[No. L-9115.

August 31, 1956]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS

(PAFLU) and MAJESTIC & REPUBLIC THEATERS
EMPLOYEES AsSOCIATION (PAFLU), petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and REMA, INCORPORATED,
respondents.

1. CAPITAL AND LABOR; SCOPE OF TERM "LABOR

DISPUTE"; CASE AT BAR.·The employees of the
petitioning association dispute the sale of the two theaters
with whose owner they had concluded a collective
bargaining agreement on the ground that the alleged
transfer was fictitious and was merely resorted to by the
former owner as a ruse to evade its liability under the
agreement, and for that reason they still consider
themselves as employees of the theaters in contemplation of
law. Althcmgh said employees do not have actual contract of
employment with the respondent, there is the vital issue
concerning the geimineness and validity of the sale of the
theaters which in the light of the spirit of labor legislation is
deemed a lat)or dispute. Thus section 2(j) of Republic Act
875 defines the term "labor dispute" as to include any
controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, "regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee."
Considering the equities involved, the relation of petitioners
to respondent comes within the purview of this definition.

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2. COURT OP INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION;

CASES WHERE INDUSTRIAL COURT MAY EXERCISE
JURISDICTION.·Upon the approval of Republic Act 875,
the power of the Court of Industrial Relations is confined to
 the following cases: (1) when the labor dispute affects an
in(Justry which is indispensable to the national interest and
is so certified by the President to the industrial court
(section 10, Republic Act 875,); (2) when the controversy
refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law
(Republic Act 602); (3) when it involves hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves an unfair
labor practice [section 5? (a), Republic Act 875], In all other
cases, even if they grow out of a labor dispute, the industrial
court does not have jurisdiction, the policy of the law being
to advance the settlement of disputes between the
employers and the employees through collective bargaining,
recognizing "that real industrial peace cannot be achieved
by compulsion of law" [section l(c), in relation to section 20,
Repiiblic Act 875].

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO ISSUE

INJUNCTION.·The Court of Industrial Relations can only
isstie injunction in cases that come under its exclusive
jurisdiction and in those cases that do not, the power can be
exercised by regular courts.

4. CAPITAL AND LABOR; LABOR DISPUTE; INJUNCTION

ISSUED BY REGULAR COURTS; ISSUANCE "Ex
PARTE", NOT ALLOWED; FAILUBE TO FOLLOW THE
PROCEDURE REQUIRED BY LAW; EFFECT OF.·The
reg^ular courts can not issue injunction ex parte under
section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, in cases involving
labor disputes. In order that the injunction may be propeyly
issued, the law requires that there should be a h^arilig at
which the parties should be given an opportimity to present
witnesses in support of the complaint and of the opposition,
if any, with opportunity for cross-examination, and that the
other conditions required as prerequisites for the granting
of relief must be established and stated in the order of the
court. This requirement was held to be jurisdictional such
that, if not followed, it may r^sult in the annulment of the
proceedings. (Lauf vs. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., Wis. 1938,
58 S. Ct. 578, 303 U. S., 323, 82^ L. Ed., 872.) It appearing
that such procedure was not followed in the present case,
the order of the respondent court granting the writ of
injunction is invalid and should be millified.

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856 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
 Inc.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Paredes, Caw, Acevedo & Associates for respondent,
Rema, Incorporated.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction seeking to nullify all the
proceedings had before respondent Judge in Civil Case No.
26169 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, particularly
that which refers to the order issued by him on May 10,
1955, enjoining the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU), its members, associates, or agents to
cease and desist from picketing the properties of
respondent REMA, Ineorporated, as well as molesting,
transferring or preventing the public from entering the
Republie and Majestic theaters leased and operated by said
respondent. In due course, this Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for upon the filing by
petitioners of a bond of P500.
On May 9, 1955, REMA, Incorporated filed an action for
dattiages with preliminary injunction against petitioners in
the Court of First Instance 6f Manila allegmg, among other
things, that the "plaintiff is the leasee and operator of the
'Republie' and 'Majestic' Theaters doing business at
Florentino Torres Street, Mariila, which establishments
were leased by the plaintiff on April 27th, 1955 from the
Goodwill Trading Co., Inc., who on the same date acquired
the said theaters by way of purchase from the L. C.
Eugenio and Co., Inc., the former owner"; that "the
members of the defendant labor union, PAFLU and the
other defendants who are mostly members of the defendant
labor union, PAFLU, were formerly employed with the
above-mentioned theaters when the latter were

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still under the ownership, operation and management of

the former owner, L. C. Eugenio and Co., Inc., but who
ceased to be such employees since the sale of the said
theaters on April 27, 1955, to the Goodwill Trading Co.,
Inc., and their subsequent lease to the plaintiff on the same
date"; and that "the plaintiff and the defendants have no
employer-employee relation because the latter are not in
any manner the employees or laborers of the plaintiff and
as &uch they have no labor dispute between them."
The court, presided over by Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, set
for hearing the petition for injunction requiring defendants
(now petitioners) to appear on May 10, 1955 to show cause
why the writ should not be issued a& prayed for in the
complaint. On the date of hearing, defendants assailed the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that, it involving ,a
labor dispute or an employeremployee relation, the sole
power to determine the issue is the Court of Industri.al
Relations as provided for in Republic Act No. 875, After the
case has been argued orally by counsel of both parties, but
without receiving any evidence in support of the factual
allegations of the petition, respondent judge declared
himself with jurisdiction to act and in effect issued on May
10, 1955 an order granting the writ of injunction upon
plaintifFs filing a bond in the amount of P500. Hence the
present petition for certiorari.
The first issue to be determined is whether the main
case involves a labor dispute or an employer-employee
relation. This needs a brief statement of the facts which led
to the institution of the main case in the lower court.
On September 11, 1954, a collective bargaining
agreement was entered into by and between the Republic
Theater Enterprises and the Majestic Theater, Inc. on one
hand and the Majestic and Republic Theaters Employees
Association on the other. This agreement was to run for a
period of two years. Because of the failure of the

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Phil Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
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theater enterprises to comply with some terms of the

agreement, the employees of the association went on strike
on January 2, 1955. In consideration of the return of the
strikers to work, the collective bargaining contract was
modified and a new one entered into also for a term of two
years on February 16, 1955. This new agreement was
signed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU), with which the employees association had
affiliated after the conclusion of the original colleetive
bargaining agreement. Among the pertinent provisions of
the agreement, as amended, were that during the period of
its life the association or any laborer or employee shall not
declare a strike, nor engage in picketing, while the
management of the theaters in return "shall not lockout*
their employees." The revised agi'eement also included
rigid clauses in the payment of overtime pay, night
differential pay and a provision for the examination of the
books of the theaters on June 30, 1955.
On March 31, 1955, the two theaters, Republic and
Majestic, with all their assets and improvements thereunto
appertaining, were sold by the owner L. C. Eugenio and
Co., Inc. to Goodwill Trading Co., Inc., which was later
supplemented by another agreement executed by the same
parties on April 26, 1955. On the same date, April 26, 1955,
a contract of lease concerning the operation of tfie two
theaters was executed! by Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. in
favor of the REMA, Incorporated, and on April 27, 1955,
the latter corporation, as Jeasee and operator of the two
theaters, sent a circular letter to all the employees of the
former owner requiring them to apply for employment with
the new management in a form expressly prepared for the
purpose. On May 8, 1955, the employees of the association
started picketing the premises of the two theaters with the
help of the members of the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU), for which reason the REMA,
Incorporated filed the present action for damages with
preliminary injunction in the Court of

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plaint for unfair labor practice was filed before the Court of
Industrial Relations by the Majestic and Republic Theaters
Employees Association against its employers, the Republic
Theater Enterprises and the Majestic Theater, Inc.,
alleging among other grounds, that the latter committed a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement concluded
between them.
It is contended by respondents that there is no relation
of einployer and employee between the REMA,
Incorporaied and the Republic and Majestic Theaters
Employees Association for the reason that the two theaters
had already been sold by their original owner and the
vendee had in turn leased them to REMA, Incorporated
which has no contractual relation whatsoever with the
members of the association. There being no employer-
employee relation, they contend, there is no labor dispute
and consequently the lower court had jurisdiction to
entertain the case. This claim is disputed by petitioners.
There is no merit in this claim of respondents. While it
is true that the employees of the petitioning association do
not have an actual contract of employment with REMA,
Incorporated and were actually employed by the former
owner of the two theaters with whom they had concluded a
collective bargaining agreement, the fact however remains
that these employees do not admit, and in fact dispute, the
genuineness and validity of the alleged transfer and for
that reason they still consider themselves as employees of
the two theaters in contemplation of law. It i,s their stand
that the alleged transfer is fictitious and was merely
resorted to by the former owner as a ruse to evade its
liability under the collective bargaining agreement because
of some provisions contained therein wbich in its opinion
were detrimental to its interests although highly beneficial
to the interests of the employees. There is therefore the
vital issue concerning the genuineness and 859

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Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
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validity of the sale involved in the main case which in the

light of the spirit of our labor legislation is deemed a labor
dispute. Thus, it was held that "The disputants need not
stand in relation of employer and employee for case to
involve a 'labor dispute' within Norris-La Guardia Act
regulating issuance of restraining order or injunction in
cases involving labor disputes"
1
(Green, et al. vs. Obergfell,
et al., 121 F 2d., 46 . While, under our own Industrial
Peace Act, the term "labor dispute" includes any
controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of
employment, "regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee." [Section
2, O'), Republic Act No. 875]. In our opinion, considering
the equities involved, the relation of petitioner to
respondent comes within the purview of this definition.
The next issue that arises is: It appearing that the main
case involves a labor dispute, does it come under the
jurisdiction of an ordinary court of justice or should it be
left entirely to the Court of Industrial Relations. This
involves a little digression on the scope and extent of the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations which is
now conferred upon it by the Industrial Peace Act.
It should be noted that prior to the approval of the
Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), the law that
governed the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations over cases involving labor disputes is
Commonwealth Act 103. This Act gave to that court broad
powers of compulsory arbitration on any matter involving a
labor dispute. In fact, that Act gave that court "jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide
and settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees
or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,

_______________

1 Our Industrial Peace Act was taken from the Norris·La Guardia
Act on the subject of injunctions.

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and regulate the relations between them" (section 1). In

other words, that court could take cognizance "of any
industrial or agricultural dispute caushig or likely to cause
a strike or lockout" with the only limitation that the
employees, laborers or tenants that may bring the matter
to court exceed thirty in number (section 4). And,
commenting on these broad powers given by
Commonwealth Act No. 103 to the Court of Industrial
Relations, this Court said:

"Resulta evidente de las disposiciones tr'anscritas lo siguiente: (a)

que cuando surge una disputa entre el principal y el empleado u
obrero, vgr. sobre cuestion de Salarios, la Corte de Relaciones
Industriales tiene jurisdiccion en todo el territorio de Pilipinas para
considerar, investigai* y resolver dicha disputa, fijando los salarios
que estime justos y razonables; (6) que para los efectos de
prevencion, arbitraje, decision y arreglo, el mismo Tribunal de
Relacionefc Industriales tiene igualmente jurisdiccion para conocer
de cualqier disputa·industrial o agricola·resultante de
cualesquier diferencias respecto de los salarios, participaciones o
compensaciones, horas de trabajo, condiciones del empleo o de la
aparceria entre los patrones y los empleados u obreros y entre los
propietarios y los terratenientes u obreros agricolas previo el
cumplimiento de ciertos requisitos y condieion&s, cuando se viere
que dicha disputa ocasiona o puede ocasioner una huelga; (c) que en
el ejercicio de sus facultades arriba especificadas, el Tribunal de
Relaciones Industriales no queda limitado, al decidir la disputa, a
conceder el remedio o remedios solicitados por las partes en la
controversia, sino que puede incluir en la orden o decision cualquier
materia o determinacion para el proposito de arreglar la disputa o
de prevenir ulteriores controversias industriales o agricolas." (The
Shell Company of Philippine Islands, Limited vs. National Labor
2
Union, G. R. No. L-1309, decided July 26, 1948).

But this broad jurisdiction was somewhat curtailed upon

the approval of Republic Act No. 875, the purpose being to
limit it to certain specific cases, leaving the rest to the
regular courts. Thus, as the law now stands, that power

_______________

2 This jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations was declared by

this Court to be exclusive. (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers vs.
Samar Mining Company, Inc., 94 Phil., 932.)

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Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et aL vs. Tan and Rema,
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is confined to the following cases: (1) when the labor

dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the
national interest and is so certified by the President to the
industrial court (Section 10, Republic Act No. 875); (2)
when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the
Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act No. 602) ; (3) when it
involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor
Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and (4) when it involves
and unfair labor practice [section 5, (a), Republic Act No.
875]. In all other cases, even if they grow out of a labor
dispute, the Court of Industrial Relations does not have
jurisdiction, the intendment of the law being "to preyent
undue restriction of free enterprise for capital and labor
and to encourage the truly democratic method of regulating
the relations between the employer and employee by means
of an agreement freely entered into in collective
bargaining" (section 7, Republic Act No. 875)* In other
words, the policy of the law is to advance Ÿthe settlement of
disputes between the employers and the employees through
collective bargaining, recognizing "that real industrial
peace cannot be achieved by eompulsion of law" [See
section (c), in relation to section 20, (Idem.)'].
It therefore appears that with the exception of the four
cases above specified the Court of Industrial Relations has
no jurisdiction even if it involves a labor dispute. And as
the issue involved in the instant case does not fall under,
nor refer to, any of those specified cases, it follows that the
lower court has jurisdiction to entertain the same.
The remaining issue is: Can the lower court grant an
injunction in connection with the picketing of the premises
of respondent by the members of the petitioning
association? If so, has respondent judge issued the relief in
accordance with law?
The pertinent provisions concerning the issuance of
injunctions in labor disputes are those embodied in sec-

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tions 9 and 10 of Eepublic Act No. 875. Analyzing the

provisions of these two sections, we find that there are two
groups of activities that may be reckoned with in
connection with the issuance of injunetion, one as to which
injunction is prohibited even if they involve or grow out 0f a
labor dispute, and another as to which injunction may be
issued under certain conditions. For ready reference, we
will quote the pertineirt provisions of these section,

As to the first group, section 9(a) provides:

"(a) No Court, Commission or Board of the Philippines shall

have jurisdiction except as provided in section ten of this
Act to issue any restraining order, temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts:

(1) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any

relation of employment;
(2) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of
any employee organization regardless of any undertaking or
promise as is described in section eight of this Act;
 (3) Paying or giving to, or withholding, from any person participating
or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment
benefits or insurance, or nioneys or things of value;
(4) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested
in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is
prosecuting any action or suit in any eourt of the Philippines;
(5) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by
any method not involving fraud or violence;
(6) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interests in a labor dispute;
(7) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the
acts heretofore specified;
(8) Agreeing with. other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and
(9) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud
or violence, the acts heretofore specified, regardless

864

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PhiL Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema, Inc.

of any such understanding or promise as is described in section

eight of this Act."

And as to the second group, section 9(d) and section 10 provide:

SEC. 9.
"(d) No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue a,
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined oxcept after
Jiearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity
for cross-exammation) in support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered,
and except after finding of fact by the Court, to the effect:

(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued
unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act
excepting against the person or persons, association, or
organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or
nctually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge
thereof;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will follow;
(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be
 inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be
inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection."

"SEC. 10. Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to the

National Interest.·When in the opinion of the President of the
Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to the national interest and when such labor dispute
is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations,
said Court may cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding the
employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees,
pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to
the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms
and conditions of employment."

From the above-quoted provisions it can be seen that the

activities that cannot be enjoined are those enumerated in
section 9, paragraph a, even if they involve or grow out of a
labor dispute. To this we may add the

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case provided for in section 9, (6), when there is an

unlawful eombination or conspiracy on the part of those
engaged in the labor dispute in connection with the acts
above enumerated. And those that can be enjoined refer to
the case certified by the President as affecting national
interest and to those enumerated in section 9, paragraph d,
particularly when "unlawful acts have been threatened and
will be committed unless restrained, or have been
committed and will be continued unless restrained." Note
that, as to the acts that may be enjoined, section 9 (d)
contains a number of conditions which the court must find
to exist before an injunction can be granted and which are
considered as limitations on the court's power to grant
relief. This requirement was held to be jurisdictional such
that, if not followed,* it may result in the annulment of the
proceedings.

"Section 7 declares that 'no court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined'
except after a hearing of a described character, 'and except after
findings of fact by the court, to the effect·(a) That unlawful acts
have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or
have been committed and will be continued iinless restrained' and
that no injunction 'shall be issued on account of any threat or
unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association or
organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same . . .' By subsections (6) to
(c) it is provided that relief shall not be granted unless the court
finds that substantial and irreparable injury to complainants'
property will follow: that as to each item or relief granted greater
injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by denying the relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting it; that
complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and that the public
officers charged with the duty to protect complainants' property are
unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection. There can be no
question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States. The District
Court made one of the required findings save as to irreparable injury
and lack of remedy at law. It follows that in issuing the injunction it
exceeded its jurisdiction." (Lauf
76250·55

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866 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al vs. Tan and Rema, Inc.

w. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., Wis. 1938, 58 S. Ct. 578, 303 U. S.,
323, 82 L. Ed., 872.) (Italics supplied.)

With regard to activities that may be enjoined, in order to

ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue the
injunction, it is necessary to determine the nature of the
controversy. When the case involves a labor dispute that
affects national interest and is certified to the Court of
Industrial Relations, or refers to the Minimum Wage Law
or Eight-Hour Labor Law, there is no doubt that it is this
court that has jurisdiction over the incident. The same
thing may be said when the case involves an unfair labor
practice, for under section 5 (a), Republic Act No. 875, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is
exclusive. But the situation varies with regard to other acts
where injunction is permissible because of the ambiguity in
the language of the law. Note that the law refers to "no
court of the Philippines", which gives the connotation that
if not because of the prohibition any court may issue the
injunction. It is true that the last part of section 9 (d) says
"after finding of fact by the Court" and, in section 2 (a), in
defining the word "court", it says: " 'Court' means the Court
of Industrial Relations * * * unless another Court shall be
specified"; but this definition is no authority for us to
conclude that only the Court of Industrial Relations can
issue injunctions in all cases mentioned in section 9 (d) for,
as already adverted to, there are cases which may involve
or grow out of a labor dispute which may not necessarily
come under its jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to
give to the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over
cases which it does not have under the law. We are
therefore forced to conclude that that court can only issue
injunction in cases that come under its exclusive
jurisdiction and in those cases that do not, the power can
be exercised by regular courts. The instant case is one of
those that do not come under its jurisdiction.

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We beMeve however that in order that an injunction may

be properly issued the procedure laid down in section 9 (d)
of Republic Act 875 should be followed and cannot be
granted ex-parte as allowed by Rule 60, section 6, of the
Rules of Court. The reason is that the case, involving as it
does a labor dispute, comes under said section 9 (d) of the
law. That procedure requires that there should be a
hearing at which the parties should be given an
opportunity to present witnesses in support of the
complaint and of the opposition, if any, with opportunity for
crossexamination, and that the other conditions required
by said section as prerequisites for the granting of relief
must be established and stated in the order of the court.
Unless this procedure is followed, the proceedings would be
invalid and of no effect. The court would then be acting in
excess of its jurisdiction. (Lauf vs. E. G. Shinner & Co.,
Inc., supra.)
It appearing that in the present case such procedure was
not followed, we are persuaded to conclude that the order of
respondent court of May 10, 1955 granting the writ of
injunction prayed for by plaintiff-respondent is invalid and
should be nullified.
Petition is granted. The order of respondent court dated
May 10, 1955 is set aside. Costs against REMA,
Incorporated.

Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Endencia, and Felix,

JJ., concur.

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the learned majority opinion penned by Mr.

Justice Bautista Angelo in so far as it invalidates and
nullifies the order of respondent Court of May 10, 1955
granting the writ, of injunction, for the reason that, in
granting the writ, respondent Court did not follow the
procedure provided for in Section 9 (d) and (/) of Republic
Act No. 875, known as the Industrial Peace Act. I also
agree that the ordinary courts of the Philippines

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may issue restraining orders or temporary or permanent

injunctions, under the conditions outlined in Section 9 (d)
and (/) of said act. However, I disagree in so far as the
majority opinion holds that the Court of Industrial
Relations (C. I. R.) may not issue writs of injunction in
cases involving labor disputes, except when said cases fall
under its exclusive jurisdictkm, such as cases involving
unfair labor practice and cases certified to it by the Chief
Executive under section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. The
reason for this disagreement is that the phrase "no court of
the Philippines" mentioned in section 9, paragraph (d), in
the absence of any distinction or qualification, must include
the C. I. R.; naturally, the C. I. E. may also issue writs of
injunction in cases involving or growing out of a labor
dispute, when warranted by section 9, paragraphs (d) and
(/).
When section 9 (d) says that no court of the Philippines
shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of labor
dispute, except after hearing the testimony of the witnesses
in open court, and except after making certain findings of
fact required by this section, to me it is clear that when
these conditions are complied wlth and fulfilled, the courts
of the Philippines empowered by the Judiciary Act of 1948
to issue writs of injunction, have jurisdiction to issue said
writs in cases involving labor disputes. If the purpose of the
law (Republic Act No. 875) were to confine the issuance of
these writs to the C. I. R., then it should have made itself
clear and unequivocal; instead of using the phrase "no
court of the Philippines", it should have just said "the
Court of Industrial Relations shall have no jurisdiction to
issue temporary or permanent injunction, except after
hearing the testimony of the witnesses," etc.
I see no reason for confining the issuance of restraining
orders in cases involving labor disputes to the C. I. R.,
because under the Industrial Peace Act, many of said

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cases involving labor disputes, as well pointed out in the

majority opinion, will never reach the C. I. R. Unless a
labor dispute involves unfair labor practice or is certified by
the Chief Executive, under section 10, the C. I. R. has no
jurisdiction over it. We are aware of many cases of strikes
and picketing, involving no unfair labor practice but merely
based on and arising from unsatisfied demands of labor for
increase in wages, payment of annual bonus, vacation and
sick leave with pay, shorter hours of work, etc. In these
labor dispute cases involving no unfair labor practice, the
parties are left to bargain or thresh out their differences
even if, as a result of failure in negotiations, the employees
resort to strikes and picketing. I repeat that, in these cases
which never reach the C. I. R. and over which it has no
jurisdiction, there is no reason f or limiting the issuance of
restraining orders under section 9, paragraphs (d) and (/) to
the C. I. R.
It is urged in the learned dissent of Mr. Justice J. B. L.
Reyes that inasmuch as the C. I. R., because of the training
and experience of its judges in handling and resolving labor
and management questions, is the court best qualified to
pass upon the merits of said labor dispute cases, it should
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue restraining orders in
labor dispute cases under section 9. I regret to disagree. In
the first place, as I have already pointed out, there are
many cases growing out of a labor dispute which by reason
of their not involving unfair labor practice, cannot and will
never reach the C. I. R. for bearing and determination, and
over which the C. I. R. consequently would have no
occasion to draw upon and use the special qualifications of
its judges to pass upon the merits of said cases. In the
second place, the cases and occasions calling for the
issuance of restraining orders under section 9, paragraphs
(d) and (/), almost invariably are those where unlawful acts
are threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or
have been actually com-

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Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
Inc.

mitted and will be continued unless restrained, acts such

as personal violence, coercion, destruction of property or
malieious mischief, (covered by Articles 282, 286, 324, 327,
Revised Penal Code) etc., sometimes committed on the
occassion of a strike and picketing. These are offenses £nd
violation of peace and order wherever committed regardless
of the occasion of or reason for their commission. Affecting
as they do, not only the immediate parties to the labor
dispute, but the populace and public tranquility, they are
cognizable and should be cognizable by the courts in the
district and territory where committed and not by one
single court with limited jurisdiction like the C. I. R.
Furthermore, a Court of First Instanee, issuing the writ of
injunction does not have to pass upon the merits of the
labor dispute or controversy, requiring or calling for the use
of special knowledge of or experience in labor management
differences and controversies. The injunction merely seeks
to restrain the violation or continued violation of the
criminal law, and this can and may be done by an ordinary
court.
Another reason in support of the view that the ordinary
courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction to issue
restraining orders in cases involving a labor dispute,
provided that the conditions outlined by the law are
complied with, is that, while the C. I. R. with its limited
number of Judges and personnel is situated in Manila, the
unlawful acts threatened and which would be committed
unless restrained, or have been committed and will be
continued unless restrained, may take place or may have
taken place outside of Manila and far from it, like far off
Aparri on the north or the distant City of Davao in the
south, and it would be quite difficult, if not impossible, for
the aggrieved party to come to Manila with his witnesses to
apply for the restraining order from the C. I. R.; and even if
despite the expense and inconvenience to witnesses it could
do so, during all the interval between the commission of the
unlawful acts and the actual issuance of the restraining

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order by the C. I. R. in Manila, and its notification to the

offender or offenders in Aparri or City of Davao,
irreparable itijury may already have been committed, and
the efforts of the aggrieved party may after all prove futile
and of no avaiL Truly, time is of the essence in such cases.

Seceion 9, paragraph (d), in part reads:

"(d) No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue a
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined except after
hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity
for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered,
and except after finding of fact by the Court, to the effect:
"(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.
"Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof
has been given, in such manner as the Court shall direct, to all
known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief
of those public officials of the province or city within which the
unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the
duty to protect complainant's property: Provided, however, That if a
complainant shall also allege that tmless a temporary restraining
order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable
injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a
temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under
oath, sufficient, if not sustained, to justify the court in issuing a
temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. Such a temporary
restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and
shall become void at the expiration of five days. * * *." (Italics
supplied.)

True, under the proviso found in the middle part of the

third paragraph above quoted, the temporary restraining
order may be issued upon an ex parte hearing based on the
testimony of only the witnesses presented by the
complainant, but it is equally true that such temporary
restraining order is good only for five days, after which it
becomes void, and thereafter the unlawful acts or threats
to commit the same may be resumed without

872

872 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
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hindrance. In order to issue a temporary restraining order

good for more than five days or a permanent one under the
1st and 2nd paragraphs of the legal provision above quoted,
a regular hearing should be held after due and personal
notice thereof to all known persons against whom the relief
is sought and also to the chief of those public officials of the
province or city within which the unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property. To do this, the C.I.R. must hold the
hearing in such province or city so as to give opportunity
not only to the witnesses for the complainant, but also to
the persons against whom relief is sought and to the peace
officers concerned. I believe that the C. I. R. with its limited
number of judges and personnel is not in a position to go to
said province or city or to detail one of its judges to hold
hearings and make findings of facts. We must bear in mind
that the C. I. R. stationed in Manila is holding hearings
daily not only in cases involving unfair labor practice of
which there are many, but also in cases certified to it by the
Chief Executive under section 10 of Republic Act No. 875.
This, to say nothing of its heavy backlog of old cases. It will
take some time for the C. I. R. with all its judges to
dispatch all these accumulated cases in Manila so that it
can ill afford to send one of its judges to the cities and
provinces outside Manila. Moreover, strikes and picketing
with their not inf requent incidents involving violations of
peace and order, may take place simultaneously in different
parts of the Philippines, calling for immediate hearing in
said cases for the purpose of acting upon urgent petitions
for issuance of restraining orders; naturally, the C. I. R.
cannot possibly cover all these urgent cases with details of
its judges outside of the City of Manila. The logical courts
for this purpose are, besides the C. I. R., the ordinary
Courts of First Instance, holding court in Manila and in all
the provinces, not only in the capitals thereof, but in the
chartered cities and sometimes

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in different parts of each province, such as Lingayen

(Capital of Pangasinan), the towns of Tayug and Alaminos
of the same province, and the chartered City of Dagupan,
same province.
It is said that because there are policemen and
constabulary soldiers supposed to keep peace and order in
the provinces, and that since the law specifically limits the
issuance of injunctions to those cases where those peace
officers are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection, there are not many cases left for the C. I. R. to
act upon as regards the issuance of restraining orders. This
argument is plausible, but I am afraid, only in theory. It is
true that those peace officers have in the past made arrests
to preserve peace and order on the occasion of strikes and
picketing, but those arrests were limited to cases of actual
violence and personal injury, such as, where killings or
physical injuries are involved. They do not cover acts of
coercion, intimidation, or obstruction of the normal
activities of the strike bound company, such as, where the
picketers by threats and intimidation actually prevent the
passing thru or crossing of the picket lines by non-striking
employees and customers of the company; or where strikers
and picketers stop the free movement of vehicles going in
and out of the company's compound to distribute its
products, or prevent motor vehicles or rail cars from
entering the eompany's compound to deliever raw
materials for processing, such as sugar cane for its sugar
mills, by not only standing in the path of said vehicles, but
even of lying down on the road or railway, knowing that the
drivers of said vehicles would not run them down and
commit roass killing. Furthermore, Republic Act No. 1167,
punishing obstruction or interference with peaceful
picketing during any labor controversy, imposes heavy
penal sanctions, the penalty for a peace officer being a fine
not exceeding P10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five
years, or both. An ordinary policeman or constabu-

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Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
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lary soldier not familiar with the intricacies of the law and
its interpretation and in no position to decide on the spot
whether or not a certain picketing is peaceful, would
naturally try to play safe and so would act and make
arrests only in actual cases of violence or killing, but not in
cases of threats, intimidation, or coercion, preferring in the
latter cases to wait for a court order for his own protection.
And it is well known that in many cases of picketing, the
labor unions and their members engaged in such picketing
object to and have denounced the presence of peace officers
for they want to conduct their picketing in their own way
without interference; and in some cases, these peace
officers are withdrawn or are relieved.
To show that only the C. I. R. can take cognizance of
cases involving labor dispute where restraining orders are
sought, the learned dissent points to the phrase "the Court"
found in the last line of the 1st paragraph of section 9 (d),
reproduced above,·* * * "and except after finding of fact by
the Court, to the effect:" in connection with the definition of
the word "court" found in section 2, paragraph (a) of
Republic Act No. 875, which reads:

"SEC. 2. Definitions.·As used in this Act·

"(a) 'Court' means the Court of Industrial Relations established
by Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and three, as
amended, unless another Court shall be specified."

In other words, it is claimed that, in the absence of any

specification, the Court mentioned in section 9, paragraph
(d), can refer only to the C. I. R. However, I am afraid that
the argument though seemingly valid, cannot be sustained.
The phrase underlined "no court of the Philippines shall
have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent
injunction" found at the beginning of said section 9 (d), in
my opinion, qualifies the word "Court" found at the end of
said paragraph. When the law says that no court of the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue temporary or
permanent injunction except after hearing

875

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and after finding of said facts, the logical conclusion is that

any cowrt of the Philippines ordinarily vested with the
jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction can take cognizance
of those cases involving a labor dispute for the purpose of
issuing restraining orders as long as it holds a hearing aftd
thereafter makes certain findings of fact justifying the
issuance of the injunction, so that the word "court" found at
the end of the paragraph must necessarily refer to any
court of the Philippines taking cognizance. Otherwise, the
paragraph in question would not only be confusing but
contradictory in that, in one part thereof, it authorizes any
court of the Philippines, such as the Courts of First
Instance, to take cognizance and then as claimed, requires
that the finding of fact based on the result of the hearing be
made by the C. I. R.
Moreover, in the very recent case of Scoty's Department
Store, et al., vs. Nena Micaller (supra, p. 762), decided by
this Court on August 25, 1956, we had occasion to interpret
section 25 of Republic Act No. 875, which in part reads as
follows:

"SEC. 25. Penalties.·Any person who violates the provisions of

section three of this Act shalL be punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court. * *
*."

The phrase "the Court" is also found at the end oi>the

paragraph above quoted, so that following the definition of
section 2, paragraph (a) of the same Act, the phrase "the
Court" must refer to the C. I. R. However, in the Scoty's
Department Store case above mentioned, this Tribunal in a
decision with no dissent clearly and emphatically said that
despite the definition of the word "Court" in section 2 (a) of
Republic Act No. 875, it is not the C. I. R. but the ordinary
courts that can impose the penalties provided in section 25.
I quote:

"In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose

4ke-pemlties provided f or in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875

876

876 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema, Inc.

is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial

Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the
industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of PIOO upon
petitioners is illegal and should be nullified. (Scoty's Department
Store, Et AL, i;s. Nena Micaller, G. R. No. L-8116, August 25, 1956)
(Italic is mine.)
In view of the foregoing considerations, I am with the
majority holding that the ordinary courts of the Philippines
may take cognizanee of cases involving labor disputes for
the purpose of issuing restraining orders under section 9,
paragraphs (d) and (/) of Republic Act No. 875.

REYES, J. B. L., J., with whom PARAS, C. J., and

CONCEPCION, J., concur, concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result, but feel constrained to dissent from

the pronouncement that the Court of Industrial Relations
has no jurisdiction over the issuance of injunctions in cases
involving or growing out of labor disputes. I submit, on the
contrary, that such jurisdiction is conferred upon the
Industrial Court by the opening statement of section 9 (d)
of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875)·

"No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue a

temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined except after
hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity
for crossexamination) in support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered,
and except after finding of fact by the Court, to the effect:

What tribunal is referred to in the expression "finding by

fact by the Court" is in my opinion conclusively settled by
the Act itself in its section 2:

SEC. 2. Definitions.·As used in this Act

(a) "Court" xneans the Court of Industrial Relations established
by Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and three as
amended, unless another Court shall be specified."

Now, the words "speeify" and "specified", in all definitions

that I have met (58 C. J. 1285; 81 C. J. S. 814; 39-A

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VOL. 99, AUGUST 31, 1956 877

Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema,
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Words & Phrases, 467 et seq.)> mean to designate by

words, expres&ly, distinctly, precisely, in an explicit
manner, or in detail. They mean just the reverse of "imply"
or "implied".

"Specify" is defined as meaning to designate by words one thing

from another; to name expressly, distinctly or particularly; to
mention or name in a specific or explicit manner; to mention
specifically or explicitly; to particnlarize; to point out; to state in full
and explicit terms or explicitly and in detail; to tell or state
precisely or in detail.
Specified. Particularized, specially named. (81 C. J. S. 814; 58 C.
J. 1285).
"The word specified has e clearly defined meaning. Transitive: to
mention or name in a specific or explicit manner; to tell or Btate
precisely or in detail; as to specify article. Intransitive, to speak
precisely or in detail; to give particulars."·Duke Power Co. vs.
Essex County Board of Taxation, 7 A2D 409, 410; 122 N. J. Law
589.
The word "specified" means to mention or name in a specific or
explicit manner; to tell or state precisely or in detail. Aleksich vs.
Industrial Accident Fund, 151 P. 2d 1016, 1021; 116 Mont. 127.
To "specify" means to mention specifically; state in full and
explicit terms; name expressly or particularly; state precisely or in
detaiL Red Top Brewing Co. vs. Massotti, D.C.N.Y., 107 F. Supp.
921, 923.
"Specify" means to mention specifically; to state in full and
explicit terms; to point out; to particularize, or to designate by
words one thing from another. Independent Highway Dist. No. 2 of
Ada Coimty vs. Ada County, 134 p. 542, 545, 24 Idaho 416; Brazil
vs. Dupre. Or., 250 P. 2d 89, 91.
"Specify" means to mention specifically or explicitly, to state in
full and explicit terms or explicitly and in detail, name expressly,
distinctly, and particularly. A. N. Dillow & Co. vs. City of Monticello,
124 N. W. 186, 189, 145 lowa 424. (39A Words and Phrases, pp. 467,
469, 470.)

The words "by the Court" in Sec. 9 (d) of Republic Act 875
undeniably fail to sperify or explicitly refer to a "Court of
First Instance"; and therefore, under section 2 of the same
Act, it is imperative to construe said words as meaning "by
the Court of Industrial Relations", thereby necessarily
conferring on that tribunal the requisite juris-

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Phil Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema>
Inc.

diction to act under section 9 (d). Otherwise, we violate the

express legislative mandate. And the jurisdiction so
conferred must be considered exclusive in the Industrial
Court, for, as we pointed out in the case of Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers vs. Samar Mining Co., 94 Phil., 932,
May 12, 1954), Congress had power to confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Industrial Court over labor-
management controversies and it is convenient that such
jurisdiction be exclusive, as "a unified policy and
centralized administration is thereby insured, the more
effectively to cope with probably explosive contingencies."
One need not range far search of cogent reasons in
support of the exclusive jurisdiction herein advocated. The
evolution of our labor and social legislation exhibits a
decided and unmistakable tendency to entrust the solution
of labor-management conflicts to specialized administrative
organs: Court of Industrial Relations, Industrial Safety
Bureau, National Employment Service, Labor Conciliation
and Wage Administration Service, Workmen's
Compensation Commission, Court of Agrarian Relations.
Whether the tendency is due to the Legislative having
believed that the regular Judges, trained in strict legal
questions of property and contract, are ill prepared to cope
with labor and tenancy disputes that demand a different
perspective and a compromising temperament, aimed
above all at minimizing friction and avoiding paralization
of the processes of production; or because it was believed
that the quick solution of social problems demanded more
simplified and less protracted procedures; or beacuse as it
has been suggested, courts and lavvyers are becoming
obsolete, the policy of specialized offices for special
problems clearly exists and should not be evaded.
With particular reference to labor injunctions, the all
important issue is whether a given case involves or grows
out of labor dispute. Our Judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations are certainly much better qualified to

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determine such issue than the regular judges, experienced

as the former are in the multifarious aspects that such
dispute may assume. Why should we entrust this and other
related questions to judges who have not handled labor
disputes on any previous occasion? The very case before us
is proof that to do so would be to nullify the restrictions
imposed by law on labor injunctions, because of the Judges'
unfamiliarity with the policies and interests involved. It
was not so long ago, either, that complaints were being
aired that the regular courts are far too generous in
 granting ex parte preliminary injunctions, without due
regard for the social aspects of the cases brought before
them; and this Court has recently passed upon case where
squatters on public thoroughfares came to be protected by
ex parte injunctions improvidently issued that took long
years to correct.
That the Court of Industrial Relations has its seat in
Manila, and can not speedily intervene in labor disputes in
the provinces, is a fact that must have been known to the
legislators who approved Republic Act No, 875; and their
failure to specify the Courts of First In&tance in section 9
(d) of the Act indicates that they did not consider that
objection decisive against the policy therein set. One must
not lose sight of the fact that the situations in which
injunctions will be sought under that section do not involve
cases of actual violence or open breachea of public peace
and order, because peace officers are duty bound to
intervene on such occasions: the law specifically limits the
injunctions to those cases where "the public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection". Such
cases, if any, will be necessarily rare; our police and
constabulary officers have never been unwilling to protect
those that deserve protection, nor have they ever been
found inadequate f or ordinary police action.
Petition granted.

880

880 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes, et al. vs. Tan, et al.

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