PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,

PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of
the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO through Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that
the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management,
thru Atty. De Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly, the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members
numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they
pushed through with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a
violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. Employers filed a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), and of the
CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the
PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

HELD:

NO. The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.
“The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that
by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March
4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent
firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police.
 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. QUINTIN B. CUETO III and VIRGILIO TORRES, respondents.

G.R. No. 117055 March 29, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent Virgilio S. Torres was employed by petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) on November 1, 1978 as a Route
Salesman assigned in Midsayap, Cotabato. Having been found guilty of multiple misappropriation of company funds in the sum of
P12,898.00 and of borrowing money and merchandise from customers, he was dismissed effective on July 15, 1988. At the time of his
dismissal, he was receiving a monthly salary of P5,180.00 On August 16, 1988, Torres filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. XII, NLRC, Cotabato City. It stated: That although it is decreed that the dismissal of the Complainant
is valid, still by reason of fairness, equity, humanitarian consideration and compassion, the Complainant with the expectation that this
will not happen again in his future endeavors and in consonance with the previous offer made by Respondent to the Complainant as
earlier discussed, it is hereby ordered that the Respondent San Miguel Corporation should allow and grant Complainant the privilege to
retire from the company with the availment of 100% benefits as practiced by the company, accruing from the time said offer was first
made.

NLRC: An examination of the records shows that the suspension of the complainant which led to his termination was precipitated by
the third of three (3) infractions he committed against the company, the first and second of which occurring in 1982 and 1983,
respectively, for which he was likewise meted out the same penalty. While it is true that labor laws in this jurisdiction have been enacted
not only to favor the workingman, but also to recognize and respect the rights of the employer, such a set-up does not provide the
employees with the green light to disregard the reasonable rules drawn up by management for harmonious relations between labor and
capital in the machinery of production. In the case at bench, complainant's malpractice of collecting beer empties and receiving cash
without issuing the corresponding official receipts therefor to his customers has constrained respondent to act in order to protect its
interest. In pursuing its defensive stance, the Commission recognizes the right of respondent to take punitive action against an employee
where there exists a just cause sufficient in law to authorize the exercise of such prerogative inherent to its self-preservation and
continued existence. Complainant further contends that respondent committed unfair labor practice in terminating his employment. The
Commission however, on this score is not in accord with his theory that because of his involvement in union activities, complainant
provoked the ire of the respondent, which was the reason why he was subjected to harassment ultimately leading to his termination.
Complainant furthermore raises the issue that he was not afforded due process during the investigation conducted by the respondent.
Said contention is untenable. Upon verification from the records, it is very clear that complainant was given ample opportunity to answer
the charges imputed against him but instead of rebutting them, he filed a request to avail of an early retirement as contained in his letter
dated March 27, 1987.

ISSUE: Did public respondents NLRC and Labor Arbiter act with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to grant private
respondent the privilege to retire with availment of 100% benefits as "a matter of fairness, equity, humanitarian consideration and
compassion," despite the finding that the dismissal was legal — there being sufficient cause found after observing due process?

HELD:

YES. In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. NLRC, et a1.,9 we held that in the case of employees separated from the
service for just and valid cause due to ". . . an offense involving moral turpitude . . . , the employer may not be required to give the
dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever name it is called, on the ground of social justice. Where the
reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance,
or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. "The NLRC's factual findings, if supported by substantial evidence,
are entitled to great respect and even finality, unless petitioner is able to show that it simply and arbitrarily disregarded evidence before
it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated".
12 Misappropriation is a species of dishonesty and is therefore an offense involving moral turpitude. Certainly, a dishonest employee
cannot be rewarded with separation pay or any financial benefit after his culpability is established in two decisions by competent labor
tribunals, which decisions appear to be wall-supported by the evidence. To hold otherwise, even in the name of compassion, would be
to send a wrong signal not only that "crime pays" but also that one can enrich himself at the expense of another in the name of social
justice. Because of his intransigence in rejecting SMC's offer during the mandatory pre-trial before the labor arbiter, and after SMC has
spent time, money and resources in litigating the claims, private respondent cannot — after losing such litigation — now arrogantly turn
to the offeror and defiantly demand the fulfillment of the pre-law suit offer. This would be totally unfair and unjust in our system of
legal advocacy.
 G.R. No. 149256 July 21, 2006

ADELAIDA B. AQUINO, petitioner,

FACTS:

Petitioner's husband, Jaime Aquino, worked as grocery man for the US Navy Commissary, Subic Bay, Olongapo City from 1970 to
1977. He performed the following tasks: (1) checked the availability of stocks before they were turned over to the supervisor of the
store; (2) piled items in shelves and display cases and assisted patrons in locating them; (3) processed retail price changes by conducting
inventories of items and (4) operated the forklift. On February 2, 2000 or about 23 years after his separation from employment, he died
of congestive heart failure. Petitioner filed a claim for surviving spouse's compensation benefits under PD 626 with respondent Social
Security System (SSS). The latter denied the claim.

Petitioner then appealed the case to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed SSS's dismissal of the claim on
the ground that the cause of death of petitioner's husband was not attributable to the nature of his work as a grocery man in the
Commissary. He was no longer connected with the store at that time. , petitioner insisted that the cause of her husband's death was
traceable to the nature of his job at the commissary store. The CA dismissed her appeal. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the CA
decision but it was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Is her husband entitled to the benefits?

HELD:

NO. Under the law, the beneficiary of an employee is entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is (1) an illness accepted as an
occupational disease by the ECC or (2) any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same
was increased by the working conditions. Stated otherwise, a claimant must prove that the illness is listed as an occupational disease by
the ECC; otherwise, he must present substantial evidence showing that the nature of the work increased the risk of contracting it.

Hence, petitioner should have shown proof that the working conditions in the commissary store where her husband worked aggravated
the risk of contracting the ailment.6Petitioner should have adduced evidence of a reasonable connection between the work of her
deceased husband and the cause of his death, or that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in her
husband's job as grocery man at the commissary store.7 Failing in this aspect, we are constrained to rule that her husband's illness which
eventually caused his demise was not compensable. Moreover, even if we were to construe the ailment of petitioner's husband as
cardiovascular disease compensable under ECC Resolution No. 432, the petition will still not prosper. the Court cannot remain oblivious
to the possibility that, within that 23-year period, other factors intervened to cause the death of petitioner's husband. Petitioner was thus
under an even greater compulsion to proffer evidence to negate this possibility and establish the causal connection between her husband's
work and his death. The 23-year gap between his separation from employment in 1977 and his death in 2000 was a gaping hole in
petitioner's claim.