Journal of Church and State Advance Access published November 9, 2010

Spiritual Security, the Russian

Orthodox Church, and the Russian
Foreign Ministry: Collaboration
or Cooptation?

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Daniel P. Payne

Introduction
Upon the recent death of Patriarch Alexey II of Moscow and All
Russia, Sergei Lavrov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry (RFM),
stated, “It is impossible to overestimate the contribution of the
Primate of the Church to strengthening the positions of our Father-
land in the world and enhancing the international prestige of
Russia.”1 First and foremost, the signing of the 2007 Act of Canon-
ical Communion of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Ortho-
dox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) signaled “a new stage in [the
Russian Foreign Ministry’s] efforts to consolidate the Russian
world.”2 During the reign of Alexey II, especially during the Putin
administration, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) expanded its
role, uniting its mission with that of the RFM to secure the rights
or “spiritual security” of the Russian diaspora as well as to reacquire

DANIEL P. PAYNE (BA, Bethany College; MDiv, Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School
of Theology; PhD, Baylor University) is a senior research fellow, J. M. Dawson
Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University, and an associate priest at
the Annunciation Greek Orthodox Cathedral, Houston, Texas. He is the author
of The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Contemporary Othodox Thought (forth-
coming). His articles have appeared in Religion, State and Society, Nationalities
Papers, Sobornost’, Faith and Economics, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, BYU
Law Review, Stranitsy, and Synaxis. Special interests include Orthodox political
theology, orthodoxy and nationalism, and civil religion.

1. Sergey Lavrov, “The Message of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of

Russia, to the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Over the Death of
Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia,” available online at http://www.
mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/e99d01ee8637c3
d6c3 257523003f9f6d?OpenDocument.
2. “Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation,” Diplomat 173, no. 9 (2008): 5.

Journal of Church and State; doi:10.1093/jcs/csq102

# The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. Dawson
Institute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:
[email protected]

1
 Journal of Church and State

property that had formerly belonged to the Russian Empire and had
been lost during the Communist period. Furthermore, the church by
collaborating with the foreign ministry has signaled that the church
is indeed united with the state in promoting a greater Russia
through the spread of Russian Orthodox Christianity.
In this essay, I will examine the relationship between the ROC and
the RFM. In particular, I will focus on three roles that the ROC is pro-

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viding. First, along with Putin’s understanding of “spiritual security”
the ROC, by consolidating its rule over the Russian diaspora, is
expanding this concept outside of Russia proper. Second, the rela-
tionship is providing the opportunity for the reacquisition of
Russian property that was lost during the Communist period.
And third, through its relationship with the RFM the ROC has been
able to expand the influence of the Russian government throughout
the world. The resurgence of Russia in world affairs has created ten-
sions within the Orthodox world, especially in regards to Western
Europe. The concept of “canonical territory,” whereby it is deter-
mined who has spiritual oversight over the Orthodox people of
a particular area, has become a controversial topic, especially
between the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP) of
Constantinople.3

Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Foreign

Ministry, and the Spiritual Security of the Diaspora
The Concept of Spiritual Security

In the 2000 National Security Concept, the Putin Administration

stated,

Assurance of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes pro-

tecting the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions
and standards of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all
Russia’s peoples. There must be a state policy to maintain the popula-
tion’s spiritual and moral welfare, prohibit the use of airtime to

3. See Daniel P. Payne, “Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Eccle-
siastical Conflict in the Orthodox Commonwealth,” Nationalities Papers 35
(2007): 831–52; Alexander Agadjanian and Kathy Rousselet, “Globalization
and Identity Discourse in Russian Orthodoxy,” in Eastern Orthodoxy in a
Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-first Century, ed. Victor Roudometof,
Alexander Agadjanian, and Jerry Pankhurst (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press,
2005), 29–57; Archbishop Hilarion Alfeyev, “La notion du territoire canonique
dans la tradition Orthodoxe,” given at the International Symposium of Canon
Law at the Catholic Theological Academy of Budapest, February 7, 2005; avail-
able at http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/6_12.

2
 Spiritual Security

promote violence or base instincts, and counter the adverse impact of

foreign religious organizations and missionaries.4

This spiritual understanding of national security saw its begin-

nings in the pursuit of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience
and on Religious Associations, which brought to an end the brief

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period of religious freedom that Russia experienced following the
1990 law on Freedom of Worship. In November 1996, then Metro-
politan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad commented about the
problem of proselytism facing the ROC.5 Once the 1990 law
allowed for freedom of conscience, “hordes of missionaries
dashed in, believing the former Soviet Union to be a vast missionary
territory.”6 Instead of aiding the ROC in its missionary endeavors,
these proselytizing groups worked against the church “like boxers
in a ring with their pumped-up muscles, delivering blows.” The
blows were against the “people’s national and religious sentiments,”
leading to a state where for many Russians, “‘non-Orthodox’ means
those who have come to destroy the spiritual unity of the people
and the Orthodox faith—spiritual colonizers who by fair means
or foul try to tear the people away from their church.”7 In the eyes
of the religious leaders of the ROC, Russia was losing its cultural
identity as an Orthodox nation. As Wallace Daniel and Christopher
Marsh state, “Unless the government affirmed Russia’s traditional
faiths against the aggressive actions of other religious groups and
sects, the patriarch [Alexey II] maintained, the renewal of Russia’s
own spiritual traditions stood little chance.”8 Therefore, in this
atmosphere, where the ROC believed itself as well as Russian
culture to be under attack, Boris Yeltsin passed the 1997 law, differ-
entiating traditional and nontraditional religions in Russia.9
Additionally, the idea arose that these foreign missionaries
were actually covert foreign intelligence workers, gathering infor-
mation about “Russian policies and strategic activities.”10 The

4. “2000 Russian National Security Concept,” available at http://www.

russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html.
5. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “Gospel and Culture,” in
Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, ed. John Witte,
Jr., and Michael Bourdeaux, 66–76 (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999).
6. Ibid., 73.
7. Ibid., 73–74.
8. Wallace Daniel and Christopher Marsh, “Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience in Context and Retrospect,” in Perspectives on Church-State Rela-
tions in Russia, ed. Wallace L. Daniel, Peter L. Berger, and Christopher Marsh,
29 (Waco: J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, 2008).
9. Ibid.
10. John Anderson, “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric
Symphonia?” Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 194.

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 Journal of Church and State

head of the religious studies faculty at the Russian Academy of State

Service, Nikolai Trofimchuk, in 2001 argued in his book Expansiya
that foreign missionaries, regardless of their intentions, “served
the interests of the countries from which they came.”11 Therefore,
more attention should be placed on the concept of “spiritual secur-
ity” in the coming years.12 In order to emphasize the spiritual
danger facing Russia, Putin, in the 2000 National Security

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Concept, “drew a tight connection between religion, culture and
nationality and stressed its central role in Russian culture and
social order.”13 In response to the recent enthronement of Patriarch
Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, Putin stated, “In the dialogue with
other Sister-Churches, the Russian Orthodox Church has always
defended and hopefully will continue to defend the national and
spiritual identity of Russians.”14 Because Orthodoxy has been asso-
ciated with Russian nationalism, that is, with Russian culture and
heritage, as John Anderson states, “competitors (especially Catho-
lics and ‘sects’) can be depicted as threats to the religion of the
nation, and thus to the nation itself.”15
In March 2002 Patriarch Alexey II, in a low-key ceremony, conse-
crated a church at the Lubianka headquarters of the Federal Security
Agency.16 According to Julie Elkner, instead of focusing on the past
tensions between the security apparatus and the ROC, the ceremony
had a different tone. As Elkner states, “the ceremony focused on the
need for concerted actions aimed at combating the current threats
posed to Russia’s ‘spiritual security,’ as the Patriarch put it.”17 Cer-
tainly the patriarch was not alone in utilizing this concept. Ideo-
logues of the right and left have been utilizing the concept for the
defense of Russian culture against the expansion of Western
culture. In 2003 Viktor Zorkal’tsev, Communist parliamentary
deputy, defined spiritual security: “Freedom of conscience is only
freedom when this is the freedom not only to believe, but to act.
However, freedom of conscience has boundaries. And these boun-
daries can be defined by a single expression—spiritual security. Spi-
ritual security is, if you like, one of the conditions of a civil

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Inna Naletova, Perspective 12, no. 3 (2002); available at http://www.bu.edu/
iscip/vol12/Naletova.html.
14. “Russian Orthodox Church to work for Russian identity—Putin,” Interfax,
February 3, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com.
15. Anderson, “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church,” 195.
16. “FSB Gets Its Own Place to Worship,” Moscow Times, March 7, 2002; available at
http:// www.moscowtimes.ru/article/938/49/247959.htm; Julie Elkner, “Spiri-
tual Security in Putin’s Russia,” available at http://historyandpolicy.org/papers/
policy-paper-26.html.
17. Elkner, “Spiritual Security.”

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 Spiritual Security

society.”18 This spiritual security, then, serves as the basis for pro-
tecting and uniting the Russian Orthodox people against threats to
its spiritual and cultural well-being, especially by limiting the
amount of freedom experienced in the civil society itself.

Spiritual Security and the Russian Diaspora

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As stated earlier, Sergei Lavrov, head of the RFM, stated that the
signing of the 2007 Act of Canonical Communion between the
Moscow Patriarchate and the ROCOR represents “a new stage in
our efforts to consolidate the Russian World.”19 In September
2003, Putin met with Metropolitan Laurus in New York in order to
discuss the possibility of the reunion of ROCOR with the ROC.20
As the Current Digest described the process, “The ROC, the ROCA
and the Russian president are all pleased that the idea that a ‘super-
power’ like our country should have a ‘superchurch’ is being
advanced as the main argument in favor of reunification.”21 A
year later, ROCOR called an All-Diaspora Council to discuss this
possibility, and in June 2007 Metropolitan Laurus and Patriarch
Alexey II co-celebrated the Divine Liturgy in Moscow, marking the
end of the eighty-year schism.
While many celebrated the spiritual and ecclesiological signifi-
cance of this reunion, others were skeptical of the political
meaning behind the merger. Yuri Zarakhovich, in an article for
Time, stated that Putin’s aim was for the “take over” of ROCOR by
the Moscow Patriarchate in order to “launch a new globalized
Church as his state’s main ideological arm and a vital foreign
policy instrument.”22 Indeed, “just as ROC congregations in other
countries served as foreign intelligence centers in the 1970s,”
remarked The Current Digest, “tomorrow the ROCA could become
an outpost for Russian geopolitical aims.”23 Furthermore, Putin
commented on the reunion as a part of the spiritual security of
the Russian nation, “equat[ing] Russia’s ‘traditional confessions’
to its nuclear shield, both . . . being ‘components that strengthen

18. Ibid.
19. See note 2.
20. According to Irina Papkova, ROCOR had been discussing this possibility
internally for the past fifteen years. Personal communication with Irina
Papkova.
21. “The Strength and Weakness of Orthodoxy,” The Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press 55, no. 51 (January 21, 2004): 19 –20.
22. Yuri Zarakhovich, “Putin’s Reunited Russian Church,” Time.com, May 17,
2007; available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1622544,00.
html.
23. “The Strength and Weakness of Orthodoxy,” 20.

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 Journal of Church and State

Russian statehood’ and create necessary preconditions for internal

and external security of the country.”24
In fact, the 2007 reunification, while being the largest and most
important overture to the Russian diaspora by the Putin administra-
tion and the ROC, is not the only attempt at reuniting the Russian
émigré communities throughout the world in order to expand
Russian influence and protect emigrant Russians.25 As Patriarch

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Kirill states,

There are parishes and monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church in

many countries. They not only unite Russians, but also the natives of
other countries in the canonical space of the Moscow Patriarchate, specif-
ically the citizens of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. All those people find
themselves drawn to the faith of their ancestors, their people, to Ortho-
doxy, when they land in foreign countries. The Church communities
seek to unite Orthodox Christians so that they can, together, get stronger
in the faith, pray and partake of the Sacraments. Moreover, our parishes
fulfill a cultural mission. They are an important link between their Mother-
land and the people living far away from their native country.26

The ROC and the RFM work together, according to Lavrov, for
“standing up for the rights and liberties of Russian citizens and
our compatriots living abroad.”27 He continues, “The Foreign Minis-
try of Russia actively helps communities of the Russian Diaspora,
even to meet their spiritual needs.” This includes the processes of
building new churches and transferring lost properties back to
Russian ownership.28 Patriarch Alexey II29 and Igor Ivanov, minister
of the RFM, affirmed this joint mission of the ROC and the RFM.
Ivanov placed “the protection of the interests of our citizens and
compatriots abroad” with the idea of “reliable security.”30 Accord-
ing to Patriarch Kirill, this is the first priority of the joint diplomacy
between the ROC and the RFM.31
In fact, at a joint conference between the ROC and the RFM held in
April 2001, Kirill commented that the churches, especially built in
Western Europe prior to the Communist period, were for the

24. Ibid.
25. Nadia Kizenko, “Houses of Worship: Church Merger, Putin’s Acquisition,”
Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2007; available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB118006040893914329.html?mod=Letters.
26. “Church Diplomacy Is Not Just a Matter of Inter-Church Relations,” Diplo-
mat 173, no. 9 (2008): 14.
27. “Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation,” 5.
28. Ibid., 7.
29. “Live Peacefully with All Men,” Diplomat 173, no. 9 (2008): 9.
30. Igor Ivanov, “Formation of New Russian Policy Completed,” International
Affairs (Moscow) 47, no. 4 (2001): 3.
31. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “The Foreign Service of the
Russian Orthodox Church,” International Affairs (Moscow) 48 no. 4 (2002): 147.

6
 Spiritual Security

sustenance of the religious life of the Russian people living abroad.

Principally, the purpose of such churches, found in “Stockholm,
Copenhagen, Paris, Nice, Cannes, Biarritz, San Remo, Florence,
Vienna, and Baden-Baden,” was to sustain the unification of the
Russian people. Such churches were built by the state under the
guidance of the RFM and the ROC.32 As Kirill notes, however,
these properties were lost during the Soviet period, simply

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because the state “abandoned all church property that had
belonged to Russia.”33 But according to Sergei Hackel, the situation
is much more complicated than simply the relinquishing of church
property by the Soviet state.
In Western Europe, the issue of church property is tied to the frag-
mentation of the Russian diaspora following the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion and the Russian emigration during the 1920s. In particular,
Patriarch Tikhon issued a decree on May 5, 1922, “‘liquid[ating]’
its structures” under pressure from the Soviet government.34 Fur-
thermore, many of the Russian parishes under the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Evlogii Georgievskii of Paris left the ROC and came
under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in
1931, placing their properties under the control of
Constantinople.35
Kirill insists that the properties do not properly belong to the
church, but rather to the Russian state, since it was the state that
built these edifices and then later relinquished them in a manner
that could be construed as criminal. As he stated at the 2001 confer-
ence, “As for the main objective of our interaction today, I believe it
is above all to recover the property of Russia—not of the Russian
Church.”36 He continues, “These churches—if they belonged to
the Russian Orthodox Church and if there is indisputable legal evi-
dence of that—should still belong to the Russian Orthodox Church.
But if they once belonged to Russia, they should belong to Russia.”37
In this vein, there have been several court cases regarding the status
of church property in Western Europe, causing the splintering of
entire congregations. More will be said about this later in regards
to the issue of canonical territory.

32. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “Cooperation between the

Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Diplomacy: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow,” International Affairs (Moscow) 47, no. 4 (2001): 158.
33. Ibid., 159.
34. Sergei Hackel, “Diaspora Problems of the Russian Emigration,” Eastern
Christianity, ed. Michael Angold, Cambridge Histories Online (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006), 545; available at http://histories.cambridge.org/
extract?id=chol9780521811132A023.
35. Ibid., 543.
36. Kirill, “Cooperation,” 159.
37. Ibid., 160.

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 Journal of Church and State

This pursuit of the reacquisition of Russian church property

abroad is tied to the issue of spiritual security in that church
leaders as well as politicians see this process as fundamental
for the unification of the Russian people with the Motherland.
For instance, commenting on the transfer of the St. Nicholas
Church in Bari, Italy, from the state of Italy to the ROC in April
2009, Kirill stated, “Today the Russian Orthodox Church face [sic]

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the need to guarantee external conditions for better reception of
worshipers [in Bari] more than ever.”38 Upon receiving the keys to
the church, President Medvedev stated that the transfer of property
was a sign of the “deep connection between our cultures and
people,”39 signifying the intimate relationship between the church
and the state in its diplomatic mission. Therefore, the ROC
working together with the RFM promotes the spiritual security of
the state through the care of Russian compatriots abroad through
their unification, both spiritual as well as physical. Additionally,
the ROC and the RFM work together to promote “Russianness” by
maintaining the union of the people with their homeland.
Moreover, the ROC and the RFM collaborate to protect the spiri-
tual security of the Russian diaspora from non-Orthodox religions
and especially from the spread of secularism. Here we witness the
paternalistic nature of the relationship between the ROC and the
Russian diaspora. As former Patriarch Alexey stated, “the main
God-given principles of international relations are the perennial
aspirations for peace, total commitment to religious/moral values,
and the ardent wish to preserve traditions of faith at any cost.”40
Particularly, Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, who is head of
the Department of External Church Relations, has been an outspo-
ken critic of the spread of “militant secularism” in Western
Europe as a threat against faith traditions. As Hilarion sees it, mili-
tant secularism is a pseudo-religion that is attempting to replace
Christianity in Western Europe.41 According to Hilarion, militant
secularism is one of “two ongoing conflicts, or battles, which will
inevitably affect the mission and witness of the Orthodox Church”
in the twenty-first century.42 He states,

38. “Patriarch Kirill Thankful to Russian, Italy Authorities for Transfer of Bari
Church,” Interfax March 2, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com.
39. “Transfer of Bari Church to Russia Is Historic Event—Medvedev,” Interfax
March 2, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com.
40. Patriarch Alexey II of Moscow and all Russia, “Religion and Diplomacy,”
International Affairs (Moscow) 47, no. 4 (2001): 150.
41. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, “Christianity and the Challenge of Mil-
itant Secularism,” available at http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/6_11.
42. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, “Orthodox Mission in the 21st
Century,” available at http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/6_22.

8
 Spiritual Security

In modern secular society Christian values are being more and more
marginalized and God is being driven to the outskirts of human existence.
In many countries of the West it is now almost taken for granted that reli-
gion can operate only at the private level: you are free to believe in God or
not, but this should in no way be manifested in your social life. Churches
and religious communities are tolerated so long as they do not trespass
their own borders, so long as they refrain from publicly expressing opin-
ions that differ from those consonant with “political correctness.” Should

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they begin to express such opinions, they are readily accused of
intolerance.43

Especially the traditional faith communities of Orthodoxy and

Catholicism are under attack from this militant secularism. It is
the role of the Church, together with the RFM, to protect the inter-
ests of these communities in an increasingly secularizing Europe.
As Hilarion states,

Unfortunately, there are European politicians who are attempting to

destroy the traditional, churchly way of life because this is precisely
how they view the function of the secular state—to divorce the Church
from the social arena. It is this attitude that the Orthodox Churches
must combat, joining their efforts with all who are ready today to
defend traditional against liberal attitudes, the religious against the
“common human” values, uniting those willing to defend the right of reli-
gions to express themselves in society.44

The second conflict facing the Church in Western Europe goes

along with the first. According to Hilarion, “There is now a deep-
seated discrepancy between Christian communities, such as the
Orthodox, that attempt to preserve the sacred Tradition of the
ancient, undivided Church, and those, like many Reform commun-
ities, that have revised and continue to revise Tradition in conform-
ity with secular standards.”45 As certain versions of Protestant
Christianity have aligned themselves with militant secularism,
they represent a threat to a common Christian witness against the
secularism that is challenging traditional Christian values and prac-
tice. Pressure is placed upon traditional Christianity to likewise
assimilate and accept these values which are foreign to its
ethos.46 According to Hilarion, what is at stake in this battle
over secularism is the “survival of Christian civilization and of

43. Ibid.
44. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, “Christianity and the Challenge of Mil-
itant Secularism.”
45. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, “Orthodox Mission in the 21st
Century.”
46. See Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “The Orthodox Church
in the Face of World Integration,” The Ecumenical Review 53, no 4 (2001):
479–84.

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 Journal of Church and State

those peoples who until recently identified themselves with Christi-

anity.”47 The ROC is caught in a battle over the soul of Europe, which
includes its own people living in diaspora.

The Expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church and

the Issue of Canonical Territory

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In April 2003, Patriarch Alexey issued a communiqué to the hier-
archs of Russian tradition in Western Europe calling for the possibil-
ity of a union of these churches—ROCOR, the Western Exarchate
under Constantinople, and the diocese of Western and Central
Europe under Moscow—under the jurisdiction of the ROC. Accord-
ing to Alexey’s intentions, the unified church would have autono-
mous status, yet be sponsored by the ROC in the formational
process.48 According to the communiqué, the problem that
needed to be addressed was the “sundered parts of the Russian
Church” and the needs of the “Church life of our compatriots in
the diaspora.”49 Yet, as Sergei Hackel points out, this idea of the uni-
fication of the churches of Russian tradition under the auspices of
the ROC was a continuation of proposals that had been promul-
gated in 1975 and 1976 to do the same, yet in “beguiling terms.”
According to Hackel, “the patriarchate had not forgotten its impe-
rialist dreams of years gone by.”50 By invoking the term “Russian
tradition,” did Alexey simply infer that he was concerned only
with uniting Russian churches under his omophorion? Or was he
concerned about uniting all Orthodox Christians in Western
Europe under the jurisdiction of the ROC? It seems that the patri-
arch was concerned more about the former than the latter, for the
consolidation of the Russian diaspora under the tutelage of the
ROC, claiming that such churches are under the “canonical terri-
tory” of the Church.51
As I have argued elsewhere, the ROC and the Patriarchate of Con-
stantinople are in a war for souls concerning the issue of canonical
territory.52 Especially, this conflict involves the churches of Estonia
and Ukraine. However, in 2006, a conflict emerged concerning the

47. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, “Orthodox Mission in the 21st

Century.”
48. Hackel, “Diaspora Problems of the Russian Emigration,” 550.
49. Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexis, “Europe and Its Future,” available at
http://www.orthodox-christian-comment.co.uk/news-futureofrussianparishesin
westerneurope.htm.
50. Hackel, “Diaspora Problems of the Russian Emigration,” 550.
51. See Agadjanian and Rousselet, “Globalization and Identity Discourse in
Russian Orthodoxy,” for the contemporary use of this idea and its correspond-
ence with Russian identity.
52. See Payne, “Nationalism and the Local Church.”

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 Spiritual Security

Diocese of Sourozh in England in regards to the communiqué for

church unification in Western Europe.
The Western Exarchate under Constantinople and the Diocese of
Sourozh, which is under the authority of the ROC, developed their
own indigenous Orthodox traditions in their respective countries,
no longer understanding themselves to be diaspora churches.53
Additionally, these churches have assimilated to the countries in

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which they find themselves. As Xenia Dennen, chairman of the
Keston Institute, writes, the conflict between the ROC and the
Sourozh Diocese was “between an ‘open’ type of Orthodoxy, open
to the culture around it, concerned with exploring the faith,
unafraid of ‘the other,’ as opposed to one that is ‘closed,’ defensive,
and focused on power and control.”54 Philip Walters also notes the
“out-going and inclusivist” nature of Sourozh compared with the
“mood in the Orthodox Church in Russia [which] has been increas-
ingly inward-looking and exclusivist.”55
The problem emerged due to the enormous influx of Russian
émigrés to Western Europe and England during and following the
years of perestroika. At first, the influx simply created a pastoral
problem for the churches because they had assimilated to the
culture of their respective countries, using the language of
the indigenous peoples as is customary in Orthodoxy. However,
the pastoral issue became political due to the complaints of
Russian émigrés to the ROC concerning their lack of pastoral care.
Particularly, the Diocese of Sourozh, under the leadership of Metro-
politan Antony Bloom, did not understand itself to be “a vehicle for
preserving Russian national identity.”56 Instead, it was to be a
center of Orthodoxy for all people regardless of nationality. Accord-
ing to Dennen, this ecclesial culture ran afoul of the vision of the
ROC. She writes, “This principle of acculturation was by implication
condemned by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk when, in a statement
on 24 October 2006, he said that the Russian Orthodox Church
should, on the contrary, seek to prevent assimilation and to pre-
serve a separate cultural and religious identity for Russians
abroad.”57 In the eyes of the ROC, the Diocese of Sourozh had

53. “Declaration of the Council of the Archdiocese,” available at http://www.

exarchat.org/article.php3?id_article=557.
54. Xenia Dennen, “Russian Orthodoxy in Great Britain: Death Knell or Growing
Pains,” Humanitas (2007): 62.
55. Philip Walters, “The Power Struggle in Orthodoxy,” Church Times, May 26,
2006; available at http://www.churchtimes.co.uk, accessed August 5, 2006.
See also Philip Walters, “Turning Outwards or Turning Inwards? The Russian
Orthodox Church Challenged by Fundamentalism,” Nationalities Papers 35,
no. 5 (November 2007): 853 –80.
56. Dennen, “Russian Orthodoxy in Great Britain,” 64.
57. Ibid.

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 Journal of Church and State

become an embarrassment. Protodeacon Peter Scorer, formerly of

the Diocese of Sourozh, in an interview with Radio Liberty, stated,

Thanks to the labours of Metropolitan Anthony, Sourozh was a diocese

unique in the entire Moscow Patriarchate. [. . .] Now this free, sobornaya
(communal) diocese, unlike any other within the Russian context, has
become an embarrassment for Russia. They would like to see them “all
of a kind,” so that the churches abroad, which are being built in many

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countries, would be something like the embassy churches before the rev-
olution. They are representations of Moscow abroad, and are controlled
not by their local bishops, but by the DECR [Department of External
Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate].58

In April 2006 Bishop Basil of Sergievo, the successor to Metropol-

itan Antony, after coming under attack for the openness of the
diocese and its refusal to kow-tow to the ROC authorities, requested
to be released from Patriarch Alexey and the jurisdiction of the
Moscow Patriarchate so that he could then seek to be placed
under the authority of Constantinople. In response to his request,
Alexey retired him, removing him as the overseer of the Sourozh
Diocese. Consequently, Basil requested from Constantinople to be
placed under its authority, which was granted on June 8, 2006, cre-
ating a separate diocese in the British Isles under the authority of
the Western Exarchate in Paris.59
It appears that part of the issue regarding the conflict in the
Sourozh Diocese was the degree to which this church had developed
its own traditions, especially ones that were considered to be out of
keeping with traditional Russian Orthodox Christianity. In a com-
mentary written concerning the conflict, Fr. Andrew Phillips of
the Cathedral of the Dormition in London argued that it was
precisely the acceptance of “modernism” and its rejection of tradi-
tional Russian Christianity that created the conflict. According to
Fr. Andrew,

The split is between those who wish to practice the Russian Orthodox
Faith, regardless of their nationality or preferred language of worship or
even beloved saints, and those who, quite simply, do not love the
Russian Orthodox Tradition. The latter want to combine contemporary
Western humanism with a form of Russian Orthodoxy. It does not work.
Thus, at present they refuse the discipline of the Russian Orthodox
Church inside Russia, as it is now rapidly being restored after three gen-
erations of militant atheism, just as they refused in the past the discipline
of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR).60

58. Quoted in Dennen, “Russian Orthodoxy in Great Britain,” 68.

59. Ibid., 66–67.
60. Andrew Phillips, “Sourozh: Russian traditions without the Russian
Orthodox Faith,” available at http://www.orthodoxengland.btinternet.co.uk/
sourozh1.htm.

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 Spiritual Security

For Fr. Andrew, this modernism had affected the Paris Exarchate
during the 1920s with the acceptance of the teaching of Fr.
Sergius Bulgakov, which was deemed heretical by the ROC and
ROCOR.61 Thus, not only is the issue regarding the Diocese of
Sourozh and the Western Exarchate in Paris associated with the
spread of Russian nationalism, it also pertains to the issue of spiri-
tual security with the ROC attempting to consolidate its own influ-

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ence against that of renovationism and secularism.
However, the creation of multiple ecclesiastical jurisdictions in
Western Europe, which the ROC on the one hand is attempting to
prevent by uniting the Russian churches under its authority but
which de facto is occurring through the expansion of the Russian
church into the territories that belong to these other churches,
creates a problem regarding “canonical territory.” According to
Inna Naletova, “The church seeks to assist the state in ‘reuniting’
the former empire in the so-called ‘canonical territory’ of the
Moscow Patriarchate. Such a ‘reunion’ is based on the idea of
common faith of persons of many nationalities and on the
common canonical structure centered around Moscow and covering
the entire territory of the former Soviet Union.”62 However, as Alex
Agadjanian and Kathy Rousselet demonstrate, with the fall of the
Soviet Union and the identification of Orthodoxy with Russianness,
“canonical territory” took on a transnational character.63 No longer
was it limited to the territory of the former Soviet Union or even the
Russian Empire; rather it was tied to the very idea of Russian iden-
tity. Thus, wherever there are Russians in the world, the ROC makes
the claim that they are part of its jurisdiction.64

61. Andrew Phillips, “The Time-Bomb That Went Off: Happier Prospects after
the Sourozh Schism,” available at http://www.orthodoxengland.btinternet.co.
uk/timebomb.htm.
62. Naletova, Perspective 12, no. 3 (2002); available at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/
vol12/Naletova.html.
63. Agadjanian and Rousselet, “Globalization and Identity Discourse in Russian
Orthodoxy,” 40–41.
64. A recent exception to this occurred in the Russian-Georgian conflict over
South Ossetia. The Russian state desired that the ROC cooperate with the
state in claiming canonical territory over the Russians of South Ossetia.
However, the ROC chose to go against the Russian state and continued to recog-
nize the traditional canonical territory of the Orthodox Church of Georgia over
the territory of South Ossetia. This has actually caused some tension between
the ROC and the RFM. See Paul Goble, “Moscow Patriarchate Losing Privileged
Status as Russia’s Religious Representative Abroad,” available at http://
politicom.moldova.org/news/moscow-patriarchate-losing-privileged-status-as-
russias-religious-representative-abroad-162266-eng.html; see also “Church
Altars Are not Political Tribunes,” available at http://www.georgiatimes.info/
?lang=en&area=interviewItem&id=10315&path=interview.

13
 Journal of Church and State

This creates a violation of Orthodox canon law, which stipulates

that there can be only one church in one locale. The establishment
of multiple churches in a single territory goes against the ecclesio-
logical basis of the Orthodox Church, where there is to be only one
bishop celebrating the Eucharist in each city or diocese. When
approached by the ROC to reunite with the mother church, the
Western Exarchate in Paris cited that it had already become a

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“local and multinational Church, situated indeed since the emigra-
tion outside the territorial and canonical boundaries of any auto-
cephalous Church, including the Patriarchate of Moscow.”65 By
introducing a Russian Church in the territory of the Western Exarch-
ate, the ROC was violating the canonical territory of the Western
Exarchate. As the Archdiocese of the Western Exarchate stated,

For us, as for our predecessors, the overlapping of jurisdictions on the

same territory can never be justified because it directly contradicts terri-
torial ecclesiology (notably that derived from the 34th Canon of the Holy
Apostles). Equally unjustifiable is the demand by various autocephalous
Churches, for direct obedience from their nationals, scattered across the
countries of western Europe as in every other part of the world. This
direct obedience can only succeed in reinforcing the overlapping of juris-
dictions. The present situation is only a phase resulting from our history;
it must be replaced by arrangement agreed with the dioceses of the other
Patriarchates represented in our countries. For these ecclesiological
reasons the proposal of the Patriarchate of Moscow is inappropriate.
When a unified local Church is established in our country, it will be
done out of scrupulous regard for the canons, especially the territorial
definition of the Church. As it is, the Patriarchate of Moscow has no
more jurisdiction in our countries than the other territorial Churches.66

Consequently, the ROC has not changed its position regarding

canonical territory. In fact, it has continued a process of expanding
its jurisdiction into other territories, establishing churches with the
aid of the RFM. Such examples as Pyongyang, Havana, Beijing, Hong
Kong, Angola, Mar del Plata (Argentina), Quito, Caracas, Rome, and
Singapore have or will have churches built in the near future
expanding Russian Orthodox influence throughout the world.
Many of these churches will serve as a means of cultural and polit-
ical dialogue between Russia and the host nation. Furthermore,
such expansion challenges the EP as the voice of world Orthodoxy.67

65. “Declaration of the Council.”

66. Ibid.
67. While the Orthodox churches do not have a single world leader as the
Roman Catholic Church, the ecumenical patriarch has traditionally been
viewed as the “first among equals” of the various local churches. Today, many
observers note the tension between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the
Moscow Patriarchate over the issue of who has the authority to speak for the
world Orthodox community.

14
 Spiritual Security

By expanding into territories, which the EP claims under Canon 28

of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, multiple overlapping jurisdic-
tions are being established throughout the world. It is to be noted
that the ROC does not accept the EP’s interpretation of Canon 28,
which gives jurisdiction over the “barbarian lands” to the bishop
of Constantinople. While this is certainly an inter-Orthodox eccle-
siological debate, what makes this more problematic is the relation-

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ship that the ROC has with the Russian state.

Conclusion
In an interview with RIA Novosti, Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, stated in regards to the Russian relationship
with Latin America and the Caribbean,

The Foreign Ministry and Russian diplomatic missions in the countries

of the region give priority attention to the deepening of interaction
with compatriots, and comprehensively help the consolidation of the
diaspora and its organizations and the expansion of the presence of
the Russian Orthodox Church. . . . We will continue to work for the
fullest possible unfolding of the rich creative potential of the Russian
World uniting us.68

As I have argued throughout this essay, the ROC has collaborated

with the RFM for the purposes of expanding and consolidating the
Russian world. Together, in the name of spiritual security, they have
done this through attempts to reunite with the other churches of
Russian tradition that exist in the Russian diaspora and through
the reacquisition of Russian church property that had been lost
during the Soviet period. They have met with some success in
their endeavor—especially to be mentioned is the reunion of the
ROC with ROCOR. Consequently, the expansion of the ROC’s canon-
ical territory has led to conflicts involving some of these churches,
especially in Western Europe.
While the stated purpose of the work of the ROC and the RFM has
been the spiritual care for their compatriots abroad, there is the
appearance that something more is at stake, the expansion of
Russian influence. Due to its favored position with the state, the
ROC is expanding transnationally, both in influence and territory.

68. “Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview with RIA
Novosti on Russian Relations with the Countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean Basin,” available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f
128a7b43256999005bcbb3/40dff6a7982643e5c3257523003f9f19?Open
Document.

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 Journal of Church and State

Moreover, this relationship holds equal potential for the state.

In order to be a world superpower once again, Russia needs an
instrument that will serve as the unifying cultural factor in its
self-identity. That instrument is the ROC.

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