Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Walt Disney's Grandson Sues Judge
Walt Disney's Grandson Sues Judge
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23 1. This case involves the Plaintiff, Bradford D. Lund (“Mr. Lund”), the
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grandson of entertainment tycoon Walt Disney. For the past decade, Mr. Lund has
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been entrapped in the probate division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 2 of 31 Page ID #:2
1 fighting against hostile trustees to receive his beneficiary distributions from his trusts.
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As one of their tactics to keep Mr. Lund from receiving his trust distributions, Mr.
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Lund’s hostile trustees, in concert with certain of Mr. Lund’s estranged family
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9 have capacity, resulting in a dismissal of that case. The disgruntled estranged family
10 members appealed the case and the Arizona appellate court unanimously affirmed the
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trial court’s decision. The Arizona Supreme Court refused review, and a final
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14 Superior Court judge found that Bradford Lund had capacity to choose successor
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trustees for one of his other trusts after similar allegations were previously made by
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Mr. Lund’s hostile trustees. In the face of these specific findings and the decade long
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18 history of litigation without any guardian ad litem, and without notice or any hearing,
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the Hon. David J. Cowan, on his own sua sponte Order to Show Cause, appointed a
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limited purpose guardian ad litem over Mr. Lund without any evidentiary hearing or
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22 notice. In so doing, Judge Cowan refused to take judicial notice of the Arizona
23 decision in the form of either judicial comity or full faith and credit.
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2. That imposition of a guardian ad litem has imposed significant
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26 constraints on Mr. Lund’s liberty and property interests in violation of the 14th
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1 Amendment, and his constitutional right to due process of law by not having any
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hearing. Indeed, his attorneys (3 current and 1 former) have filed affidavits under
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oath which stated that Mr. Lund is, in fact, competent, and does not need any
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5 guardian ad litem – consistent with the specific findings of fact made by Judge
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Oberbillig in Arizona, and Judge Beckloff in California, that were completely ignored
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by Judge Cowan.
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13 of due process of law is all too reminiscent of a perspective where facts do not matter
14 but alternative facts do, where the constitution does not matter and where the rule of
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law is set aside and replaced by the rule of subjective, fact-free decision-making.
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4. After a ten-day bench trial in Arizona, as explained above, on a
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22 proven that he deserves the freedom in life to make his own choices.” (Exhibit A, p.
23 3-6). Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Arizona specifically determined that Mr.
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Lund was entitled to his property and lifted all stays in the Arizona probate matter,
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5 court on Mr. Lund’s competency. The Trustees motion for a § 730 Expert was
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denied by the Hon. Mitchell L. Beckloff.
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6. In a 2013 bench trial before the Hon. Mitchell L. Beckloff, in regard to
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9 an issue of whether Mr. Lund was competent to appoint his successor trustees on one
10 of his trusts, he was found to have capacity. Indeed, there was no guardian ad litem
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appointed over Mr. Lund at any time during that California probate proceeding, nor
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13 any of the appeals following that judgment. Specifically, Judge Beckloff determined
14 that: “Evidence presented during the trial did not persuade the court that Mr. Lund
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lacked capacity to exercise his Trustee Removal Power.” (Exhibit B, p. 32).
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Additionally, Judge Beckloff found: “The evidence did not rebut the statutory
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18 presumption that Mr. Lund had capacity to exercise the Trustee Removal Power.”
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(Exhibit B, p. 32). Regarding the allegations that Mr. Lund was subject to undue
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influence, Judge Beckloff specifically found: “There is no direct evidence that Mr.
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22 Lund was unduly influenced to exercise the Trustee Removal Power.” (Exhibit B, p.
23 33). Ultimately, Judge Beckloff specifically found: “The court finds that Mr. Lund’s
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exercise of the Trustee Removal Power was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”
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26 (Exhibit B, p. 35).
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5 Sharon D. Lund Residuary Trust fbo Bradford D. Lund (the “BRT”) that Mr. Lund
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was incapacitated, in the face of the Arizona decision and previous California
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decisions otherwise. In his written order appointing the limited guardian ad litem,
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9 Judge Cowan stated that Mr. Lund had not proven his capacity, despite the statutory
10 presumption that all persons have the capacity to make decisions and to be
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responsible for those acts and/or decisions. This was not Mr. Lund’s burden to
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14 that all individuals have capacity and are competent, the burden is placed on the party
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challenging competence or capacity. However, Judge Cowan turned that burden on
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its head and, again, required Mr. Lund to prove that he was competent and had
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18 capacity.
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8. The guardian ad litem has complete control over Mr. Lund’s legal
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decisions and actions, together with interfering with Mr. Lund’s right to choose his
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22 own attorneys. Specifically, the order appointing the guardian ad litem grants to that
23 position the following powers to: (1) “facilitat[e] a new settlement agreement”; (2)
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determine “whether the Court can grant Bradford’s request to appoint” a trustee; (3)
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26 “provide the Court with a report on how to streamline future litigation” if a new
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5 refusal to provide information regarding the Nevada Trust or any other reason”; (6)
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determine “whether the interim stay should be lifted” on the 1992 Trust case; (7)
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whether approval of the settlement could be conditioned on a court order before
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9 decanting of assets in the Nevada Trust; and (8) representing Mr. Lund “on any
10 appeal of this order.” (Exhibit C, p. 18-19).
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9. Despite the lack of evidentiary basis for the deprivation of Mr. Lund’s
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13 liberty, Mr. Lund was forced into the de facto custody of a guardian ad litem. The
18 even a hearing, before subjecting him to the losses of liberty by appointing a guardian
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ad litem; (2) set effective limits for the de facto custody of a guardian ad litem,
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including limits on the duration; and (3) provide any post-deprivation remedy; and (4)
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26 Mr. Lund’s constitutional and civil rights have been violated by a public official
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1 under color of law and thus, such actions cannot be allowed to stand in a nation of
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laws, not men; in a nation that cares about the constitution and the rule of law.
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Therefore, Mr. Lund brings this complaint as follows:
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5 JURISDICTION
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11. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.
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13 relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory
14 relief was unavailable.” In the present matter, declaratory relief is available and that
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is the only relief requested. See Yellen v. Hara, No. CV 15-00300 JMS-KSC, 2015
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WL 8664200 (D. Haw. Dec. 10, 2015).
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18 In Yellen, the judicial officer was named as a party and the case was not
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dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1
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There, the Yellen court stated:
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22 Applied here, although state proceedings are ongoing, they are not “quasi-
criminal enforcement actions,” nor do they “involve a state's interest in
23 enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id. This action involves
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25 1
The claims against the judge were dismissed because the plaintiff was seeking
26 monetary damages and injunctive relief which are prevented. In the present case,
there are no damages or injunctive relief sought.
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10 13. Venue is proper in the United States District Court or the Central District
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of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
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14. This is an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
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14 for the purpose of determining a question of actual controversy between the parties.
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Mr. Lund seeks a declaration from this Court that the laws of the State of California,
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as executed, are unconstitutional because Mr. Lund is “in custody” by virtue of the
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18 appointment of the guardian ad litem without due process of law. This de facto
19 custody of the guardian ad litem continues despite specific findings on previous
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occasions that Mr. Lund is not incapacitated, not in need of a guardian or a
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22 conservator, together with under oath declarations from his attorneys that Mr. Lund
23 is, in fact, competent. The ongoing unwillingness to correct the custody of the
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guardian ad litem that Mr. Lund has been placed in, is a continuing deprivation of Mr.
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Lund’s due process rights.
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1 PARTIES
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15. Plaintiff, Bradford D. Lund, is and was, at all times relevant herein a
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citizen of the United States, a resident of Clark County, Nevada, and involved in
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9 17. Defendant, the Los Angeles County Superior Court, is a division of the
10 State of California.
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18. Defendants are named only in their official capacities. Defendants were
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13 acting and continue to act under color of state law in the deprivation of Mr. Lund’s
14 constitutionally protected rights. Both Defendants, Judge Cowan and the Los
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Angeles County Superior Court, are hereinafter referred to collectively as “Judge
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Cowan”.
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22 Lund Residuary Trust fbo Michelle A. Lund, FRTC as former trustee of the Bradford
23 Disney Lund 1992 Trust, and Sharon D. Lund 1986 Irrevocable Trust fbo Bradford
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D. Lund; and FRTC as a Co-Trustee of the Lillian B. Disney Trust fbo Bradford D.
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26 Lund are not named as defendants or real parties in interest because there is no
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1 pecuniary interest. Mr. Lund is not seeking any damages or any monetary interest at
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all.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
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5 Background Facts:
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20. Mr. Lund is a forty-nine-year-old man who is the heir to the fortune of
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entertainment and media pioneer Walt Disney. The litigation in California began on
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9 October 20, 2009 and the litigation in Arizona began six days later on October 26,
10 2009.
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21. Mr. Lund unquestionably prevailed in the Arizona Matter and benefited
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13 from detailed and specific findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge
14 Oberbillig. The contents of those findings are attached as Exhibit A, and specifically
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incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Judge Oberbillig found in
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pertinent part:
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8) Petitioners concede Bradford Lund has the capacity to manage all
of his activities of daily living.
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9) Michelle Lund testified in the Superior Court of California on
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December 17, 2013, that Bradford Lund is “competent” and “he ultimately
17 had the capacity to decide what he would want to do in a business sense.”
18 […]
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12) Bradford Lund is able to effectively manage his medical care,
20 estate, and other affairs. Bradford Lund has consistently demonstrated
that he makes mature and appropriate financial decisions. He properly
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relies and has relied upon the advice of his father, Sherry Lund, Rachel
22 Schemitsch, Robert Rosepink, Douglas Wiley, and others as any
reasonable person of substantial wealth would do in making important
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decisions involving his personal affairs, estate, and financial matters.
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[…]
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15) Bradford Lund, now 45, has been described by Petitioners and the
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other witnesses as a very “frugal” man with his money.
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1 16) There was no credible testimony Bradford Lund has ever wasted or
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dissipated any property or funds at any time in his life.
3 17) The weight of the credible evidence does not support Petitioners’
claim that Respondents are out to get Bradford Lund’s funds or have
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wrongfully benefitted from or improperly used his funds.
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18) There was undisputed evidence Bradford Lund’s father has assisted
6 Bradford Lund and Michelle Lund in making collectively over $100
7 million in profits.
17 Superior Court Case Nos. BP119205 (In re The Sharon D. Lund Residuary Trust fbo
18 Bradford D. Lund); BP120814 (In re The Bradford Disney Lund 1992 Trust); and
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BP129815 (In re The Sharon D. Lund 1986 Irrevocable Trust fbo Bradford D. Lund).
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There was no guardian ad litem appointed in any of the California Litigation at all.
22 Ultimately, Judge Beckloff made the following findings on the only issue presented
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that had anything to do with competence or capacity.
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25 a. “Evidence presented during the trial did not persuade the court
26 that Mr. Lund Lacked capacity to exercise his Trustee Removal Power.
While there are legal proceedings pending in Arizona to conserve Mr.
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 13 of 31 Page ID #:13
13 After having considered the evidence, the court cannot find that Mr.
Lund’s free will was overborne by another. Mr. Lund elected to exercise
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his Trustee Removal Power with the advice and assistance of his counsel.
15 Mr. Lund’s exercise is not without articulated reasons. While Mr. Lund
is dependent upon those around him, the evidence is insufficient to
16 establish that Mr. Lund is not acting of his own will and desire on the
17 issue. The court finds that Mr. Lund’s exercise of the Trustee Removal
Power was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
18
(Exhibit B, p. 35).
19
24 BP119204 (In re The Sharon D. Lund Residuary Trust fbo Michelle A. Lund);
25 BP119205; BP129814; BP129815 (collectively, the “Lund Trust Matters”).
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 14 of 31 Page ID #:14
1 25. On December 19, 2018, Judge Cowan, on his own motion, issued two
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separate orders to show cause. One of those orders to show cause involved whether
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the court should appoint a guardian ad litem for Mr. Lund (the “OSC”). Judge
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5 Cowan specifically set a hearing on the order to show cause to be heard on February
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7, 2019.2 Both Mr. Lund and the opposing party, Mr. Lund’s trustees, filed
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Responses to Judge Cowan’s OSC on February 28, 2019.
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9 26. The parties of the Lund Trust Matters all agreed to continue the OSC
10 hearing in order to engage in mediation in an effort to settle the case, or portions of
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the case. The OSC hearings were continued with Judge Cowan’s blessing pursuant to
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13 his subsequently issued order for the parties to attend mediation. No guardian ad
18 hand, and the Trustees, on the other hand, engaged in a two-day in-person mediation
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on March 25 and 26, 2019, before the Hon. Leslie Green, a retired Los Angeles
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County Superior Court Probate Judge. Additionally, the parties engaged in another
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25
26
2
That date was continued to a later date given the parties stipulation for extensions of
time for the filing of the briefing, but the hearing on the OSC never actually occurred.
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 15 of 31 Page ID #:15
1 settlement agreement himself, and the Trustees accepted his signature, without any
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guardian ad litem of any kind appointed over Mr. Lund.
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28. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the agreement was presented to
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5 Judge Cowan for approval which would finally put an end to over a decade of
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litigation between the parties to the Lund Trust Matters. For the first time in a decade
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all of the parties stood before the Los Angeles County Superior Court, and in a
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9 unified voice asked for the approval of the Settlement Agreement which would
10 finally end all of the litigation.
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29. Judge Cowan refused to approve the Settlement Agreement in its
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13 entirety and only approved portions of the same including the substantial payment of
22 Hathaway’s Estate, 111 Cal. 270, 271 (1896)). Mr. Lund had no pre-deprivation
23 remedy or any post-deprivation remedy to remove the limited purpose guardian ad
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litem.
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26
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1 32. On October 17, 2019, Mr. Lund timely filed a Petition for Writ of
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Mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Second District, regarding the
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improper appointment of a guardian ad litem. On November 14, 2019, the California
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5 appellate court summarily denied Mr. Lund’s writ petition. On November 20, 2019,
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Mr. Lund timely filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court of California
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challenging the summary denial of the writ petition. On November 26, 2019, the
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9 California high court summarily denied Mr. Lund’s petition for review.
10 33. Mr. Lund exhausted his state court remedies regarding the imposition of
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a limited purpose guardian ad litem being appointed over him.
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13 34. The imposition of the limited guardian ad litem without any hearing has
26 due to conflict”;
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5 reason”;
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f. Determine “whether the interim stay should be lifted” on the 1992
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Trust case;
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14 (Exhibit C, p. 18).
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35. The above actions by the guardian ad litem represent a deprivation of not
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only Mr. Lund’s liberty interests, but also relegates Mr. Lund into the de facto
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18 custody of guardian ad litem. Indeed, the guardian ad litem is, in fact, has already
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begun to engage in renegotiation of the settlement with the Trustees. (Exhibit D, p.
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3:15-19).
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22 36. Judge Cowan has deprived Mr. Lund of his liberty and property. The
23 Constitution imposes upon him the State’s concomitant duty to see that no
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deprivation occurs without adequate procedural protections. In this case, Judge
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26
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1 Cowan failed to assure that Mr. Lund was accorded due process prior to a loss of
2
liberty or property.
3
The 1992 Trust Litigation
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5 37. On or about, November 5, 1992, Mr. Lund began the Bradford Disney
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Lund 1992 Trust (the “1992 Trust”).
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38. Mr. Lund is the settlor of the trust and the trusts sole lifetime
8
9 beneficiary. The 1992 Trust was to pay income to Mr. Lund not less often than
10 quarterly. The 1992 Trust also required mandatory birthday distributions when Mr.
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Lund achieved the age of 35, 40, and 45.
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13 39. The 35th Birthday Distribution was for one-third of the trust estate. The
14 40th Birthday Distribution was for one-half of the trust estate. The 45th Birthday
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Distribution was for the remaining balance of the trust estate. The only exception to
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the Birthday Distributions was that if the trustees of the trust determined that Mr.
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18 Lund “has not theretofore demonstrated the maturity and financial ability to manage
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and utilize such funds in a prudent and responsible manner.”
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40. When Mr. Lund was 44 years old, and just before he was about to turn
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22 45 years old, the trustee of the 1992 Trust, Mutual of Omaha Bank, determined that
23 Mr. Lund should receive his 35th and 40th Birthday Distributions. Mutual of Omaha
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determined in their discretion that the exception, set forth above in paragraph 27, to
25
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1 41. At the same time, and in the same petition, Mutual of Omaha indicated
2
that it would make the decision on the 45th birthday distribution after Mr. Lund
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turned 45, on June 5, 2015.
4
5 42. Michelle Lund (Mr. Lund’s twin sister), the contingent beneficiary of the
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1992 Trust, filed an objection to Mutual of Omaha’s Petition for Instructions.
7
Michelle’s objection was based on her allegation that Mr. Lund did not meet the
8
9 Distribution Standard, together with the fact that there was, at that time, a protective
10 proceeding pending in Arizona.
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43. Prior to the decision by the Court on Mutual of Omaha’s petition and
12
13 Michelle’s objection, Mr. Lund removed Mutual of Omaha as trustee, and appointed
14 as replacements, Sherry Lund and James Dew to serve as trustees of the 1992 Trust. 3
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44. On September 6, 2016, the Hon. Roy L. Paul, among other things,
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ordered, “The New 1992 Trustees shall hold the Remaining 1992 Trust Assets in
17
22 otherwise owing to Brad from the 1992 Trust; and (b) the New 1992 Trustees may
23 use 1992 Trust assets to pay attorneys’ fees and costs, trustees’ fees and costs, and
24
25
26
3
Mr. Lund also appointed himself and then resigned from the role as trustee of the
1992 Trust.
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 20 of 31 Page ID #:20
1 other administrative expenses of the 1992 Trust, without prejudice to any party’s
2
right to challenge such expenses.”
3
45. The reason for Judge Paul’s interim stay was of because of Michelle
4
5 Lund’s objections in the 1992 Trust Case which have since been settled.
6
46. On September 27, 2018, Mr. Lund and Michelle settled all issues in the
7
1992 Trust case. Included in the settlement was that Michelle would not “object to
8
9 the distribution of the proceeds of the 1992 Trust by the Co-Trustees Sherry and Dew
10 to Bradford in accordance with his directives.”
11
47. The settlement between Mr. Lund and Michelle Lund put all issues,
12
14 purported creditor seeking outstanding attorneys’ fees, but have never filed an
15
affirmative pleading seeking any fees. Judge Paul’s order required a holdback of
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$600,000. Mr. Lund and Mutual of Omaha Bank settled regarding the 1992 Trust On
17
22 as a petition. The Co-Trustees of the 1992 Trust filed the Petition to Lift Interim Stay
23 on January 8, 2019.
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49. On September 27, 2019, the court effectively again denied Mr. Lund the
25
26 right to his own personal property even though there are no longer any issues
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 21 of 31 Page ID #:21
1 regarding the 1992 Trust except purported creditor issues by FRTC (former trustee of
2
the 1992 Trust) which have a specific holdback.
3
50. Mr. Lund has been denied his due process and access to his own
4
5 personal assets by the California Superior Court. Despite the resolution of all issues
6
in the 1992 Trust except the objections to the accountings filed by FRTC, the
7
California Superior Court refuses to remove its order preventing Mr. Lund from
8
11
Full Faith And Credit Clause
12
13 51. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution reads
14 in pertinent part: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
15
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
16
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
17
22 ignored the 2016 Arizona Judgment and appointed a limited guardian ad litem over
23 Mr. Lund.
24
53. Judge Cowan specifically ignored the findings made in an Arizona
25
26 Superior Court In & For Maricopa County case involving Mr. Lund. In In re The
21
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5 One. Judge Cowan specifically ignored the findings that Mr. Lund was competent,
6
had capacity, was not in need of any guardian or conservator, and “Although not his
7
burden of proof, Bradford Lund has proven that he deserves the freedom in life to
8
14 55. The Trustees and the Arizona Petitioners were in privity because they
15
had a common interest agreement between them. The privity between the Trustees
16
and Arizona Petitioners applies because a party is adequately represented for
17
18 purposes of the privity rule “if his or her interests are so similar to a party’s interest
19
that the latter was the former’s virtual representative in the earlier action.” Citizens
20
for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1070
21
22 (Cal. App. 1998). Having a common interest agreement between the Trustees and
23 Arizona Petitioners required them to have the same legal interest. See OXY Res.
24
California LLC v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 4th 874, 891 (2004) (“For
25
26 the common interest doctrine to attach, most courts seem to insist that the two parties
22
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1 have in common an interest in securing legal advice related to the same matter—and
2
that the communications be made to advance their shared interest in securing legal
3
advice on that common matter.’”). Therefore, the Arizona Petitioners and the
4
9 One of the Trustees, Andrew Gifford, was a star witness for the Arizona Petitioners,
10 and his counsel, Hayward Kaiser, was present for Gifford’s testimony. Also, it is Mr.
11
Lund’s position Trustees assisted (behind the scenes) with the strategy, planning, and
12
13 initiation of the case. Indeed, most of the exhibits submitted by the Petitioners were
22 Lund.
23 59. The Arizona Petitioners (Kristen Olson and Michelle Lund) appealed the
24
trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. On December 26, 2017, the
25
26 Arizona Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the 2016 Arizona Judgment and
23
Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 24 of 31 Page ID #:24
11
issues, among other things. Ultimately, the Arizona Court of Appeals found: “We
12 affirm the superior court’s judgment denying Olson’s petition for guardianship and
13
conservatorship.” (Exhibit E, p. 29 ¶ 82).
14
60. The Arizona appellate court in determining the guardian ad litem issue
15
16 stated: “Substantial support exists in the record showing Bradford’s interests were
17
being represented by independent counsel and his representation was adequate under
18
A.R.S. § 14-1408(A). Substantial evidence also exists demonstrating that Bradford is
19
20 not incompetent. Consistent with the court’s findings of fact and conclusion of law,
21 the record shows he understood the nature of the proceedings and was able to assist in
22
the presentation of his case. Therefore, the substantial evidence shows Bradford was
23
24 not in need of a GAL under A.R.S. § 14-1408 or Rule 17 of the Arizona Rules of
25 Civil Procedure, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s dismissal of the GAL.”
26
(Exhibit E, p. 28 ¶ 79).
24
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1 61. On January 25, 2018, the Arizona Petitioners filed a petition for review
2
in the Supreme Court of Arizona together with an emergency motion to stay the
3
distribution of assets from the Walt Disney Trust. On February 9, 2018, the Arizona
4
5 high court denied the emergency motion to stay. On August 29, 2018, the Supreme
6
Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.
7
62. On September 27, 2019, Judge Cowan appointed a limited purpose
8
9 guardian ad litem over Mr. Lund and ignored the findings made in California. Judge
10 Cowan ignoring the findings made in the Arizona Superior Court violated the Full
11
Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitution.
12
14 63. On October 17, 2019, Mr. Lund filed a Verified Statement Objecting To
15
Judge David Cowan Pursuant To Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1. See Exhibit F,
16
incorporated herein. Throughout the hearings in this case, Judge Cowan prejudged
17
18 and predetermined the issues. As one example only, Judge Cowan stated: “Do I want
19
to give 200 million dollars, effectively, to someone who may suffer, on some level,
20
from Down syndrome? The answer is no.” Judge Cowan would not retract that
21
22 statement even after on of Mr. Lund’s counsel indicated that there was an
23 indisputable DNA test proving that Mr. Lund did not have Down syndrome.
24
25
26
25
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1 64. On October 24, 2019, Judge Cowan, the very same judge that Mr. Lund
2
objected to, filed an order striking his Statement of Disqualification pursuant to Code
3
of Civil Procedure § 170.4(b).
4
5 65. Mr. Lund was denied his due process through the allowance of the
6
California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.4(b) which allowed Judge Cowan to strike
7
the objection from the record.
8
9 Count One
10 (Due Process Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
11
Constitution)
12
18 person to a long term, indefinite, de facto custody; (2) fail to provide Mr. Lund with
19
procedural due process prior to taking away his liberty and property; (3) fail to
20
provide Mr. Lund with any procedural safeguards, including but not limited to, a
21
22 means to have the trial court’s decisions reviewed in a timely manner; and (4) fail to
23 provide Mr. Lund with any post-deprivation rights of direct appeal to remove the
24
appointment.
25
26
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Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 27 of 31 Page ID #:27
1 68. The Defendants’ failure to give Full Faith and Credit to the 2016
2
Arizona Judgment is a violation of Mr. Lund’s due process.
3
69. The Defendants’ acts through Judge Cowan in appointing the guardian
4
5 ad litem and refusing to release Mr. Lund from the appointment constitute violations
6
of Mr. Lund’s rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
7
Constitution not to be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of
8
9 law and to enjoy the equal protection of the laws of the State of California.
10 70. The Defendants’ acts through Judge Cowan in ignoring the 2016
11
Arizona Judgment constitute violations of Mr. Lund’s constitutional right to Full
12
13 Faith and Credit together with violations of his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
18 (Declaratory Judgment)
19
71. Mr. Lund hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 70 above as if fully
20
set forth herein.
21
22 72. The above facts demonstrate that Defendants have acted in violation of
23 Mr. Lund’s constitutional rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
24
Constitution.
25
26
27
Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 28 of 31 Page ID #:28
5 ruling, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmation of Judge Oberbillig’s ruling, and the
6
sworn declarations from Mr. Lund’s counsel that they have “directly observed that
7
[Mr. Lund] was able to understand the nature and consequences of proceedings and to
8
13 a competent adult for any period of time without a hearing are unconstitutional. See
14 Weaver by Weaver v. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys., 717 F. Supp. 1039, 1044
15
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1990).
16
17 Count Three
18
(Declaratory Judgment)
19
75. Mr. Lund hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 74 above as if fully
20
25 77. Judge Cowan reversed the burden of proof and required Mr. Lund to
26 prove that he was not incompetent. (Exhibit C, p. 19-28).
28
Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 29 of 31 Page ID #:29
1 78. Mr. Lund is entitled to declaratory judgment holding that the above
2
actions by Judge Cowan, forcing Mr. Lund to prove his competency, violated Mr.
3
Lund’s due process. See Weaver by Weaver, 717 F. Supp. at 1044.
4
5 Count Four
6
(Declaratory Judgment)
7
79. Mr. Lund hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 78 above as if fully
8
18 82. Mr. Lund is further entitled to a declaratory judgment holding that Full
19
Faith and Credit Clause applies to the Arizona Judgment.
20
Count Five
21
22 (Declaratory Judgment)
23 83. Mr. Lund hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 82 above as if fully
24
set forth herein.
25
26
29
Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 30 of 31 Page ID #:30
1 84. Pursuant to 14th Amendment all parties are entitled to have a neutral and
2
detached decision maker preside over their litigation. Judge Cowan, the subject of
3
the objection, ordered those objections stricken from the record. It is obvious that
4
9 violation of Mr. Lund’s his right to due process pursuant to the 14th Amendment to
10 the Constitution.
11
86. Mr. Lund is entitled to a declaratory judgment holding the California
12
18 described above, has violated and continues to violate Mr. Lund’s rights pursuant to
19
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
20
U.S.C. § 1983.
21
26 Amendment.
30
Case 2:20-cv-01894 Document 1 Filed 02/27/20 Page 31 of 31 Page ID #:31
5 States Constitution.
6
4. Issue a declaratory judgment finding that Judge Cowan refusing to lift
7
the stay on the 1992 Trust is an unconstitutional deprivation of property to Mr. Lund
8
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22
23
24
25
26
31