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Allied Banking Corp - V - CIR
Allied Banking Corp - V - CIR
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
On July 16, 2004, the BIR wrote a Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment
Notices to petitioner, which partly reads as follows: 8
It is requested that the above de ciency tax be paid immediately upon
receipt hereof, inclusive of penalties incident to delinquency. This is our nal
decision based on investigation. If you disagree, you may appeal the nal
decision within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, otherwise said de ciency tax
assessment shall become final, executory and demandable.
Petitioner received the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices on August
30, 2004. 9
Proceedings before the CTA First Division
On September 29, 2004, petitioner led a Petition for Review 1 0 with the CTA
which was raffled to its First Division and docketed as CTA Case No. 7062. 1 1
On December 7, 2004, respondent CIR led his Answer. 1 2 On July 28, 2005, he
led a Motion to Dismiss 1 3 on the ground that petitioner failed to le an administrative
protest on the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices. Petitioner opposed
the Motion to Dismiss on August 18, 2005. 1 4
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On October 12, 2005, the First Division of the CTA rendered a Resolution 1 5
granting respondent's Motion to Dismiss. It ruled:
Clearly, it is neither the assessment nor the formal demand letter itself that
is appealable to this Court. It is the decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on the disputed assessment that can be appealed to this Court
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Villa, 22 SCRA 3). As correctly pointed out
by respondent, a disputed assessment is one wherein the taxpayer or his duly
authorized representative led an administrative protest against the formal letter
of demand and assessment notice within thirty (30) days from date [of] receipt
thereof. In this case, petitioner failed to le an administrative protest on the
formal letter of demand with the corresponding assessment notices. Hence, the
assessments did not become disputed assessments as subject to the Court's
review under Republic Act No. 9282. (See also Republic v. Liam Tian Teng Sons &
Co., Inc., 16 SCRA 584.)
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED . The Petition for
Review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. HCDAcE
SO ORDERED. 16
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by
the First Division in its Resolution dated February 1, 2006. 1 7
Proceedings before the CTA En Banc
On February 22, 2006, petitioner appealed the dismissal to the CTA En Banc. 18
The case was docketed as CTA EB No. 167.
Finding no reversible error in the Resolutions dated October 12, 2005 and
February 1, 2006 of the CTA First Division, the CTA En Banc denied the Petition for
Review 1 9 as well as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 2 0
The CTA En Banc declared that it is absolutely necessary for the taxpayer to le
an administrative protest in order for the CTA to acquire jurisdiction. It emphasized that
an administrative protest is an integral part of the remedies given to a taxpayer in
challenging the legality or validity of an assessment. According to the CTA En Banc,
although there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the instant case does not fall in any of the exceptions.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse, where petitioner raises the lone issue of whether
the Formal Letter of Demand dated July 16, 2004 can be construed as a nal decision
of the CIR appealable to the CTA under RA 9282.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 7 of RA 9282 expressly
provides that the CTA exercises
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review by appeal decisions of the
CIR in cases involving disputed
assessments
The CTA, being a court of special jurisdiction, can take cognizance only of
matters that are clearly within its jurisdiction. 2 1 Section 7 of RA 9282 provides: IaECcH
The word "decisions" in the above quoted provision of RA 9282 has been
interpreted to mean the decisions of the CIR on the protest of the taxpayer against the
assessments. 2 2 Corollary thereto, Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) provides for the procedure for protesting an assessment. It states:
SECTION 228. Protesting of Assessment. — When the Commissioner or his
duly authorized representative nds that proper taxes should be assessed, he
shall rst notify the taxpayer of his ndings: Provided, however, That a
preassessment notice shall not be required in the following cases:
(a) When the nding for any de ciency tax is the result of mathematical
error in the computation of the tax as appearing on the face of the return; or
(b) When a discrepancy has been determined between the tax withheld and
the amount actually remitted by the withholding agent; or EcHTCD
(c) When a taxpayer who opted to claim a refund or tax credit of excess
creditable withholding tax for a taxable period was determined to have carried
over and automatically applied the same amount claimed against the estimated
tax liabilities for the taxable quarter or quarters of the succeeding taxable year; or
(d) When the excise tax due on excisable articles has not been paid; or
The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on
which the assessment is made; otherwise, the assessment shall be void.
In the instant case, petitioner timely led a protest after receiving the PAN. In
response thereto, the BIR issued a Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices.
Pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC, the proper recourse of petitioner was to dispute
the assessments by ling an administrative protest within 30 days from receipt
thereof. Petitioner, however, did not protest the nal assessment notices. Instead, it
led a Petition for Review with the CTA. Thus, if we strictly apply the rules, the dismissal
of the Petition for Review by the CTA was proper. DcTaEH
1. That the said assessment has already prescribed in accordance with the
provisions of Section 203 of the Tax Code.
2. That since the exemption of FCDUs from all taxes found in the Old Tax
Code has been deleted, the wording of Section 28(A)(7)(b) discloses
that there are no other taxes imposable upon FCDUs aside from the
10% Final Income Tax.
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Contrary to your allegation, the assessments covering GRT and DST for
taxable year 2001 has not prescribed for [sic] simply because no returns were
filed, thus, the three year prescriptive period has not lapsed.
aAHTDS
With the implementation of the CTRP, the phrase "exempt from all taxes"
was deleted. Please refer to Section 27(D)(3) and 28(A)(7) of the new Tax Code.
Accordingly, you were assessed for de ciency gross receipts tax on onshore
income from foreign currency transactions in accordance with the rates provided
under Section 121 of the said Tax Code. Likewise, de ciency documentary stamp
taxes was [sic] also assessed on Loan Agreements, Bills Purchased, Certi cate of
Deposits and related transactions pursuant to Sections 180 and 181 of NIRC, as
amended.
The 25% surcharge and 20% interest have been imposed pursuant to the
provision of Section 248(A) and 249(b), respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended.
It appears from the foregoing demand letter that the CIR has already made a final
decision on the matter and that the remedy of petitioner is to appeal the nal decision
within 30 days.
In Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 5 we
considered the language used and the tenor of the letter sent to the taxpayer as the
final decision of the CIR.
In this case, records show that petitioner disputed the PAN but not the Formal
Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices. Nevertheless, we cannot blame petitioner
for not ling a protest against the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices
since the language used and the tenor of the demand letter indicate that it is the nal
decision of the respondent on the matter. We have time and again reminded the CIR to
indicate, in a clear and unequivocal language, whether his action on a disputed
assessment constitutes his nal determination thereon in order for the taxpayer
concerned to determine when his or her right to appeal to the tax court accrues. 2 6
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, respondent is now estopped from claiming that he
did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a nal
decision.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that in the Formal Letter of Demand with
Assessment Notices, respondent used the word "appeal" instead of "protest",
"reinvestigation", or "reconsideration". Although there was no direct reference for
petitioner to bring the matter directly to the CTA, it cannot be denied that the word
"appeal" under prevailing tax laws refers to the ling of a Petition for Review with the
CTA. As aptly pointed out by petitioner, under Section 228 of the NIRC, the terms
"protest", "reinvestigation" and "reconsideration" refer to the administrative remedies a
taxpayer may take before the CIR, while the term "appeal" refers to the remedy available
to the taxpayer before the CTA. Section 9 of RA 9282, amending Section 11 of RA 1125,
2 7 likewise uses the term "appeal" when referring to the action a taxpayer must take
when adversely affected by a decision, ruling, or inaction of the CIR. As we see it then,
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petitioner in appealing the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to the
CTA merely took the cue from respondent. Besides, any doubt in the interpretation or
use of the word "appeal" in the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices
should be resolved in favor of petitioner, and not the respondent who caused the
confusion. cITCAa
To be clear, we are not disregarding the rules of procedure under Section 228 of
the NIRC, as implemented by Section 3 of BIR Revenue Regulations No. 12-99. 28 It is
the Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notice that must be administratively
protested or disputed within 30 days, and not the PAN. Neither are we deviating from
our pronouncement in St. Stephen's Chinese Girl's School v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 2 9 that the counting of the 30 days within which to institute an appeal in the
CTA commences from the date of receipt of the decision of the CIR on the disputed
assessment, not from the date the assessment was issued.
What we are saying in this particular case is that, the Formal Letter of Demand
with Assessment Notices which was not administratively protested by the petitioner
can be considered a nal decision of the CIR appealable to the CTA because the words
used, speci cally the words " nal decision" and "appeal", taken together led petitioner
to believe that the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices was in fact the
nal decision of the CIR on the letter-protest it led and that the available remedy was
to appeal the same to the CTA.
We note, however, that during the pendency of the instant case, petitioner availed
of the provisions of Revenue Regulations No. 30-2002 and its implementing Revenue
Memorandum Order by submitting an offer of compromise for the settlement of the
GRT, DST and VAT for the period 1998-2003, as evidenced by a Certi cate of Availment
dated November 21, 2007. 3 0 Accordingly, there is no reason to reinstate the Petition
for Review in CTA Case No. 7062.
WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED . The assailed August 23, 2006
Decision and the October 17, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 7062 is hereby
DISMISSED based solely on the Bureau of Internal Revenue's acceptance of
petitioner's offer of compromise for the settlement of the gross receipts tax,
documentary stamp tax and value added tax, for the years 1998-2003.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Abad and Perez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 156 Phil. 517, 522-523 (1974).
2. Rollo, pp. 7-21.
3. An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating its Rank to
the Level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging its Membership,
Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1125, as Amended,
otherwise known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, and for Other Purposes.
4. Rollo, pp. 23-30; penned by Associate Justice Erlinda P. Uy and concurred in by Presiding
Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, and Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Lovell R.
Bautista, and Caesar A. Casanova. Associate Justice Olga Palanca-Enriquez inhibited
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herself and did not take part.
5. Id. at 32-34.
6. Id. at 53-54.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 35-36.
9. Id. at 24.
25. G.R. No. 148380, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 205, 211.
26. Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, supra note 1.
27. Section 11. Who may Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. — Any party adversely
affected by a decision, ruling or inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry
or the Secretary of Agriculture or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals or the
Regional Trial Courts may le an appeal with the CTA within thirty (30) days after the
receipt of such decision or ruling or after the expiration of the period xed by law for
action as referred to in Section 7 (a) (2) herein.
3.1.5 Disputed Assessment — The taxpayer or his duly authorized representative may
protest administratively against the aforesaid formal letter of demand and assessment
notice within thirty (30) days from date of receipt thereof . . . .
The taxpayer shall state the facts, the applicable law, rules and regulations, or
jurisprudence on which his protest is based, otherwise, his protest shall be considered
void and without force and effect . . . .
The taxpayer shall submit the required documents in support of his protest within sixty
(60) days from the date of ling of his letter of protest, otherwise, the assessment shall
become final and executory and demandable . . .
If the taxpayer fails to le a valid protest against the formal letter of demand and
assessment notice within thirty (30) days from date of receipt thereof, the assessment
shall become final, executory and demandable.
If the protest is denied, in whole or in part, by the Commissioner, the taxpayer may
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from date of receipt of the
said decision, otherwise, the assessment shall become final, executory and demandable.
In general, if the protest is denied, in whole or in part, by the Commissioner or his duly
authorized representative, the taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, within
thirty (30) days from date of receipt of the said decision, otherwise, the assessment shall
become nal, executory and demandable: Provided, however, that if the taxpayer
elevates his protest to the Commissioner within thirty (30) days from date of receipt of
the nal decision of the Commissioner's duly authorized representative, the latter's
decision shall not be considered nal, executory and demandable, in which case, the
protest shall be decided by the Commissioner.
If the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative fails to act on the taxpayer's
protest within one hundred eighty (180) days from date of submission, by the taxpayer,
of the required documents in support of his protest, the taxpayer may appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from the lapse of said 180-day period, otherwise,
the assessment shall become final, executory and demandable.