Crim Casedigest Paciente 17
Crim Casedigest Paciente 17
FACTS:
-On April 13, 1981, Virgilio took the portable shed that were used by the accused without permission of the latter. Romeo Agapinay
berated Virgilio for taking the shed.
-The two exchanged words and tempers apparently flared. Romeo stabbed him in his right arm while Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay
held his arms. Romeo stabbed him for the second time at the right side of his back. Virgilio, however, managed to extricate himself
again and ran away.
-While Virgilio was running, Delfin, Alex, Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilio threw rocks at him. All of a sudden Amor Flores appeared and
plunged a knife at the back of Virgilio. It was then that Virgilio collapsed.
-Antonio and Eufemio Paino, brothers of Virgilio, and Artemio Siababa brought the wounded Virgilio to the Don Alfonso Enrile
Hospital at Gonzaga however he was declared dead on arrival, but before he died, he confessed that Agapinays as well as Amor
Flores were responsible for the incident.
-During arraignment, all six accused pleaded “not guilty”. However, the lower court found that the Agapinays had conspired to kill
Virgilio Paino and thus held them, all principals by participation.
-The court finds, however, that the accused should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation (or vindication of a
grave offense or passion of obfuscation) since clearly, the deceased uttered offending words (“vulva of your mother, if you are
talking as if you have no debts, not like me, I have no debts”) that made the Agapinays, especially Romeo, react violently.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a conspiracy on the part of the Agapinays when they committed the crime charged. (YES)
Ruling:
The law provides under Art 248 of the Revised Penal Code that any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed within any of the following
attendant circumstances. Paragraph 1 states that with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength with aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
CONCLUSION:
In this case, the fact that Delfin and Fortunato held Virgilio Paino while Romeo stabbed him, does not demonstrate treachery.
Rather, what it proves is abuse of superiority. It is indeed plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had
taken advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who, at that time was already injured.
Abuse of superiority qualifies the taking of the life of another into murder. Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato were found guilty as co-
principals of murder. However, Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, were only found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the same
offense.
Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato all surnamed Agapinay, are ORDERED to undergo indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, 4 months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as
maximum. Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, also surnamed Agapinay, are ORDERED to undergo and indeterminate sentence of four (4) years
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum. All
six accused are also ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Virgilio Paino, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS. Costs against the accused.
PEOPLE v IGNAS (412 SCRA 371, 2003)
FACTS:
-Sometime in September 1995, June Ignas’ wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend, Romenda Foyagao, that she was
having an affair the Nemesio Lopate.
-In February 1996, Romenda, as instructed by Wilma Grace via letters, informed June Ignas that there was an extramarital affair
between Wilma Grace and Nemesio Lopate. Appellant became furious, he declared “There will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill
that Nemesio”.
-In March 1996, Alfred Mayamnes, the appellant’s neighbor, saw him load his bakery equipments on board a hired truck and depart
for Nueva Vizcaya.
-Annie Bayanes, another prosecution witness, said that she was at the unloading area of Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet
(bagsakan) when suddenly she heard two gunshots.
-Also, at the bagsakan was witness Marlon Manis, who testified that it was it was his close friend and neighbor, June Ignas, who
killed Nemesio Lopate.
-Mona Barredo, another prosecution witness, testified that appellant came to her residence and asked her to dispose the handgun’s
empty shells. Because of nervousness, she complied.
-Appellant was brought in for questioning, he admitted that he had shot and killed Nemesio. However, he later denied his
statements and claimed that he was baking bread in Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya when the crime had occurred.
-Both the prosecution and the defense filed for respective motions for consideration. The prosecution sought the imposition of the
death penalty. The defense prayed for acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the nature of the crime committed was murder. (NO)
RULING: The law provides under Article 249 of the RPC that any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of
homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
CONCLUSION:
In this case, the defendant admitted that the distance between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers,
which can be negotiated in 4 or 5 hours. Clearly, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time
of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail.
The foregoing circumstances clearly show that appellant had the motive, the opportunity, and the means to commit the crime at the
place and time in question. Under the proved circumstances, the appellant’s defense of alibi is untenable.
Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
The judgment of the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (1) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day to reclusion temporal as maximum.
PEOPLE v PAJERES (210 SCRA 237, June 23, 1992)
FACTS:
-At about 11:30PM on Oct 11, 1985, Renato Perez and deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store located at Gomez St.,
Paco, Manila to buy something.
-Suddenly, appellant Leandro Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his head.
When Perez tried to help Viojan, he too, was attacked by Pajares with a baseball bat hitting him at the back below the left shoulder.
-Perez grappled the appellant but the Parajes’ companions namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until
he lost consciousness. He was treated for the injuries he sustained at the Philippine General Hospital.
-On Oct 12, 1985, Cpl. Benigno Dong of the Zamora Police Department invited Leandro Pajares for questioning regarding the
incident. Pajares verbally admitted his participation in the incident.
-Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician of the Philippine General Hospital, testified that Diosdado Viojan was brought to the
emergency room for a head injury, left occipital region. The victim was in critical condition, and while on operation, the victim died
while undergoing surgery. He averred that the injury could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a baseball bat.
-Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares, his younger brother, was mauled by the group of
Diosdado Viojan. The mauling of former is a big insult and truly offending to the him and his family. Hence, the clubbing of Diosdado
Voijan by herein appellant was a vindication of the grave offense committed against his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in favor of the
accused. (NO)
RULING: The law provides under paragraph 5 or Article 13 of the RPC that if the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, it will be a mitigating circumstance.
CONCLUSION: In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. The law says that there is
treachery when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony which ensure its commission without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
As found by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit Disdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind without any warning thereby
precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
While it may be true that appellant’s brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the deceased at about 11:30AM of
Oct. 11, 1985, it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado
Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity. Hence, the mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciate in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the accused-appellant merely acted in self-defense when he shot
the deceased. (NO)
RULING: The law provides that under Article 249 of the RPC, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. However, considering
that there are two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attendant to the crime, the imposable penalty will
follow the Article 64 paragraph 5 of the RPC.
CONCLUSION:
In this case, two out of the three mitigating circumstances considered by the CA can be credited to the petitioner. The CA properly
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was,
likewise, properly appreciated.
The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave
offense.
The essential requisites of self defense are as follows: (a). unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of
the means employed and to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Gregorio Pelonia is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.