G.R. No.

146611 February 6, 2007  CA denied the motion

TANCREDO REDEÑA,, petitioner,  petitioner filed a Petition for Relief[8] anchored on Section 2,[9] Rule
vs. 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEÑA, Respondent.  petitioner prays the CA to set aside its dismissal resolution
and reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of
 special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his
Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of appellant’s brief
the Court of Appeals  CA held that Petition for relief is not among the remedies
available in the Court of Appeals as these petitions are filed
 petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition against his brother, with the trial courts
respondent Leocadio Redeña before the then CFI now RTC of San  CA further held that Under Rule 47, an annulment of
Pablo City, Laguna judgment or final orders and resolutions may be filed before
CA based on the ground of extrinsic fraud which seems to be
 the parties’ common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, a the premise of the petition, but it is worth looking into by
residential lot, a riceland and another parcel of land the petitioner if the factual basis of the present petition for
relief may qualify as an extrinsic fraud, under Rule 47
 trial court confined the partition to only the property actually
pertaining to the estate of the parties’ deceased father and co-  Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned
owned by them, namely, the parcel of land as the rest of the resolution was likewise denied by the CA
properties were owned by the defendant
 petitioner is now before this Court via the instant recourse on his
 petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal submission that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
 court gave due course to the notice and directed the ruled that a petition for relief is not an available remedy in the court
elevation of the records of the case to the CA of appeals

 the CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as appellant, to file  petitioner prays that the court relax the application of procedural
his appellant’s brief. rules, or suspend them altogether, in favor of petitioner’s
 Evidently, the period for filing the brief was even extended substantial rights
by the CA

 there being no appellant’s brief filed within the extended period, the ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to relief under Rule 38
CA issued a resolution[5] considering the appeal abandoned and
accordingly dismissing the same. HELD: No

 8 months after the CA issued the above resolution, petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration
 petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of  petition for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding
equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when involved in a case tried by a municipal trial court shall be filed in
there is no other available or adequate remedy. and decided by the same court in the same case, just like the
 A petition for relief may not be availed of where a procedure followed in the present Regional Trial Court
party has another adequate remedy available to him,
which is either a motion for new trial or appeal from
the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not  petitioner failed to show diligence in pursuing his cause. His
prevented from filing such motion or taking the condition as a farmer, by itself alone, does not excuse or
appeal. exempt him from being vigilant on his right. He cannot lay the
blame solely on his former lawyer. It is settled that clients are
 The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their
be relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of the counsel.[18] While, exceptionally, a client may be excused from
remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode the failure of his counsel, the circumstances obtaining in this
of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be case do not convince the Court to take exception.
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already
been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a  petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the
mistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel Rules of Court. He was not prevented from filing his notice of
appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, as
 Under Section 2 of Rule 38, supra, of the Rules of Court, a in fact he filed one. The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be
party prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of
order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his
excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in the own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that
same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
due course reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either
 This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of
precisely because of any of the aforestated reasons procedure by counsel.[21] The Rules allow a petition for relief
which prevented him from appealing his case only when there is no other available remedy, and not when
litigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by negligence
 Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be availed
of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction  On a final note, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be
 For sure, under the present Rules, petitions for relief issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and
from a judgment, final order or other proceeding gross abuse of discretion as to amount to
rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a
court in the same case from which the petition arose. duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
VDA. DE VICTORIA vs. CA
> The fencing was discontinued after the children of Mrs. Victoria
Mario Victoria, through an appeal by certiorari, seeks to set aside the threatened to shoot at the workers of the Sps. Gibe with an armalite rifle.
Resolutions of CA promulgated on May 25 and July 12, 2000, which (1) It left approximately 8,000 sq. m. of the northwestern portion of the Lot
dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari and (2) denied open and unfenced.
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, respectively.
>Mrs. Victoria filed her Answer, with Motion to Dismiss Ejectment Case,
FACTS: denying the fact that she entered the lot of Judge Lantin that was sold to
Sps. Gibe. She claimed that her farmhouse was constructed on the very
October 27, 1993 – Sps. Gibe filed a Complaint for "Ejectment and lot awarded to her family by DAR.
Damages with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" against:
1. Isidra Vda. de Victoria (the mother of herein petitioner Mario > Preliminary Conference of the Ejectment Case - parties mutually agreed
Victoria) to a relocation survey of the property to be conducted by a geodetic
2. Eusebio Arida engineer.
3. Juan and Guillermo Becina
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauan, Laguna. >The geodetic engr. submitted the results of the relocation survey.

>Sps. Gibe alleged: >Mrs. Victoria and her co-defendants in the ejectment case filed
Manifestation with Motion requesting the trial court to allow an
>1992 – they acquired property for the heirs of late Judge Lantin. independent surveyor, to be paid by them, to conduct another survey.

>Property was originally part of Lot 1-B-153, which was subdivided >Court granted the motion, however, no survey plan was submitted by
into 7 parcels in 1989 among Judge Gregorio Lantin and his 4 tenants, them.
Felix Victoria, Juan and Guillermo Becina, and Eusebio Arida.
May 21, 1998 - MTC rendered decision in favor of SPS. Gibe finding them
*Felix Victoria is the deceased husband of Isidra Victoria. All the real owners of the property in question.
defendants in this ejectment case were given home lots, while the lots
allotted to Judge Lantin were sold to Sps. Gibe. May 22, 1998 – Sps. Gibe filed a motion for Immediate Execution and
Demolition praying that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the
>Lot 1-B-153-A was being fenced and it was discovered that: judgment. The defendants in the Ejectment Case were not given notice.
1. The Victoria house was standing on the northwestern portion of the
property. May 29, 1998 – after promulgation and receipt of the MTC decision, the
2. Mrs. Victoria was harvesting and picking fruits from the citrus trees defendants filed a notice of appeal, without filing a supersedeas bond to
planted in that area without the knowledge and permission of the Gibe stay the immediate execution of the decision & depositing monthly
spouses. rentals.
3. Eusebio Arida, Juan Becina and Guillermo Becina were also
surreptitiously planting palay on the northwestern portion.
June 1, 1998 – MTC granted the Motion for Immediate Execution & issued proceedings. In other words, certiorari is a remedy designed for the
a writ of execution. correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment as its
function is to keep and inferior court within its jurisdiction.
July 13, 1998 - Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for
Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) was filed with RTC >Having found [the MTC] to have jurisdiction to issue the decision dated
of Calamb, Laguna. May 28, 1998, the respondent judge likewise has jurisdiction to direct the
execution of the same pending appeal pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of
>Petition assailed MTC decision contending that it had no jurisdiction over the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
the case and committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding in favor of
Sps. Gibe and in issuing Writ of Execution pending appeal. >CA: May 25, 2000, the CA dismissed the CA Certiorari Petition because:
1. The correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a
>Mrs. Victoria died before MTC promulgated the questioned order and petition for certiorari is an ordinary appeal.
she was substituted by her son, Mario Victoria. 2. The instant petition is filed out of time.
3. The statement of material dates as to timeliness of the filing of the
>RTC of Calauan, where the petition for certiorari was raffled, issued a petition is incomplete.
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
>Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA by
October 7, 1998 - The appeal field by defendants before the RTC of Resolution of July 12, 2000 for being filed 2 days beyond the
Calauan,Laguna was dismissed for failure to file the appeal memorandum. reglementary period, he filed the petition at bar after he was granted, on
his motion, an extension of thirty days to file the petition, conditioned
August 3, 1999 – RTC dismissed petition for certiorari. upon the timeliness of the motion for extension.
>Petitioner, Victoria, contends that RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case
and t issue the questioned decisions because under PD 27 any dispute ISSUE/S:
involving said lands must be referred to DARAB.
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GADLEJ BY NOT
> Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
complaint.The complaint filed by the private respondents was for ON GROUND OF TECHNICALITY INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE CASE ON
Ejectment and Damages With a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. THE MERITS.
Ejectment proceedings are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court. II. RTC OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, COMMITTED GADLEJ BY RULING THAT
THIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MTC, AND THAT
THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO WAS NOT AN ERROR [OF]
> Petitioner Victoria did not question the jurisdiction of the Court but JURISDICTION BUT AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOT
prayed for the dismissal of the case below for lack of cause of action. REVIEWABLE IN CERTIORARI [P]ROCEEDINGS.

>The Decision of the Court below is therefore not an error of jurisdiction HELD:
but an error of judgment which is not reviewable by certiorari
Petition is denied. thoroughly discussed in Rivera v. Santiago ,41 the party alleging tenancy
must prove the existence of all the essential requisites of tenancy in order
RATIO: to oust the MTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
1ST ISSUE
> In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the > In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as an affirmative
reglementary period to appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months prior and/or special defense in their Answer with Counterclaim. Under the RSP
to the filing of petitioner’s motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001. [Revised Rule on Summary Procedure], the MTC was supposed to conduct
- The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the CA dismissing the a preliminary conference to determine if such relationship was indeed the
CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by counsel for real issue. We emphasize that the MTC did not automatically lose
petitioner’s agent on June 5, 2000. its jurisdiction simply because respondents raised tenancy as a
- Petitioner had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal or defense. It continued to have the authority to hear the case
a motion for new trial or reconsideration. precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of
the ejectment suit on its merits.

> Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it denied > To determine whether the CA was correct in its reversal of the trial
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed two days court, it is necessary to keep in mind the essential requisites of tenancy
after the expiration of the reglementary period on June 22, 2000. which are as follows:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
>The instant petition for review must likewise be denied for having been (2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land;
filed on May 12, 2001, almost 11 months after the expiration of the (3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties;
period to appeal on June 20, 2000. (4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
>The records indicates that this case should have been terminated as (6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
early as January 4, 2000 with the lapse of the period within which All these elements must concur. It is not enough that they are alleged; to
petitioner could have appealed from the RTC Decision. divest the MTC of jurisdiction, they must all be shown to be present.

>Duremdes vs. Duremdes: Rules of procedure must be faithfully > In the present case, neither petitioner nor his predecessor-in-interest
followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed submitted evidence to substantiate the existence of the essential
to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to requisites of tenancy. Thus, there is no basis at all to support petitioner’s
comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal claim that the MTC was without jurisdiction to render the questioned
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the Decision.
part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his
failure to abide by the rules. HERNANDEZ vs RURAL BANK

2ND ISSUE FACTS:

>The MTC does not automatically lose its exclusive original jurisdiction
over ejectment cases by the mere allegation of a tenancy relationship. As
>March 21, 1961 – Sps. Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank of clear whether in August, 1961 the San Pablo Colleges could make a
Lucena a loan payable on March 21, 1962. Loan was cured by a mortgage withdrawal from its deposit in the Lucena bank.
on 2 lots in Cubao. The interest for 1 year was paid in advance.
August 23, 1961 – Hernandez sent to the bank by registered mail a
>3 mos. after loan was obtained, the bank became a distress bank. photostat of the check and a letter inquiring whether the bank would
-June 6, 1961: Acting Gov. of the Central Bank apprised the honor the check and when he should go personally to the bank for that
stockholders of Lucena Bank after having found that the officers, directors purpose. That letter was received by the bank on August 29.
and employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted to
unsound and unsafe banking practices. August 30, 1961 –the executive vice-president wrote to Hernandez and
informed him that the check could not be honored for the time being
>The Monetary Board advised the stockholders to reorganize the Lucena because of adverse events that had disrupted the bank's operations.
bank by electing a new board of directors and directed that bank (a) not What the vice-president meant was that by reason of the letter of the
to grant new loans or renewals; (b) not to accept deposits from new Central Bank Governor dated June 16. 1961 the operations of the Lucena
depositors; (c) to service only the existing deposit accounts and (d) not bank were suspended.
to issue drafts or make any disbursements without the prior approval of
Central Bank examiners. >The vice-president explained that because there was a run the bank its
assets were exhausted, and so the check sent by Hernandez, which check
>The Monetary Board gave the warning that, if its directives were not was drawn against the Lucena bank, could not be accepted.
obeyed, the Central Bank. would take over the management of the
Lucena bank. >The vice-president said that when Hernandez presented the check, the
Lucena bank was no longer in a position to honor withdrawals and that
June 21, 1961 – Instead of bowing to the will of the Monetary Board, the had Hernandez paid cash, his payment would have been accepted. To
Lucena bank and its board of directors filed with the CFI of Manila a honor the check would have been tantamount to allowing a depositor
complaint seeking to restrain the implementation of Resolution No. 928. (San Pablo Colleges) to make a withdrawal but the Lucena bank could not
entertain withdrawals without the consent of the Central Bank examiners.
August 22, 1961 – Before the expiration of the one-year term of the loan, Payment by check was a disbursement.
Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan by
means of a check for P6,000 dated August 8, 1961 which was drawn >The VP did not take the trouble of asking the Central Bank examiners
against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was whether the payment by check made by Hernandez could be accepted.
payable to Fernandez As the bank's executive vice president was not Hernandez, who should have known that the bank was in distress, did not
available, the payment was not consummated. bother to take up his problem with the said examiners.

>At the time that the check was issued, the San Pablo Colleges, had a October 18, 1961 – Hernandez again asked the bank when he could
deposit in the Lucena bank amounting to P11,890.16 (27 tsn April 25, deliver the check.
1966). Instead of withdrawing P6,000 from that deposit, the San Pablo
Colleges chose to issue a check for that amount w/ Hernandez. It is not October 24, 1961 – EVP told him that the bank could not yet honor the
check because it had not resumed its banking operations, that it might
reopen in January, 1962, and that, anyway, the loan would not be due charter and on the assumption that the Lucena bank was insolvent, filed
until March 21, 1962. with the Court of first Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27, 1962
for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank [THIS
February 1, 1962 – Hernandez sent another letter enclosed the original IS ANOTHER CIVIL CASE].
check (duly endorsed) with his letter to the bank dated March 7, 1962,
which was sent by registered mail and special delivery. March 28, 1963 – CFI Manila issued an order directing the Lucena bank to
turn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative.
March 7, 1962 - the check was returned to Hernandez because the bank's
manager was allegedly in Manila. April 2, 1963 – Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 426 designated the
Superintendent of Banks or his duly authorized representative to take
April 25, 1962 - Hernandez again mailed the check to the bank on April charge of the assets of the Lucena bank.
25, with the request that his mortgage be cancelled.
November 27, 1963 – The Board in its resolution ordered the
>In the meantime, the Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Superintendent of Banks to convert the assets of the Lucena bank to
Lucena Bank. money. The Lucena bank, by means of certiorari sought to annul the
liquidation proceeding. This Court denied its petition.
February 8, 1962 –Governor of the Central Bank in a letter enjoined the
Lucena bank from transacting business and advised it to turn over its October 29, 1963 – Hernandez informed the Central Bank that he had
assets, documents and records to the chief bank examiner. The bank sent to the Lucena bank on April 25, 1962 the chock for P6,000. He again
building was sealed. requested that his mortgage be cancelled.

February 12, 1962 – the Lucena Bank filed with the Court of First December 9, 1963 – Associate Superintendent of Banks in his answer
Instance of Lucena City a complaint praying that the Central Bank be returned the check to Hernandez and informed him that, according to the
enjoined from liquidating the said bank. Lucena bank's executive vice-president, the check could not be applied to
the payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank was already closed
February 14, 1962 – the court issued an ex parte preliminary injunction when he received the check. Moreover, the chock was drawn against the
which it dissolved ten days later. current deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank which was
in the process of liquidation. Hernandez was advised to settle his account
>On the same date, FEBRUARY 14, 1962, the Manila court rendered a by paying cash or by means of a chock drawn against a bank other than
decision in Civil Case No. 47345, restraining the enforcement of the the Lucena bank.
Monetary Board resolution, which required the Lucena bank to undertake
a reorganization and to curtail its operations [THIS IS THE PREVIOUS December 16, 1963 – Hernandez announced to the Associate
CASE FILED BY THE LUCENA BANK AGAINST MB]. The Central Bank Superintendent of Banks in his letter of that he was going to deposit the
appealed. said check in the court of First Instance of Lipa City on or before
December 26, 1963.
>To implement the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidation
of the Lucena bank, the Central Bank, pursuant to section 29 of its
January 2, 1964 – Hernandez enclosed the check with his letter to the (2) in not holding that it had no jurisdiction because the Hernandez
clerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa City. That letter was spouses should have ventilated their claim in the liquidation proceeding
received in court on January 6, 1964. pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Instead of filing a
separate action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City;
January 11, 1964 – Hernandez wrote a letter informing the Associate (3) in not holding that there was no valid consignation;
Superintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. Copies of (4) in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees; and
that letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo Colleges. (5) in ordering execution pending appeal in spite of the tact that the
assets of the Lucena bank are in custodia legis or in the custody of the
October 12, 1964 - Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of liquidation court and the receiver appointed by it.
First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the
Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the
check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The RATIO:
Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of
P10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000. RTC judgment is reversed and set aside. The case is dismissed without
prejudice to the right of the Hernandez spouses to take up with the
October 20, 1964 – Ventral Bank filed a motion to dismiss contending liquidation court(proper venue to resolve this case) the settlement of
that the venue was improper because the action involved a real property their mortgage obligation.
so it should have been instituted in QC where the lots are situated. Also,
Lucena Bank is under liquidation and its properties and assets are in HELD:
custodial egis and may only be reached by motion in CFI Manila. (1)Defendants-appellants contend that the action of the Hernandez
spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the
January 30, 1967 – the counsel of Lucena offered to compromise the case mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title to real property
by stipulating that the central Bank would apply the check in question to which should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
the mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit of the San Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated.
Pablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the check of
P6,000 and that, by virtue of that compromise, the complaint and >Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions
counterclaim would be dismissed. The compromise did not happen affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
because the lawyers of Hernandez and Central Bank did not assent to it. condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
October 31, 1967 – RTC rendered an amended decision ordering Lucena thereof lies".
or Central Bank to honor the check, cancel the mortgage and pay
Hernandez damages and attorney’s fees. >The rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage. In
ISSUE/S: the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to
The Central Bank contends that the trial court erred: accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. It is a
(1) in not holding that the venue was improperly laid; personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has, not foreclosure
the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession of July 21, 1997 – the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to
the mortgaged lots. them was cancelled by UCPB. As a result, Go demanded from UCPB the
return of 2 TCTs covered by the Real Estate Mortgages executed. UCPB
>Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate refused to return of the TCTs. It proceeded to have the 2 pre-signed Real
mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real Estate Mortgages notarized and caused for its registration before the RD
mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the of Mandaluyong on September 2, 1997.
mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the
mortgage. June 15, 1999 – UCPB filed with the Sheriff of Mandaluyong an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered by a TCT for
>The venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant non-payment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. The public
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff auction sale of the property was set on 11 April and 3 May 2000.
or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and
A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is damages, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injuction, against
not the same as an action in personam. the bank and its officers and the sheriff, with the RTC of Pasig. The
amended complaint alleged:
We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the >Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT, which will be
venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" in auctioned, although it was registered only in the name of Looyuko;
section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or domicile. >UCPB was aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked to sign 2
deeds of real estate mortgage covering the said property;
GO vs UCPB >The approved omnibus credit line applied for by Go and Looyuki
did not materialize and was cancelled by UCPB on July 21, 1997 and so
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 31 July 2002 the pre-signed real estate mortgages were cancelled;
of the Court of Appeals, where the respondent judge is directed to >He demanded from UCPB the 2 TCTs to be returned to him but the
dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. bank refused;
>Despite the cancellation of the credit line, UCPB had the 2 deeds
FACTS: or real estate mortgage notarized and caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure;
>Go & Looyuko are co-owners of Noah’s Ark International and a lot more >That the auction sale be enjoined;
of Noah’s Ark Enterprises. Sometime in August 1996, they both applied >TCTs be returned to him and bank be ordered to pay him for
for an Omnibus Line accommodation with UCPB for 900M, which the UCPB damages.
approved.
June 7, 2000 – UCPB filed motion to dismiss stating that:
>Transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over lands located in > that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to
Mandaluyong and registered under Looyuko’s name and another lot nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees;
registered in the name of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery. > that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;
 >an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
and, therefore, the complaint states no cause of action; property. The venue for real actions is the same for regional trial courts
>that the complaint was improperly verified; and and municipal trial courts -- the court which has territorial jurisdiction
>that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
insufficient and false certification of non-forum shopping.
>Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for
June 7, 2000 – RTC issued an order enjoining the auction sale and the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach,
granted the writ for preliminary injunction. or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property.22 The venue for personal actions is likewise the same
August 9, 2000 – RTC denied bank’s motion to dismiss the case. The MR for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where
was denied as well on November 8, 2000. the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
January 3, 2001 – UCPB questioned said orders before CA via petition for the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
certiorari alleging that the RTC acted w/o or in excess of jurisdiction w/
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order that denied the motion to >It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for
dismiss and the MR. cases of the above nature is the primary objective for which said cases
are filed.
July 31, 2002 – CA set aside the orders of RTC and ordered for the
dismissal of the civil case on the ground of improper venue. >The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,31 is more particularly
instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the mortgage
14 November 2002 – Go’s MR was denied. documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that
affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before
ISSUE/S: the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies,
which is the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Whether petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is
a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue? >In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the
instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage
HELD: is a real right and a real property by itself.35 An action for cancellation of
real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the
Petition denied for lack of merit. The assailed decisions denying the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and
motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies.

RATIO: Rule 1, Sections 1 – 6 Rules of Court

Paderanga vs. Buissan (September 1993)
>In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as TO DETERMINE THE PROPER VENUE OF AN ACTION TO FIX THE PERIOD
provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title OF A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH PRAYER FOR DAMAGES
to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include FACTS:
- In 1973,PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA Industries Since it is a real action, venue is laid in the court having

company as represented by its General Manager JOSE ELUMBA jurisdiction over the territory where the property lies.
entered into an oral contract of lease o ELUMBA
o For the use of a commercial space in a building owner by  The recovery of possession being incidental, the original
PADERANGA action is for breach of the contract of lease, and
o The lease was for an indefinite period, but the rent was damages
agreed as P150/month  The action is one in personam (between parties) and
o The leased area was used as the sales office of Allied Air not in rem (against the whole world)
Freight in Ozamis City  Therefore, the venue may be laid in the place
- 1977 PADERANGA subdivided the leased area into two where plaintiff-defendant resides
o He took possession of the other half
ISSUE: Whether the action filed is a personal action or a real action?
o Repossession was allowed by the local manager of ELUMBA
HELD:
- July 1977, ELUMBA instituted an action for damages and PRAYED - The case is deemed a real action and must be tried in the province
FOR THE FIXING OF THE PERIOD OF LEASE AT 5 years. WHERE the property lies (OZAMIS CITY).
o They filed the action before the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte o The instant action is for damages, and the fixing of the lease
based in Dipolog City period
- PADERANGA then moved for the dismissal of the case because the  Although there the recovery of possession is incidental,
action was a REAL ACTION which should have been filed before CFI IT IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE
of Misamis Occidental in Ozamis City, because the property was  Kara’s train of thought – DAMAGES WHY? 
situated there. BREACH OF CONTRACT, a portion of the property leased
- 1978 – Judge BUISSAN denied the Motion to dismiss was repossessed by the lessor  IF the damages is
o Because it was an enforcement of the contract of lease granted  the repossessed portion will likewise be
o No question of ownership was raised returned to the lessee  THEREFORE, the recovery of
o The venue was then proper possession IS INCIDENTAL the initial action filed.
- MR of PADERANGA was also denied  Even though the action did not seek for recovery of
o Although there was an action for recovery of possession, it possession, it is the ULTIMATE PURPOSE of the action,
was not the main issue raised (remember, Dean said that the and as such, it is a real action because you want to
main issue/contention is what is alleged in the initiatory recover something.
pleading, in this case, the recovery of possession was ONLY
incidental to the contract of lease, and claim for damages) Personal RTC where the defendant or any of the defendants reside or
- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES Action where plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs reside
o PADERANGA Real RTC having jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject
Action property or a portion thereof lies - VITUG failed to pay, and the properties were foreclosed and sold at
public auction
INCIDENTAL ISSUE: Whether or not the venue for an action to fix the o Jaramilla and Bacani also failed to settle the loan
period of a contract of lease should be before the CFI Misamis Occidental o Cert of Sale was issued to PNB
– OZAMIS CITY(where the property is) or the CFI of Zamboanga del
o PNB later on sold the properties
Norte – DIPOLOG CITY (where ELUMBA is based)?
HELD: The venue should be in Ozamis City. - HISTORY (sorry, this is important to understand the case)
- The court pointed out that ELUMBA is confused with the concept of o Clodualdo Vitug was married twice, his second wife is
personal and real actions vis-à-vis actions in personam and in rem. MONTEMAYOR
We will focus on personal and real actions o He died intestate (with no will) and his estate was settled and
o The action instituted is in personam but this does not mean distributed
that the action is PERSONAL. A personal action may not  MONTEMAYOR was the administratix (meaning, the
necessarily be an action in personam and a real action may court made her the administer the estate of Clodualdo)
not be an action in rem  MONTEMAYOR entered a contract of lease with
two of her children
Action in An action against a person on the basis of his o But then the other children filed an action for partition and
personam PERSONAL liability reconveyance and damages against the administrator of
Action in rem Is an action against the THING itself, instead of the
MONTEMAYORS estate (by this time Montemayor already
person
passed away)
PNB vs. CA (1987) o They also included PNB in the action, because PNB sold
*GUYS Im not sure if this is the correct case, I don’t have the SCRA copy. the mortgaged properties
So, I’m saying sorry if this is the wrong one.  THE SUBJECT of the action is 30 parcels of land, which
PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION OF THE CA they claim to be CLODUALDO’s and MONTEMAYORS
WHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES  They argue that
FACTS:
o The mortgage to PNB as well as
- In 1952, Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUG
o The PUBLIC AUCTION are null and void.
mortgaged several parcels of land situated in Pampanga, the
 They invoke a previous court decision wherein the
property served as a guarantee for the loan granted by PNB
properties were decided to be of conjugal nature.
o LOAN TO Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani
 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint
- In 1963, MONTEMAYOR also mortgaged 2 parcels of land to
 Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA
guarantee the loan of her son VITUG
 Reversed lower court decision stating that the
- The TCTs mortgaged were all in the name of Donata MONTEMAYOR
public auction of the properties are valid, but only
HALF.
  SO NOW, PNB filed a petition for certiorari. attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount
of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a party to action for reconveyance and
damages? Tesorero vs. Mathay (1990)
HELD: NO. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE BOARD
- Remember that there was a previous decision stating that the OF ENERGY
parcels of land are of conjugal nature FACTS:
o PNB cannot be a proper party thereto. - 1980 respondent Davao Light (DALIGHT) filed with public
o PNB was only included because the subject properties were respondent BOE an application for the approval of the sound value
sold. appraisal of its properties worth P339M
 REMEMBER LAND TITLES (and this will apply to your o The appraisal was made by the Technical and Management
Credit Trans): A mortgaged property should be in the Service (TAMSPHIL)
name of the mortgagee, because the assumption is the - June 1981, the BOE disapproved the TAMSPHIL Appraisal report
mortgagee will be in default (eventually). The property due to deficiencies and discrepancies
is a security for the payment of the loan. - 1982, DALIGHT again filed an application for the approval of its
 PNB relied on the Torrens title, why would they even appraisal, this time Asian Appraisal Co conducted the appraisal
question the validity of the titles? The titles were in the - 1983, DOE approved P282M as the fair and reasonable value of
name of MONTEMAYOR. Therefore, they don’t have to DALIGHTs properties, and DALIGHT received the same
look beyond the title. - Jan 1984 (17 days after receiving the decision), the petitioners
- Actions for the recovery of real property and for partition filed an MR but the same was denied, but the petitioners did not
ARE REAL ACTIONS, but they are also actions in personam receive the decision
that bind particular individuals who are parties thereto. - June 1984, petitioners prayed that a hearing be conducted and/or a
o PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by said resolution be issued on their MR
decisions - BOE replied that the MR has been denied, and provided copies of
 PNB was also not aware of the case and the said the decision
decision, because of they knew the conjugal nature of
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case?
the property, they would have required the consent of HELD: NO.
all the heirs (co-owners). - The proper remedy is to appeal to the Office of the President 7
DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF ITS DECISIONS OR ORDERS.
WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is - It must be noted that the decision was received on Dec 19, 1983,
hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
but the petitioners ONLY filed their MR on Jan 5, 1984 or 17 days
DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay
after from receipt of the said decision
 - They received the copy of the denied MR on Dec 1984  On June 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision4
- The Court in the broader interests of justice has in a number of dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.
cases given due course to a petition for certiorari, although the  Petitioner was, however, ordered to pay private respondent’s one
month salary of P80,000.00 in lieu of the 30-day advance notice of
proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant
dismissal, plus an indemnity of P5,000.00 for its failure to comply
recourse and considering the dismissals on technicalities are viewed with procedural due process.
with disapproval  Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
- It is also well settled that litigations should, as much as possible be (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
decided on the merits and not technicalities, that this Court, in the ordered petitioner Manila Hotel to pay full backwages, separation
exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided to disregard technicalities in pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, and
order to resolve the merits. moral and exemplary damages.
 A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied.
- A careful review of the records show that this case will not only
 A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of
affect herein petitioners but also the more or less 70,000 Appeals which dismissed the petition on the following grounds:
consumers in Davao City and its environs. It appears more o 1) the petition was not accompanied with copies of the
appropriate to consider the petition on its merits rather than decision of the Labor Arbiter and the position paper of the
dismiss it on technicalities. parties;
o 2) the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by Atty.
Manila Hotel vs CA GR No 143574 July 11 2002 Martin B. Isidro, petitioner’s counsel and Assistant Vice-
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner, President, Personnel Department; and
vs. o 3) the petition was not accompanied with a board resolution
COURT OF APPEALS and SAMUEL ALCORDO, respondents. authorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to act for and in behalf of
petitioner.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the  A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner alleging that
Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57760, which the failure to attach said documents to the petition was due to
dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari assailing the inadvertence or oversight.7 Attached to the motion were copies of
October 29, 1999 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in the omitted decision of the Labor Arbiter, the position papers, as
NLRC NCR CN. 00-12-09877-98.3 well as the required board resolution.8
 Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration stressing
Facts: that under Rule 46, Section 3, in relation to Rule 65, Section 1 of
 Private respondent was hired by petitioner on as Food and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to append copies of
Beverage Director. relevant documents is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
 On November 30, 1998 his services were terminated on the ground petition.
of loss of confidence due to his inability to improve the profitability  Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari praying for a
of the restaurants under his responsibility. liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure.
 Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against  The petition is without merit.
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not procedural rules can be liberally construed? Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by this Court in
Held: No the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in
Ratio: manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party
Pertinent portion of Rule 65, Section 1 and Rule 46, Section 3 of the 1997 successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
Rules of Civil Procedure, provide: and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.— recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
46. complying with the procedure prescribed.9
SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with
requirements. - Petitioner contends that the omission of the required documents is due to
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of "oversight" or "inadvertence." In Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v.
service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the Court of Appeals, et al.,10 however, the Court held that "oversight"
court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a and "excusable negligence" have become an all too familiar and
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, ready excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty
order, resolution or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the to comply with established rules.
record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
pertinent thereto. . . . . orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing strict adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of
(Emphasis supplied) equity and substantial justice.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown any cogent reason for the
The Court of Appeals outrightly dismissed petitioner’s action on the Court to be liberal in the application of the rules.11
ground that the petition was not accompanied with the required board Hence, the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals on technical
resolution authorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to institute the petition; as grounds must be sustained.
well as copies of the Labor Arbiter’s decision and the position paper of the Petition is DENIED. Resolution of Court of Appeals affirmed.
parties.
The issue posed before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the Rebollido vs CA GR No 81123 February 28 1989
termination of private respondent’s employment. Hence, the need to CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN
append copies of the Labor Arbiter’s decision and the position papers of REBOLLIDO, petitioners
the parties. Under the circumstances, there was a necessity for the vs.
appellate court to review the facts and the law on which the conclusions HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
were based, considering the conflicting findings of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter.
The issues raised in this petition for review on certiorari in an action for  Realizing that the judgment of the lower court would eventually be
damages arising from a vehicular accident are lack of jurisdiction over the executed against it, respondent PEPSICO, Inc., opposed the motion
defendant and absence of due process. for execution and moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:  The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of
 August 7, 1984, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. 8113 for summons to a mere clerk.
damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines,  The lower court denied the motion of the private respondent
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Pepsi Cola) and Alberto Alva before holding that despite the dissolution and the assumption of liabilities
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. by the private respondent, there was proper service of summons
 The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1, 1984, upon defendant Pepsi Cola. The lower court said that under Section
involving a Mazda Minibus owned and driven by petitioners 122 of the Corporation Code, the defendant continued its corporate
Crisostomo Rebollido and Fernando Valencia, respectively and a existence for three (3) years from the date of dissolution.
truck trailer owned at that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by Alberto  The private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari and
Alva. prohibition with the respondent court (CA) to annul and set aside
 September 21, 1984, the sheriff of the lower court served the the judgment of the lower court and its order denying the motion to
summons addressed to the defendants (PepsiCola). vacate the judgment, for having been issued without jurisdiction.
 It was received by one Nanette Sison who claims to be authorized  The Court of Appeals granted the petition on the ground of lack of
to receive the summons as she was the secretary of the legal jurisdiction ruling that there was no valid service of summons. The
department of Pepsi Cola. appellate court stated that any judgment rendered against Pepsi
 Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. Cola after its dissolution is a "liability" of the private respondent
 The lower court heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the within the contemplation of the undertaking, but service of
defendants jointly and severally liable for damages. summons should be made upon the private respondent itself. It
 When the default judgment became final and executory, the remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the private
petitioners filed a motion for execution, a copy of which was respondent be summoned and be given its day in court.
received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by private  A motion for reconsideration was denied.
respondent PEPSICO, Inc.  Hence, this petition.
 At that time, the private respondent, a US corporation, was
already occupying the place of business of Pepsi Cola at Legaspi Issue:
Village, Makati to prepare for the expected dissolution of Pepsi Cola. (1) whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the
 The dissolution of Pepsi Cola was approved by the SEC, one day real party in interest to whom summons should be served in the
after the accident occurred, March 2, 1984. civil case for damages; and
 The Board of Directors and the stockholders of Pepsi Cola adopted (2) whether or not there was valid service of summons through Nanette
its amended articles of incorporation to shorten its corporate term. Sison, allegedly the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. If
 Immediately after such amendment, Pepsi Cola cause the there was valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola, the issue arises as
publication of a notice of dissolution and the assumption of liabilities to whether or not such service validly vested jurisdiction on the lower
by the private respondent in a newspaper of general circulation. court over the person of the respondent corporation.
Held: its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
(1)Pepsi Cola is the real party in interest . obligation of the defendants and an act or omission of the
(2) There was valid service of summons defendant in violation of said legal right."
The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can
Ratio: still be made a party to a suit according to the Corporation Code.
(1) In American jurisprudence, a similar provision in the Corporate Act of
On the first issue, the petitioner maintain that it is Pepsi Cola which is the 1896 was construed with respect to the kinds of suits that can be
real party in the case before the trial court because when the accident prosecuted against dissolved corporations:
happened one day before the date of legal dissolution, Pepsi Cola was still xxx xxx xxx
the registered owner of the truck involved. Being solidarily liable with its ... The words 'defending suits against them mean suits at law or in
driver for damages, there appears to be no question that the complaint equity, in contract or tort, or of what nature soever, and whether begun
and summons were correctly filed and served on Pepsi Cola. before or after dissolution.
The rationale for extending the period of existence of a dissolved
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that: corporation is explained in Castle's Administrator v. Acrogen Coal, Co.
Parties in interest - Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the (145 Ky 591,140 SW 1034 [1911]) as follows:
name of the real party in interest. ... . The person who has a valid claim against a corporation, whether it arises
In the case of Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile in contract or tort should not be deprived of the right to prosecute an
Market, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals real party-in-interest as the party who action for the enforcement of his demands by the action of the
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to stockholders of the corporation in agreeing to its dissolution. The
the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means dissolution of a corporation does not extinguish obligations or liabilities
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as due by or to it.
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. In the case at bar, the right of action of the petitioners against
In the case of Walter Ascona Lee vs. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr, a real party Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the complaint
in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of
interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act action accrued, i.e. on March 1, 1984 which is the date of the accident
or omission violates the legal rights of the former. and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong.
For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real
party in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not (2)
only because it is the registered owner of the truck involved but also Although it maybe true that the service of summons was made on a
because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a person not authorized to receive the same ..., nevertheless since it
corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the
right of another. corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was
substantial compliance, with the rule on service of summons. Indeed the
The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against purpose of said rule as above stated to assure service of summons on the
Pepsi Cola, A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission of corporation had thereby been attained. The need for speedy justice must
one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and prevail over a technicality.' (at p. 469; Emphasis supplied).
The valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola operated as a sufficient Hughes claims that soon after the decision against the PNR, he had his
service of summons upon the private respondent. The lower court can driver's license renewed and then sought reinstatement with Baliwag
enforce judgment against the private respondent. Transit. He repeated his request several times even after the dismissal of
Therefore, we rule that the private respondent is bound to satisfy the the criminal case. He then decided to seek the assistance of Minister
judgment by default which has become final and executory. The lower Ople, who wrote the petitioner on April 24, 1980, and "implored" the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of the private private respondent's re- employment. As this request was also ignored,
respondent to vacate judgment. Hughes finally demanded his reinstatement on May 2, 1980. On May 10,
1980, the petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstated because his
G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989 driver's license had already been revoked and his driving was extremely
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, dangerous to the riding public."
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, and CIV PRO FACTS
ROMEO HUGHES, respondents.
The private respondent's reaction to this rejection was to file on July 29,
OVERVIEW 1980, a formal complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for
illegal dismissal against the petitioner, with a prayer for his reinstatement
The petitioner is a duly organized corporation with a valid authorization with back wages from May 10, 1980.
from the Board of Transportation to operate a bus line. The private
respondent was hired by it in 1966 and continued serving therein as a On January 22, 1981, the complaint was dismissed by Director Francisco
bus driver until the incident in question, when he was relieved of his L. Estrella, National Capital Region, on the ground of prescription, "it
duties. appearing that although the private respondent was separated from the
service on 10 August 1974 (date of the accident), it was not until 29 July
The incident occurred on August 10, 1974. Romeo Hughes was driving 1980, or a little less than 6 years thereafter, when he filed the
Baliwag Transit Bus No. 1066 when it was stalled at the railroad crossing complaint."
in Calumpit, Bulacan, because the vehicle ahead of it had stopped owing
to a jeep that was making its way into a garage. As thus positioned, the The regional director was, however, reversed by Minister Ople in his order
bus was hit at its rear end by an onrushing train of the Philippine National dated May 21, 1981.
Railways that dragged it several meters.
Eighteen passengers died and fifty six others suffered serious physical The question that has to be settled is the date when the cause of action
injuries. accrued and from which the period shall commence to run.The contention
of Baliwag is that it should be August 10, 1974, when the collision
Baliwag filed a complaint for damages against the Philippine National occurred. Hughes insists it is May 10, 1980, when his demand for
Railways, which was held liable for its negligence in a decision rendered reinstatement was rejected by the petitioner.
on April 6, 1977, by Judge Benigno Puno. Hughes was absolved of any
contributory negligence. SC = Hughes is correct it’s May 10, 1980.
It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, (1) a ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC.,
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law defendants-appellees.
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or On June 11 , 1930, defendant Esteban Icarañgal, for value received,
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in
plaintiff. security for its payment, said Esteban Icarañgal executed a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna.
We hold that the private respondent's right of action could not have
accrued from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August Promissor defaulted in the payment.
10, 1974, as he was not considered automatically dismissed on that date.
At best, he was deemed suspended from his work. Plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the
collection of the amount due.
There was no apparent disagreement then between Hughes and his
employer. As the private respondent was the petitioner's principal witness Judgment was there rendered for Bachrach.
in its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, we
may assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of terms A writ of execution was subsequently issued.
when the case was being tried.
The provincial sheriff of Laguna levied on the properties of the
We agree with the private respondent that May 10, 1980, is the date defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Esteban
when his cause of action accrued, for it was then that the petitioner Icarañgal in favor of the plaintiff.
denied his demand for reinstatement.
Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging
Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal that by virtue of a writ of execution, the property which was the subject
right of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had
an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right the already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.
cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses,
expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty. The sheriff desisted from the sale of the property, as a consequence, the
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.
Hughes's complaint was filed not later than three months only after such
rejection, there is no question that his action has not prescribed. Bachrach instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered Bachrach
G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939 took the present appeal.

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs. Whether or not Bachrach is barred from foreclosing the real estate
mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment
against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate
of which the mortgage was constituted as a security. Estate of Susana Agustin, petitioner-plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SC = Yes Bachrach is barred. We rule against splitting a single cause of LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU,
action. respondents-defendants-appellees.

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in by the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite
the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. repeated demands an action to eject him was filed.

In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-appellant
payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both Agustin, as adininistrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin,
demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu.
for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Both refer to one
and the same obligation. Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immediately vacate
the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00
There exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that representing arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he
obligation. Plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a actually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs.
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint Bacalan’s answer included a counter-claim alleging that the present
will bar the subsequent complaint. action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with
malice and bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of this action by the
The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent plaintiff against the defendant, the latter suffered, and will continue to
repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same suffer, actual and moral damages in the amount of no less than
subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damages. In addition,
and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." defendant has been compelled to retain the services of undersigned
counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless, malicious and frivolous claim and to
It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem protect and enforce his rights for which he obligated himself to pay the
cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees."

We hold, therefore, that a mortgage creditor may institute against the City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and
mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to pay the
foreclose the mortgage. He may pursue either of the two remedies, but plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of
not both. P150.00 as attorney's fees.

G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985 The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is hereby Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court
required in favor of the defendant. 1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay which granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he
a) P10,000.00 as moral damages; seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment.
b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the
2. With costs against plaintiff defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the
jurisdiction of the court of origin?
The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of
execution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded
real properties belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment. jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable
award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such
Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by
denied. the plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V
is a proper remedy.
With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal,
Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began.
decision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's
case on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court,
and void from the beginning for the following reasons: likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same.

(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs) G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986
distributed thus:
P10,000.00 as moral damages REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages vs.
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu. FERNANDO CALION, respondents.

Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the  Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge
plaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant and Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio City and Benguet
ruled: This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of
cause of action. jurisdiction.
 Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in
Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case shall
appeal before the Court of Appeals. be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of
 Section 39 of BP129. This provision applies only to ordinary appeals owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for
from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
the Interim Rules). specifically alleged.
 The order appealed from states two causes of action; the first cause
of action is against respondent Binongcal for refusing to pay the  Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent
amount of P11,643, and the second one is against respondent portion of the FORMER RULE under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act
Calion for refusing to pay the amount P10,212. of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:
 On December 15, 1983, respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of ... Where there are several claims or causes of action
the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00 (RTC between the same parties embodied in the same
has exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
demand is more than P20,000). of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective
 It was further averred in said motion that although another person, of whether the causes of action arose out of the same
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of or different transactions; but where the claims or causes
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by
that of the other respondent. or due to different parties, each separate claim shall
 The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
 Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the
case following the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 Issue:
and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.  W/N Court was correct in dismissing the case due to lack of
 The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows: jurisdiction
THIS IS THE PRESENT RULE
Held:
... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of  Yes. RTC does not have the proper jurisdiction over the case.
action between the same or different parties, embodied
in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be Ratio:
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,  There is no difference between the former and present rules in
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate
of the same or different transactions. ... causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus: whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos,
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the then the regional trial court has jurisdiction.
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved,  On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and
the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint. Each
irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
  In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the  The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties ground, inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules over the property subject matter of the action.
of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it  On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal
appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the
the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC
jurisdiction. of Paranaque City, where the property subject matter of the
action was located.
 In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages
[G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005] and attorney's fees is a personal action and not a real action;
hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside.
SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners, They averred that while their second cause of action for the
vs. recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the
SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondents. same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their
causes of action for damages (legal basis: Sec 5(c) Rule 2).
Facts:  On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order granting the
 The petitioners were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the
constructed thereon, located in Paranaque, Metro Manila. principal action of the petitioners was a real action and should
 On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents have been filed in the RTC of Paraaque City where the property
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the former subject matter of the complaint was located. Hence the present
sold the property to the latter payable in six installments via recourse.
postdated checks.
 It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to Issue:
transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the  W/N the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be
dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to Held:
reconvey the property to the petitioners.  No, petition was correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdication.
 On May 17, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint against the
respondents with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for the Ratio:
annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and  The Court ruled that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does
damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the
transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents,
vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter's refusal to pay the
payment for the purchase price of the property were dishonored by first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon,
the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property,
therefor. as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the
 respondents. The claim for damages are merely incidental to the
main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes
of action.
 Being a real action, it should have been filed in the proper court
where the property is located, namely, in Paraaque City,
conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.