Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Hierarchy of Laws PDF
The Hierarchy of Laws PDF
CASE
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila
Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince
Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to
Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a
living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on
matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a
“qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to
Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter
execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the
other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government." Also on
February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents
Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which provided: SECTION 2.
All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.
ISSUE:
WON the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period
which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD:
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the Provisional Constitution,
the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
reading:
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of
the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated
February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and effect.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
STATCON
Presumption of constitutionality
Every statute is presumed valid
o Lies on how a law is enacted
o Due respect to the legislative who passed and executive who approved
o Responsibility of upholding the constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the
legislative and executive branches as well
Courts cannot inquire into the wisdom or propriety of laws
To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law to the constitution must be clear and
unequivocal
All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of law; to doubt is to sustain
Final arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the Supreme Court EN BANC (majority who took part and
voted thereon)
Nonetheless, trial courts have jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in
appropriate cases
Standing to sue
Legal standing or locus standi – personal/ substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of governmental act that is being challenged
“interest” – an interest in issue affected by the decree
Citizen – acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
concrete injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government
o E.g. taxpayer – when it is shown that public funds have been illegally disbursed
Member of the Senate or of the House has legal standing to question the validity of the Presidential
veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriations bills
SC may, in its discretion, take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing
o E.g. calling by the President for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the
PNP in visibility patrols around the metro
where the constitutional question is of paramount public interest and time is of the essence in the
resolution of such question, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be relaxed and the court,
in its discretion, may squarely decide the case
where the question of validity, though apparently has become moot, has become of paramount interest
and there is undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong reasons of public policy may demand that its
constitutionality be resolved.
Test of constitutionality
Is what the Constitution provides in relation to what can or may be done under the statute, and not by
what it has been done under it.
o If not within the legislative power to enact
o If vague – unconstitutional in 2 respects
Violates due process
Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
o Where there’s a change of circumstances – i.e. emergency laws
Effects of unconstitutionality
It confers no rights
Imposes no duties
Affords no protection
Creates no office
In general, inoperative as if it had never been passed
2 views:
o Orthodox view – unconstitutional act is not a law; decision affect ALL
o Modern view – less stringent; the court in passing upon the question of unconstitutionality does
not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution; decisions affects
parties ONLY and no judgment against the statute; opinion of court may operate as a
precedent; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute
Emergency laws
It is deemed valid at the time of its enactment as an exercise of police power
It becomes invalid only because the change of conditions makes its continued operation violative of the
Constitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should only affect the parties involved in the
case and its effects applied prospectively
Partial invalidity
General rule: that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced
Exception – that when parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest – such as in the case of
Tatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC