Republic of the Philippines from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and

SUPREME COURT respondent would come to an end.

Manila
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
SECOND DIVISION between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime
in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a
ADM. CASE No. 3319, June 8, 2000 second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime
in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship
LESLIE UI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, Respondent.
persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent
Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
The relevant facts are: relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer, respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City and as a result of knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged.
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris in 1985 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their
that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines marriage before they would live together.
was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update
respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to
later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate
child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a
few days after she reported to work with the law firm  she was
connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of
Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
has been communicating with her. Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not respondent Carlos left the same.
illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988,
when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been  prima
with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's
Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
parents' funds. By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
and groundless disbarment case against respondent. make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
In her Reply dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others,
that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her support of their respective positions on the matter support and
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent cause for the offense charged.
with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
complaint against respondent reads: Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed  on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527
the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however
show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989. complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission wherein she charged respondent with making false
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
of respondents started and was discovered by complainant which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred,
among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she
1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage duly certified by the not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning
State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent
of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 
was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged
that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
within the wedlock. It is the contention of complainant that such act altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason
constitutes a violation of Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent
respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent
an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified
member of the Philippine Bar. and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the
date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this
Contempt),  respondent averred that she did not have the original matter.
copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the
she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with
marriage certificate in her possession. Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored
car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of
Respondent filed her Memorandum on February 22, 1995 and raised the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing
the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, does
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no
practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: photographer from a private security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented
i. Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the 5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent
legal profession; and for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
ii. Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent charged and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of
conducted herself in an immoral manner. Justice to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In
fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos
Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic)
in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of
her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him. 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the
Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.
In the Memorandum filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no
reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate time did they live together.
relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled
late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure,
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. It was thus highly improbable she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad
not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date. x x x           x x x          x x x

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum, respondent stated that Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of
the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
such information was made known to respondent. Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that: applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition
Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
light of contemporary human experience.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men. the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to
the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
law are: flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; C.J.S. 959). 
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that
d. a person of good moral character; when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single.
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result
turpitude, are filed or pending in court; of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
character. More importantly, possession of good moral character should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened
the revocation of such privilege. It has been held — with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead
us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she
professional probity. never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this
woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
the opinion of good and respectable members of the members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
community.  Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as no less than the highest degree of morality.
to be reprehensible to a high degree. 
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
standards."  Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more
Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same
moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting or similar offense in the future.
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. SO ORDERED.
After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by

respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of
the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom
how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the
year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information

contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot
stand.
 Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino
SUPREME COURT started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were
Manila secretly married.

SECOND DIVISION In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del
Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing
his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA, Complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D.
MANIWANG, Respondent. When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was
pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz,
to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they
AQUINO, J.:
were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have
the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying
the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the for a marriage license.
Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he
refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he
relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child,
expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb.
Michael Dino Maniwang.
He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he
passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the
student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law baptism of his child.
student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became
sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released
Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting
on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which
her.
Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with
Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her
following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to
dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Ivisan.
Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had
gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him
sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love
there only to be told that their marriage could not take place
with another man and that she had a child with still another man.
because  he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She
Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind
was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
because he loved her very much.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7
and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J). C.J.S. 959).

Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child
and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who
repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re  Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd
been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an 896).
illegitimate child before Michael was born.
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary
opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of
reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a
lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a
character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any surrounding circumstances.
court.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself
have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying
"A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a
saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533,
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
535).
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of
the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in
the following cases:
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of 1. Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage,
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their
sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during
 Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony."
flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my
abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life."
Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
2. Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous
that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman
Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece
and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 256). Phil. 865).
3. Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another women who had borne him a child The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing
(Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva,
contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual
101 Phil. 313). relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar
4. The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to
Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts
spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while in hotels.
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another
girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage
a secret while continuing to demand money from the On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual,
complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to
resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy
his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint
of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450). whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
5. Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was
engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him According to the complainant, two children were born as a
to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she
that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money
upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant
a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24,
439). 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547,
January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322;
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10,
that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in 1979,93 SCRA 91).
having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a
marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to
Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every
SUPREME COURT time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why
Manila she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours
ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe
THIRD DIVISION St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost
restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face
and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast.
A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007
Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting
his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. the car.
MACABATA, Respondent.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent
RESOLUTION informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer
and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and
read as follows:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula
against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter
with Gross Immorality. Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm
Complainant alleged the following: replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore" 
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you 
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia anymore)
Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of
regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As at 6:17:59 pm the situation.
promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy
attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties. Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t
Sent by complainant have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas
Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2
against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle At 6:32:43 pm put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very
their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to put it
complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, rightly it is an expression of feeling)
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show
embraced her very tightly. by respondent  u my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you
at 6:42:25 pm still see me so I can show you my sincerity)
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she
met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon
City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na
tayo). On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.
Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation, recommending
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry.
Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20
admission of guilt. March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
In his answer, respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal
services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the
offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required
Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto
busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
to commit the acts imputed to him. months.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent
criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious
respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension
Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula from the practice of law.
Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana
because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we
archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by deal with respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling effect on how
the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined.
complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it
complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
ate at a restaurant. responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with
greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar,
to withdraw the privilege.
CANON I – x x x
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
immoral or deceitful conduct. members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
no less than the highest degree of morality. We explained
of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated
in Barrientos v. Daarol that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must
Bar.
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
xxxx highest moral standards of the community."

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
legal profession. fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Bar Matter No. 1154, good moral character was defined as what a
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve their opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
practice of law. In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr., we emphasized that:
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients;
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the
of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a lips.
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes
not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one
In his Answer, respondent confessed, thus: went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left
cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ...
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you should I say tilted her face towards me and when she’s already
goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night.
hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently She went down the car, that’s it.
on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
COMM. FUNA: February 10 iyan.
xxxx
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left
cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her ATTY. MACABATA: Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go
right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my
was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same
No breast holding was done. Everything happened very corner. So before she went down , before she opened the door of the
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
harassment."
COMM. FUNA: Pardon?
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP
Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent ATTY. MACABATA: I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I
candidly recalled the following events: kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a
little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and
ATTY. MACABATA: That time in February, we met … I fetched her I that’s it. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
I said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not
okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food
and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) In Zaguirre v. Castillo, we reiterated the definition of immoral
order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless
that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to
said let’s go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but
my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As
grossly immoral conduct: such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be
disbarred."
In Toledo v. Toledo, a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law,
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another In Tucay v. Tucay, respondent contracted marriage with another
woman who had borne him a child. married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married
for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., a lawyer was disbarred after complainant conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s
relationship with a married woman. This court declared that disbarment.
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar. In Villasanta v. Peralta, respondent married complainant while his
first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We
In Dantes v. Dantes, respondent’s act of engaging in illicit held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is
relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the
marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and In Cabrera v. Agustin, respondent lured an innocent woman into a
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that
respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar, it was ruled that it was highly immoral of which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is,
respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes
where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
would flank in all her subjects in case she refused. indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, respondent lawyer was disbarred when respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate
he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent attitude toward good order and public welfare.
woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a
"bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or
beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, respondent entered into multiple camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him
we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if
undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly
this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the immoral.
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in
advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other
sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof lawyers from similar misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are means
rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who
the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and
a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
of its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular
who denies, must prove." As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should
proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the
negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence
miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his
mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. to the public.

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution
conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the
phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those
to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the
out. moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction
unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced
Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or
private place or a more remote place where he could freely aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the
accomplish the same. offense should also be considered.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of
not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor
or suspension. infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. In the Matter
of Darell Adams, a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a
female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely
against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of
reflected on his fitness to practice law.
a number of factors. When deciding upon the appropriate sanction,
the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and
considering that this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand would
suffice.

We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly

believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and
agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer
of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the
incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be
corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent

Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be
more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on
him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he
SUPREME COURT has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Manila
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much
EN BANC patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A
Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984 Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to
that place.
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, Complainant, vs. GENEROSO B.
OBUSAN, JR., Respondent. The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was
corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook  leader, testified that Obusan introduced
AQUINO, J.: himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His
name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr.
her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968. respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was
Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to
Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of
They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio
November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's
Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia testimony.
was subsisting or undissolved.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife,
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did
not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional
evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has

sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of
her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated
from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that
he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and
resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman,
fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs.
Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife

and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the

Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora
SUPREME COURT Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to
Manila be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to
attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the
EN BANC complainant that they take refreshment before going to the
Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel
at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1967
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to
complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.  assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with
FLORA QUINGWA, Complainant, vs. ARMANDO reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of
PUNO, Respondent. respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage,
complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant. room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent. 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel,
respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as
REGALA, J.: soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not
complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I
immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again
averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent
Rules of Court. pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then
placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her
flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for
complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took
then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant,
place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening
assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and
when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party
documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-
together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June
examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise
1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some
testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at
more but complainant refused telling that they had better
the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting
wait until they were married; that after their said sexual
"Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored
respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959,
charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites: complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of
shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and
possessed by members of the Philippine Bar. departed at 7:00 P.M.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent. Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5,
1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in
denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and
intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent,
1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.
Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his
answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed. and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November,
1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated
day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the
complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. respondent to be his.
There was no appearance for the respondents.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified
intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records
the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an clerk of the hospital.
opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and
6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court. the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even
stated in the complaint. respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he
used to ask for money from the complainant.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school
teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony. hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so
respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from
November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were the State the very means by which it may assist him.
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos,
a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his
to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.) complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that
because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of
(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
1966). court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127
re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re  Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon
of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that
vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53
upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the
O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one
practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm.
of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138,
Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re  Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
Rules of Court).
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law
Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards
did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, Ethics:
speaking for the Court, said:
...The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in
State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.
 Republic of the Philippines her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill
SUPREME COURT her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes
Manila after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her
foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual
EN BANC intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June
2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been
heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone
JOSEFINA ROYONG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON
because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
OBLENA, Respondent.
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes
when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and
BARRERA, J.: received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that
the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the
General for investigation, report and recommendation. office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with
of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows: the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him,
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached
the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last
he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all,
dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house
lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He
threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage
lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster
fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After
the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the
parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given
to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14- on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court
16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). may fix.."

xxx     xxx     xxx But he was not then the person of good moral character he
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
FINDINGS AND COMMENT continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman
and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of
him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take
under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the
the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of
undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was
office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from
performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations
behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have
with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct
been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving
should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we
her honor....
recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned
cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
xxx     xxx     xxx
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not
long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that
the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence RECOMMENDATION
shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from
17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave attorneys.
abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he
knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was
He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent
'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living
is not difficult to see why she could not resist him. adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia,
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and
filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this
Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister,
respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent
name from the roll of attorneys." courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and
she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent
defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n.
of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as
original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months
necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she
Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations)
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed. [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga,
Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live
with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court
(t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines),
Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case
who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n.
was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a
lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that
memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not
respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962,
been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the
pp. 5-6]."
respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was
committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission
to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at
member of the bar. a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed
on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case ...That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
not covered by this stipulation of facts.  complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and
his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958,
when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his
living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention
to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime
...Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he
She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia,
Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together
Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he
them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already
married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted
he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter
had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had
and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the
already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live complainant Josefina Royong and the open cohabitation with Briccia
with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' respondent's disbarment.
from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married
woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his
petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has
was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true
so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or
when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
(Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962). disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated
by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may
be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary
advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in
continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair
a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698,
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule
examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making
with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such
one year. statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over
attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States,
respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued
hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave possession of a fair private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss Kan. 398, 404), to wit:
requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential
rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him
unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for
enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character
see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission degeneration of the members of the bar.
of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to
be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand
the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
expected of a member of the bar. scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case,
as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession
constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he
have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she
this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her
after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the
are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
noblest means he could have employed was to have married the accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the
maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's investigation.
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to
the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion
for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
735). approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral
character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not
exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
different from those originally charged in the complaint of January good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from
14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
128 of the Rules of Court, which state:. estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744
orders differently. B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent,
therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of
served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the
the bar.
complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of
herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
 Republic of the Philippines 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where
SUPREME COURT he made statements which were highly contemptuous of Judge
Manila Abastillas. Hence, according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order
on March 2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show cause why he should
EN BANC not be held in contempt of court and recommended for suspension
from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas
issued an order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of
A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815, July 11, 1994.
contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of
P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this Court that
JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. Atty. Chua be suspended from the practice of law. This order of
RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled
50 Bacolod City, Respondent. "Judge Renato Abastillas v. Enrique S. Chua."

JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to
ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent. Associate Justice Alfredo J. Lagamon of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court
Enrique S. Chua for complainants. dated May 6, 1993.

DECISION After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report
recommending the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
PER CURIAM: Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition
of appropriate disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique 5. Chua in
Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified Adm. Case No. 3815.
complainant dated June 8, 1992, docketed as Adm. Case No. RTJ-
863, charging respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563.
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his sala entitled Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their
"People v. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious misconduct charges of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bench, gross ignorance gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a magistrate against
of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest Judge Abastillas, through the affidavits and testimonies of Johnny
partiality, oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua.
justice "which may result or has resulted in falsification of public
documents or in the commission of falsehood." The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe
money of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as
In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas down payment of the consideration for the dismissal of the criminal
vehemently denied the charges against him. He averred that Atty. cases against his clients, is summarized in the report of Justice
Chua had an axe to grind against him because of a prior incident Lagamon, to wit:
between them. Judge Abastillas pointed out that on September 28,
1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as fees so that both of them can receive their respective compensation
their principal witness declared in his Affidavit that when criminal for their efforts (Exh.’H’, par. 9).
cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod
City, presided by the respondent, he was heartened because the Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about
respondent was among the few judges he was comfortable with. 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon he delivered P20,000.00 to the
Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in respondent and before he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly
his chambers and apprised him of the background of the cases and said where will they celebrate that evening.
requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyance because of
the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson
the respondent accordingly instructed the docket clerk not to release Lee and Atty. Chua appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council
the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent allegedly and briefly related the delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent
said, Ike, don’t worry toe much, anyway, that is not your personal where he was rebuked by Dean Palma for allowing himself to be
problem. They are just cases of your clients. What is important is that used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palma asked
you are assured of your attorney’s fees. Why, how much is your fee Atty. Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par.
there? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a share there 16).
and I will take care of everything’ (Affidavit of Atty. Chua; Exh.’H’).
During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first
Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened meeting with the respondent was between April 10 to 15, 1991 in his
and told him not to worry but at the same time informed him that the chambers when the criminal docket clerk was instructed not to
judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny release the warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41,
K.H. Uy advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give P50,000.00 TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it was also at that time
to the respondent because of their sad experience with the when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, ‘why, how
Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the much is your fees there? P50,000.00? You double it.’ (p. 54, TSN,
objections of Atty. Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount of Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua
P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turn give to discussed the reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on
respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but most probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86,
Chua deposited the check in his account. TSN, Sept. 15, 1993), and the third meeting was when he delivered
the P20,000.00 which he said was on May 2, 1991 but which he
Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket rectified during cross examination that he withdrew the amount on
clerk of the respondent informed Atty. Chua that the bail bond for his May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was
clients was increased from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon on May 3, 1991 at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64,
ax paste motion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse TSN, Sept. 15, 1993).
development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua for not giving the money
yet to the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of the "In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he
respondent where accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a pointed out the following facts which were either admitted or
motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for the reduction of the bail undisputed and which he believes established the misconduct and
and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it the impropriety of the respondent as follows:
shall be in cash. The motion was filed and the respondent granted it
the following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chua that the bail
bond should be in cash to facilitate the collection of his attorney’s
 a. Respondent Judge’s admission that he met complainant Lee balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied, "Okay, okay.
ahead of witness Johnny Uy, whom he tagged as the ‘financier’ Anyway, I know they have no case against you."
of the herein complainants on May 29, 1991; ‘while he met Uy
only on October 7, 1991’ (p. 11, Comment dated September 28, On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask
1992 of respondent). Judge Abastillas why he approved three ex-parte motions of the
private prosecutor in the criminal cases, one, for issuance of a
b. Respondent Judge’s admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, warrant of arrest of the accused and, another, for increase of their
he and complainant Lee saw each other at the Quezon City bail bond, without giving the accused an opportunity to oppose the
Sports Center, during the meeting of the Philippine Judges’ same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing
Association (p. 11, Comment, supra). to worry "because that is my style. I will just give them a little favor.
Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."
c. As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that ‘it is true that
respondent met with Johnny N.H. Uy on October 7, 1991 at the Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one
residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Johnny Uy, a brother of Ban Hun Flores, who had a hand in the filing
Quezon City . . .’ (p. 7, Comment, supra). of the criminal cases, wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said
yes. "You just give him my telephone number and call me." Judge
Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling card bearing his
the accused who were charged with two (2) criminal cases before his telephone number 7222968.
sala will render him liable for gross misconduct or conduct
unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate." The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon
City Sports Center became the basis for the charges of "gross
Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to misconduct and conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."
Judge Abastillas, the latter told him that the accused (in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see the Judge at the Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases
forthcoming convention of Philippine Judges’ Association to be held pending before Judge Abastillas where the accused were charged
at the Quezon City Sports Center. with embezzlement of the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation.
According to Uy, he was interested in the outcome of the cases,
Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for the reason that
and 10011, narrated on the witness stand that he received a long the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the
distance call from Atty. Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas operation of the corporation, 75% of which stocks had been assigned
wanted to see him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City Sports Center to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his residence
on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges’ Association was to in St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about
hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. Alter 11:30 in the morning. Before going to Judge Abastillas’ house, Uy
introducing himself to Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function called him by telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction
room where they had a private conversation for about twenty of his place. During that visit, where the background and merits of
minutes. During the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge Abastillas if the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas assured Uy that
he had received what they sent to Atty. Chua. Judge Abastillas said he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge Abastillas
yes, but added, "I cannot give you what you are asking. It will take a told Uy to ask Johnson Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with
little time to study." Johnson Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the 5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Lee
about the matter and would inform Judge Abastillas by telephone of reminding Chua that by delivering himself the advance payment of
the result. On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the judge.
Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no
problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the cases
of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas told Uy to take
up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge
friend of Uy and Judge Abastillas. The telephone conversation was Abastillas, complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 averred and
taped by Uy (Exh. "B"). sought to prove the following:

Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further 1. When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the
declared that sometime in the middle of June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, Judge
called his office and left a note that they would have dinner with Abastillas, instead of acting on the same, issued an order for
Judge Abastillas at six o’clock in the evening at Manila Hotel. their arrest and confiscation of their bailbonds in view of their
Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, Judge failure to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;
Abastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice:
"Johnson, don’t worry," Huwag kang mag-alala. Nakatimbre na ang
kaso n’yo sa akin. 2. Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail,
Judge Abastillas still insisted that they be present at their
arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave preferential treatment to
After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was some cases, particularly Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847,
giving the accused a runaround, not having done anything relative to entitled "People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous
the criminal proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of Drugs Acts and for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
the bargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar Ammunitions, which were heard and the accused acquitted in
Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 to oppose Judge just five (5) months, and in which the accused were not
Abastillas’ application for transfer to Manila as RTC Judge on the required to be present at the hearing of the Motion to Quash
ground of his lack of good moral character. Johnson Lee saw Justice the Information; whereas in connection with complainants’
Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judge Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information, their presence
allegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 was required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion
and accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in connection with Criminal was denied in open court in a "trifling manner.
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come
back together with Johnny Uy and bring with them the tape
containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge 3. Complainants’ Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set
Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on Arraignment, Pre-trial and Continuous Trial dated June 2, 1991
January 29, 1991 Johnson Lee, together with Johnny Uy and Atty. was arbitrarily denied, their bonds were declared forfeited and
Chua, returned to JBC’s office where the tape was replayed before the bondsmen were asked to show cause why no judgment
then JBC member Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained shall be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds.
an English translation of the taped conversation and gave it to In addition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants’
Justice Relova and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. arrest and fixed an excessive bond of P50,000.00 each for
Both extensively interrogated Johnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. their provisional liberty.
Chua. At one point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua for
having allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly
 4. In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order "A: Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I
posthaste requiring the delivery to court of the illegally had then with me my old bank passbook. I traced the deposit and
possessed firearm and ammunition, which order was not withdrawal in that passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991
necessary because the items should have been forfeited in of the sum of P20,000.00. So most probably, it’s either on that very
favor of the Government and deposited in Camp Crame. same day or immediately the next day that I delivered the money.

5. Two of complainants’ motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 "A: I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not
and 10011 had remained unresolved beyond the 90-day mistaken, the next day is either a non-working day or a Saturday and
reglementary period. I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. when I placed the P20,000.00 in
my attache case, I remember my kid commenting that ‘Papa, you
have so much money in your attache case.’ So the money stayed
overnight with me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, Sept.
15, 1993.)
In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn
Affidavit of October 22, 1993, as well as in his testimony in his own
behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Seizing upon Atty. Chun’s above-quoted assertion that the delivery
Atty. Chua or having received P20,000.00 from him as initial of the money "most probably’ was on May 3,1991, Judge Abastillas
payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his argued that he could not have received the money in the afternoon of
defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the May 3 as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that day by ferry
personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan (Branch Clerk of boat for Iloilo City and then proceeded by car to Roxas City where he
Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in honor of
Alma M. Ronato, Wilma B. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce Justice Bellosillo who was appointed as Court Administrator. To
(Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter), Amando N. Eso prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an affidavit of Judge
(Deputy Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2) and Edwin O. Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC,
Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during the incumbency Bacolod City) certifying that he and his wife were with Judge
of Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had Abastillas in their journey to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano,
never seen Atty. Chua enter the judge’s chambers. Ramon B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the Regional Trial Court
at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the effect that Judge
Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991
While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered
where he stayed up to the following day.
the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas either on May 2 or May 3 of
1991, on cross-examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when
pressed to give the exact date that: Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991
at the Quezon City Sports Center during the convention of the
Philippine Judges’ Association. But he denied having asked Johnson
"Q: Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May
for a meeting there or having talked to him privately regarding the
2 or the next day, you delivered P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas?
criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTC Judge Joselito de la
Rosa of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge
"A: Yes. Correct. de la Rosa, a friend of Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him.
According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card to Judge de
"Q: Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May la Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This
3?
was the same calling card that was introduced as evidence by the "24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to
complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863. be cordial to Lee, I showed my displeasure by not addressing him. It
is not true that I told him I will take care of the two criminal cases."
Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson (At pp. 13 and 14.)
Lee at the Manila Hotel in the evening of June 7, 1991 but that the
latter was never invited by him to be there on that occasion. This is Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the
the account of Judge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, went to his
the meeting: residence at Quezon City on October 7, 1991. But the visit,
according to Judge Abastillas, was not at his own initiative and the
"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is
with my cousin and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila his version of the meeting:
Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on that
occasion. what happened was this: My cousin and I agreed to a "25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00
foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. When my wife and I from Johnny Uy. He did come to my residence on that date, but that
were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called was not on my initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting
me up and said he wanted to see me. I told him that I was going to a word from our maid and from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had been
dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeing me; and I had an calling up asking for me, but refused to leave any message. And
inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I then on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a
told him, I was willing to see him, as long as he did not bring along luncheon meeting, our maid informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to
either or both Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me that Lee talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phone Johnny Uy
and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house;
this condition because I did not want to meet Lee and/or Moreno he said he wanted to talk to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where
outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I his sister Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that he
was willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of was going to discuss the Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if
mine, and he was counsel for one of my brothers-in law (’bilas- he had, I would have refused to see him, because I did not want to
husband of my wife’s sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed that he would talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with the
not take with him either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the pushiness and aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to
Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was at the Manila establish a close relationship with me. Uy was very insistent that I
Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when I saw Atty. see him, so just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he
Simbulan, I asked him: ‘Bakit ba nandito iyan?’ (Why is that person came to my house on said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about
here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: ‘Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka the S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never asked him
na; Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya’ (I don’t know. for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money, Philippine or American
Please be patient; don’t get angry. Let him join us). I contained my currency, on that occasion, or over the phone. Uy was lying when he
irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife were civil and testified that when he came to see me at home, I asked for
hospitable. We, Filipinos, are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, $5,000.00 from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said
we tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by that in a telephone conversation with me on October 16, 1991, said
Johnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also $5,000.00 was discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have
gatecrashed during the Judges’ Convention. Furthermore, as talked with him over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have
indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed $5,000.00. Also, I
Lagamon, the Investigating Justice in this proceeding.
have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him, or In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge
with anybody else." (Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.) Abastillas expanded his charges against Atty. Chua to include the
following:
Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815
A. Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a
The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the member of the Bar and he violated his oath of office for the
March 11, 1993 contempt order were contained in the Urgent Motion reason that:
for Reconsideration dated February 21, 1992 he filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, to wit: 1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy
with Lee, Moreno and Uy, he committed the crime of bribery
1. ’And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised
regrets to say that in denying the six (6) incidents in the manner Penal Code;
above-described, the Court acted no better than a pre-school kid
who murmurs a favorite nursery rime (sic)’ (Page 3, par. 5 of the 2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of
Motion). Public Document in People of the Philippines versus
Enrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of
2. ’To put it bluntly, Accused have the feeling that these cases are the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;
being railroaded against them’ (Page 5, 2nd par. of the Motion).
3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm.
3. ’Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the Case No. 1425, entitled "J. Bautista Rabago v. Atty.
various palpable erroneous actuations of the Court, which have Enrique S. Chua;"
gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt extraordinary
remedies or corrective disciplinary sanctions urgently required, 4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee,
so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations Moreno and Uy, by testifying in the proceedings under oath
created by the series of plainly and outrageously, if not that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on
maliciously, erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highly May 3, 1991, when he knew that he never gave any bribe
prejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the money to Judge Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made
administration of justice and in effect, constitute a desecration of other false statements in the proceedings to harass Judge
our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the Abastillas.
President Judge RENATO E. ABASTILLAS unfit to continue
wearing the judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Bench, a copy of this Motion is made under oath and furnished Responsibility, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R.
Narvasa; Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, 1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under
without prejudice to the impending formal administrative oath that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge
complaint the accused will in due time institute with the Supreme Abastillas on May 3, 1991;
Court (Page 12, No. (7) of the Motion)."
 2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive just cannot underestimate my sister Banua and perhaps you do not
language in his pleadings and memoranda against know her. And he said giving of money is not in reality a bribe
Undersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice; because we are in effect buying justice. And he told me I have to be
practical about the whole thing.
3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by
perjuring himself in declaring that be gave P20,000.00 bribe "Q: So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a
money to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false bribe but you were only ‘buying justice’?
evidence in the form of a taped conversation, indicating lack
of candor, fairness and good faith with the Court, and which "Q:I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way
acts of Atty. Chua violate his duties not to do any falsehood of life approach such practice but I really do not know why I gave in
to mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice; and to their constant persistent pleadings.

4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client — the two (2) "Q: Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 — not to your clients?
attend the scheduled arraignment.
"A: Partly maybe.
Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the
proceedings before Justice Lagamon that he gave P20,000.00 as "Q: So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas
bribe to Judge Abastillas. Thus: was allegedly asking from you?

"A: That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to

him." (TSN., Oct. 27, 1993, pp. 7-8.)
"Q: In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by
Judge Abastillas, what was your advise to your clients? Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863

"A: I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge
intrinsically meritorious. So I do not see any reason giving money or Abastillas accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in view of Atty. Chua’s
bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the habit doing that. uncertainty as to the date he delivered the money. His final estimate
of the date on cross-examination — May 3, 1993 — had afforded
"Q: Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe? Judge Abastillas a credible defense of alibi.

"A: That is what I told them. However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge
Abastillas had willingly and knowingly discussed with interested
"Q: What did your clients tell you? parties with whom he met at least three (3) times, the possible
dismissal of the criminal cases for a certain consideration.
"A: They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me.
Because their reason is the sad experience they had undergone with Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with
the Dept. of Justice. And according to Mr. Uy he told me, he said you Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 on May 29, 1991 at the Philippine Judges’ convention at the Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uy’s voice on the
Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 and at the Manila Hotel phone and in fact they had a face-to-face conversation on October 7,
on June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that he accepted as visitor in 1991 in the Judge’s house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge
his house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 Abastillas could not say definitely whether he had a talk with Johnny
Johnny K.H. Uy, a party interested in the outcome of the criminal Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame and shallow stance
cases. This meeting was followed by a telephone call made by Uy to only serves to emphasize the obvious.
Judge Abastillas on October 16, 1991 wherein the former informed
the latter that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the
US$5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee would be cleared telephone conversation as recorded in the tape by Johnny Uy on
first, to which Judge Abastillas suggested to Uy to take up the matter October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped
with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both. conversation was replayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon
with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified and recognized
Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he the voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.
talked to Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991, except to
say, "It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge
categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we even Abastillas that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US
discussed $5,000.00’, (p. 16, Sworn Statement, Em. "27"). Judge $5,000.00) as long as the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be
Abastillas also declared on cross-examination that "it is possible (that cleared first. Judge Abastillas’ response was to advise Uy to take up
Johnny Uy talked to him over the phone on October 16) but I cannot the matter with Al Simbulan.
remember exactly the caller, maybe one of the callers might be a
certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas
voice." (TSN, p. 25, November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified solicited US$5,000.00. However, the taped conversation as the
comment dated September 28, 1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillas evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would
declared he had telephone conversation with Johnny Uy just before show, was just a sequel of a series of interlinked events that had
Uy went to his house on October 7, 1991. Thus: earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by Judge Abastillas
of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment,
"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid followed by the meeting between Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee
Beth informed me that Mr. Johnny Uy wanted to talk to me. When at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, and the
respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latter’s
asked that he be allowed to see respondent in his house. house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City where the judge asked for
Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry because he had a US $5,000.00. All the interrelated events ineluctably point to the
2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very conclusion that Judge Abastillas knew that the "5T" meant $5,000.00
insistent, so, just to get rid of him, respondent agreed to see Uy for a he tried to solicit.
few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latter’s house.
After introducing himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had
against complainants herein. no idea at all about the "5T" mentioned by Johnny Uy, he should
have expressed surprise and inquired from Uy what he meant by it.
"What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on He did not, which goes to show he filly understood what the "5T"
the counsel of Lee and Moreno to do all that need to be done in the stood for.
case." (pp. 6-7.)
It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to “3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that
Judge Abastillas, the latter’s reply did not appear to be responsive meeting of May 29, 1991 with complainant Lee at the Judges’
because he mentioned something like ‘Take up the matter with Al convention, he ‘did not give him the opportunity to see respondent
Simbulan." The theory is advanced that it would be illogical for a again’ and that ‘he took all steps necessary so that he could not have
person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party and a lawyer to talk again to Lee’, is a pure lie, and thus cannot be believed,
at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty. because when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation,
Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge Abastillas and Johnny Uy. He was confronted with a calling card (EXH.’D’) of his own cousin Mr.
could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant Lee, in the
the direct personal involvement of the taker in the payoff. presence of respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila
Hotel on June 7, 1991 or barely a weck after respondent Judge,
In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the realizing that he could no longer pretend to be that ‘resolute’ in
admissibility of the taped conversation (Exh. 13) as evidence. He avoiding complainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext that complaint
offered no objection to its replay at the hearing before Justice (sic) Lee ‘was a gatecrasher on that occasion’. This, by itself is
Lagamon. extremely difficult to believe.

We do not believe that Judge Abastillas’ meeting with Johnson Lee Even respondent Judge’s explanation about the presence of
at the Quezon City Sports Center was not pre-arranged. Neither do complainant Lee at that Manila Hotel dinner is silly, if not childish and
we accept his explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at ridiculous. According to respondent Judge, he already ‘had inkling’
the judge’s party at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the on what was in Arty. Simbulan’s mind when the latter ‘insisted in
discussion in complainants’ memorandum in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92- seeing him’ at the time he and his wife were already on their way to
863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote: the Manila Hotel for a ‘foursome’ dinner. That ‘inkling’ according to
respondent Judge, are the two criminal cases where complainant
Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless
"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which
willingly allowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner,
he first met complainant Lee by way of his justification in meeting the
notwithstanding the fact that, in his own words, ‘prior to this, he (Atty.
said Complainant, should he taken with a grain of salt, so to speak.
Simbulan) informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his
Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow Judges
partner, Atty. Pineda’. Thus if indeed respondent Judge is so
Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being instrumental in paving the way
determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in
for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two judges was
avoiding at all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress
presented by him to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent
upon the Investigating Justice, then, he could have easily set up an
was able to secure the affidavit of Judge Ponferrada (Annex ‘4’ of his
alibi to mislead Atty. Simbulan. Thus, there was indeed a prior
sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact that on
understanding on where and when to meet Lee again after their
May 3, 1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he
meeting at the Judge’s convention.
cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from Judge Ponferrada to
bolster the circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."
Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to
prove that complainant Lee was really a ‘gatecrasher’ or request
Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under
Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his version that Lee was the most
mutually conducive and cordial circumstances which subsequently
unwanted guest during that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent
led to the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very
Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Lee’s having his calling
probable.
card (EXH.’C’), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him
up by telephone prior to their seeing each other on October 7, 1991 Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of the
at the residence of respondent Judge." arraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court
from orally denying the motion to quash and proceeding with the
The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties arraignment. It appears that the motion which was filed only one day
who had a stake in the outcome of Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and before the scheduled date of hearing was intended to delay and
100~I and the recorded telephone conversation where said cases derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into account that the Sept.
were discussed manifested Judge Abastillas’ willingness, nay, 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court in
propensity to ester into deals with motivations incongruous to the the presence of Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for
merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26.
serious misconduct no less.
The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the People v. Espinos (Crim. Cases 8846 and 8847) where the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence (Rule 1.01). respondent ordered that the firearms involved in the case be
He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule delivered to the custody of the Court for proper disposition.
1.02). He should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01). The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in
a favored manner just because counsel for the accused Atty. Roger
It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly, a ‘full-blown trial type hearing’
dispensing justice be developed to a high degree of proficiency, to was conducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the case was
gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the complainants the accused
impartiality of its administration, because appearance is as important were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991
as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesar’s wife, must not only arraignment notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is
be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas our observation that the two cases cannot be equated because in the
transgressed against the high standard of moral ethics required of first place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court
judges. notwithstanding notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the
accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, the Order of the
Court directing the delivery of the firearms in the custody of the
We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm.
police is properly and in order. We are fully aware of the evil practice
Case No. RTJ-92-863 against Judge Abastillas without merit. We
of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of the
quote with approval the pertinent portions of Justice Lagamon’s
firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an
report relative to said accusations:
Order for the delivery of the firearms for proper disposal. In fact, Atty.
Chua is guilty of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court
‘The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an changing the phrase ‘to this Court’ to ‘to him’, thereby creating an
Order of Arrest when the accused Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno implication that the respondent entertained personal interest in the
failed to appear during the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. firearms.
Atty. manifested that he instructed his clients not to appear in Court
because a day before the date set for arraignment he allegedly filed
The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the
a consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the same be
firearm in question be delivered to the court and after an Order of
heard on Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified
Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with the Firearms and
of the arraignment. They should have displayed their respect for the
Explosives Unit, PC Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh.’15’, p. 143, Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients’ case was
records). meritorious, his clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as
the practical way to obtain justice.
The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423
(Susana Lim v. Lim) within 90 days cannot be given much Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chua’s profound
consideration taking into account the Certification issued by the Clerk expression of remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability
of Court of the branch to the effect that the case was partially tried by when we consider his willingness to come forward, at the risk of
the respondent and that the stenographer who took down the being administratively penalized himself, to expose what we
stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the very ones
same. There is. therefore, a need for the retaking of the testimonies tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
of the witnesses.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional
The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, is hereby found GUILTY of
private prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 as well as the motion for serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92863 for having met
reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court with persons involved and/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos.
only on February 5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of the 10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and Sonny
series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua. Respondent lost Moreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose
track of what motions are due for resolution until he was reminded on of discussing or soliciting bribe in connection said cases and is
January 20, 1992 through a supplemental motion filed by Arty. Chua, hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement
however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motions were all benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-
resolved." employment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.
Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815
This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in
Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas.
he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge
Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a
illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not repetition of a similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." future will be dealt with more severely.

However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation SO ORDERED.
before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed his genuine regrets for
having acted the way he did. He said: "I considered that particular
moment of my life as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry
for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist," he added
(TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12).
 provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the
United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Pursuant
to the contract, PAWI shipped to FASGI a total of eight thousand five
hundred ninety four (8,594) wheels, with an FOB value of
US$216,444.30 at the time of shipment, the first batch arriving in two
containers and the second in three containers. Thereabouts, FASGI
paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later
found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with
stated requirements, viz;

"A. contrary to the terms of the Distributorship Agreement and in

violation of U.S. law, the country of origin (the Philippines) was not
stamped on the wheels;

"B. the wheels did not have weight load limits stamped on them as
required to avoid mounting on excessively heavy vehicles, resulting
in risk of damage or bodily injury to consumers arising from possible
Republic of the Philippines shattering of the wheels;
SUPREME COURT
Manila "C. many of the wheels did not have an indication as to which
models of automobile they would fit;
THIRD DIVISION
"D. many of the wheels did not fit the model automobiles for which
G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000 they were purportedly designed;

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., Petitioner, vs. FASGI "E. some of the wheels did not fit any model automobile in use in the
ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondent. United States;

DECISION "F. most of the boxes in which the wheels were packed indicated that
the wheels were approved by the Specialty Equipment
Manufacturer's Association (hereafter, `SEMA'); in fact no SEMA
VITUG, J.: approval has been obtained and this indication was therefore false
and could result in fraud upon retail customers purchasing the
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a wheels."
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of California, United States of America, entered into a On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI
distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the
Incorporated ("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court
Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian corporation. The agreement for the Central District of California.In January 1980, during the
pendency of the case, the parties entered into a settlement, entitled "We understand your situation regarding the lease of your
"Transaction" with the corresponding Italian translation "Convenzione warehouse. For this reason, we are willing to defray the extra
Transsativa," where it was stipulated that FPS and PAWI would storage charges resulting from this new schedule. If you cannot
accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to renew the lease [of] your present warehouse, perhaps you can
FASGI the purchase price of US$268,750.00 via four (4) irrevocable arrange to transfer to another warehouse and storage charges
letters of credit ("LC"). The rescission of the contract of transfer thereon will be for our account. We hope you understand our
distributorship was to be effected within the period starting January position. The delay and the revised schedules were caused by
up until April 1980. circumstances totally beyond our control."

In a telex message, dated 02 March 1980, PAWI president Romeo On 21 April 1980, again through a telex message, PAWI informed
Rojas expressed the company's inability to comply with the foregoing FASGI that it was impossible to open a letter of credit on or before
agreement and proposed a revised schedule of payment. The April 1980 but assured that it would do its best to comply with the
message, in part, read: suggested schedule of payments.[4] In its telex reply of 29 April 1980,
FASGI insisted that PAWI should meet the terms of the proposed
"We are most anxious in fulfilling all our obligations under schedule of payments, specifically its undertaking to open the first
compromise agreement executed by our Mr. Giancarlo Dallera and LC within April of 1980, and that "If the letter of credit is not opened
your Van Curen. We have tried our best to comply with our by April 30, 1980, then x x x [it would] immediately take all necessary
commitments, however, because of the situation as mentioned in the legal action to protect [its] position."
foregoing and currency regulations and restrictions imposed by our
government on the outflow, of foreign currency from our country, we Despite its assurances, and FASGI's insistence, PAWI failed to open
are constrained to request for a revised schedule of shipment and the first LC in April 1980 allegedly due to Central Bank "inquiries and
opening of L/Cs. restrictions," prompting FASGI to pursue its complaint for damages
against PAWI before the California district court. Pre-trial conference
"After consulting with our bank and government monetary agencies was held on 24 November 1980. In the interim, the parties, realizing
and on the assumption that we submit the required pro-forma the protracted process of litigation, resolved to enter into another
invoices we can open the letters of credit in your favor under the arrangement, this time entitled "Supplemental Settlement
following schedule: Agreement," on 26 November 1980. In substance, the covenant
provided that FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for
every LC opened and paid by PAWI:
"A) First L/C - it will be issued in April 1980 payable 90 days
thereafter
"3. Agreement
"B) Second L/C - it will be issued in June 1980 payable 90 days
thereafter "3.1 Sellers agree to pay FASGI Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand,
Seven Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars ($268,750.00), plus interest
and storage costs as described below. Sellers shall pay such amount
"C) Third L/C - it will be issued in August 1980 payable 90 days
by delivering to FASGI the following four (4) irrevocable letters of
thereafter
credit, confirmed by Crocker Bank, Main Branch, Fresno, California,
as set forth below:
"D) Fourth L/C - it will be issued in November 1980 payable 90 days
thereafter
"(i) on or before June 30, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the payable ninety days after the date of the bill of lading under the latter
amount of (a) Sixty-Five Thousand, Three Hundred Sixty-nine and of credit."
00/100 Dollars ($65,369.00), (b) plus interest on that amount at the
annual rate of 16.25% from January 1, 1980 until July 31, 1980, (c) Anent the wheels still in the custody of FASGI, the supplemental
plus Two Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and 00/100 settlement agreement provided that -
($2,940.00) and (d) with interest on that sum at the annual rate of
16.25% from May 1, 1980 to July 31, 1980, payable on or after "3.4 (a) Upon execution of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement,
August 31, 1980; the obligations of FASGI to store or maintain the Containers and
Wheels shall be limited to (i) storing the Wheels and Containers in
"(ii) on or before September 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in their present warehouse location and (ii) maintaining in effect
the amount of (a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety- FASGI's current insurance in favor of FASGI, insuring against usual
Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Two commercial risks for such storage in the principal amount of the
Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,940.00), plus Letters of Credit described in Paragraph 3.1. FASGI shall bear no
(c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, liability, responsibility or risk for uninsurable risks or casualties to the
San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the Containers or Wheels.
amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, and on
the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until December 21, "x x x x x x x x x
1980, payable ninety days after the date of the bill of lading under
the letter of credit;
"(e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters
of Credit are delayed past such date pursuant to the penultimate
"(iii) on or before November 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in Paragraph 3.1, in which case from and after such later date, FASGI
the amount of (a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety- shall have no obligation to maintain, store or deliver any of the
Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Two Containers or Wheels."
Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,490.00), plus
(c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank,
San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the The deal allowed FASGI to enter before the California court the
amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, and on foregoing stipulations in the event of the failure of PAWI to make
the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, good the scheduled payments; thus -
payable ninety days after the date of the bill of lading under the latter
of credit; "3.5 Concurrently with execution and delivery hereof, the parties
have executed and delivered a Mutual Release (the `Mutual
"(iv) on or before January 1, 1981, a documentary letter of credit in Release'), and a Stipulation for Judgment (the `Stipulation for
the amount of (a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety- Judgment') with respect to the Action. In the event of breach of this
Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Five Supplemental Settlement Agreement by Sellers, FASGI shall have
Thousand, Eight Hundred Eighty and 00/100 Dollars ($5,880.00), the right to apply immediately to the Court for entry of Judgment
plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment in the full amount thereof,
Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on less credit for any payments made by Sellers pursuant to this
the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, and on Supplemental Settlement Agreement. FASGI shall have the right
the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, thereafter to enforce the Judgment against PAWI and FPS in the
United States and in any other country where assets of FPS or PAWI
may be located, and FPS and PAWI hereby waive all defenses in November 1980, and each to be paid ninety (90) days after the date
any such country to execution or enforcement of the Judgment by of the bill of lading under the LC. As so expressed in their affidavits,
FASGI. Specifically, FPS and PAWI each consent to the jurisdiction FASGI counsel Frank Ker and FASGI president Elena Buholzer were
of the Italian and Philippine courts in any action brought by FASGI to more inclined to believe that PAWI's failure to pay was due not to
seek a judgment in those countries based upon a judgment against any restriction by the Central Bank or any other cause than its
FPS or PAWI in the Action." inability to pay. These doubts were based on the telex message of
PAWI president Romeo Rojas who attached a copy of a
In accordance with the aforementioned paragraph 3.5 of the communication from the Central Bank notifying PAWI of the bank's
agreement, the parties made the following stipulation before the approval of PAWI's request to open LCs to cover payment for the re-
California court: importation of the wheels. The communication having been sent to
FASGI before the supplemental settlement agreement was
executed, FASGI speculated that at the time PAWI subsequently
"The undersigned parties hereto, having entered into a Supplemental
entered into the supplemental settlement agreement, its request to
Settlement Agreement in this action,
open LCs had already been approved by the Central Bank. Irked by
PAWI's persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of
"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between plaintiff FASGI the Central District of California the following stipulation for judgment
Enterprises, Inc. (`FASGI') and defendants Philippine Aluminum against PAWI.
Wheels, Inc., (`PAWI'), and each of them, that judgment may be
entered in favor of plaintiff FASGI and against PAWI, in the amount of
"PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. in the
Two Hundred Eighty Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty And 01/100ths
Courtroom of the Honorable Laughlin E. Waters of the above Court,
Dollars ($283,480.01).
plaintiff FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC. (hereinafter `FASGI') will move
the Court for entry of Judgment against defendant PHILIPPINE
"Plaintiff FASGI shall also be entitled to its costs of suit, and to ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. (hereinafter `PAWI'), pursuant to the
reasonable attorneys' fees as determined by the Court added to the Stipulation for Judgment filed concurrently herewith, executed on
above judgment amount." behalf of FASGI and PAWI by their respective attorneys, acting as
their authorized agents.
The foregoing supplemental settlement agreement, as well as the
motion for the entry of judgment, was executed by FASGI president "Judgment will be sought in the total amount of P252,850.60,
Elena Buholzer and PAWI counsel Mr. Thomas Ready. including principal and interest accrued through May 17, 1982, plus
PAWI, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the the sum of $17,500.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees for plaintiff in
supplemental settlement agreement. While it opened the first LC prosecuting this action.
on 19 June 1980, it, however, only paid on it nine (9) months after, or
on 20 March 1981, when the letters of credit by then were supposed "The Motion will be made under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil
to have all been already posted. This lapse, notwithstanding, FASGI Procedure, pursuant to and based upon the Stipulation for
promptly shipped to PAWI the first container of wheels. Again, Judgment, the Supplemental Settlement Agreement filed herein on
despite the delay incurred by PAWI on the second LC, FASGI readily or about November 21, 1980, the Memorandum of Points and
delivered the second container. Later, PAWI totally defaulted in Authorities and Affidavits of Elena Buholzer, Franck G. Ker and Stan
opening and paying the third and the fourth LCs, scheduled to be Cornwell all filed herewith, and upon all the records, files and
opened on or before, respectively, 01 September 1980 and 01 pleadings in this action.
"The Motion is made on the grounds that defendant PAWI has Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is
breached its obligations as set forth in the Supplemental Settlement bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
Agreement, and that the Supplemental Settlement Agreement tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and
expressly permits FASGI to enter the Stipulation for Judgment in the convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
event that PAWI has not performed under the Supplemental states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
Settlement Agreement. jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. A In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal
certificate of finality of judgment was issued, on 07 September may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
1982, by the US District Judge of the District Court for the Central underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
District of California. PAWI, by this time, was approximately twenty convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and
(20) months in arrears in its obligation under the supplemental fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon
settlement agreement. regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
States, FASGI filed a complaint for "enforcement of foreign jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice;
judgment" in February 1983, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in
61, of Makati, Philippines. The Makati court, however, in an order of the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
11 September 1990, dismissed the case, thereby denying the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in
enforcement of the foreign judgment within Philippine jurisdiction, on the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the
the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of
clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign due notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of
judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the Court of the Philippines provides:
assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the
purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders - The effect of a
return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
situation, the trial court maintained, amounted to an unjust jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the trial court said,
the supplemental settlement agreement and the subsequent motion xxxx
for entry of judgment upon which the California court had based its
judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's authorization. judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between
FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
Appeals. In a decision, dated 30 July 1997, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the full In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
enforcement of the California judgment. evidence a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Hence this appeal.
In Soorajmull Nagarmull vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc., one blown trial. PAWI, under the agreement was afforded time to
of the early Philippine cases on the enforcement of foreign reimburse FASGI the price it had paid for the defective
judgments, this Court has ruled that a judgment for a sum of money wheels. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits
rendered in a foreign court is presumptive evidence of a right of the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by subsequent the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its
title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, hopeful expectations.
such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready's authority to sign on its
fact. In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, the behalf the Supplemental Settlement Agreement but denounced
Court has said that a party attacking a foreign judgment is tasked likewise his authority to enter into a stipulation for judgment before
with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity. the California court on 06 August 1982 on the ground that it had by
then already terminated the former's services. For his part, Mr.
PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its Ready admitted that while he did receive a request from Manuel
authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, Singson of PAWI to withdraw from the motion of judgment, the
without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of request unfortunately came too late. In an explanatory telex, Mr.
the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement Ready told Mr. Singson that under American Judicial Procedures
will best serve his client's interest. when a motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel would
not be permitted to withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From
In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was the time the stipulation for judgment was entered into on 26 April
signed by the parties, including Mr. Thomas Ready, on 06 October 1982 until the certificate of finality of judgment was issued by the
1980. The agreement was lodged in the California case on 26 California court on 07 September 1982, no notification was issued by
November 1980 or two (2) days after the pre-trial conference held PAWI to FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready's services. If
on 24 November 1980. If Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready who purportedly acted
PAWI to enter into the supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI in collusion with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue before
could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the the forum which issued the judgment in line with the principle of
settlement. Instead, more than a year after the execution of the international comity that a court of another jurisdiction should refrain,
supplemental settlement agreement, particularly on 09 October as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of
1981, PAWI President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to passing judgment on the correctness of the application of law and
Elena Buholzer of FASGI that failed to mention Mr. Ready's the evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal.
supposed lack of authority. On the contrary, the letter confirmed the
terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance for the Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign
impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not
schedule stipulated in the agreement. controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or
that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive
It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the
compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic
the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of
about it. action - such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract - is
Nor could PAWI claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against
spared from possibly paying FASGI substantial amounts of damages the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.
and incurring heavy litigation expenses normally generated in a full-
Even while the US judgment was against both FPS and PAWI, PAWI cannot, by this petition for review, seek refuge over a business
FASGI had every right to seek enforcement of the judgment solely dealing and decision gone awry. Neither do the courts function to
against PAWI or, for that matter, only against FPS. FASGI, in its relieve a party from the effects of an unwise or unfavorable contract
complaint, explained: freely entered into. As has so aptly been explained by the appellate
court, the over-all picture might, indeed, appear to be onerous to
"17. There exists, and at all times relevant herein there existed, a PAWI but it should bear emphasis that the settlement which has
unity of interest and ownership between defendant PAWI and become the basis for the foreign judgment has not been the start of a
defendant FPS, in that they are owned and controlled by the same business venture but the end of a failed one, and each party,
shareholders and managers, such that any individuality and naturally, has had to negotiate from either position of strength or
separateness between these defendants has ceased, if it ever weakness depending on its own perception of who might have to
existed, and defendant FPS is the alter ego of defendant PAWI. The bear the blame for the failure and the consequence of loss.
two entities are used interchangeably by their shareholders and Altogether, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the
managers, and plaintiff has found it impossible to ascertain with appellate court in its appealed judgment.
which entity it is dealing at any one time. Adherence to the fiction of
separate existence of these defendant corporations would permit an WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
abuse of the corporate privilege and would promote injustice against AFFIRMED. No costs.
this plaintiff because assets can easily be shifted between the two
companies thereby frustrating plaintiff's attempts to collect on any SO ORDERED.
judgment rendered by this Court."

Paragraph 14 of the Supplemental Settlement Agreement fixed the

liability of PAWI and FPS to be "joint and several" or solidary. The
enforcement of the judgment against PAWI alone would not, of
course, preclude it from pursuing and recovering whatever
contributory liability FPS might have pursuant to their own
agreement.
PAWI would argue that it was incumbent upon FASGI to first return
the second and the third containers of defective wheels before it
could be required to return to FASGI the purchase price therefore,
relying on their original agreement (the "Transaction"). Unfortunately,
PAWI defaulted on its covenants thereunder that thereby occasioned
the subsequent execution of the supplemental settlement
agreement. This time the parties agreed, under paragraph
3.4(e) thereof, that any further default by PAWI would release FASGI
from any obligation to maintain, store or deliver the rejected
wheels. The supplemental settlement agreement evidently
superseded, at the very least on this point, the previous
arrangements made by the parties.
 Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a
contract on the complainant's client who had never been a party to
the agreement.

The facts are as follows:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit

compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City.
The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu,
clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of
respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda
San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit
owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document
titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for
the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of
way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr.
Republic of the Philippines Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the
SUPREME COURT contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the
Manila parking arrangements.

FIRST DIVISION On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for
A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014 allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that
(Formerly CBD 10-2607) the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was
never a party to the contract.
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. MANUEL T.
MOLINA, Respondent. In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel
among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble
RESOLUTION was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential
compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the
SERENO, CJ: document.
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio
the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors of the administrative Abreu filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim,
Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square
Preamble. The first case was filed with the Housing and Land Use It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant
Regulatory Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the does not file a petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15)
Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for days from notice of the Board’s resolution. This rule is derived from
Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:
declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were
dismissed.
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary
sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
court, this time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall
suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own hands be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or
by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15)
blocking the latter’s egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)
Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board’s resolution on
Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579.
21 March 2013, as evidenced by a registry return receipt. To this
According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an
date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from Atty.
Order dated 12 December 2008.
Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court
within 15 days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the
Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his above mentioned Section 12(c).
answer to the Complaint.
Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason
On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez to deviate from the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
rendered a Report and Recommendation. He recommended
dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the
When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things
complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming
are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly
that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not
preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith.
complainant.

On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual
XIX-2011-210, adopting and approving the Report and
basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina with providing
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square
Preamble is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not
Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice,
but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on 29 December however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint
2012. Notices of the denial were received by the parties on 21 March or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that
2013. Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of
the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.
No petition for review has been filed with this Court.
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal
advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any
showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule
on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession
is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest

mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said
that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it
should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is
bound to know all the law. x x x.

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad
faith is never presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its
determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary. There is
no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was
indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The
presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by

clear preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating
Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by
complainants Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis
(Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan
(Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales (Minerales),
and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip Z. A.
Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him with making false
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of
this case in disregard of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and
malpractice as a notary public in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing

units (subject properties) in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-
II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp.
(Rudex). In view of several inadequacies and construction defects in
the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the
Republic of the Philippines rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and
SUPREME COURT Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the
Manila
monthly amortizations they had paid. The first batch of rescission
cases was filed by herein complainants Sioting on May 24, 2002,
EN BANC
and Crisostomo and Marquizo on June 10, 2002, while the second
batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan on
A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014
March 3, 2003, Solis and Ederlinda M. Villanueva (represented by
Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang on July 29, 2003. In all the
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN
MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented by herein
MARILEN MINERALES, AND MELINDA D. SIOTING, respondent Atty. Nazareno.
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. PHILIP Z. A.
NAZARENO, Respondent. Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the
first batch of rescission cases. Sometime in August 2003, Rudex
DECISION filed three (3) petitions for review before the HLURB assailing the
same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and
legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or
has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency – this, addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed
notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation of Atty. malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1)
Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9, 2002 document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications
against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6)
before the Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC). April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment.

On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute
filed another complaint against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the administrative charges against him.
the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment,
similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 2005
the certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by and May 12, 2005, dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and
the Head of its Credit and Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan, ejectment on the ground that its statements in the certifications
Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any against forum shopping attached thereto were false due to the
action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of
court, tribunal or agency. The said certification was notarized by Atty. the Rules of Court.
Nazareno himself.

On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints for rescission of contracts

to sell and ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of
amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications
against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex In a Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2012, Integrated
has not commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Oliver A.
action before any court, tribunal or agency. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a
period of six (6) months for his administrative violations.
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there
claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to were unassailable proofs that the certification against forum
the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps.
Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at the time
that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s
Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was
agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission already pending. Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have
had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against declared its existence, more so, since both complaints involve the
Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the
Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In rescission complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment
complaint. In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading
that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence of his omission since he upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for
was not only Rudex’s counsel but the notarizing officer as well. summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.
Having knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications
against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of
recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held administratively liable and false entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes
thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension. indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:
In a Resolution dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or
Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month. initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
The Issue Before the Court that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
should be held administratively liable and accordingly suspended for claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
a period of one (1) month. claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
The Court’s Ruling
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
penalty imposed. initiatory pleading has been filed.

Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping, curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. CA as follows: pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing (Emphases supplied)
them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the other
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as follows: against forum shopping the existence of complainants’ own
complaints for rescission.
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. cases, Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and
more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral declared the existence of the pending related cases in the
or deceitful conduct. certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent
pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to
xxxx
refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his
FAITH TO THE COURT. administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be imposed,
the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be In Molina v. Atty. Magat, a penalty of six (6) months suspension from
misled by any artifice. the practice of law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was
shown to have deliberately made false and untruthful statements in
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of a
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping attached to similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned
Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively from the foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same,
liable. the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed,
in August 2003, petitions for review assailing the judgments of Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of
default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without malpractice as a notary public, considering that he assigned only one
disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against
of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
issue related to the complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should
January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that
complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at
disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page
of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each
as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once
him a number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary
Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule. public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that:

Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
shopping attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of converts a private document into a public document thus making that
any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
other forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at
1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
Atty. Beradio, to wit: notary public and appended to a private instrument.

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a xxxx

false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the the document under his hand and seal he gives the document the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring
sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to
confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of
respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the notary public
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of
processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences
deceitful conduct. (Emphasis supplied) of his unwarranted actions.

In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found
containing false statements had his notarial commission revoked and GUILTY of making false declarations in the certifications against
was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of forum shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a
one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such nature law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he is
the Court deems it proper to revoke his existing commission and PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange
hereby REVOKED. Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as The facts are culled from the pleadings.
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief
guidance. Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company,
Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned
SO ORDERED. from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of

Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy
Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating purposes”. The
GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD)
and President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and

practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary
dissolution with the SEC.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar
Manila of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming
that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by
THIRD DIVISION knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and
President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and
had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015 BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice of
meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and
LIMPIN, Respondent. President of LCI.

RESOLUTION Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin
as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC
requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter.
against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and
that her certification served to attest to the information from the last stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a
BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as
the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.
Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text
message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the
Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the authority to appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty.
affirmative and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible.
17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be
time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder,
of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, chairman and president of the company. The Secretary’s
2008. Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were of
no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. signatory of bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a
Limpin presented Secretary’s Certificates dated May 16, 2006, May stockholder.
22, 2006, and June 13, 2007 bearing Guarin’s signature.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution adopted
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration but
complaints against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Governors.
Angeles, et al. and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc. In those proceedings,
Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin
spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
“when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still
pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply
same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as
contradictory findings.” During the mandatory preliminary loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed
evidence to warrant disbarment. She stated that merely presenting independently of civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated
the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
harassment and malpractice. follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against
the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of
In its Report, the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be the court in accordance with his oath.”
suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that
based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a
 Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these be dealt with more severely.
are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
take before the admission to practice. Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
we agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any guidance.
share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a
seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is SO ORDERED.
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made
the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation
that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein.
That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of
Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We
also note that there was no submission which would support the
allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed
an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord
with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by

the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the
members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules
enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of
such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in

submitting a false document we see it fit to increase the
recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of
law.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin

GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for
SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a
 Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia
(Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases,
docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated
in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against

Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was
docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married
Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita
and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a
dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia
alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their
marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño,

representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for
support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years
old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In
2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s
children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended
Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño
Republic of the Philippines was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18,
SUPREME COURT for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that
Manila Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime
against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to
EN BANC continue his practice of law.

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015 In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia
filed a similar complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAUL H. Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as
SESBRENO, Respondent. CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint
was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he
DECISION acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.

PER CURIAM:
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral
A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report and turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing
recommendation. International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273) involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The
IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for
the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia
the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-
CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous
conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher
despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had
served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong
practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his
verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by
he alleged in A.C. No. 7973. respondent, bear the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing
what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling
was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to
penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the
the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural
only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many.
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Respondent’s inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and men who were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on
desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was
court. not only vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced
sense of superiority.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-
2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon where the
moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD respondent was disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated
ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide
and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following
his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral
the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood turpitude was discussed by this Court in International Rice Research
and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant Institute v. NLRC where it ruled:
circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from
his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on the This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not
grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral
full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that after his turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is
wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia and that he already and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
already withdrew the complaints against him. frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x
generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude,
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained
Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreño’s motion for whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime
reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes
the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08- which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there
2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only.
dated 30 September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
and A.C. No. 10457. indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of
homicide involves moral turpitude. In People v. Sesbreño, the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide
and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is
approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found
Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term
Board of Governors. of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of
Luciano Amparado in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the
the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by
costs.
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This
Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral SO ORDERED.
turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral
morals. turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was
and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and
walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, political rights.
without any provocation from the former, went out of his house,
aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can
theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons,
when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In
turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an
Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a
shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished
Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped
rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness, out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason
Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release
Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and and Discharge stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x
walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted
stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application
and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in
firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In
Amparado. addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted
only to those possessing good moral character. A violation of the
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of
restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of
Parcasio to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was disbarment.
granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon" 11 which restored his
"full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED
cases. Here, the Order of Commutation 13 did not state that the effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties
were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 SO ORDERED.
years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term
of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay
an indemnity of ₱50,000.00.
 This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan
(Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath, docketed as CBD
Case No. 10-2631.

The Facts

Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her

godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Following the introduction,
Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of
money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP
250,000) from her (Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the
house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they
discussed the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced
to her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust
the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to
accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the
amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty.
Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check
dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos
(PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On
due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the
check for the reason that she was still waiting for the release of the
Republic of the Philippines proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple
SUPREME COURT of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as
Manila to whether or not the check was already funded enough. In July
2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009
EN BANC in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) representing the
interest which accrued due to the late payment of the principal
A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013 obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the
check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to
pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands. Worried that she would not
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINA be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit
ESPEJO, Respondent. to her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but
without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check
DECISION was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter
became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She,
VELASCO, JR., J.: for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter
dated August 3, 2009.
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
complaint against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised In its Report and Recommendation dated July 15, 2010, the CBD
Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of
Office. law and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the The CBD reasoned:
Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office which she personally received and
continued to ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended only one (1) The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment
scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set,
loan obligation. shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated deserves disciplinary sanction.
December 8, 2009 in the amount of two hundred seventy five
thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient
said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. funds and despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with her
Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary
charges against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the
submitted for resolution without Atty. Espejo’s participation. Victoria charges against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute
thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against
before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through Director for respondent.
Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order directing Atty.
Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s administrative complaint
failing which would render her in default. The warning, On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a
notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD
2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner with the modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5)
Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to
conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non- Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000 within thirty (30) days from
appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the
right to participate in further proceedings. demand was made. The Resolution reads:

At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared. RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order noting Atty. entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
Espejo’s failure to appear during the mandatory conference and her finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s
default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby SUSPENDED from
position paper, which she filed on June 11, 2010. the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to
complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(₱250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made. committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may
be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross
the Resolution pertaining to Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the
the records of this case. privilege which his licenses and the law confer.

The Court’s Ruling In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of
worthless checks, which is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in
this case, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in
oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus:
part.1âwphi1 Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria
or traverse allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her
obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. In Tomlin II v.
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such
Moya II, We explained that the prompt payment of financial
act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s
obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:
low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the profession she should hold in high esteem.
the complaint but offered no justifiable reason for his continued
refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and
xxxx
written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself
scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to
complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued
pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong worthless checks for which he was convicted in the criminal case
doing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act filed against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure
constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that it to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was
duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations. imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been
found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment
of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless
the complainant.
checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of
no moment. As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her
but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file
an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In
Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other years, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the
duly constituted authorities, including the IBP: circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBP’s
recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings
the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties
position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a may to choose me against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is
observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the
IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.
empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys. WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross
misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the
blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s practice of law for two (2) years effective immediately.
Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule
7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court
which provide: Administrator for dissemination to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, personal files of respondent.
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall SO ORDERED.
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule
7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
 We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Romeo S.
Gonzales for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
the forum shopping he allegedly committed.

In his complaint, Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales

acted as counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that
the latter filed against him. The first ccise, Special Proceeding No.
99-95587, involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela
Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty.
Gonzales assisted.

Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207, for Annulment of

Document, Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the
special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil cases,
according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that
warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales.

Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the

two cases. He asserted, however,, that he did not violate the forum
shopping rule as the cases were not identical in terms of parties,
subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the
complainant only filed the disbarment case to harass him.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
Manila
In our Resolution dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment
SECOND DIVISION complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 6760, January 30, 2013 In his Report and Recommendation dated July 5, 2010,
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found Atty. Gonzales
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III, Complainant, vs. administratively liable for forum shopping.
ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.
According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-
DECISION 95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207 hinged on the same substantial
issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate property in trust for
BRION, J.: Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and
Teodoro-Marcial.
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. The case directly poses to us the question of whether Atty. Gonzales
Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they committed forum shopping and thereby violated the Code of
are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was the Professional Responsibility.
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila.
According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she The Court’s Ruling
sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration so that Manuela’s properties We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly
could be inventoried and settled in accordance with law. reverse the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, but we modify
the commissioner’s recommended penalty to censure and a warning
In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the that another violation would merit a more severe penalty.
beneficiaries of a trust held by Manuela over the same parcel of land
contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They alleged that Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in
during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable
They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of certiorari.
Title in the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their
names.
There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at
res judicata over the other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions,
shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 without (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief
indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In sought.
committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the
Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum
shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while Special
Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be
suspended for one month from the practice of law, with a warning
that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe Identity of Parties
penalty.
An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and
The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioner’s Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, the initiating parties are the
recommendation. In a resolution dated December 10, 2011, the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato, Teodoro-Marcial, Jorge I. Teodoro,
Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty. Gonzales for Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T. Teodoro. They
lack of merit. represented the same interest in both cases. All claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-owners of the land that she held
in trust for them.
The Issue
Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99- Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked
95587, is also the sole defendant in Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale Manuela executed in
cases, he espoused the same interest, as transferee-owner of the lot favor of Anastacio. They likewise asked the court to cancel the
allegedly held in trust by Manuela. resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the latter, and
to issue a new one in their names.
Identity of causes of action
While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two
The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form cases are different in form, a ruling in one case would have resolved
of an action taken, but on whether the same evidence would support the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the lot been declared as
and establish the former and the present causes of action. The heirs part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,
of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply there would have been no need for a decision annulling the sale in
varying the form of their action or by adopting a different method of Civil Case No. 00-99207. Conversely, had the sale in Civil Case No.
presenting it. 00-99207 been annulled, then the property would go back to the
hands of the heirs of Manuela. Placing the property under
administration, as prayed for in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had
would have been unnecessary.
no jurisdiction over the case, as Manuela left no properties at the
time of her death. The lot in Malate, Manila, which was the sole
property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included in her Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the
estate, has been sold to Rogelio and Anastacio when Manuela was parties are substantially similar in the two cases. Since the elements
still alive. The trial court did not give credence to their claim that of litis pendentia and res judicata are present, Atty. Gonzales
Manuela held the property in trust for them. committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207
without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still
pending.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an
order granting Anastacio’s Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. It held
that the heirs of Manuela had been unable to prove their claim that As Commissioner Dulay observed:
Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit. Neither were they able
to prove that the sale of a portion of the lot to Anastacio was void. Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both
cases, that he raised the issue of trust with respect to the Malate
In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and that he was
Manila in trust had to be decided by the trial court. The initiating raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment case
parties’ claim in the two cases depended on the existence of the trust xxx
Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence necessary
to prove their claim was the same. To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum
shopping for the second case (annulment case) and state that there
Identity of relief sought is no pending case involving the same or similar issue would
constitute misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action.
It was his duty to advise his client properly, and his failure to do so,
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for
in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit
the issuance of letters of administration, the liquidation of Manuela’s
estate, and its distribution among her legal heirs.
is indicative of a predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyer’s
promote respect and obedience to the law. duty to the Court or the client. As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales’ act
of forum shopping disregarded his duty to obey and promote respect
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition against
courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. It also violated
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and efficient
this obligation." administration of justice.

The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and
shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to accordingly CENSURE Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for resorting to
conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his
made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this
reprimand should be attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales’ personal
file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.

SO ORDERED.
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes.

To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be

very harsh in light of all the circumstances of this case. Neither is the
commissioner’s recommended penalty of suspension consistent with
prior rulings of the Court.

In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al. we severely
censured Renecio Espiritu, the counsel who filed a petition in the
Court of Appeals thirty-three days after a similar petition had been
filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him guilty of direct
contempt.

The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like

Espiritu, Atty. Gonzales misused court processes in contravention of
the express rule against forum shopping. We held then that Espiritu
should be penalized and we imposed the penalty of censure —the
penalty usually imposed for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser
nature.
 A.C. No. 4728

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege

burdened with conditions, including continuing fidelity to the law and
constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of the
law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a consequent
obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct. Failure to live by the standards of the legal profession and
to discharge the burden of the privilege conferred on one as a
member of the bar warrant the suspension or revocation of that
privilege.

The Factual Antecedents

Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B.

Astorga entered into a "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" on
December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with rightof repurchase)
to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga,
Republic of the Philippines
Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
SUPREME COURT
662 for ₱15,000.00. Under the said deed, respondent represented
Manila
that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the
subject property and that the said property is "free from all liens and
EN BANC encumbrances." The deed also provided that respondent, as vendor
a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if
A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014 not repurchased within the said period, "the parties shall renew [the]
instrument/agreement."
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ARTURO B.
ASTORGA, Respondent. Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the
period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the contract was
x-----------------------x made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated
May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant
remained in peaceful possession of the property until December
1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which
(Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged accused executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd December,
by respondent to RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed 1981, without first redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate
on the property, and that complainant should therefore vacate the complainant knowing of accused[’s] unlawful act only on or about the
property. last week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him
of the property, the mortgage having been foreclosed, private
Complainant was alarmed and made aninvestigation. He learned the complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced by
following: accused[’s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.

1. TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed
the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB) as early as as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;
2. TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases
names of respondent and his wife on January 4, 1982 against respondent by filing before this Court an Affidavit-
pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between Complaint dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaint
PNB and respondent; dated February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697
3. Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both complaints, complainant
March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on the property, and sought the disbarment of respondent.
subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27,
1991. Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the
property by RBAI. Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa In his Consolidated Answer dated August 16, 2003 filed before the
against respondent with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of IBP, respondent denied that his agreement with complainant was a
Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of pacto de retrosale. He claimed that it was an equitable mortgage and
Leyte approved the Resolution dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95- that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from
144 finding that "[t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to engender a the produce of the land, the total amount would have exceeded
well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been committed and that ₱15,000.00.
respondent herein is probably guilty thereof." Accordingly, an
Information dated January 8,1996 was filed before the Municipal Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
with the crime of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
In a Report and Recommendation dated April 29, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP’s Commission on Bar
On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with
parcel of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to
mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was one of
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud
the possessor and owner at that time was private complainant when he represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
dated December 2, 1981 that the property was covered by TCT No. property to other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that
T-662, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said complainant should render an accounting of the produce the latter
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on had collected from the said property, which would already exceed
November 17, 1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine the ₱15,000.00 consideration stated in the deed.
National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even worse, when
he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T- There is no merit in respondent’s defense.
7235 under his and his wife’s name on January 4,1982 without
informing complainant. This was compounded by respondent’s Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and
subsequent mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to the complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retroor of equitable
acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly
that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice of law for one show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency,
year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers,
with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of ₱15,000.00, for which respondent should be held administratively liable.
the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de retrosale,
with interest at the legal rate.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an
oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and
Considering respondent’s "commission of unlawful acts, especially "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
crimes involving moral turpitude, actsof dishonesty, grossly immoral knowledge and discretion." He gravely violated his oath.
conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation with modification as follows: respondent is(1) The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent caused the ambiguity or
similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as he was
(2) ordered to return the sum of ₱15,000.00 received in the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent
consideration of the pacto de retrosale, with legal interest. could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of
mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as "mortgagor"
and "mortgagee," respectively, rather than as "vendor a retro" and
The Court’s Ruling "vendee a retro." If only respondent had been more circumspect and
careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed, then the
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of controversy between him and complainant could havebeen avoided
Governors to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading
years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack oflegal
₱15,000.00 consideration, plus interest. competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to "conduct
[him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with Right to discretion."
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 in favor of complainant.
However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of sale with More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the
pacto de retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent fundamental tenet of human relations asembodied in Article 19 of the
argues that he still had the legal right to mortgage the subject Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the T-7235 on January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the execution of
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross
and observe honesty and good faith. dishonesty and deceit against complainant.

Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility
complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his provide:
agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that
clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the
respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said immoral or deceitful conduct. Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only
parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is
formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the
significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of
complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least all lawyers.
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by,
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act, the law in effect at in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful."
the time the PNB acquired the subject property and obtained TCT "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure element.
proceedings becomes final, such purchaser becomes entitled to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a memorandum
thereof shall be "indorsed upon the mortgagor’s original To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
certificate." TCT No. T-662, which respondent gave complainant defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking inintegrity, honesty,
when they entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On
dated December 2, 1981, does not bearsuch memorandum but only the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:
a memorandum on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and
the subsequent amendment of the mortgage. [Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious
appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms,
name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon,
certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed
been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the in the manner contemplated to his injury. The actions of respondent
name of PNB. He did not evencare to correct the wrong statement in in connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to
the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the
show a disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They Code of Professional Responsibility:
also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent’s part.
Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned. CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good by others.
faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his gross disregard of this
Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s Investigating xxxx
Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to
the Court’s referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty
and recommendation), which caused delay in the resolution of these to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
administrative cases.
xxxx
In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on
complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint in A.C. No. 4697 and
Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
June 25, 1997, respectively. While he requested for several file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
extensions of time within which to submit his comment, no such submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a so.
Resolution dated February 4,1998 to (1) show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
and (2) submit the consolidated comment. Respondent neither execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
showed cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held
in contempt for such failure, nor submitted the consolidated Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has
comment. already been imposed a disciplinary sanction before. In Nuñez v.
Atty. Astorga, respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming an
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the attorney for which he was fined ₱2,000.00.
proceedings before the IBP’s Investigating Commissioner,
respondent was again required several times to submit his Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice
consolidated answer. He only complied on August 28, 2003, or more of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of
than six years after this Court originally required him to do so. The Governors, is proper.
Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers. Despite having been given several The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to
opportunities to submit the same, respondent did not file any position order respondent to return the sum of ₱15,000.00 he received from
paper. complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase." This
is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather
Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the than the present administrative cases.
Investigating Commissioner, which caused undue delay in these
In Roa v. Moreno, the Court pronounced that "[i]n disciplinary for a period of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this Decision,
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future shall be dealt
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. with more severely.
Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative
liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
which the parties may choose to file against each other."While the Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give rise at the same information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to
time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.
determined in the appropriate case; and every case must be
resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the SO ORDERED.
quantum of proof required in each. Section 5, in relation to Sections
1 and 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative
cases, such as the ones atbar, only substantial evidence is required,
not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence asin civil cases. Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the
present administrative cases, complainant instituted a criminal case
for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-
A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. Unless the complainant waived the civil action, reserved the
right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, then his civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the estafa committed by respondent is deemed instituted
with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that complainant
may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes restitution;
reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for
consequential damages, which may already cover the ₱15,000.00
consideration complainant had paid for the subject property.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following:

breach of the Lawyer’s Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue delay of
these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
 ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG,
Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution of the Board of Governors (BOG),

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014,
affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent
Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one
(1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his
unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint, dated May 31, 2011,
filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for
“unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful” acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order, the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his
Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed
to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her
complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner
issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing
on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five
(5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his
verified Answer.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila During the conference, only the complainant together with her
husband appeared. She submitted a set of documents contained in a
EN BANC folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The
Investigating Commissioner indicated that the said documents would
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of
for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
for resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes of the requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of
mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 P150,000.00, as filing fee. When asked about the exorbitant amount,
o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated. respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed
respondent’s Answer. that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled
Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24,
amounted to P22, 410.00 per trial court records.
2012 Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case
Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also
therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100, discovered that respondent was the one who notarized the document
000.00 and P22, 000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel
to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint
Complainant’s Position
filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1]
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were
respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of
absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint
had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage discussed the method of payment which was not the point of
his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of
which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20, were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those
000.00 as acceptance fee and P5, 000.00 for incidental expenses. matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter to Tropical Villas On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that
Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. the latter extend to him the amount of P70, 000.00 or P50,000.00 “in
He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100, the moment of urgency or emergency.” Complainant obliged the
000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. request and gave respondent the sum of P22, 000.00.
Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and
lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the
note evidenced the loan.
judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of
was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had previously P25, 000.00 which was covered by a receipt, stating that “it is
purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after
favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting
2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract
complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed
to respondent the amount of P25, 000.00. Respondent’s Position

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not In his Answer, respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had
having been notified by respondent, complainant learned of the been engaged in the practice of law since March 1972, and was
dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He
status of the case with the court. She went to the office of admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject
respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his
gave her a copy of the order of dismissal. notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for
complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of
her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the
complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for
reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The
reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry
Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these about its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he
were amended; and to make the additional averment that the received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
defendant was using false documents. suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering
the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for
copy of the reply with a message from him that the matters she their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the
requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a
same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from
so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be
P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very
value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never
set the following month. said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his
of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination, representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing
after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that
respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having
been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16,
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable 2014 to which he filed a motion for reconsideration. Complainant
law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an
respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in
rendered in other cases for the complainant. court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.

Reply of Complainant In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension
In her Reply, complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3)
by making reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of
that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127, 590.00.
Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had
relations long before she met him. While respondent was employed No petition for review was filed with the Court.
as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos
Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code
involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the
The Court’s Ruling
amount of P100, 000.00 she extended to respondent was never
considered as “no loan.” The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent’s violation of
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating
Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the
Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued
conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable
conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
cause against respondent for estafa.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation, the Investigating well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the
Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
year. capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”
approved with modification the recommendation of suspension by
the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a
filing fee amounting to P127,590.00. lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing
fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation
involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. of the trust reposed in him by, the client. When a lawyer receives
In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150, render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent
000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use
P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly return the money to the client.
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors
of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and
her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00
complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge
accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent
to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the
with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of other half of the amount at the time the case had already been
the legal profession. dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct
that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only
the money or property collected or received for or from his client.” an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary.
the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice.
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the
his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously
deserves punishment. would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that
the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s
received various amounts from complainant but he could not account trust in the courts.
for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as
the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved himself to
be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate
of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a
Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
remiss in his duty to his client. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in
of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients,
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice; he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or
the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior
just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s
visited his client in her home and borrowed P100, 000.00 for the professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit
repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
a loan of P70, 000.00 or P50, 000.00 “in the moment of urgency or be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
emergency” but was only given P22, 000.00 by complainant. These and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found
transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the guilty of misconduct on both scores.
authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These
acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting
seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the
particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that opposing party, Tierra Realty.
these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
loans of P100, 000.00 and P22, 000.00 were surely not protected by
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship
assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of
between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same
client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
complainant.
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy
and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles
candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve
client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided
conflicting interests.” Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional profession suffers.”
employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition
against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s
evidence to hold respondent liable for representing conflicting oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a embodied in the CPR. For the practice of law is “a profession, a form
corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who
cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized are qualified and who possess good moral character.” The
the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.
the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the
some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7)
and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who
willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in
in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question.
Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his
collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and,
apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is
written consent from any of the parties involved. not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of
respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to
member of the Bar. hold one administratively liable. Furthermore, the Court has to
consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.
for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the
judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for amount of P127, 590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees
representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the
the penalty of disbarment. lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount
of P50, 000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the
borrowed from complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were
v. Obias, the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return connected to his professional relationship with the complainant.
money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for
because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with
continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.
the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties
may choose against each other.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to legal profession.” The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and
appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of
Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no
different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of
cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. an attorney.”
Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang,
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
in opposition thereto.” In administrative cases, only substantial Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of
evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a
law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the JR., and ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners, vs.
amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00. VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa
Legados, Respondents.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court DECISION
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
BRION, J.:
SO ORDERED.
We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari the
challenge to the October 11, 2005 decision and the May 9, 2006
resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV
No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog
City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part the complaint for
recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the
Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita
Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to
Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo

(collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant
over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415
(subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They
were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13,
1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On
Republic of the Philippines April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the
SUPREME COURT spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames)
Manila Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently
issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
SECOND DIVISION
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an
G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014 action before the RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga
City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the
CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially
substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health
of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE,
reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the
Lacaya. name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately
informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff
assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in on September 14, 1981.
the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land
law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya
hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee filed on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of
stipulation specifically reads: execution.

10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the
hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames
parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for filed a complaint before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for
attorney’s fees. Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good
Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo,
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the
Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA. spouses Ames’ children).

On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance
Case No. 1721was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721,andthe spouses
to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as
children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two
mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank of the equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and
Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children. productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the
spouses Cadavedo.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No.
1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the
sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter
and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the
initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as
spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352
name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this was pending.
Court via the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which
this Court dismissed for lack of merit. On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable
settlement (compromise agreement) in Civil Case No. 215 (the
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each.
DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the publication of a notice of foreclosure Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement.
The MTC approved the compromise agreementin a decision dated The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by
June 10, 1982. Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was
₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that the parties
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the novated this agreement when they executed the compromise
RTC an action against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving
Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC added that
denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot,
case to the CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds
petition in its decision of January 31, 1984. the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the disposition
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done
precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to
property itself.
the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18,
1988, TCT No. 41051 was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot. These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-
half portion of the subject lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent
fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an
convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not
action against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved
sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive
compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time
4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo
or skill, or to perform extensive research.
prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their
one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an
accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the
the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due judgment, of the excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be
consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its fruits.
handling the civil cases.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo modified the decision in its resolution dated December 27, 1996. The
executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. RTC ordered the respondents to account for and deliver the produce
Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690 and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares
was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on that the RTC ordered the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses
the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352. Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final restoration of the
premises.
The Ruling of the RTC
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
In the September 17, 1996 decision in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC
declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and The Ruling of the CA
unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares
and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining In its decision dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo. aside the RTC’s September 17, 1996 decision and maintained the
partition and distribution of the subject lot under the compromise spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous and
agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.
Lacaya served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until
1988,when the latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2) The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation
during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, for professional services, especially those contained in the pleadings
Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s fees to which the
–Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In
(3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even reached this this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the
Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was ₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half
civil case lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya
agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on
Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.
approved the compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all
of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty.
Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them in Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable.
several cases. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue that the issues
involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of law;
that should guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and
ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya effort in research. They point out that the two subsequent civil cases
rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the should not be considered in determining the reasonable contingent
probability of him losing other employment resulting from his fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his services in Civil
engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and Case No. 1721, as those cases had not yet been instituted at that
the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and time. Thus, these cases should not be considered in fixing the
rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim that the spouses
reasonable. Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and
costs for each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did
The Petition not even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT
covering the subject lot.
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA
erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that
10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to
confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2) defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half of the
not holding the respondents accountable for the produce, harvests subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement
and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained from is a champertous contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited
the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) by law for violation of the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and
upholding the validity of the purported oral contract between the a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in The Court’s Ruling
Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did not novate their original
stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil We resolve to GRANT the petition.
Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping
Case No. 1721. cases prior to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty.
Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of
The Case for the Respondents discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and
proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
In their defense, the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee
stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or
Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the questioned voiding of contract of sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967.
stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty.
Lacaya. Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or
Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.
caused the survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately
after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with
RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982.
Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the
agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of
the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al.
approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally (Ejectment Case), filed between the latter part of 1981 and early part
designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement on May
compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership 13, 1982.
and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s
acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, The agreement on attorney’s fee
good customs, public order and public policy. consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died. He to recover possession
was substituted by his wife -Rosa -and their children –Victoriano D.L.
Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, Marcelito The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee
L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and
Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya- binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons
Camaongay. discussed below.
A. The written agreement providing for Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the
over the oral agreement providing for one- latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void.
half of the subject lot
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and
of ₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for
subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-
by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is contrary
former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to to public policy.
pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be
decided in their favor. Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an
aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the the medieval period. The doctrine of maintenance was directed
nature of a penalty that the court would award the winning party, to "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of
be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where
court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo the assistance rendered is without justification or
and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the excuse." Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the
case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the
former prays from the court as an incident to the main action. intermeddler." Some common law court decisions, however, add a
second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the
CA and agreed as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee risks of, the litigation."
agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced
to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in
engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. response "to medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent
1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that
the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those
contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an
written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in entitlement to the spoils of the litigation." "In order to safeguard the
favor of the former. Hence, the contingency fee of ₱2,000.00 administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance
stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common
contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot. law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and
contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of
B. The contingent fee agreement between public policy."
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted
lot, is champertous from American decisions, for public policy considerations. As matters
currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation
in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then
judgment is obnoxious to the law." The rule of the profession that stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence
forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in of any showing that special skills and additional work had been
litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the
expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of
between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply
enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within
action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than five years from its acquisition.
that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of
his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause." the two subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise justify an
attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, the Court struck down the contingent petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate
fee agreement between therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these two
Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy. There, the cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been
Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the considered and taken cared of Based on these considerations, we
former is against public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive
carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain and unreasonable.
to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client. D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of
the one-half portion contravenes
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of
Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by
Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of
a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
pay or beat the expense of litigation. The same reasons discussed profession. The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the
above underlie this rule. Canons of Professional Ethics.

C. The attorney’s fee consisting of A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court
one-half of the subject lot is excessive or when it is subject of the judicial action. Following this definition, we
and unconscionable find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya
acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it following established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya
void for being excessive and unconscionable. The contingent fee of filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case
services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981,
intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed
possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to
subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and depend upon the success of the litigation. The payment of the
Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided portions; and contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation
(5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been
compromise agreement. rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.

From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of
fee agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the
Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which was after subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship
October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA
agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty.
Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo. Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause
pursuant to the terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement,
Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake
disputed one-half portion and the compromise agreement – as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public
independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his
them to be prohibited and void by reason of public policy. Under clients.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are contrary to public
policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are
considered in existent and void from the beginning.
E.The compromise agreement could not
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note validate the void oral contingent fee
that the transfer violated the provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil agreement; neither did it supersede the
Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the transfer and the written contingent fee agreement
execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the
two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721. In reversing the The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty.
RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify
so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the
agreement. disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a void
jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article transaction, should be void.
1491(5) of the Civil Code, contrary to the CA’s position, however, this
recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
good customs, public order or public policy is in existent and void performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation" for it.
from the beginning. It can never be ratified44 nor the action or The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
prescribe; and any contract directly resulting from such illegal person to retain benefit without paying for it.
contract is likewise void and in existent.
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 20 of
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the the Code of Professional Responsibility, factors such as the
written contingent fee agreement providing for attorney’s fee of importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent
₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from questioning its and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for
validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the
acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are
1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise lawyer is entitled.
agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could not have
attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in
ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of possession de considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum
facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel
possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of
position, the petitioners–in filing the present action and praying for, time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya
among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil
portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the
Lacaya for his services –were not barred by the compromise instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames)
agreement. lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second
(Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and
meruit basis. (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size
of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in
effect, impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorney’s All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s
fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the considerations in appreciating the character of the services that Atty.
reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on
to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled
to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half
basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the
contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
of legal fees." "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the
benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, Petitioner, vs. Judge ESTRELLITA M.
litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer, PAAS, Respondent.
particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and
express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003 [In Re: Use by Atty. Renerio
(a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on the G. Paas as an Office in His Private Practice of His Profession
rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the owner
the Office of His Wife, Pasay City MeTC Judge Estrellita M.
protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around;
otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property right Paas.]
over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between
a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed property, DECISION
which in this case, the Court properly accords.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding
the petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated September 17, 1996
and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the Regional Trial Judge Estrellita M. Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility
Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with "discourtesy, disrespect,
MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty,
Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPINo. 00-956-
The fruits that the respondents previously received from the disputed P.
one-half portion shall also form part of the attorney’s fees. We
hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous
remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty.
to his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to
Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement.
maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises despite
SO ORDERED. order to do so, thus amounting to insubordination; was, and on
several instances, habitually absent from work or made it appear that
Republic of the Philippines he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to
SUPREME COURT stay out of the office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners
Manila P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release
Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was necessary for the
EN BANC purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed to mail
printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount
A.M. No. P-03-1690, April 4, 2003 given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential information to
litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a monetary
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, Petitioner, vs. EDGAR E.
consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying
ALMARVEZ, Respondent.
party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, April 4, 2003 Practices Act).
Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at
by his Affidavit, and members of the court staff, by a Joint Affidavit, falsification"; the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him "Bakit
attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes"; and on July 31, 2000, the
around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing Judge called him again to her chambers and told him "Ang kapal ng
with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero's affidavit also mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil
corroborated Judge Paas' allegation that Almarvez would merely driver kita."
sign the logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the office.
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria
August 2, 2000, attested that the alleged printed matter intended to Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of
be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn
mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date. statement-complaint against Judge Paas and went to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to
Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo talk the matter over with her who then told him that they should
Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective forget all about it.
affidavits, attested that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez
receive from detention prisoners PI 00.00 to P-200.00 in On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for
consideration of the release of their Release Orders. money in exchange for the release of court orders and alleged that
both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits
Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000, denied Judge Paas' because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective
charges, and alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping
case against him was because she suspected him of helping her him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his charge; the court's
husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them for
since she failed to elicit any information from him, she resorted to mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged
calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, unmailed printed matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not
2000, she hurled at him the following invectives before the other on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail, because the
employees of the court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver long kita, money given to him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days
pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang when he was out of the office, he was actually performing personal
asawa ko, ulupong"; and she insisted that he sign a prepared errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him
resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep. as their personal driver and messenger.

Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the As further proof of Judge Paas' oppressive behavior towards him,
following incidents of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per
2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers where she Memorandum dated September 7, 2000, even if he had no history of
berated him as follows: "Sinungaling ka, angdami mong alam, hindi drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test
ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong results of his examination.
The Court treated respondent's Answer as a counter-complaint law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula
against Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in
Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for court personnel attesting that Atty. Paas' visits to the court are
evaluation to the OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in
Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation. the practice of his profession.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit
was revealed that Judge Paas' husband, private practitioner Atty. wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return
Paas, was using his wife's office as his office address in his law address for notices and orders in Crim. CaseNos. 98-1197 to 98-
practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of 1198, "People vs. Louie Manabaty Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz
Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch y Salita, " (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37),
109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and
vs. Louie Manabat, et al. (G.R. Nos. 140536-37) which indicated facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were
Atty. Paas' address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City, the terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.
office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.
By Resolution of February 12, 2002, the Court referred the matter to
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which allows the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
the Supreme Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the
discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his
00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution of the Court en On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-
banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint 12-02-SC dated March 1, 2002.
Affidavit wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter
was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office I. OCA Findings and Recommendations
address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio
Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the
has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or charges against Almarvez of exacting money from detainees,
when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during violating confidentiality of official communication, absence without
special occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which official leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez'
are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating periods covering
tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to January to June 2000, July to December 2000, and January to April
the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Arty. Paas' 2001, however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized for
inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged
Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted informations which is confidential in nature to party litigants in
under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having advance of its authorized release date before the release of Court
failed to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving
employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later undue advantage or favor to the paying party detrimental to the due
portion of this decision. administration of justice, in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of
material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet the same.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and
With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits of court
OCA, for lack of supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are
the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found, contrary to what is reflected in his performance rating that he
however, that Judge Paas "had used her administrative power of cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.
supervision and control over court personnel for her personal pride,
prejudice and pettiness" when she issued her September 7,2000 On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any evidence to support the charge,
already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded the affiants-jail officers who claimed to have witnessed Alarvez
that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering receive money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release
Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support of their Release Orders not having been presented, hence, their
the administrative case she had already filed against him. claim remains hearsay, Almarvez' categorical denial and counter-
allegation that these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear
of or favor to Judge Paas gain light.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and
of simple misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with would thereafter leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she
with more severely. submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum
requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office on
II. This Court's Findings:
September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of
A. On the charges against Almarvez: his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he
reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on
Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing
the charge of violation of confidentiality of official communication as required by her in her September 7, 2000 memorandum, which
against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas' explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr.
complaint-affidavit which reads: Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug
Board. As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez'
explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in the (a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive
afternoon for the Supreme Court was not controverted. unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice.
Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed
On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is
findings of the OCA that he should be faulted therefor: sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance
shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating
given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall
periods covering January to June 2000, July to December 2000 and
contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to
January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to perform his
prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the
performance ratings given him is tantamount to an implied The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as
acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of Executive recommended by the OCA, is thus in order.
Order No. 292, quoted as follows:
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
"Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating
given him may appeal through the established Grievance Procedure Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against
of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to substantiate the same.
his copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the
prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right." Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an
unlawful order. Per Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to undergo a drug
grounds to drop him from the Rolls. However, considering that his test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be
superior/supervisor failed to comply with the requirements set forth in drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a
Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity
Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to of the civil service. However, considering that the order was issued
make up and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it
to improve his performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him.
as shown by his performance rating for the period April to June 2001 This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which
with a "very satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the roll will no Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.
longer be appropriate (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:
Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in
the above-quoted findings of the OCA reads: By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24, 2002
Supplemental Affidavit, she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas
2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance. was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case
lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, "[w]hile the same
appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of
sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
same building and should be given special treatment by other judges relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige
or court personnel." of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
against the judge and her spouse, Atty. Paas: (Italics supplied.)

SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of SC Circular No. 3-92, dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
Courts as Temples of Justice and Promoting Respect for their
Officials and Employers" reads: SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE
FOR RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all
times be preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of
justice system, court officials and employees must: Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to the
functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be
In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the
grounds for disciplinary action under, as the case may be, the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or
Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, profession.
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply with the Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 {Nellie Kelly Austria vs.
norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and improper
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees use of the court's premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and
(R.A. No. 6713); his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991,
found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct
Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices; prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of
the service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE,
xxx
the Court declaring that such use of the court's premises inevitably
xxx degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing
judicial records to danger of loss or damage. (Italics supplied.)
xxx
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings
Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than before other courts, Judge Paas indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her
for court or judicial functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied.) prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct" and of the above-stated Supreme
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious charge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all under the Rules of Court and is punishable under the same Rule.
activities." Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:
A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
of impropriety; and his behavior not only in the performance of influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond
reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judge's official life The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence banking on his relationship with a member of the bench which tends
and that upon a Judge's attributes depend the public perception of to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot
the Judiciary. be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the
least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige. Public
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible
and deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to and improper conduct.
impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client,
that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that
following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: expediency and a desire to ensure receipt of court orders and
notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have
CANON 3 A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES his court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that
address. While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair should not violate his lawyer's oath or the Code of Professional
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the
judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
FAITH TO THE COURT.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be 1. In A.M. OCA IPINo. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez
misled by any artifice. GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1)
Month without pay;
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS
2. In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M.
CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS
Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the
TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that
INFLUENCING THE COURT.
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS severely;
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS 3. In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,
WITH HIS CLIENTS.
 a. Judge Paas GUILTYoiviolating SC Administrative Circular Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for
pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS'(P l respondents.
2,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely; and AQUINO, J.:
b. Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980
verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with law firm organized in Illinois.
more severely.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres,
This Decision shall take effect immediately. using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names
of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and appended to
respondents' personal record. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any
liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
SO ORDERED. whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what
is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

Republic of the Philippines We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
SUPREME COURT practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
Manila admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
EN BANC Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine
Adm. Case No. 2131, May 10, 1985 bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant,
vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
CURAMMENG, JR., Respondents. engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo).
This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON,
115.) Respondents.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law DECISION

under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
SO ORDERED.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
that seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman Resolution dated
May 15, 1995 in OMB-CRIM-0-93-1597 which dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners against respondent Assistant Solicitor
General (ASG) Magdangal M. de Leon, and the Ombudsman Order
dated March 13, 1996 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioners.

Petitioners General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), Worldwide

Insurance and Surety Company (Worldwide), Midland Insurance
Corporation (Midland) and Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard)
filed a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon on July 5, 1993.
Docketed as OMB-CRIM-093-1597, the complaint accused
respondent ASG de Leon of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for allegedly

x x x causing undue injury to the Government of the Republic of the

Republic of the Philippines Philippines and the GBTC Stockholders in giving Lucio Tan
SUPREME COURT unwarranted benefit or advantage in the discharge of his official
Manila functions by protecting and defending the interest of Lucio Tan and
the Central Bank relative to (sic) verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan
THIRD DIVISION Bid as the Liquidation Plan of GBTC under Monetary Board
Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.
G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000
and charged respondent administratively with malfeasance in office,
GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC); WORLDWIDE
for his alleged
INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY (WORLDWIDE);
MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND); and x x x deliberate and adamant refusal to comply with his statutory duty
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. (STANDARD), Petitioners, vs. to protect and defend the interest of the Government of the Republic
THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO RAUL E. TOTANES and of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central
Bank relative to the verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the the court's assistance in the liquidation of GBTC. The Court docketed
Liquidation Plan of GBTC under Monetary Board Resolution No. 677, the said petition as Spec. Proc. No. 107812, entitled "Petition for
March 29, 1977. Assistance in the Liquidation of GBTC";

OMB-CRIM-093-1597 was assigned to respondent Raul E. Totanes, On May 05, 1982, three minority stockholders of GBTC, namely,
Ombudsman Graft Investigation Office II, Evaluation and Preliminary Worldwide, Midland and Standard through their counsel, ATTY.
Investigation Bureau (EPIB). Respondent Totanes dismissed the ANGEL C. CRUZ, filed an intervention in the said case, praying for
criminal case against respondent ASG de Leon in the assailed the annulment of the closure and liquidation of GBTC by the
Resolution dated May 15, 1995, the dispositive portion of which Monetary Board of the Central Bank as these were allegedly done
reads: arbitrarily and in bad faith. Later, GBTC itself joined and adopted the
intervention of its aforesaid three minority stockholders;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned investigator
respectfully recommends that the above-entitled case be forthwith Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo, to whose Team the
DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence to hold respondent said case was assigned by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, re-
CRIMINALLY liable for the acts complained of in the instant assigned the said case from Solicitor Juan C. Nabong to the herein
complaint. respondent in view of Juan C. Nabong's appointment as RTC Judge;

SO RESOLVED. From that time on, all the pleadings, filed with the Liquidation Court
RTC of Manila, were signed by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 10, 1995 Agpalo and the herein respondent in behalf of the Office of the
that was denied in an Order dated March 13, 1996. Hence, this Solicitor General (OSG).
petition.
What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent
The relevant facts as summarized by the Office of the Ombudsman ASG de Leon with the Ombudsman is the alleged "inconsistent
are: position" of said respondent in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil
Case No. 0005 filed with Sandiganbayan.
On March 27, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed
Resolution No. 677 to the effect that GBTC is insolvent and therefore Civil Case No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case filed by the
has to stop its banking business operations. It designated a Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) through the
Liquidator and approved a Liquidation Plan whereby (sic) Lucio Tan OSG on July 17, 1987. This case was instituted against Lucio Tan,
Group shall purchase all the assets and assume all the liabilities of former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al.
GBTC;
Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005, the first of the
On April 07, 1977, the Central Bank of the Philippines and Arnulfo B. causes of actions therein as stated in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) alleges
Aurellano in his capacity as the Monetary Board of the Central Bank that:
Liquidator of GBTC filed through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) a Petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking
(A) The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC under MB personal capacity but in his official capacity as one of the lawyers in
Resolution, March 25, 1977; the OSG, which is headed by the Solicitor General.

(B) The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB Resolution, Everything stated in the pleadings filed by the OSG in the aforesaid
March 29, 1977; case is not the personal stand or opinion of the herein respondent
but the official stand or opinion of the OSG. Hence, OSG as counsel
are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy with and of the Central Bank of the Philippines in the aforesaid case is
taking advantage of the close relationship between the LUCIO TAN defending its client, the Central Bank. It is not defending the interest
Group and the deposed President and Wife, other CB officials, with of Lucio Tan. The fact that, under the Liquidation Plan approved by
the help and manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, the Lucio Tan Group
and former PNB President Panfilo O. Domingo xxx. purchased the assets and assumed the liabilities of GBTC, is merely
incidental. What is at issue in the aforesaid case, which is now
The charge that respondent ASG de Leon espoused conflicting
before the Court of Appeals, is whether or not the Monetary Board of
interests rests on the contention of petitioners that said respondent's
the Central Bank acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in its actions, leading
act of defending the legality of the Central Bank closure of GBTC
to the closure and liquidation of GBTC.
amounts to defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank.
Petitioners maintain that the position taken by the OSG represented As regards the complaint in the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil
by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 is "against Case No. 0005, which is an action for the recovery of the alleged ill-
the 'interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' as gotten wealth against Lucio Tan, et. al., the same was signed by
contained in the statement of ultimate facts set forth in Par. 14 (a)-(1) Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman
to (3) of EDSA-SDB Civil Case No. 0005, ANNEX "C". Ramon Diaz and Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. While it is true
that, the said case is in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
On December 16, 1992, counsel of petitioners wrote respondent
yet it was filed by the PCGG which is the only agency involved in that
ASG de Leon that he inhibit himself from appearing in Spec. Proc.
case. The said PCGG case has nothing to do with Spec. Proc. No.
No. 107812 and to defend the interest of the Government of the
107812 (CA-G.R. CV No. 39939) which involves the issue of validity
Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan in Civil Case No.
of the closure and liquidation of GBTC. Neither the Central Bank nor
0005.
GBTC Liquidator Arnulfo B. Aurellano of the Central Bank,
When respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the petitioners-appellants in the said CA G.R. CV No. 39938, are parties
Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812, petitioners then filed the in the said Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005.
complaint against respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman.
With the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution having been
In dismissing the case, the Office of the Ombudsman held: denied, petitioners filed this petition raising the following issues:

Thus, the records of this case convincingly show that, whenever the I.
herein respondent Assistant Solicitor General appears in court or
signs any pleading in the aforesaid case, he is doing so not in his
THAT RESPONDENT OMB AND RESPONDENT INVESTIGATION believe that respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central
OFFICER RAUL E. TOTANES COMMITTED OUTRAGEOUSLY Bank in Spec. Proc. 107812 (now CA-GR CV No. 39939) is also
WRONG FINDINGS (A) THAT THE OSG "IS NOT DEFENDING defending the interest of Lucio Tan. Considering that Sandiganbayan
THE INTEREST OF LUCIO TAN" IN SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, Civil Case No. 0005 is a complaint against Lucio Tan filed by the
NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939, AND (B) THAT THE EDSA CASE PCGG through the OSG and includes averments pertaining to the
SANDIGANBAYAN CIVIL CASE NO. 0005 HAS NOTHING TO DO alleged illegal and arbitrary closure of GBTC, petitioners are
WITH SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939, ARE convinced that respondent ASG de Leon must be held personally
DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS ON RECORD. liable for the alleged inconsistent interest or position taken by the
OSG in these two cases.
II.
To be criminally liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, these
THAT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMPLETELY ERRED IN elements must be present: (1) That the accused are public officers or
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL NOR private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
ANY LEGAL PROVISION NOR ANY DECISIONAL AUTHORITY officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their
NOR ANY PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY VESTING UPON OSG official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they
THE RIGHT AND OR DUTY TO REPRESENT INTEREST "IN cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
CONFLICT OR OPPOSED" TO THE INTEREST OF THE private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OF WHICH OSG IS THE CHIEF benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the
COUNSEL, IN ANY ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASE SUCH AS THAT public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
ARISING FROM THE ILLEGAL AND FRAUDULENT CB CLOSURE gross inexcusable negligence.
AND LUCIO TAN'S TAKEOVER OF GBTC, AS SET FORTH IN
PAR. 14 (a)-(1) TO (3), EDSA-SDB CIVIL CASE NO. 0005, ANNEX Respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central Bank in Spec.
"C". Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 was acting in his official
capacity as Assistant Solicitor General. As Assistant Solicitor
III. General, respondent was a member of the legal staff of the OSG
tasked to represent the Central Bank, an agency of the Government,
THAT RESPONDENT OMB IS TOTALLY WRONG IN NOT
in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-GR CV No. 39939. Based on the
FINDING THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE EXISTS AGAINST
records, the case was originally assigned to Solicitor Nabong, but
RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e), RA No. 3019,
was re-assigned to respondent who at the time was a Solicitor, in
AS AMENDED CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON
view of the appointment of Nabong as RTC judge.
RECORD, BEING DOCUMENTARY, IS SO CLEAR AND SO PLAIN.
In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de
The petition must be dismissed. Not only are the charges against
Leon was merely acting in the interest of the Central Bank, which is
respondent ASG de Leon baseless, they are also misplaced.
the client of OSG. It may be true that a successful defense of the
In accusing respondent ASG de Leon of malfeasance and violation interest of the Central Bank in said case would also inure to the
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, petitioners would like this Court to benefit of the Lucio Tan group. However, such benefit would just be
an incidental result of the position that the government has taken in To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned
justifying the closure of said bank because the approved Liquidation elements must concur. In the absence of proof that respondent ASG
Plan for GBTC provided that the Lucio Tan group shall purchase all de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing the official stand of
the assets and assume all the liabilities of GBTC and such the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939,
Liquidation Plan would be in force upon a judgment upholding the respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA
legality of the closure of GBTC. Whatever benefit the Lucio Tan 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove the fifth element is fatal
group would reap upon a favorable judgment in Spec. Proc. No. to their cause.
107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 is but a natural consequence of a
successful defense of the actions of the Central Bank in closing Petitioners harp on the alleged conflicting positions of respondent
GBTC. Certainly, it cannot be deemed as an act of causing undue ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and
injury to a party by giving it unwarranted benefits or advantage. in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. However, the records fail to
disclose the nature and extent of respondent ASG de Leons
We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de Leon cannot be held participation in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. What has been
criminally liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending set in detail is the participation of respondent ASG de Leon in Spec
the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal duty to Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Assuming arguendo that
defend the interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the respondent ASG de Leon participated in these two cases, this Court
position taken by it. Whatever legal services respondent ASG de cannot hold him personally liable. The perceived inconsistent
Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. positions are the official positions taken by his office as the principal
107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as law office and legal defender of the Government.
a member of the legal staff of the OSG. We note that in all of the
pleadings filed by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV Petitioners have already raised the issue of "inconsistent positions"
No. 39939, the signature of respondent ASG de Leon appeared of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil
therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor General. Case No. 0005 with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 033642
However, it must be noted that these pleadings also bore the (Appeal of the Central Bank from the decision of the RTC of Manila,
signatures of the Solicitor General and other members of the legal Branch IV in Spec. Proc. No. 107812).
staff of the Office of the Solicitor General.
In CA-G.R. CV No. 033642, petitioners sought to have then Solicitor
Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had the imprimatur of General Francisco Chavez cited in contempt and subjected to
the OSG which had consistently defended the interest of the Central disciplinary action for said inconsistency. In upholding the position of
Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Four Solicitor General Chavez, the Court of Appeals stated in its
Solicitor Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoez, Frank Chavez Resolution dated July 19, 1988:
and Raul I. Goco have maintained the policy of defending the closure
The second ground in support of the motion for contempt may have
of GBTC by the Central Bank and respondent ASG de Leon merely
some basis per se, that is, appellants counsel espouses two
acted with the other officials of the OSG in representing the State.
inconsistent positions or interests: the first, in favor of Central Bank
and Lucio Tan, which is the position taken in the case at bar, and the
second, in favor of the Republic but against Lucio Tan and his The power of the Ombudsman to determine the merits of a complaint
cohorts in the Civil Case before the Sandiganbayan. The situation of is mandated by the Constitution and courts should not interfere in the
the appellants counsel may therefore be likened to one whose exercise thereof. There is also a practical reason behind this rule, to
choice is between the devil and the deep blue sea. wit:

Still and all, we are not ready to condemn appellants counsel The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
because of the fix in which he found himself. On the contrary, we prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
might commiserate with him. He is under the payroll of the State and Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
he represents the State sometimes through its instrumentality like of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitioners
the Central Bank and its officials, as in the instant case. In other assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
words, the State in both cases has knowingly allowed counsel to Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
represent it, and for this reason, the latter may not be held in much the same was that the courts would be extremely swamped if
contempt and subjected to any disciplinary action. they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
This Court agrees that even the Solicitor General cannot be file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
personally liable for the predicament he found himself in Spec. Proc. complainant.
No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. Basic to a
prosecution under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is that public officers IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence in performing his legal duty. We find no SO ORDERED.
reason to disturb the ruling of respondent Totanes that there was no
prima facie case against respondent ASG de Leon. The perceived
conflict of interest or position undertaken by the OSG in Spec. Proc.
No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0005 should be addressed to the OSG or the Solicitor
General in particular.

Furthermore, in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, we ruled that the

"courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the
averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he
otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may
proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due
and proper form."
 MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of

explosives (handgrenade) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
five years, seeks a new trial which was denied him by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by respondent Court of
Appeals.

Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the Court to resolve, viz: did
respondent appellate court commit an error of law and gravely abuse
its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for new trial "for the
reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use
handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC
agent with Code No. P-36-68 and code Name 'Safari' (both
documents are dated 31 January 1968)"

The following incidents are not in dispute:

On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga,

petitioner Jose was arrested by the local police leading to the filing
with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III of several
criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm (Crim.
Republic of the Philippines Case 6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of
SUPREME COURT explosives (Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were jointly tried
Manila after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision dated
December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970 acquitted
FIRST DIVISION accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery,
but convicted him for illegal possession of the handgrenade that was
G.R. No. L-38581, March 31, 1976 found on his person at the time of his arrest.

LORENZO JOSE, Petitioner, vs. After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day filed
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE his notice of appeal. Nine days thereafter or more particularly on
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be
reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had
Francisco Carreon & Zosimo D. de Mesa for petitioner. made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade
in question. The trial court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the
motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very
Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for
date the decision was promulgated. 
respondents.
The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the
of Appeals where petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues following grounds should justify this Court to review the ruling of
of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal possession of explosives respondent appellate court to wit:
when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and
(2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the 1. Petitioners's plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and
reception of his permit to possess the handgrenade. In his brief, his being imprisoned for five (5) years when there is indubitable
Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the exculpatory evidence on hand is a result so harsh that the
remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial. Honorable Court may well undertake a review of the case just to
satisfy itself of the justice and inevitability of such a result;
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, rendered its 2. A question of substance not heretofore determined by the
decision of March 8, 1972, affirming the findings of fact and the Honorable Court is involved, as the evidence sought to be
judgment of conviction of the court a quo, and declaring that no introduced at the new trial is, technically, not newly discovered:
reversible error was committed by the latter when it denied the and
reopening of the case as the court had lost its "power to change, 3. The denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his
modify, or alter its decision."  above-quoted statement of the main legal issue, is contrary to
the decisions of this Honorable Court because under these
A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea decisions, the new trial should have been granted since there is
that "assuming arguendo that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to a 'strong, compelling reason' in this case for granting the relief
act upon appellant's motion for new trial because of the perfection of prayed for, such strong compelling reason being the very strong
the appeal, this Honorable Court — before which said motion was probability of petitioner's acquittal if a new trial were granted.
reiterated and which has competence to act thereon — should have (Workmen's Insurance Co. vs. Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison vs.
granted the same if for no other reason than to prevent a miscarriage Gatchalian, 51 SCRA 262; Rubio vs. Mariano 52 SCRA 338;
of justice which is the inevitable result of its denial." 7 This motion for Montecines vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 14; Posadas vs.
reconsideration was denied in respondent court's resolution of April Court of Appeals, L-38071, April 25, 1974; please see
3, 1974.  Annotation: 52 SCRA 346 ... (pp. 157-158, rollo)

A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion
Lorenzo Jose but this was also denied by the appellate court in a for reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of
Resolution promulgated on July 24, 1974.  "substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part of respondent
Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of convinction," and that it
being admitted by petitioner that the evidence sought to be
Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty.
introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence,
Francisco Carreon, filed with Us this petition for review which We
the denial of the new trial "visibly papers as correct". This Opposition
denied outright on September 6, 1974, "the question raised being
drew a lengthy reply from petitioner's counsel.
factual and for insufficient showing that the finding of facts by
respondent court are unsupported by substantial evidence, and for
lack of merit." On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the
Solicitor General informing the Court that in view of the " Persistence
of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this Honorable Court
and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing
appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to handgrenade," in the
interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries Inclosure:
from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter
dated December 27, 1974 with enclosures, xerox copies of which are Appointmenmt paper of subject person dtd
being attached to the manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D. 
Jan. 31, 1968 with Personal History Statement
Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor
General reads: Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner
Lorenzo Jose as a PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Command with Code Number P-36-68 and Code Nanie "Safari" with
expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We
Padre Faura, Manila quote:

Dear Solicitor General Mendoza: This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide our firearms and
such other equipment which it may deem necessary for your
With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be personal protection on the need basis which will be covered by
informed that Colonel Pedrito C. de Guzman who is now Provincial separate written authority. (p. 192, rollo)
of Sorsogon Constabulary Command, confirmed that he executed an
affidavit on May 4, 1974 at Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that he In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside
appointed Mr. Lorenzo Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as PC the denial of this petition for review, to give due course and consider
Agent on January 31, 1968. the Petition as a special civil action. In another Resolution of April 4,
1975, the parties were given time to submit their respective
The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary memorandum.
Command also confirmed the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC
agent during the year 1968. This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure
must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice
Attached herewith pertinent papers related to the said appointment. where justice is due-to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The
failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the
Sincerely yours,
situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual, thereby
closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted,
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this
Court.
FIDEL V. RAMOS
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff
Major General, AFP for upholding the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous
terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al that a prosecuting
Chief of Constabulary (p. 191, rollo) officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and
interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but
that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the
public that while guilt shall not escape, innocene shall not suffer. (69 While Section 13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for
Phil. 556, 564-565, qouting Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and
Court in 69 U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309) The errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial. Section 11,
Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best Rule 124 quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the
be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case
trial. basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting
a new trial or re-trial.
We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of
Appeals that the evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate to aid and
do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence because not to obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth
the same — his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the
Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade — were hand that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves
supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
and not discovered only thereafter.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on from them for the purposes of justice or, in a proper case, disregard
the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) them. In this jurisdiction, in not a. few instances, this Court ordered a
the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute,
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the vis retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not counsel. Improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and where a
to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.  judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both
the prosecution and the defense. 
However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial
on newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention
substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 
which provides:
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case
Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a now before Us which may be classified as exceptional enough to
judgement of the Court of First Instance, the appellate court may warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his
affirm or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty innocence of the crime charged.
imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of First
Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal
possession of a handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess
appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found
embrace situations as the instant case where the court may grant a himself in a situation where he had to make a choice — reveal his
new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section Identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary
13 of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.  assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and
face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the
dissidents considering that Floridablanca the site of the incident, was
in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible
exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution. Without revealing his Identity as an agent of the
Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had
a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present
the same. The permit however could not be produced because it
would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of
conviction and with it the staggering impact of a five-year
imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it was
unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed,
hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's
appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to
possess a handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was
too late according to the trial court because in the meantime the
accused had perfected his appeal.

We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of

petitioner's cas to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating
exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court which
petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed
by the Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of
examining the documentary sought to be produced, and of cross-
examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the
accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-
production of the of the evidence during the trial.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of

conviction of the herein petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the
case to the court a quo for a new trial only for purpose of allowing
said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial
court shall inform this Court of the final outcome of the case within a
reasonable time. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the Appeal dated June 11, 2013 (with Urgent
Motion to Prohibit Protestant-Appellee to Participate in the Election
for Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
[IBP] Set on June 15, 2013) filed by Atty. Aileen R. Maglana,
President of IBP Samar Chapter, assailing the June 7, 2013 decision
of the IBP Board of Governors (BOG).

This BOG decision granted the election protest of Atty. Jose Vicente
R. Opinion; declared Atty. Opinion as eligible to run for Governor of
IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term; annulled the
proclamation of Atty. Maglana as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas;
and proclaimed Atty. Opinion as the duly elected Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.

The Antecedents

On May 25, 2013, thirteen (13) delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas
Region gathered at the Session Hall of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 24, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Capitol Site, Maasin,
Leyte, to elect the Governor of their region for the 2013-2015 term.
Also present during the meeting were the Court’s designated
observer, Judge Bethany G. Kapili (Executive Judge of the RTC,
Branch 24, Maasin, Leyte), other lawyers of the Southern Leyte
Chapter and outgoing Governor Manuel Enage, Jr. Governor Enage
Republic of the Philippines presided over the election. He then called the election to order and
SUPREME COURT opened the nominations for the position of Governor of IBP Eastern
Manila Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.

EN BANC Upon a motion duly seconded, Atty. Maglana - the incumbent

President of IBP Samar Chapter - was nominated for the position of
B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014 Governor. Atty. Maglana then moved that Governor Enage declare
that only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon for the
ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA, Complainant, vs. position of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas, to the exclusion of all
ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R. OPINION, Respondent. the other eight (8) chapters. Atty. Maglana cited the rotation rule
under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or the start of
RESOLUTION the implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had
not served as Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas.
Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, After heated debates on the proper interpretation of the rotation rule
thereafter, took the floor and manifested that before he decided to to the present case, Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty.
run for Governor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he was still Opinion was disqualified from running for the position of Governor of
qualified to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in IBP Eastern Visayas. Thereafter, some delegates protested the
the immediately preceding term. Atty. Opinion stated that he decision of Governor Enage which prompted him to call a recess.
received an opinion dated April 2, 2013 from Governor Vicente M. When the session resumed, Atty. Malig-on, Vice President of IBP
Joyas, Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee that pertinently Cebu Chapter, moved that the election be suspended and the issue
stated: of Atty. Opinion’s objection to Governor Enage’s ruling be resolved
by the IBP BOG. Governor Enage, however, denied this motion and,
This has reference to your Letter dated March 15, 2013 addressed to thereafter, ordered the distribution of the ballots.
former IBP President Roan I. Libarios seeking clarification on your
Chapter’s qualification to field a candidate for Governor on May 25, The counting of the ballots revealed that only ten (10) out of the
2013. eleven (11) ballots cast were filled up. Governor Enage counted the
votes, with six (6) votes in favor of Atty. Opinion considered as stray
Please be informed that your having lost the Governorship elections votes and four (4) votes in favor of Atty. Maglana. He then
for Eastern Visayas in 2011 does not disqualify your Chapter from proceeded to proclaim Atty. Maglana as the duly elected Governor of
seeking an election for Governorship of Eastern Visayas Region. IBP Eastern Visayas in view of the disqualification of the other
Thus, under the present set up, the IBP Chapters of Eastern Samar, nominee, Atty. Opinion.
Samar, and Biliran are qualified to field their respective candidate for
the scheduled Regional Elections on May 25, 2013. The Protest

Atty. Opinion also manifested that in the 2011 Regional Elections for On May 27, 2013, Atty. Opinion filed an election protest with the IBP
IBP Eastern Visayas, the representative of IBP Samar Chapter, BOG. In support of his election protest, Atty. Opinion raised two
Judge Amanzar, waived "the votes as he cannot pursue an election points.
at that time." Instead, Atty. Opinion was "asked to run." The Chapter
President of Samar in 2011, however, categorically denied the First, he noted that since its introduction in 1990, the rotation rule
waiver and said, "I did not pursue my intentions, although I had one had not been followed in the elections for Governor of IBP Eastern
at that time to run for governor, because I was financially Visayas since Cebu Province, Cebu City, Bohol and Northern Samar
handicapped... but I did not categorically waive our right to the have had two elected governors each, as opposed to other chapters
governorship, because I believe that waiver should be, - should not which only had one governor elected. Since the rotation rule was not
be implied. I categorically say that I did not waive my right, or the followed, IBP Eastern Samar Chapter cannot be disqualified to run
right of the chapter to run for governor." since it was merely exercising its right to run for the second time in
the same manner as that of the other chapters that had elected two
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon, the delegate from Biliran, meanwhile governors.
pointed out that Governor Joyas as Chairman of the IBP Executive
Committee had no authority to make the above-cited Second, he emphasized that IBP Samar Chapter had waived its turn
pronouncement; it is only the Supreme Court that has the authority to in the rotation when it did not field a candidate for Governor in the
determine the qualified chapters in the region. 2007, 2009 and 2011 elections. He notes that IBP Samar Chapter
should not be allowed to assert its turn in the rotation at anytime;
otherwise, it would disrupt the sequence considering it "follows Cebu In its June 7, 2013 decision, the IBP BOG granted the election
City sequence wise." Thus, for the 2013 regional elections, both protest of Atty. Opinion and declared him the duly elected Governor
Eastern Samar and Samar should have been declared eligible to run of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas.
First, the IBP BOG held that IBP Samar waived its turn in the first
In her Comment, Atty. Maglana argued three points. rotation cycle, from 1989 to 2007. It noted that under the rotation
rule, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many as the
First, IBP Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation. In fact, number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a
the former IBP Samar Chapter President, Atty. Cesar Mabansag, chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG. In the case of IBP
categorically denied, during the May 25,2013 regional elections, that Eastern Visayas, the region consists of nine (9) chapters, thus the
he had waived the right of IBP Samar Chapter to the governorship. cycle consists of nine governorship terms (from 1989 to 2007).
Even if there was a waiver during the 2011 election, IBP Samar Based on the records, it is clear that four chapters have been
Chapter can reclaim its right to the governorship before the rotation represented twice; IBP Eastern Samar was represented once while
is completed, pursuant to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP Samar was never represented at all.
IBP By-Laws. Thus, for the 2013-2015 term, IBP Samar Chapter,
which remains to be the only chapter that did not have its turn in the Based on these considerations, the IBP BOG concluded that IBP
rotation, should be allowed to reclaim its right to the governorship. 18 Samar Chapter effectively waived its turn in the rotation order when it
did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007,as well as when it did
Second, she noted that since Bar Matter No. 586, dated May 14, not invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those
1991, mandated the strict implementation of the rotation rule, and candidates whose chapters had already been previously represented
based on IBP records, all chapters in the region, except IBP Samar in the rotation cycle.
Chapter, have already had their turn in the rotation. Thus, she
argued that in order for the rotation cycle in the region to be Second, the IBP BOG ruled that the first rotation cycle had already
completed, IBP Samar Chapter, which had not yet had its turn in the terminated with the 2005 to 2007 term despite the lack of
rotation, should be deemed the only qualified chapter to field its representation from Eastern Samar as it has effectively waived its
candidate for governor in the May 25, 2013 regional elections. turn in the first rotation cycle. It emphasized that the rotation rule is
not absolute and is subject to waiver, such as when the chapters, in
Third, she contended that even if the rotation cycle is reckoned from the order of rotation, opt not to file or nominate their own candidates
1973, it is still IBP Samar Chapter’s turn in the rotation, pursuant to for governor during the election regularly done for that purpose. It
the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP also held that Atty. Maglana’s contentions that IBP Eastern Samar
By-Laws. She notes that with the election of Governor Enage in the can reclaim the governorship at any time and that the first rotation
2011-2013 term, the remaining chapters that have not served as cycle cannot be completed unless IBP Eastern Samar has had its
governor are Samar, Biliran and Eastern Samar Chapters. Thus, turn are completely anathema to the concept of the rotation cycle;
pursuant to Section 39, IBP Samar Chapter should be able to field its the rotation cycle should run its course and the rotation in the region
candidate for governor first, ahead of Biliran and Eastern Samar cannot be held hostage by any one chapter.
Chapters.
Third, the IBP BOG found that based on the rotation by exclusion
The IBP BOG Decision rule (i.e., once a member of the chapter is elected as governor, his or
her chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken
turns in the rotation cycle), the six (6) remaining chapters in the rotation order to reclaim its right at any time before the rotation is
region were actually qualified to field a candidate for governor in the completed.
May 25, 2013 regional elections. It also noted that the IBP Eastern
Visayas region is actually already in its second rotation cycle with Third, the rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern Visayas region can only
governors from Leyte (2007-2009), Bohol (2009-2011) and Southern be completed once a nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served
Leyte (2011-2013) already having served the region. In the present as Governor for the 2013-2015 term. The rotation cycle cannot
case, both IBP Eastern Samar and IBP Samar were actually simply be deemed complete by just equating the number of terms
qualified to field their candidates for Governor, alongside IBP Cebu with the number of chapters in the region. Atty. Maglana contends
City, IBP Cebu Province, IBP Biliran and IBP Northern Samar that the situation of IBP Samar Chapter is the same as that of
Chapters. Romblon Chapter in 2009 when the Court, in In the Matter of the
Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
Fourth, the IBP BOG concluded that Atty. Opinion, who was actually Philippines, affirmed IBP Romblon Chapter’s right to the 2009-2011
a qualified candidate for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas, should be term despite the fact that there were other chapters in the Western
declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the Visayas region that had served more than one term.
2013-2015 term, considering that he garnered the majority six (6)
votes, as opposed to the minority four (4) votes garnered by Atty. On July 2, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution denying Atty.
Maglana. Maglana’s prayer to restrain Atty. Opinion from voting in the election
on June 15, 2013, the same having become moot and academic. In
The Appeal the same Resolution, the Court also required Atty. Maglana to
furnish the Court, within five (5) days from notice, a certified true
On June 11, 2013, Atty. Maglana filed the present Appeal (With copy of the IBP BOG decision dated June 7, 2013.
Urgent Motion to Prohibit Protestant-Appellee to Participate in the
Election for Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the On August 3, 2013, Atty. Maglana submitted her Compliance with
Philippines Set on June 15, 2013). In support of her Appeal, Atty. the Court’s directive in its July 2, 2013 Resolution.
Maglana submits the following arguments:
The Issues for Resolution
First, IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a
candidate for governor for the 2013-2015 term, to the exclusion of all The core issues raised by the present Appeal are the following:
other chapters in the IBP Eastern Visayas region. She emphasizes
that based on the records, IBP Samar Chapter clearly had never 1. Whether the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas, since
served as governor for IBP Eastern Visayas since the introduction of the implementation of Bar Matter No. 491, has been completed;
Bar Matter No. 491 in 1989. 2. Whether IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation order
so that it can no longer claim its right to the governorship
Second, IBP Samar Chapter never waived its turn in the rotation position for the 2013-2015 term;
cycle because under the rotation by exclusion scheme, it does not 3. Whether IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field
know when its turn to serve as governor would be. Even assuming a candidate for governor in IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-
that there had been a waiver, Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of 2015 term; and
the IBP By-Laws allows the chapter that waived its turn in the 4. Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Our Ruling The logical starting point in resolving the present matter before us is
Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter
We affirm the IBP BOG decision dated June 7, 2013 and declare No. 491. This provision established the rotation rule in the IBP. The
Atty. Opinion the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for provision states:
the 2013-2015 term.
SEC. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one
We begin with a brief background on the organizational structure of (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
the IBP. The IBP is divided into nine (9) geographic regions, namely: region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which
Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Greater shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the
Manila, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao and region.
Eastern Mindanao.
In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, the
Each of these regions is subdivided into chapters and is represented Court decreed without amending Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-
by a Governor elected by delegates from among the member- Laws that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39, Article VI of the
chapters of each region. In the case of IBP Eastern Visayas, the IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented "so that all prior
region is composed of nine (9) chapters, namely: elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or
considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected
from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of
1. Biliran
Governors."
2. Bohol
3. Cebu Province
4. Cebu City Despite the call for strict implementation of the rotation rule under
5. Eastern Samar Bar Matter No. 586 in 1991, the Court amended Section 39, Article
6. Leyte VI of the IBP By-Laws only in 2010 in In the Matter of the Brewing
7. Northern Samar Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
8. Samar by mandating the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation
9. Southern Leyte rule, as well as recognizing that the rotation rule is subject to waivers
by the chapters of the regions. The provision, as further amended,
now reads:
At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates
from each region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall
be chosen by rotation. Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one
(1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall be chosen
These nine (9) Governors constitute the IBP BOG which governs
by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented
and has general charge of the IBP’s affairs and activities. Aside from
among the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in
the Governors, the other national officers of the IBP are: the IBP
the rotation order, its place shall redound to the next Chapter in the
President, the EVP, the National Secretary, the National Treasurer,
line. Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the
and the heads of the National Committees.
Governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise,
it will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the same place that
The Rotation Rule it had in the round completed.
Broken down into its components, Section 39, Article VI, as own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for
amended, of the IBP By-Laws contains the following elements: that purpose."

1. Delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their The Operation of the Rotation System in IBP Eastern Visayas
region who shall be chosen by rotation;
2. Rotation of the governorship of each region shall be mandatory Pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491, the delegates for the 1989-1991
and to be strictly implemented; term elected Atty. Benedict H. Alo of Cebu Province as Governor of
3. A chapter may waive its turn in the rotation order which shall IBP Eastern Visayas. This development ushered in the
redound to the next chapter in the line; and implementation of the rotation system for the governorship of IBP
4. The chapter that waived its turn may reclaim its right to the Eastern Visayas. Thus, the rotational cycle should be counted from
governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; the time of Bar Matter No. 491, when the Court provided for the
otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the rotation system. This term (1989-1991) constituted the first "turn" in
same place that it had in the round completed. the cycle and should be considered the starting point for
consideration in resolving the various aspects of the present
Elements a, c and d are key elements that are decisive in resolving controversy. Note, however, that part of this term was under a
the present controversy. As far as element (a) is concerned, the caretaker that served as a preliminary and preparatory measure
problem relates to the element of rotation where the manner of under the developments that initiated Bar Matter No. 491.
implementation is the disputed issue. Elements (c) and (d) also
assume significance because of the assertion of waiver on the part The tabulation below shows the election developments for the
of IBP Samar Chapter of its right to the governorship. position of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas from the 1989-1991
term up to the present, viz:
As has been interpreted and applied by the Court in the past, the
rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By- Term Elected Governors Chapter
Laws actually consists of two underlying directives.
1989-1990 Caretaker Board N/A
First is the directive for the mandatory and strict implementation of
the rotation rule. The rule mandates that the governorship of a region 1990-1991 Benedicto H. Alo Cebu Province
shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the
region. This serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance to
represent the region in the IBP BOG. 1991-1993 Baldomero C. Estenzo Cebu City

Second is the exception from the mandatory and strict 1993-1995 Agustinus V. Gonzaga Bohol
implementation of the rotation rule. This exception would allow a
chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order, subject to its right to 1995-1997 Jose Aguila Grapilon Biliran
reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is
completed. Thus, as the Court held in In the Matter of the Brewing 1997-1999 Kenny A.H. Tantuico Northern Samar
Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
"[t]he rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the 1999-2001 Celestino B. Sabate Eastern Samar
chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their
2001-2003 Emil L. Ong Northern Samar the Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas came from the same chapter,
such as Northern Samar (1997-1999 and 2001-2003), Cebu
2003-2005 Manuel M. Monzon Cebu Province Province (1990-1991 and 2003-2005) and Cebu City (1991-1993 and
2005-2007).
2005-2007 Manuel P. Legaspi Cebu City
These "aberrant" developments, strictly speaking, sidetracked the
smooth and proper implementation of the rotation rule in the first
2007-2009 Evergisto S. Escalon Leyte
rotational cycle that started with the 1990-1991 term of IBP Cebu
Province and which should have ended in the 2005-2007 term with
2009-2011 Roland B. Inting Bohol all the chapters, including Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte, given
the chance to be governor. Stated otherwise, had the chapters
2011-2013 Manuel L. Enage, Jr. Southern Leyte strictly and mandatorily followed the rotation rule, the first rotational
cycle should have been completed in 2007.
2013-2015 Disputed Disputed
We cannot sustain Atty. Maglana’s arguments, that: (1) the first
1. The First rotation cycle has been completed in 2007. rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas region had not been completed
in 2007; and (2) that the rotation cycle can only be completed once a
Counting from the governorship of Atty. Benedicto H. Alo of IBP nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as governor for the
Cebu Province Chapter, the first rotation cycle of governors, 2013-2015 term, for two reasons.
consisting of nine (9) governorship terms from 1989 to 2007,
followed the following pattern and succession: First, as the IBP BOG established, the primary reason why some
chapters, such as Northern Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City,
1. Cebu Province - Benedicto H. Alo, 1990-1991 were represented twice (in the first rotation cycle) was because
2. Cebu City - Baldomero C. Estenzo, 1991-1993 Samar either did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007 or it
3. Bohol - Agustinus V. Gonzaga, 1993-1995 failed to invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of
4. Biliran - Jose Aguila Grapilon, 1995-1997 those candidates whose chapters had already been represented in
5. Northern Samar - Kenny A.H. Tantuico, 1997-1999 the rotation cycle. We agree with the IBP BOG that Samar Chapter
6. Eastern Samar - Celestino B. Sabate, 1999-2001 effectively waived its turn in the rotation order, as will be further
7. Northern Samar - Emil L. Ong, 2001-2003 explained below. Because of this waiver of its turn in the first rotation
8. Cebu Province - Manuel M. Monzon, 2003-2005 cycle, we conclude that the first rotation cycle had been completed in
9. Cebu City - Manuel P.Legaspi, 2005-2007 2007.

leaving three chapters – Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte – with no Second, Atty. Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP Samar Chapter’s
governor elected to represent the chapter’s slot in the rotation. right to the governorship in the 2013-2015 term because it is contrary
Pursuant to the rotational rule, the governorship of a region shall to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws. This
rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region, provision states that the chapter which has waived its turn in the
to give every chapter a chance to represent the region in the IBP rotation cycle may reclaim its right to the governorship at any time
BOG. However, not every chapter was represented in the first before the rotation is completed. Having been established that the
rotational cycle. As the IBP BOG noted, there were instances when first rotational cycle had been completed in the 2005-2007 term, IBP
Samar Chapter can no longer belatedly reclaim its right to the Thus, the dissent cannot simply apply Section 39, Article VI, as
governorship in the 2013-2015 term as it should have exercised its amended, of the IBP By-Laws in the present case because this
claim on or before the completion of the first rotation cycle in 2007. In amendment calling for the strict implementation of the rotation rule
this regard, we quote with approval the disquisition of the IBP BOG: cannot be interpreted retroactively, but only prospectively, so that it
would only take effect in the 2011-2013 term.
Moreover, protestee’s view that the Samar chapter, by virtue of its
being the only chapter that has yet to have its turn as governor in the As previously emphasized, not every chapter was represented in the
rotation rule era, can reclaim the governorship at any time it opts to first rotation cycle; there were three instances when the Governor of
and that the rotation cycle cannot be deemed completed until it does IBP Eastern Visayas came from the same Chapter, such as the case
is anathema to the very concept of the rotation rule. The region of Northern Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City. These aberrant
cannot be held hostage indefinitely by one chapter. The rotation has developments can only be justified under the "as much as possible"
to run its course. Indeed the flaw of protestee’s reasoning would be qualifier cited above. Based on these considerations and from a
even more apparent if the issue of the election of the Executive Vice practical perspective, we can reasonably conclude that the first
President would come into play inasmuch as the Samar Chapter rotation cycle has been completed in 2007 despite the non-
could then invoke its perceived right to the governorship when it is participation of Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte, after considering
the turn of Eastern Visayas Region to have an EVP elected from its the following premises:
ranks, thus, giving it an undue advantage over the other chapters in
the region. i. Bar Matter No. 491 lays down the starting point of the
IBP's rotation system that called for the election of a
The dissent, however, emphasizes that the preferred policy as governor for a region to be rotated as much as possible
mandated in Section 39, Article VI, as amended of the IBP By-Laws, among the chapters of the region;
is the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation by ii. This rule on rotation prevailed until the amendment of
exclusion rule. The dissent posits that unless and until IBP Samar Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws on December 14,
Chapter had actually been given the opportunity to seat as Governor 2010 decreeing the mandatory and strict implementation of
of IBP Eastern Visayas, the first rotation cycle for the position of IBP the rotation rule; and
Eastern Visayas cannot be considered complete. iii. The recent amendment of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP
By-Laws should be interpreted prospectively so that it would
The dissent’s reliance on the mandatory and strict implementation of only take effect from the 2011-2013 term.
the rotation by exclusion rule, as mandated by Section 39, as
amended, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, is inaccurate. Despite the 2. IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.
amendment of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws mandating
the strict implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule, the Court As mentioned, the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as
cannot ignore the reality that prior to the present amendment (i.e., amended, of the IBP By-Laws is not absolute as it is subject to a
from the 1989-1991 term until December 2010), the prevailing waiver, as when a chapter in the order of rotation opts not to field or
rotation rule was not mandatory; the choice of governor should only nominate its candidate for governor during the election regularly
be rotated as much as possible among the chapters of the region. called for the purpose. The dissent, however, posits that IBP Samar
Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation cycle because there was
Note that this rule even prevailed after the first rotation cycle of no clear or unequivocal waiver on its part.
governors, consisting of nine governorship terms from 1989 to 2007.
First, the dissent notes that no express waiver was executed by the Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws in In the Matter of the
IBP Samar Chapter to forego its turn in the rotation cycle. Second, Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
the second and third elements of a valid waiver were not proven. The Philippines. As mentioned, the Court ruled that the rotation rule
dissent argues only during the election for governor for 2013-2015 under Section 39 is not absolute, but is subject to a waiver, as when
that IBP Samar Chapter could have been aware of its right to be the a chapter in the order of the rotation opts not to field or nominate a
sole and only remaining Chapter that should vie for the position of candidate for governor during the election regularly called for that
Governor because it is only during that time that it becomes clear purpose. Notably, the Court in that case also established the
that it is the only remaining Chapter of IBP Eastern Visayas which standards by which a chapter may be deemed to have waived its
remains unrepresented in the IBP BOG. Lastly, the IBP By-Laws is turn in the rotation cycle under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of
silent on how and when the waiver should be made and whether or the IBP By-Laws. Thus, the dissent's reliance on the standards of
not the Chapter President or the Board of Directors is clothed with waiver of rights under civil law cannot simply prevail over the
authority to waive the turn of the Chapter in the rotation cycle on standards set by the Court in the Brewing Controversies case.
behalf of its members. Thus, the dissent concludes that it remains
unclear that there was a clear and unequivocal intention on the part In the Brewing Controversies case, the Court held that the six
of IBP Samar Chapter and its members to waive its right to the chapters in the region that should strictly take precedence in the
governorship. rotation rule over Lanao del Sur Chapter (i.e., IBP Sarangani
Chapter and the other five chapters) waived their turn in the rotation
The dissent’s citation of Article 6 of the Civil Code and its application order by not fielding a candidate for governor and by failing to invoke
of the elements of a valid waiver of a right under civil law is the rotation rule to challenge the nominations from the latter. In ruling
misplaced. that Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter was qualified to
run for governor in the 2009 elections, the Court noted that there
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates the Court’s power were instances when the governor of Western Mindanao Region
of supervision over the IBP. In Garcia v. De Vera, the Court held that came from the same chapter and that the other chapters opted not to
implicit in the constitutional grant to the Supreme Court of the power field or nominate their own candidates, thus:
to promulgate rules affecting the IBP (under Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution) is the power to supervise all the activities of the In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the
IBP, including the election of its officers. In administrative matters voting delegates of IBP Western Mindanao Region voted into office
concerning the IBP, the Court can supervise the IBP by ensuring the Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as Governor for the
legality and correctness of the exercise of its powers as to means 2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty.
and manner, and by interpreting for it the constitutional provisions, Benjamin Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur
laws and regulations affecting the means and manner of the exercise Chapter. A third candidate, Atty. Escobar from the Sarangani
of its powers. For this reason, the IBP By-Laws mandates that the Chapter, was nominated but he declined the nomination.
Court has the plenary power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-
Laws in accordance with policies it deems, not only consistent with While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region,
the Constitution, laws and regulations, but also as may be including Sarangani, are entitled to precedence over the Lanao del
necessary, practicable and appropriate in light of prevailing Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains that not one of
circumstances. them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks
during the April 25, 2009 election. Neither did any one of them
Pursuant to the Court's power of supervision over the IBP, the Court challenge the nominations of the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on
already spoke decisively on the issue of waiver under Section 39, the order of rotation.
By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the Suffice it to say, the "rotation rule" should be applied in harmony
nomination raised in favor of its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as
the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic cannot be
rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The
chapters. They too are deemed to have waived their turn in the order of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its
rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a candidate from relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.
among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation
rule to challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. The same facts obtain in the present case. As the IBP BOG noted,
On the contrary, they fully expressed their concurrence to the cited not all the nine (9) chapters of Eastern Visayas were able to field a
nominations, which may be interpreted as a waiver of their right to governor for the first rotation cycle from 1989 to 2007 since three
take their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for chapters were represented twice. IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, to
the 2009-2011 term. which Atty. Opinion belongs, was represented once while IBP Samar
Chapter, which Atty. Maglana represents, was not represented at all.
It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there The IBP BOG also established that some chapters were represented
were instances when the Governor of the Western Mindanao Region twice during the first rotation cycle because Samar Chapter either did
came from the same chapter such as ZAMBASULTA (1997-1999 & not field any candidate for governor from 1989 to 2007 or it did not
1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus, invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those
Atty. Marohomsalic could not be faulted if the other chapters opted candidates whose chapters had already been previously represented
not to field or nominate their own candidates. Having been validly in the rotation cycle. Based on these considerations and pursuant to
nominated and duly proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the Court’s December 14, 2010 ruling, we conclude that IBP Eastern
Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to Samar effectively waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.
assume his position during the remainder of the term.
To justify its position that it is the sole Chapter qualified to field a
It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of candidate in the 2013-2015 term, Atty. Maglana cites the December
rotation fielded its own candidate or invoked the rotation rule to 14, 2010 Resolution of the Court in In the Matter of the Brewing
challenge Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination. But the record is bereft Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
of any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was Philippines where it upheld the turn of IBP Romblon Chapter which
challenged on that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely then completed the rotation cycle in IBP Western Visayas region.
referred to his nomination by Atty. Macalawi which the Committee
itself has found to be in order. Thus, no compelling reason exists to The citation is also misplaced. In this case, the Court upheld the
disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting election of Atty. Fortunato as Governor of IBP Western Visayas since
delegates as expressed through the ballot. he obtained the highest number of votes and also because under the
rotation rule, it was the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent IBP
The "rotation rule" is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the Western Visayas Region in the IBP BOG. Contrary to Atty.
chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their Maglana’s contentions, the Court in that case never made a finding
own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for that there were also chapters that had two governors in one cycle
that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest and that these second terms were considered as "aberrations."
number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate Furthermore, unlike the case of IBP Samar Chapter, the Court did
deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as not make any finding regarding the waiver of the right to the
established by evidence. Such is not the case here. governorship in IBP Romblon Chapter’s case.
c. IBP Samar Chapter is not the only qualified chapter to field a Based on the above considerations, we agree with the IBP BOG that
candidate for governor for the 2013-2015 term. Governor Enage seriously erred in disqualifying Atty. Opinion as a
candidate and in declaring the six (6) votes he garnered as stray.
With the end of the first rotation cycle in 2007 during the term of Atty.
Manuel P. Legaspi of IBP Cebu City Chapter, the election of Atty. The election of Atty. Opinion is well-settled. He did not only come
Evergisto S. Escalon of IBP Leyte Chapter in that same year from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the position but
effectively ushered in a fresh second rotation cycle in the IBP also got the majority of six (6) votes, as opposed to the four (4) votes
Eastern Visayas region. garnered by Atty. Maglana in the May 25, 2013 elections.

Thus, the second rotation cycle for governor in the IBP Eastern As the Court held in its December 14, 2010 Resolution in In the
Visayas region now follows the following pattern and succession: Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, "[i]f a validly nominated candidate obtains the
1. Leyte - Evergisto S.Escalon, 2007-2009 highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral
2. Bohol - Roland B. Inting, 2009-2011 mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as
3. Southern Leyte - Manuel L.Enage, Jr., 2011-2013 established by evidence."

With the IBP Eastern Visayas region already in the second rotation Similarly, such is not the case here and thus, Atty. Opinion should be
cycle and with governors from Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas in the
Chapters having served the region as starting points, Atty. Maglana’s 2013-2015 term.
position that IBP Samar Chapter is the only remaining chapter
qualified to field a candidate for governor in the 2013 -2015 term WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:
clearly fails. The rotation by exclusion rule provides that "once a
member of [a] chapter is elected as Governor, his [or her] chapter 1. Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion is qualified to run for Governor
would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in of IBP Eastern Visayas region for the 2013-2015 term;
the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle 2. The six (6) votes cast in favor of Atty. Jose Vicente R.
commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to Opinion are valid votes and should be counted in his favor;
vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion." 3. The proclamation of Atty. Aileen R. Maglana by Governor
Manuel Enage, Jr. be annulled since she failed to obtain the
Under this rule, considering that Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte majority of the votes cast in the May 25, 2013 elections; and
Chapters already served in the second rotation cycle, the six 4. Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion be declared the duly elected
remaining chapters are qualified to field their candidates for governor Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas region for the 2013-2015
in the 2013-2015 term. Applied in the present case, it is clear that term, having garnered the highest number of votes cast in
both IBP Eastern Samar and IBP Samar, along with Cebu Province, the May 25, 2013 elections.
Cebu City, Biliran and Northern Samar Chapters, are qualified to
field their candidates in the May 25, 2013 regional elections in the SO ORDERED.
IBP Eastern Visayas region.

5. Atty. Opinion is the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern

Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
 CORONA, C.J.:

This resolves the above matter involving the leadership controversy

at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the administrative
case that was filed against some of the high-ranking officers of the
IBP on account thereof.

I. Antecedents

The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated June 2, 2009 created a

Special (Investigating) Committee to look into the brewing
controversies in the IBP elections, specifically in the elections of
Vice-President for the Greater Manila Region and Executive Vice-
President of the IBP itself xxx and any other election controversy
involving other chapters of the IBP, if any, that includes as well the
Republic of the Philippines election of the Governors for Western Mindanao and Western
SUPREME COURT Visayas.
Manila
Consequently, the Special Committee called the IBP officers
EN BANC involved to a preliminary conference on June 10, 2009. With respect
thereto, Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan then submitted a Preliminary
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC: December 14, 2010 Conference Brief on the same day. During the conference it was
determined that the investigation would focus on the following issues
IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE or controversies:
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRA TED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article V of the
x-----------------------x IBP By-Laws which provides:

A.C. No. 8292 SEC. 31. Membership. The membership (of Delegates) shall consist
of all the Chapter Presidents and, in the case of Chapters entitled to
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA and more than one Delegate each, the Vice-Presidents of the Chapters
NASSER MARAHOMSALIC, Complainants, vs. and such additional Delegates as the Chapters are entitled to.
ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C. ESTRADA, Unless the Vice-President is already a Delegate, he shall be an
BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON, and alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates and alternates shall in
REYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO, Respondents. proper cases be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter.
Members of the Board of Governors who are not Delegates shall be
members ex officio of the House, without the right to vote.
RESOLUTION
 2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater Manila investigation, further received a letter dated June 22, 2009 from Atty.
Region? Alex L. Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter.
3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas
Region? As to the administrative case filed against him, Atty. Vinluan, as
4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Mindanao respondent, filed his Comment dated June 15, 2009. In turn, Attys.
Region? Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic, as complainants, submitted
5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President for the their Reply dated June 23, 2009.
next term?
6. What is the liability, if any, of respondent Atty. Rogelio A. The Special Committee then submitted a Report and
Vinluan under the administrative complaint for grave Recommendation dated July 9, 2009 the dispositive portion of which
professional misconduct, violation of attorneys oath, and acts read as follows:
inimical to the IBP filed against him by Attys. Marcial Magsino,
Manuel Maramba and Nasser Marohomsalic?
A. That to avoid further controversy regarding its proper
interpretation and implementation, Sec. 31, Article V, of the By-
Meanwhile, a Supplemental Complaint dated June 11, 2009 was Laws should be amended as follows (suggested amendments
received from Attys. Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic are in bold print):
regarding the earlier complaint that they filed last May 21, 2009
against Atty. Vinluan.
SEC. 31. Membership. The membership of the House of Delegates
shall consist of all the Chapter Presidents and in the case of
As such, then IBP President Feliciano M. Bautista and then Chapters entitled to mo(r)e than on(e) Delegate each, the Vice
Executive Vice President (EVP) Vinluan agreed to submit their President of the Chapters and such additional Delegates as the
respective position papers on the above issues and controversies. Chapters are entitled to. Unless the Vice President is already (a)
Also, Atty. Vinluan was required to file his answer to the delegate, he shall be an alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates
administrative complaint against him. and their respective alternates shall be elected from, and by, the
Board of Officers of the Chapter. If the Delegate chosen is
A Position Paper dated June 15, 2009 was then received from Atty. incapacitated, or disqualified, or resigns, or refuses to serve, and
Vinluan. Attys. Elpidio G. Soriano, III and Erwin M. Fortunato also there are enough members of the Board to be elected as
filed their Position Papers both dated June 15, 2009. It appears that Delegates, then the Board of Officers shall elect the additional
an earlier Position Paper also dated June 15, 2009 was submitted by delegates and alternates from the general membership of the
Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto. Chapter, and his corresponding alternate shall take his place.

For their part, Attys. Bautista, Maramba and Magsino filed their B. That to avoid any ambiguity as to how the President shall
Position Paper dated June 16, 2009. Incidentally, in a Manifestation preside and vote in meetings of the House of Delegates,
likewise dated June 16, 2009 Attys. Bautista, Maramba and Marcial paragraph (g), Sec. 33, Article V of the By-Laws should be
M. Magsino submitted the same paper but already bearing the amended as follows:
signature of Atty. Bautista.
(g) In all meetings and deliberations of the House, whether in annual
Atty. Nasser A. Marohomsalic submitted his Position Paper dated or special convention, the President shall preside, or the Executive
June 17, 2009. The Special Committee, in the course of its
Vice President, if the President is absent or incapacitated, but neither wait for its turn in the next round, in the same place that it had in the
of them shall vote except to break a tie. round completed.

C. Similarly, Sec. 42, Article VI of the By-Laws, on meetings of the F. That in view of the fact that the IBP no longer elects its
Board of Governors, should be amended to read as follows: President, because the Executive Vice President automatically
succeeds the President at the end of his term, Sec. 47, Article
Sec. 42. Meetings. The Board shall meet regularly once a month, on VII of the By-Laws should be amended by deleting the provision
such date and such time and place as it shall designate. Special for the election of the President. Moreover, for the strict
meetings may be called by the President, and shall be called by him implementation of the rotation rule, the Committee recommends
upon the written request of five (5) members of the Board. The that there should be a sanction for its violation, thus:
President shall not vote except to break a tie in the voting. When for
any reason, the President cannot preside on account of his absence, Sec. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
incapacity, or refusal to call a meeting, the Executive Vice President have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional
shall preside, there being a quorum to transact business, but he may Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a strict
not vote except to break a tie. rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by
the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors shall be ex
D. That Sec. 43, Article VI of the By-Laws, on the procedure for officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be
approving a resolution by the Board of Governors without a a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
meeting, should be amended by adding the following exception
thereto so that the procedure may not be abused in connection The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by
with any election in the IBP: annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from
election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
This provision shall not apply when the Board shall hold an election
or hear and decide an election protest. G. That Atty. Manuel M. Maramba should be declared the duly
elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-
E. That the provision for the strict implementation of the rotation 2011 term.
rule among the Chapters in the Regions for the election of the H. That Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter should be
Governor for the regions, (as ordered by this Honorable Court in declared the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas
Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) should be incorporated in Region for the 2009-2011 term.
Sec. 39, Article VI of the By-Laws, as follows: I. That a special election should be held in the Western Mindanao
Region, within fifteen (15) days from notice, to elect the
Governor of that region for the 2009-2011 term. In accordance
Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one (1)
with the rotation rule, only the six (6) Chapters in the region that
month before the national convention the delegates from each region
have not yet been elected to the Board of Governors, namely:
shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall be chosen by
Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Za(m)boanga del
rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented among
Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-
the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in the
Cotabato City, shall participate in the election.
rotation order, its place shall redound to the next Chapter in the line.
J. That, thereafter, a special election should also be held by the
Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the Governorship at
Board of Governors to elect the Executive Vice President for the
any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to
 2009-2011 term with strict observance of the rotation rule. added a Public Relations Officer (P.R.O.) and Auditor to its Board of
Inasmuch as for the past nine (9) terms, i.e., since the 1991- Officers, the number of delegates allotted to the Chapter was also
1993 term, the nominees of the Western Visayas and Eastern increased to eleven (11) like the membership in its Board of Officers,
Mindanao Regions have not yet been elected Executive Vice pursuant to a reapportionment of delegates by the Board of
President of the IBP, the special election shall choose only Governors under Sec. 30, Art. V of the By-Laws.
between the nominees of these two (2) regions who shall
become the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term, in Up to the 2007-2009 term, all the officers of the QC Chapter were
accordance with the strict rotation rule. also the Chapters delegates to the House of Delegates. Atty. Victoria
K. That the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Loanzon who has been an officer of the Chapter in various
Vinluan and his group of Governors, Abelardo Estrada, capacities since 2003, like her fellow officers in the Board,
Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund automatically became a delegate since 2003 up to this time.
Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of
business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter For the 2009-2011 term, the Board of Officers of the IBP-QC Chapter
disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the that assumed office on April 1, 2009, is composed of six (6) officers
Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which and (5) directors, namely:
should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition
in the future.
President - - - - - - - - - - Tranquil Salvador III

Vice President - - - - - - Jonas Cabochan

II. Findings of the Special Committee
Secretary - - - - - - - - - - Christian Fernandez
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009, the Special
Committee disclosed when it was discussing the Board of Officers of Treasurer - - - - - - - - - - Victoria Loanzon
each chapter that:
Auditor - - - - - - - - - - - Ginger Anne Castillo
The government of a Chapter is vested in its Board of Officers
composed of nine (9) officers, namely: the President, Vice-President, P.R.O. - - - - - - - - - - - - Ernesto Tabujara III
Secretary, Treasurer, and five (5) Directors who shall be elected by
the members of the Chapter at the biennial meeting on the last Director - - - - - - - - - - - Annalou Nachura
Saturday of February, and shall hold office for a term of two (2) years
from the first day of April following their election and until their Director - - - - - - - - - - - Melody Sampaga
successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. For the 2009-
2011 term, the election of Chapter officers was held on February 28,
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Francois Rivera
2009.

Director - - - - - - - - - - - Joseph Cerezo

In 1983 up to 1995, the Quezon City Chapter elected the usual nine
(9) officers to its Board of Officers and they were all delegates to the
House of Delegates. Beginning with the 1997-1999 term, when it Director - - - - - - - - - - - Marita Iris Laqui
It is important to be an officer of ones Chapter and a delegate to the (Clarification Re: Bar Matter No. 491, Atty. Romulo T. Capulong
House of Delegates, because a delegate gets to elect the Governor petitioner). With respect thereto, it was revealed that:
for the Region (which must rotate among the Chapters in the region).
The Governor of the Region becomes a member of the Board of Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the governorship of a region
Governors, and gets to elect, or be elected, as the next IBP shall rotate once in as many terms as the number of chapters there
Executive Vice President who automatically becomes President for are in the region, to give every chapter a chance to represent the
the next succeeding term (which must also rotate among the region in the Board of Governors. Thus, in a region composed of 5
Regions). chapters, each chapter is entitled to the governorship once in every 5
terms, or once every ten (10) years, since a term is two (2) years.
The Special Committee then pointed out that with respect to the IBP
Board of Governors this consists of nine (9) Governors from the nine The record of the National IBP Secretariat shows that during the past
(9) Regions. One (1) Governor for each Region shall be elected by five (5) terms, from 1999 up to 2009, the GMR (Greater Manila
the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The Region) governorship was occupied by the five (5) chapters of the
Governors, the President and the Executive Vice-President shall region as follows:
hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 immediately
following their election, up to June 30 of their second year in office 1999-2001 ----- Jose P. Icaonapo ------------ Manila III
and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
It was further added by the Committee that:
2001-2003 ----- Santos V. Catubay, Jr. ---- QuezonCity
At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates
from each Region shall elect the Governor for their region. The IBP 2003-2005 ----- Rosario Setias-Reyes ------ Manila II
By-Laws provide that starting in 1993-1995, the principle on rotation
shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for Governor in 2005-2007 ----- Alicia A. Risos-Vidal ------ Manila I
the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who
should be Governor to be selected from the different chapters to 2007-2009 ----- Marcial M. Magsino ------- Manila IV
represent the region in the Board of Governors. Hence, the
governorship of the region shall rotate among the chapters in the In the next round, which starts with the 2009-2011 term, the same
region. order of rotation should be followed by the five (5) chapters, i.e.,
Manila III shall begin the round, to be followed by Quezon City for
The Governors-elect shall, by a vote of at least five (5), choose an 2011-2013 term, Manila for the 2013-2015 term, Manila I for the
Executive Vice-President, x x x either from among themselves or 2015-2017 term, and Manila IV for the 2017-2019 term.
from other members of the Integrated Bar. The Executive Vice-
President shall automatically become President for the next In the Western Visayas Region which is composed of ten (10)
succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine (9) chapters, each chapter is entitled to represent the governorship of
Regions. the region once every ten (10) terms. The first chapter to occupy the
governorship, must wait for the nine (9) other chapters to serve their
According to the Committee, the rotation of the position of Governor respective terms, before it may have its turn again as Governor of
of a region among the Chapters was ordered by the Supreme Court the region. The same rule applies to the Western Mindanao Region
in its Resolution dated May 14, 1991 in Bar Matter No. 586 which is composed of twelve (12) chapters.
On April 25, 2009, the election of Governors for the nine (9) IBP Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan) ------ Central Luzon ---- 2007-
regions proceeded as scheduled, presided over by their respective 2009
outgoing Governor.
Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao
It was then cited by the Special Committee that Sec. 47, Art. VII of regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum
the By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had
that the Executive Vice President shall be chosen by the Board of two (2) terms already.
Governors from among the nine (9) regional governors. The
Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the
the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as
nine Regions. Further, the Committee averred that: Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term. The one who is not
chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term.
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by Afterwards, another rotation shall commence with Greater Manila in
the IBP National Secretariat, shows that the governors of the the lead, followed by Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western
following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine (9) Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central Luzon, and either
terms (1991-2009): Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the round.

Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan) --- Central Luzon --- 1991-1993 The Committee then disclosed that the controversies involved herein
and should be resolved are the following: (I) the dispute concerning
Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) ------ Manila ------------ 1993-1995 additional delegates of the QC Chapter to the House of Delegates;
(II) the election of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region
(GMR); (III) the election of Governor for the Western Visayas
Raul R. Angangco (Makati) -------------- Southern Luzon - 1995-1997
Region; (IV) the election of Governor for the Western Mindanao
Region; (V) the resolution of the election protests; (VI) the election of
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) ----------- Eastern Visayas 1997-1999 the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term; and, (VII)
the administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio Vinluan.
Arthur D. Lim (Zambasulta) ------------- Western Mindanao-1999-2001
In addressing the above controversies, the Committee arrived at the
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga-Apayao)-Northern Luzon 2001-2003 following findings and conclusions:

Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) Bicolandia -------- 2003-2005 1. The silence of Sec. 31, Art. V of the IBP By-Laws on who may be
elected as additional delegates and alternates by the remaining
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) Bicolandia ----2005-Aug members of the Board of Officers of the Chapter when the
2006 Chapter is entitled to more than two (2) delegates to the House
of Delegates, is the root cause of the conflicting resolutions of
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay) ---------- Bicolandia --- Aug. 2006- the Bautista and Vinluan factions on the proper interpretation of
2007 the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws.
According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 dated April 17, 2009 of Officer, GMR Governor Marcial Magsino, during the election on
the Bautista Group, the additional delegate/s shall be elected by the April 25, 2009 of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region, in
Board of Officers of the Chapter only from among the remaining duly accordance with the guideline in Resolution No. XVIII-2009.
elected officers and members of the Board, in consideration of their
mandate from the general membership. The argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador, that
Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not
According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken.
of the Vinluan Group, the election of the additional delegate/s for the
Chapters entitled to more than two (2) delegates shall be elected by Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws provides that:
the Board of Officers of the Chapter from among the general
membership who are in good standing to include the remaining duly Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be elected
elected officers and members of the Board. by the Board of Officers of the Chapter.

The Committee finds the qualification introduced by Resolution No. The QC Chapter is not a proper case for the election of additional
XVIII-2009 that the additional delegate/s and alternates must be delegates by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to
elected from among the remaining officers of the Chapter to be the same number of delegates (11) to the House, as the number of
consistent with the precedent set by Section 31 itself in appointing officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the
members of the Board of Officers, namely, (a) the president of the Chapters delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of
Chapter as the delegate, and the vice president as the alternate, or Officers to conduct an election.
second, delegate to the House of Delegates, when the Chapter is
entitled to two (2) delegates. There is a manifest intention in Sec. 31,
Art. V of the By-Laws to reserve membership in the House of A proper case for the election of additional delegates and alternates
Delegates (which is the deliberative body of the IBP) for the elected by the Board of Officers occurs when the number of additional
officers of the Chapter since they have already received the mandate delegates and alternates for the Chapter is less than the members of
of the general membership of the Chapter. the Board of Officers, for, then, the Board of Officers must select,
and elect, who among themselves should be the additional
delegate/s and alternates of the Chapter to the House of Delegates.
For the past four (4) terms (2003-2011), Atty. Loanzon has been an That has never been the case of the QC Chapter.
officer and delegate of the QC Chapter to the House of Delegates,
until the Vinluan Group introduced its own interpretation of the
aforementioned provision of the By-Laws and elected non-officers of 3. Atty. Manuel Maramba (Manila III Chapter) was validly elected
the Chapter as delegates to the House of Delegates in lieu of herself as GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term, not only because he
and Atty. Laqui. outvoted his rival, Atty. Elpidio Soriano (Quezon City Chapter),
but also because under the principle of rotation of the
governorship (Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) since the five
We find the Vinluan Groups interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the (5) chapters of the Greater Manila Region have all represented
By-Laws in Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special 23 April 2009) to be the region in the Board of Governors during the past five (5)
in error and devoid of rational and historical bases. terms, in the following order:

2. Attys. Victoria Loanzon and Marite Laqui were properly 1999-2001 -------- Manila III -------- Jose P. Icaonapo
recognized as delegates of the QC Chapter by the Presiding
2001-2003 -------- Quezon City ----- Santos V. Catubay, Jr. The contention of the protestants, Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Antique
Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega (Negros Occidental Chapter) that the
2003-2005 -------- Manila II ---------- Rosario Setias-Reyes rotation rule in Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws is not
mandatory but only directory, betrays their ignorance of the
resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16,
2005-2007 -------- Manila I ----------- Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
1991, ruling that the principle on rotation shall be strictly
implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall
2007-2009 -------- Manila IV --------- Marcial M. Magsino be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the
governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the
it is now the turn of the representative of the Manila III Chapter to sit region in the Board of Governors.
again in the Board of Governors for the next round which begins in
the 2009-2011 term. The Manila III representative, Atty. Manuel M. 5. Neither Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic nor Atty. Benjamin Lanto is
Maramba, has every right to the position not only because he won qualified to be elected Governor of Western Mindanao Region.
the election with 13 votes in his favor against 12 for Atty. Soriano, Sec. 39, Art. VI of the IBP By-Laws provides that: Starting in
but also because his election follows the rotation rule decreed by the 1993-1995, the principle of rotation in the position of governor
Supreme Court. among the different chapters to represent the region in the Board
of Governors shall be strictly implemented.
On the other hand, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the
special election that was presided over by EVP Vinluan on May 4, Under Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, the Governor of a region shall
2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special region only. Since the delegate of a Chapter to the House of
election conducted by the Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(00)8 was Delegates is the President of the Chapter, not the Board of Officers,
illegal because it was not called nor presided over by the regional the nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee of the Board
Governor. Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for GMR of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region.
Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his election as such would
violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires to be
However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter
strictly implemented. Under the rotation rule, the GMR governorship
that should represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of
for the 2009-2011 term belongs to the Manila III Chapter, not to the
Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record of the IBP National
QC Chapter, whose turn will come two (2) years later, in 2011-2013
Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict
yet.
implementation of the rotation rule began, the 12-chapter Western
Mindanao Region has been represented in the Board of Governors
4. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was duly elected by only six (6) Chapters, as follows:
as Governor for the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011
term, not only because he obtained the highest number of votes
1993-1995 ----- Lanao del Sur ------ Dimnatang T. Saro
among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also
because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon
Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP 1995-1997 ----- Cotabato ------------ George C. Jabido
Board of Governors.
1997-1999 ----- ZAMBASULTA -- Arthur D. Lim
1999-2001 ----- ZAMBASULTA -- Paulino R. Ersando and presided over by EVP Vinluan in the Board Room of the IBP
National Office, while the other election for the same position was
2001-2003 ----- North Cotabato --- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa presided over by outgoing IBP Pres. Bautista in another room of the
same building, at the same time, 9:00 A.M., on the same date, May
9, 2009.
2003-2005 ----- Sultan Kudarat ---- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

Those present at the meeting of the Vinluan Group were:

2005-2007 ----- SOCSARGEN ----- Rogelio C. Garcia

1. Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano

2007-2009 ----- Sultan Kudarat ---- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
2. Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto
3. Atty. Amador Tolentino, Jr., Governor-elect for Southern Luzon
Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation, the Lanao del Sur Chapter 4. Atty. Jose V. Cabrera, Governor-elect for Bicolandia
must wait for the six (6) other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga 5. Atty. Erwin Fortunato, Governor-elect for Western Visayas
Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Lanao del 6. Atty. Roland B. Inting, Governor-elect for Eastern Visayas
Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have
their turn in the Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again
Since both Attys. Soriano and Lanto were not validly elected as
represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors.
Governors respectively of the Greater Manila Region and the
Western Mindanao Region, they were disqualified to sit in the
Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and B(e)njamin Lanto belong incoming Board of Governors and participate in the election of the
to the Lanao del Sur Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be succeeding Executive Vice President. The remaining four (4)
elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao Region for the 2009- Governors-elect Governors Tolentino, Cabrera, Fortunato, and
2011 term. With respect to Atty. Benjamin Lanto, his nomination by Inting, did not constitute a quorum of the Board of Governors to
the Board of Officers was not only invalid, but also lost credibility conduct a valid election of the IBP Executive Vice President. The
after three (3), out of the thirteen (13) signatories to his nomination, election of Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano as Executive Vice President by
resigned from the Board of Officers, and six (6) others signed the Vinluan Group was invalid. Aside from lack of a quorum to
authorizations in favor of Atty. Macalawi authorizing him to nominate conduct the elections, EVP Vinluan wrongly presided over the
and elect the Governor for the Western Mindanao Region. That left election. Thus, Atty. Soriano was not duly elected as Governor of the
only four (4) votes in favor of his nomination for Governor of the Greater Manila Region, hence, he is disqualified to sit in the Board of
Western Mindanao Region. Governors.

6. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President separately Neither did the meeting of the Bautista Group fare any better, for
held on May 9, 2009 by the Bautista and Vinluan Groups were those present were:
null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5)
Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9-
1. Atty. Milagros Fernan-Cayosa, Governor-elect for Northern
member Board of Governors-elect who shall elect the Executive
Luzon
Vice President.
2. Atty. Ferdinand Y. Miclat, Governor-elect for Central Luzon
3. Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, Governor-elect for Greater Manila
As previously stated, there were two (2) simultaneous elections for 4. Atty. Roan Libarios, Governor-elect for Eastern Mindanao
the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term one was called 5. Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic
Atty. Marohomsalics election as Governor for Western Mindanao The Board may take action, without a meeting, by resolution signed
was invalid for violating the rotation rule. The four (4) remaining by at least five Governors provided that every member of the Board
governors-elect (Attys. Cayosa, Miclat, Maramba and Libarios) like shall have been previously apprised of the contents of the resolution.
those in the Vinluan Group, did not constitute a quorum to conduct
the election of the IBP Executive Vice President for the current term. But the Vinluan Group ignored that procedure. They held a special
The election of Governor Roan Libarios as Executive Vice President meeting on April 23, 2009, where they adopted Resolution No. XVIII-
by this group was therefore null and void. 2009 (Special-23 April 2009) striking out as ultra vires the earlier
Resolution No. XVIII-2009 passed in the regular monthly meeting of
Besides that flaw in his election, since the Eastern Visayas Region, the Board of Governors on April 17, 2009. That meeting was illegal,
represented by Governor Jose Aguila Grapilon of Biliran, had hence, the resolution adopted therein was null and void.
succeeded to the presidency in 1997-1999, its next turn will come
after the eight (8) other regions shall have also served in the 2. The second special meeting held by the Vinluan Group on
presidency. That will be after sixteen years, or, in 2015-2017 yet. April 30, 2009 wherein they approved Resolution XVIII-2009
(Special-A-30 April 2009) resolving the election protests in
7. The administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio A. Vinluan the GMR, Western Visayas and Western Mindanao
and his Group of Governors (Abelardo Estrada of Northern governors elections, with complete disregard for the
Luzon, Bonifacio Barandon of Bicolandia, Evergisto Escalon of protestees right to due process, was likewise illegal, hence,
Eastern Visayas, and Raymund Mercado of Western Visayas) is the Groups resolution of the election protests was likewise
meritorious, for their conduct was fractious and high-handed, null and void, and the new election of the GMR Governor
causing disunity and acrimonious disagreements in the IBP. which they set on May 4, 2009 was invalid.
3. The Board Resolution which was adopted and faxed to the
1. The request of the EVP Vinluans Group for a special Governors-elect on May 8, 2009, by the Vinluan Group,
meeting of the Board of Governors on April 23, 2009 two (2) setting the election of the IBP Executive Vice President on
days before the scheduled election of the regional May 9, 2009, at 9:00 A.M.; declaring Pres. Bautista unfit to
Governors on April 25, 2009 when IBP Pres. Bautista was in preside over the election and designating EVP Vinluan to
Zamboanga on IBP business, and the other Governors had preside over the election in lieu of Pres. Bautista, was
just returned to their respective regions to prepare for the uncalled and unwarranted, and caused disunity and disorder
April 25 election of the regional governors, was in the IBP. It was in effect a coup to unseat Pres. Bautista
unreasonable. before the end of his term, and prematurely install EVP
Vinluan as president.
The special meeting on April 23, 2009 which he himself presided
over violated Sec. 42, Art. VI of the By-Laws which provides that it is The actuations of Atty. Vinluans Group in defying the lawful authority
the President who shall call a special meeting and it is also the of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluans overweening desire
President who shall preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan (Sec. to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next
50, Art. VII, By-Laws). presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly
condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar
The proper recourse for the Vinluan Group, in view of President Integration Rule.
Bautistas refusal to call a special meeting as requested by them, is
found in Section 43, Art. VI of the By-Laws which provides that-
Again, it must be noted that while the pending administrative case 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23
against Atty. Vinluan and his co-respondents has not yet been April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases.
resolved, Atty. Vinluan was not allowed to assume his position as It was then pointed out that (t)he argument of the QC-Chapter
President of the IBP for 2009-2011. Instead, the Supreme Court President Tranquil Salvador, (as well as by Atty. Soriano), that Attys.
designated retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Santiago Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not
Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP. elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken. Likewise, the
Committee considered the situation then involving the Quezon City
III. Rulings of the Court Chapter as not a proper case for the election of additional delegates
by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same
number of delegates (11) to the House (of Delegates), as the
The Court completely agrees with the recommendations of the
number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto
Special Committee with respect to, among others, the following:
the Chapters delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board
of Officers to conduct an election.
1. Declaring Atty. Manuel M. Maramba (Manila III Chapter) as the
duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region for the
Thus, and as rightly determined by the Committee to which the Court
2009-2011 term; and,
subscribes to, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the
2. Declaring Atty. Erwin M. Fortunato (Romblon Chapter) as the
special election that was presided over by EVP Vinluan on May 4,
duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the
2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano
2009-2011 term.
already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special
election conducted by the Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(009) was
As far as the Court is concerned, there is no dispute that the election illegal because it was not called nor presided by the regional
of Atty. Maramba was in order. During the election held last April 25, Governor (Atty. Magsino). Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run
2009 which was duly presided over by then outgoing Greater Manila for GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his election as
Region Governor Marcial Magsino, it was Atty. Maramba who such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court
garnered the highest number of votes among the delegates requires to be strictly implemented. This being so, since he was not a
compared to Atty. Soriano, 13 votes to 12 votes. However, instead of duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region, then Atty.
accepting the said defeat graciously, Atty. Soriano then filed an Soriano cannot be voted as well as IBP Executive Vice President for
election protest on April 27, 2009 claiming that the said election was 2009-2011.
void because there were non-delegates, particularly Attys. Loanzon
and Laqui of the Quezon City Chapter, who were allowed to vote.
With respect to the case of Atty. Fortunato, his election as Governor
Consequently, Atty. Soriano got a favorable ruling from the group of
for the Western Visayas Region was upheld since he obtained the
Atty. Vinluan, as EVP, and former Governors Estrada (Northern
highest number of votes among the three (3) candidates for the
Luzon), Barandon, Jr. (Bicolandia), Escalon (Eastern Visayas) and
position and also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of
Mercado (Western Visayas) per Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special
the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in
A-30 April 2009). This then resulted in the anomalous election of
the IBP Board of Governors. On account thereof, the Court is
Atty. Soriano as Governor of the Greater Manila Region last May 4,
convinced that the contentions of protestees Attys. Cornelio Aldon
2009.
(Antique Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega (Negros Occidental
Chapter) cannot prosper. After all, the Court already upheld per its
In addressing the said controversy, and as already discussed, the Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991 that the
Committee concluded that the Vinluan Groups interpretation of Sec. rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws shall be
strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the Macalawi, to select and vote for the Regional Governor for Western
region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who Mindanao. Thus, (t)he withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the
should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to Resolution No. 002, left only four (4) votes in support of Lantos
represent the region in the Board of Governors. More so, when the nomination a puny minority of the 14-member Board of Officers of
concerned chapter invoked its right thereto as in the case of Atty. the Lanao del Sur Chapter.
Fortunato who came from the Romblon Chapter which was next in
the rotation. The attempt of Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors to nullify the
election of Atty. Marohomsalic through Resolution No. XVIII-2009
To the Court, the election of Atty. Fortunato as Governor last April (Special A-30 April 2009) was clearly irregular and unjustified. Based
25, 2009 is well-settled. He did not only come from the chapter which on the April 25, 2009 election results, Atty. Marohomsalic won over
is entitled to be elected for the said position, but also got the highest his rival Atty. Lanto, 6 votes to 5 votes. Consequently, he was duly
number of votes among the candidates that included protestees proclaimed as the elected Governor of the Western Mindanao
Attys. Aldon and Ortega. As the election was presided over by then Region. On April 27, 2009, Atty. Lanto filed an election protest,
outgoing Governor Raymund Mercado, the Court finds no cogent questioning the validity of Atty. Marohomsalics nomination by Atty.
reason as well to reverse the findings of the Committee insofar as Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter, and claiming
upholding the election of Atty. Fortunato is concerned. Suffice it to that his (Lantos) nomination by the Board of Officers of the Lanao del
say, the Committee was correct in not finding any anomaly with Sur Chapter was the valid nomination.
respect thereto.
Immediately, on April 30, 2009, the group of Atty. Vinluan issued
On the nullification of the election of Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic as Resolution No. XVIII-2009 proclaiming Atty. Lanto as the duly
Governor for the Western Mindanao Region, the Court does not elected Governor without affording Atty. Marohomsalic his right to
agree with the recommendation of the Committee to hold a special due process. More importantly, instead of calling for another election
election in the said region. Instead, the Court rules to uphold the like what it did for the Greater Manila Region, the group of Atty.
election of Atty. Marohomsalic last April 25, 2009 which was Vinluan proceeded to instantly declare Atty. Lanto as having been
presided over by then outgoing Governor Carlos Valdez, Jr. duly elected on the ground that the nomination of the protestee,
Nasser Marohomsalic, was contrary to the will of the Lanao del Sur
It must be pointed out that Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated Chapter expressed through Board Resolution No. 00(2)-2009 of the
by Atty. Alex Macalawi, President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and Board of Officers (of the Lanao del Sur Chapter).
the official delegate of the said chapter to the House of Delegates for
the Western Mindanao Region during the elections held last April 25, As borne out by the records, Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated
2009. On the other hand, Atty. Benjamin Lanto was supposedly by Atty. Alex Macalawi, President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and
nominated by the Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, the official delegate of the said chapter to the House of Delegates for
except Atty. Macalawi, in Resolution No. 002-2009 dated February the Western Mindanao Region during the elections. On the other
28, 2009. However, it appears that, as discovered by the Committee, hand, Atty. Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of
three (3) signatories of the resolution apparently resigned as Officers of the same Chapter in a resolution dated February 28,
members of the Board of Officers since they are prosecutors who are 2009, which was not signed and approved by Atty. Macalawi.
ineligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated However, and as already pointed out by the Committee, the
Bar or any Chapter thereof, while (s)ix (6) other signatories of the withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution No. 002, left
resolution allegedly recalled their signatures and they, instead, only four (4) votes in support of Lantos nomination a puny minority of
signed an authorization authorizing the Chapter President, Atty. the 14-member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter.
Thus, the Committee, citing Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, clearly 2005-2007---SOCSARGEN-----Rogelio C. Garcia
repudiated and overturned Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A- 30
April 2009) of Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors. In its Report, 2007-2009---Sultan Kudarat-----Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
it declared that the nominee of the Chapter President, not the
nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation rule, the Lanao del Sur
of the Region, thereby sustaining the position of Atty. Marohomsalic Chapter must wait for the six (6) other Chapters in the region
and, in effect, the validity of his nomination by Atty. Macalawi. (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato
Despite the said findings, Atty. Marohomsalic was stripped of his City) to have their turn in the Board of Governors before Lanao del
electoral mandate and victory when the Committee, invoking the Sur may again represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board
strict application of the rotation rule, proceeded to altogether nullify of Governors.
the result of the elections duly conducted on April 25, 2009.
According to the Committee, neither Lanto nor Marohomsalic is Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and Benjamin Lanto belong
qualified to be elected governor because it was not the turn of Lanao to the Lanao del Sur Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be
del Sur chapter to represent the Western Mindanao Region in the elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao Region for the 2009-
Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. As declared in the 2011 term.
Report --
The ruling of the Committee insofar as it nullified the election of Atty.
However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter Marohomsalic as Governor of the Western Mindanao Region cannot
that should represent the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of be sustained for not being in full accord with facts and the rules.
Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record of the IBP National While the Committee may have correctly pointed out that under the
Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict rotation rule it was not yet the turn of IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter to
implementation of the rotation rule began, the 12 chapter Western represent the region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011
Mindanao Region has been represented in the Board of Governors term, it does not necessarily follow that the result of the elections
only six (6) Chapters, as follows: should be altogether nullified on that ground. Evidently, and as
determined by the Committee itself, there are instances when the
1993-1995---Lanao del Sur-----Dimnatang T. Saro rotation rule was not followed insofar as the elections in 1999 and
2007 were concerned with respect to the Western Mindanao Region.
1995-1997---Cotatabato---------George C. Jabido
In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the
1997-1999---ZAMBASULTAArthur D. Lim voting delegates of IBP Western Mindanao Region voted into office
Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as Governor for the
1999-2001---ZAMBASULTA---Paulino R. Ersando 2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty.
Benjamin Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur
Chapter. A third candidate, Atty. Escobar from the Sarangani
2001-2003---North Cotabato---- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa
Chapter, was nominated but he declined the nomination.
2003-2005---Sultan Kudarat-----Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region,
including Sarangani, are entitled to precedence over the Lanao del
Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains that not one of The rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the
them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their
during the April 25, 2009 election. Neither did any one of them own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for
challenge the nominations of the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest
the order of rotation. number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate
deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as
By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the established by evidence. Such is not the case here.
nomination raised in favor of its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar),
the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the Suffice it to say, the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with,
rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as
They too are deemed to have waived their turn in the rotation as they expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic cannot be
opted not to field or nominate a candidate from among their divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The
respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to order of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its
challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. On the relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.
contrary, they fully expressed their concurrence to the cited
nominations, which may be interpreted as a waiver of their right to If only to stress, compared to the case of Atty. Fortunato whose
take their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for Romblon Chapter invoked the rotation rule, no chapter in the
the 2009-2011 term. Western Mindanao Region which was next in the rotation invoked
the said rule.
It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there
were instances when the Governor of the Western Mindanao Region Now, in its Report, the Committee nullified the elections for the IBP
came from the same chapter such as ZAMBASULTA (1997-1999 & EVP separately and simultaneously conducted by President Bautista
1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus, and EVP Vinluan on May 9, 2009 and called for a special election for
Atty. Marohomsalic could not be faulted if the other chapters opted the same. In the case of the election conducted by EVP Vinluan, the
not to field or nominate their own candidates. Having been validly results were nullified for lack of authority to preside over the election
nominated and duly proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of and for lack quorum, citing the disqualification of Attys. Soriano and
Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to Lanto to sit in the incoming Board of Governors. The finding
assume his position during the remainder of the term. deserves to be sustained.

It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of In the same Report, the Committee also nullified the result of the
rotation fielded its own candidate or invoked the rotation rule to election for the incoming EVP conducted by President Bautista.
challenge Atty. Marohomsalics nomination. But the record is bereft of While recognizing President Bautistas authority to conduct the
any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was election, the Committee nonetheless nullified the election results for
challenged on that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely lack of quorum, citing the ineligibility of Atty. Marohomsalic to sit in
referred to his nomination by Atty. Macalawi which the Committee the incoming Board of Governors, thereby leaving only four (out of
itself has found to be in order. Thus, no compelling reason exists to nine) Governors-elect in attendance which did not constitute a
disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting quorum.
delegates as expressed through the ballot.
With the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as Governor of Western Raul R. Anchangco (Makati)Southern Luzon1995-1997
Mindanao being deemed valid, then the defect of lack of quorum that
supposedly tainted the election proceedings for EVP separately Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) Eastewrn Visayas 1997-1999
conducted by IBP President Bautista may have been cured, five (5)
Governors being sufficient to constitute a quorum. Arthur D. Lim ( Zambasulta)Western Mindanao1999-2001

Be that as it may, the recommendation of the Committee to hold a Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga Apayao)Northern Luzon2001-2003
special election for the EVP for the remaining 2009-2011 term
deserves to be upheld to heal the divisions in the IBP and promote
unity by enabling all the nine (9) Governors-elect to elect the EVP in Jose Anselmo L. Cadiz (Camarines Sur)Bicolandia2005-Aug. 2006
a unified meeting called for that purpose. This will enable matters to
start on a clean and correct slate, free from the politicking and the Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay)Bicolandia Aug. 2006-2007
under handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so
long. Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan)Central Luzon2007-2009

In the conduct of the unified election of the incoming EVP, the Only the Governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao
following findings and recommendations of the Committee shall be regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum
adopted: next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had
two (2) terms already. Therefore, either the governor of the Western
Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region
should be elected as Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011
THE ROTATION OF THE PRESIDENCY AMONG THE REGIONS- term.

Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. Accordingly, a special election shall be held by the present nine-man
6, 1989, provides that the Executive Vice President shall be chosen IBP Board of Governors to elect the EVP for the remainder of the
by the Board of Governors from among the nine (9) regional term of 2009-2011, which shall be presided over and conducted by
governors. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become IBP Officer-in-Charge Justice Santiago Kapunan (Ret.) within seven
President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate (7) days from notice.
among the nine Regions.
Further, in its report, the Committee declared that the high-handed
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of
the IBP National Secretariat, shows that the governors of the Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon Jr., Evergisto
following regions were President of the IBP during the past nine (9) Escalon, and Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and
terms (1991-2009): orderly flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National
Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost
disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan)Central Luzon1991-1993 misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage
its repetition in the future.
Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) Greater Manila 1993-1995
The Committee, however, fell short of determining and the-bud such gross misconduct and unprofessionalism. They all
recommending the appropriate penalty for the grave professional deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well the trust
misconduct found to have been committed by Atty. Vinluan and his bestowed on them for the high positions that they previously held.
group of Governors. Still, with the above firm and unequivocal
findings and declarations of the Committee against Atty. Vinluan and The Resolution of the Court in the case of Re: 1989 Elections of the
his group that included Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Integrated Bar of the Philippines already declared that unethical
Mercado as unprofessional members of the IBP Board of Governors practices of lawyers during IBP elections cannot but result in the
(2007-2009 term) they certainly do not deserve to hold such stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble
esteemed positions. and honored profession being diminished. As held therein, (r)espect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are
It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
the Code of Professional Responsibility that (a) lawyer shall not cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Added observance. Indeed, the said strong and vigorous declaration of this
to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that (a) lawyer shall not engage Court on the 1989 IBP Election scandal is relevant here.
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of their
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In the case at bar, positions in the IBP, this can no longer be done as their terms as
such canons find application. Governors already expired, specially on the part of Attys. Estrada,
Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado. However, in the case of Atty.
In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court agrees, that Vinluan, as former EVP of the IBP he would have automatically
(t)he actuations of Atty. Vinluans Group in defying the lawful succeeded to the presidency for the term 2009-2011 but now should
authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluans not be allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of the
overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Committee, he has clearly manifested his unworthiness to hold the
Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, said post. On account thereof, Atty. Vinluan is thus declared unfit to
which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By- assume the position of IBP President. To the Court, if Atty. Vinluan
Laws and the Bar Integration Rule. Indeed, said actuations of Atty. cannot be fit to become a Governor and EVP of the IBP then he is
Vinluan and his group of former IBP Governors Estrada, Barandon, not entitled to succeed as its President for the 2009-2011 term.
Jr., Escalon and Mercado were grossly inimical to the interest of the
IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as lawyers. After all, what Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed to run
they did served only to benefit the apparently selfish goals of as national officers to prevent such similar irregularity from
defeated candidate Atty. Elpidio Soriano to be elected as IBP EVP happening again. Thus, in subsequent elections of the IBP, they are
and be the next IBP President for the 2011-2013 term by hook or by disqualified to run as candidates.
crook.
On the recommendation of the Committee to amend Sections 31, 33,
Bearing the above in mind, what Attys. Vinluan, Estrada, Barandon, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the
Jr., Escalon and Mercado conspired to do was truly high-handed and IBP By-Laws, the Court finds the same in order. As such, and in
divisive that must not pass unsanctioned. Otherwise, future leaders order to immediately effect reforms in the IBP, particularly in the
of the IBP, Governors at that, might be similarly inclined to do what holding of its elections for national officers, the subject amendments
they did, much to the prejudice of the IBP and its membership. are hereby adopted and approved.
Surely, this should be addressed without much delay so as to nip-in-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:

1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato

and Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater
Manila Region, Western Visayas Region and Western
Mindanao Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are
UPHELD;
2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for
the 2009-2011 term is hereby ORDERED to be held under the
supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of
this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and
Marohomsalic being allowed to represent and vote as duly-
elected Governors of their respective regions;
3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon,
Jr., Evergisto Escalon and Raymund Mercado are all found
GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their
actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections
in the IBP last April 25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby
disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any
subsequent election. While their elections as Governors for the
term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled as this has already
expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of
IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and
therefore barred from succeeding as IBP President for the
2009-2011 term;
4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42,
and 43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws
as contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Special
Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby approved and
adopted; and
5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as
Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall continue, unless earlier
revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.

SO ORDERED.
 MENDOZA, J.:

Subjects of this disposition are the: (1) Resolution Urgently

Requesting the Supreme Court to Issue Clarification on the Query of
Western Visayas IBP Governor Erwin M. Fortunato Involving the
Application of the Rotational Rule in the Forthcoming Elections in his
Region1Ï‚rνll (IBP Resolution), filed by the IBP Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG); and the (2) Urgent Motion for Clarification with Prayer for
Leave of Court to Admit Motion and to Intervene and for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order 2Ï‚rνll (Urgent Motion)
filed by Atty. Marven B. Daquilanea (Atty. Daquilanea), immediate
past president of the IBP-Iloilo Chapter.

The Court shall likewise act upon the Petition-in-

InterventionÏ‚rνll filed by the IBP-Southern Luzon Region, regarding
its qualification to field a candidate for the position of Executive Vice-
President for the 2011-2013 term.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Brief Statement of the Antecedents
Manila
On December 14, 2010, the Court resolved the various controversies
EN BANC persistently pestering the various IBP chapter elections in a
resolution, Ï‚rνll the dispositive portion of which reads:
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC: December 4, 2012
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:
IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato
and Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila
A.C. No. 8292 Region, Western Visayas Region and Western Mindanao Region,
respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUELM.MARAMBAAND
NASSER MAROHOMSALIC, Complainants, vs. ATTYS. ROGELIO 2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the
A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C.ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T. 2009-2011 term is hereby ORDERED to be held under the
BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON AND supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of this
RAYMUNDJORGEA.MERCADO, Respondents. Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being
allowed to represent and vote as duly-elected Governors of their
respective regions;
RESOLUTION
3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., As the IBP-BOG was unable to reach a unanimous resolution on the
Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of matter, it issued the subject IBP-Resolution, urgently requesting the
grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in Court to issue a clarification on the query of IBP-Western Visayas
connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April Region Gov. Fortunato involving the application of the rotational rule
25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as for the next regional election.
national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. While their
elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be On April 29, 2011, Atty. Daquilanea, the immediate past president of
annulled as this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to the IBP-Iloilo Chapter, filed the subject Urgent Motion likewise
hold the position of IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009 seeking clarification on the application of the rotational rule for the
term and, therefore, barred from succeeding as IBP President for the election of Governor for IBP-Western Visayas Region for the 2011-
2009-2011 term; 2013 term, specifically, whether the IBP-Capiz Chapter would be the
only chapter to be allowed to nominate candidates for said election.
4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42,
and 43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as On May 3, 2011, upon filing of the subject Urgent Motion and the
contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Special IBP-Resolution, then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona issued a
Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby approved and adopted; Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) suspending the election for
and Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region and directing retired
Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (Justice Kapunan), Officer-in-Charge
5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as of the IBP and Gov. Fortunato of the IBP-Western Visayas Region to
Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall continue, unless earlier revoked by file their respective comments thereon.
the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.
On May 31, 2011, the TRO was confirmed nunc pro tunc by the
SO ORDERED. Court En Banc.

In the December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court once again upheld On May 17, 2011, the majority of the presidents of the various
its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586, dated May 16, 1991, that the chapters composing the IBP-Western Visayas Region filed their
"rotation rule" under Sections 37 and 39Ï‚rνll of the IBP By-Laws Respectful Comment-in-Intervention, praying for the lifting of the
should be strictly implemented, "so that all prior elections for TRO without prejudice to the resolution on the Urgent Motion.
governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in
determining who should be the governor to be selected from the In its Comment, ½ll dated June 2, 2011, the IBP-BOG, through
different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors." Justice Kapunan, presented the view that with the completion of a
A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied by the Court rotational cycle with the election of Gov. Fortunato representing
in its Resolution, dated February 8, 2011. Romblon, "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie of the
governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the
On April 15, 2011, Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Gov. Fortunato) of IBP- chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained
Western Visayas Region wrote a letterÏ‚rνll to the IBP-BOG seeking sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have
confirmation/clarification on whether "Capiz is the only Chapter in the its turn in the rotation."
IBP-Western Visayas Region eligible and qualified to run for
Governor in the forthcoming election for Governor."
Like the IBP, Atty. Daquilanea espoused the view that upon the Thus, under the rotation by pre-ordained sequence, only members of
completion of a rotational cycle, elections should be open to all the IBP-Capiz Chapter may vie for Governor of the IBP-Western
chapters of the region subject to the exclusionary rule. Visayas Region. Under the rotation by exclusion, every chapter in
IBP-Western Visayas Region may compete again.
On June 23, 2011, the IBP-Capiz Chapter filed its Comment-in-
Intervention with Motion for Early Resolution, ½ll praying for a Resolution of the Court
declaration that it was its turn to serve as Governor for IBP-Western
Visayas Region and moving for the early resolution of the Re: IBP-Western Visayas Region
controversy.
After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments
Issues for the Courts Consideration raised by the parties involved, the Court finds wisdom in the position
of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, that
A reading of both the IBP-BOG Resolution and the Urgent Motion at the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed
discloses that the respective movants are praying that the Court qualified to vie of the governorship for the 2011-2013 term without
determine whether at the start of a new rotational cycle, nominations prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-
for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region are: a] once again ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter
open to all chapters subject to the rule on "rotation by exclusion"; or will have its turn in the rotation." Stated differently, the IBP-BOG
b] limited only to the chapter first in the previous rotation cycle, recommends the adoption of the rotation by exclusion scheme. The
following the previous sequence or "rotation by pre-ordained Court quotes with approval the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on
sequence." this score:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The issue, therefore, in the IBP-Western Visayas Region is whether, 6. After due deliberation, the Board of Governors agreed and
after the first cycle, the rotation rule will be the rotation by pre- resolved to recommend adherence to the principle of "rotation by
ordained sequence or rotation by exclusion. The rotation by pre- exclusion" based on the following reasons:
ordained sequence is effected by the observance of the sequence of
the service of the chapters in the first cycle, which is very a. Election through rotation by exclusion is the more established
predictable. The rotation by exclusion is effected by the exclusion of rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the
a chapter who had previously served until all chapters have taken chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded
their turns to serve. It is not predictable as each chapter will have the in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation
chance to vie for the right to serve, but will have no right to a re- cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle
election as it is debarred from serving again until the full cycle is commences, all the chapters in the region are once again
completed. entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by
exclusion.
As can be gleaned from the records and all pleadings, there is no b. Election through a rotation by exclusion allows for a more
dispute that the IBP-Western Visayas already completed a full cycle democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of
with the election of Gov. Fortunato of Romblon for the 2009-2011 choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which
term. The first governor was Eugene Tan of the IBP Capiz Chapter assures the every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation
and, later, all chapters were able to serve as governors. cycle.
 c. On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or Re: Query by IBP-Southern Luzon
election based on the same order as the previous cycle, tends
to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice On July 27, 2012, the IBP-Southern Luzon Region filed its Petition
which is crucial to a democratic process is virtually removed. for Intervention, Ï‚rνll seeking a declaration that it was qualified to
Only one chapter could vie for election at every turn as the nominate a candidate for the position of Executive Vice-President for
entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the 2011-2013 term. It argued that since the Court removed its
the order in the previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation member, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, as IBP Executive Vice-President for
by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which is the 2007-2009 term, it should not now be prejudiced and disallowed
the bedrock of any democratic election process. to vie for the position of Executive Vice-President of the IBP for the
d. The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the 2011-2013 term. To do so would be a violation of the rotational
Supreme Court may have adopted in AM No. 09-5-2-SC, system and the principle of equal rotation among the different
involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous regions to lead the IBP.
election for GMR may not be controlling, not being one of the
principal issues raised in the GMR elections. On September 21, 2012, Gov. Fortunato filed an Ex Abundanti Ad
Cautelam Vigorous Opposition/Comment, ½l opposing the position
7. Thus, applying the principle of rotation by exclusion in Western of the IBP-Southern Luzon on the ground that:
Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the
exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the 1) in its December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court found that it was
Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters only the IBP-Western Visayas chapter and the IBP-Eastern
entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the Mindanao chapter that had yet to have their turns as Executive Vice-
new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the President. Since IBP-Eastern Mindanao, through now IBP President
rotation. Roan I. Libarios, was elected as the Executive Vice-President, it is
only IBP-Western Visayas which is the only region qualified to file a
The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by candidate for the 2011-2013 term;
succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the
elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve as 2) Section 2, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court allows for intervention
Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of only before the rendition of judgment; and
course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While
predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one
chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court 3) Atty. Vinluan was actually able to serve his 2007-2009 term as
"the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in Executive Vice President even if he was later on disqualified by the
derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed Court in December 14, 2010 Resolution. To allow IBP-Southern
through the ballot." Luzon to vie for the position of Executive Vice President of the IBP
for the 2011-2013 term would allow said chapter to serve twice as
Executive Vice President since Atty. Raul R.
Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the
chapters shall have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of
Governor for the next cycle except Romblon, so as no chapter shall Angangco of IBP Southern Luzon had already served as Executive
serve consecutively. Every winner shall then be excluded after its Vice President for the 1995-1997 term.
term. Romblon then joins the succeeding elections after the first
winner in the cycle.
The Court finds merit in the contentions of both parties, and thus A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a
believes that the IBP-BOG should be given its say on the matter court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the
pursuant to the dictates of due process. supreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby holds that in the IBP-Western The Case
Visayas Region, the rotation by exclusion shall be adopted such that,
initially, all chapters of the region shall have the equal opportunity to Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant
vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon. Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of San
Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision
The Temporary Restraining Order dated May 3, 2011 is hereby lifted of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong,
and the IBP-Western Visayas Region is hereby ordered to proceed Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation
with its election of Goven10r for the 2011-2013 term pursuant to the (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional
rotation by exclusion rule. Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.

The IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to file its comment on Antecedent
the Petition for Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED. On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC,
received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a
Republic of the Philippines Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of
SUPREME COURT the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Manila Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter
of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose
EN BANC petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.

A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013 On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr.
Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL
OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY,
Complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent. of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No.
DECISION
084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court
files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings
BERSAMIN, J.: No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin
Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of
Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine the Bar Confidant.
copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court counter-affidavit, whereby he denied any participation in the
proceedings in the UK. falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on
Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds
document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had
court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court
situation. decision; that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had
caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an
communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW),
investigation of the falsification. had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to
solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also
learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa,
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed
a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn
an affidavit on March 4, 2005, wherein he stated that it was the
statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the
respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision
assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband,
in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of
document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.
P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were
substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley
Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005. Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution treating the respondent’s
counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, but he invoked
recommendation.
his constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued
subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter
appeared and gave his sworn statement. The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, Atty. Lolita A.
the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the
recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the
of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The NBI likewise She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported
recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of
Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the
petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the Ruling
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with
Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner; and that the respondent had We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the
received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court
rationalized her conclusions thusly: decision in consideration of a sum of money.

Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the
that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification,
issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy
the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady
believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had
Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of
decision on file in Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names and employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did
not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy
remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not
this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s
been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was
Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket
him in this incident. denial, which by nature was negative evidence. Also, the imputation
of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007, the IBP not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent
Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment. The
suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years. belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing
more than an afterthought.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709 denying the respondent’s motion for The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed
reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been
IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such
accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife
was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of
respondent’s comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed
review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim
the petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in
the complainant’s comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15
days from notice.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the
of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to
decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the
at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities.
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for
are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
or deceitful conduct. disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to
investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or professional or private capacity. The test is whether the conduct
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST.
the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective
upon receipt of this decision.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar
that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of
confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. The ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from
Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those the Roll of Attorneys.
among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring
demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to: This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated
proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or all courts of the country, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the
best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well SO ORDERED.
to the courts as to [their] clients x x x.
 This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint for the alleged
betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent
Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the
election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections,
instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK

Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival
Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants
lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera.
On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to
pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court
appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
Si P30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more
than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved
n at a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008
deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of
Republic of the Philippines the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest.
SUPREME COURT Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses
Manila Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which
was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the
FIRST DIVISION aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and
Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty.
De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015 Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives
of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names. The
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by
UMAGUING, Complainants, vs. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty.
VERA, Respondents. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).
DECISION
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own
Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the
document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the
MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal
Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by
falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a filing the aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As
Omnibus Motion, seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with
and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing
excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case. To add, he
affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of
election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled “Release
falsified. Waiver & Discharge,” which, to him, discharges him and his law firm
from all causes of action that complainants may have against him,
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed including the instant administrative case.
out that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although
promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the
not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an
explanation regarding his non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to In a Report and Recommendation dated December 5, 2009, the IBP
Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense Commissioner found the administrative action to be impressed with
counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from
decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.
appear for the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that
which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the
decision for Umaguing. IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the
integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that
fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit,
their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its
fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was
for the case. not Almera – was found to be credible as it was too straightforward
and hard to ignore. It was also observed that the backdrop in which
In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was
accusations lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the
merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based filing of the election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really
on the statements of his clients. Atty. De Vera then explained that pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of advising
the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and
knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to
beat the deadline set for the filing of the election protest. To this, the thus:
IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
the law and ethics of the profession. Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and
(2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera. will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
On reconsideration, however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
Resolution dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension God. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law
as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
The Issue Before the Court means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
held administratively liable. the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
The Court’s Ruling nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself
were duly substantiated by the records. However, the Court finds it in complete agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months. who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that
Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the
the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as
member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full a witness given that nothing appears on record to seriously belie the
expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has same, and in recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its officers
taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during
disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
the opportunity to first-hand observe their demeanor and interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is
absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in his premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant
Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
entire life, and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to
impugned documents, much less of the participation in using the practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
same. Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person
be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera- who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in the misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
support of the claim of falsification. administration of justice.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath
rendered its recommendation – is that Almera’s affidavit was and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated by submitting a falsified document before a court.
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty.
significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere Abellana (Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein from the practice
afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In
Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to
remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he impose the same here.
himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires
him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law. Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement for the
Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without return of the amount of P60,000.00, comprised of Atty. De Vera’s
adequate preparationor allow his client to dictate the procedure in acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his
handling the case. professional engagement, for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the
document captioned “Release Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation
Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from in Samonte:
all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such
as the present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott that: whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession.
Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to
cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of
the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern
disciplinary sanctions.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is

found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition
of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants

Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00
which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from
the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of further administrative
penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution or
the IBP Board of Governors which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the
performance of his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial
Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further, he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the
letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles,
Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon.
Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay
(respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time
he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao
SUPREME COURT
and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized
Manila
on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and
SECOND DIVISION Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A.
A.C. No. 8103, December 3, 2014 Castro married to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and
Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL 4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on
OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, March 17, 2008;
BATAAN, Complainant, vs. 5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent. and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights
DECISION executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized
March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando
MENDOZA, J.: and Nelia Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3,
2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification
Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008; issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and
Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008; The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter,
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and the latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for
and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar
Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008; Discipline (CBD).
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S.
Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required
March 18, 2008; Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied on
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008
of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008; Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he
Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March was out of the country," and that any advice on how to consider or
18, 2008; treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion
Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter
Development Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008; to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo
Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes This Court, in its Resolution, dated February 2, 2009, resolved to
Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008; note the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30, 2008, and
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente require respondent to comment on the said letter. In his
Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and comment, dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not
Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and aware that those were documents notarized using his name while he
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the
Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge
14, 2008. and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without
realizing the import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Court for his lapses and averred that he had terminated the
the Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were employment of his secretary from his office.
notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the
Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report
affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized and recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory
which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty.
sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and
signed them or the documents cameout of the office already signed. requesting that his attendance be excused. The mandatory
Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out conference was terminated and the parties were directed to file their
that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a position
paper, to which he added that for 21 years that he had been
practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish on On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial reconsideration of respondent stating:
practice.
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration,
The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
(Atty. Abelita III) as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere
of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated
comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, September 28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.
however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment
appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May
attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his 4, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the
absence by his office secretary.He admitted the fact that there were Chief Justice for appropriate action.
documents that were notarized while he was abroad and his
signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of
the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who had country constituted negligence.
access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially
pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training,
respondent failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules on The Court answers in the affirmative.
Notarial Practice.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his
notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for
Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years. commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary
public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the
official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is
recommendation in its Resolution, dated September 28, 2013. responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left
his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary,
of the IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up to what fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot
merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed be countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple
simple negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty. negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s
flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness
exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out
person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and
responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in
secretary. the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional
claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is
as a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only in order.
infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on
guard and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a
duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an privilege and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only
unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public
act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is
penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate. substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
(CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not administrative offices in general.
only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but
also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts
function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such a private document into a public document, making that document
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Respondent violated confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would
Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or be undermined.
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his
negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession
public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving that the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of
his office open despite his absence in the country and with his notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by
secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize the public in our legal system hang in the balance.
documents without any restraint.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, Philippines is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court
dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from
while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would
The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) The Case
months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of
a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of
take effect. the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant
to be appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the The Facts
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance. Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order
dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
SO ORDERED. requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation
of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.

Republic of the Philippines When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each
SUPREME COURT other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them
Manila before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
SECOND DIVISION person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013 Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to
sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty.
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature
RUSTIA, Complainants, vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents. and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and
Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
DECISION
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

CARPIO, J.:
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint's Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate attached a Report dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National
cases for Falsification of Public Document and Dishonesty be filed Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-
against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants. complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices,
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass
case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and persecute innocent people.
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the
cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged
him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia. Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
dispositive portion states: Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his
insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay. permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his
name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
SO ORDERED.
since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were
meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was
also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated employed as secretary of their law office.
19 September 2005.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May
Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear.
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Commission on Bar
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to irresponsibility as lawyers.
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law
2006, the IBP received complainants' position paper dated 18 firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
October 2006 and respondents' position paper dated 23 October certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm.
2006. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
xxx
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present.
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T.
same Code. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his
Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the
and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibilities in their law firm. responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and
other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner
opined: Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to
perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against
complainants' Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of states: roblesvirtualawliy
malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule
9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored Respondent Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the
the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Tenorio, where we held:
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit. The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
Comment/Reply to Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration and privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008. of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
Governors denied both complainants' and Atty. Bancolo's motions for disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007. name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to
aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court's Ruling
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading
grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel's signature serves as a
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one's signature
to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify
CANON 9 to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or
of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. with more severely.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the
affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him
if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. SO ORDERED.
Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the
verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of

some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against
Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his
tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his
signature to a pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which IS
a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his
secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding
of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the

practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the
dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T.

larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable

for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that
 INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.

Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.

Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc  of

the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October
20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU,

FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU,
and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter
referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of
Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining
agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon
Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW
Republic of the Philippines and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular
SUPREME COURT Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
Manila president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW
EN BANC and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no
avail.
G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with
the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES
Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE
and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he
BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, Petitioners, 
was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February
vs.THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU
19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic
made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-
collective bargaining with the Unions. proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and
figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the
proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare
respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies'
expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to unfair labor practices.
make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective
October 1, 1957. Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as
supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the
negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees
were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result resigned from the Unions.
of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for
"deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices
were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions'
proposals en toto  so that the said Unions might consider the On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and
feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as
other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter- the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A)
proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their quoted verbatim as follows:
demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was
done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct
Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular picketing.
demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point
by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still
refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily,
two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the you may:
former were also asked to drop their union security demand,
otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider themselves 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your
bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to intention to do so.
October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two 2. Take your meals within the office.
petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or
25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have
remaining demands. been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight
demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the hours.
matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even
motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management. more convinced of our decision.

The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold
few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will
May 21, 1958. continue to do so with or without you.

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group
called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against
thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the
assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be
personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to forced to obtain your replacement.
penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia,
upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a Before, the decisions was yours to make.
picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which
both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of So it is now.
employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent
Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against
the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers. the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the
fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight
physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of
others.
photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges
against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the
pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies
First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to
issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further report back to work on June 2, 1958.
orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc.
the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required
driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of
from, out and in, of the Companies' building. Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among
the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose
hereunder in its entirety: from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the
Companies without being required to secure clearances from the
fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies
readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the October 20, 1965.
strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest
of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower
allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission court erred:
are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building
Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the 1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked
and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Exhibits A and B;
Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above 2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
number were ultimately notified months later that they were being discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in
dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;
checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) 3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving
formal dismissal notices given to them. them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present
their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The 4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of
complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date
with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.
concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits
them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of
comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the
subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on striking employees individually — by registered special delivery
or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards were representing the employees in the collective bargaining.
readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually
during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs
material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be
therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint. an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of
collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31
Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133
decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for
reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under
memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to
negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor
individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an
strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually,
as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332). offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the
consequences of returning to work would be.
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting
unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor
president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus
on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a
constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the
collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to
likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking
employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in
therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their
their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the
homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if
to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new
because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the building to work in.
employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the
employer's molestation. Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of
the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work
to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila
protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the
Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters,
exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance
striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account
2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated,
agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in
Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference
vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422). constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply
because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is
to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a
occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.
eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the
employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly
employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the
section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the
evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of
statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to
inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the
adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M.
(Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted
C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735). by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the
three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the
themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building.
subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine," breakers. Then the respondents brought against the picketers
criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these
three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be
actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the
evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were
court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding,
to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates,
collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion
entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and
by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the
were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which
same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was
they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor
sent — again individually and by registered special delivery mail —
relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an
to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report
established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg
for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners
on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee — of
which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges."
proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the
bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34
Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-
as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the
respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately
was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal
the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique
as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel
compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's
the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the
petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop
Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," BARGAINING...
without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed.
They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day
were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the
and by the courts. reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining
nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958,
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the
issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:
the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not
destroy unionism within them. 3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union
shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which
replacements for them in order to protect and continue their could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8,
business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike letter dated April 15, 1958.)
on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was
a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said
supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the
the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double
was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia: crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal
collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime
being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation
of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS  salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p.
MANILA 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following
circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider
the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic]
go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand
unions intends to go on strike against
for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2)
when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands.
Plaza Moraga, Manila Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to
the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP  instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable
Plaza Moraga, Manila formula which takes into account the financial position of the group
companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila.
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although
strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the
continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the
no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of
on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of
evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a
the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando,
considered as having complied with the first and third conditions. Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing  Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil.
Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also
complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate
strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of
Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the power to
charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen
their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon
refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists
inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non- reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two
strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the employees — having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the
fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal picketers during the strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless to
charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the
were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in
discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring rehiring.
and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act. Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is
having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly
in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was
on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing
Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43
even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It
is significant to note in this connection that except for one union Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the
official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination
who later participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each
single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted
undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the
the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but
who were denied reinstatement. refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-
29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening
committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame
 therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every
14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent year of your service in the Group Company.
Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had
been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, Very truly yours,
1962, p. 19.)
(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES
Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to President, Insurance Life
explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers Acting President, FGU.
whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing
was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose
participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of
56). But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts
acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office
basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or
upon a cursory examination of the evidence on record. For with the dismissed.
exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other
strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of
misconduct." the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance
single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused
himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2,
mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming
on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to
unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his
except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra
required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them particularly identified the management men to whom he and his
back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the
respondents in the following stereotyped tenor: respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them
and later directed them — when Olbes refused them an audience —
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise
Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958. categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as
directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth,
it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you De Asis and Enage — who testified anyway as witnesses for the
committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The
Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on
terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and
asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an
doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to
10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that
for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court." would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on
January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls.
notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the
reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted
taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified
the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent public accountants. But assuming arguendo  that Tongos indeed
in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various times revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip — which the
during the next three days, but were told that there were no respondents never denied or tried to 
openings. Said the Court: disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a
unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor
dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is
guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the
unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's
right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any
officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any
activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after
method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the
the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the
right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a
discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In
Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor
labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth
Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union
man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were
after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being
When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his
reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech
relieved from the duty of returning further. protected by the Constitution.

Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the
despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is
vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard
hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions.
not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on
emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of
president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v.
officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.)
were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined business (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that
information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an
violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the
nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the
the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the
formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw
Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the
And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend
Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that
should not have given them much weight. The firm of these they did not resort to violence.
witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general
agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the
they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on
Tongos. this point is the following commentary: .

Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately
Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is
constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are
not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket
Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21, line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those
1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads
and forehead — acts considered inimical to the interest of the direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be
respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress
complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights
Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We
them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that
versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the
grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107
happened. The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)
blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No.
25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon
Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be
offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:
Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at
Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella,
the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at the
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce
a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by
Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between
NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.) the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations
and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a
transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only
misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement. evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's
participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo
Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that
petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-
unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes
NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the
and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company,
union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex
23 NLRB No. 28.)
C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes the
respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances,
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy
charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, on the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is
they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the
charges in the same office were refused readmission. The petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such
with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in
rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to
the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required constitute unfair labor practice.
reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report
of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained
Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be
interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice
and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional
could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the
picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of
company clients and customers from entering the Companies' the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and
buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .
line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only
when management men made incursions into and tried to break the
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the
picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing
officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from
is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket
June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their
 usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what
environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is
law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement
practices committed by the respondents, and that when the are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even
strikers reported back for work — upon the invitation of the though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer
respondents — they were discriminatorily dismissed. The to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the
members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to
reinstatement with back pay. unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs.
on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12
strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA
Labor Relations, p. 418.) 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the
cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed
employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions
discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial
adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S.
Relations, supra).
S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery,
140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F.
2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for
American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of them,
Co., 99 F2d 99.) however, were refused readmission because they had criminal
charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although
non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege
readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2,
that the positions of these union members have already been filled
1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed
by replacements.
employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true
even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors
to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller,
"unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so
defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were
filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the employees
and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the
aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have
replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked- found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just
out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that period
improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the
entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no
employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.) one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod
& Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as
205 [1955]). to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the
adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense
acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or
Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said
Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an
the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the
required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the
dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities. act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act
of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial
misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs.
establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by
Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81,
serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence
December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)
thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the
termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the
employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which
of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot contained the underscored portions of the above citation read
be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or however as follows:
a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been
the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito
Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].) Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer
as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an
fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure
and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office,
deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In
Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and
Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a
11 SCRA 134 [1964]). report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the
exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the
presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the
practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the
respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of
light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal
Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on
Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act
the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject
could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the
of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same
aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary
on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the
publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions: assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the
Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have
employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary the prima facie  right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the
measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate
an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the
act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest. decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the
his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity
his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to inimical to the employer's interest."
thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in
the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this
an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges
same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and
employees now under consideration may be considered as a litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred
misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours) to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by
paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et
pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this
the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this
"For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and
remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their
underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers
Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and
decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and
succeeding paragraph. recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's
decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are
verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark,
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an
appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as
indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the
well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations
respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the
are correct.
misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully
realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels,
land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular
their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their
mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F.
careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the Meads.
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is
reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the RESOLUTION
respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning
Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with SANCHEZ, J.:
backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual
reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent
MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought
to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.
Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be
taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a
show-cause order.

The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set

forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto:

a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have

made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur
International. Such efforts could be accurately called
"scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents
dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom
of page 13 and first line page 14).
Republic of the Philippines b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the
SUPREME COURT immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents'
Manila Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines
EN BANC  on bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims
G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970 and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., Petitioners,
bottom of the page).
vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., Respondents, In
Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys.
 Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there
statements: was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision."
d. and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law The "incidents" cited are as follows:
due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for a) Said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). declared unconstitutional.
e. Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a b) Said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-
gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can entitled case.
be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse c) Said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and
losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous
and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and cases of this nature.
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the d) Due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first
Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was
effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay
10, 1968). respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
e) The preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be
herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at
himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala all.
and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and f) There are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said
Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof correct.
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the g) The two main issues in the said decision were decided
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the h) The fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said
the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states decision manifests.
"[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion i) The public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred
was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the
the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through
rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a
lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself
comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in
of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the
Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by
defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit
expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included
stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, through inadvertence.
his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel
sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for
appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it
Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr.
which in full reads: Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the
original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial
1. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God Court of July 31, 1968.
in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what
the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his
incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic)
recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial
motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally conscience."
oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle
involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took
himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also
also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his
explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for
it that many of our government officials are just amoral? a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose
and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no
original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally
compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10,
there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge
reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by
should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not
explanations made on November 21, 1968. stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
 We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of only those members present when any matter is submitted for
December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication
December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present
his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by instance because the member who penned the decision was
him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. the very member who was absent for approximately four
Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable
was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was
outside his professional competence and referred Meads to xxx xxx xxx
another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in
view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their 3. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals
previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft
other document in connection with this case. and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding
of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property
subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or
six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
permission to have his name included as counsel in all of Government without either compensation or due process of law
MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
on leave of absence. cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969. million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is
made.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969,
respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969,
Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days
a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for
Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the contempt of court."
following paragraphs:
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there
2. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and
was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion;
time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations
Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of
one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed
wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for
same; that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen
allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument minutes.
allegedly made in the case.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said
Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court
L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that
of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a
Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the
Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, World Court.
1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against
all of them will be heard by this Court." On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and
Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and
He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) second contempt incidents seriatim.
convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked 1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third
him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not
motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners
Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized,
Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is
never prepared the motion and that he never even read it. not.

On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of
follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous
fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we
Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even
changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case:
same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice
went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a
left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was many of our government officials are just amoral?"
rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem
that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of
for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of
Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a
and further removed conditions have been known to create favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court
the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping
Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or statement that "any other justices who have received favors or
against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members
Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion President", should also inhibit themselves.
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from
the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief
be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other
allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
begun." from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or
their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity of
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this
contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be
fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should
paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the
motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be
explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the
because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is
included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the
"many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney
chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, to downgrade this Court.
and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is
seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a
mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are
two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By
now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr.
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge
is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' administration of justice."
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not
is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the
which he is bound to uphold.' " administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of
the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an administration of justice— is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to guilty of contempt of court.
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."  Faith 2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze
in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made
the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of
and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and
administration of justice." arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a
not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines
their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping
observant of law and ethics." As rightly observed by Mr. Justice with the dignity of the legal profession." It is Sotto's duty as a
Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and
his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the
 party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in
which he is charged." this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the
708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any
of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be
was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood held exempt from contempt.
he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here 5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The
comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has
shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by been made why this has been done.
the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the
forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context.
the bar and an affront to the court." Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part.
— ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus —
Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There
should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters
contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be
power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court
with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, date of submission; however, only those members present when any
under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them,
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date
tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, of submission.
guilty of contempt.
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. explain this point.
It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of
the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted
consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by
the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the
in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his
conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is
not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While 8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he
Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and
see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive
There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling
was intentionally omitted. represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to
sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not
World Court and/or the United States government. It must be for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to
to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that
announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite
corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is
May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and reconsideration during all that time.
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually…" Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent
MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his
decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility.
has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain
decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer
already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a
a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their
no aboveboard explanation. relation."

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected
he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith
has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults
was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character. behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the justice.
fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the
contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He 9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only
is guilty of contempt. for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide
the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our
 decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this
terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago,
bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the
Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite SO ORDERED.
bond." It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say
that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions
to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.

It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was

by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this
case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause
would just the same have failed.

For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty.

Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty.
Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds
Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy
not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago,
Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt
of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional
P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling,
P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the

Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take
in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.

Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable,

the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in
relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge,

Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the
defendant in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas
plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by
herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge
Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge
Manahan issued an Order dated January 12, 2011, whereby she
voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said
Order reads in part, viz:

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations,

his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren
in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would
amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious
ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to
Rules 139 a & b.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar

Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the
Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar 3. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised
Confidant (OBC) deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan as to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being
a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed as truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the 4. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even
Regional Trial Court of Rizal for investigation, report and Erap was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. But even worse is a
recommendation. lawyer who violates the law.
5. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, Investigating Philippine Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due.
Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing
the antecedents of the case as follows: divine and human laws.

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court xxxx
(MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled
Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an
(PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating
while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant. the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference
on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On
Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear
Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre- and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its
Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as
expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another follows:
Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty.
Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof. If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff
sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which you may
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
September 8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and
submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant
The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and to look for another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer
October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in
submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall your sala.
be considered a waiver on his part.
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to
dated September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
allegations: Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language
in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty.
xxxx Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not
Investigating Judge. commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It
appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also,
Our Ruling we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-
year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested
before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s
century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the
foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of
several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but
to obey and respect court processes.
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to
the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if
our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the
Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to
which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the SO ORDERED.
judicial system."

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings.

As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect
in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty.
Flores failed in this respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full
devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within
the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within
the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries
with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of
reason and common sense.