Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Certiorari SCOTUS
Certiorari SCOTUS
___ (2019).
___ (2019).
___ (2019).
1
referred to the Court is denied.
certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record
is denied.
granted.
2
18-1323 ) JUNE MEDICAL SERV., ET AL. V. RUSSO, SEC., LA DEPT. OF HEALTH
)
18-1460 ) RUSSO, SEC., LA DEPT. OF HEALTH V. JUNE MEDICAL SERV., ET AL.
3
CERTIORARI GRANTED
CERTIORARI DENIED
4
19-702 O'BRYANT, ALEN D. V. OKLAHOMA
5
19-778 WEINHAUS, EDWARD A. V. ILLINOIS, ET AL.
19-791 ANDERSON LAW OFFICES, ET AL. V. COMMON BENEFIT FEE & COST COMM.
6
19-845 HUGGINS, CHARLES V. UNITED STATES
7
19-5568 NELSON, KEITH D. V. UNITED STATES
8
19-6432 THIBODEAUX, MICHAEL A. V. EVANS, DREW
9
19-6815 WINGATE, BLAKE V. NEW YORK
10
19-6916 JEFFERSON, SHERRI V. SUPREME COURT OF GA
11
19-6981 BYKOV, VLADIK V. ROSEN, STEVEN G., ET AL.
12
19-7028 GREEN, JESS L. V. ERRINGTON, JOE
13
19-7094 LAWRENCE, ERNEST V. GREWAL, ATT'Y GEN. OF NJ, ET AL.
14
19-7169 COBBLE, DANIEL E. V. UNITED STATES
19-7198 B. T. D. V. ALABAMA
15
19-7228 CARTER, JERRY V. UNITED STATES
16
19-7271 HALL, ERIC V. UNITED STATES
17
19-7335 PRODOEHL, CHAD V. UNITED STATES
18
19-7439 SAMAAN, SADDAM S. V. UNITED STATES
petition.
denied.
petition.
19
19-6832 LACY, JAMES H. V. UNITED STATES
dissenting).
petition.
dissenting).
20
19-7119 BELL, LARRY V. RANSOM, SUPT., DALLAS, ET AL.
petition.
denied.
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the
(per curiam).
petition.
21
petition.
dissenting).
19-7312 IN RE MO S. HICKS
MANDAMUS DENIED
22
19-7029 IN RE PAUL FAHRING
denied.
PROHIBITION DENIED
REHEARINGS DENIED
23
19-6160 CASWELL, REGGIE D. V. NEW YORK
19-481 IN RE R. C. LUSSY
denied.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
24
cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in
this Court.
from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue,
from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue,
from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue,
from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue,
from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue,
25
D-3065 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF PHILIP R. FARTHING
26
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1
Per Curiam
PER CURIAM.
In 1979, the Office of the Superintendent of Catholic
Schools of the Archdiocese of San Juan created a trust to
administer a pension plan for employees of Catholic schools,
aptly named the Pension Plan for Employees of Catholic
Schools Trust (Trust). Among the participating schools
were Perpetuo Socorro Academy, San Ignacio de Loyola
Academy, and San Jose Academy.
In 2016, active and retired employees of the academies
filed complaints in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance
alleging that the Trust had terminated the plan, eliminat-
ing the employees’ pension benefits. The employees named
as a defendant the “Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church
of Puerto Rico,” which the employees claimed was a legal
entity with supervisory authority over all Catholic institu-
tions in Puerto Rico. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58–59, 152–153
(emphasis deleted).1 The employees also named as defend-
ants the Archdiocese of San Juan, the Superintendent, the
three academies, and the Trust.
The Court of First Instance, in an order affirmed by the
Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, denied a preliminary injunc-
tion requiring the payment of benefits, but the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court concluded
——————
1 The petition for a writ of certiorari includes certified translations of
the opinions, originally in Spanish, of the Puerto Rico courts. We cite the
certified translations.
2 ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN JUAN
v. ACEVEDO FELICIANO
Per Curiam
that “if the Trust did not have the necessary funds to meet
its obligations, the participating employers would be obli-
gated to pay.” Id., at 3. But, because “there was a dispute
as to which defendants in the case had legal personalities,”
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of First
Instance to “determine who would be responsible for contin-
uing paying the pensions, pursuant to the preliminary in-
junction.” Ibid.
The Court of First Instance determined that the “Roman
Catholic and Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico” was the only
defendant with separate legal personhood. Id., at 239–240.
The Court held such personhood existed by virtue of the
Treaty of Paris of 1898, through which Spain ceded Puerto
Rico to the United States. The Court found that the Arch-
diocese of San Juan, the Superintendent, and the acade-
mies each constituted a “division or dependency” of the
Church, because those entities were not separately incorpo-
rated. Ibid.
As a result, the Court of First Instance ordered the “Ro-
man Catholic and Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico” to make
payments to the employees in accordance with the pension
plan. Id., at 241. Ten days later, the Court issued a second
order requiring the Church to deposit $4.7 million in a court
account within 24 hours. The next day, the Court issued a
third order, requiring the sheriff to “seize assets and mon-
eys of . . . the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church,
and any of its dependencies, that are located in Puerto
Rico.” Id., at 223.
The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals reversed. It held that
the “Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico”
was a “legally nonexistent entity.” Id., at 136. But, the
Court concluded, the Archdiocese of San Juan and the Per-
petuo Socorro Academy could be ordered to make contribu-
tion payments. The Archdiocese enjoyed separate legal per-
sonhood as the effective successor to the Roman Catholic
Church in Puerto Rico, the entity recognized by the Treaty
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3
Per Curiam
Per Curiam
——————
2 “The laws of the United States relating to . . . removal of causes . . .
as between the courts of the United States and the courts of the several
States shall govern in such matters and proceedings as between the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and the courts
of Puerto Rico.” 48 U. S. C. §864.
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 7
Per Curiam
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
——————
*In addition, as JUSTICE THOMAS has pointed out, Hardison did not
apply the current form of Title VII, but instead an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission guideline that predated the 1972 amendments
defining the term “religion.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
575 U. S. 768, 787, n. (2015) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1
——————
1 As I have previously noted, Chevron arguably sets out an “interpre-
tive too[l]” and so may not be entitled to stare decisis treatment. Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 114, n. 1 (2015) (opinion concur-
ring in judgment) (citing C. Nelson, Statutory Interpretation 701 (2011)).
The same can be said of National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v.
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967 (2005).
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3
948 (2017).
When 18th- and 19th-century courts decided questions of
statutory interpretation in common-law actions or under
federal-question jurisdiction, they did not apply anything
resembling Chevron deference. Judges interpreted statutes
according to their independent judgment. For example, in
a lawsuit involving a federal land patent, the Court simply
“inquire[d] whether the statute, rightly construed, defeated
[the respondent’s] otherwise perfect right to the patent.”
Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 88 (1871); see also id., at
91. When courts disagreed with the Executive’s interpreta-
tion, they gave no weight to it. See United States v. Dick-
son, 15 Pet. 141, 161–162 (1841) (Story, J., for the Court).
Courts did apply traditional interpretive canons that ac-
corded respect to certain contemporaneous, consistent in-
terpretations of statutes by executive officers. See Bamzai,
supra, at 933–947. In perhaps its most famous articulation,
the Court wrote that “[i]n the construction of a doubtful and
ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those
who were called upon to act under the law, and were ap-
pointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect.” Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206,
210 (1827). The Court continued to apply this approach
throughout the 19th century. See, e.g., United States v.
State Bank of N. C., 6 Pet. 29, 39–40 (1832) (“[T]he construc-
tion which we have given to the terms of the ac[t] is that
which is understood to have been practically acted upon by
the government, as well as by individuals, ever since its en-
actment. . . . We think the practice was founded in the true
exposition of the terms and intent of the act: but if it were
susceptible of some doubt, so long an acquiescence in it
would justify us in yielding to it as a safe and reasonable
exposition”); Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How. 48, 68 (1850) (simi-
lar). And when the interpretation “has not been uniform,”
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 7
——————
2 The phrasing and substance of these canons vary, and I express no