Comelec V Noynay
Comelec V Noynay
Comelec v Noynay
G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Balbune incorrectly cited a decision of
the Supreme Court: “x x x whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election
offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, x x x”
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states: “x x x in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,"
245 SCRA 286 x x x”
Issue: Whether incorrect citing of a decision of the Supreme Court violates the duties to the court?
Ruling: Yes. If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the
complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza nor Alberto alone, but ALBERTO
NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 but in volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were findings of the SC
when it is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
Doctrine. In relation to Legal Research, this case is relevant in that it zoomed in on the judge’s
misreading of the law and on the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate that judges should be studious in the
principles of law and office administration in due regard of legal system integrity, respectively. As well,
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates them to be faithful to the law and to
maintain professional competence. The above actions of Hon. Noynay contradicts these provisions.
Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that lawyers
should not misquote or represent court rulings. In its MR, COMELEC through its counsel Atty.
Balbuena cited Alberto v. Judge Lavilles. In this citation, however, the present court finds that errors
persist. One, that the plaintiff in the case is Alberto Naldoza not Alberto Naldeza or Alberto as used by
the COMELEC lawyer. Two, that that case is 254 of SCRA not 245. And third, in its ascription of a
Court Administrator’s Memo as the Court’s ruling.
2. Tiongco v. Aguilar
Facts:
1. Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He characterized the decision of respondent Judge as “having been crafted in
order to fool the winning party”; as a “hypocritical judgment in plaintiff’s favour”; one with
“perfidious character.”
2. Tiongco described respondent as a liar, perjurer or blasphemer
Ruling:
1. The duty contemplated in Canon 11 is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer’s oath “to
conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts,” his duty under Section 20(b) of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers,” and his duty under the first canon “to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.
2. The use of unnecessary /offensive and abusive/abrasive and offensive language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of
the Court and to degrade the administration of justice by the Court.
3. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious
insinuation against this Court. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not
given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who seems to be of that frame
of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be
right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views.
4. Tiongco was ordered to pay fine of Php 5,000 plus warning.
In a civil case for ejectment and damages, Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren was the plaintiff's counsel. Atty.
Saturnino V. Bactad, the defendant's counsel and the incumbent vice-governor of the province, and
Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty. Melinda D. Gatdula, the judge and clerk of court
respectively of the Municipal Trial Court, San Antonio, Zambales where the aforementioned civil case
was docketed.
Atty. Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct,
partiality, serious nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of duty and ignorance of the law relative to the
disposition of civil case no. 111.
On the other hand, Atty. Bactad, the defendant's counsel, was charged by the complainant with false
representation and employing scheme to defeat the application of the Rule on Summary Procedure the
latter alleging Atty. Bactad's claim and false representation that a motion to dismiss is an allowable
pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Proceedings.
Court "DISMISSED the case without prejudice to the refiling of an administrative case at the proper
time, it appearing that the case is on appeal with the RTC … where relief is available". Atty. Boquiren
filed an MR.
SC Ruling:
The Court strongly notes the excessive prose employed by complainant Atty. Boquiren in his MRs
describing the Court's Resolutions as: "highly questionable"; "based on insufficient or incorrect
reasons"; "a classic arbituarily concluded resolution", "a glaring violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics"; "pregnant with aptness to mislead, deceptive or delusive quality"; "patently erroneous"; "a
BRAZEN LIE and MOCKERY OF JUSTICE" "classic carelessness, inefficiency, if not lack of
industry on the part of Special Asst. to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the 3rd Div. and/or to the
adjudication officer/office"; "mirror[ing] the Adjudicating Tribunal's and/or its staff's BRAZEN
MOCKERY OF JUSTICE with their gross violation of the PUBLIC INTEREST POLICY of the
State"
It appears prima facie that the foregoing words are aimed at seriously undermining the integrity of this
Court. Complainant seems to have forgotten his duty, as a lawyer and as an officer of the court, to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers (Canon 11, Code of
Professional Responsibility).
Atty. is ordered to explain within 5 days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be
cited for contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.
4. ACME SHOE V. CA
The contempt aspect of this case arose from the motion for reconsideration of 6 June 1994 which Atty.
Fortes filed. He sought therein the reconsideration of the resolution of 11 May 1994 which the court
denied the instant petition. He contends that "the petition was denied wholly on the basis of
technicality"; that the "denial did not consider the fraud sought to be stopped"; and that in
peremptorily denying the petition, this Court disregarded the purpose of judicial proceedings, i.e., "to
seek the truth," even as it is "unusual that the Resolution failed on this aspect," and upheld" the fake
and falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons." He further stated therein that:
“it pained the petitioners and their counsel to surmise that nobody cared to read the Petition. If they
did they refused to understand the arguments in order not to blur the preconceived resolution of this
case.”
In the resolution the Court (a) denied with finality the motion to reconsider the resolution of 11 May
1994 which denied the instant petition for the failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the
respondent court committed any reversible error in rendering the challenged decision, and (b) directed
the counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Mario G. Fortes, to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court and declared liable for misconduct for his "apparently malicious and unfounded
accusation that this Court did not read the petition and for craftily suppressing from the body of the
petition the final decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fortes should be held in contempt of court and declared liable for
misconduct?
HELD: Yes. Ordered to pay a fine of (P2, 000.00) and warned that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Indisputably then, Atty. Fortes' sole purpose was to show and prove his clients that he was all the time
correct and this Court dismally wrong not only for veering away from the true purpose of judicial
proceedings and suppressing the truth and upholding and illegal title, but, worse, for not even reading
the petition or if it did, for not understanding it in order to hide its prejudgment of the case. In so
doing upon a matrix of false and unfounded premises, Atty. Fortes did an immeasurable disservice to
this Court by putting it into dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminishing public confidence
or promoting distrust in the Court, and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them
without violating their duty to render justice.
Thus, Atty. Fortes deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts and his duties
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Section 20, Rule
138, Rules of Court; Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility), observe candor, fairness and
good faith to the courts (Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility), and to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance (Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics). A client's cause
does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society,
their first duty is not to their clients as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their
client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.
FACTS: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was
charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required to answer
the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court
granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following
acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients (The Fortunados), to pay all expenses, including
court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation.
xxx
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former clients (The Fortunados), to enter into a contract with
him for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in the case, claiming that he
acquired 50% interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the clients (Fortunados), while knowing fully well
that the said property was already sold at a public auction and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City;
xxx
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses,
for the suit, including court fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.
HELD: YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO: The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to
Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree
with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same
should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados,
however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s
rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have
part of the thing in dispute. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between
the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, it was concluded that in the document filed by respondent
with the CFI, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement were made to
appear as having signed the original document. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and
complainant who signed the original and duplicate original and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado
and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado
only signed the xerox copy after respondent asked them to sign. Respondent acknowledged that
Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed,
the alleged true copy. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy, he knowingly
misled the Court into believing that the original was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor
Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at
all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by
an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22,
Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
7. CEIC v CA
8. Tan v. CA
9. Mariveles v. Mallari
10. Gabriel v. CA
11. Paas
Decision: The judge allowed her husband to ride on her prestige for the purpose of advancing his
private interests.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity
for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rationale: to protect the good name and reputation of the lawyer and the judge for such will surely lead
to misconstruction of motives. The observant public may jump to conclusions that such action is in
anticipation of a reciprocation from the judge. A lawyer should not also seek opportunity to cultivate
familiarity with the judges. He must not infiltrate the circles of the judges in hop of influencing them in
legal maters.
Examples:
1. Joining associations or clubs where judges are members.
2. Making the judges the godfathers of their children.
A lawyer who resorts to such practice of seeking familiarity with judges dishonours the profession, and
the judge who consents to them is unworthy of his high office.