Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, Et Al. vs. Tan and Rema, Inc.
Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, Et Al. vs. Tan and Rema, Inc.
855
Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Tan and Rema, Inc.
856
857
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859
plaint for unfair labor practice was filed before the Court of
Industrial Relations by the Majestic and Republic Theaters
Employees Association against its employers, the Republic
Theater Enterprises and the Majestic Theater, Inc.,
alleging among other grounds, that the latter committed a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement concluded
between them.
It is contended by respondents that there is no relation
of einployer and employee between the REMA,
Incorporaied and the Republic and Majestic Theaters
Employees Association for the reason that the two theaters
had already been sold by their original owner and the
vendee had in turn leased them to REMA, Incorporated
which has no contractual relation whatsoever with the
members of the association. There being no employer-
employee relation, they contend, there is no labor dispute
and consequently the lower court had jurisdiction to
entertain the case. This claim is disputed by petitioners.
There is no merit in this claim of respondents. While it
is true that the employees of the petitioning association do
not have an actual contract of employment with REMA,
Incorporated and were actually employed by the former
owner of the two theaters with whom they had concluded a
collective bargaining agreement, the fact however remains
that these employees do not admit, and in fact dispute, the
genuineness and validity of the alleged transfer and for
that reason they still consider themselves as employees of
the two theaters in contemplation of law. It i,s their stand
that the alleged transfer is fictitious and was merely
resorted to by the former owner as a ruse to evade its
liability under the collective bargaining agreement because
of some provisions contained therein wbich in its opinion
were detrimental to its interests although highly beneficial
to the interests of the employees. There is therefore the
vital issue concerning the genuineness and 859
860
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1 Our Industrial Peace Act was taken from the Norris·La Guardia
Act on the subject of injunctions.
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(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued
unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act
excepting against the person or persons, association, or
organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or
nctually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge
thereof;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will follow;
(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be
inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be
inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection."
865
"Section 7 declares that 'no court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined'
except after a hearing of a described character, 'and except after
findings of fact by the court, to the effect·(a) That unlawful acts
have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or
have been committed and will be continued iinless restrained' and
that no injunction 'shall be issued on account of any threat or
unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association or
organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same . . .' By subsections (6) to
(c) it is provided that relief shall not be granted unless the court
finds that substantial and irreparable injury to complainants'
property will follow: that as to each item or relief granted greater
injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by denying the relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting it; that
complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and that the public
officers charged with the duty to protect complainants' property are
unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection. There can be no
question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States. The District
Court made one of the required findings save as to irreparable injury
and lack of remedy at law. It follows that in issuing the injunction it
exceeded its jurisdiction." (Lauf
76250·55
866
w. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., Wis. 1938, 58 S. Ct. 578, 303 U. S.,
323, 82 L. Ed., 872.) (Italics supplied.)
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lary soldier not familiar with the intricacies of the law and
its interpretation and in no position to decide on the spot
whether or not a certain picketing is peaceful, would
naturally try to play safe and so would act and make
arrests only in actual cases of violence or killing, but not in
cases of threats, intimidation, or coercion, preferring in the
latter cases to wait for a court order for his own protection.
And it is well known that in many cases of picketing, the
labor unions and their members engaged in such picketing
object to and have denounced the presence of peace officers
for they want to conduct their picketing in their own way
without interference; and in some cases, these peace
officers are withdrawn or are relieved.
To show that only the C. I. R. can take cognizance of
cases involving labor dispute where restraining orders are
sought, the learned dissent points to the phrase "the Court"
found in the last line of the 1st paragraph of section 9 (d),
reproduced above,·* * * "and except after finding of fact by
the Court, to the effect:" in connection with the definition of
the word "court" found in section 2, paragraph (a) of
Republic Act No. 875, which reads:
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The words "by the Court" in Sec. 9 (d) of Republic Act 875
undeniably fail to sperify or explicitly refer to a "Court of
First Instance"; and therefore, under section 2 of the same
Act, it is imperative to construe said words as meaning "by
the Court of Industrial Relations", thereby necessarily
conferring on that tribunal the requisite juris-
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