JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña

G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 185 SCRA 703

Facts:
Herein private defendant filed for a certificate of candidacy for 1988 elections for the
position of Governor of the Province of Cebu. Private respondent’s candidacy was contested
by Jose B. Aznar, the chairman of Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, on the ground that
private respondent is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner submitted a Certification that Osmeñ a is an American and is a holder of an

Alien Certificate Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence. During the hearing
before the COMELEC First Division, petitioner presented as evidence the private
defendant’s Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1, Alien Certificate of Registration,
Permit to Re-enter the Philippines and Immigration Certificate of Clearance.

Osmeñ a, in response, maintained his being Filipino by alleging, that his ascendants
are Filipinos, that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, that he has
been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth, that he hasn’t gone out of the
country for more than six months, and that he has been a registered voter since 1965.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-
citizenship?

Held:
No, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeñ a had lost his Filipino
Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. There are three modes thru
which an individual loses his Filipino citizenship, (1) by naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
a foreign county. None of the aforementioned extinguished Osmeñ a’s Filipino citizenship.
 Petitioner’s averment that private respondent is an American citizen by being issued
an alien certificate of registration as an American Citizen and a clearance and permit to re-
enter the Philippines, therefore, must have sworn allegiance to a foreign country is found to
be a case of non sequitur or it does not follow. The mere fact that the respondent was issued
a Certificate of Alien Registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines does not follow that he is not anymore a Filipino.

Swearing of allegiance to the USA is also vehemently denied by the private

respondent. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of

the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION and SECURITY OFFICER, DETENTION STATION, ENGINEER ISLAND,
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX R. DOMINGO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
III, and MONICO MUYA, alias TIU KIM KEE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21274             July 31, 1963
Facts:
Private respondent Muya came to the Philippines aboard a ship in 1959 as a
stowaway Chinese' citizen under the name of Tiu Kim Kee. Detected and returned to the
port of departure, the same private respondent entered the country again in1962, arriving
from Hongkong on board a plane, and sought admission as a Filipino citizen, this time under
the name Monico Muya, on the strength of a Certificate of Registration and Entry issued by
the Philippine Consulate at Hongkong by authority of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. His
identity being exposed, he was detained by the Immigration authorities and was
recommended for exclusion and deportation as an alien that entered through false and
misleading statements.

Herein private respondent instituted a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
claiming to be a Filipino citizen, seeking certiorari to review and annul the decision of the
Commissioners of Immigration, and praying for his release without further molestation.
However, he obtained a dismissal of the case on the ground that all administrative remedies
has not been availed of and exhausted by him.

Barely seven months after, respondent Muya went again to court, this time in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and filed therein a petition for Declaratory Judgment
with Mandamus and Injunction, again asserting Filipino citizenship, and asking that he be
declared a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, among others. The court issued the
order of preliminary mandatory injunction to set Muya free.

The immigration authorities sought reconsideration of the order and injunction writ,
questioning the lower court's authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against
officers stationed outside of its territorial jurisdiction and averring, among others, that the
citizenship claimed by the private respondent can not be the object of a declaratory suit.
The motion sought for reconsideration was denied by the respondent court, hence, this
petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual is proper?

Held:
No. It is well settled by the decisions of the Court that there is no proceeding
established by law, or the rules, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual and that citizenship is not a proper subject for declaratory judgment. Since
respondent Muya was not entitled to the declaratory judgment he filed in the court, that
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction by the respondent judge was in abuse of
discretion and excess of jurisdiction, because the principal remedy sought was clearly not
available.

Being in custody of the immigration authorities in Manila, the proper remedy for the
herein private respondent to test the legality of his detention is habeas corpus and not an
action for declaratory judgment with incidental mandamus to release him and it should be
brought in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila where he is detained.
It is highly desirable that courts should at all times be keenly aware that certain
aliens are apt to resort to desperate means in order to obtain the benefits of Filipino
citizenship, and that they should ever endeavor to bar the possibility that judicial
proceedings should be utilized to circumvent the policy of our Constitution and statutes,
even temporarily.

Petition was granted as prayed for, and the orders of the respondent court as well as
the writ of injunction issued by it directing the release of respondent Monico Muya alias Tiu
Kim Kee, are hereby annulled and set aside. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
made permanent. Costs against the private respondent, Monico Muya.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen
being born in San Francisco, California, USA of Filipino parents. At the age of six, his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents
also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration.

The COMELEC 2nd Division which handled the disqualification case declared
Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position on the ground of having dual
citizenship as provided in Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of

the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship
when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31,
1998. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
1. Whether or not application and subsequent issuance of Alien Certificate of
Registration results to repudiation or renunciation of Filipino citizenship?
2. Whether or not there was a valid election of citizenship?
Held:
1. No. It is a well settled by jurisprudence that obtaining an Alien Certificate of
Registration is not tantamount to a repudiation of original citizenship. Neither may it
result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. An application for, and the holding of, an
alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine
citizenship.

Much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is

registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and
that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United
States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of
candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can
be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar
v. COMELEC  18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeñ a was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of
both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason
that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

2. Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of
certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenship have elected their
Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondent’s
certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I
am a Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto…”The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual-citizen.

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and
R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other
hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution
provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered

with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings.  In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial
of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national.  A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

JUANITO SORIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24102 January 30, 1971
Facts:
Juanito Soria came to the Philippines on December 2, 1960 as a temporary visitor for
the purpose of visiting his relatives. His authorized stay was for one (1) month, but it was
repeatedly extended until November 1, 1961.

Seven days after his arrival, the petitioner, through counsel, requested the
Commissioner of Immigration that he be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. He alleged,
among other things, that he was born in Bangued, Abra of a Filipino mother and a Chinese
father; that sometime in 1931, along with his mother and sister, he was taken to China by
his father; that his father died in China while his mother was still living; that in 1949 he
escaped to Hongkong from the Chinese mainland. Petitioner, however, never submitted his
birth certificate.

The petition was heard on three times by an investigator in the Bureau of

Immigration. The investigator submitted his report and concluded that Juan Soria is a
Filipino citizen by illegitimate birth, entitled to recognition as such. Upon review of said
report, the Commissioner of Immigration found the evidence presented insufficient to
prove the petitioner's claim of illegitimacy and consequently denied the petition.

Petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on a petition

for mandamus with preliminary injunction praying among others, that he be declared a
citizen of the Philippines. Before the case could be heard on the merits, however, the
petitioner's counsel moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that his client had left the
Philippines and had lost interest in the further prosecution of the case and the motion was
granted.

While the mandamus case was pending, petitioner was able to secure a Certificate of

Registration and Identity from the Philippine Vice-Consul in Bangkok, Thailand, certifying
"that he has been documented as Philippine citizen. Armed with said certificate, the
petitioner came back to the Philippines and sought admission as a Filipino citizen. However,
the Bureau of Immigration denied him entry on the ground that he was improperly
documented and that he was still an alien as shown by the records of the said office. The
Commissioner of Immigration thereupon ordered his arrest and exclusion from the
Philippines.

Petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on a petition for

certiorari with preliminary injunction, praying, among others, that "judgment be rendered
declaring the petitioner a citizen of the Philippines at birth. In effect, the petitioner was
seeking a review not only of the order of exclusion but also of the denial of his petition for
admission as Filipino citizen, which was the subject of his petition for mandamus previously
dismissed by the lower court upon motion of his own counsel. Finding that the respondent
had neither abused his discretion nor acted without jurisdiction in both instances, the trial
court dismissed the petition. The petitioner moved to reconsider but was turned down;
hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent and the lower court erred in not declaring the petitioner as
a Filipino citizen?

Held:
No. Petitioner’s contention that the lower court erred in not declaring the petitioner
a Filipino citizen is without merit. His petition was for certiorari and this remedy is
available against action taken without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The order of respondent Commissioner of Immigration for the exclusion of
petitioner falls under neither category; and the facts on which the said order was based
were not properly in issue. It is true that one of the prayers in the petition is that judgment
be rendered declaring petitioner a citizen of the Philippines. But it is now well-settled that
there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules, for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. In the case of Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16108, October 31,
1961, this Court said:
If the petition be considered as one for declaratory judgment, the facts do not
warrant the filing of the said special civil action. If the petition seeks to
 compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her and her children's
alien certificate of registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a
competent court, in an action where the citizenship of parties is a material
matter in issue, declaring the Filipino citizenship of the petitioner and her
children, and such declaration cannot be obtained directly because there is no
proceeding at present provided by law or the rules for such purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner-appellant.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING CIVIL
STATUS, ELEUTERIA FELISETA TAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-16108            October 31, 1961
Facts:
Eleuteria Feliseta Tan filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, alleging that petitioner she is the common-law wife of Tan King Pock, a
Chinaman, and that nine minor children were born to them out of wedlock; that she and her
children are registered as aliens; that she had asked the Commissioner of Immigration to
cancel her registration and that of her children as aliens, but that the Commissioner refused
to grant her petition. Therefore, she prayed that the cancellation of the alien certificate of
registration of herself and her children be ordered.

Pursuant to the order and suggestion by the lower court, petitioner through counsel,
amended her original petition converting it into one for declaratory judgment, alleging,
among others, that petitioner is a Filipino citizen being the illegitimate child of a Chinaman
by the name of Sy Siwa and Benita Feliseta, a Filipina, without benefit of marriage.

The Solicitor General asked for the denial of the petition because the petition is not
based upon any of the grounds required by the rules as a ground for declaratory judgment;
that there is no need for the present action for the cancellation of their alien certificate of
registration; and that the petition is evidently one which seeks a judicial pronouncement as
to petitioner's claim for citizenship, which matter should be threshed out in a proper action.
The provincial fiscal also prayed that the petition be denied, alleging that the petition is not
in order; that the children are not represented by a guardian, and that the end sought in the
petition should be threshed out in a proper action.

The lower court decided in favor of the petitioner and her children, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not declaratory relief is the proper action in the lower court’s decision
declaring the petitioner and her children as Filipino citizens?

Held:
No. Declaratory relief is a special civil action which may lie only when "any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by statute or ordinance," demands construction thereof for a declaration of his
rights thereunder. None of the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration.
And this Court has already held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules
by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to
that effect or in regard to his citizenship.

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach
of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,
the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise,
such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding
may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or
single or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise
to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits
the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no
similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry. (Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960,
reiterated in G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961).

If the petition be considered as one for declaratory judgment, the facts do not
warrant the filing of the said special civil action. If the petition seeks to compel the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her and her children's alien certificate of
registration, this petition would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation of alien
certificate of registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent court, in
an action where the citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino
citizenship of the petitioner and her children, and such declaration cannot be obtained
directly because there is no proceeding at present provided by law or the rules for such
purpose.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, set aside, and
the petition dismissed. With costs against petitioner-appellee.
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 137000               August 9, 2000
Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father
and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle
in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well.

In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was elected
governor of Davao Oriental.  Her election was contested by her opponent in a petition for
quo warranto. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
Philippine citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. When Lopez ran for re-
election in 1995 elections, her opponent filed a petition for disqualification, contesting her
Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections.  Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner Cirilo Valles.

The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino citizen
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is
a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen
under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making
her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that,
she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there
are the COMELEC Resolutions in two previous petitions, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly
qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
 Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining
that herein private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted
facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration
as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration; b) On even date,
she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was
issued Australian Passport.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent is a Filipino?
2. If she is, whether or not she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR
and being issued an Australian passport?

Held:
1. Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. 
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli, which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian.  Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.  These were
the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein
including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. 
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
 deemed to be a Philippine citizen.  By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws
in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood

relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father.  The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.  If Australia follows the principle
of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be

express.  The mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship.  For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in
the case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to
an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship.  The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.  Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine
citizenship.  Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not
hold water.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent

executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992.  And, as a
result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled,
as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. 
As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of
the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions,

dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
RAMON L. LABO, JR. VS. COMELEC
G. R. NO. 86564 AUGUST 1, 1989

FACTS:

 Private respondent was married to an Australian citizen in 1976, thus he gained

Australian citizenship through such act.
 In 1980, when he returned to the Philippines, he was declared as alien by the
Commission on Immigration and deportation.
 In 1982, it was found that private respondent had 2 administrative cases on the petition
regarding his citizenship but COMELEC found him to be a citizen of the Philippines.
 On January 20,1988, private respondent was declared Mayor of Baguio City
 On January 26 1988, a petition for quo warranto was filed by private respondent
against public respondent questioning their capacity questioning his citizenship.
 September of the same year, CID rendered private respondent not citizen of the
Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter,
considering that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time.
2. Whether private respondent is a Filipino citizen or not.

RULING:
1. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed
filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided
for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Code reading as follows:

SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the result of the election.
 The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36,
Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment
of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as
required by law.

But private respondent alleged that the filing fee was actually paid ahead of time but
COMELEC only treated it as pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPS Case No.
88-288 where no filing fee was collected eventhough it was offered.  It was only on
February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10,
1988, wherein he immediately paid the filing fee on that date.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay
there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true
that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a
precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case,
declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case
only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith,
the case shall be dismissed.

2. Reviewing the 2 administrative cases and the evidences presented by CID, it is clear that
private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines.He did not deny those evidences as
well. But what the Court wanted to reiterate is that must take pride in his status as such and
cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen
fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage,
rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may
not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he
sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having
done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his
adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by
election to public office.

Petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr.was declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He was also
ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City.
Serra v. Republic
In the Matter of the Application for the Naturalization of Luis Serra
GR No. L-4223 May 12, 1952

FACTS:

 Petitioner was born to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother

 His parents were not legally married but only lived together as husband and wife since
his father was married to a Chinese woman.
 Petitioner then got married to a Filipina, had children and acquired a hardware
business.
 Through his business he met different types of people like the auxiliary engineer of the
government.
 He entered an agreement with the engineer wherein the said engineer would procure
cements from him for possible government projects.
 But to his prejudice, the engineer never paid him and now the case questioning his
citizenship.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

2. Whether petitioner is legally allowed to have business in the Philippines.

RULING:

1. Yes, the petitioner is a Filipino citizen as provided by Article 18 of the Civil. His parents
are not legally married, thus he had to follow the citizenship of his mother. Since petitioner
is Filipino,hence he is legally allowed to have business in relation to issue number 2.

Luis Serra was declared a Filipino citizen, hereby the case was dismissed.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

FACTS:

 Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.On 17 July 1998, Ching, after
having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City,
filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
 In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election

Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing

that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

 In 1999, the successfully passed the bar examinations, unfortunately, he was forbidden
to take the lawyer’s oath and was adviced to present more pertinent records of his
citizenship.
ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent’s proof of citizenship are good enough to declare him as a Filipino
citizen.
2. Whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time."
RULING:

1. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
"(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. 
2. In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five
(35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or
over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise
the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked
by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
 Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.

The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORA FE SAGUN

G.R. No. 187567               February 15, 2012
FACTS:

 Respondent was the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City 3 and did
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
 In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath
of Allegiance4 to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
 Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport but her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
 In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and
Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family
Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-
Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of
Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local
and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification 5 issued by Atty. Maribelle
Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.
 She was declared Filipino citizen by the lower court which prompted the Office of the
Solicitor General to file the present case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is

procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible.

2. Whether an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the
age of majority, is considered to have been made "within a reasonable time" as interpreted
by jurisprudence.8
RULING:
1.  This
Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the
Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. 13 There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person
is part of our citizenry.

However, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration

under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be
required to register as an alien. 24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is
required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now
Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on
his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on
the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. 25 Afterwards, the same is
elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.

With the case at bar, it was clear that respondent did not comply with the foregoing.

2. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of

alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of
majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not
within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 27 Moreover, there was
no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register
with the nearest local civil registry.
Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer
upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.

The petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent
Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2.2.

RENALD F. VILANDO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 : August 23, 2011

FACTS:

 Petitioner filed a quo warranto petition before HRET questioning the citizenship of
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong.
 Limkaichong ran for a seat in the First District of Negros Oriental and won.
 Petitioner aimed Limkaichong to be disqualified on the ground that she was born to a
father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who
acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.
 Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
 She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and
in order and had already attained the status of res judicata.
 Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a
collateral attack.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the argument of the petitioner, that the quo warranto petition does not
operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father.
2. Whether respondent is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
1. As to issue number one, petitioner makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of
naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute
a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. The held, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. 13

the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the
proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper
provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably
after previous investigation in each particular case.

Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated
by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be
raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

There is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings for
a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo
warranto is not a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo
warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of due process on the part of the
persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case.

Indubitably, with Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a

naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following
the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has
satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of
the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO CABILING
MA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B.
CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of
Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL, Respondents.
GR. No. 183133               July 26, 2010

FACTS:

 Petitioners were born to a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother.

 They were able to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority but failed
to register.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a
Filipino mother.

RULING:

The Court ruled that their right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.

The election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election
beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have
publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.

To register is to record or annotate. It pertains to the entry made in the registry

which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real
rights.61 Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification. 62

Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the
act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will
confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed.
 Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to
elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the
election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The
lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any.

The Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005,
and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-
574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo
Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety
(90) days from notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration
shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their financial obligations to
the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; and ACT
thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.

NESTOR A. JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMELEC

G.R. No. 179848             November 27, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became
a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General of Los
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of
petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the
Bureau of Immigration certified petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.

On 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before
the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed
to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
In the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections Petitioner garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May

2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship.

HELD:
Petitioner should be disqualified. Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and
his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
 candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

In the present case petitioner Jacot, although successfully reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
.

MANUEL B. JAPZON vs. COMELEC and JAIME S. TY

G.R. No. 180088             January 19, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel B. Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty were candidates for
the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007.
 On 15 June 2007, Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition 5 to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon
averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been to spouses
Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated
to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in
the USA for the last 25 years.

Japzon asserted that when Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he
falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was a permanent resident
or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160. In fact, even after filing his
application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the
USA. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, he continued to conduct himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or
related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the
disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter’s
Certificate of Candidacy.

In his Answer, Ty claimed that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007,he already performed the following acts: (1) Under Republic Act No. 9225, granting
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in
Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. hereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter
in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a
duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty
argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American
citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.

Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 15 May 2007. 7

ISSUES:1. Whether Ty substantially complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5

of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
2. Whether Ty complied with the one-year residency requirement.
HELD:
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty substantially complied with the
requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, to wit:

Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2,
2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance
with R.A. 9225. Although Ty has lost his domicile in the Philippines when he was
naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14
May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. . It was only on 19 March 2007
that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became
a pure Philippine citizen again.

We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and
subsequently spurns the same, is by clear acts of repatriation a Filipino Citizen and hence
qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino
with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
 In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. , the instant Petition
for Certiorari is dismissed.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 198742           August 10, 2012
REYES, J.:
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section
5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold
any elective public office.

FACTS:
 The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship

before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." 5 The
application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation

of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying
that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of
votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13,
2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan  and Luis
M. Bautista, all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual
citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The RTC ruled in favor of Respondents for failure of Petitioner to execute a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner validly renounced her foreign citizenship in accordance with the
requirement under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

HELD:
No, Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands that natural-born Filipinos
who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino
citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It
is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to

Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the
operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to
comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006.
As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a
sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
elective office in the Philippines.
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.The petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en banc
is AFFIRMED in toto.
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,
B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines.
 The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he
became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on
September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume
the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his
petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition to re-acquire the practice of law be granted.
HELD:
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later
re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in
the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
 Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients
repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of
law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies
of the following documents in relation to his petition:
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the
Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his
good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,
UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with
the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in
the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar
to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
 WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,
subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the
Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
FACTS:
 Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine
bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
HELD:
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
 The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall
be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine
bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss
of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a

citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." 17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right
to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar. The petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject
to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance
to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS et al vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
GARCIA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, pray that they and others who retained
or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism
provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003  (R.A. 9189) and that the
COMELEC accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters
under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
FACTS:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Even before
the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification
as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United
States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23,
2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the
different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration,
as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals
who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.

Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling
in Macalintal vs. COMELEC on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality …, it is the

Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the
right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted
for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18
September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are
considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among
others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to
the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,
petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
 On April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for the denial of
the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said
elections.

Because of the transcendental issue tendered in the petition, i.e., the propriety of
allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however,
remains unresolved. The Court accords merit to the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners and others who might have retained and/or reacquired
Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

HELD:
Yes, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
"duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized
that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote.

Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal V COMELEC:

It is clear from these discussions of the … Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have
not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
[Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, …, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines
may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad exercise their right to vote;
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register
and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of
elections.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so
holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to
vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183110               October 7, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
The Respondent Azucena was born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September
28, 1941 to Chinese parents and she has never departed the Philippines since birth.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools.

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-
born Filipino citizen. They have five children, all studied in Philippine public and private
schools and are all professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.

She resigned from her teaching job and the couple engaged in the retail business and
later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra.

On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur and was granted her petition as she amply supported the allegations in
her petition. The Court of Appeals as well affirmed the RTC's decision. However the Office of
the Solicitor General assails the CA's decision hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the OSG's Petition for Review on Certiorari be granted regarding the
Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas making reference to the alleged
failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473.

RULING:
The OSG's Petition for Review on Certiorari was denied for the Petition lacks merit
and the Petition for Naturalization of the respondent was approved.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act
No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is
found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
 "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines."

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they
have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the
United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15
of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru
derivative naturalization.

As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the
conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows:

The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that
she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband
to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the
CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen as only
their marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship but was adequately
proven before the Court of Santiago's Filipino citizenship. This is an operative fact that
should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473. On the submitted evidence,
nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4
of the same Act.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been
unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that
prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular
naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what
option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant.

In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA
473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473
was denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law.

Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial

naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to
deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

However, the case before the Court is a not Petition for judicial declaration, i.e., the
petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asking a court to declare or confirm his status
as a Filipino citizen but rather a Petition for judicial Naturalization under CA 473, in which
the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant
of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly
Filipino family.

The Court also affirms the findings of the CA that since the government who has an
interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified
through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have complied with
the public hearing requirement under CA 473. No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as
qualification to become a Philippine citizen: He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before
she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint
provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and
wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and have all
become professionals and responsible citizens of this country.

Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena
herself is a professional and can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves
her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only
country she has known since birth.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity
and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other.

Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and business activities reserved
by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the
wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31,2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for
Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED.
 Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No.
530 which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization
be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be
cancelled.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.

LIM BIAK CHIAO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28541 January 14, 1974
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner-appellee filed a petition for Naturalization in accordance with
Commonwealth Act 473 but failed to comply "Section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473" which
requires that the petition for naturalization should specify the qualifications possessed by
an applicant.

Petitioner's petition, which was filed on December 14, 1964, stated that petitioner's
average annual income was P5,000.00 more or less, ... . Petitioner's income tax returns
presented at the trial show that in 1962 his net income was P2,644.03; in 1963, P3,746.87;
and in 1964, P6,988.46.

Aside from himself, petitioner had to support his wife and children. In 1962, he had
one child (Edmond Yu Lim) ; in 1963 he had two children (Edmond Yu Lim and Benzon Yu
Lim); in 1964 he had three children (aside from the two was Juvy Yu Lim).

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in granting citizenship to the petitioner Lim Biak
Chiao under the Naturalization Act to comply the requirement of (1) a showing of good
moral character and (2) lucrative employment.

RULING:
Yes, the lower court erred in granting citizenship to the petitioner.
(1) To assert that any alien, one desirous of joining the ranks of Filipino citizens, has the
inescapable duty of satisfying every requirement of the Naturalization Act is to assert the
undisputed and indisputable. To the state belongs the exclusive competence of determining
on who shall be conferred that eagerly sought privilege. It follows then that it may prescribe
the conditions that much be fulfilled, the steps that must be taken, and the allegations that a
petition for naturalization must contain. There must be a faithful compliance with every
requirement. Otherwise consequences fatal in character as far as the petition is concerned
would result. The applicant is thus called upon to set forth categorically that he has all the
qualifications required by law. More specifically, considering that the Naturalization Law
itself requires a showing of good moral character, it would follow, as held in Lim Cho Kuan
v. Republic, that such a matter should "be alleged and proved."In the latest decision in point,
promulgated barely two years ago, this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, reaffirmed
such a doctrine.

(2) Now as to the lack of lucrative employment, it is one of the qualifications required in the
Naturalization Act that petitioner must be worth either not less than P5,000.00 or "must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation." Some of the earlier
decision stressing how essential such a requirement is came from the pen of former Chief
Justice Bengzon, in the cases respectively of Lim v. Republic, Tiong v. Republic, and Swee Din
Tan v. Republic. In Tan v. Republic, there was a definition of what lucrative employment
signifies from the pen of Justice Zaldivar. It "means a gainful employment. It is not only that
the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must
be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment, sickness or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming
the object of charity or a public charge. Again, from Chief Justice Concepcion comes the
latest decision applying such doctrine consistently adhered to with undeviating rigidity.
Reference is made to Watt v. Republic, where, in a sense, a further refinement was made in
the Tan pronouncement leading to a stricter view of the matter. In the language of the Chief
Justice: "It is not enough for an applicant for naturalization not to be a financial burden
upon the community. He must, also, have a 'lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation.' And this qualification has been construed to mean, not only that he is not a
beggar, a pauper or indigent, but, also, that his financial condition must be such as to permit
him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this
stage of our civilization."

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of October 17, 1966 granting citizenship to
petitioner Lim Biak Chiao subject to Republic Act No. 530 is reversed.
In re PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHIU BOK alias
DAVID CHIU, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor appellant.
G.R. No. L-33568 June 20, 1988
PADILLA, J,:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, the petitioner had filed a petition for naturalization with the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte and the lower court declared the petitioner
qualified to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines.

However, on appeal, the Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the petition for
naturalization on the ground that the petitioner did not have a lucrative income decent
enough to maintain his family. The Court also found that the Petitioner's use of an alias,
without authority, as provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 142, is in clear violation of that
law, the Anti-Alias Law, and render him all the more disqualified to obtain Philippine
citizenship. It shows that the said petitioner is not a person of irreproachable character.

The petitioner filed second petition for naturalization on 26 April 1967 and claimed
that the grounds for the denial of his first petition are "not anymore existing at the present
and have been cured." To sustain his claim, the petitioner presented his income tax returns
for the years 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967, wherein it is shown that his net income for
said years are P4,626.09, P7,686.12, P8,413.19, P9,605.03 and P9,651.26, respectively. The
petitioner's family consists of eight (8) members, including himself and his wife, what
belongs to each member, per capita, would be only P100.53 a month.

The petitioner also presented a copy of the order issued by the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte on 21 September 1966 in Sp. Proc. No. R-464, wherein his
use of an alias was legalized.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner Chiu Bok alias David Chiu is qualified for admission as citizen
of the Philippines on his second appeal.
RULING:
No, the petitioner is not qualified to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines even on
his second appeal.
 Since lucrative income is to be reckoned with as of the filing of the application for
naturalization petitioner's net income for the year 1967, when the application for
naturalization was filed, which is P9,651.25, should be determinative of the issue.

This amount, however, is not lucrative enough to support the petitioner's family
within the purview of the Naturalization Law, for that would give him at most a monthly
income of P804.27.

Since the petitioner's family consists of eight (8) members, including himself and his
wife, what belongs to each member, per capita, would be only P100.53 a month.

Unless the petitioner has other income not duly reported, this amount can hardly be
considered lucrative considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing
power of the peso and the fact that three (3) of his children are studying in Cebu City, and
he has to pay for their board and lodging and other incidental expenses.

This reason, alone, is sufficient to support a reversal of the decision appealed from
and the denial of the application for naturalization.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered dismissing the petition for naturalization filed in Naturalization Case
No. R-58 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF CHUA KIAN LAI TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF

THE PHILIPPINES. CHUA KIAN LAI, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-37443 September 11, 1974
AQUINO, J.:p
FACTS:
Chua Kian Lai, the petitioner, was born on October 27, 1903 in Amoy, China. He
arrived in the Philippines in 1914 on board the SS Lim An. In 1922 he married Ty Siok
Cheng at Amoy. They begot ten children. The eldest was born on September 18, 1924 in
Fookien, China. The last child was born on August 22, 1948 in San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.

Since his arrival in the Philippines Chua Kian Lai resided at the following places: (1)
from 1914 to 1935, Nueva Street, Manila; (2) from 1935 to 1941, Benavides Street, Manila;
(3) from 1941 to 1947, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; (4) from 1947 to 1953, 3-5
Estrella Street, Binondo, Manila, and since 1954, 741-5 Padilla Street, San Miguel, Manila.

He is a businessman with an investment in various enterprises amounting to

P60,000. His average annual income before 1961 was P6,500. Damaso L. Martinez, Delfin
Garcia, and Ireneo L. Bangit, his three character witnesses, came to know him in 1944, 1941
and 1948, respectively.

The petition for naturalization was filed on September 24, 1959. After hearing, the
Court of First Instance of Manila granted the petition in its decision dated October 3, 1961.
A copy of the decision was served in the office of the Solicitor General on October 20, 1961.

Inasmuch as the petitioner took no step to take his oath, the Solicitor General on
February 29, 1966 filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. The petitioner
opposed the motion. It was denied by the lower court in its order of March 7, 1966. The
court directed the petitioner to file a motion to be allowed to take his oath. He filed that
motion.

On the date set for the hearing of the motion to take the oath, the petitioner and his
counsel did not appear. At the instance of Solicitor Hector C. Fule, the lower court dismissed
the motion in its order of July 2, 1966. On July 27, 1966 the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The lower court reconsidered its order. After hearing petitioner's motion
to take the oath, the lower court issued an order dated February 19, 1968 granting it.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner Chua Kian Lai is allowed to take oath of allegiance and be
admitted as a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No, the petitioner is denied to take his oath of allegiance and cannot be admitted as
a Filipino Citizen for the following reasons:

1) One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner "must be of good
moral character". That circumstance should be specifically alleged in the petition (Secs.
2[3rd] and 7, Com. Act No. 473). The State, in its brief, notes that Chua Kian Lai did not aver
in his petition that he is a person of good moral character. He simply made a blanket
allegation that he had "all the qualifications required of Commonwealth Act No. 473". That
general statement is not sufficient. Section 7 of the law provides that the petitioner should
set forth in his petition, inter alia, "a declaration that he has the qualifications required by
this Act, specifying the same". The omission of that specific averment nullifies his petition
(Chua Bon Chiong vs. Republic, L-29200, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 318, 325).

2) Chua Kian Lai averred in his petition that his residence was at 741-745 Padilla
Street, San Miguel, Manila and that his former residence was in Amoy, China (2 Record on
Appeal). In his testimony he disclosed four other places of residence.

The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition "his
present and former places of residence" (See. 7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement is
designed to facilitate the verification of petitioner's activities which have a bearing on his
petition for naturalization, especially as to his qualifications and moral character, either by
private individuals or by investigative agencies of the government, by pointing to them the
localities or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok vs. Republic,
112 Phil. 986). Moreover, the suppression of that information might constitute a falsehood
which signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not, therefore, qualified
to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines (Ang Ban Giok vs. Republic,
L-26949, February 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 556, 560).

3) The Solicitor General also points out that the petitioner, a businessman, who has
ten children, five of whom were still dependent on him for support in 1961, when he
testified, and whose annual income was P6,500, cannot be regarded as having a "lucrative
trade" (Sec. 2[4th], Com. Act No. 473). That income is not adequate to enable him and the
members of his big family "to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity at this
stage of civilization" (Watt vs. Republic, L-20718, August 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 683 and nine
other cases). It was held that the petitioner has no lucrative income and failed to satisfy the
property or income requirement thus a ground for denying applicant's petition for
naturalization.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of February 19, 1968, allowing Chua Kian Lai
to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen, is reversed and its decision of October 3,
1961, granting his petition for naturalization, is set aside.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ONG BAN UAN TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF

THE PHILIPPINES. ONG BAN UAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22496 February 26, 1974
FERNANDO, J.:p
FACTS:
The petitioner arrived in the Philippines in 1923 and stayed first at 207 Echague St.,
Manila, from 1923 to 1949. Thereafter he transferred to Puerto Princesa, Palawan for the
years 1950 to 1951, then to Coron, also in that province in 1952. In 1959, he went to live at
Cuyo, Palawan, his residence at the time his petition for naturalization was heard. He is
married to one Susana Lim with three children, namely, Grace L. Ong, born on November
30, 1967; Raymond L. Ong, born on February 12, 1959; and Maria Susana Ong, born on
April 8, 1961. As set forth in his petition, his trade or profession was that of an employee,
with an average income of four thousand pesos. His employer was his mother-in-law.1 It
must be added that while his petition spoke of his place of residence as Cuyo, with
reference likewise to Coron, he did also testify as to having lived at 207 Echague St., Manila
from 1923 to 1949.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-appellee complied with the requirements to be granted
Philippine citizenship

1) as to his lucrative employment or income; and

2) statement of the present and all the former places of residence

RULING:
No, the grant for Phillippne citizenship is denied.

1) The Court ruled that due to the issue of lack of lucrative employment. "It is one of
the qualifications required in the Naturalization Act that petitioner must be worth either
not less than P5,000.00 or 'must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation.' There was a definition of what lucrative employment signifies from the pen of
Justice Zaldivar. It 'means a gainful employment. It is not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income
over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of
charity or a public charge. In the case at bar, as set forth in his petition, his trade or
profession was that of an employee, with an average income of four thousand pesos.

2) Considering that the absence of lucrative income precludes us from affirming the
grant of citizenship, there is no need to discuss the question of failure to state all his places
of residence.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of August 10, 1963, granting citizenship to
Ong Ban Uan is reversed, that is, his petition for Philippine citizenship is denied.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ROSAURO JOSE TIONG ALSO KNOWN AS JOSE
CHUA TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. ROSAURO JOSE TIONG also
known as JOSE CHUA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-33817 July 25, 1974
FERNANDO, J.:p
FACTS:
The petitioner-appellee was born on October 8, 1943 in Paco, Manila; that he
formerly resided in 1154 Herran, Paco, Manila and also of 1160-62 Herran, Paco, Manila;
that he went to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in 1965 where he established his residence;
that he is single; that he is a citizen of the Republic of China; that he is employed as
salesman in the San Jose Trading Store in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, with an annual
salary of P3,000.00, out of which income he gives his parents the amount of P150.00 once
every two months; and that he studied up to third year high school at the Mapua Institute of
Technology in Manila. Notwithstanding that the annual income he could show was only
P3,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-appellee substancially complied the statutory requirement
of having a lucrative income to grant him the petition for naturalization.

RULING:

No, the petition for naturalization of the applicant cannot be granted as the
petitioner-appellee failed to show compliance with the legal requirement of a lucrative
income.

In Tan v. Republic, there was a definition of what lucrative employment signifies

from the pen of Justice Zaldivar. It 'means a gainful employment. It is not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin
of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the
object of charity or a public charge.'
 In the language of the Chief Justice: 'It is not enough for an applicant for
naturalization not to be a financial burden upon the community. He must, also, have a
"lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation." And this qualification has been
construed to mean, not only that he is not a beggar, a pauper or indigent, but, also, that his
financial condition must be such as to permit him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.

In the present case, considering the high cost of living, it is difficult to see how an
applicant, with an income of P250.00 a month, who to his credit would still share some of it
with his parents, can manage to come within the strict statutory requirement of possessing
"some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation."

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 28, 1971 is reversed and set aside and the
petition for naturalization is dismissed.

LI TONG PEK, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-20912           November 29, 1965
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1921 in Chingkang, China and arrived at Manila on
August 12, 1930 where he resided until 1931. Sometime in 1931, he left the Philippines for
Amoy, China where he studied for about three years. In 1934, he returned to the Philippines
and resided in Manila for about a year, while in 1935 up to the present he resided in Naga
City. He married one Josefa Dy Liaco Chua-Unsu, a Chinese citizen, with whom he begot
eight children, namely, Peter, Josefina, Lily, Andrew, John, Tenny, James and Philip, who
were all born in Naga City. Peter, Josefina and Lily are at present enrolled in the Anglo-
Chinese School, while his son Andrew is enrolled in the Hope Christian School, both schools
being recognized by our government where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught.

In 1947, he was employed in the Naga Ricemill which was owned by his brother with
a salary of P80.00 a month. In 1957, he began to receive a daily wage of P10.00 from the
same employer, but was paid his wage only when he worked and he usually worked only
for six days a week. On the average, the monthly compensation he received ranges from
P240.00 to P260.00. In 1957, he also became the cashier and bookkeeper of said employer
where from then on up to 1959 he received an average salary of P3,000.00 per annum. In
February, 1962, his brother raised his daily compensation to P15.00 and whenever his
employer realized profits he was given bonus at the end of the year. In 1958, his wife
worked as a cashier for one Yu Ka Koh, a distributor of the Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Company, who was paid a compensation of P250.00 a month in addition to a possible
annual bonus of P1,000.00 at the end of the year.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen in accordance with
Section 2, par. 4 Commonwealth Act No. 473;

2) Whether the petitioner manifested a sincere desire to embrace the citizenship.

RULING:
 1) No, the petitioner is not qualified to become a Filipino citizen. Under the law the
petitioner should be the one to possess "some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation" to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen (Section 2, par. 4, Commonwealth
Act No. 473) and that he did not place his children of school age in schools recognized by
our government where the students are predominantly Filipinos hence evinced a sincere
desire to become a Filipino citizen as should be expected from one who desires to embrace
our citizenship.

The petitioner does not poses a lucrative income to give him the economic
sufficiency within the purview of the law for it appears that considering the wages he was
given during the period he was employed in the Naga Ricemill it can be said that his average
monthly salary would only amount to P390.00.

In the light of the long line of decisions rendered by this Court on this matter, such
income is indeed far from being lucrative not only because petitioner has a big family, being
a father of eight children, but especially considering the high cost of living and the low
purchasing value of our currency during the present time.

It is true that petitioner's wife, as the record shows, also works as cashier of a certain
Yu Ka Koh, a distributor of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Company from which she is
given a salary of P250.00 a month, but such additional income would appear to be
immaterial here for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess "some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen
(Section 2, par. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 473).

2) No, the petitioner did not manifest sincere desire to become a Filipino citizen as
should be expected from one who desires to embrace Filipino citizenship. The Court noted
that the petitioner's claim that the four children of school age of petitioner named Peter,
Josefina, Lily and Andrew were only enrolled by him either in the Anglo-Chinese High
School or in the Hope Christian School, operated in Naga City, which, though recognized by
our government, are however run by Chinese mentors.
 The least that can be said is that said institutions being predominantly, if not
exclusively, attended by Chinese students are operated primarily for the education of
Chinese children, since they are being supervised by Chinese citizens.

This is an indication that by enrolling his children in said schools petitioner has not
evinced a sincere desire to become a Filipino citizen as should be expected from one who
desires to embrace our citizenship.

Wherefore, the petition having been granted by the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur in a decision rendered on September 27, 1962 for naturalization was
reversed hence the petition for naturalization was denied.
Macalintal vs Comelec
G.R. No. 157013 405 SCRA 614 453 Phil 585 July 10, 2003
Summary Cases:
Subject: Standing as Taxpayer; Issue is of transcendental importance; Ripe for adjudication;
Not a political question; Laws are presumed to be constitutional; Constitutional
construction-Constitution should be construed as a whole; Section 5(d) of RA 9189 is
constitutional — Section 2, Art V (absentee voting) is an exception to Section 1, Art V
(residency requirement for voters) of the 1987 Constitution;
Affidavit requirement for Filipino abroad under Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 is merely to overcome
the presumption of abandonment of their Philippine domicile Absentee Voting, being an
exception to the regular form of voting, is purely a statutory privilege; In election laws,
residence is considered synonymous with domicile; Section 18.5 of RA 9189 is
unconstitutional insofar as it enables the Comelec to usurp the duty of Congress to proclaim
the winning candidates, for president and vice-president; Sections 19 and 25 of RA 9189
are unconstitutional --Congress may not intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority

Facts:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a petition, as a taxpayer and as a lawyer, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity.

The petition raises three principal questions:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing
an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the
President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
 C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC shall
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution? Among the objections raised to the petition, and to
the propriety of the court in taking cognizance of thecase, were (1) lack of standing
of petitioner to file the case; (2) filing of petition was premature, and thus, no actual
controversy is presented; (3) issue involves a political question;

Held:
I. Procedural Issues
Standing as Taxpayer
Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court has held
that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.

Section 29 of R.A. No. 9189 appropriates funds insofar as it provides that a

supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Issue is of
transcendental importance.

The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the
petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance
to the Filipino people. Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality
standing, or interest are, in the main, procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution,
to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has
taken cognizance of these petitions.
 In this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of
suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed
by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987
Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the
instant petition10 and determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the
Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.

Ripe for adjudication

There is a question on the prematurity of the petition as there are no ongoing
proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution.

Not a political question

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case),
it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

Substantive Issues
Laws are presumed to be constitutional

An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within

constitutional limitations.
 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on
the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by
the legislative department of the government itself. (see Peralta vs Comelec)

To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution

must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public
good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must
be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows
it to be done.

Constitutional construction-Constitution should be construed as a whole

As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole.

A constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. The intent of the
Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document itself. Should it be
ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through their debates in the
constitutional convention. Section 5(d) of RA 9189 is constitutional — Section 2, Art V
(absentee voting) is an exception to the residency requirement for voters under Section 1,
Art V of the 1987 Constitution.

Under Section 5(d) of RA 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant
or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she
executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration
under said Act.
 Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election.

Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to

qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. However,
while Section 5(d) of RA 9189 appears to violate Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution,
petitioner has ignored Section 2, Article V which provides:
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,

Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance
with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a
system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country.

The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and
considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting
overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially
because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters. Thus,
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the
inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest
number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional
Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee
voting.

The intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the

responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated
in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason
why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with
respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by
Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos
abroad, the assumption is that they have the "qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to vote." It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided
for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they
do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Accordingly, Section 4 of RA 9189, which provides for the coverage of the absentee
voting process, does not require physical residency in the Philippines. Affidavit
requirement for Filipino abroad under Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 is merely to overcome the
presumption of abandonment of their Philippine domicile

Section 5(d) of RA 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident

who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent
residence in another country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his country of
origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to
register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not
abandoned his domicile.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise."
 To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their
intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a
promise to "resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three years from approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare
that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the removal" of their
names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia."

Indeed, the probability that after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he
shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year from the execution of the
affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of a
legislative exercise. As expressed in Tañ ada vs. Tuvera, the Court is not called upon to rule
on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.

The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed
the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an
immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore,
under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections
5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

Absentee Voting, being an exception to the regular form of voting, is purely a statutory
privilege.
 The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct
from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from that
previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. The right
of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory;
absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law. xxx Such statutes
are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right.

When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with
equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited
in their application to particular types of elections. xxx they should also be construed in the
light of the circumstances under which they were enacted. Further, in passing on statutes
regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole and every part of the election
laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give
effect to every portion thereof. In election laws, residence is considered synonymous with
domicile.

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the
same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the
countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual’s "permanent home," "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent."

Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements : (1) the fact of residing
or physical presence in a fixed place and (2) animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.
 Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an
individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
of another domicile of choice.

There is a difference between domicile and residence. ‘Residence’ is used to indicate

a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; ‘domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

The registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been
deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of such residence of origin. Section 18.5
of RA 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as it enables the COMELEC to usurp the duty of
Congress to proclaim the winning candidates, for president and vice-president.

Section 4 of RA 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for
president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. Section 18.5 of the same
law empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates, including
that for president and vice-president.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as Sec 18.5 totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by
the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-
president. Section 18.5 of RA 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the
proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency. It
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the
returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of
canvassers to Congress.

The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read
as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes
and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the
entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. Sections 19 and 25 of RA 9189 are
unconstitutional --Congress may not intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.

Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article IX-
A of the Constitution which provides that Constitutional Commissions shall be
independent . Particularly, the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC
which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative
departments of government; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC
violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators. Section 25 of RA 9189 provides for the creation
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC). Composed of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the JCOC is a purely legislative body. However,
aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, RA 9189 gives to the JCOC the following
functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to
the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries
for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.

Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law
only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
 By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Hence, the second sentence of the first paragraph of Section
19 stating that "[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and
the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission," should be stricken out of the statute for constitutional infirmity.

Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight

Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to
authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and
the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section areunconstitutional as they
require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections.
Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries
wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the
conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of RA 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.

In summary:
A. Section 5(d) is CONSTITUTIONAL

B. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is CONSTITUTIONAL with respect only to the
authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators
and party-list representatives but UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
C. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence
of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to
the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
by virtue of this Act for prior approval;" and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission" of the same law.
AASJS, Calilung vs Datumanong
G.R. No. 160869 523 SCRA 108 May 11, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. Petitioner
prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic
Act No. 9225, entitled An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional
as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply
taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.

Issue:
1. Is R.A. 9225 constitutional?
2. Does the court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

Ruling:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship and further claims that the oath in
Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen
is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the
applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is
an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
 From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out
of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether
or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and

it is not a self-executing provision thus, there is still a need to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. In the case of Mercado, it did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Thereby, in the absence of law, it would be premature for the judicial department to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Yet, it cannot arrogate the duty of legislatures to set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. In
the case at hand, the court ruled the petition be DISMISSED for lack of merit.