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MTJ-00-1301
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THIRD DIVISION
CIRILO I. MERCADO, ARSENIO L. CARPIO, PEDRO V. SORIANO and FLORDELIZA C. ALEJO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE HECTOR F. DYSANGCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING JUDGE OF 2nd MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, GEN. NATIVIDAD - LLANERA AND TERESITA S. ESTEBAN, CLERK OF COURT, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In an election, one vote can spell the difference between victory and defeat. Trial judges are, therefore, advised to
exercise caution in granting petitions for inclusion of voters. Fealty to the procedures outlined in the Omnibus
Election Code is imperative, lest not only the integrity of the judiciary but also that of the election process would be
undermined.
In a sworn complaint1 dated May 29, 1997, complainants Flordeliza C. Alejo, Arsenio L. Carpio, Cirilo I. Mercado,
and Pedro V. Soriano charged Judge Hector F. Dysangco, Acting Presiding Judge of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija, and Teresita S. Esteban, Clerk of Court of the same court, with grave
misconduct.
The complainants alleged that prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, forty-eight (48) persons filed with
the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters’ list. Of these forty-eight (48) petitioners, nine (9) were
supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado, while thirty-nine (39) were supporters of his opponent Alejandro
Gonzales. Mercado and Gonzales were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Kabulihan, Gen.
Natividad, Nueva Ecija. Consequently, Mercado and the other complainants filed an opposition to the petition of the
thirty-nine (39) supporters of Gonzales.
The hearings of the petitions were set on April 17, April 28, May 6, May 8, and May 9, 1997. The first three
scheduled hearings were cancelled due to the absence of either respondent judge or petitioners’ counsel. The May
8 hearing proceeded but only the nine (9) petitioners supporting complainant Mercado presented their evidence.
The thirty-nine (39) petitioners supporting Gonzales requested the postponement of the hearing to May 9. However,
on that day, those petitioners and their counsel failed to appear in court. Thus, respondent judge dismissed their
petitions in open court.
On May 10 (Saturday), respondent judge, when approached by herein complainants, assured them that he did not
issue any order for the inclusion of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners in the voters’ list of Barangay Kabulihan.
However, on the day of the election, complainants were surprised to find thirty-four (34) of the thirty-nine (39)
petitioners with an Order signed by respondent judge and attested by respondent clerk of court,2 directing their
inclusion in the voters’ list of Barangay Kabulihan.
Complainants averred that the issuance of the Order by respondent judge was "highly anomalous, illegal, and
patently of dubious origin" because not one of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners presented evidence or appeared in the
scheduled hearings. Respondents, therefore, aided and abetted thirty-four (34) flying voters in violating the Election
Laws and in influencing the result of the Barangay Elections in Kabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija.
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Respondent judge denied committing any anomaly in ordering the inclusion of the thirty–four (34) petitioners in the
voters’ list of Barangay Kabulihan. He explained that his Order was based on his interviews with those petitioners,3
who registered as voters in the said barangay during the registration on June 14-15 and 21-22, 1997, per
Certification issued by the Office of the Election Officer.4
In her comment, respondent clerk of court denied any hand in the issuance of the questioned Order, asserting that it
was respondent judge’s official and personal act. She claimed that, as a mere clerk of court, she could not coerce
respondent judge into issuing the Order. Moreover, she did not have any personal reason or motive in aiding the
thirty-four (34) petitioners. Lastly, she invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties as clerk
of court and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against her.5
In a Memorandum6 dated March 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator found respondents’ comments
unsatisfactory. Thus, on April 21, 1999, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, for investigation, report and recommendation.7
On January 3, 2000, Executive Judge Johnson L. Ballutay submitted the following findings and recommendation:
"…in the memorandum of respondent Judge Hector F. Dysangco, he admitted that he conducted merely
personal interviews, he did not categorically state as to whether during his interviews, the counsel for the
petitioners as well as the counsel for the oppositors were present. Likewise, the respondent Teresita Esteban
admitted that the thirty-four (34) petitioners for inclusion were included and allowed to vote merely on the
strength of interview conducted by Judge Hector F. Dysangco and that there was no hearing conducted.
Considering, however, that Atty. Ambrosio Matias, Jr. appeared for the thirty-nine (39) petitioners for inclusion
and Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba appeared for the oppositors, fair play requires that during the interview of the thirty-
nine (39) petitioners at least this (sic) two (2) counsel must have been present which, however, as admitted
by the Clerk of Court, Teresita S. Esteban, they were not present. Such failure to wait for Attys. Ambrosio
Matias, Jr. and Ellis F. Jacoba, as in fact, they were both absent when the interviews were conducted by the
Municipal Judge, is a conduct which should have been avoided if a fair hearing should have been afforded the
two (2) lawyers. Such act of the respondent Judge is not only reprehensible, but also denial of due process.
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, recommendation is hereby made that for the said act of respondent Judge
Hector F. Dysangco, he should be meted a fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS with warning that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. On the part of respondent Teresita S. Esteban, she
must be reprimanded and warned that she should be more careful in her actuation and she should act strictly
in accordance with her duties as stated in her job description."8
In his Memorandum dated October 12, 2000, the Court Administrator found that respondent judge, in issuing the
questioned Order, committed a lapse and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The Court
Administrator further recommended that the complaint against respondent clerk of court be dismissed for lack of
merit. Thus:
"In order that a judge may be held liable for serious misconduct, there must be reliable evidence showing that
the judicial acts complained for were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules (Ang Kek Chen vs. Judge Amalia Andrade, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1504,
November 16, 1999). The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. In the
instant case, complainants failed to present evidence to show that respondents acted with corrupt and
malicious intent to violate the law so as to warrant the imposition of penalty of dismissal for grave misconduct.
However, we concur with the observations of Executive Judge Ballutay that there appears to be a
lapse in according herein complainant her right to due process when respondent judge interviewed
the thirty-four (34) petitioners in the absence of counsels of both parties, sans a formal hearing. As to
the liability of respondent Clerk of Court, this was not sufficiently established either in the complaint or the
report of the investigating judge."9 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, on February 11, 2002, this Court dismissed the complaint against respondent Clerk of Court Teresita S.
Esteban.10
We find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct constituting violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended.11
Section 143 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, explicitly lays down the
procedure governing petitions for inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters, thus:
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SEC. 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and correction
of names of voters. --
(a) Outside of regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall
be received.
(b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged voters shall state the place,
day and hour in which such petition shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof
by registered mail or by personal delivery or by leaving it in the possession of a person of sufficient discretion
in the residence of the said person or, in the event that the foregoing procedure is not practicable, by posting
a copy in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within
the city or municipality, at least ten days prior to the day set for the hearing.
In the interest of justice and to afford the challenged voter every opportunity to contest the petition for
exclusion, the court concerned may, when the challenged voter fails to appear in the first day set for the
hearing, order that notice be effected in such manner and within such period of time as it may decide, which
time shall in no case be more than ten days from the day the respondent is first found in default.
(d) No costs shall be assessed in these proceedings. However, if the court should be satisfied that the
application has been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the adverse party and causing him to incur
expenses, it may condemn the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.
(e) Any candidate who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and present his evidence.
(f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented. If the question is whether or not the voter is
real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the
registered voter is fictitious. In no case shall a decision be rendered upon a stipulation of facts.
(g)These applications shall be heard and decided without delay. The decision shall be rendered within
six hours after the hearing and within ten days from the date of its filing in court. Cases appealed to the
regional trial court shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal in the office of the clerk of court.
In any case, the court shall decide these petitions not later than the day before the election and the decision
rendered thereon shall be immediately final and executory, notwithstanding the provision of Section 138 on
the finality of decisions. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on the basis of the evidence
presented, b) to conduct a hearing thereon, and c) to render a decision within 10 days from the filing of the petition.
Respondent judge, unfortunately, does not know the above legal provisions.
He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners’ evidence. He could not have done so. Extant in the record
is the fact that the thirty-nine (39) petitioners failed to attend any of the scheduled hearings. How then could they
present evidence?
Respondent judge claimed that he personally interviewed the thirty-four (34) petitioners on April 25, 1997 and that
this was the basis of his Order. We are hard put to treat such personal interview as corresponding to the "hearing"
required by law. A hearing means that a party is given the chance to adduce evidence to support his side of the
case.12 The minutes of the interview merely show that it is a superficial and mechanical inquiry on each petitioner’s
age, citizenship, residence and years of residence in Barangay Kabulihan. The petitioners were not required to
swear under oath or to present proof of their residence.13 Their lawyers were not even notified. These
incidents render the bare assertions of the thirty-four (34) petitioners doubtful and unreliable.
Significantly, despite respondent judge’s allegation that the petition for inclusion was set for hearing on April 25, no
notice of hearing was sent to the parties and their counsel. This was affirmed by Bonifacia C. Barcancel, the court
stenographer, during the investigation conducted by Executive Judge Ballutay, thus:
Court:
xxx xxx
Q So, actually here as per record of the case there was no notice to their lawyer, there was no
notice to the counsels, to the oppositors as well as counsel for the oppositors?
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xxx xxx
Q It was just like this. It was not just like a proper trial that is what you want the Court to understand?
Q No trial, no lawyer?
That respondent judge did not conduct any hearing was confirmed by no less than respondent clerk of court,
Teresita S. Esteban, thus:
Court:
xxx xxx
Q Was there actual hearing on April 25, 1997 or merely interview which was conducted?
Q No hearing?
A None, Your Honor, on May 8, Atty. Matias was there, Your Honor.
xxx xxx
Q But there was actually no hearing, it was only/merely an interview which was conducted, there
was no full blown hearing despite the opposition?
And, second, respondent judge issued the Order beyond the ten-day period required by Section 143. The petitions
of the thirty-nine (39) Gonzales supporters were filed prior to April 17, 1997,16 yet the Order granting them was
issued only on May 9, 1997. In releasing the Order on a Friday and two days before the Barangay Elections,
respondent judge effectively deprived the complainants of their right to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. Clearly,
they were deprived of their right to due process.
Respondent judge’s issuance of the controversial Order sans hearing and beyond the ten-day period constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. His failure to observe the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code is inexcusable. As
a judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion or
exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these legal requirements because it can be assumed that
these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.17 Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
respondent judge must have the basic rules on the palm of his hand. He is expected to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the laws and rules of procedure.18 The litigants will have faith in the administration of
justice only if they believe that the occupants of the bench cannot be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.
Respondent judge likewise committed gross misconduct constituting violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides that, "a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." That respondent judge exhibited partiality in favor of candidate Gonzales,
being supported by the thirty-four (34) petitioners, is shown by the fact that he granted their petitions despite their
absence on the scheduled hearings and their failure to present evidence. Surely, he did not accord the same
treatment to the petitioners supporting complainant Mercado.19 Not to be glossed over is respondent judge’s
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surreptitious issuance of the assailed Order, i.e. without furnishing the complainants with a copy thereof and after
misleading them that no such Order was issued.
It needs to be reiterated over and over again, until it sinks into the consciousness of every judge, that litigants are
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice
and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges
must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to
their fairness, impartiality and integrity.20
The reminder applies all the more sternly to trial judges, like herein respondent, because they are the judicial front-
liners. They have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests
and the embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.21
In fine, we hold that respondent judge has tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the
obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and worthy of the people’s trust.22 He did not just commit a simple lapse.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,23 classifies administrative charges as serious, less
serious, or light. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct are subsumed under serious charges. Thus, the fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
recommended by both the investigating Executive Judge and the Court Administrator is not commensurate to the
administrative offenses committed by respondent judge. Section 11 of the same Rule provides:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering the circumstances in this case, the penalty of suspension from office for four (4) months without salary
and other benefits is deemed appropriate.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge HECTOR F. DYSANGCO, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija, then Acting Presiding Judge of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Natividad-Llanera, same
province, is SUSPENDED for four (4) months without salary and other benefits. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his records with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-10.
4 Ibid., p. 23. Only twenty-one (21) of the thirty-four (34) petitioners were certified by the Office of the Election
Officer as registered voters of Barangay Kabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija. The Certification was given
on August 28, 1997, long after the proceeding for inclusion.
5 Rollo, pp. 19-20.
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7 Ibid., p. 34.
10 Resolution of the Third Division dated February 11, 2002, rollo, p. 83.
11 Per Administrative Order No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on October 1, 2001.
Atty. Jacoba:
Q Mrs. Barcancel, in this Exhibit "9" the minutes of interview you took down faithfully everything
that happened on April 25, 1997, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q I noticed here that all the interviewees, the person allegedly interviewed by Judge Dysangco on
April 25, 1997 were not required to take an oath to tell the truth, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Court:
Q That is why you did not include any oath taken by each of the applicants because there was no
such oath because it was merely an interview that happened?
17 Siawan vs. Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056, May 21, 2001.
18 Malinao vs. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1475, December 12, 2001; Chavez vs. Escañan, 343 SCRA 170
(2000).
19 Two (2) of the nine (9) petitioners supporting complainant Mercado were absent on the scheduled hearings
and their petitions were dismissed.
Notably, respondent judge granted the petitions of the thirty-nine (39) supporters of Gonzales notwithstanding
the fact that he had also dismissed the said petitions in open court for failure of the petitioners to attend the
hearing on May 9, 1997.
20 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sanchez, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1486, June 26, 2001; De la Cruz vs.
Bersamira, 336 SCRA 353 (2000); Dacera, Jr. vs. Dizon, Jr., 337 SCRA 144 (2000) citing Rallos vs. Gako,
Jr., 328 SCRA 324 (2000).
22 Huggland vs. Lantin, 326 SCRA 620 (2000), citing Garcia vs. Dela Peña, 229 SCRA 766 (1994).
23 Supra.
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