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Villanueva G.R. No. L-19450 Digest
Villanueva G.R. No. L-19450 Digest
FACTS:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief before the justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna. He was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City as private prosecutor after securing
the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition was that he would be considered on official LOA and
would not receive any payment for his services every time he appears at the trial of the case.
This was questioned by the counsel for the accused, arguing that the JP court, in entertaining the appearance of
City Attorney Fule in the case, is a violation of the ruling in Aquino et al. vs. Blanco, et al. which ruled that "when
an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified,
by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." The counsel also invoked Section 32, Rule 27,
now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Fule violated sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rulesof Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing.
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advice to clients.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney.
In this case, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning
and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
CONCLUSION:
City Attorney Fule did not violate Sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing. The term private practice of law does not apply to this case. Moreover, he was
given permission by his immediate superior. It was clear that he did not receive any payment and was considered
on official LOA as a consequence of appearing at the trial of the accused.