Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CRPC Project
CRPC Project
Project
On
Framing of Charges.
Submitted to Submitted by
2019-2020
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Acknowledgement
Yours Sincerely,
Suyash Gupta
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INDEX
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.......................................................................................................II
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................2
MEANING OF CHARGE......................................................................................................2
JOINDER OF CHARGES.......................................................................................................5
FRAMING OF CHARGE.......................................................................................................10
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………12
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................13
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I. INTRODUCTION
One basic requirement of a fair trial in criminal cases is to give precise information to the
accused as to the accusation against him. This is vitally important to the accused in the
preparation of his defence. In all trials under the Code the accused is informed of the accusation
in the beginning itself. In case of serious offences the Code requires that the accusations are to
be formulated and reduced to writing with great precision and clarity. This “charge” is then to
be read and explained to the accused person.
Provisions relating to charge are aimed at giving full notice to the accused about the offence of
which he is charged. It gives the accused accurate and precise information about the accusations
made against him.1 Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused
is charged.
In the State v Ajit Kumar Saha casethe material on record did not show a prima facie case but
the charges were framed by the Magistrate. Since there was no application of mind by the
Magistrate the order framing charges was set aside by the High Court. It is a basic principle of
law that before summoning a person to face a charge and more particularly when a charge sheet
is actually framed, the court concerned must be equipped with at least prima facie material to
show that the person who is sought to be charged is guilty of an offence alleged against him.
In State of Karnataka v. Eshwaraiah case two accused were separately charged for committing
murder in furtherance of common intention. In the charge framed against one accused the name
of the other was not mentioned but charges were read over to each of the accused in presence
of the other accused and the plea has been recorded in the presence of each of the accused and
their advocates. It was held that there was no scope for misunderstanding part played by each
accused and therefore the defect in framing of the charge was a mere irregularity.
Charge is an accusation made against a person in respect of an offence alleged to have been
committed by him.2 A charge is the first notice to the prisoner of the matter whereof he is
accused and which must convey to him with sufficient clearness and certainty what the
1
B N Srikantiah v State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC 672.
2
Birichh Bhuian v State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1120.
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prosecution intends to prove against him and of which he would have to clear himself. The
basic requirement is that the charge must be so framed as to give the accused person as fairly
reasonable idea of the case which he has to face and the validity of the charge must be
determined by the application of the test viz had the accused a reasonable sufficient notice of
the matter with which he was charged. 3
Where an accused person is charged, along with others under Section 307/149 and 302/149 of
the Indian Penal Code but the others are acquitted and the accused alone is convicted under
Section 302 and 307, the absence of specific charges against the accused under Section 302
and 307, is a very serious lacuna in the proceedings and it materially prejudices the accused
and his conviction for those cannot be maintained.4
In Musa Khan v State of Maharashtra case the Additional Sessions Judge framed charges
against the accused persons under Section 149 and 395 of the Penal Code. Since offence under
Section 395 of the Penal Code comes into existence only when act of dacoity is committed by
five or more persons jointly the questions of applying Section 149 was held to be mere
surplusage. That is where a charge under Section 395 of the Penal Code is framed no charge
under Section 149 for the same offence need be framed.
The charge may not specify particular items or exact dates. The charge framed in the above
manner shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of Section 219
provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one
year. Where it is impossible to specify the particular date on which the offence was committed,
it will be sufficient to state two dates between which the offence was committed. 5 It is
permissible to state in a charge under Section 212(1) that the particular offence was committed
on or about certain date.6
Sub-section (2) was primarily enacted so that persons who showed a deficiency in the accounts
with which they were entrusted could be convicted of criminal misappropriation even when it
could not be shown that they had misappropriated any specified sum. 7
3
Chittranjandas v State of West Bengal AIR 1963 SC 1696.
4
Suraj Pal v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1955 SC 419.
5
Banamali Tripathy v Emperor AIR 1943 Pat 212.
6
Chittaranjan Das v State of West Bengal AIR 1963 SC 1696.
7
Wazir Singh v Emperor AIR 1942 Oudh 89.
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The object of Section 213 is twofold: first to ensure that the accused has sufficient notice of
the matter with which he is charged as otherwise he will be seriously prejudiced in his defence,
and secondly to enable the court to keep in view the real points in issue and to confine the
evidence to such points.
Omission in a charge cannot be regarded as material unless in terms of Section 215 it is shown
by the accused that he has in fact been misled by such omissions or that there has been a failure
of justice as a result of such omission.8 Where the accused is not misled defect in the charge is
not material.9 The irregularity of charging together different offences instead of charging them
separately are curable under this section and Section 465 if the accused is not prejudiced. 10 In
considering the question whether the accused has been prejudiced in his defence by the defect
in the charge regard must be had to the fact that the objection to the framing of the charge was
not raised till a late stage in the proceedings. 11
The Code gives ample power to the courts to alter or amend a charge provided that the accused
has not to face for a new offence or is not prejudiced either by keeping him in the dark about
that charge or in not giving a full opportunity of meeting it and putting forward any defence
open to him, on the charge finally preferred against him. 12 Any addition or alteration of a charge
will not be illegal only when it does not prejudice the accused.
Under Section 217 the accused has a right to recall prosecution witnesses alter the alteration of
the charge, even if such alteration does not affect his defence. 13Such right may be denied by
the Court if it is of the opinion that the purpose is only delay or vexation or defeating the ends
of justice. However the Courts do not owe a legal duty to ask the accused, after the charge has
been altered to state whether he wishes to have any of the witnesses recalled or re-examined
and whether the wishes to call any witnesses.14 The Code gives ample power to the trial as well
as Appellate Courts to alter or amend a charge provided the accused has not to face a charge
for a new offence or is not prejudiced either by keeping him in the dark or in not giving a full
8
Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v State of Bombay AIR 1956 SC 575.
9
Bhimbadhar Pradhan v State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 469.
10
Babulal v Emperor AIR 1938 PC 130.
11
Sukha v State of Rajasthan AIR 1956 SC 513.
12
Kantilal v State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 359.
13
Ramalinga Odayar v Emperor AIR 1929 Mad 200.
14
Moosa Abdul Rahiman v State of Kerala 1982 Cr. LJ 1384 (Ker)
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opportunity of meeting it and putting forward any defence open to him on the charge finally
preferred against him.15
The object of the rule embodied in Section 218 is to ensure a fair trial and to see that the accused
is not bewildered by having been asked to defend several unconnected charges or distinct
offences lumped together in one charge or in separate charges.16 There is no exception to the
rule that there should be separate charge for each offence. The first part of this section relates
to framing of charges. Section 218 is mandatory and for every distinct offence, there should be
a separate charge excepting in those cases which are specified in the code. Where two dacoities
are committed in two different houses on the same night a single rolled up charge embracing
both dacoities should not be framed.
According to sub-section (2) the operation of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223 shall not be
affected by the above said basic rule. In other words these sections are exceptions to the basic
rules contained in Section 218(1). These exceptions are based on some rational principle or
other. In Section 219 which permits a joint trial for offences of the same kind not exceeding
three in number and committed within a period of twelve months, the principle is the avoidance
of a multiplicity of proceedings.17
(a) Exception 1 to the basic rule: Section 219 makes a provision for one trial of three offences
of the same kind committed by one accused within a period of 12 months whether committed
in respect of the same person or not. For the application of this section, it is necessary that:
The offences must be of the same kind
That they must be committed within the space of 12 months from the first to last
That the number of them should not exceed three.18
There are conflicting judicial opinions as to whether Sections 219-221 and 223 are mutually
exclusive or whether they can be used to get a cumulative effect. In other words, the question
is whether it is open to the prosecution to take help partly of one section and partly of another
section in order to justify the joinder of charges or whether the intention of law is that
sections should be mutually exclusive and only one of the them can be availed of at one
15
Kantilal v State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 359.
16
Aftab Ahmad Khan v State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 SC 436.
17
Ravinder Pal Singh v State of Punjab 2004 Cri LJ 1322 (P&H).
18
M R Menon v State of Kerala 1973 Cr. LJ 394 (Ker).
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time. The Allahabad High Court has pointed out in this connection that each of the four
Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223 mentioned in Section 218 can individually be relied upon
as justifying a joinder of charges in respect of any trial. Use cannot be made of two or more
of these sections together to justify a joinder. In other words it is not open to the prosecution
to take help partly of one section and partly of another in order to justify the joinder of
charges. Further it has been observed that the normal rule as embodied in Section 219 or
220 or 221 or 223. Each section is to be an exception individually. It is not the intention of
the Legislature to group together different sections in order to constitute an exception. 19
(b) Exception 2 to the basic rule: Offences committed in course of same transaction can be
charged at one trial. Under Section 220(1) it is stated that if, in one series of acts so
connected together as to form the same transaction more offences than one are committed
by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial every such offence.
A transaction is defined by Sir James Stephen “as a group of facts so connected together
as to be referred to by a single name, as crime, a contract, wrong or any other subject of
inquiry which may be in issue.” The question whether a series of facts are so connected
together as to form the same transaction is a question of fact in each case depending on
proximity of time and place continuity of action and community of purpose or design. In
order to determine whether a group of facts constitute one, it is necessary to ascertain
whether they are so connected together as to constitute a whole which can properly be
described as a transaction. The real and substantial test by same transaction depends on
whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or as cause and effect or as
principal and subsidiary acts as to constitute one continuous action.
(c) Exception 3 to the basic rule: Offences of criminal breach of trust or dishonest
misappropriation of property and their companion offences of falsification of accounts to
be tried at one trial. When a person charged with one or more offences of criminal breach
of trust or dishonest misappropriation of property as provided in Section 212(2) or in
Section 219(1) is accused of committing for the purpose of facilitating or concealing the
commission of that offence or those offences one or more offences of falsification of
accounts he may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence—Section
220(2)
19
Emperor v Dhaneshram AIR 1927 Nag 223.
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Many a time the offence of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of
property is accompanied with the offence of falsification of accounts the latter offence
being committed for the purpose of facilitating or concealing the commission of the former
offence. Section 220(2) enables to have these offences tried at one trial.
(d) Exception 4 to the basic rule: Same act falling under different definitions of offences such
offences may be tried at one trial. If several acts of which one or more than one would by
itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence,
the person accused of them may be charged with and tried at one trial for the offence
constituted by such acts when combined and for any offence constituted by anyone or more
of such acts—Section 220(3). This section may be conveniently read with Section 71 of
the IPC which inter alia provides that ‘where anything is an offence falling within two or
more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are
defined or punished, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment
than the court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.’ In such a case
however the accused can be charged with and tried in one trial for all such offences.
(e) Exception 5 to basic rule: Acts forming an offence also constituting different offences
when taken separately or in groups—all such offences to be tried at one trial—If several
acts of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence,
constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged
with, and tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when combined and fro
any offence constituted by any one or more of such acts—Section 220(4). Section 71 of
IPC provides that where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or
themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the
offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the court which tries
him could award for any one of such offences. However according to Section 220(4) the
accused person can be charged with and tried at one trial for all such offences. Section
220(5) provides that nothing contained in Section 220 shall affect Section 71 of the IPC.
(f) Exception 6 to the basic rule: Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed.
According to sub-section (1) of Section 221 several offences under this section need not
necessarily be offences of same kind but may be offences of different kinds. The essential
thing is that all of such offences must arise out of a single act or set of acts. The court under
this section may frame cumulative charges or charges in the alternative. But a charge
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alternatively of two different offences under different section of IPC based on same facts
is not permissible under this section. For example a person charged with rape on a married
woman cannot be alternatively charged with adultery with same woman and on the same
facts as a complaint for adultery should be actually instituted by the husband. Sub-section
(2) provides that a man may be convicted of an offence although there has been no charge
in respect of it, if the evidence is such as is sufficient to establish that offence. However,
offences charged and offences shown by evidence to have been committed must be cognate
offences, such as criminal breach of trust and attempt to cheat. According to some High
Courts the actual commission of an offence and its abetments are also cognate offences.
(g) Exception 7 to the basic rule: Certain provisions may be charged jointly. Section 223
applies only to trials and not to inquiries. A joint trial of several persons under this section
is not vitiated merely by the facts that at the end of the trial the facts found happen to be
different from those on the basis of which the charges were originally framed.20 It was held
in A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak case that an accused person cannot assert any right to a joint
trial with his co-accused. It is the right of the prosecution to decide whom to prosecute. In
Ayodhya Singh v. State of Rajasthan, case Ayodhya Singh and Hira Singh were charged
jointly for the offences under Section 457 read with Section 75, IPC and under Section 380
read with Section 75 IPC. It was considered that there had been mis-joinder of charges. It
was held by the Supreme Court that the accused jointly committed the offences with which
they were charged and that those offences were committed in the course of same
transaction. The two accused could consequently be charged and tried together.
Clause (a) states that the words “same offence” means an offence arising out of the same
act or series of acts.21 They imply that the accused person must have acted in concert or
association.
Clause (b) states that the joinder of three charges under Section 420 of the IPC against one
accused with three charges of abetment of those offences against another accused is legally
permissible and proper. 22
Clause (c) states the words “within the meaning of Section 219” indicate that, what was
meant by the words “offence of the same kind” in clause (c) of Section 223 is the same
thing as was meant by the identical expression used in Section 219(1) defined in Section
20
Trilockchand v Rex AIR 1949 All 187.
21
Amar Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1954 Punj 106.
22
K Satwant Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 226.
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219(2) and nothing more. If it was intention of the legislature to provide that the number
of offences for which several accused persons could be tried under clause (c) of Section
223 should be limited to three as provided in Section 219(1), the legislature would have
expressed the same in so many words.
Clause (d) states that the offence of conspiracy and the offences committed by each
conspirator in pursuance of the conspiracy are ‘offences committed in the course of the
same transaction’ within the meaning of Section 220 and persons accused of such offences
can be tried jointly by one trial. The common concert and agreement which constitute the
conspiracy serve to unify the acts done under it. Identity of time is not essential in
determining whether certain events form the same transaction within the meaning of
Section 223. It is the continuity of action and the sameness of purpose that determine
whether the events constitute the same transaction.
Clause (e) states an offence which includes theft means an offence of which theft is an
essential ingredient.
Clause (f) states that the expression “possession of which has been transferred by one
offence” refers to the original theft of the property stolen on one occasion. Therefore where
different properties stolen at one theft were received by several persons at different times,
all or any of such receivers can be tried jointly for their offences of receiving stolen
properties. However persons found in possession of such stolen properties secured by
different thefts cannot be tried jointly under this clause.
Power of Court to order separate trial in cases where joinder of charges or of offenders is
permissible
The basic rule regarding charge is that for every distinct offence there shall be a separate charge
and for every such charge there shall be a separate trial. The only exception recognised is
contained in Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. Therefore separate trial is the rule and the joint
trial is an exception. The sections containing the exception are only enabling provisions. A
court has got the discretion to order a separate trial even though the case is covered by one of
the exceptions enabling a joint trial. A joint trial of a very large number of charges is very much
to be deprecated even though it is not prohibited by law. A separate trial is always desirable
whenever there is risk of prejudice to the accused in a joint trial.
OFFENCE CHARGED
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Section 222 contemplates a conviction of minor offence included in the offence charged in
either of the two cases:
Where the offence charged consists of several particulars a combination of some only of
which constitutes a complete minor offence and such combination is proved but the
remaining particulars are not proved.
Where facts are proved which reduce the offence charged to a minor offence. But there can
be no conviction for major offence on a charge of minor one. This section is an exception
to the rule that a person cannot be convicted of an offence with which he is not charged.
When a charge containing more heads than one is framed and the conviction has been had on
one or more of them the complainant or the person conducting the prosecution may with the
consent of the Court withdraw the remaining charge or charges or the Court may of its own
accord stay enquiry or trial of such charge. The withdrawal of charge or the stay of enquiry or
trial is possible only on the conviction being on any other charge. Section 224 allows
withdrawal or stay of charges only when conviction has been passed on one or more of the
charges. When before the beginning of the trial the public prosecutor withdraws the charge of
the offence under one head the section has no application.
Before invoking provisions of Sections 227 and 228 dealing with trials before the Court of
Session, no court takes note of Section 226 which obliges the prosecution to describe the charge
brought against the accused and state by what evidence the guilt of the accused would be
proved. This point was stressed by the two-Judge Bench in Satish Mehra v Delhi Admn case
But it is a matter of regret that neither the courts nor the prosecution complies with this section.
It may reduce the workload of the courts if the trial courts insist upon the prosecution to strictly
comply with the provisions of Section 226 of the Code inasmuch as the courts can discharge
the accused if there is no prima facie case.
The Supreme Court in Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau case observed, of Investigation has
examined the legal provisions and authorities on framing of charge in criminal prosecutions.
While reiterating the legal principles evolved by the courts over the years, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as under:
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In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal case the scope of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. was
considered. After adverting to various decisions, this Court has enumerated the following
principles:
"(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227
of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case
and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views
are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while
giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within
his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the
present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial."
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 & 228 of Cr.P.C. On consideration of the authorities
about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:-
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the
Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test
to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has
to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused
might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion
is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot
be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material
placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was
possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and
documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face
value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this
limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all
that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished
from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Kelkar, R.V., Criminal Procedure Code, 5th edition Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, ,
(2008)
Articles
Sathasivam, Justice P., “Framing of Charge: Principles and Law”, The Legal Blog, (2011)
Websites
http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/2002v2a3.htm
http://legalperspectives.blogspot.in/2010/10/framing-of-charge-in-criminal-trial-law.html
http://www.legalblog.in/2011/08/framing-of-charge-principles-and-law.html
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