Case: 10-3270 Document: 95 Page: 1 12/10/2010 164862 21

10-3270
10-3342 IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

VIACOM INTERNATIONAL INC., COMEDY PARTNERS, COUNTRY MUSIC TELEVISION,

INC., PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, BLACK ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION
LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
(caption continued on inside cover)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE MATTHEW L. SPITZER, JOHN R. ALLISON,

ROBERT G. BONE, HUGH C. HANSEN, MICHAEL S. KNOLL, REINIER
H. KRAAKMAN, ALAN SCHWARTZ, AND ROBERT E. SCOTT IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

Richard B. Kendall
Laura W. Brill (Counsel of record for Amici Curiae)
Joshua Y. Karp
KENDALL BRILL & KLIEGER LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
Los Angeles, California 90067
(310) 556-2700
 Case: 10-3270 Document: 95 Page: 2 12/10/2010 164862 21

v.
YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, GOOGLE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.

THE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION PREMIER LEAGUE LIMITED, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated, BOURNE CO., CAL IV
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, CHERRY LANE MUSIC PUBLISHING COMPANY,
INC., NATIONAL MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ ASSOCIATION, THE RODGERS &
HAMMERSTEIN ORGANIZATION, EDWARD B. MARKS MUSIC
COMPANY, FREDDY BIENSTOCK MUSIC COMPANY, dba Bienstock
Publishing Company, ALLEY MUSIC CORPORATION, X-RAY DOG
MUSIC, INC., FEDERATION FRANCAISE DE TENNIS, THE MUSIC FORCE
MEDIA GROUP LLC, SIN-DROME RECORDS, LTD., on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, MURBO MUSIC PUBLISHING, INC., STAGE
THREE MUSIC (US), INC., THE MUSIC FORCE, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

ROBERT TUR, dba Los Angeles News Service,

THE SCOTTISH PREMIER LEAGUE LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,

v.
YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, GOOGLE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE .................................................................. 1 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2 

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 4 

I.  The Language Of The DMCA’s Safe Harbor Reflects More

Than A Century Of Jurisprudence That Equates Willful
Blindness With Knowledge ................................................................... 4 

II.  From An Economic Perspective, One Who Acts Willfully To

Maintain Ignorance Should Be Held To Have The Knowledge
He Sought To Avoid ............................................................................. 7 

A.  Liability Rules That Punish A Knowing Bad Actor

Without Punishing A Willfully Blind Bad Actor Create
Incentives To Avoid Knowledge Instead Of Creating
Incentives To Reduce Harm........................................................ 7 

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 11 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES 
In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................4, 9
Mackey v. Fullerton,
7 Colo. 556 (1884) ...........................................................................................5

STATUTES 
15 U.S.C. §1117(b). ...................................................................................................2
17 U.S.C. § 504 ..........................................................................................................8
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) .................................................................................................5, 6
18 U.S.C. § 983(d) .....................................................................................................2
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) .....................................................................................................2

OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Arlen & Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes,
72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687 (1997) .........................................................................8
Charlow, Wil[l]ful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability,
70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351 (1992 .............................................................................5
Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge,
17 Mod. L. Rev. 294 (1954) ............................................................................5
Perkins, “Knowledge” as a Mens Rea Requirement,
29 Hastings L. J. 953 (1977-78) ......................................................................5
Polinsky & Shavell, law, economic analysis of, in The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume
eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2008) ......................................................................7
Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985) .....................................................................10
Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens
Rea,
81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 191 (1990).......................................................5

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Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University

Press 2004).......................................................................................................7
Shavell, liability for accidents, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., Palgrave
Macmillan 2008) ..............................................................................................7
Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of
Locating a Guilty Agent,
104 Colum. L. Rev. 459 (2004) .......................................................................7
Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2d ed. 1961) ........................................5

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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are professors and scholars who, from various perspectives, focus

their work on the economic incentives of legal liability rules, including questions

about efficiency and deterrence. They are Matthew L. Spitzer, John R. Allison,

Robert G. Bone, Hugh C. Hansen, Michael S. Knoll, Reinier H. Kraakman, Alan

Schwartz, and Robert E. Scott. A summary of the qualifications and affiliations of

the individual amici is provided at the end of this brief. Amici file solely as

individuals and not on behalf of the institutions with which they are affiliated.

Amici represent neither party in this action, and write because this appeal raises

what they understand to be a very basic and important economic question: whether

a defendant ought to be permitted to escape liability under a statute that proscribes

knowing misconduct by remaining intentionally ignorant or willfully blind. From

an economic perspective, the answer is clearly no; amici write here to succinctly

explain why.2

1
This brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for a party. No
person or entity other than amici made any monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief. Amici and their counsel were not
compensated in any way.
2
All parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Many legal rules turn at least in part on the question of whether the alleged

bad actor had knowledge of certain facts. The Lanham Act, for example,

authorizes treble damages in instances where the seller of counterfeit goods knew

that the goods were in fact counterfeit.3 The Civil Asset Forfeiture Act of 2000

prevents an owner’s property interest from being forfeited if that owner lacked

knowledge of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.4 Federal prohibitions on drug

trafficking require that the accused trafficker knew that he was peddling a

controlled substance, like cocaine, and not merely selling some harmless look-alike

substance, like sugar.5

Knowledge is a central consideration in these and many other statutes that

proscribe socially undesirable acts, for a simple and practical reason: The law can

encourage an actor who knows he is committing or contributing to a bad act to

refrain from doing so or at least to mitigate the bad act’s detrimental consequences,

whereas an unknowing actor is immune to the law’s incentives. The overall goal is

an obvious one, namely creating an incentive for informed parties to act well, and

to avoid acting badly.

3
15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
4
18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
5
21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

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To achieve this goal, it is necessary that a bad actor not be permitted to

avoid liability merely by choosing to be willfully blind to the knowledge on which

the law depends. If the law were otherwise, bad actors would readily and actively

embrace ignorance and thereby exacerbate harm. Willful blindness – whether

called “intentional ignorance,” “conscious avoidance,” or any other talismanic

phrase – is thus in obvious tension with the law’s underlying purpose. In order to

incentivize the proper behavior the law is seeking, those who choose willful

blindness over knowledge must still face liability of equal consequence.

This thesis is uncontroversial. Willful blindness is widely understood to be

tantamount to specific, culpable knowledge, as our law-and-economics colleague

Judge Richard Posner has said explicitly from the bench. We write only to add

that this pervasive body of law gets the analysis exactly right: When a legal rule is

keyed to knowledge, the goal is not to promote taking active steps to ensure

ignorance and discourage knowledge. Rather, the law underscores the fact that

knowledge should be used to reduce harm and that one who acts wrongfully in the

face of knowledge is especially culpable.

In short, from an economic perspective, the law should deem an actor to

have culpable knowledge of specific facts when that actor has taken active steps to

avoid knowledge simply as a ploy toward avoiding legal liability. Applied here,

therefore, if Defendants-Appellees (“YouTube”) took active steps to avoid learning

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the details of infringement on the YouTube site, Defendants-Appellees should be

deemed to have the knowledge that they purposefully avoided learning.6

ARGUMENT

I. The Language Of The DMCA’s Safe Harbor Reflects More Than A

Century Of Jurisprudence That Equates Willful Blindness With
Knowledge

“Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law . . . as it is in the law

generally.”7 With this singular sentence, Judge Richard Posner summarizes the

core principle of this amicus brief: Willful blindness, in both civil and criminal

law, has long been held to be the equivalent of knowledge. When the law

proscribes actions taken with the mental state of knowledge, an actor generally

cannot escape liability by purposely avoiding such knowledge. Instead, the law
6
For purposes of this brief, amici assume that Plaintiffs-Appellants have put
forth evidence (1) that Defendants-Appellees knew that YouTube had very high
levels of infringing material on its site, and (2) that they adopted a deliberate
strategy to seek to blind themselves to specific acts of infringement in order to
remain eligible for the DMCA’s safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). This
amicus brief does not address the separate question of whether there was sufficient
evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that YouTube had actual
knowledge of specific acts of infringement, or whether YouTube was aware of
“facts or circumstances” from which infringing activity was apparent. This brief
solely addresses the implications of YouTube’s assumed willful blindness to
infringing activity on its website.
7
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner,
J.) (“One who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady
dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge
of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have a criminal intent, because
a deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish
a guilty state of mind.” (internal citations omitted)).

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imputes to the willfully ignorant the knowledge they contrive to avoid.8 There is

no shortage of cases and academic works acknowledging this principle.9

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, like numerous other laws and

statutes, makes knowledge relevant to the imposition of legal liability. Section

512(c) of the DMCA provides that internet service providers (“ISPs”) are not liable

for monetary relief for infringement of copyrights, by reason of storage at the

direction of a user, of material residing on its system or network, if the service

provider, among other things:

8
Rollin M. Perkins, “Knowledge” as a Mens Rea Requirement, 29 Hastings
L. J. 953, 956-58 (1977-78); see also Robin Charlow, Wil[l]ful Ignorance and
Criminal Culpability, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1412 n. 250 (1992) (Willful ignorance
“‘requires in effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the administration
of justice.’” (quoting Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, § 57, at
159 (2d ed. 1961)).
9
Civil cases have long equated willful blindness with knowledge. E.g.,
Mackey v. Fullerton, 7 Colo. 556, 560 (1884) (“Willful ignorance is equivalent, in
law, to actual knowledge. A man who abstains from inquiry when inquiry ought to
be made, cannot be heard to say so, and to reply upon his ignorance.”). The
history of criminal law is no different. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of
Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294, 298 (1954) (“For well-neigh a hundred years, it
has been clear from the authorities that a person who deliberately shuts his eyes to
an obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea for an offense based on
such words as ‘permitting,’ ‘allowing,’ ‘suffering,’ and ‘knowingly.’”); see also Ira
P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens
Rea, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 191, 192 n. 4 (1990) (“‘Men readily regard
their suspicions as unworthy of them when it is to their advantage to do so. To
meet this, the rule is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but he deliberately
omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is
deemed to have knowledge.’” (quoting Williams, supra note 8, § 57, at 157)).

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(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or

activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing;

(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of

facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent; or

(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts

expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.10

Congress, through this provision, has proclaimed that an ISP is not entitled to

invoke the safe harbor, and must instead face the potential for legal liability, when

it has actual knowledge of infringing activity on its network or has awareness of

facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent and elects to sit

on its hands rather than to remove or disable access to the infringing materials.

The question, then, is whether the DMCA should be interpreted nonetheless to

allow an ISP to escape liability by taking active steps to deliberately avoid actual

knowledge of infringement on its system or network, such that the willfully blind

would be entitled to invoke the DMCA’s safe harbor. From a law and economics

perspective, the answer is clearly no; any rule that would give ISPs the shelter of

the safe harbor as a reward for taking active steps as a ploy to remain willfully

blind is simply illogical.

10
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).

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II. From An Economic Perspective, One Who Acts Willfully To Maintain

Ignorance Should Be Held To Have The Knowledge He Sought To Avoid

A. Liability Rules That Punish A Knowing Bad Actor Without Punishing

A Willfully Blind Bad Actor Create Incentives To Avoid Knowledge
Instead Of Creating Incentives To Reduce Harm

The economic analysis of law, also known as the “law and economics”

approach to law, “seeks to identify the effects of legal rules on the behavior of

relevant actors and to determine whether these effects are socially desirable.”11

This approach analyzes liability rules in both tort and criminal law through the

prism of optimizing social welfare and encouraging efficient prevention of

accidents and intentional harms.12 Liability rules deter bad actors by creating

incentives to reduce harm.13 Economically efficient liability rules create the

appropriate incentives for socially desirable outcomes and, conversely, create the

appropriate deterrents to undesirable behavior. In doing so, such rules enhance

11
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, law, economic analysis of, in The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume
eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2008), available at
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_L000038.
12
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law
(Harvard University Press 2004); Stacey Neumann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal
Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104
Colum. L. Rev. 459, 487-88 (2004).
13
Steven Shavell, liability for accidents, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, supra note 11, available at
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000215.

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social welfare “by minimizing the net social costs of wrongdoing and its

prevention.”14

Congress, in denying the benefits of the DMCA’s safe harbor when a

company fails to stop copyright infringement despite knowledge of infringing

material or activity on its network, or when it has awareness of facts or

circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, has clearly indicated that

stopping copyright infringement in such circumstances is socially desirable and

that failing to do so is the opposite. To incentivize ISPs to take appropriate action,

Congress made ISPs that refuse to take action liable for the full gamut of copyright

damages.15 By making knowing actors ineligible for the safe harbor, Congress

attempted to deter such actors from sitting on their hands while their services are

used to infringe copyrights.

From an economic perspective, the question arises of what would happen to

the deterrent effects of copyright protection, and the narrow scope of the DMCA’s

safe harbor exemption, if willful blindness – defined as taking active steps to avoid

knowledge as a ploy – was not considered tantamount to knowledge. Specifically,

we ask what would happen if ISPs that have general knowledge of widespread

copyright infringement on their networks but actively and consciously avoid

14
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:
An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 691 (1997).
15
See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (“Remedies for infringement: Damages and profits”).

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specific knowledge of the individual infringing videos in question were to be found

to nonetheless be eligible for the safe harbor when they fail to remove or disable

access to the infringing materials.

Under such a rule, the deterrent effects of copyright law would suffer so

severely that it is implausible to conclude that this was Congress’ intent. In such a

scenario, the economic incentives on ISPs are twisted. Despite knowing that its

site is being used for rampant copyright infringement, the ISP would have no

incentive to detect infringing content before or after it is posted and to remove

infringing material upon detection. Nor would the ISP have an incentive merely to

allow itself to gain knowledge in the normal course of business.

Indeed, instead of spending resources gaining and responding to such

knowledge in order to avoid infringement, the ISP is incentivized to spend

resources avoiding knowledge and the associated obligations. For example, the

ISP in such a regime would have a strong incentive to spend resources (1) training

employees on how to “look the other way” in response to potential acts of

infringement, (2) implementing technologies to make reporting of infringement

more burdensome, (3) developing a cynical corporate culture that belittles the

interests of copyright owners, and (4) exploiting infringement for financial gain.16

16
Such conduct is comparable to the facts of In re Aimster, where defendant
encrypted the copyrighted files being transferred through its service in order to
shield itself from actual knowledge. 334 F.3d at 650-51. Judge Posner refused to

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Condoning willful blindness not only results in misdirecting the ISP’s

resources, it also results in inefficient expenditures by copyright owners, because

every copyright creator has to develop its own means to search for infringing

material. Those efforts are also far less effective than comparable measures by the

ISP because they necessarily can result in the removal of infringing material only

after infringement and the resulting damage has already occurred. This shifting of

costs – when the ISP has intentionally taken active steps to avoid knowledge –

yields no social benefit and is clearly economically inefficient.17

The goal of the DMCA is not to penalize ISPs for having knowledge of

infringement on their networks; having such knowledge, by itself, is not

blameworthy. Instead, the DMCA targets knowing ISPs because such ISPs have

the ability to act efficiently on such knowledge and to prevent the harms that result

from copyright infringement. Immunizing ISPs that actively and consciously

avoid this knowledge as a ploy turns the DMCA’s goal on its head by encouraging

countenance such tactics. Id. (“[A] service provider that would otherwise be a
contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself
from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being
used.”).
17
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1195-96 (1985) (noting that “if I am allowed to [steal a] car
[without being punished] I will have an incentive to expend resources on taking it
and my neighbor will have an incentive to expend resources on preventing it from
being taken, and these expenditures considered as a whole, yield no social
product”).

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those who would otherwise have the ability to prevent copyright infringement

efficiently to invest in tools to avoid that ability and perpetuate the harm.

ISPs should thus be incentivized to gain this knowledge, not to avoid it. The

only way to accomplish this goal is to hold that willfully blind actors have the

knowledge they seek to avoid. Under this rule, ISPs would, as the law hopes,

choose knowledge over willful blindness, because only then will they be able to

disable infringing materials and activities on their networks and thus qualify for the

safe harbor. Consequently, it would then be unprofitable for the ISP to choose

willful blindness, because such a decision, and the resources needed to implement

it, would lead to liability for copyright infringement; such ISPs would be held to

have specific knowledge and as such they would not qualify for the safe harbor. In

short, a rule that deems the willfully blind to have the knowledge they seek to

avoid deters willful blindness and incentivizes the use of resources to obtain

knowledge and prevent copyright infringement. This is the efficient result of the

DMCA’s safe harbor scheme. Any rule excusing the willfully blind is detrimental

and inefficient.

CONCLUSION
Economic analysis of the deterrent effects of the Digital Millennium

Copyright Act’s safe harbor for internet service providers leads to one conclusion:

An internet service provider should not be able to invoke the safe harbor of the

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Digital Millennium Copyright Act after hiding its head in the sand to avoid the

knowledge which triggers an affirmative duty to remove or disable access to

copyrighted materials. When the law penalizes actors who cause harm while

acting with willful blindness to the same degree as it penalizes actors who

knowingly harm, the result is that the willfully ignorant forego expenditures they

would otherwise make to avoid knowledge and instead spend resources to acquire

the knowledge needed to eliminate future harm. Any rule that excuses willfully

blind actors encourages ignorance over knowledge, and perpetuates the harm the

law seeks to stop.

As a result, if YouTube engaged in such willful blindness, it should be held

to have the knowledge it purposely sought to avoid.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard B. Kendall
Laura W. Brill (Counsel of record for Amici Curiae listed below)
Joshua Y. Karp
KENDALL BRILL & KLIEGER LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
Los Angeles, California 90067
(310) 556-2700

List of Amici Curiae

John R. Allison
Spence Centennial Professor of Business Administration
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin

Robert G. Bone
G. Rollie White Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin

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Hugh C. Hansen
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
Director, Intellectual Property Law Institute, Fordham University School of Law

Reinier H. Kraakman
Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

Michael S. Knoll
Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Professor of Real Estate, Wharton
Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania

Alan Schwartz
Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School

Robert E. Scott
Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
Director, Center for Contract and Economic Organization, Columbia Law School

Matthew L. Spitzer
Hayden W. Head Regents Chair for Faculty Excellence, University of Texas at
Austin School of Law
Professor, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin

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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Form 6.

Certificate of Compliance With Rule 32(a)

Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation,

Typeface Requirements and Type Style Requirements

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7)(B) because:

X this brief contains 3,122 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii),
or

__ this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains [state the number
of] lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief ex empted by Fed. R.
App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)
because:

X this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface

using Microsoft Word 2007 in 14 point Times New Roman,
or

__ this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state name
and version of word processing program] with [state number of
characters per inch and name of type style].

(s) /s/ Laura W. Brill

Attorney for Amici Curiae Matthew L. Spitzer, John R. Allison, Robert G.

Bone, Hugh C. Hansen, Michael S. Knoll, Reinier H.

Kraakman, Alan Schwartz, and Robert E. Scott

Dated: December 10, 2010

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & CM/ECF FILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of December, 2010, I caused the

foregoing Brief of Amici Curiae to be served on all counsel of record in this appeal

via Electronic Mail generated by the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF)

with a Notice of Docket Activity pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 25.1(h)(1) &

(2):

Susan J. Kohlmann Max W. Berger

JENNER & BLOCK LLP John C. Browne
919 Third Avenue BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
New York, NY 10022 & GROSSMANN LLP
(212) 891-1600 1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019
Stuart J. Baskin (212) 554-1400
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
599 Lexington Avenue Charles S. Sims
New York, NY 10022 William M. Hart
(212) 848-4000 Noah Siskind Gitterman
Elizabeth A. Figueira
Theodore B. Olson PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
Matthew D. McGill 1585 Broadway
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER New York, New York 10036
LLP (212) 969-3000
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036 Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
(202) 955-8500 (10-3342)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

(10-3270)

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Andrew H. Schapiro
A. John P. Mancini
Brian M. Willen
MAYER BROWN LLP
1675 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
(212) 506-2500

David H. Kramer
Michael H. Rubin
Bart E. Volkmer
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI P.C.
650 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 493-9300

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

/s/ Laura W. Brill

Laura W. Brill

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