GARCIA V SESBRENO

GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO (A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
10457 | February 3, 2015)
DOCTRINE: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
FACTS:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio
(Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's
Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973 - On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the
Bar Confidant. Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing
of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed.
In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed
a Second Amended Complaint against him.
A.C. No. 10457 - Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in
Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his
sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage
in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-
CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C.
No. 7973. In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with
the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty
was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme
malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, the IBPCBD further ruled that
homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed
the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading
to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude.
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for having been
convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
ISSUES: whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
RULING: YES
The court adopted the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated
12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
1
The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not
do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
The court cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute
and unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present in these
cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the
executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the
commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.
As regards Disbarment, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Hence, Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.

GARCIA V SESBRENO

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GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO (A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.

10457 | February 3, 2015)

Hence, Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.

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