Ashrita Nagpal History EE

History Extended Essay
May/June Session 2019

Ashrita Nagpal
To what extent did the effective execution

of OperationPowers and enable the Allies
to invade Sicily, leading to Allied victory in
the Mediterranean theatre of World War II?
The Operation Mincemeat team, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/8184158/Operation-Mincemeat-BBC-Two-review.html
~ 4217 words ~
Introduction
During the Casablanca Conference, which took place between U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt
and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Allied military strategy against the Axis
Powers for 1943 was coordinated.1 The two superpowers decided to target the Mediterranean
first by attacking Sicily, a natural bridge between Africa and Europe located barely eighty miles
off the Tunisian coast, where the final North African Campaign was precedingly fought. The
invasion of Sicily would open up the road to Rome, draw German troops from the eastern front
to relieve the Red Army, allow for preparations to invade France, and potentially knock Italy out
of the war. Sicily was a therefore gateway to Italy and possibly to the continent of Europe.
However, if the Allies recognized the strategic importance of Sicily, then surely Germany and
Italy also recognized its role. As Churchill stated, “Everyone but a bloody fool would know it was
Sicily.”2
The solution to this transparency was devised by Charles Cholmondeley and Ewen Montagu of
the British Intelligence interservice Twenty Committee. They sought inspiration from a 1939
memo written by Ian Fleming. Cholmondeley suggested planting a set of false plans on a dead
officer, who would deliver them into the enemy’s hands.3 The aim of this plan – formally known
as Operation Mincemeat – was that the false documents carried by the dead officer would be
convincing enough to be passed to Hitler himself.4 The false documents would convey that the
Allies planned to attach Greece rather than Sicily, and accordingly, Hitler would transfer German
1
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/Casablanca.
2
“Historian Claims to Have Finally Identified Wartime 'Man Who Never Was'.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media
Group, 3 Jan. 2010, www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/6923826/Historian-claims-to-have-finally-
identified-wartime-Man-Who-Never-Was.html.
3
Evers, Chia, and Chia Evers. “A Little Bit of War Magic: Operation Mincemeat and the Man Who Never Was.”
Medium.com, Medium, 8 Mar. 2016, medium.com/@chialynn/a-little-bit-of-war-magic-operation-mincemeat-
and-the-man-who-never- wass-52fed067ace6.
4
Lane, Megan. “Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Tramp Fooled Hitler.” BBC News, BBC, 3 Dec. 2010,
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-11887115.
troops from Sicily5 to Greece. This paved the way for the Allied attack on Sicily, codenamed
Operation Husky. The impact of Sicily’s conquest is said to have “rippled through the Second
World War like a rock flung into water.”
I believe that this topic is significant because it uncovers an unconventional but highly
sophisticated aspect of warfare: deception. Unlike war on land, sea, or air, in military deception,
the course of war can be shifted with minimal casualties to the attacker’s army. Operation
Mincemeat, in particular, is an example of one successful military deception: it is said to have
changed the course of a global, total war and potentially have saved 30,000 Allied lives.6
Therefore, given the extent of impact that a technique as obscure as military deception can have,
I thought it was worthy of shining light upon. My research question accordingly emerged: to
what extent did the effective execution of Operation Mincemeat deceive the Axis Powers and
enable the Allies to invade Sicily, leading to Allied victory in the Mediterranean theatre of World
War II?
Planning Operation Mincemeat
The very first step of Operation Mincemeat was to obtain the body of the “dead officer”.
Cholmondeley and Montagu used a Welsh tramp’s body from a London morgue.7 Then, they
created a personality for the corpse – he was given the name William Martin, and designated a
position in the Royal Marines. Using false identity cards, faked personal letters, receipts, bills,
photographs and other "wallet litter", Cholmondeley and Montagu gave William Martin a father,
a fiancée and a backstory. Most crucially, however, they chained a briefcase to his wrist. It
5
Walsh, Robert. “Operation Mincemeat: The Dead Man Who Duped Hitler.” Explore the Archive, Open Road
Media, 18 Dec. 2017, explorethearchive.com/operation-mincemeat.
6
“Historian Claims to Have Finally Identified Wartime 'Man Who Never Was'.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media
Group, 3 Jan. 2010, www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/6923826/Historian-claims-to-have-finally-
identified-wartime-Man-Who-Never-Was.html.
7
Andrews, Evan. “What Was Operation Mincemeat?” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 5 June 2013,
www.history.com/news/what-was-operation-mincemeat.
contained official-looking documents and letters that clearly indicated that the Allied army in
North Africa was headed for Sardinia next. These too, was false.8
In April 1943, this body was dropped from a Royal Navy submarine into the Atlantic Ocean
surrounding the southern coast of Spain. The body washed up on the coast of Huelva, right into
Adolf Clauss’ hands, as hoped. Adolf Class was a German spy operating on Spain's south coast
and was known to be efficient, ruthless and extremely gullible.9 As anticipated, Clauss
immediately sent the documents to Germany, where they ultimately reached Adolf Hitler
himself. Naturally, Hitler couldn’t believe his luck and fell for the decoy completely.10
The Successful Execution of Operation Mincemeat
Operation Mincemeat was launched at a time when the Axis intelligence was prone to respond
to favourable Allied signals: only a month before, Axis intelligence had failed to act on the
genuine documents that had washed up with Lieutenant Turner, and thus missed the
opportunity to anticipate Operation Torch. They would be unlikely to make the same mistake
twice, quite evidently: ‘The Germans, having cause to regret the ease with which they had been
taken by surprise by the North African landings, would not again easily dismiss strategic Allied
documents if and when they came into their possession.”11
Due to the efforts of the Bletchley Park codebreakers – Britain's main decryption establishment
during World War Two – British deception planners gained insight into the enemy’s suspicions,
ripe for exploitation.12 The Axis Powers suspected Sicily as the Allies’ next logical move.
Therefore, the documents in Martin’s briefcase suggested a two-pronged approach: an
American attack against Sardinia and simultaneously a British attack against Kalamata in the
8
“Bark West Beach - The Canadians Come Ashore in Sicily.” The Maritime Explorer, 6 Mar. 2018,
themaritimeexplorer.ca/2016/10/29/bark-west-beach/.
9
10
“The Homeless Man Decoy.” Visit Pearl Harbor, 1 July 2016, visitpearlharbor.org/the-homeless-man-decoy/.
11
Burns, Jimmy. Papa Spy: a True Story of Love, Wartime Espionage in Madrid, and the Treachery of the
Cambridge Spies. Bloomsbury Paperbacks, 2011. Kindle edition
12
Smyth, Denis. Deathly Deception the Real Story of Operation Mincemeat. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Peloponnese peninsula.13 Sicily, the real target, was portrayed as a mere decoy. This double bluff
would ensure that when the Germans found out about preparations to attack Sicily, they would
assume this was part of the deception plan.14
This deception plan meticulously targeted Hitler’s pre-existing conceptions and obsessions
with Southeastern Europe.15 Hitler noted in his official war diary that “the Fuhrer does not
agree with the Duce [Mussolini] that the most likely invasion point is Sicily. Furthermore, he
believes that… the planned attacks will be directly mainly against Sardinia and Peloponnesus.”16
Transforming Hitler’s notions into action was pivoted upon the validity of William Martin, or the
man who never was. The high officials would have to believe that the documents Martin carried
were genuine; only then would they provoke drastic measures. Therefore, the masterminds left
nothing to chance. Everything the body wore or carried was minutely inspected to ensure that it
added to the story, on the assumption that the Germans would make every “effort to find a flaw
in Major Martin’s make-up.”17
Several steps were taken to minimize the scope doubt. Firstly, the use of a dead body rather
than a live human ensured that torture and force would prove futile. A dead body could never
verbally reveal the falsity of the information it carried.18
Secondly, the real William Martin had served aboard the aircraft carrier Hermes, which was
sunk by the Japanese in April 1942. A death notice for the fake William Martin was posted in the
13
Rowe, Neil C, and Hy Rothstein. “Deception for Defense of Information Systems: Analogies from
Conventional Warfare.” Http://Www.au.af.mil/Au/Awc/Awcgate/Nps/Mildec.htm.
14
Macintyre, Ben. Operation Mincemeat: the True Spy Story That Changed the Course of World War II.
Bloomsbury, 2016. p. 62
15
Smyth, Denis. Deathly Deception the Real Story of Operation Mincemeat. Oxford University Press, 2011. p.
431
16
Macintyre, Ben. Ben Macintyre's Espionage Files: Agent Zigzag, Operation Mincemeat & Double Cross. Kindle
edition.
17
18
British press, so the Germans would assume that this referred to the body carrying the
documents.19
Thirdly, it was decided that Martin would be presented as a Roman Catholic, confirmed by the
silver cross around his neck. This would discourage post-mortem examination of his corpse.
Moreover, the Francoist authorities – who were uniformly Catholic – would be averse to
violating the ‘temple of the Holy Ghost’, especially that of a co-religionist.20
Fourthly, equipping Martin with evidence of day-to-day financial burdens would only
strengthen his appearance as a real-life character. Therefore, Cholmondeley and Montagu
contacted a bank manager to draft a fictious letter that informed Martin of an overdraft of
seventy-nine pounds. This letter was planted in Martin’s briefcase.21 Further, one of the letters
in Martin’s briefcase was to his fiancée, Pam, in which he foreshadowed his departure on a
military mission. This would reinforce the idea that he was a real person, and also that his life
tragically ended whilst delivering confidential documents.
Fifthly, Cholmondeley and Montagu even consulted M15’s scientists to determine the rates of
solubility of various inks used by correspondents in Britain. They found that most inks
dissolved upon contact with water, although some brands proved fairly resistant even when
immersed in water.22 This was good news for Operation Mincemeat, as it meant that Martin’s
official documents could remain legible even after surviving an extended period at sea.
19
Macintyre, Ben. Ben Macintyre's Espionage Files: Agent Zigzag, Operation Mincemeat & Double Cross. Kindle
edition.
20
203
21
203
22
228
Sixthly, after the British learnt that the Spanish recovered Martin’s body, British authorities
initiated seemingly frantic attempts to recover the case, which would convince the Germans that
an essential British document was leaked.23
After the Germans fell victim to Operation Mincemeat, its effects began appearing in intercepted
German communications. This, however, raise a security issue – beyond the Twenty Committee,
those who learned that high-profile documents landed in the hands of the enemy would
question the carelessness of the British. Therefore, Bletchley Park members were instructed to
redirect messages referring the intercepted Mincemeat documents only to Montagu himself.24
Precautions were, therefore, taken even after the digestion of Operation Mincemeat; such
meticulous planning only exemplifies many considerations that guaranteed the success of
Operation Mincemeat.
The Results and Effects of Operation Mincemeat
The successful execution of Operation Mincemeat is little debated. For instance, Fremde Heere
West, the German intelligence department that focused on western threats, called the
intelligence coup “absolutely convincing.”25 This is backed by the fact that Operation Mincemeat
confirmed Hitler’s suspicions that the Allies would invade Europe through the Balkans. Less
than two weeks after the execution of Operation Mincemeat, on May 12th 1943, Hitler
announced, “It is to be expected that the Anglo-Americans will try to continue the operations in
the Mediterranean in quick succession… Measures regarding Sardinia and the Peloponnese take
precedence over everything else.”26 And soon enough, German forces in the Balkans were
23
Andrews, Evan. “What Was Operation Mincemeat?” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 5 June 2013,
www.history.com/news/what-was-operation-mincemeat.
24
25
Bacon, Donald J. “Second World War Deception: Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Planner.”
Http://Www.au.af.mil/Au/Awc/Awcgate/Wright/wf05.Pdf. p. 4
26
reinforced from 8 to 18 divisions, and the Italian fleet diverted into the Adriatic Sea.27 This
drastic action marked the success of Operation Mincemeat, which was noted by Sir Michael
Howard, the renowned British historian. He went on to claim that Operation Mincemeat was
“perhaps the most successful deception operation in the war.”28
The Allied attack on Sicily thus came as a complete surprise to Hitler in July of 1943. According
to historian Anthony Richards, this element of surprise, as well as the lack of enemy
enforcements in Sicily due to Hitler’s misallocation of troops, proved to be “a deciding factor” in
the successful Allied invasion of Sicily.29 However, converting the plans presented to Hitler as a
part of Operation Mincemeat into military action allowed the Allies to sustain this element of
surprise. For instance, the Allies attacked airbases in Greece to further convince the enemy of
the false plans to invade Sardinia and to mask the actual objective in Sicily.30 In regard to
Richards’ statement about the lack of enemy reinforcements, this was not only due to Hitler’s
misallocation of troops to Sardinia (a result of Operation Mincemeat), but also because the
Allied airfield attacks targeted the docks and ferry crossings on the Messina Straits that fed
reinforcements to Sicily from the Italian mainland.31 Not to mention, claiming Operation
Mincemeat as the deciding factor in the Allied invasion of Sicily fails to consider other key
factors. For instance, even with the success of Operation Mincemeat, the success of Operation
Husky would have been unlikely if the Axis air threat was not tackled. As historian Steven
Zaloga highlights, the capabilities of land-based bombers and torpedo aircraft against maritime
targets instigated considerable anxiety over the vulnerability of the Allied landing fleets once
27
“Operation Barclay.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 30 Sept. 2018,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barclay.
28
29
“The War on Paper: Operation Mincemeat.” Imperial War Museums, www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-war-on-
paper-operation-mincemeat.
30
Zaloga, Steven J., and Howard Gerrard. Sicily 1943: the Debut of Allied Joint Operations. Osprey, 2013. Kindle
edition
31
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they approached the shores of Sicily.32 Allied intelligence estimated that the landings at Sicily
would face attack by 545 German and 250 Italian aircraft, and suggested that as many as 300
Allied ships were likely to be sunk.33 Therefore, additional resources to counter the Axis air
threat were sought, including a heavy influx of US Army Air Force bombers. During the bombing
campaign, the 3000 tons of bombs dropped by the Allies totalled Axis aircraft loss to 227
aircrafts and caused damage to 183. More importantly, barely a dozen Allied ships were sunk, as
historian Ben Macintyre points out. Therefore, without the Allied success in the bombing
campaign, a majority of the Allied troops needed to capture Sicily may have been drowned.
Further controversy to Richards’ claim that Operation Mincemeat caused the lack of enemy
reinforcements in Sicily is pointed to by historian Ralph Bennett. He states that “even had there
been no deception, [the Germans] would have taken precautions in the Balkans.” As Bennett
points out, what the Germans truly feared in the summer of 1943 was that the Italians would
drop out of the Axis alliance.34 This fear was indeed justified: first, Italy’s forces in Russia
experienced a severe blow, losing 85,000 troops. Further amplifying this catastrophe was the
defeat of the Axis in Tunisia, which struck Italy far more severely than Germany.35 In the wake
of the defeat of the Italian army in North Africa, even Churchill was convinced that a successful
operation on Italian soil would knock Italy out of the war.36 Therefore, Mincemeat or no
Mincemeat, Bennett writes, the Germans “would probably have refused to commit more troops
to Sicily in support of the Italian Sixth Army lest they be lost in the aftermath of an Italian
defection.”37
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34
Gladwell, Malcolm, and Malcolm Gladwell. “Pandora's Briefcase.” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 19 June
2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/10/pandoras-briefcase.
35
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36
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37
Gladwell, Malcolm, and Malcolm Gladwell. “Pandora's Briefcase.” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 19 June
2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/10/pandoras-briefcase.
Even if Operation Mincemeat was not the sole cause for Hitler’s allocation of troops to Sardinia,
it is viewed in a positive light, allowing the Sicily campaign to last only thirty-eight days as
opposed to the expected ninety.38 The rapid capture of nearly all of the Sicily’s main port cities
denied them to the Axis, and secured the ports for immediate Allied logistical support and the
staging of future operations.39 Moreover, Macintyre remarks that Operation Mincemeat saved
thousands of lives – “the British had expected 10,000 casualties in the first week of the 38-day
invasion, whereas in fact only 1,400 were killed or wounded.”40
Although the initial days of Operation Husky may have been successful for the Allies, it has been
proved otherwise when analyzed across the complete 38 days, during which the US lost over
2,200 troops, and the British had nearly 13,000 casualties, including 2,700 killed. Moreover,
German losses had not been severe, and the Allies’ failure to capture the fleeing Axis armies
undermined their victory.41 By the end of the Sicily campaign, the Germans evacuated over
50,000 German soldiers, while the Italians evacuated over 60,000 soldiers.42 As historian Rick
Atkinson notes, these troops would kill thousands of Americans in the coming months.43
The Axis soldiers that escaped were a result of Allied failures in command and control; as
American military historian Carlo D’Este points out, the Allies needlessly prolonged the
reduction of Sicily by ponderous and largely ineffective tactics.44 This was largely due to the lack
of direct involvement by Eisenhower, the supreme commander of Allied forces in Western
Europe during World War II. As General Omar Bradley recollected, “there was little guidance
38
“'Perhaps the Most Successful Single Deception Operation of the Entire War.” History TV,
www.history.co.uk/article/operation-mincemeat-how-a-dead-tramp-and-the-author-of-james-bond-helped-
the-allies-take.
39
“Sicilian Campaign: Operation Husky.” Naval History and Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil/browse-
by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1943/sicilian-campaign.html.
40
Ambrosey, Conner. “Deceiving the Nazis, Successful Allied Encounter, Exploring WWII Spycraft: Operation
Mincemeat.”
Http://Www.academia.edu/36021662/Deceiving_the_Nazis_Successful_Allied_Encounter_Exploring_WWII_Sp
ycraft_Operation_Mincemeat.
41
Editors, History.com. “Invasion of Sicily.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 18 Nov. 2009,
www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/invasion-of-sicily.
42
McKenzie, Geoffrey M. “Operation Husky: Seeking an Operational Approach to Decisive Victory.”
Https://Apps.dtic.mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/u2/a611984.Pdf.
43
Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: the War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944. Abacus, 2013. Kindle edition
44
DEste, Carlo. World War II in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945. Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990. p. 76
from the top – no one man exerting a firm hand.”45 Further, British General Alexander’s inept
leadership and justified mistrust of American fighting ability meant there was a lack of
coordination between the British and Americans. In addition, the failure of the air forces to
make more than a token of effort to impede the German evacuation and the navy’s failure to
block the Strait of Messina46 only demonstrated the need for a more effective command
structure. With the appointment of an overall operational commander to unite air, naval, and
ground forces in a coordinated manner, the burden of theater strategic duties would be
minimized. Considering this Allied inefficiency, D’Este claimed that “the Germans and their
reluctant Italian ally succeeded in turning what ought to have been a great triumph into a bitter
victory.”47 Military historians lament the Axis evacuation and the Allied failure to destroy the
German and Italian armies in Sicily.48
Nevertheless, the impact of Sicily’s invasion – even if it was inefficient – is far-reaching. Jarred
by the Sicily invasion, which lasted from 9th July to 17th August of 1943, the Italian fascist regime
fell rapidly into disrepute, as the Allies had hoped.49 In the midst of the invasion itself, Prime
Minister Benito Mussolini was deposed and arrested and a new provisional government was set
up under Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Badoglio had opposed Italy’s alliance with Nazi Germany and
immediately began secret discussions with the Allies about an armistice.50 Subsequently, on
September 3rd 1943, Italy surrendered to the Allies. As historian Martin Kitchen poses, Italy’s
defeat would allow the encirclement around Germany to advance, and possibly force Germany
to fight in isolation on multiple fronts. German resistance could then be worn down using air
45
Cote, Stephen. Operation HUSKY: A Critical Analysis. Naval War Coll Newport Ri Joint Military Operations
Dept, 2001. Kindle edition
46
DEste, Carlo. World War II in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945. Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990. p. 76
47
DEste, Carlo. Bitter Victory: the Battle for Sicily. E.P. Dutton, 1988. Kindle edition
48
49
50
bombardment, blockade, and propaganda.51 Overall, continued Allied operations in the
Mediterranean, such as Sicily, were aimed to effect this type of attrition warfare.52
Germany’s suffering, however, can be argued in terms of factors other than the invasion of Sicily.
Historian Steven Zaloga suggests several factors due to which the Wehrmacht was badly
overextended on all fronts. Firstly, the loss of 40 Italian divisions on occupation duty in Greece,
Yugoslavia and Southern France would oblige the Wehrmacht to replace them with German
troops.53 Secondly, the impending collapse of Italy prompted Hitler to call off Operation
Zitadelle, the German offensive against the Kursk salient, on July 13th 1943.54 Germany lost the
strategic initiative in the war and would be on the defensive even after. Therefore, Zaloga
concludes that Operation Husky was not solely responsible for this climactic turn in the fortunes
of war: it was merely the culmination of a series of disasters that halted German momentum in
1943.55 As a result, the Allied leadership was especially optimistic that the Italian military would
be of use in driving out the Germans. In reality, however, Germany had troops stationed
throughout Italy proceeded with an occupation of the country and seized strongholds from a
disorganized Italian military.56 This suggests that the surrender of Italy to the Allies was not
entirely advantageous as expected. However, historian Rick Atkinson points out that Italy
offered the only feasible place to kill Germans in large numbers between late 1943 and early
1944.57
Significantly indeed, several advantageous entailments of Sicily’s capture remain. Atkinson
poses that the control of southern Italy proved vital to the liberation of Europe by allowing them
51
Kitchen, Martin. A World in Flames: a Short History of the Second World War in Europe and Asia: 1939-1945.
Longman, 1990. Kindle edition
52
Gillies, Peter S. “Sicily – Analysis of Combined Operations in Battle.”
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56
https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/oct-13-1943-italy-switches-sides-in-world-war-ii/
57
to maintain essential communications58: the sea lines of communication through the
Mediterranean offered the best means of maintaining the lend-lease route to Russia via Iran.59
Further, previously, Sicily’s rugged topography made it a tough, protected bastion from which
the Axis aerial and naval forces could intercept the Allied sea lanes through the
Mediterranean.60 Thus, Sicily’s conquest promoted the Allies to a position of control over the
middle sea. Moreover, it was in the Mediterranean that the Allies forced the Axis on the strategic
defensive, as air bases in Sicily gave the Allies a base to launch the bomber offensive that crept
ever closer to the Reich.61
Even admitting all the controversy about the overall efficacy of strategic bombing, the sustained
campaign against German oil production facilities in Romania clearly did have a major impact
on the Wehrmacht.62 There is now no doubt that the desire to keep Romanian oil was one of the
main components of Hitler's policy and defined considerably his European strategy. "The
Wehrmacht needed oil more than anything else… If I have no oil, I will have to end the war,"
Hitler said.63 Oil became the indispensable material for laying runways, making toluene for
bombs, manufacturing synthetic rubber for tires, and for distilling into gasoline. Gasoline was
used in trucks, tanks, and airplanes; it also served as a lubricant for guns and machinery.64
The Axis Power’s natural resource supply was further threatened by the invasion of Sicily,
whose resources were crucial to the Axis war effort. Before the war, Sicily was the world’s
largest producer of sulphur outside the United States. In 1940, Sicily produced about 500,000
tons and since then has supplied two-thirds of all the sulphur used by the Axis Powers.
Therefore, the invasion of Sicily cut off a vital resource of the Axis Powers and limited their war
58
59
60
Birtle, A. J. Sicily: the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993. p. 3
61
62
Atkison, Rick. An Army at Dawn: the War in North Africa, 1942-1943: Volume One of The Liberation Trilogy.
Abacus, 2004. Kindle edition
63
Персональный Сайт Ч.А.Султанова, www.sultanov.azeriland.com/books/en_ussr/pages/page_04_e.html.
64
Miller, Keith. “How Important Was Oil in World War II?” History News Network,
historynewsnetwork.org/article/339.
effort. At the same time, the Allies secured a main war industry area, bringing them closer to
achieving their Victory Program – a military plan for the production requirements to defeat
potential enemies.65
The benefit of the Sicily campaign was most significant in that it provided valuable lessons for
the development of airborne and amphibious warfare that would be put to good use the
following summer in Normandy. The Sicilian campaign showed the growing abilities of the
Allies in conducting complicated combined operations, a vital tactical skill that would be
essential in Normandy.66 Atkinson went so far as to posit that without the Mediterranean
experience, the Allied invasion of France “would have undoubtedly become a failure.”67
Interestingly, Operation Mincemeat also cast a lasting shadow of scepticism in the enemy’s
mind. The twice-shy Germans would go on to find other secret documents that were actually
genuine yet chose to ignore them and act in a contradictory manner, convinced that the
documents were just another mincemeat-style trick.68 For instance, during a large-scale Allied
airborne operation in Netherlands in September of 1943 (Operation Market Garden), the Allies
carelessly left complete detailed plans for the attack – including charts and maps – on the
battlefield in a transport glider.69 The Germans found the plans, yet they were so convinced that
it was another deception that they failed to act.
Operation Mincemeat proved handy again during Operation Fortitude South, which borrowed
the elaborate techniques used in Operation Mincemeat by using a “dummy” army of “inflatable”
tanks and vehicles, ultimately bringing Allied success during the D-Day invasion of Normandy.70
65
Eiler, Keith E. Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940-1945. Cornell University
Press, 1997. p. 200
66
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67
68
Seaburn, Paul, et al. “Operation Mincemeat and the Man Who Never Was.” Mysterious Universe, 5 Oct.
2015, mysteriousuniverse.org/2015/10/operation-mincemeat-and-the-man-who-never-was/.
69
Seaburn, Paul, et al. “Operation Mincemeat and the Man Who Never Was.” Mysterious Universe, 5 Oct.
2015, mysteriousuniverse.org/2015/10/operation-mincemeat-and-the-man-who-never-was/.
70
Ambrosey, Conner. “Deceiving the Nazis, Successful Allied Encounter, Exploring WWII Spycraft: Operation
Mincemeat.”
According to Hastings, the misdirection about the Allied landing at Normandy rather than the
Pas de Calais is one of the four strategically significant battles of World War II that he cites
where intelligence turned the tide.71
Conclusion
The lasting impact of Operation Mincemeat and Operation Husky is argued to have outweighed
its criticisms and counterarguments. The criticisms and counterarguments are summarized as
follows: firstly, air campaigns played a role in addition to Operation Mincemeat in
overstretching the German forces; secondly, German forces in Sicily would have been minimal
regardless of Operation Mincemeat; thirdly, Allied losses totalled nearly 5000, around 100,000
Axis troops evacuated by the end of Operation Husky due to discord within Allied command;
and fourthly, Operation Husky was not solely responsible for putting Germany on the defensive.
A counter-argument to each of these counterarguments is as follows, correspondingly. Firstly,
the air campaigns were a part of overarching Operation Husky, not Operation Mincemeat, so
they don’t undermine the role of Operation Mincemeat. Secondly, without Operation
Mincemeat, historian Anthony Richards claims that in the summer of 1943, the Germans
would’ve still taken precautions in the Balkans. But can we be certain that “precaution” would
have totalled the transfer of 240,000 Axis troops72, as Operation Mincemeat did? Thirdly,
although 5000 Allied troops were killed, around 30,000 Axis troops were killed in Sicily, so the
Allied sacrifices can be argued to have had worthy consequences. Moreover, Operation
Mincemeat is deemed to have saved 30,000 Allied lives. Fourthly, one of the two reasons that
Zaloga cites for Germany being overstretched is the German offensive against Kursk. However,
shortly after the invasion of Sicily came the collapse of Italy, which meant that Germany had to
maintain the defense of Italy by herself, despite her dwindling manpower and resource base. In
order to defend its vulnerable southern flank, Nazi Germany had to transfer much needed forces
Http://Www.academia.edu/36021662/Deceiving_the_Nazis_Successful_Allied_Encounter_Exploring_WWII_Sp
ycraft_Operation_Mincemeat.
71
Malwarwickonbooks.com, malwarwickonbooks.com/revisionist-history/.
72
“German Reinforcements Said to Be Moving Into Southern Greece.” The Havre Daily News 2 Jun. 1943: 4.
Print
from the Eastern Front to Italy, Southern France and the Balkans.73 The immediate result of this
was the decisive Soviet Victory in the Battle of Kursk, the last major Nazi offensive in the east. 74
Therefore, Operation Husky was not only a factor itself in overstretching Germany, but also a
direct cause for one of the other major reasons in Germany’s downfall.
Having addressed the counter-arguments against Operation Mincemeat and Operation Husky,
the beneficial impact of these operations must be noted as well. Firstly, contrary to D’este’s view
of Allied incoordination, after the conclusion of the Invasion of Sicily, General Eisenhower
himself praised the Anglo-American formations: "Allied Forces of all services and of all arms had
demonstrated even more perfect teamwork than in the closing stages of the Tunisian
campaign."75 The command structure of the Husky invasion force emerged as a decentralized
hierarchy in which the responsibility was shared by the Anglo-American commanders who
directed the individual military services, which was adapted for Operation Overlord and worked
“exceptionally well”.76 Sources go on to claim that the command system for Operation Husky set
the organizational basis for the command hierarchy which reached ultimate victory in Europe.
Additionally, the Allied communication lines established by the capture of Sicily maintained
positions in the Eastern theatre that safeguarded vital interests while denying Japan access to
raw materials, vital to her continuous war effort.77 It therefore strengthened the Allies and
weakened the Axis Powers. In fact, the raw materials secured via the capture of Sicily led the
Allies one step closer to a vital, overarching military strategy – the Victory Program – and
diminished a vital component of the Axis Powers’ overall European strategy regarding oil
acquisition. It therefore had a significant impact on the war effort of both sides.
73
Paksoy, Taylan. Cradle Of Triumph: The Invasion Of Sicily And The Anglo-American Alliance In The Second
World War. Aug. 2017.
74
75
AFHQ, Part II, Dec. 1942 – Dec. 1943, Section 1, 140.
76
77
Lastly, the importance of Operation Mincemeat in the success of D-Day – through the tactical
learnings applied and the scepticism ingrained in the enemy – was highly significant. The
invasion of Normandy is considered the most significant victory of the Western Allies in World
War II78: any contribution to this success, therefore, is noteworthy.
Overall, Operation Mincemeat – and subsequently Operation Husky – played a pivotal role in the
defeat of Italy, and to some extent, even Southern France: two vital targets of the Mediterranean
theatre. As historian Taylan Paksoy states, “Operation Husky was a decisive strategic,
operational and tactical victory and the Island of Sicily was the cradle in which the Anglo-
American triumph over Third Reich in Europe and Mediterranean had grown.”79
Bibliography
AFHQ, Part II, Dec. 1942 – Dec. 1943, Section 1, 140.
Ambrosey, Conner. “Deceiving the Nazis, Successful Allied Encounter, Exploring WWII Spycraft:
Operation
Mincemeat.”http://Www.academia.edu/36021662/Deceiving_the_Nazis_Successful_Allied_Enco
unter_Exploring_WWII_Spycraft_Operation_Mincemeat.
Andrews, Evan. “What Was Operation Mincemeat?” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 5
June 2013, www.history.com/news/what-was-operation-mincemeat.
Atkison, Rick. An Army at Dawn: the War in North Africa, 1942-1943: Volume One of The
Liberation Trilogy. Abacus, 2004. Kindle edition
Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: the War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944. Abacus, 2013. Kindle
edition
Birtle, A. J. Sicily: the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II. U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1993. p. 3
78
“Why D-Day Was So Important to Allied Victory.” Imperial War Museums, www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-d-
day-was-so-important-to-allied-victory.
79
Burns, Jimmy. Papa Spy: a True Story of Love, Wartime Espionage in Madrid, and the Treachery
of the Cambridge Spies. Bloomsbury Paperbacks, 2011. Kindle edition
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Operations Dept, 2001. Kindle edition
DEste, Carlo. World War II in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945. Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill,
1990. p. 76
Eiler, Keith E. Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940-1945. Cornell
University Press, 1997. p. 200
Evers, Chia, and Chia Evers. “A Little Bit of War Magic: Operation Mincemeat and the Man Who
Never Was.” Medium.com, Medium, 8 Mar. 2016, medium.com/@chialynn/a-little-bit-of-war-
magic-operation-mincemeat-and-the-man-who-never- wass-52fed067ace6.
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1943: 4. Print

Gladwell, Malcolm, and Malcolm Gladwell. “Pandora's Briefcase.” The New Yorker, The New
Yorker, 19 June 2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/10/pandoras-briefcase.
“Historian Claims to Have Finally Identified Wartime 'Man Who Never Was'.” The Telegraph,
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two/6923826/Historian-claims-to-have-finally-identified-wartime-Man-Who-Never-Was.html.
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Kitchen, Martin. A World in Flames: a Short History of the Second World War in Europe and
Asia: 1939-1945. Longman, 1990. Kindle edition
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2010, www.bbc.com/news/magazine-11887115.
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historynewsnetwork.org/article/339.
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The Second World War. Aug. 2017.
“'Perhaps the Most Successful Single Deception Operation of the Entire War.” History TV,
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History Extended Essay

May/June Session 2019

To what extent did the effective execution

The Operation Mincemeat team, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/8184158/Operation-Mincemeat-BBC-Two-review.html

World War like a rock flung into water.”

Mincemeat, in particular, is an example of one successful military deception: it is said to have

Planning Operation Mincemeat

The Successful Execution of Operation Mincemeat

documents if and when they came into their possession.”11

Therefore, the documents in Martin’s briefcase suggested a two-pronged approach: an

assume this was part of the deception plan.14

in Major Martin’s make-up.”17

verbally reveal the falsity of the information it carried.18

violating the ‘temple of the Holy Ghost’, especially that of a co-religionist.20

strengthen his appearance as a real-life character. Therefore, Cholmondeley and Montagu

tragically ended whilst delivering confidential documents.

an essential British document was leaked.23

The Results and Effects of Operation Mincemeat

“perhaps the most successful deception operation in the war.”28

enforcements in Sicily due to Hitler’s misallocation of troops, proved to be “a deciding factor” in

invasion, whereas in fact only 1,400 were killed or wounded.”40

of direct involvement by Eisenhower, the supreme commander of Allied forces in Western

German and Italian armies in Sicily.48

Significantly indeed, several advantageous entailments of Sicily’s capture remain. Atkinson

ever closer to the Reich.61

it was another deception that they failed to act.

where intelligence turned the tide.71

follows: firstly, air campaigns played a role in addition to Operation Mincemeat in

A counter-argument to each of these counterarguments is as follows, correspondingly. Firstly,

War II78: any contribution to this success, therefore, is noteworthy.

AFHQ, Part II, Dec. 1942 – Dec. 1943, Section 1, 140.

Gillies, Peter S. “Sicily – Analysis of Combined Operations in Battle.”

L., Martin Charmaine. “Military Deception Reconsidered.”

McKenzie, Geoffrey M. “Operation Husky: Seeking an Operational Approach to Decisive Victory.”

“North African Campaign.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 21 Jan. 2019,

“Operation Barclay.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 30 Sept. 2018,

Sellers, Bena E. “Case Study: Operation Mincemeat.”

“Sicilian Campaign: Operation Husky.” Naval History and Heritage Command,

“The War on Paper: Operation Mincemeat.” Imperial War Museums,

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/milestones/1937-

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