G.R. No. L 24693 Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila PDF
G.R. No. L 24693 Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila PDF
Panganiban, Abad & Associates and Asst. City Fiscal L.L. Arguelles for appellant.
Jose M . Aruego, Arsenio Tenchavez and Luis Go for appellees.
Alfreo Concepcion for intervenor.
SYLLABUS
FERNANDO , J : p
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an
action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of
the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional,
and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more speci cally set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an
attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was led on July 5, 1963
by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general
manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities regularly
paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and
representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was
at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels;
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee
per annum for rst class motels and P4,500.00 for second c]ass motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to
any person or persons without his lling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and
middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be speci ed, with data furnished as to his residence
certi cate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certi cation that a
person signing such form has personally lled it up and a xed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for
being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, inde nite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
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against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels
into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in rst
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry
similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents
or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar
as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a nal
judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower
court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor
to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer led on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions
of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power
and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self- incrimination, with
the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a
stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, both with o ces in the City of Manila, while the petitioner
Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to
sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City
Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of
operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of
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the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and
669 of the compilation of ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th Indorsement dated
February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because
of undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar, 3 0 no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest." 3 1 What cannot be stressed su ciently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity
of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is wider. 3 2 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process
ground by invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a
recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance
is that the provisions are too detailed and speci c rather than vague or uncertain.
Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in
view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred
to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering
the room with him at about the same time or coming at any inde nite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of
a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators;
another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the
"full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or
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merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations su ce to render the
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is
to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co. 3 3 to Adderley v. Florida, 3 4 the
principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a
charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in constructing laws
as saying what they obviously mean." 3 5
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued
lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ
., concur.
Concepcion, C .J . and Dizon, J ., are on official leave.
Footnotes
1. The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami
Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingco Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto
Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Spring eld Hotel,
New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
2. U.S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an a rmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria
decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
3. 282 U.S. 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
4. Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the
police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape policy. It de es legal de nition;
as a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional
formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it must not fall back upon
sterile cliches; its judgments are not to derive from an abstract dialectic between liberty
and the police power. Instead, in a world of trust and unions and large-scale industry, it
must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is
more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in
vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive
society, new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In
the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole
truth been brought up from its bottomless well: and how fragile in scienti c proof is the
ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social development is a
process of trial and error; in the making of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be
given for the play of human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez
faire — not the individual — must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice (1939)
48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
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5. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 US 412.
6. U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7. Rubi v. Provincial Board (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
8. U.S. v. Giner Cruz (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
9. U.S. v. Rodriguez (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, 60 Off. Gaz. (2)
196; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
10. U.S. v. Pacis (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
11. U.S. v. Espiritu-Santo (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. v. Joson (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People v.
Chan Hong (1938) 65 Phil. 625.
17. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.
18. Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 US 420, at 487.
24. 98 Phil. 148 (1955) citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed.
1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L.
Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling, L-19824,
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July 9, 1966.
25. Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, 65 Off. Gaz. (12) 2861.
26. Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
27. Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans
v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28. Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916),
242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruz (1914), 189 Al., 66.
30. 46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American
Supreme Court decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this
Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(1924) 261 US 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937) 300 US 379.
31. Antamok Gold elds Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
32. Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it
also collides with the principles of the First, is much more de nite than the test when
only the fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a
State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process
test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v. Barnette, (1942) 319 US 624, at 639).