THE EMERGENCE OF THE MARATHAS, SHIVAJI & EXPANSION UNDER THE

PESHWAS

QUESTIONS –

2003 – 1) Examine the social background to the rise of the Maratha movement
during the 17th century.

2) Discuss the nature of the Maratha state under the Peshwas.

2004 – Account for the rise and fall of the Marathas during the period from
1707 to 1761.

2005 – Examine the nature of the Maratha movement in the 17th century and
the role of Shivaji in the rise of the Marathas.

2006 – Discuss the rise of the Maratha power under the Peshwas. What led to
the decline of the Marathas?

2007 – Critically evaluate the achievements of Shivaji in the light of the Maratha
movement.

2008 – Discuss the nature of the Maratha polity in the 17th century. How far did
the rise of Peshwas mark a significant change in the policy?

2009 – Elucidate the social and political background to the rise of the Maratha
movement during the 17th century.

2010 – Discuss the Maratha state under the first 3 Peshwas.

2011 – Discuss the nature of the Maratha polity in the 17th century. How far
did the rise of the Peshwas mark a significant change in this polity?

INTRODUCTION –

The Marathas who dominated Deccan politics in the 17th and 18th century
emerged as a result of a remarkable socio political phenomenon. The rise of the
Marathas and the establishment of an independent Maratha state in 1674 is
closely associated with the rise of Shivaji.. Prior they had not been able to setup

The Marathas 1
well established independent states of their own and were seen as powerful
local chiefs and potential allies rather than autonomous rulers.

Historical evidence about the Marathas dates back to the 3rd century BC with
the first reference to them as a social and political group during the time of the
Yadavas. However the origins of the Marathas have been ambiguous and there
was considerable debate among contemporary writers of that period as to
whether the term Maratha applied to specific people or anyone coming from
modern day Maharashtra. Sabhasad, a contemporary writer during Shivaji’s
period made a clear distinction between the Marathas and the Brahmins.
Ramdas, an important Bhakti saint and the spiritual guide of Shivaji used the
term Marathas in an all comprehensive way by referring to all those who speak
Marathi. Thus, it is evident that the background regarding the Marathas is far
from clear.

RISE OF THE MARATHAS –

INTRODUCTION – The rise of the Marathas in the 17th century is a matter of

great debate and there are a number of views on it. An important view that has
been put forward by many historians is that the rise of the Marathas was
gradual and was not a sudden event. Traditional historians such as Jadunath
Sarkar emphasize the role of Shivaji in the emergence of the Marathas.
Colonial writers such as Grant Duff attributed the rise to favourable
circumstances while Nationalist writers such as R.C. Majumdar and M.
Sardesai viewed it as a reaction to Aurangzeb’s religious policies. M.G.
Ranade views it as a Maratha National Movement aimed against the foreign
rule of the Mughals. Satish Chandra is of the view that it was a caste
movement and speaks of the social base of Shivaji’s supporters. Andre Wink
looks upon the rise as a result of fitna while other historians have referred to
the Bhakti movement as providing an ideological background to the
emergence of the Marathas.

FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES – European historian, Grant Duff attributed

the rise of the Marathas to favorable circumstances in the Deccan. Duff terms

The Marathas 2
the Marathas as free booters and plunderers who were driven by the lure of
wealth. It was their cunning nature, plundering activities and the decline of the
Deccan sultanates that led to the emergence of the Marathas. However, Duff
gave only a cursory review of the period of the rise of Shivaji and thus
downplayed continuities with prior kingdoms in Maharashtra.

THE RISE OF THE MARATHAS AS A GRADUAL EVENT (POLITICAL

BACKGROUND) – It has been put forward by many historians that the rise of
the Marathas was not a sudden event but a long drawn process. It is true that
the emergence of the Marathas as an independent state took place under
Shivaji, but one must look at the ground work laid by the earlier Maratha
chiefs such as Shahji Bhonsle, Shivaji’s father. The political texture of the
17th century Maharashtra to the specific events of the Sultanates of Bijapur
and Ahmadnagar, set the stage for the rise of the Marathas and Shivaji, the
founder of the Maratha polity.

The recruitment of Marathas into the administration of the Deccani

kingdoms started in the Yadava period, continued in the Bahamani period
and under Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, they were recruited in large numbers in
the service of the state. There was constant conflict amongst the kingdoms
which created a need for the use of Marathas who knew the terrain well.
Maratha families like the Mores, Bhonsles and Nimalkars all came into
prominence and exercised local authority in many areas. Their position
improved as the various kingdoms and the Mughals competed for their
support.

Shivaji’s grandfather Maloji was a petty horseman under the Jadhavs and rose
in the service of Malik Amber, whose troops were virtually all Marathas. An
important step in the rise of the family was the grant of the Mokasa or
revenue rights of Sholapur and Pune to Shahji Bhonsle by Malik Amber in
1622. In 1630 Shahji defected to the side of the Mughals after the murder of
his in laws and patrons but his alliance was short lived. Subsequently he
defected to Bijapur and emerged as the kingmaker in the Nizam Shahi
dynasty. However after the treaty of Bijapur with the Mughals in 1636, Shahji
had to give up the areas of Ahmadnagar he dominated, and he joined the

The Marathas 3
Bijapur service in accordance with an important clause that he would be
posted as far away from the Mughal territories.

The post 1636 period, saw the rise of Shivaji as an important political force
and this background is important for understanding the rise of the Marathas
and Shivaji and how the Bhonsles moved from being king makers to
independent kings. Thus the Marathas were able to use this state of affairs to
strengthen their position, added lands, and built armies to an extent that Shivaji
was able to consolidate his territory and established the Maratha kingdom in
1674.

ROLE OF SHIVAJI – Traditional historiography always equates the rise of the

Marathas with the rise of Shivaji. Shivaji was born in 1630 and the early years
of his childhood were ones of constant warfare and famine in Maharashtra.
He started his career in 1647 by administering his father’s jagir of Pune. One
of Shivaji’s first acts directly challenged the Bijapuri government which was
in crisis and he also struck against rival Maratha families. Shivaji continued
his consolidation of his father’s jagir by taking control of forts the most
important being Purandar. Around the 1650s, the Marathas were not an
independent power but Shivaji began to gain in stature and successfully
crushed any opposition to his control of the Pune region.

Shivaji began his real career of conquest in 1656, when he acquired the jagir
of Javli from the More family strengthening his position further. According to
Stewart Gordon, the period from 1655-60 was an extraordinarily confused
time in both the politics of the Bijapur state and in the larger politics of the
whole of Maharashtra. Bijapur was under attack by a Mughal army led by
Aurangzeb which saved Shivaji from Bijapuri reprisals. Shivaji entered
negotiations with Aurangzeb offering to keep passes open and his services in
return for recognition of his rights in the Pune region. A peace treaty was
signed between Bijapur and the Mughals in 1657 by which Bijapur ceded to
the Mughals all the territory it had conquered from Ahmadnagar. At the
same time, Shivaji made deep inroads into Mughal areas, seizing rich booty
and territory in the name of the Mughals. Thus the nature of Shivaji’s

The Marathas 4
interaction with the Mughals during this period gave an insight to the nature
of Shivaji’s ambitions.

It is clear that the Mughals were not keen to see the rise of a powerful
Maratha state on their frontier and Bijapur too, was particularly concerned
with Shivaji’s entry into the coastal regions of Konkan. Shivaji’s movement
for independence was high on the list of problems and Bijapur finally took
action in 1659 when Afzal Khan, a premier noble led an army of about 10000
troops to crush Shivaji. After negotiations, Afzal Khan and Shivaji agreed to
meet each other but convinced it was a trap, Shivaji went prepared and
murdered Khan. Thereafter his troops fell on the unsuspecting Bijapuri
army which they slaughtered leading to an escalated conflict with Bijapur.
Shivaji followed this by consolidating his hold on the Konkan. In mid 1659,
Aurangzeb sent Shaista Khan, the Mughal governor in the Deccan to invade
Shivaji’s dominions. He was initially successful but in 1663, Shivaji executed a
daring night attack on Shaista Khan’s camp, wounding and putting him into
disgrace. In spite of continuing Mughal pressure, within a few months of the
earlier attack, Shivaji launched an attack on Surat which was an important
trade port. Thus the twin insults turned Shivaji from a minor regional
irritation to a major problem for the Mughal Empire.

The Mughal response came in the form of a large army commanded by Jai
Singh, one of the best generals of the period. Satish Chandra said that Jai Singh
did not underestimate the Marathas and made careful diplomatic and
military preparations. Through 1665, he pursued a multi-pronged offensive
against the Marathas and besieged the large fort of Purandar. Although the
Mughals recognized that Shivaji was an important factor to be dealt with the
larger objective was the conquest of Bijapur and Golconda. Subsequently,
the Treaty of Purandar was signed and Shivaji had to agree to the terms.
Shivaji was asked to surrender some of his forts, lands and possessions and his
son was given a high mansab. He was exempted from attendance at the
Mughal court in return to promising to join personally in any Mughal campaign
in the Deccan. The Treaty was not a surrender of Shivaji to Mughal imperial
might but the result of extended negotiation which reflected the power
realities of Maharashtra and Jai Singh’s overall strategy for the conquest.

The Marathas 5
By the end of 1665, Jai Singh didn’t like the situation in Maharashtra and was
worried about Shivaji defecting and suggested to the Mughal Emperor
Aurangzeb that he be forced to visit Agra. At the Agra court, things went badly
from the very first day as there was a difference in Shivaji’s position as
perceived by Shivaji and Aurangzeb. The situation deteriorated further and by
July 1666, Shivaji escaped from the Mughal court. His Agra visit proved to be
the turning point in Mughal-Maratha relations. Back in the Deccan, Shivaji did
not attack the Mughals immediately and the following three years were ones of
peace which broke down in 1670 when Shivaji launched a vigorous offensive.
He attacked Surat for a second time and not only recovered the powerful fort
of Purandar but also made deep inroads into Mughal territories such as
Khandesh, Berar and Baglan. Shivaji also renewed his contest with Bijapur.

In 1674, Shivaji was coronated and from being a petty jagirdar, he was now
the most powerful among the Maratha chiefs. The formal coronation
transformed Shivaji into a legitimate and independent leader and the
Maratha state into a nation. It raised the status of Shivaji by the virtue of the
extent of his dominions and the size of his army, as an important power in the
Deccan and a rallying point for the Marathas. He decided to have himself
crowned as a Hindu king, a Kshatriya king and at a stroke solve his minor
problems of authority over Brahmins and major problems of authority over the
large Deshmukh families. Shortly after his coronation, Shivaji undertook a bold
new venture and planned the invasion of Karnataka. Although Shivaji had
assumed the title of the protector of the Hindu faith, he plundered mercilessly
the Hindu population of the area. According to Sabhasad, he annexed huge
amounts of territory and captured booty which was beyond computation. The
Karnataka expedition was Shivaji’s last and he died in 1680. He left a kingdom
with a full treasury, more than a hundred forts in the Ghats, the Desh and the
Konkan, and more tenuous possessions and rights east and south into
Karnataka. Through his charismatic leadership, successful campaigning
and administrative pressure, he had built up a strong Maratha state. The
above events show that the rise of the Marathas was gradual and a result of a
long, protracted struggle. Although the rise of Shivaji did play a very important

The Marathas 6
role it was also attributed to the determined efforts of the predecessors of
Shivaji. Their emergence was in no way a result of chance and circumstances.

REACTION TO AURANGZEB’S RELIGIOUS POLICY – One of the most popular

theories regarding the rise of the Marathas was presented by the Nationalist
historians – R.C. Majumdar and D.R. Sardesai, who viewed it as a reaction
to the religious policies adopted by Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb followed a policy
that was intolerant and bigoted. Later day Marathi sources also emphasized
a religious angle to the rise of the Marathas. The only contemporary account
available is the one given by Sabhasad, who mentioned Shivaji as being an
incarceration of Mahadev or Shiva. Such sources are used by Sardesai to
affirm that Shivaji adopted the title of ‘haindava-dharmoddaraka’ or
redeemer of the Hindu dharma.

However this view has been critiqued by a number of historians. Firstly,

Majumdar and Sardesai overlooked the socio-political factors and
overemphasized Aurangzeb’s bigotry. It is believed that Aurangzeb wanted
to build an alliance with the Marathas but other elements in his court such
as Jahanara and Shaista Khan opposed this. Secondly, according to Satish
Chandra the nationalist theory lacked a historical basis. The early phase of
Maratha expansion occurred during the reign of Shah Jahan and Jahangir
which was a period when the state followed a policy of religious tolerance.
Although Shivaji assumed the title of ‘haindava-dharmoddaraka’ there is no
reason to think that Shivaji was setting himself as a champion of the Hindus,
intent to fight the narrow religious policies of Aurangzeb. In fact the titles
adopted by Shivaji were to gain legitimacy over the Hindu population that he
ruled. Thus the religious policy of Aurangzeb is not an adequate explanation
for the rise of the Marathas.

RESULT OF A MARATHA NATIONAL MOVEMENT –M.G. Ranade presented it

as a result of a Maratha Nationalist Movement. Ranade held that in the 17th
century, the Marathas emerged from a political, social and religious
renaissance. They represented an incipient nationalism and Shivaji’s
resistance to the Mughal Empire was that of an emerging nation to foreign
domination. However, this theory too has its fair share of criticism. Firstly, it

The Marathas 7
would be problematic to define the Mughals as foreigners if the nationalist
movement was aimed against them. If the Marathas considered the Mughals as
foreigners then why did they accept the rule of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar who
were as foreign as the Mughals. Satish Chandra suggests that this period was
marked by the absence of a strong middle class, which is generally
associated with a nationalist movement. Lastly, nationalism is a modern
concept and therefore cannot be applied so easily to the context of the 17 th
century. However, one cannot deny a regional feeling or a sense of
brotherhood that was shared by the Marathas.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND – Satish Chandra tried to trace the rise of the Marathas
in terms of the social conditions and undertook a detailed study to prove this.
According to him, the Maratha society was deeply fragmented and the polity
was a highly decentralized one. He spoke of the social base of Shivaji’s
supporters which included several prominent Maratha chiefs and their
families who were initially associated with the Deccani kingdoms. They were
attracted by the common cultural base of the Marathas and that the Deccani
kingdoms were on the verge of decline. When Shivaji came to power he had to
contend with decentralization and he took definitive steps to control the
zamindars who indulged in revenue farming, which helped him establish direct
links with the peasantry. He destroyed forts of the strong Deshmukhs and
Deshpandes. Shivaji was successful in controlling the bigger Deshmukhs but
this doesn’t mean that the zamindars ceased to play an important role in
revenue collection. Satish Chandra’s argument seems flawed as no state in the
medieval period was able to do away with the landed intermediaries.

Sardesai is of the view that although Shivaji was opposing the bigger
Deshmukhs at the political level but at the social level he adopted a
conciliatory policy by fostering marriage alliances among prominent families.
Satish Chandra suggests that the acceptance of these alliances points towards
the growing influence of Shivaji and that the Maratha society was an open
one. Chandra also studied the caste composition of the region. Apart from the
Brahmins who were the landowners there were two other castes – the Kumbis
and the Kolis, who were a part of the deprived sections of society and aspired
for a higher status. The Marathas who did not get Kshatriya status were

The Marathas 8
aspiring for that. Thus it was a two way process and resulted in the growth of
the cadre of Shivaji and in turn made the Marathas a force to reckon with.

RESULT OF FITNA – Andre Wink looks upon the rise of the Marathas as a
result of fitna which can be explained as a practice of forging alliances. It
was the ability of the Marathas to forge favorable alliances that provided an
impetus to their rise.

IDEOLOGICAL BASIS – The Bhakti movement provided the ideological basis

for the emergence of the Marathas. It shunned the caste system and
emphasized the equality of all men before God. There was a rise in the
popularity of Bhakti saints such as Tukaram, Dyaneshwar, Namdev and
Gyandas who promoted the use of vernacular leading to the development of
vernacular literature and cultural homogeneity. This fostered a sense of
unity among the Marathas. The Bhakti movement did not refer to any
political question but still created an environment for regional
consciousness which helped create the notion of a Maratha state.

AGRARIAN CRISIS – An economic factor that contributed to the rise of the

Marathas was the agrarian crisis in the Deccan in the 17th century. Irfan Habib
and Athar Ali look upon it as a peasant movement. There was a great famine
in 1630 that forced a large section of the peasantry to migrate to other areas
with some of them joining Shivaji in the prospect of wealth and an
improvement in social status. Habib suggests that an abandonment of
cultivation led to the rise of the Marathas as a fallout of the inherent
contradictions of the agrarian system.

CONCLUSION – The advent of the Marathas as a potent force in Deccan in the

17th century was not a mono causal event. It cannot be dismissed as a result
of chance circumstances or attributed to a single figure of Shivaji. It is true
that Shivaji gave the Maratha state a concrete shape but the rise was dictated
by a number of factors that played specific roles in strengthening the
movement. These included the role of socio-economic factors, of Aurangzeb’s
policies and of the Bhakti movement which cannot be ignored. The Marathas in
the later years expanded northwards and their power was manifested in the
Maratha state under the Peshwas.

The Marathas 9
NATURE OF THE MARATHA STATE –

The Marathas emerged as a fierce and potent force and remained the most
prominent political and military force in India from the decline of the Mughals
till their eventual defeat at the hands of the British. There are various
viewpoints on the nature of the Maratha state.

VINCENT SMITH AND JADUNATH SARKAR – Colonial writers like Vincent

Smith felt that the Marathas never had an organised state. The chief
ambition of the Maratha chieftains was to gather as much plunder as possible.
Thus Smith characterized the Maratha state as a robber state. Jadunath Sarkar
called it a war state and said that it was an artificial unity of people attracted
by plunder.

ATHAR ALI AND IRFAN HABIB – The Aligarh School historians such as
Athar Ali and Irfan Habib, put forward the view that there was no fully fledged
Maratha state and that the Marathas were free booters, adventurers and
plunderers. According to Athar Ali, the Marathas were primarily landed
elements or zamindars rather than rulers and remained so despite the
formal coronation of Shivaji. In Irfan Habib’s view, the Maratha movement
was an armed resistance against the broader context of agrarian rebellions
facing the Mughal state in the 17th century. The Marathas represented the
zamindari element of these rebellions and therefore Shivaji did not develop
an evolved administration.

Ali and Habib who studied the Mughal state structure looked for this model
in the organization of the Maratha state as Maratha history was seen as an
offshoot of Mughal history. The absence of all the Mughal institutions such
as the mansabdari and jagirdari system, law, coinage, land revenue system and
well developed checks and balances led them to look upon the Marathas as
mere plunderers. They therefore said that there was no state under the
Marathas denied them an administration and state structure. However one
cannot deny that Shivaji did have a territorial base and a state structure.

ANDRE WINK – Andre Wink critiques the above view and points out that there
was some sort of authority and state structure. He said that there was a

The Marathas 10
notion of swarajya or self rule in the Maratha state as opposed to parajya or no
rule. According to Wink, swaraj was a fluid term as the Maratha state didn’t
have a fixed territorial boundary. In some areas, swaraj implied full political
and territorial control while in other areas it meant the exercise of zamindari
claims. In this regard he brought in his theory of fitna, which the Marathas
indigenized to a Maratha term fitwa. He said that fitna which meant the
forging of alliances, played an important role in the emergence of the Maratha
state. The Maratha notion of fitna can also be found in Kautilya’s
Arthashastra, which while referring to different forms of political
domination talks of sva-visaya or ruler’s own dominion and par-visaya or the
enemy’s dominion. The Arthashastra said that a ruler who exercised self rule
could exercise his authority over the enemy’s dominion through dana or gift
giving, sama or conciliation, bhed or sedition and dand or force. Wink says
that these were the four means by which a state could extend authority and
thus the Marathas did so through alliances or fitna wherein they got people to
accept their sovereignty without conquest. Wink held that sovereignty was
not always a result of administrative, political and territorial control but a
result of alliances.

The Marathas established their own sovereignty or swaraj, but they did so
without denying the legitimacy of the Mughal universal domain and not
shedding the claim of zamindar. Thus fitna came to be coincident with
processes of social mobility and ‘gentrification’ for a variety of groups. While
the role of alliances in the rise of Marathas needs to be acknowledged, it needs
to be qualified by the fact that given the fluidity of Deccan politics, the alliances
forged were never stable. In the case of Marathas one sees a bifurcation of
sovereignty into two forms in terms of – 1) absolute authority over certain
territories 2) nominal authority over regions where tribute was extracted and
the Marathas were accepted as sardeshmukh or zamindar figures. Therefore
this was the manner of state formation under the Marathas along with sedition
and military force to expand power. Thus Wink’s argument was seen to be
valuable a critique of Irfan Habib and Athar Ali’s views.

The Marathas 11
ADMINISTRATION UNDER SHIVAJI –

The Maratha polity as envisaged by Shivaji was essentially a centralized

autocratic monarchy with a sound system of administration. It was largely
borrowed from the administrative practices of the Deccan states and some
Mughal institutions. Shivaji was constantly engaged in building up and
expanding his kingdom and the administrative divisions adopted by Shivaji
were based on those prevalent in the Deccan.

ASHTAPRADHAN – Shivaji established the ashtapradhan or council of eight

ministers that held important administrative positions. He clearly laid
down their duties and responsibilities and they were directly responsible
to him. Shivaji assigned no separate independent powers to his ministers and
it was merely a system for dividing administrative work. The most
important official was the Peshwa or the Prime Minister, who had generalized
functions and looked after the finances, administration as well as the welfare
and interests of the state. The other ministers were –

 Amatya – in charge of revenue

 Sachiv – looked into the king’s correspondence by drafting and revising
letters and affixing royal seals on them
 Senapati – the commander in chief who was responsible for military
affairs
 Mantri – personal adviser who kept daily records of the kings doings and
court proceedings
 Samanta – foreign minister in charge of the relations with foreign
powers
 Panditrao – minister of charities and religion who looked after religious
grants and ceremonies
 Nyayadhish – minister of justice responsible for judicial affairs

According to G.S.Sardesai, in his work ‘New History of the Marathas’, the

offices of the ashtapradhan were not hereditary and they were appointed and
dismissed at the king’s pleasure. Apart from the members of the
ashtapradhan, there were other officials at the centre including the chitnis or

The Marathas 12
personal secretary to the king, the majumdar or the chief accountant and the
waqe navis who was responsible for intelligence, posts and household affairs.

DEFENCE – An important aspect was Shivaji’s organization of the defence

forces. In his army, Shivaji’s main fighting forces had two branches – troopers
and foot soldiers. Most of his soldiers were either directly selected by him or
guaranteed by those who shared his confidence. There were two main classes
of troopers, Siledars and Bargirs and large camps of troops were formed at
convenient places with thousands of horses and weapons. Spies were
attached to each regiment and were the most efficient branch of Shivaji’s
army. Shivaji preferred to give cash salaries to the regular soldiers, though
sometimes the chiefs received revenue grants. Insistence on order, implicit
obedience and the strictest discipline were the rules which distinguished
Shivaji as a ruler far in advance of his age.

Of all measures of defence the most prominent that was devised and
persistently developed by Shivaji was his system of forts. The forts which
were a major source of strength for Shivaji were carefully supervised and
became a necessary adjunct of the guerilla method he developed. Raigad, his
capital revealed the great importance which Shivaji attached to these forts and
the lavishness in their construction.

Shivaji early in his career saw the necessity of having a strong and
independent navy, for protection and for the expansion of his resources by
means of foreign trade. He was one of the few Indian rulers who tried to
develop a navy and realized that without a navy he would not be able to
control the places where trade and commerce were located. Nor would he be
able to defend the coast from the depredations of the Siddis of Janjira. Though
most of Shivaji’s efforts at sea were confined to battles to seize Janjira and its
neighboring areas, he also used his ships for plunder.

REVENUE SYSTEM – Shivaji’s revenue system seems to have been patterned

largely on the system devised by Malik Amber. According to Stewart Gordon,
there was a certain amount of continuity in revenue collecting procedures with
the Deccani kingdoms in terms of methods of assessing land, categories of land
and so on. For revenue collection purposes, there was a division of territory

The Marathas 13
into three main provinces or subas. These were divided into tarafs under a
tarafdar or havaldar and a taraf was further divided into mauzas. The
assessment of revenue was made after a careful survey and classification of the
lands. The share of the state was fixed at two-fifths of the gross produce,
which when converted into cash amounted to 1/3rd of the total value of the
crop. However when Shivaji abolished other cesses, a consolidated share of
40 percent was claimed by the state. The cultivator was given the option of
paying either in cash or kind.

Besides the land revenue, Shivaji had other sources of income of which the most
important were the chauth and sardeshmukhi. These two claims were
central to the development of the Maratha polity and were levied on those
living outside Maratha kingdom as a safeguard against Shivaji's forces
plundering or raiding their territory. The chauth was the contribution which
came to one fourth of the land revenue or produce of an area. It was in the
nature of zamindari charges and no government could concede chauth and
retain dominant control of the countryside. Another claim based on zamindari
rights was Shivaji’s claim of sardeshmukhi, defined as 10 percent of the
government’s share of the revenue. It was based on the notion that Shivaji
was the head and possessed superior rights over all the deshmukhs of Central
Maharashtra.

It has been argued by many historians including Ranade and S.N.Sen that
Shivaji abolished feudalism in his dominions. Sen says that Shivaji made it a
rule not to assign any jagir to any officers civil or military. This notion is based
on a single statement made by Sabhasad which read that the mokasa or
revenue grants would have created disorder among the rayat – cultivators
or landholders, and led them to assume power and rebel. Therefore ‘no
mokasa was to be given to anyone’. He also established direct links with the
peasantry by appointing government agents to collect the land revenue.

Satish Chandra, who critiqued the above view, said that mokasa rights in the
Deccani kingdoms referred to three types of grants – 1) when revenue rights
or share in revenue was given in lieu of salary 2) revenue rights given on
condition of service or in entirety 3) mokasa rights given to high

The Marathas 14
grandees/officials. Chandra says that on a close reading of Sabhasad’s view
when he said that no mokasa rights were given, he was probably referring to
the second category which Shivaji was also opposed to. There was a lot of
documentary evidence suggesting that Shivaji did make grants so it would be
incorrect to say that no grants were made during his time. Chandra also
critiqued the argument about the direct links with the peasantry. He said
that Shivaji may have restricted the rights of the big chieftains in favour of the
peasantry and the petty chiefs. However the establishment of direct links with
the peasantry in the medieval period was very hard.

There is also reference to another term – saranjam, which was the most
common kind of grant. It was issued at the village level for people who
claimed a share of village revenue and could be for land collectors, measurers
as well as to Shivaji’s soldiers and havaldars in lieu of their salary. Therefore,
Chandra believes that it would be incorrect to say that Shivaji was able to do
away with the feudal system altogether as the zamindari class was very
powerful. Thus Shivaji’s efforts were towards reforming the existing system
to make it work better rather than trying to create a new one.

ESTIMATE OF SHIVAJI’S CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS –

Shivaji’s setting up of an independent Maratha state, out of a marginal

frontier area of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar and to hold it against the vastly
superior forces of Bijapur and the Mughal Empire was no mean achievement.
Shivaji’s coronation was an important step in the further growth of Maratha
national sentiment. According to Sardesai, Shivaji quickly transformed the
lawlessness of the Maratha people into a national solidarity by his
unequalled leadership enabling them to attain the foremost place among the
various races of India. It was possible because Shivaji was able to gather the
support of wide sections in Maharashtra, thereby winning over many of the
powerful deshmukh families which were initially opposed to him.

Shivaji was an able general of extraordinary personal charisma, a skillful

tactician and a shrewd diplomat. He was not only a successful and courageous

The Marathas 15
leader of men but also evolved a strategy that consistently baffled and
defeated armies sent against him. His administrative and military systems
perfectly suited to his Maratha kingdom were his own creation, usually
associated in our day with a civilized state. He certainly was a champion of
Hinduism but was no bigot and treated all religions with equal respect.
Shivaji’s administration did not have any specifically Hindu character but a
popular base. His modernizing spirit is well exemplified in the significant titles
he adopted at his coronation. The chief of every Maratha clan used to be
addressed as Raja but Shivaji to assert his over lordship assumed the title of
Chhatrapati. Shivaji stands out unmistakably as a unique personality, not
only in his own time but in the modern age as a whole. Thus Jadunath Sarkar
said that Shivaji was the central power house of the new Maharashtra and
not only the maker of the Maratha nation but also the greatest constructive
genius of medieval India.

EMERGENCE OF THE PESHWAS –

The rise of the Peshwas in the 18th century marked a significant development
in Maratha politics as within a span of a few generations, the Peshwas came to
be the de facto rulers of the Marathas, and the Maratha Empire transformed
into a loose confederation of Maratha chiefs. The development of the Maratha
movement under the Peshwas is one of the most remarkable as well as
puzzling phenomena in medieval Indian history. According to Satish Chandra,
the Maratha movement can be divided into three phases. The first phase was
the struggle for the establishment and defence of Shivaji’s Swarajya. This phase
ended with Balaji Vishwanath’s journey to Delhi in 1719, with the issue of the
formal rescripts by the Mughal Emperor for the grant of Swarajya, chauth and
sardeshmukhi in the Deccan to Shahu. The second phase began with Baji Rao’s
accession to the post of Peshwa and the Maratha bid for the conquest of Gujarat
and Malwa. This phase ended in 1741, with the virtual transfer of these two
provinces to the Marathas. The third phase beginning in 1741 saw the Maratha
bid for Rajasthan, parts of Doab and Punjab upto Attock. It climaxed in the third
battle of Panipat in 1761.

The Marathas 16
When Shahu returned from from Mughal captivity following the death of
Aurangzeb in 1707 the Marathas were not a unified movement led by the
Chhatrapati but there were multiple areas of resistance by different Maratha
sardars. The office of the Peshwa became hereditary and emerged superior
to the Ashtapradhan from the time of Balaji Vishwanath. In the first half of the
18th century, as the office of the Peshwa becomes powerful and that of the
Chhatrapati weakened, the Maratha polity came to be called a Peshwa polity.
The next Peshwa, Baji Rao was the real founder of the institution of the
hereditary Peshwa and played an important role in the expansion of the
Maratha power northwards and thereby enhanced the resources of the
Peshwas. The power of the Peshwas increased and all campaigns were fought
by the Peshwas though in the name of the Chhatrapati. By 1740, when Balaji
Baji Rao became the Peshwa, two rival groups emerged – 1) those loyal to
the Chhatrapati 2) those who were loyal to the Peshwa. After the death of
Shahu, Balaji Baji Rao succeeded in eliminating the Chhatrapati. By 1755,
he agreed to give up all his powers to the Peshwa with only one demand of some
land around Satara. The Chhatrapati was now a nominal head and a pensioner
who held little control over the Maratha polity. Therefore, in the 18th century
one saw the rise of the power of the Peshwa and the decline of the Chhatrapati
and Ashtapradhan.

NATURE OF THE STATE UNDER THE FIRST THREE PESHWAS –

Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath came to power in 1713 and became the de facto ruler
of the Maratha Empire and it was from this period on that the Chhatrapati was
relegated to the status of a nominal sovereign or a ‘flag king’. He now
controlled, dominated and supervised the other ministers as the vice-regent of
the Chhatrapati. The office of the Peshwa became hereditary during the reign
of Shahu. The predominance of the Peshwa also led to the division of Maratha
sardars into two distinct categories. The old nobles such as the Angrias,
Bhonsles and Gaikwads regarded the Peshwa as their equal and obeyed him
only as a deputy of the Chhatrapati. The new nobles like the Sindhias and
Holkars regarded themselves as ‘servants of the Peshwa’.

The Marathas 17
Basically in the administrative structure of the Marathas under the Peshwas,
the Chhatrapati was the Head of the State. He was the sovereign authority in
secular and religious matters. The Peshwa as well as the Maratha chiefs owed
him allegiance, though the Peshwa himself undertook all administrative
responsibility and took decisions. All these inter-relationships form the
background of our analysis of the role of the Peshwa, as well as the various
factors which influenced his policies, position and gave a distinct character to
the Maratha administration.

Some important administrative changes took place due to the revival of the
Jagirs or saranjam system by Raja Ram. Maratha chiefs took the responsibility
of the administration of large territories outside Maharashtra. The swarajya
came under the direct control of the Peshwa. The semi-autonomous position of
Maratha chiefs gave rise to what is known as the Maratha “confederacy”.
Nominally, the Maratha state thus became a unitary monarchy in which all
administrative transmission and state policy was carried out in the name of the
Chhatrapati. But practically however, it was a loose and precarious structure
without any cohesion whatsoever.

Reorganization of administration and regulation of Maratha expansion was

done through an elaborate scheme of repartition of revenue. According to this
scheme, the revenues of the state were to be shared by the Chhatrapati and his
feudatories. The royal share was 34% while the lion’s share was taken away by
the feudatories. This system implied the placing on Maratha sardars the entire
responsibility for the collection of Chauth and sardeshmukhi. It made the Raja
virtually a pensioner dependent on his feudatories. The responsibility for the
collection of the Chauth and sardeshmukhi was divided in such a way that no
individual Maratha sardar could dominate a large compact area. The treaty,
which Balaji Vishwanath concluded on behalf of Shahu with the Mughals, is
regarded as the high-mark of statesmanship by some, while others accuse him
of converting the Maratha state into a vassal state of the Mughals.

Balaji Vishwanath died in 1720 and was succeeded by his son Bajirao. Bajirao’s
accession saw a change in the character of the Maratha movement from
defensive to offensive. Prominent in his reign was the conquest of Malwa and

The Marathas 18
Gujarat. In an attempt to give legitimacy to Maratha expansion, the Peshwa
made the Emperor grant him a Sanad or established tribute of the Chauth and
Sardeshmukhi of Malwa and Gujarat. Under Shahu’s authority Bajirao granted
Sanads to his Sardars Pawar, Holkar, and Sindhia ,allowing them to levy the two
collections and to retain the mokasa for the payment of their troops. The
conquest ended with the Treaty of Bhopal (1738) – a legal recognition of
Maratha agreement with local Zamindars for yearly tribute; The Marathas
thus made little attempt displace local powers. There were beginnings of a
centralized, performance-based civilian revenue administration, loyal directly
to the Peshwa. Subsequently the Maratha army got larger and stronger.

In order to build loyalty and keep the military, administrative and banking
agencies under Central control, Bajirao –

1) Centralized the rights granting process, pushing aside families which

held previous or alternate authority.
2) He also tried to scatter and intermix grants so that no leader could use a
compact territory as a basis for rebellion.
3) He deliberately kept the revenue settlement, collection and division
complicated, which placed his Brahmin administrators in a strong
position and made him the supreme arbitrator of disputes.
4) The Peshwa also centralized the banking system so that administrators
would have to annually come to the capital and pay their advance to the
Peshwa before proceeding to their districts.
Bajirao died in 1740 and was succeeded by his son Balaji Bajirao who
combined the policy of consolidation with an aggressive forward policy in
North India. Between 1740-48 he organized four expeditions to the North, and
after the death of Shahu, succeeded in dislodging the Raja of Satara and
assuming his sovereignty. The capital shifted from Satara to Poona.

The epicenter of the Peshwa’s administration was his secretariat at Poona,

which was known as the ‘Huzur Daftar’. It was divided into several departments
and bureaus, employing a large army of staff members. Within the Huzur Daftar
were preserved the records of all branches of administration. The secretariat
dealt with matters relating to revenue and expenditures, the delineation of
public revenues and the budget of civil, military and religious establishments.
As the de facto Head of the State, the Peshwa arbitrated upon a number of social

The Marathas 19
issues affecting religion and social custom such as the remarriage of widows,
dowry, adoption etc. Another significant step was the introduction of banking
and credit facilities, which were of crucial importance to Shahu’s
administration for military and civil expenditures of a developing state.

The old self-supporting village community did not lose its importance during
the rule of the Peshwas.

1) Patil: Chief Revenue Officer, Chief Police Magistrate as well as the

Chief judicial officer. He also acted as the intermediary between the
villagers and the Peshwa administration.
2) Kulkarni – the village clerk and record keeper.
3) The Potedar tested coinage for any illegal debasement.
4) A group of 12 artisans or Balutas were responsible for the industrial
requirements of the village. In return they received a share of the crops
and other prerequisites in return for their services.

The District and provincial administration under the Marathas was of crucial
importance for the Marathas. Tara Pargana, Sarkar and Subah have been used
to denote administrative divisions. Mamlatadars were responsible for bigger
divisions, Kamavisdars were responsible for smaller divisions. They were
directly subordinate to the Huzur Daftar (except in certain cases). The
Sarsubhadar was in charge of all branches of the district administration along
with the some social and religious responsibilities. The Deshmukhs
maintained records relating to estates, alienation and transfer of property and
were called for in all disputes connected with lands. Their rights were nested
rights, also including adjudication, troops, ritual leadership. Hence the
administration wove grantee/holders into the fabric of rural society.

The principal sources of revenue during the Peshwa period were land
revenue, miscellaneous taxes such as horse tax and marriage tax, custom
duties and income drawn from forests, private mints, and fees for
administering justice. These sources were supplemented by the Chauth and
Sardeshmukhi. The proceeds of the Sardeshmukhi were originally reserved for
the state, while the proceeds from the Chauth were divided into four shares (the

The Marathas 20
Head of the State, feudal chiefs the sachiv and people who enjoyed the pleasure
of the Head of the State)

The land revenue administration under the Peshwas was carried out with
efficiency and organization. The agricultural lands in the villages were
generally divided between two classes of holders - the mirasdars and the upris.
The assessment on village lands was based on a survey of the area under
cultivation. For purposes of revenue, land was divided into three categories;
the superior, ordinary, and inferior categories. Lenient assessment was the
incentive offered for bringing wastelands under cultivation. It is important to
note that the revenue policy of the Peshwas was based on the principle of
securing the prosperity of the tax payer.

There existed a common pattern of revenue collection in the areas of stable

control. The Kamavisdar was appointed to settle and collect taxes,
adjudicate disputes and allocate funds to develop agriculture. The
Peshwa’s clerk prepared an estimate of the revenue collection for each
Kamavisdar. He did this on the basis of the detailed report provided by the
Kamavisdar. The collector then borrowed money from the Poona Banking
communities for paying the advance to the Peshwas which varied from 1/3rd to
½ of the contract. This was known as the Rasad. This money along with its
interest were to be recovered from the Kamavisdar of the district. This was
followed by the regular touring of fields, examination of crops and settling of
taxes. Documents conferring taxes were signed by village headmen who sent
the payments to the local Maratha treasures. At the end of the year, the
collector balanced the receipts against the revenue agreed upon and prepared
a balance sheet for each village.

The Maratha judicial system under the Peshwas was rudimentary and
simple. There were no codified laws or rules and procedures. In both civil and
criminal cases, decisions were based upon customs and rules drawn from
ancient smriti works. The judicial officer in the village was the ‘patil’. Above
him were the Mamlatdar and Sarsubhadar, and at the top was the Peshwa who
represented the Chhatrapati. Capital punishment seems to have been
unknown under the reign of the first three Peshwas. The village police was

The Marathas 21
under the Patil, while the district police, under the mamlatdar. In big cities, the
police was placed under the Kotwal. As far as the Maratha army is concerned,
its character underwent a total transformation under the Peshwas.

Shivaji’s army had been under strict central control since he distrusted feudal
levies. However, after Sambhaji’s death in 1689, the central control over the
army slackened and almost disappeared. The Maratha soldiers fighting against
the Mughals were now irregular groups led by different chiefs. The
feudalization of the state resulted in the feudalization of the army as well.
Although the Peshwas maintained some regiments under their immediate
control, they relied mainly on the forces provided by the feudal nobles in
terms of contracts relating to their saranjams. The racial composition of the
army also underwent a change under the Peshwas. Shivaji’s officers and
soldiers were men of his own race, coupled only with a few number of Muslims.
The Peshwas on the other hand, employed men of all races and creeds,
including foreigners. This heterogeneous army, it is important to note, could
not be inspired by the common ideal which had inspired Shivaji’s forces.
The predominance of non-Marathas in the infantry reduced the Maratha
cavalry to a secondary position. The Angrias, who were virtually independent
of the Peshwas were responsible for the development of the Maratha navy.
After Shivaji, Balaji Baji Rao had caused irreparable damage to the Maratha
naval power by crushing Taalaji Angria. However, in the second half of the 18th
century, concerted efforts were directed towards the development of a
commercial navy.

It has been pointed out by Satish Chandra that the rise of the Peshwas to
supreme power in the state and the gradual eclipse of the Maratha King and
Ashtapradhan did not imply as great a change in Maratha polity as has been
generally assumed. The Zamindars did continue to be a powerful element
in Maratha polity. Under Raja Ram and Shahu the leading officers of the state
– the Paratinidhi and the Pant Sachiv – became practically hereditary. Apart
from this, the general pattern of administration in the ‘swarajya’ territory
was more or less same as in the time of Shivaji.

The Marathas 22
The administrative machinery exposed the institutional defects in the Maratha
administration and made it vulnerable to the blight of feudalism. In the words
of S.N. Sen, “the Maratha empire ultimately became like the Holy Roman
Empire- a loose confederacy of ambitious feudal chiefs, while the Peshwa
command was met with scant respect”. The government and the army were
more calculated and fashioned to destroy rather than to create an empire. The
Peshwas could never really consolidate and bring together all the warring and
dissatisfied Maratha chiefs under their control. They could not indeed plug the
loopholes in the administrative system that they had inherited; their claim to
fill the political vaccum created by the disintegration of the Mughal empire
looks preposterous as their administration was never really was nurtured and
conditioned to carry forward the legacy of an administrative structure as strong
and long lasting as that of the Mughals. By the close of the 18th century, the
Peshwa’s paramountcy began to decline and the dominant Maratha families
began carving out independent territories and re-organizing their
administrative structures. The Third Battle of Panipat exposed the weakness of
the Marathas and the British ultimately absorbed their remaining power.
Nonetheless, the legacy of the Marathas themselves includes large-scale
migration into Maharashtra, of diverse social groups. Their heritage in tax
collection and record-keeping was carried on to the Colonial period. Last but
not the least, the stories of heroism and martial traditions fashioned the self-
image of the Marathas to this date.

The Marathas 23