ARREST, SEARCH and SEIZURE

VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 Right against Searches and/or Seizures
July 5, 2018
FACTS:
As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
ISSUES:
What constitutes a reasonable search?
Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or seizures without search warrant or
court order in violation of the Constitution.
RULING:
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only
by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security measure
to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES,
ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA,
ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA,
MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE,
MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO
GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA
MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO
SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL.
JESUS GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990
Ponente: Gutierrez, J.
FACTS
Guazon and forty other petitioners, who of legal age, bona fide residents of Manila, and have a
common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, question the conduct of military
and police officers in conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or “Saturation Drives” in Manila.
According to them, the police and military officers have a common pattern of human rights abuses
stating that: 1) the police have no search warrant and warrant of arrest; 2) the raiders rouse
residents by banging on the walls or windows and ordering the residents within to come out of their
residence; 3) the residents are herded like cows and were stripped down half-naked and examined
for tattoo marks; 4) the raiders ransacked their houses and that their money and valuable
belongings have disappeared; 5) and that some arrested were detained without charges and that
they were subject to physical and mental torture. The respondents stressed that they have legal
authority to conduct saturation drives, and that the accusations of the petitioners are total lies.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether the Saturation Drives violate the constitutional rights of the residents.
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: The petition is DISMISSED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
No. Absent proper party/parties that are directly affected by the operation, the Court has no
authority to pass upon the issue for it falls under the execution of the Executive and the RTCs.
The Constitution grants the government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements.
However, all police actions are governed by the limitation of the Bill of Rights. It is significant to
point out that it is not police action per se which is impermissible and which should be probited.
Rather, it is the procedure used or the methods which offende even hardened sensibilities.
In this case, not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner
appears as petitioner or as come before the trial court to present evidence. The Court believes it is
highly probable that some violations were actually committed. But the remedy is not to stop all
police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of force is sometimes necessary
as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers’s suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman who can be
prosecuted. As such absence of facts, no permanent relief can be given.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

Alvero vs Dizon Case

Digest

AURELIO S. ALVERO vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,

G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946

FACTS:
The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution
presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United
States Army, accompanied by Filipino Guerrillas in the petitioner’s house.
The Petitioner further contends that the seized documents should be returned as it obtained by means of force and
intimidation or through coercion, those are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New
Leader’s Association, which was proven to be an organization created for
the purpose of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation of the seized documents in the trial is tantamount
to compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the “seized” documents are legal?
2. Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as evidence in the trial court?
HELD.
No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is absolutely no merit.
RATIONALE:
The right of the officer and men of the United States Army to arrest the petitioner as a collaborationist suspect, and to
seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also, proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief of
the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given
aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance

PEOPLE V. ANDRE MARTI - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

l The appellant Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his
friend Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland.
l The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their package and asked the appellant if she could examine
and inspect the packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on examining the
packages.

l Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
and husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection.
l When Job Reyes opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused,
he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one
of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof.
l Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
l He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, (August 14, 1987).
l Job Reyes was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.
l Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila.
l Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of
the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers
from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.
l The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered
that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained Tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigar.
l The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
l The NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail.
l The NBI agents asked for assistance to Manila Central Post Office’s Chief Security, where the
appellants passport addressed was indicated.
l Appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on
the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.
l On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.
l An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
l Trial court convicted him for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11
and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
l Accused appealed to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures
is violated when his parcels were opened without his permission.

ISSUE:

WON an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be

HELD:

1. NO. The court ruled in the negative.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, on the cases cited by the SC, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.

The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities.

Therefore, In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.

In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.
BACHE & CO. V. RUIZ - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

l Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Misael Vera , wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co., herein petitioner
corporation for violation of Section 46(a) of the NIRC in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209.
l Vera authorized, Rodolfo de Leon, his Revenue Examiner, to make and file the application of search
warrant which was attached to the letter.
l In the afternoon of the following day, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the CFI of Rizal. They brought the following:
1. Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by
respondent De Leon;
2. An affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon;
3. A deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but
not yet subscribed; and
4. A search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
l When the respondents arrived at the court, the respondent Judge Ruiz, was still hearing a certain
case.
l So, by means of a note, the judge instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of
respondents De Leon and Logronio.
l When the session was adjourned, the deputy clerk informed the judge that the depositions were
taken then the stenographer read to the judge her notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false
and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
l Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for a search warrant and respondent
Logronio’s deposition, and the Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and
accordingly issued.
l Three days later, the agents of BIR served the warrant and seized 6 boxes of documents.
l The petitioners moved to quash the search warrant, filed for an injunction, and other reliefs prayed
for but the respondent judge dismissed the petition.
l The Bureau made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97,
partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant was validly issued.

HELD:

NO. The Court found three (3) defects in the search warrant issued.

1. First, there was no personal examination of the judge.

The petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and
void
RATIO DECIDENDE:

l In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio).

The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance
with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial
and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position
to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of
whether or not there was probable cause. This is pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The determination of whether or
not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and
should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

l Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have committed
acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code.”
l Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners
and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties
“books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
l The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

l Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the
Rules of court by:

(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.

l The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; The
defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects are
admissible regardless of the irregularity.
l The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices
of the corporations.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD:

NO the search warrant is invalid.

l The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.

l The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides;
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
In the case at bar, none of these are met.

l The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”

l In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract.

l As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

l As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes.

l The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

l Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.

l However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued
against their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.

l The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.