PEOPLE v.

DE LA CRUZ
G.R. NO. 120988 | August 11, 1997 | J. Melo
Stages of Execution

DOCTRINE: To our mind, the felony committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor in the
attempted stage only. The attempted phase of a felony is defined as when the offender commences the
commission of a felony, directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (Article 6, Revised
Penal Code). The overt act must be an external one which has direct connection with the felony, it being necessary
to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically and
necessarily ripen to a concrete offense.

FACTS:
 Accused-appellant Rosemarie de la Cruz was caught holding a seven-year old schoolgirl by the hand and
leading her out of the school grounds. 
o Charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor, she was convicted, and accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of no less than  reclusion perpetua. 
o Accused-appellant contends that her guilt has not been established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt and that the entire case is nothing but an overreaction to the situation.
 The Information charged:
o That on or about September 27, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
a private individual and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, detain or in any manner deprive one WHIAZEL SORIANO y CRUZ, seven years of
age, of her liberty, against her will and consent.
 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-139168 before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region (Branch 35, Manila). 
 After accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, trial commenced. But as mentioned above, she convicted
of the crime. Hence this petition with the following arguments:
o Accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal, contending that her act of holding the child by the
hand and leading her out of the school premises cannot be considered an act of kidnapping without
leaving room for reasonable doubt. 
o Accused-appellant points out that Whiazel did not categorically state that accused-appellant tried to
kidnap her. 
 On the contrary, the child testified that she voluntarily went with accused-appellant and that
she was neither forced nor intimidated into accompanying accused-appellant. 
o Also, it is said, accused-appellants excuse for going to Whiazels school to look for Dr. Medina is
buttressed by the fact that she had a tooth extracted in jail sometime in November 1994; and that
contrary to Whiazels statement, the guidance teacher, Eufemia Magpantay, testified that even
persons not connected with the school are allowed to consult Dr. Medina at the schools dental clinic. 
o Accused-appellant thus contends that she had a valid reason for being at the school premises, as
indeed, she did not run away and instead faced her accuser.  All these circumstances, accused-
appellant submits, constitute reasonable doubt as to her guilt which, therefore, necessitate her
acquittal.
 The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that Whiazel was deprived of her liberty, no
matter how short a time, the moment accused-appellant, a person unknown to Whiazel, prevented her from
going over to her neighbor, Cecilia Caparos. Under the circumstances, considering that she is of such tender
age, deprivation of liberty was consummated even in the absence of force or threats upon the victim.

ISSUE: WON accused appellant Rosemarie de la Cruz is guilty of the crime. (YES. But only attempted kidnapping
and serious illegal detention.)
HELD:
 In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter’s liberty, in any
manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). 
 The acts held by the trial court, and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in
this case are those when accused-appellant held the victims hand and refused to let go when the victim asked
to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what was happening. 
o This happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that there were a
good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there
was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help.
 While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant
circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. 
o It must further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked
to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily.  Without any further act
reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance
of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated.  
o While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts, especially when they concern
the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the Court may
choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).
 READ DOCTRINE.
 In the case at bar, accused-appellant already commenced her criminal scheme by taking hold of Whiazel by
the hand and leading her out of the school premises. As mentioned earlier, these do not sufficiently establish
that kidnapping had been consummated. 
 However, considering other attendant facts and circumstances, it does reveal that accused-appellant had
less than noble intentions with the victim. 
o Firstly, the child was led to believe that accused-appellant wanted to see the dentist. It is not clear,
however, that there really was a Dr. Medina employed by the school as dentist. Not even the
guidance counselor who testified for the defense made any specific mention of the doctor. 
o Secondly, if accused-appellant wanted to see the dentist, why was she on her way out? If it is true
she had already gone to the clinic and found no one there and that she then decided to leave, what
else was she doing with the child? 
o Thirdly, accused-appellant did not simply ask for directions; she wanted the victim to accompany
her. That seems suspicious enough. And of all people, why ask a seven-year old? Fortunately, the
further progress and completion of accused-appellants felonious design was thwarted by the timely
intervention of Cecilia Caparos, the victims neighbor.
 The Court thus holds that the felony committed by accused-appellant in the case at bar is not kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of a minor in the consummated stage, but rather in its attempted stage.
 Since the crime is only in its attempted stage, the penalty imposable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which is reclusion perpetua to death, has to be lowered by two degrees
(Article 51, Revised Penal Code). Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua to death would be prision mayor,
which has to be imposed in its medium period in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
(Article 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying further the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty would range from prision correccional, as the minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as the
maximum.

SC= WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted kidnapping and serious illegal detention.  Accordingly, accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and one (1) day of  prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as maximum. The award for moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 is hereby DELETED.