Professional Documents
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Civpro Rules 1 To 2 Digests 1 PDF
Civpro Rules 1 To 2 Digests 1 PDF
TANCREDO REDEÑA,, petitioner, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief[8] anchored on Section 2,[9] Rule
vs. 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEÑA, Respondent. petitioner prays the CA to set aside its dismissal resolution
and reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his
Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of appellant’s brief
the Court of Appeals CA held that Petition for relief is not among the remedies
available in the Court of Appeals as these petitions are filed
petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition against his brother, with the trial courts
respondent Leocadio Redeña before the then CFI now RTC of San CA further held that Under Rule 47, an annulment of
Pablo City, Laguna judgment or final orders and resolutions may be filed before
CA based on the ground of extrinsic fraud which seems to be
the parties’ common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, a the premise of the petition, but it is worth looking into by
residential lot, a riceland and another parcel of land the petitioner if the factual basis of the present petition for
relief may qualify as an extrinsic fraud, under Rule 47
trial court confined the partition to only the property actually
pertaining to the estate of the parties’ deceased father and co- Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned
owned by them, namely, the parcel of land as the rest of the resolution was likewise denied by the CA
properties were owned by the defendant
petitioner is now before this Court via the instant recourse on his
petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal submission that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
court gave due course to the notice and directed the ruled that a petition for relief is not an available remedy in the court
elevation of the records of the case to the CA of appeals
the CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as appellant, to file petitioner prays that the court relax the application of procedural
his appellant’s brief. rules, or suspend them altogether, in favor of petitioner’s
Evidently, the period for filing the brief was even extended substantial rights
by the CA
there being no appellant’s brief filed within the extended period, the ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to relief under Rule 38
CA issued a resolution[5] considering the appeal abandoned and
accordingly dismissing the same. HELD: No
>Sps. Gibe alleged: >Mrs. Victoria and her co-defendants in the ejectment case filed
Manifestation with Motion requesting the trial court to allow an
>1992 – they acquired property for the heirs of late Judge Lantin. independent surveyor, to be paid by them, to conduct another survey.
>Property was originally part of Lot 1-B-153, which was subdivided >Court granted the motion, however, no survey plan was submitted by
into 7 parcels in 1989 among Judge Gregorio Lantin and his 4 tenants, them.
Felix Victoria, Juan and Guillermo Becina, and Eusebio Arida.
May 21, 1998 - MTC rendered decision in favor of SPS. Gibe finding them
*Felix Victoria is the deceased husband of Isidra Victoria. All the real owners of the property in question.
defendants in this ejectment case were given home lots, while the lots
allotted to Judge Lantin were sold to Sps. Gibe. May 22, 1998 – Sps. Gibe filed a motion for Immediate Execution and
Demolition praying that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the
>Lot 1-B-153-A was being fenced and it was discovered that: judgment. The defendants in the Ejectment Case were not given notice.
1. The Victoria house was standing on the northwestern portion of the
property. May 29, 1998 – after promulgation and receipt of the MTC decision, the
2. Mrs. Victoria was harvesting and picking fruits from the citrus trees defendants filed a notice of appeal, without filing a supersedeas bond to
planted in that area without the knowledge and permission of the Gibe stay the immediate execution of the decision & depositing monthly
spouses. rentals.
3. Eusebio Arida, Juan Becina and Guillermo Becina were also
surreptitiously planting palay on the northwestern portion.
June 1, 1998 – MTC granted the Motion for Immediate Execution & issued proceedings. In other words, certiorari is a remedy designed for the
a writ of execution. correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment as its
function is to keep and inferior court within its jurisdiction.
July 13, 1998 - Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for
Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) was filed with RTC >Having found [the MTC] to have jurisdiction to issue the decision dated
of Calamb, Laguna. May 28, 1998, the respondent judge likewise has jurisdiction to direct the
execution of the same pending appeal pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of
>Petition assailed MTC decision contending that it had no jurisdiction over the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
the case and committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding in favor of
Sps. Gibe and in issuing Writ of Execution pending appeal. >CA: May 25, 2000, the CA dismissed the CA Certiorari Petition because:
1. The correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a
>Mrs. Victoria died before MTC promulgated the questioned order and petition for certiorari is an ordinary appeal.
she was substituted by her son, Mario Victoria. 2. The instant petition is filed out of time.
3. The statement of material dates as to timeliness of the filing of the
>RTC of Calauan, where the petition for certiorari was raffled, issued a petition is incomplete.
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
>Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA by
October 7, 1998 - The appeal field by defendants before the RTC of Resolution of July 12, 2000 for being filed 2 days beyond the
Calauan,Laguna was dismissed for failure to file the appeal memorandum. reglementary period, he filed the petition at bar after he was granted, on
his motion, an extension of thirty days to file the petition, conditioned
August 3, 1999 – RTC dismissed petition for certiorari. upon the timeliness of the motion for extension.
>Petitioner, Victoria, contends that RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case
and t issue the questioned decisions because under PD 27 any dispute ISSUE/S:
involving said lands must be referred to DARAB.
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GADLEJ BY NOT
> Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
complaint.The complaint filed by the private respondents was for ON GROUND OF TECHNICALITY INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE CASE ON
Ejectment and Damages With a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. THE MERITS.
Ejectment proceedings are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court. II. RTC OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, COMMITTED GADLEJ BY RULING THAT
THIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MTC, AND THAT
THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO WAS NOT AN ERROR [OF]
> Petitioner Victoria did not question the jurisdiction of the Court but JURISDICTION BUT AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOT
prayed for the dismissal of the case below for lack of cause of action. REVIEWABLE IN CERTIORARI [P]ROCEEDINGS.
>The Decision of the Court below is therefore not an error of jurisdiction HELD:
but an error of judgment which is not reviewable by certiorari
Petition is denied. thoroughly discussed in Rivera v. Santiago ,41 the party alleging tenancy
must prove the existence of all the essential requisites of tenancy in order
RATIO: to oust the MTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
1ST ISSUE
> In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the > In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as an affirmative
reglementary period to appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months prior and/or special defense in their Answer with Counterclaim. Under the RSP
to the filing of petitioner’s motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001. [Revised Rule on Summary Procedure], the MTC was supposed to conduct
- The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the CA dismissing the a preliminary conference to determine if such relationship was indeed the
CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by counsel for real issue. We emphasize that the MTC did not automatically lose
petitioner’s agent on June 5, 2000. its jurisdiction simply because respondents raised tenancy as a
- Petitioner had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal or defense. It continued to have the authority to hear the case
a motion for new trial or reconsideration. precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of
the ejectment suit on its merits.
> Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it denied > To determine whether the CA was correct in its reversal of the trial
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed two days court, it is necessary to keep in mind the essential requisites of tenancy
after the expiration of the reglementary period on June 22, 2000. which are as follows:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
>The instant petition for review must likewise be denied for having been (2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land;
filed on May 12, 2001, almost 11 months after the expiration of the (3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties;
period to appeal on June 20, 2000. (4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
>The records indicates that this case should have been terminated as (6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
early as January 4, 2000 with the lapse of the period within which All these elements must concur. It is not enough that they are alleged; to
petitioner could have appealed from the RTC Decision. divest the MTC of jurisdiction, they must all be shown to be present.
>Duremdes vs. Duremdes: Rules of procedure must be faithfully > In the present case, neither petitioner nor his predecessor-in-interest
followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed submitted evidence to substantiate the existence of the essential
to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to requisites of tenancy. Thus, there is no basis at all to support petitioner’s
comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal claim that the MTC was without jurisdiction to render the questioned
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the Decision.
part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his
failure to abide by the rules. HERNANDEZ vs RURAL BANK
>At the time that the check was issued, the San Pablo Colleges, had a October 18, 1961 – Hernandez again asked the bank when he could
deposit in the Lucena bank amounting to P11,890.16 (27 tsn April 25, deliver the check.
1966). Instead of withdrawing P6,000 from that deposit, the San Pablo
Colleges chose to issue a check for that amount w/ Hernandez. It is not October 24, 1961 – EVP told him that the bank could not yet honor the
check because it had not resumed its banking operations, that it might
reopen in January, 1962, and that, anyway, the loan would not be due charter and on the assumption that the Lucena bank was insolvent, filed
until March 21, 1962. with the Court of first Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27, 1962
for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank [THIS
February 1, 1962 – Hernandez sent another letter enclosed the original IS ANOTHER CIVIL CASE].
check (duly endorsed) with his letter to the bank dated March 7, 1962,
which was sent by registered mail and special delivery. March 28, 1963 – CFI Manila issued an order directing the Lucena bank to
turn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative.
March 7, 1962 - the check was returned to Hernandez because the bank's
manager was allegedly in Manila. April 2, 1963 – Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 426 designated the
Superintendent of Banks or his duly authorized representative to take
April 25, 1962 - Hernandez again mailed the check to the bank on April charge of the assets of the Lucena bank.
25, with the request that his mortgage be cancelled.
November 27, 1963 – The Board in its resolution ordered the
>In the meantime, the Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Superintendent of Banks to convert the assets of the Lucena bank to
Lucena Bank. money. The Lucena bank, by means of certiorari sought to annul the
liquidation proceeding. This Court denied its petition.
February 8, 1962 –Governor of the Central Bank in a letter enjoined the
Lucena bank from transacting business and advised it to turn over its October 29, 1963 – Hernandez informed the Central Bank that he had
assets, documents and records to the chief bank examiner. The bank sent to the Lucena bank on April 25, 1962 the chock for P6,000. He again
building was sealed. requested that his mortgage be cancelled.
February 12, 1962 – the Lucena Bank filed with the Court of First December 9, 1963 – Associate Superintendent of Banks in his answer
Instance of Lucena City a complaint praying that the Central Bank be returned the check to Hernandez and informed him that, according to the
enjoined from liquidating the said bank. Lucena bank's executive vice-president, the check could not be applied to
the payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank was already closed
February 14, 1962 – the court issued an ex parte preliminary injunction when he received the check. Moreover, the chock was drawn against the
which it dissolved ten days later. current deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank which was
in the process of liquidation. Hernandez was advised to settle his account
>On the same date, FEBRUARY 14, 1962, the Manila court rendered a by paying cash or by means of a chock drawn against a bank other than
decision in Civil Case No. 47345, restraining the enforcement of the the Lucena bank.
Monetary Board resolution, which required the Lucena bank to undertake
a reorganization and to curtail its operations [THIS IS THE PREVIOUS December 16, 1963 – Hernandez announced to the Associate
CASE FILED BY THE LUCENA BANK AGAINST MB]. The Central Bank Superintendent of Banks in his letter of that he was going to deposit the
appealed. said check in the court of First Instance of Lipa City on or before
December 26, 1963.
>To implement the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidation
of the Lucena bank, the Central Bank, pursuant to section 29 of its
January 2, 1964 – Hernandez enclosed the check with his letter to the (2) in not holding that it had no jurisdiction because the Hernandez
clerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa City. That letter was spouses should have ventilated their claim in the liquidation proceeding
received in court on January 6, 1964. pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Instead of filing a
separate action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City;
January 11, 1964 – Hernandez wrote a letter informing the Associate (3) in not holding that there was no valid consignation;
Superintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. Copies of (4) in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees; and
that letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo Colleges. (5) in ordering execution pending appeal in spite of the tact that the
assets of the Lucena bank are in custodia legis or in the custody of the
October 12, 1964 - Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of liquidation court and the receiver appointed by it.
First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the
Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the
check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The RATIO:
Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of
P10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000. RTC judgment is reversed and set aside. The case is dismissed without
prejudice to the right of the Hernandez spouses to take up with the
October 20, 1964 – Ventral Bank filed a motion to dismiss contending liquidation court(proper venue to resolve this case) the settlement of
that the venue was improper because the action involved a real property their mortgage obligation.
so it should have been instituted in QC where the lots are situated. Also,
Lucena Bank is under liquidation and its properties and assets are in HELD:
custodial egis and may only be reached by motion in CFI Manila. (1)Defendants-appellants contend that the action of the Hernandez
spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the
January 30, 1967 – the counsel of Lucena offered to compromise the case mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title to real property
by stipulating that the central Bank would apply the check in question to which should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
the mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit of the San Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated.
Pablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the check of
P6,000 and that, by virtue of that compromise, the complaint and >Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions
counterclaim would be dismissed. The compromise did not happen affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
because the lawyers of Hernandez and Central Bank did not assent to it. condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
October 31, 1967 – RTC rendered an amended decision ordering Lucena thereof lies".
or Central Bank to honor the check, cancel the mortgage and pay
Hernandez damages and attorney’s fees. >The rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage. In
ISSUE/S: the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to
The Central Bank contends that the trial court erred: accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. It is a
(1) in not holding that the venue was improperly laid; personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has, not foreclosure
the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession of July 21, 1997 – the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to
the mortgaged lots. them was cancelled by UCPB. As a result, Go demanded from UCPB the
return of 2 TCTs covered by the Real Estate Mortgages executed. UCPB
>Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate refused to return of the TCTs. It proceeded to have the 2 pre-signed Real
mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real Estate Mortgages notarized and caused for its registration before the RD
mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the of Mandaluyong on September 2, 1997.
mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the
mortgage. June 15, 1999 – UCPB filed with the Sheriff of Mandaluyong an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered by a TCT for
>The venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant non-payment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. The public
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff auction sale of the property was set on 11 April and 3 May 2000.
or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and
A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is damages, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injuction, against
not the same as an action in personam. the bank and its officers and the sheriff, with the RTC of Pasig. The
amended complaint alleged:
We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the >Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT, which will be
venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" in auctioned, although it was registered only in the name of Looyuko;
section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or domicile. >UCPB was aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked to sign 2
deeds of real estate mortgage covering the said property;
GO vs UCPB >The approved omnibus credit line applied for by Go and Looyuki
did not materialize and was cancelled by UCPB on July 21, 1997 and so
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 31 July 2002 the pre-signed real estate mortgages were cancelled;
of the Court of Appeals, where the respondent judge is directed to >He demanded from UCPB the 2 TCTs to be returned to him but the
dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. bank refused;
>Despite the cancellation of the credit line, UCPB had the 2 deeds
FACTS: or real estate mortgage notarized and caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure;
>Go & Looyuko are co-owners of Noah’s Ark International and a lot more >That the auction sale be enjoined;
of Noah’s Ark Enterprises. Sometime in August 1996, they both applied >TCTs be returned to him and bank be ordered to pay him for
for an Omnibus Line accommodation with UCPB for 900M, which the UCPB damages.
approved.
June 7, 2000 – UCPB filed motion to dismiss stating that:
>Transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over lands located in > that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to
Mandaluyong and registered under Looyuko’s name and another lot nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees;
registered in the name of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery. > that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;
>an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
and, therefore, the complaint states no cause of action; property. The venue for real actions is the same for regional trial courts
>that the complaint was improperly verified; and and municipal trial courts -- the court which has territorial jurisdiction
>that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
insufficient and false certification of non-forum shopping.
>Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for
June 7, 2000 – RTC issued an order enjoining the auction sale and the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach,
granted the writ for preliminary injunction. or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property.22 The venue for personal actions is likewise the same
August 9, 2000 – RTC denied bank’s motion to dismiss the case. The MR for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where
was denied as well on November 8, 2000. the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
January 3, 2001 – UCPB questioned said orders before CA via petition for the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
certiorari alleging that the RTC acted w/o or in excess of jurisdiction w/
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order that denied the motion to >It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for
dismiss and the MR. cases of the above nature is the primary objective for which said cases
are filed.
July 31, 2002 – CA set aside the orders of RTC and ordered for the
dismissal of the civil case on the ground of improper venue. >The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,31 is more particularly
instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the mortgage
14 November 2002 – Go’s MR was denied. documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that
affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before
ISSUE/S: the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies,
which is the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Whether petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is
a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue? >In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the
instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage
HELD: is a real right and a real property by itself.35 An action for cancellation of
real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the
Petition denied for lack of merit. The assailed decisions denying the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and
motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies.
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in by the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite
the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. repeated demands an action to eject him was filed.
In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-appellant
payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both Agustin, as adininistrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin,
demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu.
for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Both refer to one
and the same obligation. Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immediately vacate
the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00
There exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that representing arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he
obligation. Plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a actually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs.
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint Bacalan’s answer included a counter-claim alleging that the present
will bar the subsequent complaint. action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with
malice and bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of this action by the
The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent plaintiff against the defendant, the latter suffered, and will continue to
repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same suffer, actual and moral damages in the amount of no less than
subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damages. In addition,
and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." defendant has been compelled to retain the services of undersigned
counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless, malicious and frivolous claim and to
It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem protect and enforce his rights for which he obligated himself to pay the
cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees."
We hold, therefore, that a mortgage creditor may institute against the City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and
mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to pay the
foreclose the mortgage. He may pursue either of the two remedies, but plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of
not both. P150.00 as attorney's fees.
G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985 The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is hereby Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court
required in favor of the defendant. 1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay which granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he
a) P10,000.00 as moral damages; seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment.
b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the
2. With costs against plaintiff defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the
jurisdiction of the court of origin?
The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of
execution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded
real properties belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment. jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable
award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such
Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by
denied. the plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V
is a proper remedy.
With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal,
Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began.
decision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's
case on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court,
and void from the beginning for the following reasons: likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same.
(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs) G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986
distributed thus:
P10,000.00 as moral damages REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages vs.
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu. FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge
plaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant and Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio City and Benguet
ruled: This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of
cause of action. jurisdiction.
Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in
Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case shall
appeal before the Court of Appeals. be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 39 of BP129. This provision applies only to ordinary appeals owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for
from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
the Interim Rules). specifically alleged.
The order appealed from states two causes of action; the first cause
of action is against respondent Binongcal for refusing to pay the Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent
amount of P11,643, and the second one is against respondent portion of the FORMER RULE under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act
Calion for refusing to pay the amount P10,212. of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:
On December 15, 1983, respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of ... Where there are several claims or causes of action
the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00 (RTC between the same parties embodied in the same
has exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
demand is more than P20,000). of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective
It was further averred in said motion that although another person, of whether the causes of action arose out of the same
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of or different transactions; but where the claims or causes
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by
that of the other respondent. or due to different parties, each separate claim shall
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the
case following the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 Issue:
and Section 11 of the Interim Rules. W/N Court was correct in dismissing the case due to lack of
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows: jurisdiction
THIS IS THE PRESENT RULE
Held:
... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of Yes. RTC does not have the proper jurisdiction over the case.
action between the same or different parties, embodied
in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be Ratio:
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, There is no difference between the former and present rules in
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate
of the same or different transactions. ... causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus: whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos,
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the then the regional trial court has jurisdiction.
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and
the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint. Each
irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties ground, inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules over the property subject matter of the action.
of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal
appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the
the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC
jurisdiction. of Paranaque City, where the property subject matter of the
action was located.
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages
[G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005] and attorney's fees is a personal action and not a real action;
hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside.
SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners, They averred that while their second cause of action for the
vs. recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the
SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondents. same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their
causes of action for damages (legal basis: Sec 5(c) Rule 2).
Facts: On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order granting the
The petitioners were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the
constructed thereon, located in Paranaque, Metro Manila. principal action of the petitioners was a real action and should
On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents have been filed in the RTC of Paraaque City where the property
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the former subject matter of the complaint was located. Hence the present
sold the property to the latter payable in six installments via recourse.
postdated checks.
It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to Issue:
transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the W/N the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be
dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to Held:
reconvey the property to the petitioners. No, petition was correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdication.
On May 17, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint against the
respondents with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for the Ratio:
annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and The Court ruled that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does
damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the
transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents,
vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter's refusal to pay the
payment for the purchase price of the property were dishonored by first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon,
the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property,
therefor. as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the
respondents. The claim for damages are merely incidental to the
main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes
of action.
Being a real action, it should have been filed in the proper court
where the property is located, namely, in Paraaque City,
conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.