EVIDENCE

For the Exclusive Use of SHARMEN D. GALLENERO

Admissibility of Evidence

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative

value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence
are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether
the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. (Heirs of Sabanpan v. Alberto C.
Comorposa, GR No. 152807, August 12, 2003)

Admissions

A party’s verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the

persons who heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
According to this provision, “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” This rule is based upon the
notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.
(Virgilio Bon v. People, GR No. 152160, January 13, 2004)

An admission, which, under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is

an "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact" is different from a
confession which, in turn, is defined in Section 33 of the same Rule as the
"declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein." Both may be given in evidence against
the person admitting or confessing. In People v. Lorenzo, the Court explained that
in a confession there is an acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the
statements of fact by the accused do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which the accused is
charged. (People v. Rene Januario, GR No. 98252, February 7, 1997; Josue R.
Ladiana v. People, GR No. 144293, December 4, 2002)

In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by

showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the
response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner;
or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. In
addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great
weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
(Josue R. Ladiana v. People, GR No. 144293, December 4, 2002)

Affidavits Inconsistent with Testimony

Ex parte affidavits are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate and

will not prevail over the witness’ statements on the stand. (People v. Domingo
Salazar, GR No. 99355, August 11, 1997; People v. Diohne Palomar, GR No.
108183-85, August 21, 1997; People v. Egmedio Lampaza, GR No. 138876,
November 24, 1999; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002;
People v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002)
 It has been held that affiants are not necessarily discredited by
discrepancies between their testimonies on the witness stand and their ex parte
statements, which are generally incomplete. Basic is the rule that affidavits taken
ex parte are judicially considered to be incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for their accurate recollection. Affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations, because the former are
often executed when affiants’ mental faculties are not in such state as to afford
them a fair opportunity to narrate in full incidents that have transpired. Moreover,
testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit. (People v. Rolando
Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001; People v. Victoriano Pontilar Jr.,
GR No. 104865, July 11, 1997; People v. Ernesto Jamiro, GR No. 117576,
September 18, 1997; People v. Tito Reduca, GR Nos. 126094-95, January 21,
1999; People v. Estanislaw Jaberto, GR No. 128147, May 12, 1999; People v.
Eleuterio Costelo, GR No. 134311, October 13, 1999; People v. Ramil Beruega,
GR No. 142931, April 11, 2002; People v. Lomer Mandao, GR No. 135048,
December 3, 2002; People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27, December 11,
2003; Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

Minor inconsistencies between sworn statements and testimonies do not

affect the credibility of witnesses. The assessment of these inconsistencies is best
left to the discretion of the trial judge who had the unique opportunity to observe
their demeanor and conduct while they were testifying. (People v. Conrado De
Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002)

Affirmative/positive evidence prevails over negative testimony

It is a legal truism that positive and forthright declarations of prosecution

witnesses are worthier of credence than the self-serving denials of the accused-
appellants. (People v. Veriato Molina, GR Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998; People
v. Rolly Obello, GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998; People v. Ramil Beruega, GR
No. 142931, April 11, 2002; People v. Mila Razul, GR No. 146470, November 22,
2002)

[I]n light of the positive identification of appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, his defense of alibi and denial cannot be sustained. “An affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness.” (People v. Robert Daraman, GR No.
126046, August 7, 1998; People v. Bonifacio Zamora, GR No. 101829, August 21,
1997; People v. Domingo Sta. Ana, GR Nos. 115657-59, June 26, 1998)

Allegations
Mere allegations are not synonymous with proof. (Vinta Maritime v. NLRC,
GR No. 113911, January 23, 1998)

Ancient Document
An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in
the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance
of suspicion. It must on its face appear to be genuine. (Fernanda Cequena v.
Honorata Bolante, GR No. 137944, April 6, 2000)

Animus Possidendi

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts

cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with
certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of
mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant
events in each particular case. (People v. William Robert Burton, GR No. 114396,
February 19, 1997)

Circumstantial Evidence

A person may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence,

provided the proven circumstances inexorably lead to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused as the guilty person, to the exclusion of all
others. Where the evidence presented admits of other conclusions, the accused
must be acquitted. (People v. Isidro Mijares, GR No. 126042, October 8, 1998;
Melanio Mallari v. People, GR No. 153911, December 10, 2004))

[A] judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld

only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion, to the exclusion of any other, that the accused are
guilty. The circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent
with any hypothesis other than that of guilt. As a corollary to the constitutional
precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every
hypothesis consistent with his innocence. (People v. Sergio Bato, GR No. 113804,
January 16, 1998; People v. Isidro Mijares, GR No. 126042, October 8, 1998;
People v. Domingo R. Muleta, GR No. 130189, June 25, 1999; People v.
Reynaldo Corre Jr., GR No. 137271, August 15, 2001; People v. Danilo Asis, GR
No. 142531, October 15, 2002; People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404,
February 14, 2003)

Circumstantial evidence is considered sufficient only when the facts from

which the inferences are derived are themselves duly proven. Well-established is
the rule that an inference cannot be drawn from another inference. (People v.
Rolando Solis, GR No. 138936, January 30, 2001)

Circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry made up of strands, which

create a pattern when interwoven, and cannot be plucked out and considered one
strand at a time independently of the others. If the picture does not point to the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction
based thereon will not weather judicial scrutiny. (People v. Warlito Ragon, GR No.
100593, November 18, 1997; People v. Eleno Paracale, GR No. 141800,
December 9, 2002)
Circumstantial Evidence; Elements

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence the

following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For such
conviction to withstand judicial scrutiny, the prosecution must further show that all
the circumstances are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
innocent or with any other rational hypothesis except that of his guilt. (People v.
Raul Mondaga, GR No. 115351, March 27, 1998; People v. Warlito Ragon, GR
No. 100593, November 18, 1997; People v. Sergio Bato, GR No. 113804, January
16, 1998; People v. Wilfredo Llaguno, GR No. 91262, January 28, 1998; People v.
Restituto Rendaje, GR No. 136745, November 15, 2000; People v. Rolando Solis,
GR No. 138936, January 30, 2001; People v. Reynaldo Corre Jr., GR No. 137271,
August 15, 2001; People v. Gerry Cuenca, GR No. 143819, January 29, 2002;
People v. Crispin Velarde, GR No. 139333, July 18, 2002; People v. Danilo Asis,
GR No. 142531, October 15, 2002; People v. Guillermo Samus, GR Nos. 135957-
58, September 17, 2002; People v. Eleno Paracale, GR No. 141800, December 9,
2002; People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404, February 14, 2003; Virgilio Bon
v. People, GR No. 152160, January 13, 2004; Melanio Mallari v. People, GR No.
153911, December 10, 2004; Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217,
April 18, 2006)

Confession

A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a declaration made voluntarily

and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that
he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. But before it can
be admitted in evidence, several requirements have to be satisfied. (People v.
Nicomedes Fabro, GR No. 95089, August 11, 1997.)

In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is

given:
1. Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery;
2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under
custodial investigation of his constitutional rights; and
3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its
consequences.

Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one, which the
normal experience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability.
(People v. Nicomedes Fabro, GR No. 95089, August 11, 1997)

When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the

Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. (People v. Edwin De
Vera, GR No. 128966, August 18, 1999)
Conjectures; Surmises, Suspicions

Conjectures, surmises and suspicions cannot take the place of evidence,

particularly where -- as in this case -- contrary suspicions, surmises and queries
can also be floated and believed. (People v. Sergio Bato, GR No. 113804,
January 16, 1998; Aurea R. Monteverde v. People, GR No. 139610, August 12,
2002)

S]peculation can never be a substitute for evidence in any legal proceeding

and cannot overturn the presumption of regularity in the execution of an election
document. (Separate Opinion in Pendatun Salih v. Commission on Elections, GR
No. 122872, September 10, 1997)

Credibility of Evidence

It is hornbook doctrine that evidence, to be believed, must come not only

from a credible witness but must in itself be credible, since there is “no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and
experience.” (People v. Norlito Cara, GR No. 117483-84, December 12, 1997;
People v. Enemesio Abellanosa, GR No. 121195, November 27, 1996; People v.
Danny Angeles, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Mark Perucho, GR No.
128869, April 14, 1999; People v. Jose Dedace, GR No. 132551, March 22, 2000;
People v. Rolando Solis, GR No. 138936, January 30, 2001; People v. Julio
Recto, GR No. 129069, October 17, 2001; People v. Prudencio Villaflores, GR
Nos. 135063-64, December 5, 2001; People v. Guillermo Samus, GR Nos.
135957-58, September 17, 2002)

More than consistency, the best test of credibility is its compatibility with the
common experience of man. A testimony deserves credence if it does run counter
to human knowledge, observation and experience; whatever is repugnant to these
standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance. (People v.
Dionisio Marollano, GR No. 105004, July 24, 1997)

Credibility of Witnesses

We have ruled time and time again that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the
truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations
during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to
disbelieve. (People v. Bienvenido Ombrog, GR No. 104666, February 12, 1997;
People v. Victoriano Pontilar Jr., GR No. 104865, July 11, 1997; People v. Sergio
Betonio, GR No. 119165, September 26, 1997; People v. Gerardo Cogonon, GR
No. 94548, October 4, 1996; People v. Joel Pinca, GR No. 129256, November 17,
1999; People v. Roberto Pacis, GR No. 146309, July 18, 2002; Celestino
Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

The time-tested doctrine is that a trial court’s assessment of the credibility of

a witness is entitled to great weight -- even conclusive and binding on this Court, if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence. Credibility is a matter that peculiarly falls within the province of the
trial court as it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and
behavior of the witnesses at the time of their testimony. Thus, assigning value and
weight to each testimony is within its jurisdiction. (People v. Danny Angeles, GR
No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Alejandro Gabris, GR No. 116221, July 11,
1996; People v. Pedrito Añonuevo, GR No. 112989, September 18, 1996; People
v. Rogelio Doepante, GR No. 102772, October 30, 1996; People v. Robert
Dinglasan, GR No. 101312, January 28, 1997; People v. Benjamin Ortega Jr., GR
No. 116736, July 24, 1997; People v. Dionisio Marollano, GR No. 105004, July 24,
1997; People v.
Bonifacio Zamora, GR No. 101829, August 21, 1997; People v. Virgilio Siguin,
November 24, 1998; People v. William Burton, GR No. 114396, February 19,
1997; People v. Mildred Villas, GR No. 112180, August 15, 1997; People v. Dione
Palomar, GR Nos. 108183-85, August 21, 1997; People v. Rodolfo Caures, GR
Nos. 104739-44, November 18, 1997; People v. Clarita Bahatan, GR No.
121901, January 28, 1998; People v. Tito Reduca, GR Nos. 126094-95, January
21, 1999; People v. Crisanto Oliver, GR No. 123099, February 11, 1999; People v.
Buenaventura Batidor, GR No. 126027, February 18, 1999; People v. Eduardo
Tabones, GR No. 129695, March 17, 1999; People v. Estanislaw Jaberto, GR No.
128147, May 12, 1999; People v. Erick Macahia, GR No. 130931, May 19, 1999;
People v. Jose Dedace, GR No. 132551, March 22, 2000; People v. Alexander
Taño, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v. Abdulajid Sabdani, GR No. 134262,
June 28, 2000; People v. Raymundo Villarez, GR No. 133795, July 27, 2000;
People v. Ponciano Aglipa, GR No. 130941, August 3, 2000; People v. Ronnie
Navales, GR No. 135230, August 8, 2000; People v. Andrew Pacina, GR No.
123150, August 16, 2000; People v. Alfredo Catubig Jr., GR Nos. 134143-47,
October 5, 2000; People v. Restituto Rendaje, GR No. 136745, November 15,
2000; People v. Darwin Bantayan, GR No. 137693, December 14, 2000; People v.
Wilbert Cabareño, GR No. 138645, January 16, 2001; People v. Asterio Cordero,
GR Nos. 136894-96, February 7, 2001; Isabelo Lorenzana v. People, GR No.
138666, March 1, 2001; People v. Mario Abendan, GR Nos. 132026-27, June 28,
2001; Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People, GR No. 136266, August 13, 2001; People v.
Reynaldo Corre Jr., GR No. 137271, August 15, 2001; People v. Eugenio
Marquez, GR Nos. 138972-73, September 13, 2001; People v. Reynaldo De
Guzman, GR No. 124037, October 2, 2001; People v. Ricardo Agliday, GR No.
140794, October 16, 2001; People v. Mario Tuada, GR No. 143486, October 18,
2001; People v. Roderick Santos, GR Nos. 135454-56, November 13, 2001;
People v. Jose Virrey, GR No. 133910, November 14, 2001; People v. Alberto
Gonzales Jr., GR Nos. 143143-44, January 15, 2002; People v. Dennis Edem, GR
No. 130970, February 27, 2002; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052,
March 6, 2002; People v. Ramil Beruega, GR No. 142931, April 11, 2002; People
v. Pedro Daramay Jr., GR Nos. 140235 & 142748, May 9, 2002; People v. Boy
Domingo, GR No. 143660, June 5, 2002; People v. Marcelo Mendoza, GR Nos.
132923-24, June 6, 2002; People v. Sixto Paragas,GR No. 146308, July 18, 2002;
People v. SPO2 Jose Magnabe Jr., GR No. 143071, August 6, 2002; People v.
Roger Puedan, GR No. 139576, September 2, 2002; People v. Atanacio
Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002; People v. Mila Razul, GR No.
146470, November 22, 2002; People v. Rogelio Bitancor, GR No. 147968,
December 4, 2002; People v. Eleno Paracale, GR No. 141800, December 9, 2002;
People v. Ruel Eugenio, GR No. 146805, January 16, 2003; People v. Limpangog,
GR No. 141438-40, February 3, 2003; People v. Rosdia Hajili, GR Nos. 149872-
73, March 14, 2003; People v. Ignacio Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003;
People v. Genaro Biong, GR No. 144445-47, April 30, 2003; People v. Veno
Esperas, GR No. 128109, November 19, 2003; People v. Danilo Caraang, GR
Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2003; People v. Homer Magdaraog, GR No.
151251, May 19, 2004)

The basic rule is that findings and conclusions of a trial court, upon which
the responsibility of assessing the credibility of witnesses primarily rests, deserve
great weight and respect. Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape
cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court. When the question
arises as to which version is to be believed, the judgment of the trial court is
accorded the highest respect in view of the opportunity it had to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. Concededly, it is in a
better position than an appellate court to discern whether a witness is telling the
truth or fabricating a lie. Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts, which might
affect the result of the case, such assessment must bind even this Court. (People
v. Joel Corea, GR No. 114383, March 3, 1997; People v. Ernesto Atuel, GR No.
106962, September 3, 1996; People v. Henry Apilo, GR No. 101213-14, October
28, 1996; People v. Efren Buendia, GR Nos. 133949-51, September 16, 1999;
People v. Vicente Basquez, GR No. 144035, September 27, 2001; People v.
Jovito Manalo, GR Nos. 144989-90, January 31, 2003; People v. Mario Umayam,
GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003; People v. Ma. Lourdes Felipe, GR No. 142505,
December 11, 2003)

Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. Such findings are
conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing that the trial
court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. (People v.
Diarangan Dansal, GR No. 105002, July 17, 1997; People v. Domingo Salazar,
GR No. 99355, August 11, 1997; People v. Efren Cabebe, GR No. 125910, May
21, 1998; People v. Cheng Ho Chua, GR No. 127542, March 18, 1999; People v.
Noriel Lacerna, GR No. 109250, September 5, 1997; People v. Nelson Agunias,
GR No. 121993, September 12, 1997; People v. Domingo Sta. Ana, GR No.
115657-59, June 26, 1998; People v. Cheng Ho Chua, GR No. 127542, March 18,
1999; People v. Glenn Lotoc, GR No. 132166, May 19, 1999; People v. Noel Diaz,
GR No. 130652, June 21, 1999; People v. Carlos Boco, GR No. 129676, June 23,
1999; People v. Jaime Ibay, GR No. 132690, August 10, 1999; People v. Isabelo
Perez, GR No. 130501, September 2, 1999; People v. Eleuterio Costelo, GR No.
134311, October 13, 1999; People v. Constancio Merino, GR No. 132329,
December 17, 1999; People v. Alfredo Cabande, GR No. 132747, February 8,
2000; People v. Ernesto Garchitorena, GR No. 131357, April 12, 2000; People v.
John Kenneth de Guzman, GR No. 137806, December 14, 2000; People v.
Domingo Perez, GR No. 134756, February 13, 2001; People v. Evangeline
Ganenas, GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001; People v. Rolando Mendoza, GR
No. 142654, November 16, 2001; People v. Sueene Discalsota, GR No. 136892,
April 11, 2002; People v. Matias Lagramada, GR Nos. 146357 & 148170, August
29, 2002; People v. Teresa Corpuz, GR No. 148919, December 17, 2002; People
v. Felix Montes, GR Nos. 148743-45, November 18, 2003; People v. Toribio
Galido, GR Nos. 148689-92, March 30, 2004; People v. Lolito Estoya, GR No.
153538, May 19, 2004; People v. Larry Cachapero, GR No. 153008, May 20,
2004; People v. Sonny Bautista, GR No. 140278, June 3, 2004; Elsa Jose v.
People, GR No. 148371, August 12, 2004)

Judges cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In

ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are not. In doing
so, they consider all the evidence before them. In other words, the mere fact that
Judge Noynay based his decision on the testimonies of respondents’ witnesses
does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those of petitioners. (Jose
Baritua v. Nimfa Mercader, GR No. 136048, January 23, 2001)

In a rape case, the credibility of the victim and her testimony is often the
most important issue. It is usually her word that she was raped vis-à-vis that of
appellant who denies such charge. This is because rape is often committed in
secrecy, without any other witness except the victim. (People v. Conde Rapisora,
GR Nos. 140934-35, October 23, 2001)

Dead Man’s Statute

Before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under

the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead,
insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by
the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the
same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable
the existence of any motive to falsify. (Fernanda Mendoza Cequena, v. Honorata
Bolante, GR No. 137944, April 6, 2000)

Declarations Against Interest

A statement may be admissible as a declaration [against interest] if it

complies with the following requisites: 1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; 3) at the time of the
declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her interest; and
4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true.
(Apolonia Ll. Ocampo v. Fidela Ll. Ocampo, GR No. 150707, April 14, 2004)

Desistance

Affidavits of desistance, especially those extracted from poor, unlettered,

young and gullible witnesses long after the trial is over, are generally frowned
upon. Testimony solemnly given before a court of justice and subjected to the test
of cross-examination cannot just be set aside, and a new trial granted on the basis
of perfunctory and pro forma affidavits that obviously were not prepared directly by
the witnesses themselves, but by some legally trained individuals. The credibility
of trials and the pursuit of truth cannot be placed at the unilateral disposal of
timorous witnesses or made dependent on one-sided statements prepared by
notaries. (People v. Eduardo Garcia, GR Nos. 120387-88, March 31, 1998)

The facts of this case show that the victim’s mother desisted from
prosecuting the case in consideration of the “financial help” extended to her family
by the accused-appellant. Such “financial help” when viewed as an offer of
compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant’s
criminal liability. Well-settled it is that the desistance of the victim’s complaining
mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does
operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively
waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-
appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from
the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor
any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court’s refusal to include a
finding of civil liability. (People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No. 110129, August 12,
1997)

[B]y itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the

dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. (People v. Florentino O.
Ramirez Jr., GR Nos. 150079-80, June 10, 2004)

Documentary Evidence

An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded

probative value. It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented
as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question
its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the
letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative value. (Melanio Mallari v.
People, GR No. 153911, December 10, 2004; People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No.
124705, January 20, 1998)

Indeed, before a private document offered as authentic is received in

evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved. However, after it has
been offered, failure to deny it under oath amounts to its admissibility. The “party
whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another
for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, which it lacks, are
waived by him.” (Air Philippines v. International Business Aviation, GR No.
151963, September 9, 2004)

It is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
photocopy. (People v. Ruben Tidula, GR No. 123273, July 16, 1998)

Dying Declaration

The elements of such exception [dying declaration] are: (1) the deceased
made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would
have been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (4) the declaration
is offered in a criminal case where the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry;
and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. (People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No.
110129, August 12, 1997; People v. Tito Reduca, GR Nos. 126094-95, January
21, 1999; People v. Rolando Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001;
People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002; Celestino Marturillas
v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

A dying declaration, as an exception to the general rule on the

inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, is entitled to highest credence because no
person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation. When a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is
silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth. Such a declaration, made in extremis when the party is at the point of death
and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth,
occasioned by a situation so solemn and awful, is considered by the law as
creating an obligation equal to that which is created by a positive oath
administered in a court of justice. The idea, more succinctly expressed, is that
“truth sits on the lips of dying men.” (People v. Dionisio Marollano, GR No.
105004, July 24, 1997; Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18,
2006)

The reasons for the admissibility of a dying declaration as an exception to

the hearsay rule are (a) necessity and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity, because
death renders a declarant’s taking the witness stand impossible, and it often
happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime. Hence, the
declaration is allowed to prevent a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, for in the
language of Lord Baron Eyre, the declaration is made in extremity, when the party
is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone, when every motive for
falsehood is silenced and the mind induced by the most powerful considerations to
speak the truth. A situation so solemn and awful is considered by the law as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in
court. The idea, more succinctly expressed, is that “truth sits on the lips of dying
men.” (People v. Rolando Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001; People
v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002)

We have clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement may be authenticated

through the declarant’s thumb mark imprinted with his own blood, and serve as
evidence in the form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death.
Verily, such declaration need not even be in writing and may be proven by
testimony of witnesses who heard it. (People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No.
110129, August 12, 1997)

The issue of whether a declaration was made under the consciousness of

an impending death is a matter of evidence. It must be shown that such
declaration was made under a realization that one’s demise or at least its
imminence, not so much its rapid occurrence, was at hand. This may be proven
by the statement of the victim or inferred from the nature and extent of the victim’s
wounds or other relevant circumstances. (People v. Rolando Mendoza, GR No.
142654, November 16 , 2001; Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217,
April 18, 2006)

Finally, the fact that the victim did not expire right after his declaration, but
survived seven days thereafter, will not alter the probative force of his dying
declaration. The occurrence of a declarant’s death immediately thereafter is not
indispensable. The rule on dying declarations does not require that the person
“should be at the time in the throes of death, or that he should die immediately, or
within any specified time thereafter, in order to give the declaration probative
force. Where a person has been fatally wounded, is in sore distress therefrom,
and believes that he will not recover and is soon to die, his statement made in this
belief relating to the cause of his injury is admissible, if it appears that he
subsequently died from the direct effects of the wound, although he may have
revived after making the statements or may have lived a considerable time
thereafter, and may have again begun to hope for recovery.” (People v. Rolando
Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001)
Equipoise Rule

“Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on

which side the evidence preponderates[,] the party having the burden of proof fails
upon that issue.” Therefore, as “neither party was able to make out a case,
neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it
had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a
consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases,
courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.” (Esmundo Rivera
v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 115625, January 23, 1998)

Evidence in Other Proceedings

As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in
the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
(People v. Jailon Kulais, GR Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998; Melanio Mallari v.
People, GR No. 153911, December 10, 2004)

As a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence

presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge. There are exceptions to this rule.
Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to
ascertain a fact not shown in the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held
that it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that
is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some instances,
courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are
closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases “may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial notice.
(Teresita Bongato v. Spouses Severo A. Malvar, GR No. 141614, August 14, 2002)

Extrajudicial Confessions

Extrajudicial declarations are inadmissible in evidence against the

declarant’s co-accused. The admission by the court of such declarations violates
the incriminated person’s right to due process. This principle holds if, as in the
case before us, the declarants fail to take the witness stand and thereby deny the
accused-petitioner the fundamental right to confront and cross-examine them
face-to-face, in order to test their truthfulness and credibility. (Melanio Mallari v.
People, GR No. 153911, December 10, 2004)

The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is

binding only upon himself and is not admissible as evidence against his co-
accused, it being mere hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned. But this rule admits of exception. It does not apply when the
confession, as in this case, is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation of the co-accused in the killing of the victims or when
the confession of the co-accused is corroborated by other evidence. (People v.
Rolusape Sabalones, GR No. 123485, August 31, 1998; People v. Mercy Santos,
GR No. 117873, December 22, 1997)
 To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional
requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the following rights of persons under custodial
investigation: to remain silent, to have independent and competent counsel
preferably of their own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to
secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to have such
counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, and to be informed of all
these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against
them in court. (People v. Domingo Muleta, GR No. 130189, June 25, 1999;
People v. Ruben Tidula, GR No. 123273, July 16, 1998; People v. Edwin De Vera,
GR No. 128966, August 18, 1999; People v. Nerio Suela, GR Nos. 133570-71,
January 15, 2002)

While it is true that the confessions of appellant were made without benefit
of counsel, they are still admissible in evidence because of appellant’s failure to
make timely objections before the trial court. If only the defense had proffered
them on time, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present
additional evidence to support its case. To disregard a major portion of the
prosecution’s case at a late stage during an appeal goes against the norms of
fundamental fairness. (People v. Guillermo Samus, GR Nos. 135957-58,
September 17, 2002)

Indeed, the Constitution also proscribes the admissibility of any confession

or admission from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense if
such admission was obtained through torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation
or any other means, which vitiates the free will. However, the Court will not take
up appellant’s allegations that he was tortured and maltreated by the investigating
police and the security guards, because such consideration is no longer necessary
in view of our holding on the violation of his right to counsel of choice. Where a
confession is extracted contrary to the accused’s Miranda rights, it is ipso facto
inadmissible in evidence. Hence, there is no more need for the appellant to prove
duress or intimidation to attain the same objective of outlawing the confession.
(People v. Mando Binamira, GR No. 110397, August 14, 1997)

Expert Opinion

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely

advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such
testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the
facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. (People v. Richard R. Deauna,
GR Nos. 143200-01, August 1, 2002; People v. Edmundo Aytalin, GR No. 134138,
June 21, 2001; Leonora Ceballos v. Intestate Estate of Mercado, GR No. 155856,
May 28, 2004)

[I]t is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even
those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds
true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the
questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.

Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged

documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the
comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. (Nora T. Jimenez v. Commission on
Ecumenical Mission, GR No. 140472, June 10, 2002; Norgene Potenciano v.
Dwight Reynoso, GR No. 140707, April 22, 2003)

In view of these actual, concrete and operative contracts, which provided

terms that were complete and facts that were indelible, expert opinion, if not
entirely worthless, certainly cannot prevail. (Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 126995, October 6, 1998)

Facsimile Copy

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic. (Heirs of Sabanpan v. Alberto
C. Comorposa, GR No. 152807, August 12, 2003)

Factual Findings of Lower Courts and Specialized Agencies

Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. (Sps. Lagandaon v.
Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 102526-31, May 21, 1998; Liberty Construction v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. 106601, June 28, 1996; Erlinda de la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 105213, December 4, 1996; Pacita David-Chan v. Phil. Rabbit
Bus, GR No. 105294, February 26, 1997; National Steel v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 112287, December 12, 1997; Industrial Insurance v. Pablo Bondad, GR No.
136722, April 12, 2000; Gregorio Pestaño v. Spouses Sumayang, GR No. 139875,
December 4, 2000; Nerio Salcedo v. People, GR No. 137143, December 8, 2000;
Yu Bun Guan v. Elvira Ong, GR No. 144735, October 18, 2001; Norgene
Potenciano v. Dwight Reynoso, GR No. 140707, April 22, 2003; Desamparados M.
Soliva v. Intestate Estate of Villalba, GR No. 154017, December 8, 2003; Virgilio
Bon v. People, GR No. 152160, January 13, 2004; Apolonia Ll. Ocampo v. Fidela
Ll. Ocampo, GR No. 150707, April 14, 2004; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. ALS
Management, GR No. 151821, April 14, 2004; Miguel Cuenco v. Concepcion
Cuenco, GR No. 149844, October 13, 2004; Pilipinas Shell v. John Bordman Ltd.,
GR No. 159831, October 14, 2005; Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No.
163217, April 18, 2006)

As a rule, judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of

the factual circumstances of the case. Specialized agencies are presumed to
have gained expertise on matters within their respective fields. Thus, their
findings of fact, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great
respect and are generally rendered conclusive upon this Court, except only upon a
clear showing of palpable error or arbitrary disregard of evidence. (PNOC
Dockyard v. NLRC, GR No. 118223, June 26, 1998; Gamaliel C. Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. 107624, January 28, 1997; KAMADA v. Pura Ferrer-
Calleja, GR No. 104692, September 5, 1997; Separate Opinion in Pendatun Salih
v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 122872, September 10, 1997; Caltex
Refinery Employees v. Jose S. Brillantes, GR No. 123782, September 16, 1997;
Eliseo B. Tan v. NLRC, GR No. 128290, November 24, 1998; AFISCO Insurance
v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112675, January 25, 1999; Gavino Corpuz v.
Spouses Grospe, GR No. 135297, June 8, 2000; Philrock v. Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, GR Nos. 132848-49, June 26, 2001; Hacienda Fatima v.
National Federation of Sugarcane Workers, GR No. 149440, January 28, 2003;
Loreta Torres v. Specialized Packaging, GR No. 149634, July 6, 2004; Inocelia S.
Autencio v. City Administrator, GR No. 152752, January 19, 2005; Jose, Julio and
Federico, All Surnamed Junio v. Ernesto D. Garilao, GR No. 147146, July 29,
2005; National Power Corporation v. Philippine Electric Plant Owners, GR No.
159457, April 7, 2006; Office of the Ombudsman v. Carmencita D. Coronel, GR No.
164460, June 27, 2006)

Generally accepted is the principle that factual findings and conclusions of

the trial court are entitled to great weight and are generally not disturbed on
appeal, considering that it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and assess their credibility. Absent any showing that it failed to
appreciate a fact or circumstance that, if considered, would have changed the
disposition of the case, its factual findings remain binding upon the Supreme
Court. (People v. Edmundo Briones Aytalin, GR No. 134138, June 21, 2001;
People v. Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28, 1996; People v. Norlito Tan,
GR No. 132324, September 28, 1999; People v. Yamasito Vergel, GR No. 128813,
October 4, 1999; People v. Wilson Catampongan, GR No. 131732, November 19,
1999; People v. Felipe Pecayo Sr., GR No. 132047, December 14, 2000; People
v. Benjamin Fabia, GR No. 134764, June 26, 2001; People v. Dionisio Bataller, GR
Nos. 134540-41, July 18, 2001; People v. Francisco Balas, GR No. 138838,
December 11, 2001; People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35, December 13,
2001; People v. Gerry Cuenca, GR No. 143819, January 29, 2002; Nora T.
Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, GR No. 140472, June 10, 2002;
People v. Rogelio Barrozo, GR Nos. 138726-27, July 3, 2002; People v. Michael
Sy, GR No. 147348, September 24, 2002; Arturo G. Rimorin Sr. v. People, GR No.
146481, April 30, 2003; People v. Ma. Lourdes Felipe, GR No. 142505, December
11, 2003; People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004; People v.
Gatudan Balag-ey, GR No. 141532, April 14, 2004; Josephine M. Sanchez v. Far
East Bank, GR No. 155309, November 15, 2005; Venancio R. Nava v. Rodolfo G.
Palattao, GR No. 160211, August 28, 2006)

The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule
deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this Court: (1) when the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its
findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court of
Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings
are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Maximo Fuentes v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 109849, February 26, 1997; Juan Castillo v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 106472, August 7, 1996; Archipelago Management v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 128850, November 20, 1998; Sps. Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, GR
Nos. 102526-31, May 21, 1998; First Nationwide Assurance v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 128797, November 19, 1999; BPI-Family Savings Bank v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 122480, April 12, 2000; Rosendo C. Carticiano v. Mario Nuval,
GR No. 138054, September 28, 2000; Asset Privatization Trust v. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 138598, June 29, 2001; Metro Concast Steel v. Manila Electric Company,
GR No. 132539, July 11, 2001; Fernando Santos v. Spouses Reyes, GR No.
135813, October 25, 2001; Nora T. Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical
Mission, GR No. 140472, June 10, 2002; Teresita Bongato v. Spouses Malvar, GR
No. 141614, August 14, 2002; Cesar Montanez v. Nestor Mendoza, GR No.
144116, November 22, 2002; Victorino Savellano v. Northwest Airlines, GR No.
151783, July 8, 2003; Roweno Pomoy v. People, GR No. 150647, September 29,
2004; Myrna Ramos v. Susana S. Sarao, GR No. 149756, February 11, 2005;
Pamplona Plantation v. Rodel Tinghil, GR No. 159121, February 3, 2005; Jose
Menchavez v. Florentino Teves Jr., GR No. 153201, January 26, 2005; Republic v.
Maxima Lensico, GR No. 158919, August 9, 2005; Erlinda Gajudo v. Traders
Royal Bank, GR No. 151098, March 21, 2006)

The judge who penned the assailed decision was not the one who presided
over the trial of the case. Because of this, the rule that the factual findings of the
trial court will not be disturbed on appeal finds no application, because the
ponente was not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of testifying.
(People v. Gerald Tayaban, GR No. 128481, September 25, 1998; People v.
Wilfredo Llaguno, GR No. 91262, January 28, 1998; People v. Noel Navarro, GR
No. 129566, October 7, 1998; Tomasa Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
135216, August 19, 1999; People v. Emmanuel Mana-ay, GR No. 132717,
November 20, 2000; People v. Rafael D. Torres Jr., GR No. 138046, December 8,
2000)

Filiation

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation,

it is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to
show pedigree. (Arturio Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 118904, April 20,
1998)

Flight

In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of the accused may,
as a general rule, be taken as evidence tending to establish guilt. (People v.
Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002; People v. Norberto Sabado,
GR No. 135963, November 20, 2000; People v. Roger Puedan, GR No. 139576,
September 2, 2002)

The flight of the accused, when unexplained, would be a circumstance from

which an inference of guilt might be drawn, for truly innocent persons would
normally grab the first available opportunity to defend themselves and establish
their innocence of the crime being imputed to them. True, the mere presence of
appellant at the scene is inadequate to support the conclusion that he committed
the crime. However, his presence there becomes an indicium of his participation
and complicity in the offense when coupled with his unexplained act of fleeing
from the situs instead of reporting the incident to the police authorities, as well as
with his act of hiding until he was arrested. Taken together, the foregoing
circumstances are highly indicative of guilt. (People v. Reynaldo Corre Jr., GR No.
137271, August 15, 2001)

Flight is evidence of guilt. It betrays a guilty mind or a guilty conscience.

(People v. Sam Hinaut, GR No. 143764, February 15, 2002)

Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt, although its converse

does not necessarily imply innocence. (People v. Danny Angeles, GR No. 109660,
July 1, 1997; People v. Rolly Obello, GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998; People v.
Eleuterio Costelo, GR No. 134311, October 13, 1999)

Foreign Law

In the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts, we

presume that such law, if any, is similar to Philippine law. We base this conclusion
on the presumption of identity or similarity, also known as processual
presumption. (Gil Miguel T. Puyat v. Ron Zabarte, GR No. 141536, February 26,
2001)

Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power
of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Grace J. Garcia v. Rederick A.
Recio, GR No. 138322, October 2, 2001)

Forgotten Evidence

Forgotten evidence refers to evidence already in existence or available

before or during a trial; known to and obtainable by the party offering it; and could
have been presented and offered in a seasonable manner, were it not for the
sheer oversight or forgetfulness of the party or the counsel. Presentation of
forgotten evidence is disallowed, because it results in a piecemeal presentation of
evidence, a procedure that is not in accord with orderly justice and serves only to
delay the proceedings. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to an endless
review of decisions, whether through a motion for reconsideration or for a new
trial, in the guise of newly discovered evidence. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Carmencita D. Coronel, GR No. 164460, June 27, 2006)

Formal Offer of Evidence

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, provides that “[t]he court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” A formal offer is
necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact and their
judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
To allow parties to attach any document to their pleadings and then expect the
court to consider it as evidence, even without formal offer and admission, may
draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties will be deprived of their
chance to examine the document and to object to its admissibility. (Spouses Ong
v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 117103, January 21, 1999)

Forms of Evidence

The Rules on Evidence recognizes different forms of evidence -- object,

documentary or testimonial -- without preference for any of them in particular.
What should really matter is the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence
presented. (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Aniano A. Desierto,
GR No. 132120, February 10, 2003)

Hearsay

The hearsay rule bars the admission of evidence that has not been given
under oath or solemn affirmation and, more important, has not been subjected to
cross-examination by opposing counsel. Cross-examination is required to test the
perception, the veracity and the articulateness of the out-of-court declarant, upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends. (Aquila Larena v.
Fructuosa Mapili, GR No. 146341, August 7, 2003)

It is elementary that a witness may testify only on facts of which he has

personal knowledge; that is, those derived from his perception, except in certain
circumstances allowed by the Rules. Otherwise, such testimony is considered
hearsay and, hence, inadmissible in evidence. (Joebert Santiago v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 128517, September 10, 1998; Virgilio Bon v. People, GR No.
152160, January 13, 2004)

The interviews are hearsay and thus lack probative value, because the
persons interviewed were never presented in court. It is of no moment that no
timely objection was raised during the trial in the face of such evidence. A
conviction can never be rooted thereon, because it is not grounded on the
personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other person
who was not cross-examined on the witness stand. (People v. Tomas Visperas
Jr., GR No. 147315, January 13, 2003)

Hearsay Rule, Exception

Exhibit 11 is admissible under a well-settled exception to the hearsay rule

per Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “entries in
official records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” (National Steel v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 112287, December 12, 1997)

Identification of Accused/Suspect
 Due process demands that the procedure for the identification of criminal
suspects be free from impermissible suggestion. Indeed, the “corruption of out-of-
court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial.” (People v. Rafael D. Torres, Jr., GR No. 138046, December 8, 2000)

The State, aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden of
correctly identifying the author of the crime. Both requisites must be “proved by
the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the defense of the
accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the people to demonstrate guilt and
not for the accused to establish innocence.” (People v. Limpangog GR No.
141438-40, February 3, 2003)

In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a

question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the
same person who is charged in the information and subject of the trial. This is
especially true in cases wherein the identity of the accused, which is a stranger to
the prosecution witnesses, is dubitable. (People v. Emmanuel Quezada, GR Nos.
135557-58, January 30, 2002)

In [a “show up”] identification procedure, the suspect alone is taken by the

police to face the witness.

True, a “show-up” may be suggestive, but it is not by itself a sufficient

reason to reject a witness’ identification of the accused. Courts consider the
totality of circumstances in each case in resolving questions regarding out-of-court
identifications. (People v. Ronnie Navales, GR No. 135230, August 8, 2000)

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in determining whether an eyewitness could

have identified the perpetrator of a crime. It is settled that when conditions of
visibility are favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their
assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. In
proper situations, illumination produced by a kerosene or wick lamp, a flashlight,
even moonlight or starlight may be considered sufficient to allow identification of
persons. Under such circumstance, any attack on the credibility of witnesses,
based solely on the ground of insufficiency or absence of illumination, becomes
unmeritorious. (People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27, December 11,
2003)

Impotency

Moreover, the presumption is in favor of potency, because impotency is an

abnormal condition. The Court has also ruled that “impotency as a defense in
rape cases must be proven with certainty to overcome the presumption in favor of
potency.” (People v. Asterio Cordero, GR Nos. 136894-96, February 7, 2001)
Inadmissible Evidence

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution

and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized
were “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.” As the Court noted in an
earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was “the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” Verily, they are the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” (Paper
Industries v. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, GR No. 122092, May 19, 1999;
People v. Danilo Asis, GR No. 142531, October 15, 2002; People v. Antonio C.
Estella, GR Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003)

Where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the
searches conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to
the invalid search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or unlicensed
firearm), were considered inadmissible as evidence against the person wrongfully
arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted without a
judicial warrant must be preceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a
warrant duly issued therefore. (Separate Opinion in People v. Doria, GR No.
125299, January 22, 1999)

Independently Relevant Statements

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations

communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the
making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact. (Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga Sr., GR No. 146030, December 3, 2002;
Virgilio Bon v. People, GR No. 152160, January 13, 2004; Lea Mer Industries v.
Malayan Insurance, GR No. 161745, September 30, 2005)

Judicial Admission

As a rule, a judicial admission is binding on the declarant. However, such

rule does not apply when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a "palpable mistake," or that (2) "no such admission was made." (Atlas
Consolidated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR No. 134467, November
17, 1999; People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004)

Marriage

When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in

litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of
marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a
witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of
children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of
the marital union, [the] failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place,
as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. (Arturio Trinidad v. Court
of Appeals, GR No. 118904, April 20, 1998; Tomasa Vda. De Jacob v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 135216, August 19, 1999)

Motive

Motive is not necessary when there is a clear and positive identification of

the perpetrators of the crime. (People v. Julie Villamor, GR Nos. 111313-14,
January 16, 1998; People v. Alberto Gaorana, GR Nos. 109138-39, April 27, 1998;
People v. Rogelio Andres, GR No. 122735, September 25, 1998)

When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by an improper motive, the presumption is that such
motive was absent, and that the witness’ testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit. (People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002; People v.
Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28, 1996; People v. Roberto Mendoza
Pacis,GR No. 146309, July 18, 2002; People v. Jaime Gonzales, GR No. 140676,
July 31, 2002; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No. 128109, November 19, 2003)

Motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or

inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or
whether the accused has committed it. (People v. Danilo Asis, GR No. 142531,
October 15, 2002)

Granting that bad blood existed between appellant and complainant’s

parents, it is unfathomable for the latter to concoct a story about the defloration of
their very own seven-year-old daughter; and, in the process, subject her to the
psychological, social, mental and emotional trauma brought about by a life-
scarring public trial. Indeed, there could have been other ways to ruin the
marriage of appellant and his wife without sacrificing Janet’s well being in the
process. Likewise, the fact that the rape case was filed against appellant only
after five years of his marriage with complainant’s grandmother renders his
imputation of ill motive even more absurd. (People v. Benjamin Fabia, GR No.
134764, June 26, 2001)

Given the absence of a positive identification of the victim’s assailants,

motive becomes material even though it is not an element of the crime. (People v.
Warlito Ragon, GR No. 100593, November 18, 1997)

Newly Discovered Evidence

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which already exists prior to or

during a trial, but whose existence is not known to the offering litigant; or, though
known, could not have been secured and presented during the trial despite
reasonable diligence. What is essential for a particular piece of evidence to be
properly regarded as “newly discovered” is that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during the trial,
but nonetheless failed to secure it. Thus, a party who knows of the existence of
specific pieces of evidence cannot offer them as “newly discovered” without any
explanation for not presenting them earlier. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Carmencita D. Coronel, GR No. 164460, June 27, 2006)
Non-Flight

That the appellants did not escape or flee from the crime scene does not
conclusively show their innocence. (People v. Rogelio Andres, GR No. 122735,
September 25, 1998; People v. Dominador Pili, GR No. 124739, April 15, 1998)

Appellant’s failure to flee and the apparent normalcy of his behavior subsequent to
the commission of the crime do not imply his innocence. Flight is indicative of
guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even
erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee --
a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt -- while others may remain in the same
vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from
other members of the community. (People v. Nelson Agunias, GR No. 121993,
September 12, 1997; People v. Darwin Bantayan, GR No. 137693, December 14,
2000)

Notarized Documents

It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument enjoys a prima

facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing
evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. (Norma B.
Domingo v. Yolanda Robles, GR No. 153743, March 18, 2005; Norgene
Potenciano v. Dwight Reynoso, GR No. 140707, April 22, 2003; Leonora Ceballos
v. Intestate Estate of Mercado, GR No. 155856, May 28, 2004)

The notarization of a document does not guarantee its validity, because it is

not the function of a notary public to validate an instrument that was never
intended by the parties to have any binding legal effect on them. (Ramon Ramos
v. Heirs of Ramos Sr., GR No. 140848, April 25, 2002)

Official Records

The entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public

officer of the Philippines or by some other person especially enjoined by law are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. This means that, in the present
case, such evidence is satisfactory, more so because it has been uncontradicted
by opposing evidence. (Mercedes R. Gochan v. Virginia Gochan, GR No. 143089,
February 27, 2003)

Paraffin Test

Time and time again, this Court has held that a negative paraffin test result
is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. In other words, it is
possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear
gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. (Celestino
Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)
Parol Evidence

Oral testimony cannot, as a rule, prevail over a written agreement of the

parties. In order to contradict the facts contained in a notarial document, such as
the two “Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan” in this case, as well as the presumption of
regularity in the execution thereof, there must be clear and convincing evidence
that is more than merely preponderant. (Emilia Manzano v. Miguel Perez Sr., GR
No. 112485, August 9, 2001)

Performance of Official Duties

There is a disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly

performed. (Jonathan Landoil v. Spouses Mangudadatu, GR No. 155010, August
16, 2004)

Photocopies

Photocopies are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible

because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided
under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions of
their admissibility.

Applying [Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court], before a party is

allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales
invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of
the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith
to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound
discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary.

Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of
them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals. (Citibank v. Efren S. Teodoro, GR No. 150905,
September 23, 2003)

Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate
should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative value. (Office of
the Ombudsman v. Carmencita D. Coronel, GR No. 164460, June 27, 2006)

Police Blotter

Entries in the police blotter should not be given significance or probative

value, as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. These
entries are usually incomplete and inaccurate, as “sometimes they are taken from
either partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting and are hearsay, untested in the
crucible of a trial on the merits.” (Joebert Santiago v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
128517, September 10, 1998; People v. Nomer Delos Santos, GR No. 132123,
November 23, 2000; People v. Lolito Estoya, GR No. 153538, May 19, 2004)
Police Lineup

There is no law that requires a police lineup as the only means by which
culprits may be identified. (People v. Edgar S. Alojado, GR No. 122966-67, March
25, 1999)

The assistance of counsel is not essential during a police lineup. (People v.

Rafael D. Torres, Jr., GR No. 138046, December 8, 2000)

Positive Identification

Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the accused -- when
categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter -- prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and
self-serving, undeserving of weight in law. (People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No.
140550, February 13, 2002; People v. Rafael D. Torres Jr., GR No. 138046,
December 8, 2000; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002;
People v. Sixto Paragas, GR No. 146308, July 18, 2002; People v. Lolito Estoya,
GR No. 153538, May 19, 2004)

This Court has noted in many crimes of violence that the most natural
reaction of persons involved in an attack is to strive to see the faces and the
appearances of the assailants, to observe the manner in which the crime was
committed, and to approximate what might be the latter’s next move, either as an
instinctive reaction or as a measure to fend off any further attack. (People v.
Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002)

Preponderance of Evidence

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by

one side outweighs that of the adverse party. In determining where the
preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the witness’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. (Arturio Trinidad v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. 118904, April 20, 1998; Cesar Montanez v. Nestor
Mendoza, GR No. 144116, November 22, 2002; Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
ALS Management, GR No. 151821, April 14, 2004)

This concept [preponderance of evidence] refers to evidence that has

greater weight or is more convincing than that which is offered in opposition; at
bottom, it means probability of truth. (Emilia Manzano v. Miguel Perez Sr., GR No.
112485, August 9, 2001)

Presence at the Crime Scene

Presence at the crime scene does not automatically make one the author of
the crime. (People v. Villamor, GR Nos. 111313-14, January 16, 1998)
 True, the mere presence of appellant at the scene is inadequate to support
the conclusion that he committed the crime. However, his presence there
becomes an indicium of his participation and complicity in the offense when
coupled with his unexplained act of fleeing from the situs instead of reporting the
incident to the police authorities, as well as with his act of hiding until he was
arrested. Taken together, the foregoing circumstances are highly indicative of
guilt. (People v. Reynaldo Corre Jr., GR No. 137271, August 15, 2001)

Presumption of Innocence

Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the accused is to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To overcome such
presumption, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our
criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not
only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of the
court to set them free. (People v. Antonio C. Estella, GR Nos. 138539-40, January
21, 2003)

[T]he presumption of innocence of the accused holds until the contrary is

proven. Every circumstance favoring it must be taken into account in a criminal
case. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt,
then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. (People v. Ernie Baro, GR Nos. 146327-29, June 5, 2002;
People v. Arnulfo Quilaton, GR No. 131835, February 3, 2000; People v. Arnold
Ratunil, GR No. 137270, June 29, 2000)

Probative Value

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative

value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence
are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether
the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. (Heirs of Sabanpan v. Alberto C.
Comorposa, GR No. 152807, August 12, 2003)

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Conviction in a criminal case does not entail absolute certainty. What is

required only is that degree of proof, which, after an examination of the entire
records of the case, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the
culpability of the accused. (People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404, February
14, 2003; Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

Rape Cases; Guiding Principles

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by the following
principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b)
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves only two persons,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Thus, courts scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant, bearing in
mind that the conviction of the accused depends heavily on the credibility of the
offended woman. (People v. Cirilo Balmoria, GR Nos. 120620-21, March 20,
1998; People v. Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28, 1996; People v.
Alejandro Gabris, GR No. 116221, July 11, 1996; People v. Celerino Castromero,
GR No. 118992, October 9, 1997; People v. Loven Daganta, GR No. 122339,
August 4, 1999; People v. Dominador Tabion, GR No. 132715, October 20, 1999;
People v. Pacito Garces Jr., GR No. 132368, January 20, 2000; People v. Felipe
Hofileña, GR No. 134772, June 22, 2000; People v. Rolando Tabanggay,GR No.
130504, June 29, 2000; People v. Arnold Ratunil, GR No. 137270, June 29, 2000;
People v. Andrew Pacina, GR No. 123150, August 16, 2000; People v. Dionisio
Bataller, GR Nos. 134540-41, July 18, 2001; People v. Conde Rapisora, GR Nos.
140934-35, October 23, 2001; People v. Romeo Manayan, GR Nos. 142741-43,
October 25, 2001; People v. Prudencio Villaflores, GR Nos. 135063-64, December
5, 2001; People v. Renato Flores, GR No. 141782, December 14, 2001; People v.
Ernie Baro, GR Nos. 146327-29, June 5, 2002; People v. Marcelo Mendoza, GR
Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002; People v. Rogelio Barrozo, GR Nos. 138726-27,
July 3, 2002; People v. Ernesto Fernandez, GR Nos. 139341-45, July 25, 2002;
People v. Matias Lagramada, GR Nos. 146357 & 148170, August 29, 2002;
People v. Rogelio Bitancor, GR No. 147968, December 4, 2002; People v. Sonny
Bautista, GR No. 140278, June 3, 2004)

Evidence of overwhelming physical force is not necessary to sustain a

conviction for the rape of an imbecile. When the victim is a retardate with the
mental age of a six-year old child, the force required to overcome her is of a lesser
degree than that used against a normal adult. (People v. Jose Moreno, GR No.
126921, August 28, 1998)

Well-settled is the rule that in a crime of rape allegedly committed by force,

the prosecution must establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the
victim was absolutely lacking. Where discrepancies pervade the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, such that the totality of the prosecution evidence fails to
constitute a truthful, rational and coherent account, the conviction of the accused
cannot be justified. To repeat, the testimony of the offended party in crimes
against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity, for the charge
can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a
claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim
whose charge is not corroborated, and whose conduct during and after the rape is
open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the
anguish and the humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice,
they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based
on the law. (People v. Prudencio Villaflores, GR Nos. 135063-64, December 5,
2001)

Rape, particularly incestuous rape, is reprehensible and abominable.

However, to convict the accused and to sentence him to death requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime and the qualifying
circumstances specifically alleged in the information. Conviction always rests on
the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, never on the weakness or the
absence of that of the defense. (People v. Danilo Abino, GR No. 137288,
December 11, 2001)

When the victim cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape
because she had been rendered unconscious before the act was committed, the
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence is
admissible, provided that more than one circumstance is duly proven, and that the
totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical
conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. (People v. Danilo Caraang, GR
Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2003)

Lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be committed even in

places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same
room where there are other members of the family who are sleeping. (People v.
Gregorio Bersabe, GR No. 122768, April 27, 1998; People v. Antonio Alimon, GR
No. 87758, June 28, 1996; People v. Cirilo Balmoria, GR Nos. 120620-21, March
20, 1998; People v. Garcia, GR Nos. 120387-88, March 31, 1998; People v.
Antonio Gastador, GR No. 123727, April 14, 1999; People v. Efren Buendia, GR
Nos. 133949-51, September 16, 1999; People v. Rolando Tabanggay, GR No.
130504, June 29, 2000; People v. Alfredo Catubig Jr., GR Nos. 134143-47,
October 5, 2000; People v. Felipe Pecayo Sr., GR No. 132047, December 14,
2000; People v. Leonardo S. Pascual, GR Nos. 144495-96, March 12, 2002;
People v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002; People v.
Mario Umayam, GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003)

Absent any other evidence, the presence of hymenal lacerations alone is

not sufficient to establish rape. (People v. Arsenio Toledo Sr., GR No. 139961,
May 9, 2001)

Recantation

When confronted with an affidavit of recantation, courts are called upon to

weigh countervailing values in our legal and judicial system. A recantation, as a
general rule, is not sufficient to warrant a new trial. If it were otherwise, a new trial
would be granted whenever an interested party succeeds in intimidating or
inducing any or some of the witnesses to retract after trial their testimony, thus,
opening the door to endless litigation. It is also injudicious to reject a testimony
solely on the basis of such recantation, which may later be repudiated, as this “will
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.” (People v. Eduardo Garcia, GR No. 120387-88, March
31, 1998)

The Court has held in a number of cases that a recantation of a testimony is

exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation
may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. When a witness who testified for the prosecution subsequently
testifies for the defense by retracting his previous testimony, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. (People v. Noel Navarro, GR No. 129566, October 7,
1998; People v. Nicomedes Fabro, GR No. 95089, August 11, 1997; People v.
Richard R. Deauna, GR Nos. 143200-01, August 1, 2002; People v. Florentino O.
Ramirez Jr., GR Nos. 150079-80, June 10, 2004)

Reluctance to Get Involved in Criminal Cases

The failure of [the witness] to reveal at once the identity of accused-

appellants as the perpetrators of the crime does not impair her credibility as a
witness. It has been held that “it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show
some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case, as in fact the natural
tendency of most people not to get involved is of judicial notice.” (People v.
Gregorio Tulop, GR No. 124829, April 21, 1998)

Res Gestae

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of,
or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission.
These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a
false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between
the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind
and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for
deliberation. (Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

Res gestae pertains to the admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight
and sufficiency. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade. (People v. Noel Navarro, GR No.
129566, October 7, 1998)

An ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence as a dying

declaration and as part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant
and has the advantage of ensuring the statement’s appreciation by courts,
particularly where the absence of one or more elements in one of the said
exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit
of assured. (People v. Edelciano Amaca, August 12, 1997, GR No. 110129;
Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

A declaration is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in

evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. (People v. Dionisio Marollano, GR No. 105004, July 24, 1997;
Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)

Res Inter Alios Acta

The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or

omission of another, except as may be allowed by the Rules of Court. Verily, the
admission of such declarations will violate the right of the petitioner to due
process, specifically his right to confront and cross-examine his co-accused.
(Joebert Santiago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128517, September 10, 1998)

Substantial Evidence

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the Department of Labor, a fact
may be established by substantial evidence, i.e. “that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
(Caurdanetaan Piece Workers v. Usec. Laguesma, GR Nos. 113542 & 114911,
February 24, 1998; Franklin Susa v. Teofila Peña, AM No. P-03-1740, September
17, 2003)

Testimony of Accused

Being of human nature, culprits are likely to pin the blame on others rather
than on themselves. There is therefore no guarantee that petitioner’s co-accused
had testified truthfully. (Joebert Santiago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128517,
September 10, 1998)

Indeed, there is no higher evidence of guilt than the voluntary testimony of

the accused himself. Such admission is evidence of the highest order, since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience. (People v. Delfin dela Cruz, GR No. 137405, September 27, 2002)

Testimony of Child Witness

To a young child, “brown complexion” may be the same as dark skin, and
having a “balding head” may refer to a long forehead. More important, minor
discrepancies, if any, will not detract from the fact that complainant categorically
identified appellant as her assailant and vividly narrated the sexual assault
committed against her. An error-free testimony cannot be expected from children
of tender years, most especially when they are recounting details of harrowing
experiences, those that even adults would rather bury in oblivion. To be sure,
complainant’s testimony may not be described as flawless, but its substance,
veracity and weight were hardly affected by the triviality of her alleged
inconsistencies. On the contrary, the supposed inconsistencies may have even
reinforced her credibility, as they had probably arisen from the naiveté of a seven-
year old child, confused and traumatized by the bestial act done upon her person.
(People v. Vicente Basquez, GR No. 144035, September 27, 2001; People v.
Romeo Manayan, GR Nos. 142741-43, October 25, 2001)

Testimony of Co-Conspirator

The testimonies of particeps criminis may be admissible against the person

incriminated. But such rule is not without qualification. We always advise caution
in according probative value to the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator, as the
latter is deemed a polluted source. His or her declaration must be scrutinized with
care and subjected to grave suspicion. True, such testimony, even if
uncorroborated, may be sufficient to convict a co-accused, provided it is shown to
be sincere, unhesitating, straightforward and detailed that it could not have been
the result of deliberate afterthought. Otherwise, his testimony would require
corroborative evidence which, if strong and convincing, may be given its due
weight and force. (Joebert Santiago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128517,
September 10, 1998)

Testimony of Informant

Intelligence agents, due to the nature of their work, are often not called to
testify in court so as not to reveal their identities publicly. Once known, they could
no longer be used again and, worse, may be the object of revenge by the
criminals they implicate. The prevailing doctrine is that their testimonies are not
essential for conviction, nor are they indispensable to a successful prosecution.
With the testimonies of the arresting officers, they would be, after all, merely
corroborative and cumulative. (People v. Carlos Boco, GR No. 129676, June 23,
1999; People v. Cheng Ho Chua, GR No. 127542, March 18, 1999; People v.
Roberto Pacis, GR No. 146309, July 18, 2002)

Testimony of Police Officer

The testimonies of the police officers with respect to appellant’s participation

in the drug-related transaction, which was the subject of the operation, carried with
it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts
accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are
presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to
the contrary. In this case, no sufficient reason or valid explanation was presented
to deviate from this presumption of regularity on their part. (People v. Evangeline
Ganenas, GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001; People v. Rafael D. Torres Jr., GR
No. 138046, December 8, 2000; People v. Roberto Pacis,GR No. 146309, July 18,
2002; People v. Ruel Eugenio, GR No. 146805, January 16, 2003)

Testimony of Relatives

The clear and positive testimony of witnesses is not devalued or impaired by

the mere fact of relationship to the victim, when there is no showing of improper
motive on the part of said witnesses. Indeed, their natural interest in obtaining
justice and redress by securing the conviction of the parties responsible for the
crime would deter these relatives from implicating persons other than the real
culprits. (People v. Danilo Layno, GR No. 11083, November 21, 1996; People v.
Buenaventura Batidor, GR No. 126027, February 18, 1999; People v. Emmanuel
Mana-ay, GR No. 132717, November 20, 2000; People v. John Kenneth de
Guzman, GR No. 137806, December 14, 2000; People v. Tomas Visperas Jr., GR
No. 147315, January 13, 2003)

Those related to the victim of a crime have a natural tendency to remember

the faces of those involved in it. These relatives, more than anybody else, would
be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before
the law. (Celestino Marturillas v. People, GR No. 163217, April 18, 2006)
Testimony of Single Witness

It is well settled that the testimony of a lone witness -- if found by the trial
court to be positive, categorical and credible -- is sufficient to support a conviction.
This is so, especially if the testimony bore the earmarks of truth and sincerity and
was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner.
Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that
the witness bent the truth, or that his or her observation was inaccurate. Evidence
is assessed in terms of quality, not quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted.
Therefore, it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a lone witness. (People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February
13, 2002; People v. Rolly Obello, GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998; People v.
Gregorio Tulop, GR No. 124829, April 21, 1998; People v. Noel Navarro, GR No.
129566, October 7, 1998; People v. Glenn Lotoc, GR No. 132166, May 19, 1999;
People v. Norberto Sabado, GR No. 135963, November 20, 2000; People v. Gerry
Cuenca, GR No. 143819, January 29, 2002; People v. Sam Hinaut, GR No.
143764, February 15, 2002; People v. Richard R. Deauna, GR Nos. 143200-01,
August 1, 2002; People v. Tomas Visperas Jr., GR No. 147315, January 13, 2003;
People v. Homer Magdaraog, GR No. 151251, May 19, 2004)

The testimony of a single credible and trustworthy witness is sufficient to

convict the appellant, particularly if said witness was not shown to have been
motivated by any bias or ill motive. (People v. Robert Daraman, GR No. 126046,
August 7, 1998)

Testimony of Victim

Conviction or acquittal of an accused depends on the credibility of

complainant’s testimony because of the fact that, usually, the only witnesses to the
incident are the participants themselves. Thus, the victim’s testimony, standing
alone, can be made the basis of accused’s prosecution and conviction, if such
testimony meets the test of credibility. Courts usually give credence to the
testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual assault, like complainant in this
case, because normally no woman would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a
public trial and testify on the details of her ordeal if it be not to condemn an
injustice. (People v. Joel Corea, GR No. 114383, March 3, 1997; People v. Allan
Erese, GR No. 120579, November 5, 1997; People v. Efren Buendia, GR Nos.
133949-51, September 16, 1999; People v. Yamasito Vergel, GR No. 128813,
October 4, 1999; People v. Felipe Hofileña, GR No. 134772, June 22, 2000;
People v. Benjamin Fabia, GR No. 134764, June 26, 2001; People v. Dionisio
Bataller, GR Nos. 134540-41, July 18, 2001; People v. Leonardo S. Pascual, GR
Nos. 144495-96, March 12, 2002; People v. Jaime Gonzales, GR No. 140676,
July 31, 2002; People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3,
2002; People v. Rogelio Bitancor, GR No. 147968, December 4, 2002)

Convictions or acquittals in prosecutions for rape almost always depend on

the credibility of the victim and her testimony. For this reason, the testimonies of
alleged rape victims must be scrutinized by the trial court to ascertain the veracity
of the charges and to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. While judges ought to be cognizant of the
anguish and the humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice,
they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based
on the law. (People v. Prudencio Villaflores, GR Nos. 135063-64, December 5,
2001)

[W]hen a woman claims she was raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed. If her testimony meets the test
of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. (People v. Ariel
Oliva, GR No. 108505, December 5, 1997; People v. Narciso Barera, GR No.
99867, September 19, 1996; People v. Enrique Ramirez, GR No. 97920, January
20, 1997; People v. Alejandro Atop, GR Nos. 124303-05, February 10, 1998;
People v. Cirilo Balmoria, GR Nos. 120620-21, March 20, 1998; People v.
Eduardo Garcia, GR Nos. 120387-88, March 31, 1998; People v. Efren Cabebe,
GR No. 125910, May 21, 1998; People v. Jose Dedace, GR No. 132551, March
22, 2000; People v. Alexander Taño, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v.
Conde Rapisora, GR Nos. 140934-35, October 23, 2001; People v. Roderick
Santos, GR Nos. 135454-56, November 13, 2001; People v. Francisco Balas, GR
No. 138838, December 11, 2001; People v. Leonardo S. Pascual, GR Nos.
144495-96, March 12, 2002; People v. Pedro Daramay Jr., GR Nos. 140235 &
142748, May 9, 2002; People v. Boy Domingo, GR No. 143660, June 5, 2002;
People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002; People
v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002; People v. Iladio
Caralipio, GR Nos. 137766-67, November 27, 2002; People v. Rogelio Bitancor,
GR No. 147968, December 4, 2002; People v. Ignacio Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-
58, April 22, 2003; People v. Mario Umayam, GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003;
People v. Genaro Biong, GR No. 144445-47, April 30, 2003; People v. Felix
Montes, GR Nos. 148743-45, November 18, 2003; People v. Toribio Galido, GR
Nos. 148689-92, March 30, 2004)

The recognized rule is that testimonies of rape victims who are young and
immature are each worthy of full credence. (People v. Alejandro Atop, GR Nos.
124303-05, February 10, 1998)

No woman, particularly a six-year old child, would concoct a story of rape,

allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to the
embarrassment and humiliation of a public trial if she has not, in fact, been a
victim of defloration. (People v. Gregorio Bersabe, GR No. 122768, April 27, 1998;
People v. Felipe Hofileña, GR No. 134772, June 22, 2000; People v. Asterio
Cordero, GR Nos. 136894-96, February 7, 2001; People v. Romeo Manayan, GR
Nos. 142741-43, October 25, 2001)

It is unthinkable that complainant, a young lady of fifteen years, would allow

her private parts to be examined and would withstand the rigors of a public trial --
along with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own mortifying
defilement -- if she was not in fact ravished. A careful examination of her
testimony does not reveal any hint of prevarication. Rather, her straightforward
and unequivocal statements, during both her direct and her cross-examinations,
show indelible badges of truth. (People v. Alejandro Atop, GR No.124303-05,
February 10, 1998; People v. Rolando Tabanggay, GR No. 130504, June 29,
2000; People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35, December 13, 2001; People
v. Ignacio Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003)

Well-settled is the rule that testimonies of young victims deserve full

credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. No
woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to
a public trial, unless she is motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. Considering that the young victim had not been
exposed to the ways of the world, it is most improbable that she would impute a
crime so serious as rape to any man, if the charge were not true. (People v.
Emmanuel Quezada, GR Nos. 135557-58, January 30, 2002; People v. Alejandro
Gabris, GR No. 116221, July 11, 1996; People v. Henry Apilo, GR No. 101213-14,
October 28, 1996; People v. Antonio Gastador, GR No. 123727, April 14, 1999;
People v. Alexander Taño, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v. Rolando
Tabanggay, GR No. 130504, June 29, 2000; People v. Felipe Pecayo Sr., GR No.
132047, December 14, 2000; People v. Angel C. Baldoz, GR No. 140032,
November 20, 2001; People v. Francisco Balas, GR No. 138838, December 11,
2001; People v. Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos. 137520-22, May 9, 2002; People v.
Rogelio Barrozo, GR Nos. 138726-27, July 3, 2002; People v. Atanacio Mendoza,
GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002; People v. Mario Umayam, GR No.
147033, April 30, 2003; People v. Felix Montes, GR Nos. 148743-45, November
18, 2003; People v. Toribio Galido, GR Nos. 148689-92, March 30, 2004; People
v. Larry Cachapero, GR No. 153008, May 20, 2004)

It would take the most senseless kind of depravity for a young daughter to
fabricate a story that would send her father to death, only because he had scolded
her or because they did not see eye to eye. A child, innocent and naive to the
ways of the world, is not likely to accuse her own father of so serious a crime as
incestuous rape if it was not the plain truth, or if her motive was not purely to bring
the offender to justice. (People v. Jaime Gonzales, GR No. 140676, July 31, 2002;
People v. Richard R. Deauna, GR Nos. 143200-01, August 1, 2002; People v.
Iladio Caralipio, GR Nos. 137766-67, November 27, 2002; People v. Mario
Umayam, GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003; People v. Genaro Biong, GR No.
144445-47, April 30, 2003)

Rape is essentially an offense committed in secrecy, generally executed in

dark or deserted and secluded places away from prying eyes. Thus, conviction for
this crime rests largely upon the credibility of the offended party who is usually the
sole witness of its actual occurrence. Thus, [the] complainant’s testimony must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety, and not by truncated portions or isolated
passages thereof. (People v. Alberto Gaorana, GR Nos. 109138-39, April 27,
1998; People v. Dominador Pili, GR No. 124739, April 15, 1998; People v. Jaime
Ibay, GR No. 132690, August 10, 1999)

Testimony; Inconsistencies

Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a

traumatic experience too painful to recall. (People v. Domingo Sta. Ana, GR Nos.
115657-59, June 26, 1998)

We stress that witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be

consistent in every detail. Slight differences in their recollections, viewpoints or
impressions are inevitable. They are in fact indicative of the truth and the sincerity
of their testimonies. So long as the witnesses concur on material points, slight
variations in their recollections of minor details and other ancillary matters do not
destroy the veracity or the probative value of their statements. Such
inconsistencies do not impair their credibility, especially when they are consistent
in relating the principal occurrence and in positively identifying the assailant. In
fact, even the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and credible by
the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(People v. Edmundo Aytalin, GR No. 134138, June 21, 2001; People v. Clarita
Bahatan, GR No. 121901, January 28, 1998; People v. Evangeline Ganenas,
GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001; People v. Gerry Cuenca, GR No. 143819,
January 29, 2002)

Different persons have different reflexes, which may produce varying

reactions, impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental,
emotional and psychological conditions may also affect their recall of the details of
the incident. No two individuals are alike in terms of powers of observation and
recollection. Each may give a different account of what transpired. One testimony
may be replete with details not found in the other. But taken as a whole, the
versions must concur on material points. (People v. Bonifacio Zamora, GR No.
101829, August 21, 1997; People v. Antonio Pareja, GR No. 88043, December 9,
1996)

Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for

they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. (People v. Domingo Sta. Ana,
GR No. 115657-59, June 26, 1998)

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to

minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity or weight
of their declarations. In fact, these inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken
their credibility, for they lessen the prospect of a rehearsed testimony. Au
contraire, such discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their
categorical, straightforward and spontaneous testimonies. (People v. Llaguno, GR
No. 91262, January 28, 1998; People v. Dione Palomar, GR Nos. 108183-85,
August 21, 1997; People v. Gregorio Tulop, GR No. 124829, April 21, 1998;
People v. Dionisio Bataller, GR Nos. 134540-41, July 18, 2001; People v. Marcos
Asuela, GR Nos. 140393-94, February 4, 2002; People v. Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos.
137520-22, May 9, 2002; People v. Lolito Estoya, GR No. 153538, May 19, 2004;
People v. Sonny Bautista, GR No. 140278, June 3, 2004)

Minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses are negligible.

Antithetically, they serve to strengthen the witnesses’ credibility and are taken as
badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood. Variance in testimonies
substantially erases suspicion that they have been rehearsed. Moreover, a
response to a question is not to be isolated in relation to other queries and
answers thereto. Well-settled is the rule that testimonies must be taken in their
entirety. (People v. Bonifacio Zamora, GR No. 101829, August 21, 1997; People
v. Alberto Gaorana, GR Nos. 109138-39, April 27, 1998; People v. Norlito Tan, GR
No. 132324, September 28, 1999; Leonida O. Pablejan v. Teresita J. Calleja, AM
No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006)

[T]he alleged conflict pertains to an insignificant detail that is not material to

the question of who killed the deceased. The general rule is that inconsistencies
and contradictions in minor and trivial matters do not impair a witness’ credibility.
The ambivalence of a witness on the exact number of stabs inflicted on the victim
does not detract from the obvious fact that the victim was killed by Gotangugan, as
clearly and positively testified to by Miranda. Indeed, in a startling event like a
killing, it is difficult for a witness to keep tab of the exact number of strokes the
killer made. It is enough that the witness gives a fair estimate. The important
thing is that the stabbing took place, the victim died and the witness identified the
culprit(s). (People v. Domingo Salazar, GR No. 99355, August 11, 1997; People v.
Pedro Ramirez, GR No. 138261, April 17, 2001; People v. Mila Razul, GR No.
146470, November 22, 2002)

The alleged inconsistencies adverted to by appellant do not detract from the

victim’s credibility, since they refer only to minor details surrounding the rape
incidents. Rape, being a harrowing experience, is usually not fully remembered.
Rather, the victim of such an atrocity is normally inclined to forget certain details
surrounding the execrable event and sweep them into her dustbin of unwanted
experiences and memories. What is important is her complete and vivid narration
of the rape itself, which the trial court herein found to be truthful and credible.
(People v. Roderick Santos, GR Nos. 135454-56, November 13, 2001; People v.
Ernesto Atuel, GR No. 106962, September 3, 1996; People v. Narciso Barera, GR
No. 99867, September 19, 1996; People v. Matias Lagramada, GR Nos. 146357 &
148170, August 29, 2002; People v. Iladio Caralipio, GR Nos. 137766-67,
November 27, 2002)

Considering the lapse of time and the limitations of human memory, a

witness telling the truth is not always expected to give a completely error-free
testimony. Thus, we have followed the rule, in accord with human nature and
experience, that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to
strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially
when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.
(People v. Nelson Agunias, GR No. 121993, September 12, 1997; People v.
Rolando Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001; People v. Renato Flores,
GR No. 141782, December 14, 2001)

As a rule, minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not discredit the

prosecution's case as a whole. Where the discrepancies pervade the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses, such that the totality of the prosecution evidence fails to
constitute a coherent account, the conviction of an accused cannot be justified.
(People v. Noel Diaz, GR No. 130652, June 21, 1999; People v. Matias
Lagramada, GR Nos. 146357 & 148170, August 29, 2002)

Testimony; Translation

We note that the victim had an interpreter when she testified in open court.
Translations from the vernacular are not always fully accurate. (People v. Dionisio
Bataller, GR Nos. 134540-41, July 18, 2001)

Victim; No standard behavioral response

Victims of sexual transgression respond differently to their ordeal. Some

victims prefer to bear the pain in silence, rather than risk their lives or expose
themselves to ignominy. Some others, for various reasons, put off reporting their
story, but such delay does not necessarily affect their credibility. (People v. Efren
Cabebe, GR No. 125910, May 21, 1998; People v. Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758,
June 28, 1996)

Different people react differently to the same or similar stimuli. There is no

standard behavior for rape victims with which we can compare herein private
complainant’s comportment, as there is no model form of behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The Court
has ruled that it is not proper to judge the actions of a child who has undergone a
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the same
circumstances from mature persons. A woman is not always expected to cry out
in public or to announce her ravishment, humiliation and pain. Young girls, in
particular, usually conceal their ordeal for some time, especially when they are
threatened. Sometimes, they simply suffer in silence. (People v. Angel C. Baldoz,
GR No. 140032, November 20, 2001; People v. Gerry Gumahob, GR No. 116740,
November 28, 1996; People v. Yamasito Vergel, GR No. 128813, October 4, 1999;
People v. Alfredo Catubig Jr., GR Nos. 134143-47, October 5, 2000; People v.
Felipe Pecayo Sr., GR No. 132047, December 14, 2000; People v. Renato Flores,
GR No. 141782, December 14, 2001; People v. Emmanuel Quezada, GR Nos.
135557-58, January 30, 2002; People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February
13, 2002; People v. Marcelo Mendoza, GR Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002; People
v. Felix Montes, GR Nos. 148743-45, November 18, 2003; People v. Homer
Magdaraog, GR No. 151251, May 19, 2004)

Taking cover or running away is not the only natural reaction possible under
the circumstances. There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a
strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which
witnesses to a crime must react. (People v. Diarangan Dansal, GR No. 105002,
July 17, 1997; People v. Ernesto Jamiro, GR No. 117576, September 18, 1997)

Witnesses, Qualifications

Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to observe,

record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty to tell the
truth. (People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No. 110129, August 12, 1997)

Although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the
same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from
testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case. (Jonar Santiago v. Atty. Edison V.
Rafanan, AC No. 6252, October 5, 2004)

By itself, prejudice against an accused cannot warrant the disqualification of

witnesses or the total disregard of their testimonies. Under [Section 20, Rule 130
of] the Rules of Court, any person, as a rule, can testify in court, regardless of
personal interest in a case. (People v. Rodrigo Maldo, GR No. 131347, May 19,
1999)

Unsoundness of mind does not per se render a witness incompetent. One

may be insane, yet be capable in law of giving competent testimony. The general
rule is that lunatics or persons affected with insanity are admissible as witnesses,
if they have sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and
are capable of giving correct accounts of the matters that they have seen or heard
with respect to the questions at issue. (People v. Richard R. Deauna, GR Nos.
143200-01, August 1, 2002)

A witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect

recollection of minor and minute details. Moreover, even the most truthful
witnesses often err and issue confused statements. (People v. Ruben Tidula, GR
No. 123273, July 16, 1998)