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BjarupJ 1982redux PDF
BjarupJ 1982redux PDF
BY
JES BJARUP
Senior Lecturer in
Jurisprudence
in the University of Aarhus, Denmark
Ph.D.
University of Edinburgh
1982
/
To Perni lie and Tine
ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 6.9)
Name of Candidate
Degree Date
Title of Thesis Reason > Emotion and the Law. Studies in the Philosophy of Axel Hagerstrom
The subject-matter of this thesis is the philosophy put forward by the Swede Axel
Hagerstrom (1868-1939). Hagerstrdm was the son of an orthodox minister of the Swe¬
dish Lutheran Church and grew up in an intensely religious atmosphere. He began
theological studies at Uppsala University which was to remain his academic home
throughout his life. Hagerstrom's interests were diverted from theology to philo¬
sophy, but he carried with him the belief of having a mission in life. As a philo¬
sopher Hagerstrom used his vocation as a way of serving his fellow-men to see the
truth. He had a very influential position in Sweden as a founder of the Uppsala-
School of Philosophy as well as a school of jurisprudence generally known as Scan¬
dinavian Legal Realism. His mission is expressed programatically in his motto:
"Praeterea Censeo Metaphysicam Esse Delendam", i.e. Moreover I propose that meta¬
physics must be destroyed. What Hagerstrom means to express by his motto is his
basic belief that the increase of knowledge makes eventually for greater social
harmony and personal happiness. We must look upon human affairs rationally and
discard metaphysics, i.e. ignorance and superstition based upon man's false ideas
which are rooted in his passions, i.e. his feelings and volitions. In order to
achieve knowledge and social harmony, a method of inquiry is needed which will
put knowledge on a secure foundation and thus force agreement amongst contending
parties. Hagerstrom's epistemology expresses this method of inquiry, presented
as a Copernican Revolution. Hagerstrom regards reason or thinking rather than
faith and sense-experience as the foundation of certainty in knowledge. This in
turn leads him to adopt the view that there is no freedom but in the rational re¬
cognition of the necessity of all things, and in the power which reason, by this
recognition, may exert over the passions.
My thesis is that Hagerstrom's epistemology is fundamental for his moral and legal
philosophy. It leads Hagerstrom to propound, I submit, not only an emotive moral
theory but also a cognitive moral theory which holds that society provides the
moral standards by which individuals and their actions must be judged. In the area
of law it leads Hagerstrom to propound, I submit, two theories of law: a formal
theory which holds that law is based upon reason and a psychological theory which
holds that law is an expression of interests.
It is
my argument that Hagerstrom is right that epistemology is important for law
and legal knowledge, but Hagerstrom's epistemology is inadequate since it does not
make room for the idea of individual rights as well as the possibility of moral
criticism of law is ruled out.
PGS/ABST/78
Declaration: I hereby declare that the thesis "Reason,
Emotion and the Law. Studies in the Philo¬
sophy of Axel Hagerstrom" has been composed
solely by me.
Preface
residing.
I decided to accept Professor Twining's advice which I
have never regretted. When I was called to an interview at
The British Council in Copenhagen I had then made up my mind
to study in Edinburgh. This was, I think, somewhat a surprise
for my interviewers who expected, I presume, my answer to be
either Oxford or Cambridge. But I was quite adamant that Edin¬
burgh was the place to go to, indeed, I made this a condition
for my accepting the Fellowship, if offered. I never thought
that I would succeed. I am, therefore, greatly indebted to
the British Council for having been awarded a British Council
Fellowship to study Philosophy of Law towards the Ph.D. at
the University of Edinburgh (Scot/Den/2202/17). And I wish to
convey my gratitude towards the office of the British Council
in Copenhagen which supported my application to the Head of¬
fice in London which granted me the Fellowship, and to the
office in Edinburgh, especially to Miss M.A. Loudon, who
assisted me during my stay in Edinburgh from 1976 to 1978.
My first visit to Edinburgh was in the glorious summer
of 1976, where Professor MacCormick offered me his welcome
and hospitality. Neil became my friend, and I lost my heart
to Edinburgh.
Scandinavian Legal Realism has always received particu¬
lar attention in Scotland.
glected .
Jes Bjarup
VIII
CONTENTS
1. At the Crossroad 1
1. Introduction 33
tiga, 1895 39
Om filosofiens betydelse for manniskan, 1898 43
Kants Ethik im Verhaltnis zu seinem erkenntnistheore-
tischen Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt, 1902 44
Stat och ratt. En rattsfilosofisk undersokning. I,
1904 50
Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft. Eine logisch-erkenntnis-
theoretische Untersuchung. I. Die Realitat, 1908 ... 53
Botanisten och filosofen, 1910 54
Selbstdarstellung, 1929 55
Uber die Gleichungen der speziellen Relativitatstheo-
rie, 1937 55
I moralpsykologiska fragor, 1908 55
Kritiska punkter i vardepsykologien, 1910 58
Om moraliska forestallningars sanning, 1911 60
Social teleologi i marxismen, 1909 60
Ar gallande ratt uttryck av vilja?, 1916 61
IX
filosofi, 1968 67
Martin Fries, Verklighetsbegreppet enligt Hagerstrom,
1944 68
Ernst Logren, Huvuddragen av Hagerstroms filosofi,
1944 70
Bo Petersson, Axel Hagerstroms
vardeteori, 1973 71
Jarl Hemberg, Religion och metafysik, 1966 72
Ernst Cassirer, Axel Hagerstrom, 1939 72
1. Introduction 83
Hagerstrom's gospel 91
Hagerstrom's pupils 94
The importance of Hagerstrom's philosophy 95
1. Introduction 223
1. Introduction 287
1. Introduction 355
Bibliography 448
1. At the Crossroads
1) "Axel Hagerstrom. The Person Whom Few Knew", Stockholm 1961. Herein¬
after referred as Waller.
to The letter is at p. 93. I have trans¬
lated the quoted passages into English, as well as all other quoted
passages.
2) This book is also used
by C.D. Broad in his "Memoir of Axel Hager¬
strom", printed in 15-29. PR p.
3) "Axel Hagerstrom" in "Som jag minns dem" (As I Remember Them),
Stockholm 1949, p. 129-138. Hereinafter referred to as Landquist.
4) "Axel Hagerstrom. Some Recollections and Impressions" in Svensk
Litteraturtidsskrift, vol. 34, 1971, p. 27-31. Hereinafter referred
to as Wedberg. See also Wedberg's bibliography in Svenskt Biogra-
fisk Lexikon (red. Erik Grill) Bd. 19. Stockholm 1971-73, p. 607-
611 with further references.
3
you have chosen the best? You will say: "My philosophy is
in harmony with right reason; other philosophies are not."
But all other philosophers except your own followers dis¬
agree with you, and with equal right say of their philoso¬
phy what you say of yours, accusing you, as you do them,
of falsity and error. It is, therefore, plain that before
the truth of your philosophy can come to light, reasons
must be advanced, which are not common to other philoso¬
phies, but apply solely to your own; or else you must ad¬
mit that your philosophy is as uncertain and nugatory as
the rest."5)
8) Waller, p. 52.
9) John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (ed. by J. Stillinger) Oxford 1971,
p. 33.
10) Hagerstrom, INLM, p. 130, cf. p. 125: the commanded person "is de¬
termined, not by values which are significant for himself, but by
the imperative form of the expression".
11) Hagerstrom, INLM, p. 159.
6
autonomy.
The strict upbringing by his father is in some ways
balanced by Hagerstrom's relationship to his mother Augu¬
sta and her mother, Axel's grandmother, Charlotte. The
latter stayed with Hagerstrom's parents and it is probably
through her influence that Hagerstrom became interested in
political and social questions. Hagerstrom's mother was
also a devoted Christian who firmly believed in the command¬
ment to love God "with all thine heart and with all thy
soul and with all thy might" followed by the commandment
"thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". Love, for Ha¬
gerstrom's mother, is not seen as a power that destroys
man's reason, but rather, as an emotional attitude by which
discord and fear can be healed.
away one's sins. Sinners are not condemned to Hell but may
be assured of his salvation, and by the power of the Holy
audience.
fied that this choice after all did not entail any dis¬
grace on the family but on the contrary was a credit to
the family, cf. below p. 15.
Hagerstrom, as indicated, did not give in to his pa¬
character".^
Hagerstrom was very sensitive about his honour, and
as he later wrote "one fights the better when one is stand-
18) Henrik Ibsen, Peer Gynt, 1867. Hagerstrom read and admired the
works of Ibsen.
19) Waller, p. 64.
20) Waller, p. 64. Letter from June 1887.
21) Waller, p. 65. Letter from June 1887.
13
22)
ing up for one's rights". The analysis of the notions
of right and duty was to occupy Hagerstrom's mind. What
Hagerstrom writes in this letter forms the background for
his later philosophical analysis of these concepts. Hager¬
strom's attention to these concepts for philosophical ana¬
lysis was undertaken, I believe, not only because of their
philosophical and legal bearings but also with a wider pur¬
22) Hagerstrom, 2.
INLM p.
23) Uppsala 1893 (Aristotle's Ethical Ideas and Their Theoretical
Presuppositions).
24) Waller, p. 79.
14
32) (On the Moral Sense and Instinct as Rational in the Principal
Forms of Modern Rationalism).
33) Waller, p. 96-97.
34) Reinhold Geijer (1849-1922), professor in theoretical philosophy
in Uppsala.
18
"The philosopher,
the true philosopher, is distinguished
from other men, not by getting
closer to the truth, but
by the fact that the love of truth is glowing in his soul
in contrast to the coolness in other people. These people
are content with bits of truth, the philosopher by contrast
ing had not been in vain, and his calling was proof of his
salvation. Now was the time to do things in the service of
mankind.
ner, where the seats were at their highest which had the
effect that the lecturer was not visible until he advanced
sitting, with the grizzled hair combed back and the pincenez
wedged to his nose, reading aloud from a thick bunddle of
lecture-notes. The lecturer would start without any cere¬
monies. Hagerstrom never greeted his audience and would
hardly look at them. If he ever raised his eyes from his
notes, he would only glance at the doves, and not have an
some of the young men of today, and that was something very
unusual in those days. He was not grey although at that
time he was close to 65. in
high-pitched
As addition he had a
a teacher. Usually a
recent book was to be discussed (e.g.
Pound's Introduction
to the Philosophy of Law or Kelsen's
Allgemeine Staatslehre). Hagerstrom would often pick up a
thread somewhere at a point that might seem to be of se¬
condary importance; he would put a question that seemed
to be innocuous; but the answer occasioned a further
question, and in a few steps he was at the core of the
problem, having approached it from an unexpected angle."
But, of course, Olivecrona was a true pupil of Hager-
strom, while Wedberg's relationship to Hagerstrom became
problematic. Wedberg came to the conclusion that Hager-
strom's views were wrong, and he openly said so in a re¬
joinder to Lundstedt, another devoted disciple. Lundstedt1s
attitude is very revealing. He writes
"In 1934, I was impudently attacked in a paper by two brash
youngsters, graduate students of philosophy (now both of
them professors of philosophy), who reproached me, among
other with misinterpreting Hagerstrom's thoughts
things,
on law. I did
feel that these two cocky boys rated an
not
answer; but when Axel Hagerstrom suggested he would answer
in my stead I agreed of course."66)
mant that his claims were the correct claims which must be
Chapter II
1. Introduction
which he
seemed to know by heart - to the history of mo¬
ral, religious, and legal phenomena, to the abstractions
of "Begriffsjurisprudenz" (i.e. Conceptual Jurisprudence),
to the theories of value propounded in economics, and the
*
Editorial, The London Times Literary Supplement, 28th December
1967. Quoted from The International Thesaurus of Quotations (com¬
piled by R.T. Tripp), Harmondsworth 1970, Sec. 91, No. 61.
1) Waller, p. 29.
2) Wedberg, p. 28.
34
way the world is and what we say about it, and Hagerstrom's
claim is that what he says about it is true. Hagerstrom,
like Bacon, takes all knowledge to be within his province
and claims to present the only tenable view concerning
what we can think and what we cannot think. There are limits
aim is to win the allegiance of the whole man and his perso¬
13)
progressive development of mankind's philosophical thought."
The advancement of philosophical knowledge only makes pro¬
15) The quotations are from a lecture Hagerstrom held in 1923, see
PR, p. 213.
16) (On the Importance of Philosophy for Mankind)
44
principle that Kant meant what he said. The task for Hager¬
strom is then to discover and describe the true meaning of
Kant's thoughts based upon another methodological principle
that we must fully absorb ourselves in Kant's thoughts.
The only way to show that we understand what Kant really
means is to study his concepts and judgements expressed in
words and sentences in the context of the whole structure
19)
of Kant's doctrines.
"Es ist fur eine solche Erkenntnis (d.h. von der Gedanken-
19) (continued) indessen so, dass bei Kant, wie bei jedem tiefgehen-
deren Denker, die einzelne Ausserung, besonders wenn sie von tie-
ferer Bedeutung fur das System im Ganzen ist, eben durch den Zu-
sammenhang, in dem sie vorkommt, bestimmt ist. Wird der Zusammen-
hang fortgelassen, so bleibt der einzelne Satz in einem Gedanken-
system in Wirklichkeit hinsichtlich seiner Bedeutung unbestimmt,
so dass in ihn ganz anderes hineingelegt werden kann, als was
gemeint ist. Dabei ist das Unvermogen der Sprache, sich vollig
einem Denken anzuschmiegen, das sich nicht bloss mit dem sinn-
lich Darstellbaren beschaftigt, von grosser Bedeutung. Dieses
26) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. X, "Es ist klar, dass eine Ent-
wickelung uberhaupt nicht ihre gehdrige Beleuchtung erhalten
kann, sofern nicht ihr Endpunkt bereits bekannt ist."
27) Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. IX.
28) Cf. Hagerstrom, Kants Ethik, p. 827, "So ist die ganze psycho-
logische Auffassung von Kant eine gewaltsame Konstruktion, auf
dem eigenen Unvermogen des Konstruierenden beruhend, in seinem
Gedanken sich iiber eine psychologische Auffassung sei es der
theoretischen oder der praktischen Erkenntnis zu erheben.
Die Folge ist, dass Kants ganze Philosophie dargestellt wird,
als hatte sie ihren Ursprung nicht in einem grossen Denker,
sondern in vielen - kleinen."
48
34) (State and Law (Recht). A Philosophical Inquiry I), Uppsala 1904.
51
VitW
52
Ill, p. 109.
56
46) Printed in the journal Psyke (Edt. Sydney Alrutz), vol. 2, 1908,
p. vol. 3, 1908, p. 85-99.
273-287,
47) Hagerstrom refers to the German edition: Ursprung und Entwicklung
der Moralbegriffe. English edition: The Origin and Development of
the Moral Ideas, London 1906.
57
48)
In an article "Kritiska punkter i varde psykologien"
from 1910, written to honour his teacher and friend E.O.
morality."51)
Perhaps the reason why Hagerstrom did change his view
around 1909-1910 was his occupation with the theories of
Marx and Engels. Engels taught that there are at bottom
only two main philosophical positions, idealism and mate¬
rialism. And for Engels materialism is the true view. Hager-
strom, I believe, followed suit and rejected his former
idealism in favour of materialism. This fitted very well
with Hagerstrom's belief in the importance of the law of
contradiction as a fundamental law of reality. In this re¬
spect Hagerstrom parted company with the dialectics of Marx
and Engels. In a series of lectures, published in 1909 as
52)
"Social Teleologi i Marxismen", Hagerstrom argued that
in his analysis of society Marx confounds the idea of the psy¬
56)
Straffrattsvetenskapen" from 1920. Hagerstrom returned
to this theme in his article "En Straffrattslig Princip-
57)
undersokning", published shortly before his death.
Kelsen's theory of law was rejected as absurd in Hager-
58)
Strom's review of Kelsen's Allgemeine Staatslehre in 1928.
59)
-
6 9)
the book "Religionsfilosofi" covering Hagerstrom's lec¬
tures on religion. Hagerstrom gave a brief account of his
view on religion in his "Selbstdarstellung" but never pub¬
lished any book on this subject although he intended to do
so after completing his book on Roman law and his work on
Einstein's theory of relativity. But his death put an end
to this plan. Hagerstrom's lectures date from 1923 to 1929
and show his pre-occupation with the relation between the
78) Om Ratt och Moral (On Law and Morality), Stockholm 1941, cf. below
Ch. Ill, p. 132.
79) See above p. 44 f.
70
way about any other reality except the reality which we conceive."
From a letter to Arnold Solven, dated 4th January 1931 and pub¬
sion dates from 1912 when Hagerstrom holds the view that
some value-judgements are neither true nor false, and that
some value-judgements are always false. Petersson's claim
Hagerstrom, A.
85) (Axel Hagerstrom's Theory of Value), Uppsala 1973. With a summary
in English.
72
is that the emotive theory, i.e. the theory that some value-
judgements are neither true nor false, is true, but Hager-
strom's arguments fail in the end to establish this.
Hagerstrom's philosophy and its importance for theology
is discussed in Jarl Hemberg, "Religion och Metafysik. Axel
Hagerstroms och Anders Nygrens Religionsteorier och dessas
86)
Inflytande i svensk Religionsdebatt".
A general exposition of Hagerstrom's philosophy is
offered by Ernst Cassirer in his, "Axel Hagerstrom. Eine
8 7)
Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart". This
is a valuable study of Hagerstrom's epistemology and his
moral and legal theory. Cassirer relates Hagerstrom's phi¬
losophy to other writers, in epistemology, for example, he
refers especially to Husserl's criticism of subjectivism
as being quite similar to Hagerstrom's criticism.
Hagerstrom's general claim is that
"all that is called Geisteswissenschaft - whether it con¬
cerns the
society, the state, morality or religion - is
I,
only an intellectual play with expressions of feeling, as
if something real were designated thereby."88)
mistake. The person who makes a claim cannot also set the
standard for assessment of the validity of his argument and
the truth of his tenets. My claim is that Hagerstrom's te¬
nets do not pass the standard of non-contradiction. And
this claim I wish to substantiate in this book.
lity on the one hand, and his inquiry into the nature of
morality and his inquiry into the nature of law on the other
hand.
97)
views of Feuerbach, at least not in the published writings,
it is extremely difficult to establish whether the condi¬
tions (1), (2), (3), mentioned above, hold or not. To estab¬
lish whether the conditions hold or not it is necessary to
have access to Hagerstrom's unpublished manuscripts, which
perhaps will give us a clue. This is, again, to stress the
need for publication of his material. Since I have not had
access to the unpublished material I shall resist the temp¬
tation to write about authors who might have influenced
Hagerstrom. But I shall, occasionally, point to a similari¬
ty between HagerStrom's views and the views of other authors.
I shall, then, concentrate my efforts on Hagerstrom's text
as the object of my inquiry, hoping to arrive at an under¬
standing of it.
I start with the assumption that Hagerstrom is not
likely to be always contradicting himself. After all, the
corner stone of Hagerstrom's philosophy is the law of con-
98)
tradiction, so I assume that Hagerstrom is a consistent
writer. From this assumption it follows that I assume that
Hagerstrom is a systematic thinker, which, I think, is also
99)
Hagerstrom's own opinion of his efforts.
Now, Hagerstrom's systematic efforts can be orienta¬
ted either toward the precise formulation of a problem for
empirical scientific inquiry or toward an encyclopedic syn¬
thesis of basic tenets. The first systematic effort aims
at the advancement of inquiry, the latter has a different
aim in mind, that of conservation and transmission of truth.
I think it makes a difference which aim one has in mind.
enligt Hagerstrom".
98) Hagerstrom, PR p. 42.
99) Cf. Hagerstrom's own admission, PR p. 313, "I have maintained
the following basic ideas although I have not carried them through".
78
100) Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed., London 1974,
p. 327, cf. his The Open Society and its Enemies, 5th ed., London
1966, vol. 2, p. 215.
101) This is similar to F.H. Bradley. See John Passmore, A Hundred
Years of Philosophy, Penguin ed. 1968, p. 61.
If Hagerstrom
"had wished to arouse an Englishman's worst suspicions, he
could not have done better than he did by his use of the
word "mystical106)
A discussion of Hagerstrom's theory of Roman law as rooted
in "traditional ideas of mystical forces and bonds""^^ re¬
Chapter III
1. Introduction
*
The Crown and
Glory of Christianity, 1662, p. 407. Quoted from
The Concise Oxford
Dictionary of Quotations, Oxford 1975, p. 42. -
Cf. "Magna est Veritas et praevalet" (Great is Truth and Mighty
above all Things), 3 Esdras, IV, 41 (Vulgate). Quoted from Oxford
Dictionary, p. 29.
1) For Ludwig Feuerbach1s development, see Frederick Gregory, Scienti¬
fic Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany, Dordrecht 1977, Ch.
1. It is interesting to notice the common background between
Feuerbach and Hagerstrom.
84
4) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50-1.
5) For the phrase "mental set" I am indebted to E.H. Gombrich, Art and
Illusion, 5th ed. London 1977, p. 53.,
7)
by the treatise itself."
The treatise referred to is "Das Prinzip der Wissen-
schaft", and it is revealing to read Hagerstrom's own ex¬
position in his "Selbstdarstellung" of that treatise. Ha¬
gerstrom writes
"Ipass over certain statements in the treatise, the ob¬
scurity of which I soon perceived for myself."8)
Since Hagerstrom gets involved in confusing himself
by using a familiar vocabulary, what, then, about Hager¬
strom's readers? Do they also perceive the obscurity as
easily as Hagerstrom does? Hagerstrom obviously must think
so, since he is not prepared to inform the readers of his
"Selbstdarstellung" about the dividing line between obscure
and non-obscure statements in "Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft".
It is rather curious why Hagerstrom keeps this as a dark
secret. I should have thought it proper that potential
9)
readers of this "most important book" were informed of
which statements they can safely ignore, and which they
have to pay attention to.
Perhaps the reason is that Hagerstrom writes equivo¬
cally. This statement needs to be defended, because Hager¬
strom's own prescription is that it is vital to discard
thinking in fluid notions in favour of thinking in fixed
or rigid concepts.^' My claim is that Hagerstrom in his
epistemological doctrine cannot afford to be clear about
his "fundamental propositions". The reason why is that
Hagerstrom's method is to take the familiar technical ter¬
minology for granted and then try to show that thinking in
these terms is inconsistent, since the terms do not coin¬
cide in some essential points with objective reality. To
establish this, it is necessary for Hagerstrom to put a
new meaning into the given terminology and incorporate
this into a new consistent theory."*""^
7) Hagerstrom, PR p. 37.
8) Hagerstrom, PR p. 38.
9) This is Hagerstrom's own description of "Das Prinzip der Wissen-
schaft", see PR p. 37.
10) Cf. above Ch. II, p. 54 f., 57 f.? 68, 75 f.
11) There is also the possibility for Hagerstrom either to use the
87
24) The quoted sentence is from Alice Ambrose, in her remarks about
Wittgenstein, in "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Portrait", in Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Language (Edt. A. Ambrose and M.
Lazerowitz) London 1972, p. 13. Ambrose writes that "Doing philo¬
sophy was a moral matter for Wittgenstein". This remark applies
to Hagerstrom as well. Cf. below p. 94.
25) Cf. The Bible, John, 8:32.
26) Hagerstrom, PR p. 304-05, from lectures delivered in 1920 and 1929,
cf. Fries, Religionsfilosofi, p. 11.
92
27) Cf. e.g. "I shall light a candle of understanding in thine heart,
which shall not be put out", 2, Esdras XIV, 25, and "Ye are the
light of the world". "Let your light so shine before men, that
they may see your good works", St. Matthew, V, 14-16. - Cf. gene¬
rally the notion of "the candle of the Lord set up by himself in
men's minds", John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding
(Edt. P.H. Nidditch) Oxford 1975, Book IV, Ch. Ill, § 20, p. 552.
28) Cf. e.g. Feuerbach, "The senses illume the world to us, but their
light is not their own, rather, it comes from the central sun of
the mind". Quoted from Gregory, Scientific Materialism, p. 20.
93
30) Cf. Hagerstrom, "In the abstract one needs an object in order to
be conscious which exists independently of me or outside of me"
PR p. 187.
31) The quotations are taken from Olivecrona's preface, see Hagerstrom
INLM XVI and p. XXI. The word "scientific" is used, I take it,
p.
as meaning "conforming to Hagerstrom's guiding principles".
32) Cf. Folke Schmidt, "There existed between Hagerstrom and Lundstedt
what can only be described as a God-to-Prophet Relationship", The
37)
case, the assent ought to be proportioned to the evidence".
If Hagerstrom's criticism has been shown to be invalid,
then one should disbelieve it; if it has been shown to be
valid, one should believe it, and if it has not been shown
to be either, which Olivecrona suggests by his remark about
44) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 135, cf. p. 150 and
p. 674 on Descartes' "remarkable revolution in philosophy".
99
tional basis for our beliefs about the world, Kant argues.
49) Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 180-1, cf. p. 95 and 191.
50) Kant, Critique, p. B XXXI (p. 30). Cf. below p. 104.
51) Kant, Critique, p. B XXX (p. 29).
101
dom realized
. .
,,,58)
.
57) G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (transl. with notes by T.M. Knox)
Oxford 1952, Preface p. 10. Cf. Knox' note p. 302.
58) Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 129, p. 86.
59) Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 326.
60) Cf. Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen
deutschen Philosophie. Reprinted in Karl Marx - Friedrich Engels,
Werke, Bd. 21, Berlin 1973, p. 267.
105
61) Cf.Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 331 ff., cf. below
62) Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 275.
106
Engels' question is
"1st unser Denken imstande, die wirkliche Welt zu erkennen,
vermogen wir in unsern Vorstellungen und Begriffen von der
wirklichen Welt ein richtiges Spiegelbild der Wirklichkeit
zu erzeugen?". '
66) Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach. Quoted from K. Marx and F. Engels,
Selected Works, vol. II, Moscow 1958, p. 403.
108
76) Cf. Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism, Ch. IX. Descar¬
tes, Conqueror of Scepticism.
77) Popkin, The History of Scepticism, p. 182. Quoting an eighteen-
century Cartesian. The following passage in the text occurs at
p. 183-4.
113
8 0)
to use a phrase from Hegel. Hagerstrom's starting-point
is nihilism, resulting in the discovery of one and only one
absolutely certain truth as the foundation of knowledge.
84)
walzung der Erkenntnistheorie."
Hagerstrom's discovery of this fundamental truth that
knowledge is equivalent to reality provides the logical
foundation, which makes it possible to recognize valid
claims of knowledge, since the concept of reality reveals
the criterion of truth. Again I let Hagerstrom speak for
himself in German:
with e • 86)
Spinoza.
Hagerstrom's revolution provides not only the answer
to Hagerstrom's initial question: "What can I know?", but
also the answer to the question: "What can men know?".
There is a common, solid foundation of departure for know¬
ing the world. When man's mind is purified from prejudices
and preconceived opinions, it is capable of knowing the
world.
88) Reid, Essays on the Intellecutal Powers of Man, Essay VI. Cf.
also Allen Vannerus, Hagerstromstudier (Studies of Hagerstrom),
Stockholm 1930, who makes this valid point against Hagerstrom in
an otherwise erratic book.
117
89) I owe the quoted phrases to Popper, Open Society and its Enemies,
vol. II, p. 227, where also the quotation in the text comes from.
118
98)
back'd Tortoise, replied, something he knew not what".
Locke's point, in telling the story, is that we use words
without having clear and distinct ideas. Had the poor phi¬
losopher just "thought of this word substance, he needed
not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to sup¬
98) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXIII,
§ 3 (p. 297).
99) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XIII,
§ 19 (p. 175).
100) Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I, Ch. IV, § 18
(p. 95), cf. Book II, Ch. XIII, § 19 (p. 175) and Ch. XXIII, § 2, (p.296).
101) Cf. Hagerstrom, PW p. 59.
122
102) Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop. XI, Corollary (p. 91)
103) Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (transl. by
W. Wallace). Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 161.
104) Hegel, Encyclopaedia. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 171.
105) Hegel, Phenomenology. Quoted from Weiss, Hegel p. 13.
123
both with the world and with his own nature. He also found
140) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 829 note (p. 633 note).
141) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50, and p. 211 respectively.
142) Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hagerstrom's filosofi, p. 54.
132
from the path of feeling and willing upon the path of think¬
ing and truth is what Hagerstrom's Copernican Revolution
aims at. The fruit of this pursuit is unity and peace among
human beings, since "it belongs to the notion of truth to
be one" This is Hagerstrom's gospel: he embodies the
truth. Soundly and plainly expounded it amounts to: he who
is not with us is against us, and again, he who is not
I said, he does not care to mention his target and put his
reader into the position to judge for himself if Hagerstrom's
criticism is correct, that is whether Hagerstrom has grasped
the meaning of the view he so violently dismisses.
A critical reader of Hagerstrom, then cannot be sure
139
159)
strom. His henchmen are now alone and left to them¬
164) For the phrases quoted, see Hagerstrom, INLM p. 112 and PR p. 57
respectively.
165) Hagerstrom, PR p. 41.
143
writing
"subjectivism I refuted by showing that in no conscious¬
ness can the consciousness itself be given. That which is
apprehended is always something other than the apprehen¬
sion ."177)
But Hagerstrom is not entitled to claim that he is the
first modern philosopher who refutes idealism by relying
on the distinction between an act of consciousness and the
cho-physical reality".
181)
intimately connected with bodily existence". In this
sense consciousness is an objective reality, a quality of
body or "a material reality". It follows that man's think¬
ing, feeling and willing by nature is a material reality
in contrast to consciousness as something spiritual, e.g.
the consciousness of activity, which is "absurd from the
182)
logical point of view", or as Hagerstrom says, con¬
"it is
evidently a philosophical opinion; for the vulgar
undoubtedly believe that it is the external object which
we immediately perceive, and not a representative image of
it only. It is for this reason that they look upon it as
a perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of ex-
151
ternal objects . ^
Hagerstrom, however, claims that the vulgar, to use
of
, . „ 193)
ordinary consciousness .
194)
to me, belongs to it as a property". - What Hagerstrom
means is, I think, that the table, besides other properties
like size, shape, weight and colour, also has the property
of being a possible sense-experience.
Hagerstrom's criticism is then aimed at phenomenalism,
195)
which claims that to be is to be perceivable. This xs
the doctrine of John Stuart Mill, who puts it that "matter
is the permament possibility of sensation". According to
phenomenalism, a physical object, say a table, is nothing
but a group of sense-experiences (or sense-data) which are
obtained by or can be obtained by perceiving the table. But
an example . ^
It is for Hagerstrom impossible to misidentify what we
touch. From this analysis Hagerstrom proceeds to offer his
own view of perception or mental apprehension as "an appre¬
hension which is associated with a unique (indescribable)
feeling of constraintThus, Hagerstrom's approach to
his theory of perceiving is not characterized by any con¬
224)
hygiene. What are the pure and foreign elements in the
human soul? The pure element is the faculty of thinking,
this is the essence of the soul. Thinking or reason is some¬
him?". 0„ 233)
tween 1. and 2.
238) I am indebted to Nicholas Rescher for the example and the argu¬
ment.
171
manner that does not favour box A over box B. What is the
that you can believe it, you can disbelieve it, or you can
something constant.
Hagerstrom's way of thinking is similar to Plato's way
24 3)
of thinking. For Plato the human soul frees itself
from disorder by recognizing the orderly relationship be¬
tween ideal forms in a world which is independent of the
sensible world. For Plato the human being becomes like what
he contemplates, and becomes orderly if he relies on and re¬
mains in contact with objects (i.e. ideas) which are constant
and changeless. Hagerstrom accepts that with the important
proviso that Plato's world of ideas for Hagerstrom is the
present, sensible world of facts. But one might object that
there is no reason why "the human soul-life" should become
disorderly merely as a result of contemplating the disorder¬
ly, or "the human soul-life" should become orderly merely
244)
as a result of contemplating the orderly. Plato thought
otherwise, and his modern follower Hagerstrom follows suit.
As noticed above, the foundation of Hagerstrom's "scien-
245)
tific world-picture" is a complex of feelings and ideas.
Hence, if we follow Hagerstrom it "must be determined as
wherever.
250) For the phrase quoted see C.A. Mace, Some Trends in the Philo¬
sophy of Mind, in British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (Edt.
C.A. Mace) London 1957, p. 99 ff., at p. 104.
177
Hagerstrom's materialism.
There is also a modified version of materialism to be
Perhaps, too, there is only one way to rescue law and mo¬
things also has its inadequacies. The latter view may very
"It is
impossible to ascribe a permanent existence to a
rule of
law or to any other rule. A rule exists only as
the content of a notion in a human being. No notion of
this kind is permanently present in the mind of anyone.
The imperative appears in the mind only intermittently."
6. Hagerstrom's Metaphysics
26V)
etwas wirkliches macht". That is to say a metaphysical
view is characterized by its concern with either pure being
(Wirklichkeit an sich) or with a particular real object, where
reality (Wirklichkeit selbst) is regarded as a property.
Thus, we have Hagerstrom's definition of metaphysics as
"nothing but a series of combinations of words, concerning
whose character the metaphysician knows nothing".
Hagerstrom's point is first that natural things and
events cannot be explained by transcendent causes, but
everything must be explained as belonging to the single
and all-inclusive system, which is reality or the world of
experience in time and space. No cause can be conceived as
somehow outside or independent of the order of reality,
e.g. a transcendent God creating reality. Reality is in
principle intelligible in all its parts and self-contained
as a system with reference to the furnishing of natural ex¬
planations in terms of necessary causes. This is Hagerstrom's
naturalism or materialism, his argument is aimed at showing
that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of
God provided by aspects of the nature of reality or of hu¬
man experience.
The second point Hagerstrom makes is the familiar Kan¬
tian view that reality or existence is not a property of
anything. Hagerstrom's argument is aimed at showing that
the attempt to prove God's existence from reason alone
266) Cf. Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, The Law Quarter¬
ly Review, vol. 90, 1974, p. 102 ff., at p. 103. Cf. John Pass-
more, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 264.
p.
267) Hagerstrom, Selbstdarstellung, p. 136, cf. PR p. 60 for the
following quotation in the text.
188
everyone who thinks, and does not chatter, must have some
but it does not follow that reality complies with his wish.
If Hagerstrom thinks so, he only deludes himself by wish¬
ful thinking, which, incidentally, is Hagerstrom's objec¬
tion to other writers, except himself. It follows we should
believe in the truth of O-proposition, and reject Hager¬
strom's thesis.
216)
sition is true. And then he proceeds to persuade other
people to accept it as the truth, writing "when it comes
276) Cf.Hagerstrom, PR p. 58, for the quotation in the text see p. 54.
277) Hagerstrom, EE p. 16 (Hagerstrom's italics).
196
But this will not do. The suspicious word" which Hager-
strom uses are "Induktionen wirklich Erkenntniswert haben",
that is genuine or actual knowledge. If Hagerstrom is asked
how he knows that his inductive reasoning has informative
value and constitutes genuine knowledge, then he can cite,
for example, some evidence from the past. If I come up with
some other evidence to the contrary, then Hagerstrom is able
to dismiss my evidence by saying that this has nothing to
do with the question at all, since my inductive reasoning
does not amount to "wirkliche Erkenntnis", or genuine
knowledge. The rejoinder to Hagerstrom is that his evidence
has nothing to do with the question at all, since he is pre¬
supposing that all events are causally determined, and this
is precisely what I am questioning. Hagerstrom simply begs
the question.
If Hagerstrom says that it is a defining characteris¬
tics of objects that they must necessarily have an inherent
orderly character (durch die eigene Beschaffenheit der
Sache bestimmt), then the rejoinder is that this argument
is unsuccessful as well. Hagerstrom, although powerful,
cannot legislate centaurs into existence by defining a word,
nor can he legislate order into existence by defining the
word 'object' (Sache). From definitions of "x", Hagerstrom
is not entitled to draw any conclusion whatever about whether
there are any x's in the world.
Whether there are any x's in the world and whether they
do exhibit order are matters for scientific investigation,
and in this respect Hagerstrom simply ignores Hume's criti¬
cism of induction and the subsequent discussion of this pro¬
blem. This is, of course, a serious flaw in Hagerstrom's
282) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sec. II, p.409.
200
28 5)
regarded as the embodiment of man's will. For Schopen¬
hauer, the proper task of philosophy lies in removing the
veil of deception that reality is the incarnation of ratio¬
nal order and setting the truth in a clear light, viz.:
that reality has the character of an endless, and in the
last analysis meaningless, struggle for existence, in which
all is stress, conflict and tension.
Hagerstrom says
ing, which discovers that human beings are but material ob¬
jects, which like other objects are spatially and temporal¬
ly ordered and stand in determinate and necessary causal
relations with one another.
291) Cf. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 320 f.; for Henri
Poincare mentioned in the text, ibid. p. 326 f. Hagerstrom does
not mention Poincare by name.
204
above Ch. I, p.2 f. and this ch. p.118 f. As for Leibniz it is worth
297)
of a reason that forgets its limits". Reason prevents
errors, and
"this gives it dignity and authority, through that censor¬
ship which secures general order and harmony, and indeed
the well-being of the scientific commonwealth, preventing
those who labour courageously and fruitfully on its be¬
half from losing sight of the supreme end, the happiness
of all mankind".
297) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 763 (p. 591); the following
quotations are from p. B 879 (p. 665), and p. B xxx (p. 29).
298) Cf. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 26. The following quota¬
tion is from p. 82, cf. 204.
299) Hagerstrom, PR p. 303.
207
our original nature, and heal us, and make us happy and
blessed" .
Although strongly opposed to the doctrines
of voluntarism, Hagerstrom has a sincere belief in his own
300) Plato, Symposium 193d, quoted from Popper, The Open Society and
its Enemies, vol. I, p. 169, cf. Plato, The Republic, Ch. XXII
(VI 497A-502C) .
304) Cf. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I, p. 31 f.,
vol. II, Ch. 11.
209
305) Cf. Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known, especially Ch. IV.
210
322) Perhaps Hagerstrom falls back on Kant, cf. Critique of Pure Rea¬
son, p. B 745 f. (p. 579 f.) and p. B 763 f. (p. 590 f.).
323) Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Prop. LXIX, p. 233, and Hagerstrom,
Ratten och Staten, p. 252, Hagerstrom, however, does not mention
Spinoza.
218
Chapter IV
1. Introduction
believe, as follows:
1) Man is a being with the faculties of thinking,
feeling, and willing.
2) Man's essence is the faculty of thinking which
is what marks man off from other living crea¬
tures .
3) Man is
capable of knowing the world by using
the faculty of thinking, and capable of over¬
coming feelings and volitions; when these fa¬
culties interfere with the faculty of thinking,
the result is meaningless words concerning the
world.
2) Hagerstrom, PR p. 60
227
the fact that the object - value - depends upon the feel-
7)
ing or desire which belongs to it". Hence good and evil,
right or wrong, are not in the objective world of matter.
These values are rather men's internal and variable reac¬
7) Hagerstrom, PR 69.
8) Hagerstrom, PR p. 68.
229
poses that gold is the sort of thing which can have the pro¬
perty of being just. This is a case of a category mistake,
since it is of necessity false that gold can be just. Consi¬
dering judgement A it is not of necessity false that gold is
the sort of thing, which has the property of being soluble.
Quite the reverse is actually the case, as Hagerstr5m im¬
plies by his judgement E. Hagerstrom's claim is that the de¬
nial of E is meaningless, but the denial of E is rather a
"a social
linguistic community, so that similar states of
mind in different
persons who use the same language are si¬
milarly expressed. But through their unconditional and
extra-individual character such sentences apparently ac¬
quire just the same properties as sentences which really
express underlying judgements."29)
As I have indicated, Hagerstrom holds that there is
a danger that the individual is deceived by language. The
deception is to be found in the distinction between sen¬
33) Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Ch. IX, §
21 (p. 488), cf. Book II, Ch. XXXIII, § 19 (p. 401). For the Lockean
view of language mentioned in the text, I am indebted to Jonathan
Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, p. 57.
34) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 139, p. 140, and p. 138 for the next two quo¬
tations .
239
an original account.
Hagerstrom simply adheres to the account offered by the
British philosophers Locke, Berkeley and Hume. In short,
39)
Hagerstrom is an empiricist about meanings. He holds that
no classificatory word makes sense to us unless either
a) we have sensorily encountered things, to which
words apply, or
b) we can define it in terms of words, which satis¬
fy (a) .
bably his reason is that all objects that exist are only par¬
ticular objects.
So for Hagerstrom the solution can only be found "in
a general, determinable feeling, for which the words, imme¬
diately regarded, are the expression". I have italicized the
word "feeling", since this implies that Hagerstrom's con¬
trast between meaningful words and misleading words collapses.
Hagerstrom's criterion of meaning is then, in
the end, based upon "a general determinable feeling", and
this feeling turns sounds into words with real meaning. The
metaphysician's sounds are still just sounds or empty words,
since these sounds are based on nothing but the metaphysi¬
cian's feeling. But what is, then, the difference between
Hagerstrom and the metaphysician, since Hagerstrom appeals
to feeling as well?
Feeling, for Hagerstrom, in contrast to thinking, does
not objectify. The nature of feeling is "in its very nature
objectless as being free from all elements of conception",
Hagerstrom claims.51' This is in contrast to thinking of some¬
thing as real "which involves one's conceiving it as exist¬
ing independently of the consciousness itself". According
to Hagerstrom's own contrast between feeling and thinking
his own criterion of meaning is a case of confusion between
conception and feeling. Hagerstrom is guilty of the very
same error, which he reproaches others for committing. The
seriously.
Hagerstrom is concerned with the question whether cer¬
tain sentences are meaningful or meaningless and with the
question whether we understand anything by such sentences.
He, quite rightly, stresses that these questions are impor¬
tant for people's actions. Granted that these questions
are important, they matter for the present. It is odd, then,
to look at the past and write bulky volumes about Romans
and their magic instead of concentrating on providing a
53)
confusion of thought.
Hagerstrom's criterion of meaning turns out to be a
piece of psychologism as well. Hagerstrom links his theory
of meaning to a causal theory according to which the crite¬
rion of meaning of words and sentences now becomes the re¬
the real act of stating it, and deduces himself into the
world.
belief .
"(A) If I think
that 'The horse is running', I mean, natu¬
rally, that the running itself, as a state of the
horse, actually is present and is therefore not mere¬
ly something which I imagine.
(B) 'The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees'
signifies that the 180-degree-sum-of-the-angles is
something real and not merely an apprehension. It is
so.
to conceive them".
70)
given to me belongs to it as a property". According to
Hagerstrom this is a contradiction, since
"the real horse, indeed,
same properties as the
has the
horse which Iwhile yet not being identical
apprehend,
with the real horse. However, the 'reality' of the horse
cannot be determined in any other way than by means of
the assertion that there is something, which is not the
same as that which is given in my apprehension."
the one hand, and its movement on the other, but also that
every judgement is a species of identity - an equation -
the imagination has only one object, viz. the image. The
latter judgement is not, properly speaking, a judgement,
since there is no reference to an external object. Proper¬
as Hagerstrom thinks.
Hagerstrom's analysis of the nature of the judgement
is that if anyone judges that a thing exists, then it does
exist, for judgement involves thought, and thought requires
an existing object. In one interpretation this is a truism,
since in every kind of thought there must be some object,
i.e. a distinct concept, thought of. On another interpre¬
tation it is an untruth, since we may have a distinct con¬
ception of things, which never existed, e.g. the animal
which is half dog and half horse. Hagerstrom seems to be
committed to the view that an affirmative judgement about
a thing implies a presumption of its existence in the mind
as conception, and in the real world as object. But this
theory is false. Hagerstrom's theory of judgement, I con¬
clude, should be rejected.
mains, false.
104) Compare in this respect the view once held by G.E. Moore to the
same effect, Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 203 f.
105) Hagerstrom, PR p. 50.
106) Hagerstrom, PR p. 45, and p. 53 f.
272
many adults as well, do not and need not reflect upon the
concepts they use. Many persons use concepts without analy¬
zing them and this may be the occasion for their failure
to see the world as a coherent and intelligible world.
Error is a matter of having relatively incomplete knowledge.
The individuals do not have complete and coherent knowledge
of the world and their illusions and errors must be replaced
by scientific knowledge, where judgements are placed "in a
fic knowledge.
Hence I hope I have vindicated my claim, made above
p. 229, that not only feeling but also thinking can lead
sible
... „ 114)
reality .
being.
These three ways are exhaustive, and since the first
and the second way are ruled out, there remains only the
third way. This way presents the secure path of scientific
research: The correct way of inquiry about any given object
is to assume that the object, whatever it may be, exists.
(WT) states the thesis, mentioned above, i.e. whatever we
shortly.
What I wish to do first is to point out that Hagerstrom
makes a quite similar classification of roads of inquiry,
i.e. the way of ordinary consciousness (WO), the way of
spiritual consciousness (WI), and the way of scientific
279
consciousness (WT). The ways of (WO) and (WI) are "the two
roots of metaphysics". Hence (WO) and (WI) are "incorrect
points of departure" leading to "a confusion in human
thought" . )
The way of ordinary consciousness (WO) is the way of
epistemological realism. It is based upon sensation and gi¬
ves only incomplete or partial knowledge. Its starting
point is reality, its end is to determine reality itself
as a definite real thing. As one proceeds on this way there
is "a confusion in human thought", so one ends in "reality-
117)
metaphysics", or "scolasticism". If an object is stu¬
died, then the object must exist. For (WO), however, the
118)
object is there, and it is not there. There are ideas
in our minds, but we cannot transcend the veil of our own
ideas, and thus we end in "the completely unintelligible,
the "thing in itself", which nevertheless is regarded, in¬
consistently, as accessible to the apprehension". So this
way is only the way of opinions, not the way of knowledge.
Next, there is the way of spiritual consciousness (WI).
This is the way of epistemological idealism. It is based
upon feeling and gives no knowledge at all. Its starting
point is the self, its end is that reality itself is not
determinable. And proceeding on this way one inevitably
ends in "I-metaphysics", or "mysticism". If an object is
studied, then the object must exist. For (WI), however,
the object does not exist at all, only the ideas in my mind
exist. Hence, the real world becomes an appearance. This
is, indeed, the way of track beyond all tidings. This way
gives no knowledge.
We must turn away from (WO) and (WI) as bogus ways of
achieving knowledge. (WO) is wrong, because reality itself
cannot be a specific reality nor become an object for thought.
(WI) is wrong, because self-consciousness cannot be a spe¬
cific reality nor become an object for thought. It follows
for Hagerstrom that we must enter upon the secure path of
side is the rejection of (WO) and (WI). (WI) makes the ob¬
ject to depend upon the knowing mind. (WO) makes the object
to be known inaccessible to the knowing mind. The construc¬
tive side is to claim
i.e.
This gives
6. If (S) can mention law or can think of law, then
law exists.
exists".
from the premises 6, 15, and 13 - that law exists, and law
does not exist. But this is impossible. If (S) is a student
of law, then law does not exist. This is absurd, and no one
119)
lagen". What is one to judge about such a book? He
follows the track beyond all tidings, according to Parme-
nides. And Hagerstrom concurs "the whole book is a collec¬
tion of absurdities".
121) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 298 for the phrase "medieval scholasti¬
cism" and PR p. 215 for the description (my brackets).
285
Chapter V
1. Introduction
*
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (transl. and introd. by
R.J. Hollingdale), Penguin Books, 1973, p. 78.
288
ces of laws and are in this respect set free. Thus to under¬
stand the laws that govern man in society is likewise to be
set free. It is consequently of the first importance to de¬
termine the character of these laws. It is even more impor¬
tant to approach such inquiries from a conceptual point of
view of philosophical thinking. It belongs to philosophical
thinking to present a system of mutually consistent non-
contradictory concepts by clarifying and rendering consist¬
ent the concepts used in ordinary and scientific discourse
concerning moral and legal judgements.
Concerning knowledge of nature Hagerstrom abandons his
nihilism in favour of rationalism. I have discussed, above
opinion is that this is not the case, cf. above Chapter III,
p. 181.
Turning his philosophical mind to values, to moral and
legal judgements, Hagerstrom explicitly acknowledges that
he has changed his mind around 1916. In his "Selbstdarstel¬
lung" he claims that he "discerned for the first time that
the whole idea of which
supposed to belong to the
value, is
3)
reality of the valued object, was impossible".
A change of view involves, of course, that Hagerstrom's
opinion concerning values in his Selbstdarstellung is in¬
consistent with his opinions concerning values expressed
in his former ethical writings. According to these writings,
for an outline I refer to Chapter II, p. , values are part
3) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70.
291
4) Hagerstrom, PR p. 70.
5) Hagerstrom, PR p. 315.
6) A full account of Hagerstrom's ethical thinking is still wanted.
But it must be
pointed out that Petersson's claim that Hagerstrom'
work before 1907 does not deal with ethical questions is without
14) London 1936, cf. for Passmore's remark in the text his A Hundred
Years of
Philosophy, p. 582, note 18. And see Kai Nielsen, On De¬
riving an Ought from an Is. A Retrospective Look, The Review of
Metaphysics, vol. 32, 1978-79, p. 487 ff., at p. 488 "Axel Hager¬
strom (a kind of Scandinavian A.J. Ayer) ".
>
295
also true that Hume holds the emotive thesis. That this is /
18)
the case is quite clear from Reid's discussion of Hume. j
Reid makes the distinction between the emotive thesis and
Wahrheitsgesichtspunkt".
18) Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (edt. by Baruch Brody),
London 1969, Essay V, Ch. VII, p. 457.
19) I. Kant, The Moral Law (transl. and edt. by H.J. Paton), London
1948, p. 106.
296
20) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. A 126 and p. B XIII (p.148 and 20).
21) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B 576 (p. 473).
22) Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltburgerlicher Ab-
sicht (1784), in Werke (Hrsg. W. Weischedel), Band 9, Darmstadt
1975, p. 35. I owe the translation to L.W. Beck, see T.C. Williams,
The Concept of the Categorical Imperative, Oxford 1968, p. 131.
23) Cf. Kant, The Moral Law, p. 69.
297
coherent reality.
In the theoretical area it is not the case that reason
3. there is
analytical thinking, or meta-ethical
thinking, concerned with conceptual analysis
of the meaning of words and sentences used in
moral discourse, and analysis of the methods
by which moral judgements can be established
as true or false.
300
(II) The second area deals with the questions such as e.g.
"what is meant by moral value?",
"what does it mean to say that something is morally
good?", or
called value-judgements".
This calls for a comment, in two respects. One is the
way Hagerstrom formulates his question, the other is Hager¬
strom's use of "wirklich", "Wirklichkeit", "real" and "Rea-
litat". Since Hagerstrom holds that the definition of a
judgement must take the reality (Wirklichkeit) judged about
into consideration, it is important to understand what Ha¬
gerstrom means by the notions mentioned. I must confess
that Hagerstrom's use of these terms has presented me with
difficulties, and I am still not quite sure whether Hager¬
strom wants to distinguish between "real" and "wirklich",
or whether he just uses these terms as synonyms. I am in¬
clined to think that the latter is the case. Hagerstrom
also uses the notions of "Wirklichkeit", "Wirklichkeit als
solcher" and "Wirklichkeit an sich", and his use of these
notions does not clarify but rather complicates the matter.
On the one hand Hagerstrom insists that it is important to
distinguish between "the reality (Wirklichkeit) and what
34)
is real (was wirklich ist)".
We must not, when we think, confuse "Wirklichkeit"
and "das Wirkliche", but this confusion is, according to
Hagerstrom, precisely to be found in metaphysical and ordi¬
nary ways of thinking. On the other hand, Hagerstrom holds
that
36)
womit die Auffassung verglichen werden konne)
He holds that
follow from our having the concept that the horse actually
exists. It is only because Hagerstrom sometimes uses "real"
in the sense of "determinate concept" and other times "real"
in the sense of "actual existence in the external world"
does know the meaning of words then one does know the mean¬
meaning it is essential
(a) to have an idea of value in one's mind
4- i c „ 4 6)
conceptual confusion.
The view,which Hagerstrom refers to,is ethical naturalism,
which holds that ethical words and sentences can be trans¬
lue". Why not, since the elements of (a), (b) and (c) are
or what is, what has been, or what will be and the course
of morality or what ought to be. This difference is also
stressed by Hagerstrom who says, in his inaugural lecture,
that "existence and value signify something entirely diffe-
49)
rent. Therefore value cannot be included within existence".
50) Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, p. 223, cf.
p. 471.
51) Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 7.
52) Cf. H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, Oxford 1949, especially Ch.
1:"Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" from Mind 1912.
53) Hagerstrom, PR p. 69.
313
56)
thinking.
In the case of words with proper or essential meaning,
the conditions are, according to Hagerstrom's theory of
meaning, that
(a) there must be simple idea in one's mind
a
of an independent object in space and time,
(b) that this simple idea is dependent upon
(caused by) a simple object,
65)
desire which belongs to it".
This is the essentialists' position. Hagerstrom asserts
that his definition of value is a true description of the
essence of value. If one asks why this is so, Hagerstrom
can only appeal to his own intuition. It is "intuitively
given" that values depend upon the feeling or desire which be¬
longs to them. What is so given cannot be mistaken. Hager¬
strom proceeds as follows. It is intuitively given that the
consciousness of something is simple, hence the content
which determines the consciousness must itself be simple.
What is simple is material. This being the case Hagerstrom
immediately knows, as a matter of logical necessity, that
his system of determinate and simple ideas is the real or
true system "besides which none other can be discovered"
This is so, for Hagerstrom knows that there cannot be two
form ofjudgement
a in which the same content which is
experienced in the feeling-consciousness is characterized^^,
more determinately as a factor in the system of reality".
This lends support to the emotive thesis concerning axiolo-
gical judgements. Such judgements are never value-judgements
but simply expressions of feelings.
Concerning normative judgements about duties we have
to consider the consciousness of willing or intention to
do the right thing. In this case Hagerstrom says, there are
"two factors present in consciousness of intention, viz. a
feeling of conative impulse and the idea of a certain ac¬
tion, the imperative form as such represents by its "Thou
shalt" the former. The "I will" of an intention represents
just the conative factor in it."72)
This does not give any clear guidance whether Hager¬
strom holds that the emotive thesis also encompasses norma¬
73) Hagerstrom, UNTLM p. 136. Following quotations from this page (my
italics, and my brackets).
74) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 151-2 (my italics).
75) Cf. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 29.
321
be declined.
real meaning. Such words are rather words without any mean¬
ing at all. Consequently, when men use these words in sen¬
tences they think they are putting forward judgements which
are true and important for social life in society. As a
matter of fact, from Hagerstrom's conceptual standpoint,
they are saying nothing at all. They suppose they are talk¬
ing sense when they use such words, but this supposition
is delusive. It "only gives expression to man's deep-rooted
tendency to make his own values into the true essence of
81)
reality". This delusion, of course, may have a profound
effect on the behaviour of men suffering from it. In this
way, Hagerstrom says "popular morality has come to work in
8 2)
an anti-social and anti-cultural direction". A rational
85) Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. II, p. 217.
328
some tribes that buried their dead and some that burned
graphs .
are born with moral values, writing "we carry within us the
93)
conflict between an altruistic and a vengeful morality".
This is an empirical claim, and it may turn out to be true.
Nevertheless Hagerstrom also believes that our moral atti¬
tudes and judgements are learned from the social environ¬
ment .
93) Hagerstrom, PR p. 79, for the next quotation in the text see p. 86.
94) Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728) in Bri¬
tish Moralists 1650-1800 (edt. D.D. Raphael) Oxford 1969, vol. 1,
p. 308.
333
95) Hagerstrom, PR p. 82, p. 79 f. - Cp. above Ch. IV, Sec. 8 for the
way of opinion, the way of illusion, the way of truth.
96) Hagerstrom, PR p. 79 f.
97) William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, V,24.
334
duty for the shepherd to prevent the wolf from doing harm".''"^'
He is also quite adamant that
"that the action ought to be done is not at all part of
what discover. The keenest analysis of what is pre¬
we can
sense in all ages. If this is so, then this may lead to the
view of ethical irrationalism, i.e. the view that there is no
117)
from an intellectual point of view". This is also Hager¬
strom's view, from "the point of view of thought" moral terms
are "meaningless", or "combinations of words of the ordinary
metaphysical variety inasmuch as one does not pass over to
. , _
rdeas of reality .
118) . . .
„
122)
of the Sophists". This is the position of ethical irra-
tionalism or moral relativism according to which it is main¬
tained that everything is permissible. Hagerstrom's rejoin¬
der is that this is a moral portion, which
"establishes other valuations than those which are con¬
tained in
ordinary moral ideas. But science does not
our
have to make
judgements.of value in this way. Just as it
cannot show that given rules ought to be followed, so it
cannot show that they ought not to be followed - and that
other principles of conduct ought to come forward instead".
125)
ultimately withstand the power of knowledge". This is
an echo of the conviction of eighteenth-century rationalist
philosophers.
Hagerstrom has a firm conviction in the power of the
"highly developed brains" of human beings to achieve know¬
ledge and abandon superstition. Some people are ignorant
and superstitious because they have been exploited in the
name of religion by cunning theologians and the classes
which have supported them. These superstitions must be era¬
dicated and people made to realize the proper functioning
of reason to achieve steady progress towards community and
solidarity. Hagerstrom writes "ultimately" and this quali¬
fication may render his claim quite vacuous. Nevertheless
Hagerstrom believes that his thesis will lead to
"a milder judgement on all human aspiration, which follows
from viewing things sub specie aeternitatis, from the in¬
sight that everything is only a moment in an endless natu¬
ral context, in which nothing is itself higher or lower". '
It is not consistent for Hagerstrom to consider things
under the form of eternity, since for him things are known by
us only as existing in relation to a given determinate space
and determinate time. Nor can it be consistent to pass "a
milder judgement" on all human aspirations, since according
reality .
Thus moral ideas are rooted in irrational feelings just
as legal ideas of rights and duties "have their roots in
traditional ideas of mystical forces and bonds", which have
12 8)
"no basis in reality". If modern moral philosophy and
modern jurisprudence still use such ideas as basis for their
judgements then this can only lead to a confusion of thought.
tions of
varying strength between (a) situations, elements
of situations, and compounds of situations and (b) responses,
readinesses to respond, facilitations, inhibitions, and di¬
rections of responses. If all these could be completely in¬
ventoried, telling what the man would think and do and what
would satisfy and annoy him, in every conceivable situation,
it seems to me that nothing would be left out. Learning ...
141)
and its relation with "the meaning of the idea of duty".
Hagerstrom holds that psychology is the science of experience,
and no one can observe an experience except the person having
it. So the method to be used must involve self-observation
case, and Hagerstrom seems to hold this view, thti. are such
words then to be discarded as meaningless? Hagerstrom's
answer is affirmative, since they do not have any referent.
If so, then mental talk is meaningless noises. It follows
then according to Hagerstrom that there are no such things
as feelings. But according to the methodological point there
must be, otherwise there is no subject-matter for psychology
to study. The way out is then to hunt the referent of mental
terms and find this to be that they refer to ideas in the
mind. What these ideas then refer to is never made clear.
Chapter VI
1. Introduction
*
Oliver Wendell Jr., Address, New York State Bar Association,
Holmes,
17th January Quoted from the International Thesaurus of
1889. -
wrong? It is one thing to ask how the words "right" and "ob¬
ligation" are used, quite another thing to ask what things
5)
individuals think are right or wrong.
but man only. And of men, thoese are all most subject to it,
7)
that professe Philosophy."
Turning to man and his place in society as the object
of inquiry, Hagerstrom's aim is to provide a definition of
"the real of
which will lead up to an exposi¬
nature law,
tion of thelaw which realty covers the fact
concept of
which legal theorists have in mind in their attempts at
conceptual construction".8)
The wording of this passage is significant and revealing.
It shows that Hagerstrom thinks that to have the concept of
law is to know the real nature of law, to have apprehended
the facts which characterize law and make law what it real¬
9)
tively established results". This is Hagerstrom's scien¬
tific method in a nutshell, which I do not intend to criti¬
cize in any detail. I only wish to point out that this Ba¬
conian recipe for jurisprudence as a rational science hard¬
ly stands a closer scrutiny. But it surely reflects the view
held by Lundstedt and Olivecrona that a scientist begins
with a careful and unbiased collection of all the facts un¬
one finds only what one seeks. One cannot have the answers
16) Hagerstrom, INLM Ch. I. The quotations are from p. 1 (my italics).
17) Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 21, Add. p. 231, cf. above p. 270.
18) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 8. Following quotations are from p. 1 and 16.
365
If the
only volitional factor is the intention to use
expressions, then there is no reference to any interests.
On the formal theory there are "thoughts behind the words",
which implies that legal rules have "real meaning" indepen¬
dently of the legislator's intention. "No personal power
exists which gives the law its force, and therefore no per-
28)
sonal wishes in themselves are at all relevant".
"Laws are thus not imperatives in the usual sense, i.e. com¬
mands issuing from a certain authority. Their force there¬
fore does by no means rest only on their imperative form.
This is indeed important from the psyetiological point of
view and it is in fact a distinguishing mark of actual laws.
But a law as such is characterized only by the fact that it
occurs as an item in a whole system of pronouncements of
universal scope, produced in a certain way and issued in a
certain form, which do in fact get their ideal content ac¬
tualized in society."33)
There is here clearly a distinction made between the
psychological point of view, i.e. what I have called the
psychological theory of law, and the non-psychological point
of view which is concerned with a law as such, i.e. the for¬
mal theory of law. Thus, I think I have established that Ha¬
gerstrom has two theories of law.
To sum up: There is the formal theory of law. This
theory holds that law is a normative system of objective
rules for rights and duties. This system has binding force
or "categorical validity", i.e. it stands above the govern¬
ing authorities and the people. The legislator's will is
determined by his knowledge of right and wrong actions.
44 )
being formally promulgated". And "a law can cease to be
in force through formal abrogation". But then Hagerstrom con¬
flates or abandons his formal theory when he writes,
"it should be noted (PT:) that even law (in the modern sense)
becomes actually binding only through the interpretation
which gets itself accepted. Only this interpretation is
irresistibly in force. But (FT:) it cannot for that reason
be denied that the law itself in its abstract character, is
also positive law, provided that it actually binds the auth¬
orities who are empowered to apply it to particular cases
by means of interpretation."^'
In this passage Hagerstrom moves from the psychological
theory (PT) to the formal theory (FT).
As for the psychological theory the question is: "when
does a legal rule become binding?" Hagerstrom's answer is:
"through the interpretation which gets itself accepted".
This is a tautology if "binding" is equivalent to "accepted"
or "actually binds" which is the criterion according to the
psychological theory. Law then becomes accepted only through
the interpretation which gets itself accepted. Clearly then
the law is "irresistibly in force". According to the psycho¬
logical theory no empirical investigation is needed to estab¬
lish this, since it is a tautology.
The psychological theory fits with Hagerstrom's state¬
ment
47) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 50. The quoted passage is Hagerstrom's and re¬
fers to Gustav Radbruch, Grundziige der Rechtsphilosophie, Leipzig
1914. - Cf. p. 95 for a similar argument.
380
*
383
55) Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings, London 1964,
p. 99 note 12.
56) Fredrik Lagerroth, Psykologisk Verklighet och Juridisk Fiktion
vid Tillampningen Sveriges Grundlager (Psychological Reality
av
and Juridical Fiction in the Application of Swedish Constitutio¬
nal Law), in Lunds Universitets Arsskrift, N.F. Avd. 1, Bd. 20,
No. 6, Lund & Leipzig 1925.
57) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 19 f., p. 51 f.; p. 119, 234, 238.
384
59)
scure Swedish journal. This may explain why it has by
and large been neglected except among the Swedes Lundstedt
and Olivecrona. Lundstedt dismisses Kelsen's theory as "pure
fantasy", as has been shown "briefly and irrefutably by
6 0)
Hagerstrom". For Olivecrona Kelsen's theory is "the great
mystery", which it is not worthwhile to explore.My aim
in this section is to show that Hagerstrom has not refuted
Kelsen's theory.
Alf Ross' book "Theorie der Rechtsquellen" appeared in
the Series Wiener Staats- und Rechtswissenschaftliche Studien,
66) Cf. Hagerstrom, INLM p. 350 referring to instinct and his dis¬
tinction between an ideal ego and an empirical ego, p. 148, cf.
p. 129, 131, 181.
388
idealism. Kelsen's view implies that mind can only know its
own ideas. Since ideas are mental it leads to the view that
69) This presupposes that feelings and volitions are active rather
than passive. Hagerstrom denies this. His theory is then incoherent,
cf. above Chapter III, section 5, especially p. 149 f.
390
71) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 297, cf. p. 259 and p. 261 for the following
quotations.
72) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 267.
393
dent activities, but it does not follow that they are mutual¬
prescript as
other method must be used, viz. the method which Kelsen calls
the method of imputation.
The case between Hagerstrom and Kelsen raises philo-
79)
sophical questions concerning monism and pluralism. I
do not have the capacity to solve these questions. I shall,
his epistemology, i.e. the view that there is only one fun¬
damental type of knowledge. Kelsen's view is based upon the
view that there are at least two types of knowledge, viz.
empirical knowledge in terms of causes and normative know¬
ledge in terms of reasons. This is a much disputed question
which I do not wish to engage in. I only wish to point out
that Hagerstrom's argument against Kelsen is directed against
Kelsen being a dualist. This may also explain why Hagerstrom
does not make a clear distinction between the formal theory
and the psychological theory. His attack against Kelsen is
based upon the view that they are rival theories, which is
not necessarily the case. This is Kelsen's position. Hence
the importance of the distinction between being an attribu¬
tive monist like Hagerstrom and an attributive dualist like
Kelsen. This is the issue. The issue for Hagerstrom is that
Kelsen is a substantival dualist, which he is not if I am
400
The basic norm is the end of norms. If the basic norm is not
true, the premise cannot be true. The way out for Kelsen is
to say that every norm, except the basic norm, is correlated
to another norm. But to this the rejoinder is the story of
the Indian philosopher and his elephant, cf. above Chapter
III, Section 4, p. 120 f. I think that this is the ground for
Hagerstrom's dismissal of Kelsen's concept of the basic norm.
empirical investigation.
Kelsen is attacked on the basis of the psychological
theory, that is to say that he fails to deliver an empirical
account. Hagerstrom's criticism is misplaced, for Kelsen must be
attacked on his own ground, that is by offering a rival ana¬
87) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 34 f., and p. 351 for the following quotations.
88) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 63.
405
which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and de-
89)
fense". And for Hobbes it is manifest "that Law in gene-
*■
411
obeying the law, and wrong, e.g. stealing! Since the formal
theory is based upon thinking, it is neutral, or so Hager¬
strom claims.
I*
413
son determines not merely the general nature of the right ac¬
tion but also the particular details of how the right action
•
is
4.
to v,
be carried . ,
out.
123)
fi
414
tice
„
.
126)
135) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 250 (my italics), referring to the paper re¬
printed, INLM p. 16-55; next quotation from p. 41 (my italics again).
418
140) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 298 (his italics) - cp. above Sec. 5, where
Kelsen is criticized for holding this position.
141) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 184, cf. p. 235 and p. 183 for the following
quotations.
142) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 182, and p. 181.
143) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 186, cf. p. 185.
421
148) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 311, p. 312 for the following quotation (my
italics).
149) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 15.
150) Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, p. 9.
151) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 313.
424
152) Hagerstrom, 352 (my italics). It may also be that the in¬
INLM p.
stinct is rather
product of education, the effect rather than
a
the cause of the legal order. The dispute may be called Hagerstrom
versus Marx. Hagerstrom presents no empirical evidence for his
thesis, cf. for a discussion Popper, The Open Society and its
Enemies, vol. II, p. 89 ff.
153) Quoted from Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, p. 13.
425
157) Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, The Law Quarterly Re¬
view, vol. 90,
1974, p. 102 ff. at p. 103.
158) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 6, cf. above Ch. IV, Sec.8.
427
jurisprudence .
160) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, Ch. 26, p. 325, cf. p. 322.
161) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 274.
162) Hagerstrom, INLM p. 53.
429
*
430
Chapter VII
Journey's End
1. Looking Back
*
William Shakespeare, King Henry the Fourth, Part One, Act V, IV
per Hotspur.
1) The quoted phrase is Hagerstrom's, referring to the Bible, where
no such thought can be found according to Hagerstrom, INLM p. 102.
433
2) Compare Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sec.
Ill, p. 415.
436
3) Hclgerstrom, PR p. 71.
438
cerning "meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and un-
4)
profitable", to use Hobbes' phrase, cannot occur.
Hagerstrom shares Hobbes' idea of peace as all-import¬
ant. Hobbes retains the idea of natural rights and intro¬
duces a powerful sovereign to make some common rules backed
up by the sword, in order to secure peace. Hagerstrom aban¬
dons the idea of natural rights and claims that the sovereign
has no creative will. He is bound by law as well. This takes
Hagerstrom into a discussion of the nature of law, which I
have considered in Chapter VI.
If my understanding of Hagerstrom is correct, then he
has two theories of law, which I have called the formal
theory of law and the psychological theory of law. The for¬
mal theory holds, briefly, that legal rules are categorical
imperatives which determine the necessary actions for the
survival of a peaceful life within society. The psychologi¬
cal theory holds, briefly, that legal rules are expression
of interests and the maintenance of legal rules depends upon
the pressure of using words to influence people to share the
interest in upholding the law. The formal theory enables
Hagerstrom to reject the voluntaristic theory of law which
holds that legal rules are made by a sovereign will, which im¬
poses names upon human conduct and thereby makes it right or
wrong conduct.
Hagerstrom's inquiry into law is a sustained attack
on voluntarist theories of law. His argument is that the
existence of a sovereign will presupposes the existence of
an independent legal order which sets limits to what the
sovereign may legitimately do. It is not open to the sove¬
reign will to choose what names to impose on conduct. Hager--
strom's assumption is that choosing is arbitrary depending
upon will, whereas finding is determined. What is created
is arbitrary, what is given or found is fixed by laws, which
operate independently of man's faculties of reason, will and
feeling. It seems to me that this assumption is false. What
is created is not necessarily arbitrary.
prescriptive sense.
Hagerstrom has then achieved his aim. His basic value, "we
wish first and foremost to live an unobstructed life", has
6)
been implemented. ' Peace has been brought about by reason,
but at a very high price, viz. the destruction of man's
freedom and creativity. I am not quite sure whether Hager¬
strom has designed his theories of law to achieve this ef¬
fect. If I am right that the destruction of man's freedom
is the effect, then can Hagerstrom's philosophy be dismissed
on that account alone?
6) Hagerstrom, PR p. 213.
444
2. Looking Ahead
7) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sec. II, p. 409.
8) Hagerstrom, PR p. 311.
9) Cf. Hagerstrom, PR p. 95.
445
10) Cf. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 19, and see above
Ch. I, Sec. 9, especially p. 31.
11) It is curious to notice that Hagerstrom's philosophy is not taken
seriously in Sweden. To mention but two examples. Alexander Pecze-
nik describes in his book Juridikens Metodproblem (Methodological
Problem of Legal Science), Stockholm 1974, p. 15, Hagerstrom as
a great philosopher, his works are mentioned too, but why Hager-
strom is a great philosopher Peczenik does not tell his reader.
In another book by Dag Victor, Rattssystemer och Vetenskap (Legal
Systems and Knowledge), Uppsala 1977, Hagerstrom's philosophy is
simply ignored, Victor is concerned with Aristotle's philosophy
and its importance for the methodology of legal science, where
Victor deals with Lundstedt's view. This seems to me to be remark¬
able. Since influenced by Aristotle, and Lundstedt
Hagerstrom is
is influenced by Hagerstrom, I should think that Victor is mistaken
when he ignores Hagerstrom's philosophy. Even more so, since Hager¬
strom's philosophy has been so influential in Sweden.
446
sions .
""The work is done". But just as one says that, the answer
comes: "The race is over, but the work never is done while
the power to work remains"." -^)
My thesis is, finally, at journey's end. But then there
is a new vista ahead, as I have just suggested, I also hope
to have the power to work on that. As Holmes says:
Select Bibliography
1. Aristoteles etiska
grundtanker och deras teoretiska forutsatt-
ningar, Uppsala 1893.
2. Undersokning av den empiristiska etikens mojlighet med sarskild
hansyn till dess moderna huvudformer, Uppsala 1895.
3. Om den moraliska kanslan och driftensasom fornuftiga i den
42. Recht, Pflicht und bindende Kraft des Vertrages nach romischer
und naturrechtlichen Anschauung (edt. Karl Olivecrona), (Skrif-
ter utg. av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala,
Band 44:3) Uppsala 1965. - Translation by Karl Wuhrer of No. 24.
,
2. Other Works
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (transl. Sir David Ross), London 1954.
Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason (transl. Norman Kemp Smith), London
1976.
Kant, I., The Moral Law (transl. and edt. H.J. Paton), London 1948.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil (transl. and edt. R.J.
Hollingdcle), Harmondsworth 1973.
Olivecrona, Karl, Law as Fact, 1st ed., London 1939, reprinted with
notes London 1962.
Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its Enemies, 5th ed., London 1966.
Popper, Karl, Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed., London 1974.
Ross, Alf, Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and
Natural Law, Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires, vol. IV,
Buenos Aires 1961.
Sandin, Robert T., The Founding of the Uppsala School, Journal of the
History of Ideas, vol. 23, New York 1962.
Schmidt, Folke, The Uppsala School of Legal Thinking, Scandinavian Stu¬
dies in Law, vol. 22, Stockholm 1978.
454
Schultz, Duane, A History of Modern Psychology, 3rd ed., New York 1981.
Simmonds, N.E., The Legal Philosophy of Axel Hagerstrom, The Juridical
Review, vol. 1976, Edinburgh 1976.