ESTRADA v.

ESCRITOR

J. Puno August 4, 2003 A.M. No. P-02-1651

Doctrine In resolving claims involving religious freedom:

1. Benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and
2. In deciding respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the law with which she
is administratively charged), it is the compelling state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.

Refer to notes.
Summary Escritor, a court interpreter, has a live-in relationship with a married man. Estrada wrote a letter to Judge Caoibes
requesting for investigation of their relationship, as it was improper for an officer of the court, making Escritor
administratively liable and should therefore be dismissed. Escritor said that their conjugal arrangement was not
immoral, being they were members of the Jehovah’s witnesses. Justice Puno went on a rampage of learning and fun.

Facts Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who
is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year
before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.
Ratio/Issues To determine what approach this court should take in construing the religion clauses, or to determine the proper test
applicable in determining claims of exemption based on freedom of religion.

WON Escritor should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct.” – GO TO
MR (NO)

A. Applicable law: “gross and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of
the Revised Admin Code.
B. WON Escritor’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations
-­‐ Refer to notes. Discussion is about determining the appropriate test.
-­‐ The court found that Benevolent neutrality and the compelling state interest test should be
applied to the case at bar.

Held The case is REMANDED to the OCA. SolGen ordered to intervene where he will be given the opportunity to:
(a) To examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice;
(b) To present evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to override respondent’s religious belief and
practice; and
(c) To show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s
religious freedom.

ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR - MR

J. Puno June 22, 2006 A.M. No. P-02-1651

Ratio/Issues To determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest. This issue involves a
pure question of fact.

WON respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “disgraceful and immoral conduct.” -
NO
• Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
 religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
• Apply compelling state interest
1. Sincerity of religious belief:
-­‐ Solicitor General concedes that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious
belief and practice are beyond serious doubt.
-­‐ having previously established the preliminary conditions required by the compelling state
interest test, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice
justifies a compelling secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that
objective.
2. Compelling State Interest
-­‐ OSG: to protect marriage and the family as basic social institutions.
-­‐ Court: it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution
itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred.
o the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it
must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if
exemptions are granted.
o Sol Gen failed.
3. Least Intrusive Means
-­‐ Even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible.
-­‐ No iota of evidence was offered aside from the teo documents (i.e. Exhibit A and B).
-­‐ Again, Sol Gen failed.
• The compelling interest test cannot be merely abstract or symbolic.
-­‐ The interest presented was only symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
-­‐ To deny the exemption would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two individuals
who have managed to stay together as husband and wife and have the effect of defeating the very
substance of marriage and the family.
• Dwelling on the issue of morality:
-­‐ The distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the
other, should be kept in mind
-­‐ Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests
-­‐ The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
-­‐ The more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secular morality
fall under the phrase “disgraceful and immoral conduct”
• Mr. Justice Carpio’s slippery slope argument, on the other hand, is non-sequitur and speculative.
-­‐ If the Court grants respondent exemption from the laws which respondent Escritor has been charged
to have violated, the exemption would not apply to Catholics who have secured church annulment
of their marriage even without a final annulment from a civil court.
• On its face, the language of the Religion clasuses grants a unique advantage to religious conduct, protecting it
from governmental imposition; and imposes a unique disadvantage, preventing the government from
supporting it.
Held The instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED.

SOME NOTES:

v A creed must meet 4 criteria under the First Amendment:

1. There must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believer’s life.
2. The religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective.
3. A demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into the truth or
reasonableness of the belief.
4. There must be some associational ties

v Free Exercise Clause - prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice.
v Establishment Clause - prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices.
o They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices.
v Strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses:
1. Standard of Separation - a “wall of separation” must exist between the state and the Church to protect the state from the
church. Both protect the principle of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle.
-­‐ Dilemma arises from the reality that church and state are not and cannot be totally separate.
a. Strict Separation
-­‐ Believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two.
-­‐ Difficulty: it is deeply embedded in American history and contemporary practice that enormous
amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from government in return for huge amounts
of mostly indirect aid from religion. (Ex. Congress expressing thanks to God after passing a
prohibition on respecting a religion)
b. Strict neutrality/separation (governmental neutrality)
-­‐ Believes that the “wall of separation” does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state
must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.
-­‐ Difficulty: if applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of
religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause.
2. Benevolent neutrality/accomodation - the wall of separation is meant to protect the church from the state.
-­‐ Recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many
traditional government practices
-­‐ Theory of accomodation: does not seek a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but
an exemption from its application or its “burdensome effect,” whether by the legislature or the courts.

v Legislative Acts and the Free Exercis Clause

o A legislative act will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because it violates the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause or both. True in any approach.

v Doctrine from cases of Sherbert and Yoder:

a. Free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test if government
substantially burdened the exercise of religion;
b. Heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed cases where the burden was direct and indirect; and
c. The Court could carve out accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general application,
whether general or criminal.

v Five components of Sherbert-Yoder doctrine:

1. Action was protected
2. Indirect impositions on religious conduct and direct restrains were prohibited
3. The protection granted was extensive.
4. The strong language was backed by a requirement that the government provide proof of the important interest at stake
and of the dangers to that interest presented by the religious conduct at issue.
5. In determining the injury to the government’s interest, a court was required to focus on the effect that exempting
religious claimants from the regulation would have, rather than on the value of the regulation in general.

v Court’s ultimate concern in Smith (decision rejecting use of strict scrutiny):

1. The difficulty in defining and limiting the term “religion” in today’s pluralistic society
2. The belief that courts have no businessdetermining the significance of an individual’s religious beliefs.

v A free exercise claim could result to three kinds ofaccommodation:

a. Those which are found to be constitutionally compelled (required by the Free Exercise Clause) – Mandatory
accomodation;
-­‐ Occurs when the following concur:
i. There is no doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief;
ii. The state has failed to demonstrate a particularly important or compelling governmental goal in
preventing an exemption;
iii. The state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means.
b. Those which are discretionary or legislative (not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the
Establishment Clause) – Permissive accomodation;
-­‐ The State may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests.
c. Those which the religion clauses prohibit – Prohibited accomodation.
-­‐ Establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests.

§ It is the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolent
neutrality- accommodation approach.
 o Because [t]he compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment’s mandate of preserving
religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.

v It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.

v Compelling State Interest:

1. [H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?
2. [I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty?
3. [H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?

§ Application should result to:

1. Mandatory accommodation would result if the Court finds that accommodation is required by the
Free Exercise Clause.
2. If the Court finds that the State may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests,
permissive accommodation results.
3. If the Court finds that that establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests, then
it must rule that the accommodation is prohibited.

v Why Justice Piocarps (permissive-accomodation only advocacy) is wrong –

o It is clearly not supported by Philippine jurisprudence.
o It is the antithesis to the notion that religion clauses, like the other fundamental liberties found in the Bill or Rights,
is a preferred right and an independent source of right.
o It is not applicable when the law in question is a generally applicable criminal law.

ü In relation to criminal statutes, only the question of mandatory accommodation is uncertain, for Philippine law and
jurisprudence have, in fact, allowed legislative accommodation.
ü The power of the Courts to grant exemptions in general (i.e., finding that the Free Exercise Clause required the
accommodation, or mandatory accommodations) has already been decided, not just once, but twice by the Court.

CRUX; WON the Court can make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application. – YES
1. The benevolent neutrality-accommodationapproach in Philippine jurisdiction is more pronounced and given leeway than in
the U.S.
2. The whole purpose of the accommodation theory was to address the “inadvertent burdensome effect” that an otherwise
facially neutral law would have on religious exercise. Just because the law is criminal in nature, therefore, should not bring it
out of the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause.
3. Mandatory accommodations are particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects
of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority.
4. Exemption from penal laws on account of religion is not entirely an alien concept
5. Given the unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in the language of the Religion clauses, the Court cannot simply
dismiss a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, solely on the premise that the law in question is a general
criminal law.