BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M.

VELEZ-
TING

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009

FACTS:
Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they
were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent
was already pregnant with their first child.

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more

than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child
was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter.

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their

marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to
drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. But after
they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly
and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the
wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would
confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and
force her to have sex with him. There were also instances
when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house. Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often
had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and
to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons
even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to
talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem,
but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being

psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said
that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs
and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and
for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except
when provoked by circumstances.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its

Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in
the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.

petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000,

the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s
ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no
proof was adduced to support the conclusion that
Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time
he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was
based only on theories and not on established fact,
contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.

Carmen filed a MR, it was denied then she filed a petition

for certiorari with the SC, SC directed CA to decide on
Carmen’s case. On review, CA reversed it’s earlier ruling.

ISSUE:
 Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when
it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases.

HELD:

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by

lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in
its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code.

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare

decisis was applied by the English courts and was later
adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the
historical development of this legal principle in his
dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections is enlightening:
 The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta
movere means “stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm.” The doctrine started with the
English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, “it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents
where the same points come again in litigation.”
As the rule evolved, early limits to its application
were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if
it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts
of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the
decision was the “actual principle or principles
necessary for the decision; not the words or
reasoning used to reach the decision.”

The doctrine migrated to the United States.

It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, “strict
rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent
“arbitrary discretion in the courts.” Madison
agreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing
the law, it should be rejected.” Prof. Consovoy
well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree
about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a
precedent.” He added that their ideas “reveal a
deep internal conflict between the concreteness
required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal
conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to
deal with for over two centuries.”

Indeed, two centuries of American case law

will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in
the United States. Two strains of stare decisis
have been isolated by legal scholars. The first,
known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the
higher courts to cases involving the same facts.
The second, known as horizontal stare decisis
requires that high courts must follow its own
precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes
that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has
been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not
a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of
the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two

kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional
stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations
of statutes. The distinction is important for courts
enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the
doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds
sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
“Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is
not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is again called
upon to consider a question once decided.” In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
opined: “the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it.” In contrast, the
application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by
the Congress itself.” This stance reflects both
respect for Congress' role and the need to
preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis

rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be
bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
dictate the policy for future courts while judges
that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with
them.
 In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme
Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule
and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's
“separate but equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races
be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
“separate . . . is inherently unequal.” Thus, by
freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis,
the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the
Philippine setting, this Court has likewise
refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis
rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,
we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling
and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a
private respondent is bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis

in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are
workability, reliance, intervening developments
in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts
put in the balance the following determinants:
 closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision
and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court

should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood
v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The
court should (1) determine whether the rule has
proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to
have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether
facts have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the

doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to
the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we
explained that the interpretation or construction of a law
by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under
the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration

of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned

the Molina doctrine.

We have not. By the very nature of cases

involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root
cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions,
while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to

emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s “defects”

were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage,
she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink
and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself,
is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological
defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such “defects” to be incurable.

*** The intendment of the law has been to confine

the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be
a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have

been the decisive evidence in determining whether to
declare the marriage between the parties null and void.
Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior
is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while Dr.
Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from
analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar
to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report
furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr.
Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.