George Bernard Shaw in "Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism" has said:

The institutions under which we live are being changed continually by the Parliament, because we are never satisfied with
them. Sometimes they are scrapped for new ones; sometimes they are altered; sometimes they are done away with as
nuisances. The new ones have to be stretched in the law courts to make them fit, or to prevent them fitting to well if the
judges happen to dislike them.

The life of a state is vibrant and in order to facilitate the ever dynamic developments and needs of society, its economic,
social and political conditions mutate continuously. So, a Constitution drafted in one context at a particular time may prove
inadequate at a later stage. Every Constitution has some method of amendment whereby a provision is modified by way of
addition, deletion or correction so as to suit the needs of the present.

Provisions for the amendment of the Constitution are made with a view to overcome the difficulties which may encounter in
future in the effective working of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were keen to avoid excessive rigidity and
wanted it to a bit flexible. They wanted to have a document that could grow with a growing nation and adapt itself to the ever
changing needs of people.

Oxfords Dictionary of Law says Amendment means changes made to legislation, for the purpose of adding to, correcting or
modifying the operation of the legislation.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines Amendment as A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, Constitution,
pleading, order, or other instrument AND In Parliamentary law, it means a motion that changes another motions wording by
striking out text, inserting or adding text, or substituting text.

But Keshavananda Bharti V. State of Kerela provided the best explanation as to the scope and definition of the word
Amendment. It purported that A broad definition of the word Amendment will include any alteration or change. The word
amendment when used in connection with the Constitution may refer to the addition of a provision on a new and
independent subject, complete in itself and wholly disconnected from other provisions, or to some particular article or clause,
and is then used to indicate an addition to, the striking out, or some change in that particular article or clause".
The Constitution of India provides for amendment mainly in Article 368 and in some other parts as specified therein.

Modes of Amending Constitution

The Constitution of India provides for the amendment by way of Amendment Acts in a formal manner. For the purpose of
amendment, the various Articles of the Constitution are divided into three categories. The first category is out of the purview
of Article 368 whereas the other two are a part and parcel of the said Article. The various categories of amendment to the
Constitution can be summarized as follows:

# Amendment by Simple Majority

As the name suggests, an article can be amended in the same way by the Parliament as an ordinary law is passed which
requires simple majority. The amendment contemplated under Articles 5-11 (Citizenship), 169 (Abolition or creation of
Legislative Councils in States) and 239-A (Creation of local Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both fir certain Union
Territories) of the Indian Constitution can be made by simple majority. These Articles are specifically excluded from the
purview of the procedure prescribed under Article 368.

# Amendment by Special Majority 

Articles which can be amended by special majority are laid down in Article 368. All amendments, except those referred to
above come within this category and must be affected by a majority of total membership of each House of Parliament as
well as 2/3rd of the members present and voting.

# Amendment by Special Majority and Ratification by States

Amendment to certain Articles requires special majority as well as ratification by states. Proviso to Article 368 lays down the
said rule. Ratification by states means that there has to be a resolution to that effect by one-half of the state legislatures.
These articles include Article 54 (Election of President), 55 (Manner of election of President), 73 (Extent of executive power
of the Union), 162 (Extent of executive power of State), 124-147 (The Union Judiciary), 214-231 (The High Courts in the
States), 241 (High Courts for Union Territories), 245-255 (Distribution of Legislative powers) and Article 368 (power of the
Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor) itself. Any list of seventh schedule or representation of states
in Parliament as mentioned in the fourth schedule is also included.

Procedure For Amendment U/A 368

A Bill to amend the Constitution may be introduced in either house of the Parliament. It must be passed by each house by a
majority of the total membership of that house and by a majority of not less than 2/3rd of the members present and voting.
Thereafter, the bill is presented to the President for his assent who shall give his assent and thereupon the Constitution shall
stand amended.In case, ratification by state is required it has to be done before presenting it to the President for his/her
assent.

Amendability of The Indian Constitution

According to Vepa P. Sarathi, there will never be a conflict between Legislature and Judiciary and these two powerful organs
will be better capable of guiding the third branch i.e. Executive, if the following view for the purpose of amendment is
accepted. Article 368 can be interpreted in the following manner:
A) The power of the Parliament to amend Constitution is absolute and there are no limits on that power.
B) Parliament should not, however, take away the power of the courts to strike down ordinary legislation as tested against
the amended Constitution.

One can relate to what Shakespeare said in Measure for Measure:

"O, it is excellent
To have a giants strength; but it tyrannous
To use it like a giant."

The elementary question in controversy has been whether Fundamental Rights are amendable so as to take away the basic
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Another controversy deals with the extent, scope and authority of Parliament to
amend Constitution. The answer has been given by the Supreme Court from time to time, sometimes under immense
pressure and can be understood in the light of the following cases:
Shankari Prasad V. Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 458)
The validity of the First Amendment Act to the Constitution was challenged on the ground that it purported to abridge the
fundamental Rights under Part 3 of the Constitution of India. Supreme Court held that the power to amend the Constitution,
including Fundamental Rights is contained in Article 368. An amendment is not a law within the meaning of Article 13(2).
Article 13(2) states that – "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part
and any law made in contravention to this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void". An amendment is valid
even if it abridges any fundamental Right.

Sajjan Singh V. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845)

The validity of the 17th Amendment Act, 1964 was challenged on the ground that one of the acts inserted by the amendment
in the 9th Schedule affected the petitioner on the basis that the amendment fell within the purview of Article 368 and the
requirements in the proviso to Article 368 had not been complied with. Supreme Court approved the judgment in Shankari
Prasad case and held that on Article 13 (2) the case was rightly decided. Amendment includes amendment to all provisions
of the Constitution.

Golaknath V. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1643)

The Supreme Court prospectively overruled its decision in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh cases and held that
Parliament had no power to amend part 3 of the Constitution so as to abridge or take away any of the Fundamental Rights.
It also added that Article 368 merely lays down the procedure for the purpose of amendment. Further, The Court said that an
amendment is a law under Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India and if it violates any fundamental right, it may be
declared void.

24th Amendment Act, 1971:

Golaknaths case created a lot of difficulties and as a result the Parliament enacted 24th Amendment act, 1971 whereby it
changed the old heading of Article 368– "Procedure for Amendment of the Constitution" to a new heading – "Power of the
Parliament to Amend the Constitution and Procedure Therefor."
To the benefit of the Legislators, the 24th Amendment Act, 1971 restored and extended the scope of power of Parliament to
amend the Constitution by adding the words "amend by way of addition or variation or repeal any provision in accordance
with the provisions laid down in this Article" Further, the amendment provided that "Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any
amendment made under this article" by way of an addition of Clause 3 to Article 368. Kesavananda Bharti V. State Of Kerela
(AIR 1973 SC 1461)

One of the various questions raised in this case was the extent of the power of the Parliament to amend under Article 368. A
13 Judge Constitutional bench was formulated under Chief Justice Sikri in order to evaluate the intricacies of Golaknaths
case. The Supreme Court overruled its decision in Golaknaths case and held that even before the 24th Amendment, Article
368 contained power as well as procedure for amendment. The majority held that there are inherent limitations on the
amending power of the Parliament and Article 368 does not confer power so as to destroy the Basic Structure of the
Constitution.
Basic Structure: 
The Theory of basic structure very effectively proved to be a limitation on the amending power of the Parliament. The Basic
Structure doctrine applies only to the Constitutionality of amendments and not to ordinary Acts of Parliament, which must
conform to the entirety of the Constitution and not just its basic structure.
Chief Justice Sikri indicated that Basic structure is:
1. The supremacy of Constitution
2. The republican and democratic forms of government
3. The secular character of Constitution
4. Maintenance of separation of power
5. The federal character of the Constitution

Justices Shelat and Grover added another three:

1. The mandate to build a welfare state contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy
2. Maintenance of the unity and integrity of India
3. The sovereignty of the country'

Justices Hegde and Mukherjea listed the following:

1. The Sovereignty of India
2. The unity of the country
3. The democratic character of the polity
4. Essential features of individual freedoms
5. The mandate to build a welfare state

Justice Jaganmohan Reddy referred the Preamble only:

1. A sovereign democratic republic
2. The provision of social, economic and political justice
3. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship
4. Equality of status and opportunity

42nd Amendment Act, 1976 and Article 368:

42nd Amendment Act, 1976 was passed by the Parliament soon after. Amendment added clause 4 and clause 5 to Article
368. Article 368(4) provided that no Constitutional Amendment shall be called in any court on any ground. Article 368(5)
provided that there shall be no limitation whatsoever on the constituent power of the Parliament.

Minerva Mills V. Union of India (AIR 1980 SC 1789)

Supreme Court struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 inserted by the 42nd amendment. Justification for the deletion
of the said clauses was based on the destruction of Basic Structure. The Court was satisfied that 368 (4) and (5) clearly
destroyed the Basic Structure as it gave the Parliament absolute power to amend Constitution. Limitation on the amending
power of the Parliament is a part of the Basic Structure explained in Kesavanandas case.

S. P. Sampath Kumar V. Union Of India (AIR 1987 SC 386)

The Constitutional validity of Article 323A and the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act was challenged on the
ground that it excluded the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 and 227. Supreme Court held that Article 323A and
Administrative Tribunals Act was valid as it has not excluded Judicial Review under Article 32 and 136. It was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt that Article 323A and Administrative Tribunals Act destroyed the basic structure and the Court
upheld their validity.

L. Chandra Kumar V. Union Of India (AIR 1997 SC 1125)

The Supreme Court struck down clause 2(d)of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B as they excluded the jurisdiction
of High court under Article 226 and 227 as well as jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 as they damage the power
of Judicial Review which is a basic feature of Constitution.

Conclusion
The final word on the issue of Amendability can be related to Basic Structure defined inKesavananda Bhartis case. To name
a few Minerva Mills case, S. P. Sampath Kumars case and L. Chandra Kumars case are well based on the principle of Basic
Structure and this situation is unlikely to change in the near future. It is clear that all laws and constitutional amendments are
now subject to judicial review and laws that transgress the basic structure are likely to be struck down by the Supreme
Court. In essence Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is not absolute and the Supreme Court is the final arbiter
over and interpreter of all constitutional amendments.

Books referred:
• H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India
• D. D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India
• M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law
• Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes
• Oxford Dictionary of Law
• Mitras Legal and commercial Dictionary
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l19-Amendability-Of-Indian-Constitution.html

Amendability of Fundamental Rights

The question whether Fundamental Rights can be amended by the Parliament under Article 368
came for consideration of the Supreme Court within a year of Constitution coming into force.

Cases Related to Fundamental Rights

In the Shankari Prasad case 4 (1951), the constitutional validity of the First Amendment Act
(1951), which curtailed the right to property, was challenged. The Supreme Court ruled that the
power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 368 also includes the power to
amend Fundamental Rights. The word ‘law’ in Article 13 includes only ordinary laws and not
the constitutional amendment acts (constituent laws). Therefore, the Parliament can abridge or
take away any of the Fundamental Rights by enacting a constitutional amendment act and such a
law will not be void under Article 13.
But in the Golak Nath cases (1967), the Supreme Court reversed its earlier stand. In that case, the
constitutional validity of the Seventh Amendment Act, which inserted certain state acts in the
Ninth Schedule, was challenged. The Supreme Court ruled that the Fundamental Rights are
given a ‘transcendental and immutable’ position and hence, the Parliament cannot abridge or
take away any of the Fundamental Rights. A constitutional amendment act is also a law within
the meaning of Article 13 and hence, would be void for violating any of the Fundamental Rights.
Again, the Parliament reacted to this judicially innovated doctrine of ‘basic structure’ by
enacting the 42nd Amendment Act (1976). This Act amended Article 368 and declared that there
is no limitation on the constituent power of Parliament and no amendment can be questioned in
any court on any ground including the contravention of any of the fundamental rights
However, the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills case (1980) invalidated this provision as it
excludes judicial review which is a ‘basic feature’ of the Constitution. Again in the Waman Rao
case 8 (1981), the Supreme Court adhered to the doctrine of the ‘basic structure’ and further
clarified that it would apply to constitutional amendments enacted after April 24, 1973 (i.e., the
date of the judgement in the Kesavananda Bharati case).
Also See:
Nope.  Any amendment that contradicts the text of the Constitution itself or an earlier amendment will simply nullify
the earlier text.  The Supreme Court presumes (logically) that if an amendment conflicts with an earlier part of the
Constitution, it must have been the intent of the people that the later amendment take precedence.

The best example is the Fourteenth Amendment, which was passed during the Civil War.  It says, in part:
"Representatives [to Congress] shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State."  This obviously conflicts with Article I, Section 3 of the
Constitution, which apportions representatives based on whole  number of "Free persons," and three-fifths of "all
other persons" (i.e., slaves).
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Vikramadhitya Perseus Cherupally, PhD Chemical Engineering, Purdue University (2023)

Answered Mar 25

So as someone who reads about comparative law across common law jurisdictions, this is a fascinating idea to
consider. Our tradition of constitutional law in the United States gives a simple, one-word answer to this
question: NO. It is axiomatic in American constitutional law tradition and history that once a constitutional
amendment is passed and ratified as required by Article V, this amendment becomes part of the Constitution itself,
and in doing so, it overrides any previous parts of the Constitution that conflict with it. As such, Article I, Sec. 5 was
overridden by the 20th Amendment, and the violative parts of that section are null and void.

As it is, the United States Supreme Court gets all its jurisdiction, authority, and power from the Constitution itself or
from Congress. Therefore, we can take it as dogmatic that the Supreme Court cannot declare as unconstitutional that
which is part of the Constitution itself. This is pretty much accepted as fact, and there is essentially no other response
to this question.

However, I wanted to look at this question in the context of comparative law because the question becomes much
more interesting when compared to other common law jurisdictions around the world. In 1965, a German juridical
academic by the name of Dietrich Conrad who was the Head of Law at the South Asian Institute at the University of
Heidelberg gave a speech at the law college of Banaras Hindu University that included the following comments on the
then-still nascent Constitution of India:

Perhaps the position of the Supreme Court is influenced by the fact that it has not so far been confronted with any
extreme type of constitutional amendments. It is the duty of the jurist, though, to anticipate extreme cases of conflict,
and sometimes only extreme tests reveal the true nature of a legal concept. So, if for the purpose of legal discussion, I
may propose some fictive amendment laws to you, could it still be considered a valid exercise of the amendment
power conferred by Article 368 if a two-thirds majority changed Article 1 by dividing India into two States of
Tamilnad and Hindustan proper?
Could a constitutional amendment abolish Article 21, to the effect that forthwith a person could be deprived of his life
or personal liberty without authorisation by law? Could the ruling party, if it sees its majority shrinking, amend
Article 368 to the effect that the amending power rests with the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister?
Could the amending power be used to abolish the Constitution and reintroduce, let us say, the rule of a moghul
emperor or of the Crown of England? I do not want, by posing such questions, to provoke easy answers. But I should
like to acquaint you with the discussion which took place on such questions among constitutional lawyers in Germany
in the Weimar period - discussion, seeming academic at first, but suddenly illustrated by history in a drastic and
terrible manner.

He came at this discussion from his experience under the Weimar Republic in Germany where he saw the entire
country’s legal foundation taken over, destroyed, and rebuilt by Hitler.

Now, clearly there are next to no comparisons between our constitutional law tradition in the United States and that
of India other than the fact that we are both common law countries, something we both inherited from our former
British overlords. However, I want to use this as the starting point of a thought experiment that I find to be
fascinating and hopefully provide some thought.

Conrad’s comments became the basis of what eventually became known as the “basic structure doctrine” in India.
Without going too far into the details of it and the complex history of Indian constitutional law, what the basic
structure doctrine basically says that despite the fact that the Constitution gives Parliament the power to amend said
Constitution, Parliament’s power to amend is inherently limited by the Constitution itself and that Parliament has no
power to amend the Constitution such that its “basic structure” is destroyed.

Now, in the initial days of Indian history, the Indian Supreme Court had the same view that ours in the United States
currently does insofar as the amendment process is concerned: Any part of the Constitution can be amended given
that the amendment process is followed by that which is enumerated in the Constitution itself, and the Supreme
Court and all inferior courts in the country are from that point on obliged to accept it.

However, when Conrad came calling, he asked some tough questions as you can see above: Can the amendment
process be used to abridge fundamental rights, harm life and property, etc.? Could the amendment process be used to
curtail the separation of powers and the power of the judiciary?

In 1964, the Supreme Court of India ruled in Singh v. Rajasthan that the amendment process was unlimited; in
dissent, Justice Mudholkar said the following: “It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a
basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of
the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368?”

Interesting question, no? So let’s continue this investigation for a bit just to see where it can go.

In 1967, Indian Supreme Court overruled itself in Golaknath v. Punjab where it said that there are certain
fundamental rights that are “transcendental” and cannot be curtailed by amendment, no matter what. In 1973,
in Bharti v. Kerala, the Court ruled that fundamental rights transcend the amendment process and cannot be
touched. And then, without getting to far into the complexities and details of Indian history, there was a period known
as The Emergency, which was effectively martial law in the country. This confirmed the suspicions that some Indian
Supreme Court justices had that democratically elected leaders naturally hungered for power and could not be
expected to relinquish it freely. Since then, the position of Indian constitutional law has been that the amendment
process of their Constitution is not infinite and that all amendments to the Constitution must conform to its own
“basic structure” or are otherwise held themselves to be unconstitutional! That’s an interesting perspective no?
Indeed, it is.

What is the basic structure, you might ask. And the Court has only said that it must be decided “on a case by case
basis”, meaning that the Court has given itself infinite power to control the Constitution no matter if people want it
changed. Nevertheless, it has included the following principles as part of its “basic structure”:

1. Supremacy of the Constitution

2. Rule of law
3. The principle of Separation of Powers
4. The objectives specified in the Preamble to the Constitution
5. Judicial Review
6. Articles 32 and 226
7. Federalism (including financial liberty of states under Articles 282 and 293)
 8. Secularism
9. The Sovereign, Democratic, Republican structure
10. Freedom and dignity of the individual
11. Unity and integrity of the Nation
12. The principle of equality, not every feature of equality, but the quintessence of equal justice;
13. The "essence" of other Fundamental Rights in Part III
14. The concept of social and economic justice — to build a Welfare State: Part IV in toto
15. The balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
16. The Parliamentary system of government
17. The principle of free and fair elections
18. Limitations upon the amending power conferred by Article 368
19. Independence of the Judiciary
20. Effective access to justice
21. Powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32, 136, 141, 142
22. Legislation seeking to nullify the awards made in exercise of the judicial power of the State by
Arbitration Tribunals constituted under an Act[8]
23. Welfare state
This doctrine now is not just Indian; it has also been adopted by the Supreme Courts of Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and has even influenced Pakistan (ironic, I know).

Now, the reason that these Supreme Courts have accepted that their Constitutions are essentially “above amendment”
is because those countries have a complicated history of one-man rule/dictatorship and military coups. As such, it
makes sense for them to have an activist judiciary that steps in whenever it wants.

Thankfully, our country here in the United States does not have such a history. However, perhaps one should wonder
and have this thought experiment. Let’s say that our amendment process was used to actually repeal, say, the Second
Amendment. Would the Supreme Court that includes Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Samuel Alito, and Brett
Kavanaugh accept that amendment lying down? I think the resounding answer is yes. However, it makes you wonder,
doesn’t it?

Using international law as an aid in interpreting our own Constitution is ill-advised in my opinion, and I largely agree
with the late-Justice Scalia that we should not care what other judiciaries around the world rule and think because
our nation is unique in its history, timetable, and complexity. I vociferously oppose the use of international law to aid
in US constitutional law as well (which is one of my great frustrations with retired Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg,
and Justice Breyer among others). But even the most ardent opponents of using international law in aiding the
interpretation of the US Constitution (Scalia and Thomas) have all allowed international law to influence their Court
opinions at one point or another (see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Committee and Holder v. Hall) so clearly, even they
are open to it should such a need arise.

What if we had such a problematic situation in this country? What would these justices say then? There is, after all,
international law already in place as seen above.

Of course, we are fortunate enough to live in this country where it is very, very unlikely that we will ever have to worry
about a dictator taking over and ripping up our Constitution, but let’s never forget that we’ve come dangerously close
to it before under Andrew Jackson, Woodrow Wilson, FDR, Abraham Lincoln (suspending habeas corpus), Nixon,
and of course, Trump.

It’s an interesting question to think about. Would love to hear what others might think.

Procedure of Amendment of the

Constitution: Method of Amendment
Article shared by :  <="" div="" style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px; border:
0px; outline: 0px; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: bottom; background: transparent; max-width: 100%;">

ADVERTISEMENTS:
Procedure of Amendment of the Constitution: Method of Amendment!
To evolve and change with all changes in the society and environment is a necessity for
every constitution. The makers of the Constitution of India were fully aware of this need.
As such, while writing the constitution, they also provided for a method of its
amendment. Further they of decided, to make the constitution both rigid as well as
flexible. They laid down a flexible amendment method in respect of its some parts and
for several others they provided for a rigid method.

Method of Amendment:
ADVERTISEMENTS:

Part XX of The Constitution of India contains only one Article 368. It deals with the
power of the Parliament to amend the constitution. It lays down two special methods for
the amendment of various parts of the constitution. Along with it the Union Parliament
has the power to change some specified features/parts of the Constitution by passing an
ordinary law.

Two Special Methods of Amendment under Art 368

I. Amendment by 2/3rd Majority of Parliament:
Most parts of the Constitution (with exception of some specific provisions) can be
amended by this method. Under this method, the Constitution can be amended by the
Union Parliament alone. For this purpose an amendment bill can be passed by each of
the two Houses of Union Parliament by a majority of its total membership (i.e. absolute
majority) and by a two-third majority of members present and voting in each House. It
is a rigid method in so far as it prescribes a special majority for amending the
constitution but it is considered to be a flexible method because under it the Union
Parliament alone can pass any amendment.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

II. Amendment by 2/3rd Majority of the Parliament plus Ratification by at

least half of the several State Legislatures:
In respect of some specified provisions of the Constitution, a very rigid method of
amendment has been prescribed.
In respect of these the amendment-making involves two stages:
First, the amendment bill is to be passed by both the Houses of the Union Parliament by
a majority of total membership and a 2/3rd majority of members present and voting in
each House.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Secondly, after this the amendment bill has to secure ratification from at least half of the
several State Legislatures (now at least 14 state legislatures).Only then it gets finally
passed and incorporated as a part of the Constitution when the President puts his
signatures on the bill.

The following provisions of the constitution can be amended by this rigid

method:
(i) Election of the President.

(ii) Scope of the executive power of the Union.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

(iii) Scope of the executive power of a State.

(iv) Provisions regarding High Courts in Union Territories.

(v) Provisions regarding Supreme Court of India.

(vi) Provisions regarding High Courts in States.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

(vii) Legislative Relations between the Union and States.

(viii) Any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. (Division of Powers between the Union
and States)

(ix) Representation of States in the Parliament.

(x) The Provisions of Article 368. (Method of Amendment)

III. Additional Amendment-making by A Simple Majority in the Two Houses

of Parliament:
In respect of some provisions of the Constitution the Parliament has been given the
power to make necessary changes by passing as a law in the normal way i.e. by simple
majority of members of both of its Houses. It is, indeed, an easy method of amendment.

It applies to the following provisions of the Constitution:

(i) A Admission/ formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names
of existing States.

(ii) Citizenship provision.

(iii) Provision regarding delimitation of constituencies.

(iv) Quorum of the two Houses of Parliament.

(v) Privileges and Salaries and allowances of the MPs.

(vi) Rules of procedure in each House of the Parliament.

(vii) English as a language of the Parliament.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

(viii) Appointment of Judges and jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

(ix) Creation or abolition of Upper Houses in any state.

(x) Legislatures for Union Territories.

(xi) Elections in the country.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

(xii) Official language of India.

(xiii) Second, fifth and sixth Schedules of the Constitution.

These methods of amendment reflect a mixture of rigidity and flexibility in the Indian
Constitution.

Main Features of the Amendment Method:

1. Fart XX of the Constitution deals with Amendment of the Constitution. It has only one
Article i.e. Article 368.

2. The power to amend the constitution is mainly with the Union Parliament. No
amendment can be made without Parliament’s action and consent. Union Parliament
alone has the power to initiate bills for amending the constitution.

3. There are three basic ways in which amendments can be made:

(i) Most provisions can be amended by the Union Parliament by passing an amending
act by a majority of total membership, and a 2/3rd majority of members present and
voting in each House.

(ii) Ten provisions of the constitution can be amended,

(a) By passing of the amendment bill by 2/3rd majority of the members of each of the
two Houses of Parliament,

(b) It becomes finally passed when approved by at least half of the state Legislatures.

(iii) Some provisions can be amended by the Parliament by an law by a simple majority
of its two Houses.

4. Signature of the President is required as the final act which transforms a duly enacted
amendment bill into an Amendment Act.

5. State Legislatures have been denied the power to initiate amendments.

6. All amendments are subject to the Judicial Review power of the courts. (The Supreme
courts and State High Courts only) Any part of any amendment or any amendment as a
whole can be declared invalid by a court in case it is found to be unconstitutional.
7. The Parliament has the power to amend every part of the Constitution. However, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the Parliament has no power to change the ‘Basic
Structure of the Constitution’.

These are the main features of the method of Amendment of the Constitution of India.

Method of Amendment: Critical Evaluation:

Main points of criticism:
1. Undemocratic:
The critics hold that since the process of amendment does not provide for a system of
getting consent or approval of the people of India, it is an undemocratic method.

2. Very Flexible:
The Parliament alone can amend most of the constitutional provisions. The flexibility of
the constitution is evident from the fact that during the past 60 years 94 constitutional
amendments have been made.

3. Very Rigid:
Some scholars feel that the Constitution of India is very rigid. It worked as a flexible
constitution during 1950-1989 only because of the presence of single party dominance
in Indian politics. In this era of coalition governments, it has become a very rigid
constitution.

4. Lack of Procedure for resolving deadlocks over Amendment Bills:

The Constitution does not provide for any method of resolving deadlocks between the
two Houses of parliament over an amendment bill.

5. Less Importance to States:

Except for the ‘ten provisions’ listed by Article 368, all parts of the Constitution can be
amended by the Union Parliament alone without the consent of the State Legislatures.
States do not have even the right to propose amendments.

6. The provision for Judicial Review over Amendments:

Some critics also object to the system of judicial review which permits the Supreme
Court and every High Court to judge the constitutional validity of the amendments
passed by the Parliament.

This makes the Supreme Court of India a super legislature with the negative power of
the rejecting duly passed amendments. On all these grounds, the critics strongly criticise
the method of amendment of the Constitution of India.

Justification:
In defence of the amendment method, it can be said that:
(1) It is the best possible method of amendment. It has both the quality of being rigid as
well as flexible. It strikes a good balances.

(2) In a developing country like India, the constitution is an instrument of social change
and that is why it has undergone frequent amendments.

(3) The detailed and lengthy size of the constitution and its character as a common
constitution of both the Union and States, have also been responsible for the
incorporation of several and frequent amendments.

(4) The existing method of Amendment stands justified as a natural necessity of India’s
pluralist society and developing polity.

The amendment method has helped the Constitution to change in response to the
changes in Indian society and polity.

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