PALE Digest
PALE Digest
UY CHICO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY,
LIMITED, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES, G.R. No. 9231, January 06, 1915
FACTS: Uy Chico seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry
goods destroyed by fire. The father of Uy Chico died in 1897, at which time he was conducting
a business under his own name, Uy Layco. Uy Chico continued to carry on the business under
the father's name. At the time of the fire, "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent
thereto the creditors petitioned for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the
plaintiffs father.
During the course of these proceedings, Uy Chico’s attorney surrendered the policies of insurance
to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their
face value, or P6,000.
Uy Chico now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belong to him
and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise
effected by the administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that Uy Chico had agreed to the compromise
settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's
attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a
compromise was to be effected.
The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's
testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The
attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally
withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney
on the ground that it was privileged.
Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument on the proposition that a waiver of the client's
privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of Uy Chico’s lawyer concerning the surrender of the policies
to the administrator as compromise is privileged communication.
HELD: NO. Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court, without
the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in
professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters."
Communications made between attorney and client are not intended for the information of third
persons or to be acted upon by them, but for the purpose of advising the client as to his rights.
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However the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third
person. A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being
communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation.
When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the communication to
the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning
whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and
his client.
It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least,
is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies
the role of intermediary or agent. We quote from but one case among the many which may be
found upon the point:
"The proposition that one, after fully authorizing his attorney, as his agent, to enter
into contract with a third party, and after such authority has been executed and relied on, may
effectively nullify his own and his duly authorized agent's act by closing the attorney's mouth
as to the giving of such authority, is most startling. A perilous facility of fraud and wrong,
both upon the attorney and the third party, would result. The attorney who, on his client's
authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his reputation and integrity that he binds his
client. The third party may well rely on the assurance of a reputable lawyer that he
has authority in fact, though such assurance be given only by implication from the doing
of the act itself.”
It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to
compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when
the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there was
a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the
policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to
show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed
to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face
value.
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FACTS: William Ong Genato alleged that in July 1992, Atty. Silapan asked if he could rent a small
office space in his building for his law practice. William Ong acceded and Atty. Silapan was made
to handle some of Ong's cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship between complainant
and respondent.
Atty. Silapan borrowed P200,000.00 from Genato which he intended to use as downpayment for
the purchase of a new car. Atty. Silapan issued to Ong a postdated check to answer for the six
(6) months interest on the loan. Atty. Silapan likewise mortgaged to Ong his house and lot in
Quezon City.
Atty. Silapan purchased a new car. However, the document of sale of the car was issued in
Genato's name and financed through City Trust Company.
Atty. Silapan failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters
to Genato. Genato tried to encash respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank but it was
dishonored as respondent's account therein was already closed.
Atty. Silapan failed to heed Genato's repeated demands for payment. Genato then filed a criminal
case against Atty. Silapan for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, Atty. Silapan made the following allegation in his Answer:
4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading
and buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and
has many cases pending in court;
Genato denied Atty. Silapan's charges and claimed that Atty. Silapan's allegation is libelous and
was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Genato further pointed to paragraph 12 of Atty. Silapan's
Answer, thus:
12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January
30, 1993, defendant Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale
transferring ownership of the car to him but the latter said that he will only do so after the
termination of his criminal case where Ong wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former counsel
in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of the review committee of the
Department of Justice or, to the prosecutor, and even to the presiding Judge, for his
eventual acquittal.
Genato gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is
guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively
liable therefor.
In his comment, Atty. Silapan insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of
dishonest business practices to complainant and his revelation of complainant's desire to bribe
government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these
statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainant's
credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He
argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant
as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP found Atty. Silapan guilty as charged and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Silapan committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
Genato illegal practices and disclosing Genato's alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case.
HELD: YES. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
An attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character
by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of
a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing
to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It
even survives the death of the client.
If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's alleged intention to bribe
government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as
the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to
advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict
sense.
Atty. Silapan's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings
fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the
complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and
respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A
lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness. Respondent's allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure
case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him.
FACTS: Ramon Saura, Jr. and Helen S. Baldoria and Raymundo Y. Saura filed complaints for
disbarment against Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa.
The two complaints are related and arose from the handling of the respondent of a settlement
case involving a piece of property owned in common by the Ramon and Helen with their other
siblings, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, all surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of
the said property of the late Ramon E. Saura who died intestate on May 15, 1992.
Ramon Saura Jr. and Helen Baldoria learned that the administrators of the property, Macrina,
Romeo and Amelita, had, with the assistance of the Atty. Agdeppa, who notarized the Deed of
Sale, sold the property without the knowledge and participation of Ramon Saura Jr. and Helen
Baldoria. Ramon and Helen allege that despite repeated demands Atty. Agdeppa refused to
disclose the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Hence, the complaint.
Atty. Agdeppa refused to answer the charges against her, and, subsequently, was penalized with
a fine of P10,000.00 and suspension from practice for one (1) year in each of the two (2) cases
pending against her.
Atty. Agdeppa alleged she could not answer the administrative charges against her without
divulging certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client privilege.
ISSUE: WON the information requested as to the proceeds of the sale of the property held
in common by the clients of Atty. Agdeppa and Ramon and Helen is covered by the rule
on Attorney-Client Privilege.
HELD: NO. The request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to account for
the proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-client privilege.
“An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.”
The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking for the
disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the
right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E.
Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such
information to them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.
FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan, as their
attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney prepared by Atty. Conrado Gonzales. Said
SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot 1350-A.
Said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco. However, Antonio Casquejo had
instituted a case for reconveyance of property against the Celestino Yokingco, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2067.
Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of Atty. Gonzales in ejecting the squatters
occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. As consequence, Atty. Gonzales filed Civil Case No. 1783-
11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against the squatters. On February 18, 1983, a judgment was
rendered in favor of Maturan. Maturan, through Atty. Gonzales, filed a motion for issuance of a
writ of execution on March 10, 1983.
In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise agreement, which
was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983.
On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution of Civil Case No. 1783-11
was pending, and without withdrawing as counsel for Maturan, Atty. Gonzales filed, on behalf of
Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, which was an action to annul the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 2067.
The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of Maturan to represent Antonio
and Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case No.
2067. On August 24, 1983, Atty. Gonzales, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., also filed
Special Civil Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction, with damages,
against Maturan.
Aggrieved by Atty. Gonzales’ acceptance of professional employment from their adversary, and
alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had been transmitted by Maturan
to Atty. Gonzales in Civil Case 1783-11, Maturan filed an administrative complaint against the
former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.
Atty Gonzales denied having committed any malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or
anomalous act against his client. Atty. Gonzales declared that he was of the belief that filing a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship
between himself and Maturan, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was
unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client relationship between them. Furthermore, he
alleged that his acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to honestly
earn a little more for his children’s sustenance.
The IBP found Atty. Gonzales guilty of representing conflicting interests and suspended him for
one year.
HELD: YES. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse
party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on
the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with
his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones.
Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given
him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his
client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
This Court finds Atty. Gonzales’ actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provide in part:
Moreover, Atty. Gonzales’ justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary
obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the
filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute
the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the
prejudice of his client.
In similar cases decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or three years suspension has
been imposed where respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De
Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr., the respondent, who appeared for complainant in a case for revival of
judgment, even though he had been the counsel of the adverse party in the case sought to be
revived, was suspended for a period of two years. In Bautista vs. Barrios, a suspension of two
years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who had drafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but
who appeared for the other party therein, when the same was sought to be enforced by petitioner.
In PNB vs. Cedo, the Court even suspended the respondent therein for three years, but only
because respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also deliberately intended to
attract clients with interests adverse to his former employer. Finally, in Natan vs.
Capule, respondent was suspended for two years after he accepted professional employment in
the very case in which his former client was the adverse party.
FACTS: At the time material to this case, Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in
Agusan del Sur. Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman. Sansaet was a practicing
attorney who served as counsel for Paredes pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
Sometime in 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario
Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved. A free patent was granted to him
and an original certificate of title was issued in his favor.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Paredes’ patent and
certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site. The trial court
rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes
in that civil case.
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, an information for perjury was filed
against Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. In this criminal case, Paredes was likewise
represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, Paredes was thereafter haled before the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the
Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. For the third time, Sansaet was Paredes’ counsel of
record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution recommending the criminal prosecution
of Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for
reconsideration. Some of his allegations in that motion are as follows:
“Paredes had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court,
went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence but said
case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the
Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the
recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus
the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein.”
On January 23, 1990, Teofilo Gelacio who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of Honrada, Paredes, and
Sansaet for falsification of public documents. He claimed that Honrada, in conspiracy with
Sansaet and Paredes, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be
a notice of arraignment, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were annexed to
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Paredes’ motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge
against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
Wanting to be discharged as government witness, Atty. Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived
to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy
by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been
arraigned therein. The documents which were later filed by Sansaet in the preliminary
investigation were prepared and falsified by Honrada and Paredes in the house of Paredes. To
evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of Paredes.
The Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against Honrada, Sansaet, and
Paredes. The proposal for the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the
Ombudsman finding that the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of
privileged communication. Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed separate informations for
falsification of public documents against Honrada, Paredes, and Sansaet before the
Sandiganbayan.
Before the Sandiganbayan, a motion was filed by the People for the discharge of Sansaet as a
state witness. The Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted
to by the Ombudsman and invoked by Honrada and Paredes, resolved to deny the desired
discharge.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed between
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, confidential matters must have been disclosed
by Paredes, as client, to Sansaet, as his lawyer.
ISSUE: WON the projected testimony of Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by
the attorney-client privilege.
HELD: NO. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and the
actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.
There was confidential communication by Paredes and Honrada to Sansaet BUT said confidential
communication does not mean automatic protection under the attorney-client privileged
communication rule —
It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases for falsification before the Sandiganbayan, and this
may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein.
Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by
Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements
being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification.
It is undisputed that said documents were filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to
the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan. The acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being
falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house
and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
For the application of the attorney-client privilege the period to be considered is the date when
the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. If the client
seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is
given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality,
however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made
by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between
attorney and client having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.
In the case at bar: The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time
he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify,
or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet
and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly,
therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes
of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having
been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification
which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that
in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a
lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents
the privilege from attaching.
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
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thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and
practice in the noble profession of law.
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FACTS: After this Court rendered its Decision in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al. and upon motion of BENECO, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R.
Rimando issued a writ of execution ordering the clerk of court and ex officio city sheriff of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction personal and real property
of the members of the Board of Directors of BENECO.
On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor
Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an injunction
suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) “to preserve the status
quo as now obtaining between the parties,” as well as a writ of preliminary preventive injunction
ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to “cease and desist
from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from the NLRC-CAR, pending
resolution of the main action raised in court.”
When this injunction case was dismissed, Atty. Flores filed with another branch of the RTC two
identical but separate actions both entitled “Judicial Declaration of Family Home
Constituted, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc.,” docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415. The said complaints were supplemented by an “Urgent Motion
Ex Parte” which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez from
proceeding with the auction sale of plaintiffs’ property “to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus
[oficio] any judgment of the court later in this [sic] cases, until further determined by the court.”
The IBP Board of Governors suspended respondent from the bar for six months
HELD: YES. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the “vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related
causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.”
Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. Modequillo vs. Breva states that
under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code.
The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and unnecessary; they were
clearly asking for reliefs identical to the prayer previously dismissed by another branch of the
RTC, i.e., to forestall the execution of a final judgment of the labor arbiter. That they were filed
ostensibly for the judicial declaration of a family home was a mere smoke screen; in essence,
their real objective was to restrain or delay the enforcement of the writ of execution. In his
deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief in two different courts, Respondent Flores was
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obviously shopping for a “friendly” forum which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an
injunction and was thereby trifling with the judicial process.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers have a duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. The Code also enjoins him from unduly delaying a case by
impeding the execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
In consonance with Millare vs. Montero and Garcia vs. Francisco, respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. In Millare, the respondent filed with different
courts a total of six appeals, complaints and petitions which frustrated and delayed the execution
of a final judgment. Holding that “respondent ‘made a mockery of the judicial processes’ and
disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in
whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered [and], thus, ‘abused procedural rules to defeat
the ends of substantial justice,’” this Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for
one year.
In Garcia, the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law, for violating
the proscription against forum shopping. This Court held that “he deserve[d] to be sanctioned, not
only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example.”
PENALTY: SUSPENDED for 2 years (Additional penalty of 1 year suspension for trying to
mislead the Court. To evade the finding of guilt for Forum Shopping, Atty. Flores claims the RTC
had already dismissed the injunction suit when he filed the case for declaration of family home)
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FACTS: On July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 86-36563, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Acting
Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. It was filed by Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng
Bagong Lipunan, Inc." composed of "some 300 individual owners and operators of separate
business stalls mostly at the periphery immediately beyond the fence of the Quiapo Church." The
president of the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo.
On August 5, 1986, Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo, and three members of the Samahan,
instituted in this Court a special civil action for prohibition to the end that Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr.,
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila, be "perpetually prohibited from revoking or cancelling their
licenses or permits and threatening the physical demolition of their business stalls.
Petitioners claim to be five of about 130 "licensed and duly authorized vendors of religious articles,
medicine herbs and plants around the Quiapo Church, Manila," bringing suit for themselves and
all others similarly situated as themselves. They allege that their licenses "were revoked or
cancelled for reasons unknown to them which is tantamount to deprivation of property without
due process of laws," written notice of such cancellation having been served on them on or about
May 3, 1986; that the revocation of their licenses was beyond the Mayor’s competence, since
Section 171 (n) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) authorizes the same only "for
violation of the law or ordinances or conditions upon which they have been granted," and no such
violation had been committed by them; but this notwithstanding, the Mayor "had given them an
ultimatum of 7:00 up to 12:00 o’clock in the afternoon" of August 5, 1986 to vacate the premises
where their respective stalls are situated or suffer physical demolition thereof."
After the filing by Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo of present the petition, they came to the
belated realization that in view of the pendency of Case No. 86-36563, they were vulnerable to
the accusation of "forum shopping." This was followed by the filing in this Court by their lawyers
of a "MANIFESTATION WITH AFFIDAVIT OF WITHDRAWAL" on August 11, 1986. The claim
is made that the five (5) petitioners in the action before the Supreme Court were brainwashed by
Atty. Reynaldo Aralar and his associates to accede to their invitation to appear for them and file
the case before the Supreme Court," and/or said Atty. Aralar and his associates had perpetrated
"piracy" of clients and "should be condemned and suspended for committing act of ‘shopping for
courts.’"
ISSUE #1: WON the forum shopping exists in the case at bar.
HELD: YES. The action must be abated on the ground of lis pendens, or more correctly, auter
action pendant; pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause.
The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts as those in the case at bar: the
members of the Samahan had been legitimately engaged "in their respective business of selling
sundry merchandise, more particularly religious articles, flowers and ornamental plants, and
medicinal herbs;" they had been religiously paying "the corresponding license and permit fees
imposed by prevailing ordinances of the City of Manila," but this notwithstanding they had been
15
given written notice dated May 3, 1986 emanating from the Mayor’s Office, advising of the
cancellation of their permits and their possible relocation to another site; and these acts "are
unjust, illegal, arbitrary, oppressive and constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Respondent."
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity
on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
Petitioners in both actions have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of their case before
this Court, but also the punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court and
that in the Regional Trial Court. Quite recently, upon substantially identical factual premises, the
Court en banc had occasion to condemn and penalize the act of litigants of filing the same suit in
different courts, aptly described as "forum-shopping," viz:
As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an identity
as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis
thereof, to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens.
That same identity puts into operation the sanction of twin dismissals just mentioned.
ISSUE #2: What is the effect of the supposed “Manifestation with Affidavit of Withdrawal”
filed on August 11?
The claim does not inspire belief. It is so out of the ordinary as to require clear and convincing
evidence of its actuality, which is lacking in this case. It is also belied by the fact that Rosalina
Buan and Liza Ocampo themselves were among those who verified the petition at bar before a
notary public.
16
FACTS: On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), through the Solicitor General,
filed a complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino
and the Manila Pilots’ Association, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-14958, praying that the
defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary
damages plus costs of suit.
The RTC, in a decision dated August 1, 1985, ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally
to pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the cost of suit.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the findings of the court a
quo.
Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (FESC) nor MPA was happy with the decision of the Court of
Appeals and both of them elevated their respective plaints to us via separate petitions for review
on certiorari (GR No. 130068 & GR No. 130150).
G.R. No. 130068 was filed by FESC. On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150 was filed by MPA.
The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario through its associate, Atty.
Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC.
G.R. No. 130068 commenced with the filing by FESC through counsel on August 22, 1997 of a
verified motion for extension of time to file its petition. Said motion contained the following
certification against forum shopping signed by Atty. Herbert A. Tria as affiant:
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
that to the best of my own knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that if I/we should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court.
This motion having been granted, FESC subsequently filed its petition on September 26, 1997,
this time bearing a "verification and certification against forum-shopping" executed by one
Teodoro P. Lopez on September 24, 1997, to wit:
in compliance with Section 4(e), Rule 45 in relation to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly sworn, depose and state:
17
1. That I am the Manager, Claims Department of Filsov Shipping Company, the local agent of
petitioner in this case.
2. That I have caused the preparation of this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
3. That I have read the same and the allegations therein contained are true and correct
based on the records of this case.
4. That I certify that petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, that to the best of my own knowledge, no such action or proceeding is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency,
that I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable
Court.
The petition filed by MPA in G.R. No. 130150 was duly filed on August 29, 1997 with a copy
thereof furnished on the same date by registered mail to counsel for FESC. Counsel of record for
MPA, Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification accompanying said petition dutifully revealed to
the Court that--
3. Petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in his Honorable Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, but to the best of his knowledge, there is an action or proceeding pending
in this Honorable Court, entitled Far Eastern Shipping Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports
Authority and Court of Appeals with a Motion for Extension of time to file Petition for Review
by Certiorari filed sometime on August 18, 1997. If undersigned counsel will come to know
of any other pending action or claim filed or pending he undertakes to report such fact within
five (5) days to this Honorable Court.
Upon motion by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150, said case was consolidated with
G.R. No. 130068.
ISSUE: Is there any defect with the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping by FESC?
HELD: YES. It was merely a pro forma compliance since FESC did not comply with what
was stated therein. (to inform the Court of any similar pending case or report that fact if it should
thereafter learn that a similar pending case has been filed or pending)
Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure incorporates the former Circular No. 28-
91 which provided for what has come to be known as the certification against forum shopping as
an additional requisite for petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, with
the end in view of preventing the filing of multiple complaints involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he
has not therefore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
For petitions for review filed before the Supreme Court, Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically requires
that such petition shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the
last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
Inasmuch as MPA's petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by registered mail on August 29,
1997 and taking judicial notice of the average period of time it takes local mail to reach its
destination, by reasonable estimation it would be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its petition
in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have received a copy of the former
and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the other petition initially filed with the First
Division. It was therefore incumbent upon FESC to inform the Court of that fact through its
certification against forum shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would appear that the
aforequoted certification accompanying the petition in G.R. No. 130068 is defective and could
have been a ground for dismissal thereof.
Even assuming that FESC has not yet received its copy of MPA's petition at the time it filed its
own petition and executed said certification, its signatory did state "that if I should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom in this Honorable Court."
Scouring the records page by page in this case, we find that no manifestation concordant with
such undertaking was then or at any other time thereafter ever filed by FESC nor was there any
attempt to bring such matter to the attention of the Court. Moreover, it cannot feign non-knowledge
of the existence of such other petition because FESC itself filed the motion for consolidation in
G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on April 24, 1998.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, displays
an unprofessional tendency of taking the Rules for granted, in this instance exemplified by its pro
forma compliance therewith but apparently without full comprehension of and with less than
faithful commitment to its undertakings to this Court in the interest of just, speedy and orderly
administration of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court. He is an officer of the court exercising a privilege which is indispensable in the
administration of justice. Candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Candor in all dealings is the very essence of
honorable membership in the legal profession. More specifically, a lawyer is obliged to observe
the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. It behooves a lawyer,
therefore, to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Being an officer of the court, a lawyer has a responsibility in the proper
19
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends -- the speedy,
efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of
final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid
any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as
he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Sad to say, the members of said law firm sorely failed to observe their duties as responsible
members of the Bar. Their actuations are indicative of their predisposition to take lightly the
avowed duties of officers of the Court to promote respect for law and for legal processes. We
cannot allow this state of things to pass judicial muster.
In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were commenced, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure had just taken effect, the Court treated infractions of the new Rules then with
relative liberality in evaluating full compliance therewith. Nevertheless, it would do well to remind
all concerned that the penal provisions of Circular No. 28-91 which remain operative provides,
inter alia:
3. Penalties.-
(c) The submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute
contempt of court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party.
The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
ISSUE #2: Who should execute the Certification against Forum Shopping?
HELD: The Petitioner, not the Counsel. It must be stressed that the certification against forum
shopping ordained under the Rules is to be executed by the petitioner, and not by counsel.
Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping
by counsel is a defective certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid
cause for dismissal of the petition.
Hence, the initial certification appended to the motion for extension of time to file petition in G.R.
No. 130068 executed in behalf of FESC by Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient. But considering
that it was a superfluity at that stage of the proceeding, it being unnecessary to file such a
certification with a mere motion for extension, we shall disregard such error. Besides, the
certification subsequently executed by Teodoro P. Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that defect to
a certain extent, despite the inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In the same vein, we shall consider
the verification signed in behalf of MPA by its counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as
substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of
the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. It bears stressing that
procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should
be used to achieve such end and not to derail it.
PENALTY: Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its
associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED.
20
F. SUB-JUDICE RULE
FACTS: This case involves the court-martial proceedings against the Major Eduardo Martelino,
alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under
him, for violation of the Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of
some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
Petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the president of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The
petitioner contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other
news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the
presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial.
The petitioners allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to
the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it became an issue against the administration
in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly influence the members of the court-martial.
Petitioner Martelino points to newspaper accounts of what had come to be referred to as the
"Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their case. The petitioner's counsel
referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily Mirror and cited other
news reports to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the President (of the Philippines)
in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were given sea burial," and that
Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice Presidential candidate, had gone to Corregidor and "found
bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26,
1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of the training operations] issue was bound to
come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an
issue that is heavily loaded against the administration."
The petitioners argue that under the circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial. In
support of their contention they invoke the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Irvin v.
Dowd, Rideau v. Louisiana, Estes v. Texas, and Sheppard v. Maxwell.
Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been
presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been
impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the
"integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE: WON the averred publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial.
HELD: NO. An examination of the cases cited will show that they, are widely disparate from this
case in a fundamental sense.
In Irvin, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the petitioner's arrest in connection with six
murders committed in Vanderburgh County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police officials issued
21
press releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of
newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against him during the six
or seven months preceding his trial." In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
"Here the 'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout the
community, was clearly reflected in the sum total of the voir dire examination of a majority
of the jurors finally placed in the jury box. Eight out of the 12 thought petitioner was
guilty. With such an opinion permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say that each
could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in
an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the
processes of the average man. Where one's life is at stake - and accounting for the frailties
of human nature - we can only say that in the light of the circumstances here the finding of
impartiality does not meet the constitutional standards. "
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial
publicity. In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, which involved elements of publicity, the
reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the selection of the jury,
although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is hard to
imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with
defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to,
unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury."
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the
kidnapping of three of its employees and in the killing of one of them, was similarly given "trial by
publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken of him in an "interview"
with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted of
interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery,
kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people. Two
weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue but their motion
was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. In reversing his conviction, the
Court said:
"[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a change of
venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to
the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later
to be charged. For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be
avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a
very real sense was Rideau's trial - at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent
court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but
a hollow formality."
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of
due process.
"The state says that the use of television in the instant case was 'without injustice to the
person immediately concerned,' basing its position on the fact that the petitioner has
established no prejudice and that this must be shown in order to invalidate a conviction. The
State paints too broadly in this contention, for this Court itself has found instances in which
a showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. At times a procedure em-
22
ployed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently
lacking in due process."
In Sheppard, Sam Sheppard, accused of the murder of his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court
observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned at the courthouse and newsmen took
over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially
Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature of the publicity to which the jury was
exposed during the trial, the judge refused defense counsel's other requests that the jury be asked
whether they had read or heard specific prejudicial comments about the case. In these
circumstances, we can assume that some of this material reached members of the jury." The
Court held:
"Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate
tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course,
there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates; or transfer it
to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury was
something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the
proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must
remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that
will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interference. Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement
officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fair-
ness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy
of disciplinary measure."
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of
Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government.
Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive
publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial, either by a failure to control
the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge
of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners
was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative
decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
23
FACTS: Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as
involved and implicated in said crime. The Court of First Instance of Pasay City found
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo
and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed
the sentence.
Pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Anyway,
intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the
investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would
appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the
trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by
those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. The results of
the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacanang investigators were made
available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with
this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those
persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo,
Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action
on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on
the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, had sent to the Office of Fiscal
Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion
for new trial was based, and Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for
said purpose a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys
Herminio A. Avendanio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, Timoteo Cruz
was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify.
According to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted
not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently,
to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of
the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a field
day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first,
after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony, respondent Salva, addressing the
newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let
you do so and the questions asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose
Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen,
again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask question to the witness if you want to. We are
willing to adopt the questions as ours."
24
ISSUE: WON the manner in which the reinvestigation was conducted by Salva is proper.
HELD: NO. Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to
make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members
of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor
with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen
of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely
and prudently declined the offer and did not ask question.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments
on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took
place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of
Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which
was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in
the press, and all with the apparent placet and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity
and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what we regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds
of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity
when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it is being tried in court;
but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is
on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put
an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary
measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
FACTS:This administrative case stemmed from Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis
Bucalon Plaza.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser, RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 30. Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that
the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide
and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix
the Amount of Bail Bond. Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge
of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court.
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of
Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial
magistrate.”
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Tan. Judge
Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent appealed the
orders to the Court of Appeals.
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The
article, entitled “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail
out,” reads:
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan’s decision before the Court of Appeals and would file
criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
“This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance.” he said.
Subsequently however, Atty. Bagabuyo was interviewed by Jun Clergio and Tony Consing in
Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court’s disposition
in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the
law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.
Atty. Bagabuyo argues that his comments does not fall within the concept of contempt of
court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter’s
instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional
right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.
26
The trial court found Atty. Bagabuyo guilty for indirect contempt and in addition, suspended him
from the practice of law.
The RTC of Surigao City transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of
Atty. Bagabuyo’s suspension from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which
maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and Atty. Bagabuyo’s
criticism in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave
violation of oath of office by respondent. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the
implementation of the trial court’s order of suspension and that Atty. Bagabuyo be suspended
from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Bagabuyo’s suspension from the practice of law is proper.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of
his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross
misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful
appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds
are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind
of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life.
A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon
them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
[he] should insist on similar conduct by others.” Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer
“shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.”
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a
press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Atyy. Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily. Atty. Bagabuyo’s statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No.
5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that “a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.”
27
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for
redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his
disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law,
that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he
was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [his] clients.”
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer
of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes
fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
28
RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION DATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R. NO. 237428
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA V. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO), A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018
FACTS: An impeachment complaint was lodged before the House of Representatives against
respondent. Having learned of respondent's disqualification as a Chief Justice from the House's
hearings, the Solicitor General filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent, basically
questioning her eligibility for the Chief Justice position.
Since the filing of the impeachment complaint, during the pendency of the quo warranto case,
and even after the conclusion of the quo warranto proceedings, Atty. Sereno continuously opted
to defend herself in public through speaking engagements before students and faculties in
different universities, several public forums, interviews on national television, and public rallies.
Instead of participating in the judicial process and answering the charges against her truthfully to
assist in the expeditious resolution of the matter, respondent opted to proceed to a nationwide
campaign, conducting speeches and accepting interviews, discussing the merits of the case and
making comments thereon to vilify the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the
impartiality of the Members of the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary, and
falsely impute ill motives against the government that it is orchestrating the charges against her.
In short, as the Court stated in the said decision, respondent chose to litigate her case before the
public and the media instead of the Court.
The Court was disquieted as doubts against the impartiality and dignity of the Court and its
Members emerged, and the obfuscation of the issues in the quo warranto proceedings resulted
from such out-of-court discussions on the merits of the case. Worse, the Court was perturbed by
the fact that Atty. Sereno, who was asserting her eligibility and right to the highest position in the
Judiciary, significantly participated in such detestable and blatant disregard of the sub judice rule.
Particularly, in several occasions, respondent insinuated the following: (i) that the grant of the quo
warranto petition will result to dictatorship; (ii) in filing the quo warranto petition, the livelihood and
safety of others are likewise in danger; (iii) that the people could no longer rely on the Court's
impartiality; and (iv) that she could not expect fairness from the Court in resolving the quo
warranto petition against her.
Consequently, the Court ordered Atty. Sereno to show cause why she should not be sanctioned
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary (NCJC) for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions
and ill motives to the Members of this Court.
Atty. Sereno argues that the acts imputed against her do not amount to conduct unbecoming of
a Justice and a lawyer which would warrant her disbarment nor warrant any other disciplinary
measure.
Respondent argues that the public utterances in question did not create such effect of a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice. Further, respondent avers that considering
that the quo warranto case in itself was already controversial and of transcendental importance,
her public statements and actions cannot be blamed for the natural attention that it gained from
the public.
29
ISSUE: WON Atty. Sereno is liable for her actions and public statements as regards the quo
warranto case against her during its pendency?
HELD: YES. Before proceeding to address Atty. Sereno’s arguments, it is necessary to discuss
the concept of the sub judice rule for which respondent is being charged of violating in this
administrative case.
Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters
under judicial consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the
public in general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench.
Historically, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to insulate members of the jury from
being influenced by prejudicial publicity. It was aimed to prevent comment and debate from
exerting any influence on juries and prejudicing the positions of parties and witnesses in court
proceedings.
Relatedly, in 2010, the late Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in filing Senate Bill No. 1852, also
known as the Judicial Right to Know Act, explained that sub judice is a foreign legal concept,
which originated and is applicable to countries who have adopted a trial by jury system. She
emphasized the difference between a jury system and the Philippine court system, implying the
inapplicability of the concept in our jurisdiction.
Acknowledging the fact that sub judice is a foreign concept, Justice Arturo Brion noted in a
Separate Opinion that in our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision
imposing the sub judice rule.
He, however, opined that "the fact that the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an
argument against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from
members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media." In fact, sub
judice rule finds support in the provision on indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - x x x, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
As can be observed, discussions regarding sub judice often relates to contempt of court.
In this regard, respondent correctly pointed out that the "clear and present danger" rule should be
applied in determining whether, in a particular situation, the court's contempt power should be
exercised to maintain the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-
protected freedom of speech should be upheld. Indeed, in P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et
al., the Court explained:
30
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings
in order to avoid prejudging the issue. influencing the court, or obstructing the administration
of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and
no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to
be protected is the all important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should
be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should
be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their
business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of
their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the
maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.
The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper
constitutional boundary between these two rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must
be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can
be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of
the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make
a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat.
From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and
present danger" to the administration of justice for statements or utterances covered by the sub
judice rule to be considered punishable under the rules of contempt.
The case at bar, however, is not a contempt proceeding. The Court, in this case is not geared
towards protecting itself from such prejudicial comments outside of court by the exercise of its
inherent contempt power. Rather, in this administrative matter, the Court is discharging its
Constitutionally-mandated duty to discipline members of the Bar and judicial officers.
As We have stated in Our decision in the quo warranto case, actions in violation of the sub
judice rule may be dealt with not only through contempt proceedings but also through
administrative actions. This is because a lawyer speech is subject to greater regulation for two
significant reasons: one, because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and two, the
significant dangers that a lawyer's speech poses to the trial process. Hence, the Court En
Banc resolved to treat this matter in this separate administrative action. Indeed, this Court has
the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceeding, aimed to purge the
31
law profession of unworthy members of the Bar and to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession.
Thus, contrary to respondent's argument, the "clear and present danger" rule does not find
application in this case. What applies in this administrative matter is the CPR and NCJC, which
mandate the strict observance of the sub judice rule both upon members of the Bar and the
Bench.
The Court takes judicial notice of the undeniably manifest detrimental effect of this open and
blatant disregard of the sub judice rule, which is a clear manifestation of the evil sought to be
prevented by the said rule, i.e., "to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice." In the said decision, We cited the May 2, 2018 issue of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, wherein certain individuals from different sectors of the society, lawyers included,
not only pre-judged the case but worse, accused certain Members of the Court of being unable
to act with justice, and threatening that the people will not accept any decision of such Members
of the Court as the same is tainted by gross injustice. To be sure, these statements do not only
"tend to" but categorically force and attempt to influence the deliberative and decision-making
process of this Court.
Atty. Sereno’s public utterances did not only tend to arouse public opinion on the matter but as
can be clearly gleaned from the tenor of the statements, such comments, speeches, and
interviews given by the respondent in different forums indisputably tend to tarnish the Court's
integrity and unfairly attributed false motives against its Members.
Thus, while it may be true that the quo warranto case was controversial and naturally invited
public attention to itself without necessity of respondent's statements, the fact remains that
respondent, who is a lawyer and who was then asserting right to the highest position in the
Judiciary, succumbed to and participated in the affray that diverted the quo warranto proceeding
from its primary purpose and created a great deal of antipathy from the public to the Court and its
Members.
Respondent cannot justify her attacks against the Court under the guise of merely discharging
her duties as a Justice and a member of the Bar. No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards
defending his cause or what he believes in, he must not forget to display the appropriate decorum
expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper and
utmost respect due to the courts.
As aptly and eloquently concluded by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in his Dissenting Opinion in
the quo warranto case, respondent, not only as a member of the Bar, but more importantly, as
Chief Justice of the Court, must exemplify the highest degree of leadership, and must refrain from
activities that will tend to cause unwarranted attacks against the Court.
G. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
FACTS: In May 1999, complainants and Atty. Cezar entered into a Deed of Assignment. For the
price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and interests over
a townhouse unit and lot. Respondent obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the
Contract to Sell he executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer.
Complainants wrote respondent, informing him that they were still willing to pay the balance on
the condition that respondent work on Crown Asia's execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
their favor. In the alternative, complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00.
Respondent requested for "a period of twenty days to either completely pay Crown Asia or return
the money." The period lapsed but respondent did not make good his promise.
Two years later , complainant sent respondent a second letter demanding the return of the
amount of P937,500.00, for failing to comply with his promise. The demand was still unheeded.
Thus, this administrative complaint. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent
guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct and recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Cezar may be held administratively liable despite not acting in a
professional capacity with the complainants.
HELD: YES. A member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer's
professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
Atty. Cezar may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with
complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot
in question. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over
33
which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the
complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and,
therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of
the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to
P937,500.00, despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.
Respondent's adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him,
which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally
reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality
required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in
him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
Respondent's culpability is clear. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted
only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing
with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.
ISSUE #2: WON Atty. Cezar may be ordered, in this administrative proceeding, to return
the amount owed to complainants.
HELD: NO. The Court cannot grant complainants' prayer that respondent be directed to return
the money he received from them in the amount of P937,500.00.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of
money that should be returned to the complainants.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) YEARS.
34
THE PREVIOUS CASE SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH THE FOLLOWING CASE WHEREIN
THE COURT ORDERED THE RETURN OF THE MONEY RECEIVED FROM CLIENT —
FACTS: On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see Atty. Macasa to avail of hiss legal
services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested for
alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
Complainant was able to pay the entire amount however, respondent did not issue any receipt.
Respondent also received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure
the provisional liberty of her son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. Complainant found
out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but
respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainant's son and
complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorney's Office for her son's
defense.
Complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer simply brushed aside the
complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any
explanation. Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for extensions of time to submit his
answer. He never did.
The IBP found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those others kept by him.
The IBP recommended the suspension of respondent for six months and him ordered to return to
complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorney's fees, and without
ordering the return of P18,000 received for the purpose of posting bail.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Macasa may be ordered to return the amount received as attorney’s fees
and the amount received for securing bail.
HELD: The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
35
the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard
of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border
on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond
to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended purpose yet
also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to
complainant despite the latter's repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000 attorney's
fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is subject to
two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the
lawyer of services to the client. Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled
to attorney's fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client,
he would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by
the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, every lawyer should act
and comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for the bond
of the complainant's son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his
dealings with his client. He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself
despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of complainant's son, respondent
showed lack of moral principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person
and a shame to the legal profession.
FACTS: Complainants alleged that sometime in June 2006, and while living abroad, they secured
the services of respondent as counsel in connection with their intention to adopt a minor child. In
consideration therefor, complainants, paid respondent P75,000.00, which was duly received by
the latter. A few months later, they purposely came back to the Philippines for a two-week stay to
commence the filing of the adoption case before the proper court. However, despite payment and
submission of all the required documents to respondent, no petition was filed during their stay.
Sometime in May 2007, complainants received respondent's letter dated March 6, 2007, asking
complainants to come to the Philippines to appear and testify in court for the adoption case she
purportedly filed on behalf of complainants before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City,
docketed as Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890.
Thus, complainants returned to the Philippines in June 2007, only to find out that: (a) Spl. Proc.
Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of another person
filed by another lawyer; and (b) respondent had yet to file a petition for adoption on their behalf.
Utterly dismayed, complainants withdrew all their documents from respondent's custody and hired
another lawyer to handle the filing of the adoption case. Moreover, complainants demanded the
return of the amount of P75,000.00 given as legal fees. However, respondent refused to return
such money, retorting that as a standard operating procedure, she does not return "acceptance
fees."
In view of the foregoing, complainants filed the instant administrative case against respondent
before this Court.
The IBP found respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that she be
meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years and ordered to return
the amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest to complainants.
ISSUE: WON not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
HELD: Respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR when she failed to return the amount of
P75,000.00 representing legal fees that complainants paid her:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a
lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
- as in this case - gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
37
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality,
as well as of professional ethics.
Even worse, respondent misrepresented to complainants that she had already commenced an
adoption proceeding on behalf of the latter, as evidenced by the letter dated March 6, 2007 she
sent to Jonathan's employer requesting that he, together with her wife, Ester, be allowed to come
home to the Philippines to appear and testify in court. She even provided them with a case
number, Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890, which was purportedly pending before the RTC. Such
misrepresentation resulted in complainants going through the trouble of coming back to the
Philippines, only to find out that: (a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for the
declaration of the presumptive death of another person filed by another lawyer; and (b)
respondent had yet to file a petition for adoption on their behalf. These deceitful acts of respondent
clearly violate Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that, as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing. Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when she committed the afore-
described acts of deception against complainants. Such acts are not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they reveal basic moral flaws that make him
unfit to practice law.
Anent the proper penalty for respondent, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers neglected their client's affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter's money
and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. In this case, not only did respondent fail to file a petition for adoption on behalf
of complainants and to return the money she received as legal fees, she likewise committed
deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had already filed such petition when nothing was
actually filed, resulting in undue prejudice to complainants. Under these circumstances, the Court
imposes on respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years, as recommended by the IBP.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount
of P75,000.00 she received from complainants as legal fees. It is well to note that "[w]hile the
Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his: civil liability, it must be
clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature
- for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement." Since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of her legal fees, the
Court, thus, finds the return thereof to be in order, with legal interest as recommended by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
and ORDERED to return the legal fees she received from the latter in the amount of
P75,000.00, with legal interest.
38
ADDITIONAL CASES:
ON SUB JUDICE:
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO AND
MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA’O, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Marantan is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, pending before the Court.
Respondent La’O is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Diokno is her
counsel therein.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG,
pending before the RTC, where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The
criminal cases involve an incident which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-
Unjieng, son of respondent La’O, Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot
and killed by police officers, which incident was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37, now
referred to as the Ortigas incident.
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, prayed, among others, that the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Atimonan, Quezon, where
Marantan was the ground commander, which resulted in the death of 13 men, now referred to as
the Atimonan incident. This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity
for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and Atty. Diokno,
organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press
conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of
the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the
criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the
Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in “TV Patrol,” an ABS-CBN news program.
Marantan quotes a portion of the interview, as follows:
Atty. Diokno: So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is
very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng
sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang
nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o: Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi
magagawa yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e he is already so arrogant because
they protected him all these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so
confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering so many innocent individuals.
Atty. Diokno : Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and
company have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the
Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by their superiors and some like Marantan
were even promoted to our consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e hangang
ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po kami
39
noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon wala pa pong action ang
Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e
subalit kitang kita naman na they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno: Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the
policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is involved
in the Atimonan killings – still roam free and remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we
are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that police rub-out will not stop until you
personally intervene.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o : Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the
evidence with us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect
contempt, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly
to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements
and malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the
petitions filed, but also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely
concluded that he and his co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Marantan’s position that the press
conference was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of influencing the decision of
the Court in the petition filed before it and the outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by
drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident.
Respondents argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were
legitimate expressions of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and
did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that
no criminal intent was shown as the utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair
comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition is intended to stifle
legitimate speech.
ISSUE: WON Respondents are guilty of violating the rule on sub judice.
HELD: NO. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice.
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt
is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially;
it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a
criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court “it must really appear” that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be
40
protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case,
particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No.
199462.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of
their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their
position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide
to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement
of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents’ comments reveals that they were
simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or
implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any
action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.
ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
FACTS: Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher, a British national who
passed away on June 18, 2004. David was engaged in business in the Philippines and owned,
among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, a domestic corporation. In order to
settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.
On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Bantegui, a major stockholder of
Consulting Edge, in order to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the company.
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the
lock of the Consulting Edge office door, which prevented the employees thereof from entering
and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file a complaint for
grave coercion against complainant and respondent. In turn, respondent advised complainant
that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's
personal records/business interests in Consulting Edge. Thus, the two entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement, whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against
Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and
committed herself to pay respondent P1,000.00 for every court hearing.
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution dated October 13, 2004,
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The
corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of course, warrants of arrest were
issued against them.
Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the
necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case
and stopped communicating with complainant. Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts,
complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Gagate was suspended by the IBP and the OBC for three years and was ordered to return
the P150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Gagate should return the money received from Pitcher as acceptance
fee.
HELD: YES. Records definitively bear out that respondent completely abandoned complainant
during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this notwithstanding petitioner’s
efforts to reach him as well as his purported receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee.
The Court sustains the OBC's recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee
received by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.
While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyers's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be
clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature
42
- for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such
as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of respondent's receipt
of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains undisputed, the Court finds the
return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 3 years and ORDERED to
return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the P150,000.00 acceptance fee
he received.