Delimitation of The Continental Shelf of Libya and Malta
Delimitation of The Continental Shelf of Libya and Malta
PARKLAND CAMPUS
BLW 4304
GROUP MEMBERS
This case, which was submitted to the Court in 1982 by Special Agreement
between Libya and Malta, related to the delimitation of the areas of continental
shelf appertaining to each of these two States.
The Court found that, in view of developments in the law relating to the rights of
States over areas of continental shelf, there was no reason to assign a role to
geographical or geophysical factors when the distance between the two States was
less than 400 miles (as in the instant case). It also considered that the equidistance
method did not have to be used and was not the only appropriate delimitation
technique. The Court defined a number of equitable principles and applied them in
its Judgment of 3 June 1985, in the light of the relevant circumstances. It took
account of the main features of the coasts, the difference in their lengths and the
distance between them.
It took care to avoid any excessive disproportion between the continental shelf
appertaining to a State and the length of its coastline, and adopted the solution of a
median line transposed northwards over a certain distance. In the course of the
proceedings, Italy applied for permission to intervene, claiming that it had an
interest of a legal nature under Article 62 of the Statute. The Court found that the
intervention requested by Italy fell, by virtue of its object, into a category which —
on Italy’s own showing — was one which could not be accepted, and the
Application was accordingly refused.
ICJ TASK
Libya position
Even though the Court has not been requested by the Parties to draw the
delimitation line" as is evident from the Special Agreement, it has been invested
with the task of deciding what principles and rules of international law are
applicable to the delimitation between the Parties and how in practice such
principles and rules can be applied by the two Parties in order that they may, in
their subsequent negotiations, delimit without difficulty their respective continental
shelves. A-major component of the second task of the Court will be. in the view of
Libya to identify, to weigh and to balance up the relevant factors and
circumstances present in this case and to test the equitableness of the anticipated
result by the criterion of proportionality.
Malta’s Position
Malta's position regarding the task of the Court, and the difficulties it sees in this
connection with Libya's Submissions, appear to be tantamount to saying that,
unless the Court is requested to draw the precise delimitation line - as was the case
in the Anglo-French Arbitration and the Gulf of Maine case - or unless the Court is
to conceive its role as prescribing for the Parties a single method of delimitation
having the degree of precision of, for example. The equidistance method, the
Special Agreement cannot be carried out by the Parties in their negotiations
following the Judgment of the Court.
Existence of a rift zone in the region of the delimitation from Libya’s Contention
that natural prolongation in the physical sense of the land territory into the sea is
still a primary basis of title to the Continental Shelf. It would follow that if there
exists a fundamental discontinuity between the shelf area adjacent to one party and
the area adjacent to the other party.
The Boundary should lie along the general line of that fundamental discontinuity.
According to Libya, According to Libya, in the present case there are two distinct
continental shelves divided by what it class the “ rift Zone” and it is "within, and
following the general direction of the rift that delimitation should be carried out.
The Court takes the view that, since the development of the law enables a state to
claim continental shelf up to 200 miles from its coast whatever the geological c
characteristic of the corresponding seabed and subsoil there is no reason to ascribe
any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance.
Since in the Present instance the distance between the coasts of the parties is less
than 400 miles, so that no geophysical feature can lie more than 200 miles from
each coast, the rift zone cannot constitute a fundamental terminating the southward
extension of the Maltese shelf and the northward extension of the Libyan as if it
were some natural boundary.
Moreover, the need to interpret the evidence advanced for and against the Libyan
argument would compel the Court first to make a determination upon a
disagreement between scientists of distinction as to the more plausibly correct
interpretation n of apparently incomplete Scientific data , a positon which it cannot
accept. The court therefore rejected the rift zone argument of Libya.
Libya contented that the court should adjudge and declare as follows:
The Court stated that an equitable result can be obtained first by drawing
between the 13" 50' and the 15" 10' meridians a median line, of which every
point is equidistant from the low-water mark of the relevant coasts of Malta,
on the one hand, and of Libya, on the other, and by then transposing this line
northwards by 18' so as to intersect the 15" 10' E meridian at a latitude of
approximately 34" 30' N.
2. The applicable principles and rules of international law
I. Natural prolongation
For Libya, the natural prolongation of the land territory of a State into the
sea remains the fundamental basis of lega1 title to continental shelf areas.
For Malta, continental shelf rights are no longer defined in the light of
physical criteria; they are controlled by the concept of distance from the
coast.
In the view of the Court, the principles and rules underlying the régime of
the exclusive economic zone cannot be left out of consideration in the
present case, which relates to the delimitation of the continental shelf. The
two institutions are linked together in modern law, and one of the relevant
circumstances to be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental
shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the exclusive economic
zone appertaining to that same State. The institution of the exclusive
economic zone, with its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is shown
by the practice of States to have become a part of customary law; and
although the institutions of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zone are different and distinct, the rights which the exclusive economic zone
entails over the sea-bed of the zone are defined by reference to the régime
laid down for the continental shelf. Although there can be a continental shelf
where there is no exclusive economic zone, there cannot be an exclusive
economic zone without a corresponding continental shelf. It follows that, for
juridical and practical reasons, the distance criterion must now apply to the
continental shelf as well as to the exclusive economic zone; and this s quite
apart from the provision as to distance in Article 76 of the 1982 Convention.
Within 200 miles of the coast, natural prolongation is in part defined by
distance from the shore. The concepts of natural prolongation and distance
are not opposed but complementary; and both remain essential elements in
the juridical concept of the continental shelf. The Court is thus unable to
accept the Libyan contention that distance from the coast is not a relevant
element for the decision of the present case.
Neither, however, is the Court able to accept Malta's argument that the
new importance of the idea of distance from the coast has conferred a
primacy on the method of equidistance for the purposes of delimitation of
the continental shelf, at any rate between opposite States, as is the case
with the coasts of Malta and Libya. Malta considers that the distance
principle requires that, as a starting point of the delimitation process,
consideration must be given to an equidistance line, subject to
verification of the equitableness of the result achieved by this initial
delimitation. The Court is unable to accept that, even as a preliminary
step towards the drawing of a delimitation line, the equidistance method
is one which must necessarily be used. It is neither the only appropriate
method of delimitation, nor the only permissible point of departure.
Moreover, the Court considers that the practice of States in this field falls
short of proving the existence of a rule prescribing the use of
equidistance, or indeed of any method, as obligatory.
The Parties agreed that the delimitation of the continental shelf must
be effected by the application of equitable principles in al1 the
relevant circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result. The
Court lists some of these principles: the principle that there is to be no
question of refashioning geography; the principle of non-
encroachment by one Party on areas appertaining to the other; the
principle of the respect due to al1 relevant circumstances; the
principle that "equity does not necessarily imply equality" and that
there can be no question of distributive justice.
VI. Proportionality
While considering that there is no reason of principle why a test of
proportionality, based on the ratio between the lengths of the relevant
coasts and the areas of shelf attributed, should not be employed to
verify the equity of the result, the Court States that there may be
certain practical difficulties which render this test inappropriate. They
are particularly evident in the present case, inter alia because the area
to which the Judgment will apply is limited by reason of the 1
existence of claims of third States, and to apply the proportionality
test simply to the areas within these limits would be unrealistic.
However, it seems to the Court that it can make a broad assessment of
the equity of the result without attempting to express it in figures. It
concludes that there is certainly no manifest disproportion between
areas of shelf attributed to each of the Parties, such that it might be
claimed that the requirements of the test of proportionality as an
aspect of equity are not satisfied.
Conclusion