Dismiss should be denied. As a general rule, no complaint involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties in the barangay and no settlement was reached (Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160; April
Martinez, v. Rodolfo G. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005). However, in barangays where majority of the
inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural communities, local systems of settling disputes through their
councils of datus or Elders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of the Local
Government Code (Sections 399, R.A. 7160). As a consequence, customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities (Sections 412, R.A.
7160), thus, the confrontation between Pedro and Juan before the Council of Elders of their barangay is sufficient
compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court under Section 412 of R.A. No. 7160 (Zamora v. Heirs of
Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004).
Be that as it may, it is well-settled that the mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement under the Katarungan
Pambarangay Law does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code (Crisanta Miguel v.
Montanez, G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2014). Accordingly, when Juan filed a complaint for sum of money in the
MTC, he is deemed to have rescinded the compromise agreement reached before the Council of Elders of the
barangay. Henceforth, Pedro is incorrect in alleging that the RTC, not the MTC, has jurisdiction over Juan’s claim.
Considering that the claim is only for P50,000.00, the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC under B.P.
Blg. 129 and may proceed pursuant to A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC or the “Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.”
Notably, a motion to dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings under Section 14(a) of said rules. Similarly, Juan’s
claim of P50,000.00 may be governed by the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure which clearly falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC, ergo, the motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter should be
denied (Section 19 (a), 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure).
VIII
Juan sued Roberto for specific performance. Roberto knew that Juan was going to file the case so he went out of
town and temporarily stayed in another city to avoid service of summons. Juan engaged the service of Sheriff
Matinik to serve the summons but when the latter went to the residence of Roberto, he was told by the caretaker
thereof that his employer no longer resides at the house. The caretaker is a high school graduate and is the godson
of Roberto. Believing the caretaker’s story to be true, Sheriff Matinik left a copy of the summons and complaint
with the caretaker. Was there a valid substituted service of summons? Discuss the requirements for a valid service
of summons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No. There was no valid substituted service of summons. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If
defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted
service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in
derogation of the usual method of Service; hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as important as the issue of due process for the Court to acquire jurisdiction. For the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or
attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically
narrated in the Return. It must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age
and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant; otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption
cannot be availed of. The Supreme Court laid down the requirements as follows:
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service. Moreover, it must be indicated therein that the sheriff has made several
attempts at personal service for at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
2. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service.
3. Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or residence;
or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business (Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006).
IX
(A) Is the buyer in the auction sale arising from an extra-judicial foreclosure entitled to a writ of possession even
before the expiration of the redemption period? If so, what is the action to be taken? (1%)
(B) After the period of redemption has lapsed and the title to the lot is consolidated in the name of the auction
buyer, is he entitled to the writ of possession as a matter of right? If so, what is the action to be taken? (2%)
(C) Suppose that after the title to the lot has been consolidated in the name of the auction buyer, said buyer sold
the lot to a third party without first getting a writ of possession. Can the transferee exercise the right of the auction
buyer and claim that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession in his favor? Briefly explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) Yes, the buyer in the auction sale is entitled to a writ of possession even before the expiration of the redemption
period upon the filing of the ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession and posting of the appropriate
bond. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale either within the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond (LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development
Bank, G.R. No. 167998, April 27, 2007). Stated otherwise, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, also refers
situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period for
redemption. Hence, upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC
shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser (Spouses
Nicasio Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045, January 22,
2014; Spouses Jose Gatuslao and Ermila Gatuslao v. Leo Ray Yanson, G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015).
(B) Yes, the auction buyer is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. It is settled that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed within a period of one
year after the registration of the certificate of sale. He is, therefore, entitled to the possession of the property and
can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper
application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court (LZK
Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 167998, April 27, 2007; Spouses
Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045, January
22, 2014; Spouses Jose Gatuslao and Ermila Gatuslao v. Leo Ray Yanson, G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015).
(C) Yes. The transferee can exercise the right of the auction buyer. A transferee or successor-in-interest of the
auction buyer by virtue of the contract of sale between them, is considered to have stepped into the shoes of the
auction buyer. As such, the transferee is necessarily entitled to avail of the provisions of Section 7 of Act 3135, as
amended, as if he is the auction buyer (Spouses Jose Gatuslao and Ermila Gatuslao v. Leo Ray Yonson, G.R. No.
191540, January 21, 2015), When the lot purchased at a foreclosure sale is in turn sold or transferred, the right to
the possession thereof, along with all other rights of ownership, transfers to its new owner (Spouses Gallent v.
Velasquez, G.R. No. 203949, April 6, 2016), ergo, it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession in
favor of the transferee of the auction buyer.
X
Hannibal, Donna, Florence and Joel, concerned residents of Laguna de Bay, filed a complaint of mandamus against
the Laguna Lake Development Authority, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department
of Public Works and Highways, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Budget, and Philippine National Police before the RTC of Laguna alleging that the continued neglect
of defendants in performing their duties has resulted in serious deterioration of the water quality of the lake and
the degradation of the marine life in the lake. The plaintiffs prayed that said government agencies be ordered to
clean up Laguna de Bay and restore its water quality to Class C waters as prescribed by Presidential Decree 1152,
otherwise known as the Philippine Environment Code. Defendants raise the defense that the cleanup of the lake is
not a ministerial function and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to perform the same. The RTC of Laguna
rendered a decision declaring that it is the duty of the agencies to clean up Laguna de Bay and issued a permanent
writ of mandamus ordering said agencies to perform their duties prescribed by law relating to the cleanup of
Laguna de Bay.
(A) Is the RTC correct in issuing the writ of mandamus? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) Yes, the RTC is correct in issuing the writ of mandamus. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the
execution; of a ministerial duty. While the implementation of the Government agencies mandated tasks may entail
a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
Here, the duty to clean up Laguna lake and restore its water quality to Class C is required not only by Presidential
Decree No. 1152, otherwise known as the Philippine Environment Code, but also in its charter. It is, thus, ministerial
in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.
Accordingly, the RTC may issue a writ of continuing mandamus directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until the judgment is fully satisfied (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008).
XI
Miguel filed a Complaint for damages against Jose, who denied liability and filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action. In an Order received by Jose on January 5, 2015, the trial court denied the
Motion to Dismiss. On February 4, 2015, Jose sought reconsideration of that Order through a Motion for
Reconsideration. Miguel opposed the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. Jose
countered that the 15-day rule under Section 1 of Rule 52 does not apply where the Order sought to be
reconsidered is an interlocutory order that does not attain finality. Is Jose correct? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No. Jose is not correct. While Jose’s reliance on Section 1 of Rule 52 is misplaced because the said Rule applies only
to cases pending before the Court of Appeals, his argument that the fifteen day rule does not apply because the
order sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order that has basis in jurisprudence. In Denso
Philippines, Inc. v. The Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 75000. February 27, 1987), the Supreme Court held
that a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not subject to the usual limiting fifteen-day period of
appeal prescribed for final judgments and orders. Be that as it may, since the motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari which is the appropriate remedy, the same can be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the denial of the motion to dismiss; otherwise, a legal aberration
would ensue where a party who has merely 60 days from notice of an adverse interlocutory order to interpose a
special civil action for certiorari would be allowed a longer period to move for reconsideration of such order.
Consequently, since Jose’s motion for reconsideration was filed 31 days after he received the order denying his
motion to dismiss, the same was still filed on time.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER
No. Jose is not correct. Rule 52 applies only to motions for reconsideration of judgments or final resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in appealed cases. This case, however, involves proceedings before the trial court. Under Section 1,
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, the period to file a motion for reconsideration shall be within the period for taking an
appeal, which under Section 3, Rule 41, should be made within fifteen (15) days from notice of the assailed order.
Applying the foregoing, Jose should have filed his motion for reconsideration within 15 days from January 5, 2015,
or until January 20, 2015. Clearly, Jose’s motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
XII
Tailors Toto, Nelson and Yenyen filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 from an adverse decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on the complaint for illegal dismissal against Empire Textile
Corporation. They were terminated on the ground that they failed to meet the prescribed production quota at
least four (4) times. The NLRC, decision was assailed in a special civil action under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals (CA). In the verification and certification against forum shopping, only Toto signed the verification and
certification, while Atty. Arman signed for Nelson. Empire filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of defective
verification and certification. Decide with reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The motion to dismiss should be granted. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping were not signed
by all the petitioners. There was no showing that Toto nor Atty. Arman were duly authorized by the other
petitioners through a special power of attorney to sign on their behalf; hence, the motion to dismiss should be
granted.
XIII
The officers of “Ang Kapaligiran ay Alagaan, Inc.” engaged your services to file an action against ABC Mining
Corporation which is engaged in mining operations in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. ABC used highly toxic chemicals in
extracting gold. ABC’s toxic mine tailings were accidentally released from its storage dams and were discharged
into the rivers of said town. The mine tailings found their way to Calancan Bay allegedly to the waters of nearby
Romblon and Quezon. The damage to the crops and loss of earnings were estimated at P1 Billion. Damage to the
environment is estimated at P1 Billion. As a lawyer for the organization, you are requested to explain the
advantages derived from a petition for writ of kalikasan before the Supreme Court over a complaint for damages
before the RTC of Marinduque or vice-versa. What action will you recommend? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
As a lawyer for the organization, I would recommend the filing of a petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. The
Writ of Kalikasan is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated,
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces (Section 1 of Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC also known as Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases).
The following reliefs may be included under the writ of kalikasan: (a) Directing respondent to permanently cease
and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws
resulting in environmental destruction or damage; (b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency,
private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment; (c) Directing the respondent
public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and
orders of the court; (d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to
make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioner (Sec. 15, Rule 7. Ibid).
The rules also provide interim reliefs in favor of the petitioner upon filing a verified motion, namely: (i) Ocular
inspection; or (ii) Production or inspection of documents or things (Sec. 12, Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC also known as
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).
Additionally, the petition for Writ of Kalikasan is more advantageous compared to a complaint for damages before
the RTC because it may be filed directly with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals.
Unlike a complaint for damages before the RTC which can only be filed by a real-party-in-interest as defined in Rule
3(2) of the Rules of Court, the rule on locus standi is relaxed in petitions for Writ of Kalikasan which allows the
petition to be filed by parties as citizen suit. In addition, any of the following may file a petition for Writ of
Kalikasan: (a) natural or juridical person; (b) entity authorized by law; or (c) POs, NGOs or any public interest group
accredited by or registered with any government agency on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated (Sec. 1, Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). Besides, the petition for Writ of
Kalikasan is exempted from the payment of docket fees.
From the foregoing, it is clear that filing a petition for Writ of Kalikasan would be the best remedy to address all the
environmental problems caused by the release of the toxic waste to the waters of Romblon and Quezon without the
burden of paying docket fees. After all, the filing of a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions; thus, the organization can later file a
complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court, should they desire to do so. At any rate, the rules provide that
judgment must be rendered within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision which
expedites the proceedings significantly considering the urgency of the situation in the instant case. As lawyer for the
organization I would recommend, therefore, the filing of a petition for a Writ of Kalikasan with the Supreme Court.
XV
Chika sued Gringo, a Venezuelan, for a sum of money. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) rendered a
decision ordering Gringo to pay Chika P50,000.00 plus legal interest. During its pendency of the appeal before the
RTC, Gringo died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis. Atty. Perfecto, counsel of Gringo, filed a manifestation
attaching the death certificate of Gringo and informing the RTC that he cannot substitute the heirs since Gringo did
not disclose any information of his family. As counsel for Chika, what remedy can you recommend to your client so
that the case can move forward and she can eventually recover her money? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
As counsel for Chika, I would recommend that she immediately procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of Gringo. Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if no
legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. After the appointment of an executor or administrator, the action shall be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person (Section 20, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
XIX.
Tristan filed a suit with the RTC of Pasay against Arthur King and/or Estate of Arthur King for reconveyance of a lot
declared in the name of Arthur King under TCT No. 1234. The complaint alleged that “on account Arthur King’s
residence abroad up to the present and the uncertainty of whether he is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be
served with summons by publication.” Summons was published and nobody filed any responsive pleading within
sixty (60) days therefrom. Upon motion, defendants were declared in default and judgment was rendered declaring
Tristan as legal owner and ordering defendants to reconvey said lot to Tristan. Jojo, the court-designated
administrator of Arthur King’s estate, filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA praying that the
decision in favor of Tristan be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. He claims that the action filed by
Tristan is an action in personam and that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over defendants Arthur King and/or
his estate. On the other hand, Tristan claims that the suit is an action in rem or at least an action quasi in rem. Is
the RTC judge correct in ordering service of summons by publication? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Yes. Under Section 14, Rule 14, Rules of Court, in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service
may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places
and for such time as the court may order. This rule applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem (Pedro T. Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008). Clearly, since the
action for reconveyance is an action in personam, the RTC Judge is correct in ordering service of summons by
publication.
XX.
Royal Bank (Royal) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Ervin and Jude before the RTC of Manila. The
initiatory pleading averred that on February 14, 2010, Ervin obtained a loan from Royal in the amount of P1 million,
as evidenced by Promissory Note No.’007 (PN) signed by Ervin. Judé signed a Surety Agreement binding herself as
surety for the loan. Royal made a final demand on February 14, 2015 for Ervin and Jude (defendants) to pay, but
the latter failed to pay. Royal prayed that defendants Ervini and Jude be ordered to pay the amount of P1 million
plus interests. In their answer, Ervin admitted that he obtained the loan from Royal and signed the PN. Jude also
admitted that she signed the Surety Agreement. Defendants pointed out that the PN did not provide the due date
for payment, and that the loan has not yet matured as the maturity date was left blank to be agreed upon by the
parties at a later date. Defendants filed a Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings on the ground that there is no
genuine issue presented by the parties’ submissions. Royal opposed the motion on the ground that the PN’s
maturity is an issue that must be threshold out during trial.
(B) A complaint in which the principal relief sought is the enforcement of a seller’s contractual right to repurchase a
lot with an assessed value of P15,000.00: (2.5%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(B) The Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over an action in which the principal relief sought is the
enforcement of a seller’s contractual right to repurchase a lot. Since said action is one for specific performance to
enforce a contractual right, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court (Surviving Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo; G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014; BP Blg. 129, Sec 19).
II.
Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying for the delivery of a
parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case was inadvertently raffled to an RTC
designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing
that the trial court was not a regular RTC, approaches you and wants you to file a petition to have the judgement
annulled for lack of jurisdiction.”
What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will advise Era that a petition for annulment of judgment is untenable, I will tell Era that the available post-
judgment remedies could be any of the following depending upon the date of his receipt of the judgment: Motion
for Reconsideration, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment, or Certiorari.
The Regional Trial Court, despite its having been designated as Special Commercial Court remains possessed of
authority as a court of general jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases, whether civil or criminal. The Constitution
vests not only in the Supreme Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts, the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law (Jesus C. Garcia v. The Hon. Kay
Alan T. Drilon, GR No 179267, June 25, 2013). The designation of the court as a special commercial court is an
internal arrangement for lower courts-that could be allowed by the Supreme Court, with the Office of the Court
Administrator as the implementing arm, with the purpose of giving priority to commercial cases on top of the trial
court’s regular cases.
IV.
Give brief answers to the following:
What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(a) This is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the
lowest, on to the next higher, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and is likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. This is an established policy
necessary to avoid inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the Court’s docket.
V.
After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Evan returned to the Philippines to retire in Manila, the place of his
birth and childhood. Ten years before his retirement, he bought for cash in his name a house and lot in Malate,
Manila. Six months after his return, he learned that his house and lot were the subject of foreclosure proceedings
commenced by ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note and a deed of real estate mortgage he had allegedly
executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier.
Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of mortgage were supposedly
executed, Evan forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila praying that the subject documents be
declared null and void.
ABC Bank filed a motion to dismiss Evan’s complaint on the ground of improper venue on the basis of a stipulation
in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive venue in the event of litigation between the parties
arising out of the loan and mortgage.
Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted? Explain your answer(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER.
No. ABC Bank’s motion to dismiss should be denied in Briones Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015),
the Supreme Court ruled that a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be
bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules
on venue. The Supreme Court ruled that it would be inherently inconsistent for a complaint of this nature to
recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which
such stipulation is contained.
In this case, Evan’s complaint directly assails the validity of the promissory note and deed of mortgage, which
contains said venue stipulation; hence, said venue stipulation is not binding on him. Evan correctly filed his
complaint with the Manila RTC pursuant to Rule of the Rules of Court.
VI.
Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract of land located in Oriental Mindoro.
She impleaded her two brothers John and Adrian as defendants but did not implead Leica and Agatha, her two
sisters who were permanent residents of Australia.
Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without impleading all indispensable parties, John
and Adrian moved to dismiss the complaint.
Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER.
Yes, the trial court has reason to deny the motion. Section 11, Rule 3 Rules of Court states that neither misjoinder
nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead Leica and Agatha, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an
indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on the trial court’s own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just (Ablaza v. Reput. lic; G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010).
VII.
Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a promissory note in favor of
Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot as security for her obligation.
The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action against Elise to foreclose the real
estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending, Merchant Bank also filed an action to
recover the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based on the same promissory note previously executed by the
latter. In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting of a single cause of
action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was devoid of any legal basis considering that
the two actions were based on separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan evidenced by the promissory note,
and the deed of real estate mortgage.
Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Yes, there is splitting of a cause of action. A creditor cannot file a civil action against the debtor for collection of the
debt and subsequently file an action to foreclose the mortgage: This is an example of splitting of a single cause of
action, a practice that is vexatious and oppressive (Dunao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48276, June 6, 2001).
VIII.
(A) Laura was the lessee of an apartment unit owned by Louie. When the lease expired, Laura refused to vacate the
property. Her refusal prompted Louie to file an action for unlawful detainer against Laura who failed to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period.
Louie then filed a motion to declare Laura in default. Should the motion be granted? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, the motion should not be granted because it is a prohibited pleading Under Section 19 (h) of the Rules on
Summary Procedure, a motion to declare defendant in default is among the pleadings that are prohibited in cases
covered by said Rule. Considering that an action for unlawful detainer is covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, Louie’s motion to declare Laura in default is a prohibited pleading, and thus, should not be granted.
(B) Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect P350,000.00, an amount representing
the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. Realizing a jurisdictional error in filing the
complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal before she was served with the answer of Yana. The RTC
issued an order confirming the dismissal .
Three months later, “Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of action this time in
the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the complaint dismissed
without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was
dismissed by the MeTC.
A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.
May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your answer (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, Yana cannot successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule. In order for the Two-Dismissal Rule to apply, Rule 17,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that both dismissals through plaintiff’s notices were made by a competent
court.
In this case, the Makati City RTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint which was dismissed through Agatha’s
notice, because it is below its jurisdictional amount of at least P 400,000.00. Therefore, the Two-Dismissal Rule can
not be successfully invoked in this case.
(The two-dismissal rule applies when the plaintiff has (a) twice dismissed actions, (b) based on or including the
same claim, (c) in a court of competent jurisdiction. The second notice of dismissal will bar the refiling of the action
because it will operate as an adjudication of the claim upon the merits. In other words, the claim may only be filed
twice, the first being the claim embodied in the original complaint. Since as a rule, the dismissal is without
prejudice, the same claim may be filed. If the refiled claim or complaint is dismissed again through a second notice
of dismissal, that second notice triggers the application of the two-dismissal rule and the dismissal is to be deemed
one with prejudice because it is considered as an adjudication upon the merits.)
IX
Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of P750,000.00 against Salvador in the RTC in Quezon City
for the latter’s alleged breach of their contract of services. Salvador promptly filed his answer, and included a
counterclaim for P250,000.00 arising from the allegedly baseless and malicious claims of Abraham that compelled
him to litigate and to engage the services of counsel, and thus caused him to suffer mental anguish.
Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, Abraham filed
a motion to dismiss vis-a-vis the counterclaim on that ground.
Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer: (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, Salvador’s counterclaim is compulsory in nature, and thus should not be dismissed. Section 7, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court explicitly states a compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication, the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Further, that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may
be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. In relation thereto, the Supreme Court held in Alday v. FGU
Insurance Corp. (GR No. 138822, January 23, 2001), that claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result
of plaintiff’s filing of a complaints are compulsory. In this case, the court’s jurisdiction over Salvador’s counterclaim,
despite being below the jurisdictional amount is evident from the following: Salvador’s claims for litigation expenses
arise out of Abraham’s complaint for damages; Salvador’s claims do not require the presence of third parties, and
being compulsory in nature, the trial court may exercise jurisdiction over said claim.
X.
On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in favor of Ramon; the latter filed a complaint for
P950,000.00 against the former in the RTC of Davao City, In an unverified answer, Harold specifically denied the
genuineness of the promissory note. During the trial, Harold sought to offer the testimonies of the following: (1)
the testimony of an NBI handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his signature; and (2) the testimony of a
credible witness to prove that if ever Harold had executed the note in favor of Ramon, the same was not supported
by a consideration.
May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief explanation of your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER.
Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of the NBI handwriting expert. The alleged promissory note
attached to Ramon’s complaint is an actionable document since it is a written instrument upon which an action or
defense is grounded (Asian Construction and Development Corporation 1. Mendoza, G.R. No: 176949, June
27, 2012). Accordingly, Harold’s failure to specifically deny under oath the genuineness of said actionable document
amounts to an implied admission of its genuineness and due execution under Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
Harold cannot thus raise the defense of forgery by presenting the testimony of a handwriting expert. Well-settled is
the rule that the trial court may reject evidence that a party adduces to contradict a judicial admission he previously
made since such admission is conclusive as to him (Equitable Card Network Inc., Capistrano; G.R. No. 180157
February 8, 2012).
However, Ramon may not validly object to the testimony of a credible witness to prove that the promissory note
was not supported by a consideration. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document does not
bar the defense of want of a consideration (Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillani GR No. L-8414, December 9, 1915).
XI
Teddy filed against Buboy an action for rescission of a contract for the sale of a commercial lot. After having been
told by the wife of Buboy that her husband was out of town and would not be back until after a couple of days the
sheriff requested the wife to just receive the summons in behalf of her husband. The wife acceded to the request;
received the summons and a copy of the complaint, and signed for the same.
(A) Was there a valid service of summons upon Buboy? Explain – your answer briefly. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) No, there was no valid service of summons in this case since the summons was not personally received by Buboy.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve
the summons within a reasonable period. “Several attempts mean at least three tries, preferably on at least two
different dates” (Manotoc v Court of Appeals, GR No. 130974, August 16, 2006).
(B) If Buboy files a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the twin grounds of lack of jurisdiction over his person
and prescription of the cause of action, may he be deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court? Explain your answer briefly (3%).
SUGGESTED ANSWERS
(B) Yes. In one case, the SC held that when a party file a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
its person, and at the same time raise affirmative defences, thereby seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal
of the case, respondents evidently manifested their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled
that the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's
jurisdiction.
XII.
What is the mode of appeal applicable to the following cases, and what issues may be raised before the reviewing
court tribunal?
(a) The decision or final order of the National Labor Relations Commission (145%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS
(a) Strictly, there is no appeal from an NLRC decision. However, NLRC decisions or final orders are reviewable on
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner may raise the
issue on whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction (Pfizer Inc,
v. Galan, G.R. No. 158460. August 24, 2007).
(b) The judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction: (1.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(b) The mode of appeal is petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court Petitioner may raise errors of fact,
law, or both Under Section 2 of Rule 42.
XIII.
Judgment was rendered against defendant Jaypee in an action for unlawful detainer. The judgment ordered Jaypee
to vacate and to pay attorney’s fees in favor of Bart, the plaintiff. To prevent the immediate execution of the
judgment, would you advise the posting of a supersedeas bond as counsel for Jaypee? Explain your answer briefly
(2%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER
I would advise Jaypee to post a supersedeas bond, but I would also advise him that the posting of a supersedeas
bond alone does not prevent the immediate execution of the judgment. To stay the immediate execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case, the defendant:
1. Must perfect an appeal,
2. File a supersedeas bond; and
3. Periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal, otherwise, the writ of
execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff (Achang v. Hon. Luczon, G.R. No: 164246, January 15, 2014; Rule
70. Sec tion 19 of the Rules of Court).
XIII
A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on September 20, 2017 by the RTC against defendant Jeff enjoining
him from entering the land of Regan, the plaintiff. On October 9, 2017, upon application of Regan, the trial court,
allegedly in the interest of justice, extended the TRO for another 20 days based on the same ground for which the
TRO was issued.
On October 15, 2017, Jeff entered the land subject of the TRO. May Jeff be liable for contempt of court? Why?
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, Jeff may not be held liable for contempt. Under Rute 58. Sec tion 5 of the Rules of Court, a Temporary
Restraining Order is valid for 20 days. Its effectivity is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that
effect, and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued,
thus, Jeff cannot be held liable for contempt.
Indispensable Party is a real party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action (Sec. 7,
Rule 3). Without the presence of his party the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality (De Castro vs. CA, 384
SCRA 607). The presence of indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an
indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence of indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only to the absent parties
but even as to those present.
(c) Assuming that XYZ Construction Co. is an indispensable party, is its non-joinder a ground for the dismissal of the
case? Explain. (3%)
No. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of
the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable.
A.3.
Mr. C sued Mr. D for reconveyance of property and damages, claiming that Mr. D, through fraud and forgery, was
able to obtain the title to Lot No. 1234, which was previously registered in Mr. C's name. The complaint was filed
before the Regional Trial Court.
Instead of filing an answer, Mr. D moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. In
opposition, Mr. C argued that lack of cause of action is not a ground for a motion to dismiss as the ground provided
under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is failure to state a cause of action.
Distinguish the concepts of lack of cause of action and failure to state a cause of action. Based on this distinction, is
Mr. C's opposition tenable? Explain. (5%)
The mere existence of a cause of action is not sufficient for a complaint to prosper. Even if in reality the plaintiff has
a cause of action against the defendant, the complaint may be dismissed if the complaint or the pleading asserting
the claim “states no cause of action”.
This means that the cause of action must unmistakably be stated or alleged in the complaint or that all the
elements of the cause of action required by substantive law must clearly appear from the mere reading of the
complaint. To avoid an early dismissal of the complaint, the simple dictum to be followed is: “If you have a cause of
action, then by all means, state it.” Where there is a defect or an insufficiency in the statement of the cause of
action, a complaint may be dismissed not because of an absence or a lack of cause of action but because the
complaint states no cause of action. The dismissal will therefore, be anchored on a “failure to state a cause of
action”.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one hand,
failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule
16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the evidence does
not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading (Lourdes Suites [Crown Hotel Management Corporation] vs.
Binaro, GR No. 204729, 08/06/2014).
There is a difference between failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause of action. These legal concepts are
distinct and separate from each other.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. Its elements are as follows:
1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
or other appropriate relief.
Lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal due to lack of cause of
action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions
or evidence presented by the plaintiff. It is a proper ground for a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
In this case, the RTC could not have dismissed the Complaint due to lack of cause of action for as stated above, such
ground may only be raised after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of the above elements, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action which is the proper remedy
under Section 1 (g) of Rule 16 xxx (Philippine National Bank vs. Sps. Rivera, GR No. 189577, 04/20/2016).
A.4.
Mrs. E filed a complaint for sum of money against Mr. F in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of Mrs. E, and since no appeal was interposed thereto,
the ruling became final and executory as evinced by an Entry of Judgment dated July 2, 2012. However, Mrs. E was
unable to immediately move for the execution of said judgment because she had a work engagement overseas.
On June 29, 2017, Mrs. E returned to the country and, on the same day, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution before the RTC. On July 7, 2017, the RTC granted the motion, and consequently, issued a writ of
execution in Mrs. E's favor.
Was the RTC's issuance of the writ of execution procedurally infirm? Explain. (3%)
Yes. Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment
is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10
years from the time the judgment becomes final.
A.5.
Mrs. G defaulted in the payment of her loan obligation with Z Bank. As such, Z Bank extra-judicially foreclosed Mrs.
G's mortgaged property and sold it at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder. Eventually, a
certificate of sale was issued in Z Bank's favor, and title to the property was later consolidated under the bank's
name.
Claiming that Z Bank used fraudulent machinations in increasing the interest and penalty charges on the loan,
thereby making it impossible for her to pay, Mrs. G filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for
cancellation of consolidation of ownership over a real property with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against Z Bank. Immediately thereafter, the RTC issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Z Bank from disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.
Did the RTC err in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte? Explain. (3%)
The RTC erred. Under the Rules, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As provided in the
Rules, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought be
adjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a preliminary injunction may cause grave and irreparable injury to
the party enjoined.
A.6.
Mr. H filed a complaint against Mr. I to recover the amount of ₱500,000.00 based on their contract of services. In
his answer, Mr. I admitted that he has yet to pay Mr. H for his services based on their contract but nevertheless,
interposed a counterclaim alleging that Mr. H still owed him rental arrearages for the lease of his apartment also
amounting to ₱500,000.00.
It has come to Mr. H's attention that Mr. I did not pay any filing fees when he filed his answer. As such, Mr. H
moved to dismiss the counterclaim. In response to Mr. H's motion, Mr. I averred that the non-payment of filing
fees was purely based on inadvertence and that the said filing fees had already been paid as of date, as evinced by
the official receipt issued by the clerk of court therefor.
What is the nature of Mr. l's counterclaim? Is the payment of filing fees required for such counterclaim to prosper?
Explain. (3%)
Permissive Counterclaim and payment of docket fee is required.
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay
docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to
compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim
is barred if not set up in the same action.
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in
another case.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues
of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? Of the four, the one
compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the
counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the
same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the
parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
A.7.
As a result of an anonymous complaint, Mr. J, a local public official, was held administratively liable for Grave
Misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in Administrative Case No. 1234. As such, he was
imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The Ombudsman also found probable cause to indict him for
violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.3019, or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Case
No. 4321. Mr. J moved for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision but was denied.
Unperturbed, Mr. J filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals
(CA), assailing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision in Administrative Case No. 1234 and Criminal Case No. 4321.
However, the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that such petition constitutes an improper remedy to
assail the administrative and criminal aspects of the aforementioned Ombudsman ruling.
Was the CA's dismissal of Mr. J's petition correct? Explain. (5%)
Yes and no.
In the Fabian case, the Court ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Kuizon v. Desierto and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that this Court has jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. For administrative
cases, however, we declared in the case of Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman(Visavas) that the petition should be
filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Dagan ruling homogenized
the procedural rule with respect to administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman — first
enunciated in Fabian v. Desierto — that is, all remedies involving the orders, directives, or decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases, whether by an appeal under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
must be filed with the Court of Appeals.
xxxx
The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause may only be assailed through certiorari proceedings (Rule 65)
before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Not every error in
the proceedings or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, however, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. It has
been stated that the Ombudsman may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in her by law, but such error or abuse
alone does not render her act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To
justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of another constitutional body, the petitioner must
clearly show that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in making her determination and in arriving at the conclusion she reached. For there to be a finding of grave abuse
of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
(Gatchalian vs Ombudsman)
A.10.
(a) Writ of kalikasan vs writ of continuing mandamus (3%)
(b) Remedies
(1) Remedies before a judgment becomes final and executory:
(a) Motion for reconsideration (prohibited in a case that falls under summary procedure) (Rules 37, 52);
(b) Motion for new trial (Rules 37, 53); and
(c) Appeal (Rules 40, 41, 42, 43, 45)
(2) Remedies after judgment becomes final and executory:
(a) Petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38);
(b) Action to annul a judgment (Rule 47);
(c) Certiorari (Rule 65); and
(d) Collateral attack of a judgment.
B.11.
Mr. X filed a complaint for sum of money against his old friend, Mr. Y. In order to ensure that Mr. Y would not be
able to file a responsive pleading and much more, participate in the case, Mr. X paid off Mr. Y's counsel, Atty. Z,
who deliberately let the case proceed as such without his client's knowledge.
Eventually, judgment was rendered on March 1, 2016 in Mr. X's favor, a copy of which was received by Atty. Z on
April 4, 2016. Bothered by his conscience, Atty. Z brought the copy of the decision to Mr.Y on June 1, 2016, thereby
surprising the latter and causing him grief. Meanwhile, the decision became final and executory in due course on
April 19, 2016.
Thereafter, Mr. Y took steps in vindicating his rights, which culminated on August 15, 2016 when he, as
represented by a new counsel, filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals (CA) on the
ground of extrinsic fraud. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Y failed to submit a satisfactory
explanation as to why he directly resorted to a petition for annulment of judgment, when he could have filed a
petition for relief from judgment.
(a) What are the differences between a petition for relief from judgment and a petition for annulment of
judgment in terms of grounds and periods to file? (3%)
Motion for New Trial Petition for Relief from Action to Annul
(Rule 37) Judgment (Rule 38) Judgment (Rule 47)
Grounds: Grounds: Grounds:
1. Extrinsic fraud 1. Extrinsic fraud 1. Extrinsic fraud
2. Accident 2. Accident 2. Lack of jurisdiction
3. Mistake of fact 3. Mistake of fact over the subject matter
4. Excusable negligence 4. Excusable negligence
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the
petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set
aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of
liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle
that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.
(Philippine Amanah Bank v. Contreras, GR No. 173168, 09/29/2014).
Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the original action for annulment may be based only on extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction, but extrinsic fraud, to be valid ground, should not have been availed of, or could not have been availed
of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. If the ground relied up is extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed
within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if the ground is lack of jurisdiction, the action must be
brought before it is barred by laches or estoppels.39 Regardless of the ground for the action, the remedy under
Rule 47 is to be availed of only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Ostensibly, the respondent could have availed
himself of the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Hence, his failure to resort to
such remedy precluded him from availing himself of the remedy to annul the judgment based on the compromise
agreement (Chung vs. Huang, GR No. 170679, 03/09/2016).
B.12.
Ms. R received a subpoena ad testificandum from a Regional Trial Court (RTC) directing her to appear and testify in
a case. Despite notice and without any sufficient justification, Ms. R failed to appear. This prompted the RTC to
issue a show-cause order directing Ms. R to explain, within ten (10) days, why she should not be cited for contempt
for her nonappearance despite receipt of the subpoena. Ms. R, however, did not file her comment. After due
hearing with notice to the parties, the RTC cited her in indirect contempt, and consequently, ordered her arrest.
Ms. R moved to quash the warrant issued for her arrest, claiming that a formal charge should have been filed
against her, and that the same should have been docketed and prosecuted as a separate case against her. She thus
claimed that since this procedure was not followed, the order citing her in contempt is null and void.
(1) The penalty for direct contempt depends upon the court which the act was committed;
(a) If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, the
penalty is a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding 10 days, or both;
(b) If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against a lower court, the penalty is a fine not exceeding
200 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both (Sec. 1)’;
(c) If the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet within the power of the respondent to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it (Sec. 8).
(2) A person adjudged in direct contempt may not appeal therefrom. His remedy is a petition for certiorari or
prohibition directed against the court which adjudged him in direct contempt (Sec. 2). Pending the resolution of the
petition for certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment for direct contempt shall be suspended. The
suspension however shall take place only if the person adjudged in contempt files a bond fixed by the court which
rendered the judgment. This bond is conditioned upon his performance of the judgment should the petition be
decided against him.
(b) What is the proper mode of appeal should Ms. R decide to assail her contempt citation? Will the filing of such
appeal automatically result in the suspension of the execution of judgment? Explain. (2%)
Remedy against indirect contempt; penalty
(1) The punishment for indirect contempt depends upon the level of the court against which the act was committed;
(a) Where the act was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding 30,000 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both;
(b) Where the act was committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding 5,000 pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one month, or both. Aside from the applicable penalties, if the contempt consists in the
violation of a writ of injunction, TRO or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to
the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved (Sec. 7);
(c) Where the act was committed against a person or entity exercising quasi-judicial functions, the penalty imposed
shall depend upon the provisions of the law which authorizes a penalty for contempt against such persons or
entities.
(2) The person adjudged in indirect contempt may appeal from the judgment or final order of the court in the same
manner as in criminal cases. The appeal will not however have the effect of suspending the judgment if the person
adjudged in contempt does not file a bond in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken. This
bond is conditioned upon his performance of the judgment or final order if the appeal is decided against (Sec. 11).