Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abella Vs Barrios Jr. A.C No. 7332 June 18, 2013
Abella Vs Barrios Jr. A.C No. 7332 June 18, 2013
EN BANC
EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,
vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Far the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo
A. Abella (complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration
Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-
VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon,
through a Decision dated May 13, 1999, 2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant ₱113,100.00
as separation pay and ₱73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA’s
Decision to the NLRC. In a Decision dated September 12, 2001, 3 the NLRC set aside LA
Carreon’s ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant to his former
position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay, including moral damages and attorney’s fees. On reconsideration, it modified the
amounts of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that complainant was
illegally dismissed.4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the NLRC’s
ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years
of service were not taken into account in the computation of his separation pay and
backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the
same purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory.7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the
Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned to
the new LA, herein respondent. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s motion
remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution on March 3,
2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no action on complainant’s motion.
Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent’s office to personally
follow-up the matter. In the process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on
how much the former’s monetary awards should be; however, their computations
differed. To complainant’s surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be "easily
fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant offered
the amount of ₱20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it ₱30,000.00." By force of
circumstance, complainant acceded on the condition that respondent would have to wait
until he had already collected from PT&T. Before complainant could leave, respondent
asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter ₱1,500.00.8
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the
NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14, 2006, 16 the NLRC annulled respondent’s
December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no authority to modify the CA
Decision which was already final and executory.17
In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 Investigating Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the
meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical, reasonable and grammatical context in
order to favor PT&T.22 He further observed that the confluence of events in this case
shows that respondent deliberately left complainant’s efforts to execute the CA Decision
unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof.
Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as
far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which eventually resulted into a
resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross
immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred.23
On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345
(IBP Resolution),24 adopting and approving Commissioner Limpingco’s
recommendation, to wit:
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco
as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the
lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against
lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule
1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s
cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to
lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to
interfere with public duties.26 It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government
office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.27
In this light, a lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules
should be taken into consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the
legal profession."28 This proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity. 29 Consequently, any errant behavior on
the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment.30
In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to recompute the monetary
awards due to the complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which had already
been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution – twice at that –
respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid
respondent a personal visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of
execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the
Court observes that the sudden dispatch in respondent’s action soon after the aforesaid
visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money
from the complainant.
To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T’s initial motion to quash
through an Order dated November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in open court on
the basis of PT&T’s supplemental motion to quash which was a mere rehash of the first
motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his earlier orders and
issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainant’s monetary awards from
₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA
Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and cursory
reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion.
On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC’s rulings dated September 12,
2001 and October 8, 2002 which both explicitly awarded backwages and other unpaid
monetary benefits to complainant.32 The only modification was with respect to the order
of reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC’s rulings which was changed by the CA to
separation pay in view of the strained relations between the parties as well as the
supervening removal of complainant’s previous position.33 In other words, the portion of
the NLRC’s rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and
the modification pertained only to the CA’s award of separation pay in lieu of the
NLRC’s previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily
deduced from the records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its
decision, propounding that the CA’s award of separation pay denied complainant’s
entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution,34 respondent stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in
directing PT&T to pay complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement.
Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other
consequential benefits that were directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be
reinstated to his previous position on the ground of strained relationship and his previous
position had already gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T could offer. x x x.
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct
from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an
employee who has been illegally dismissed.35 There is nothing in the records that could
confound the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC,
and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly
believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to
backwages in view of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal.1âwphi1 In this
regard, respondent’s defense deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and
upholds Commissioner Limpingco’s and the IBP Board of Governor’s pronouncement of
respondent’s gross immorality. Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions
constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community.36 It treads the line of grossness when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency.37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes
"improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment."38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred:
Thus, as respondent’s violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross
misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of course.1âwphi1 However, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39 which therefore
precludes the Court fromduplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the
Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of ₱40,000.00 40 in order to
penalize respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a
privilege41 accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications.
Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater
responsibility to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential
that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral
uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives.
Truth be told, the Bar holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice