Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................... 2
4 A. The Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint ............................................ 2
5 1. Joanna and Nathan ..................................................................... 2
6 2. Fuller Theological Seminary ...................................................... 2
7 3. Fuller’s non-discrimination policies .......................................... 4
8 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................... 4
9 A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss ........................................................... 4
10 B. Plaintiffs State a Title IX Claim ........................................................... 5
11 1. Title IX Prohibits Sex Discrimination Based on Sex
Stereotypes and Sexual Orientation ........................................... 5
12
2. Title IX applies to independent, religious institutions like
13 Fuller .......................................................................................... 6
14 3. Determining the consistency between Fuller’s religious
tenets and application of Title IX requires a factual
15 analysis ..................................................................................... 11
16 C. Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims do not violate the Religion Clauses ......... 11
17 1. The church autonomy doctrine is limited to churches. ............ 12
18 2. The ministerial exception is limited to employment
actions involving ministers. ..................................................... 13
19
D. Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are not barred by the freedom of
20 association .......................................................................................... 15
21 E. Plaintiffs Title IX claims are not barred by RFRA. ........................... 18
22 F. Plaintiffs’ state-law claims should not be dismissed.......................... 20
23 1. Plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claims should not be dismissed ............. 20
24 2. Nathan’s statutory claims are not time-barred. ........................ 21
25 3. Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims should not be
dismissed. ................................................................................. 22
26
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 25
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
Page(s)
3
Federal Cases
4
AHDC v. City of Fresno,
5
433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................. 15
6
Alcazar v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle,
7 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2011) ....................................................................... 14, 15
8
Ammons v. N. Pac. Union Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists,
9 139 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................... 12
10 Bob Jones University v. United States,
11 461 U.S. 574 (1983) ....................................................................................... 16, 17
12 Boy Scouts v. Dale,
13 530 U.S. 640 (2000) ............................................................................................. 15
27 Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973) ............................................................................................. 15
28
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16 Rweyemamu v. Cote,
520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008)................................................................................. 18
17
18 Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................... 5
19
Semegen v. Weidner,
20 780 F. 2d 727 (9th Cir.1985) ............................................................................... 24
21
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
22 426 U.S. 696 (1976) ............................................................................................. 12
23 Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp.,
24 669 F. 3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................. 4
25 Stevens v. Optimum Health Institute,
26 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ................................................................ 20
16 State Cases
17 Brown v. Grimes,
18 192 Cal. App. 4th 265 (2011) .............................................................................. 23
3 Pines v. Tomson,
160 Cal. App. 3d 370 (1984) ............................................................................... 20
4
5 Federal Statutes
6 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ................................................................................................ passim
7 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)..................................................................................................... 6
8
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) ............................................................................................ 7, 9
9
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) .......................................................................................... 18
10
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c)........................................................................................... 18
11
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e) ............................................................................................... 9
13 State Statutes
14 Cal. Educ. Code, § 213.............................................................................................. 24
15
Cal. Educ. Code, § 66270.......................................................................................... 25
16
Cal. Educ. Code § 66290.1........................................................................................ 25
17
18 Cal. Educ. Code § 66290.2........................................................................................ 25
19 Rules
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ................................................................................................... 24
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ............................................................................................... 4
22
Legislative History
23
134 Cong. Rec. H565-02 (1988), 1988 WL 1083034............................................... 10
24
25 S. Rep. 100-64 (1987), 1987 WL 61447, S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1987 ....................................................................................................... 10
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1 Treatises
2
1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 813, 814,
3 852, 938–940 ........................................................................................................ 23
4 Other Authorities
5
Charles E. Jones, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327 (2016) .................................................. 8, 9
6
7
8
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1 INTRODUCTION
2 This case is about whether the government may attach non-discrimination
3 requirements to federal laws that provide funding to private, religious organizations.
4 Our society has long recognized that we must protect religious organizations from
5 majoritarian views that would burden their deeply held religious beliefs. The
6 freedoms of religion, speech and association are fundamental and sacrosanct. We
7 have also come to a place where we recognize that gay people, like racial, gender and
8 other minorities, can no longer be treated as social outcasts. Equality, dignity and
9 civility are revered and celebrated social and constitutional values as well.
10 A challenge for our constitutional democracy is how to maintain our
11 commitment to religious liberty while preserving civil rights. This challenge is often
12 presented as a battle between religion and gay rights. However, this perception
13 oversimplifies the reality. The reality is that most gay people are religious, with an
14 abundant diversity of religious practice and belief. Indeed, every religion has gay
15 people within its midst, as sexuality does not discriminate among religions. And
16 many religions affirm the rights of gay people.
17 But what does the law require when there is an apparent clash between values,
18 institutions and people? If Joanna and Nathan had been expelled from their churches
19 because of their same-sex marriages, the values of equality and dignity would give
20 way to the values of religious and associational freedom. The law recognizes that at
21 a church must be free to select its ministers and to select, and expel, its members. On
22 the other hand, if Joanna and Nathan had been denied marriage licenses by a county
23 clerk who objected on religious grounds, the value of religious freedom would give
24 way to the values of equality and dignity. The law recognizes that a government actor
25 may not deny a gay person the right to marry the person they love.
26 Here, however, the Court is not presented with the situation of a purely private
27 actor, like a church, or a purely public actor, like a county clerk’s office, as Fuller is
28 an educational institution that is subsidized by the federal government. Consequently,
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1 we are in the realm of the rules that apply when the government places restrictions
2 on benefits that it makes available to private actors, like Fuller, who carry out public
3 purposes, like education. The law instructs us that government may not deny a
4 generally available benefit to a religious organization merely because it is religious.
5 However, the law also recognizes that the government may impose a non-
6 discrimination requirement on organizations, including religious organizations like
7 Fuller, that choose to receive government funding, like the federal funding made
8 contingent on compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (“Title IX”), because the
9 government "is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition."
10 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
11 A. The Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint1
12 1. Joanna and Nathan
13 Joanna is a wife and mother who financed her education through federal
14 funding from the U.S. Department of Education. FAC ¶ 2. Joanna’s peers and
15 professors respected her as a Christian woman who was married to another woman.
16 FAC ¶¶ 6, 28. She studied at Fuller for three years and was expelled for her same-sex
17 marriage shortly before completing her degree. FAC ¶¶ 29, 175.
18 Nathan is a husband and minister licensed by his denomination who financed
19 his education through federal funding from the U.S. Department of Education. FAC
20 ¶¶ 3, 8. Faculty and others within the Fuller community affirmed him as a Christian
21 man who was married to another man. FAC ¶ 8. Nathan enrolled at Fuller and
22 attended some classes but was expelled by Fuller just as he was beginning his studies.
23 FAC ¶¶ 93, 100, 110.
24 2. Fuller Theological Seminary
25 Fuller is a religious educational institution. FAC ¶ 4. Fuller also sets
26
1
27 Plaintiffs reject Fuller’s reliance on Exhs. 2-10 in support of its Motion. Fuller’s
Motion relies heavily on evidence and facts outside the Complaint. Such reliance is
28 inappropriate on a Motion to Dismiss because the Court and parties are limited to
analyzing the allegations contained in the pleadings.
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1 community standards for its students and prohibits “homosexual forms of explicit
2 sexual conduct.” FAC ¶ 191.
3 Fuller admits students from a variety of faith traditions. FAC ¶ 46. Students
4 attending Fuller come from more than one hundred denominations. FAC ¶ 47. Fuller
5 admits students from faith traditions and churches that affirm same-sex marriages.
6 FAC ¶ 48. Fuller hires faculty and administrators from faith traditions and churches
7 that affirm same-sex marriages. FAC ¶ 49. Fuller admits students from faith
8 traditions that ordain lesbian, gay and bisexual ministers who are in same-sex
9 marriages. FAC ¶ 50. Fuller hires faculty and administrators from faith traditions
10 that ordain lesbian, gay and bisexual ministers who are in same-sex marriages. FAC
11 ¶ 51. Fuller does not prohibit students or faculty from attending or officiating same-
12 sex weddings. FAC ¶¶ 52, 53.
13 Fuller admits students who, like Joanna and Nathan, are sexual or gender
14 minorities. FAC ¶ 57. Fuller does not prohibit same-sex dating relationships among
15 its students. FAC ¶ 58. Fuller’s written policies do not prohibit its students from
16 entering into same-sex marriages. FAC ¶ 59.
17 Fuller is an independent institution. FAC ¶ 60. Fuller is not affiliated with a
18 denomination or church. FAC ¶ 61. Fuller’s board of trustees is not appointed by a
19 denomination, church or external organization. FAC ¶ 63. The members of Fuller’s
20 board of trustees are not required to belong to a particular denomination or church.
21 Students are not required to adhere to a statement of faith. FAC ¶ 64. While Fuller is
22 a religious educational institution, it is not a church. FAC ¶ 65. As an accredited and
23 federally-funded educational institution, Fuller’s primary purpose is to provide
24 educational courses and to grant certificates, diplomas and degrees in recognition of
25 student completion of graduation requirements. Id. Fuller is the largest recipient of
26 federal funding of any seminary in the United States, having received more than
27 $77,000,000 in federal funding between fiscal years 2015-2018. FAC ¶ 69.
28 //
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1 Haven Bd. Of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226 (D. Conn. 2006) (same-sex sexual
2 harassment actionable under Title IX); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F.
3 Supp. 2d 135, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (anti-gay harassment actionable under Title IX);
4 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School Dist., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (Title IX
5 prohibits gender identity discrimination), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018); Zarda
6 v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (Title VII prohibits sexual
7 orientation discrimination); Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853
8 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (same).
9 Consequently, Joanna and Nathan have stated claims for sex discrimination
10 under Title IX due to Fuller’s discrimination against them on the basis of sex
11 stereotyping (i.e. real women only marry men) and sexual orientation (i.e. lesbians
12 should not be allowed to marry women). FAC ¶¶ 201-216.
13 2. Title IX applies to independent, religious institutions like Fuller
14 Fuller does not qualify for a religious exemption to Title IX because Fuller, as
15 an independent, non-denominational institution, is not controlled by a religious
16 organization. FAC ¶¶ 60-64. Moreover, even if it were, Fuller has not requested or
17 been granted a religious exemption pursuant to Title IX’s implementing regulations.
18 FAC ¶ 5.
19 a. Fuller is not controlled by a religious organization
20 Title IX regulates all educational institutions that receive federal funding.
21 According to Title IX, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
22 excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
23 discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
24 assistance[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
25 Title IX’s coverage is broad and its exemptions are narrow. Jackson v.
26 Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-75 (2005) (“Title IX is a broadly written
27 general prohibition on discrimination, followed by specific, narrow exceptions to that
28 broad prohibition.”); Goodman v. Archbishop Curley High School, Inc., 149 F. Supp.
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1 3d 577, 583-86 (D. Maryland 2016) (finding that Title IX’s religious organizations
2 exemption must be viewed narrowly and did not bar plaintiff’s Title IX claim against
3 religious school).
4 Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3), a limited exception applies to “an
5 educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the
6 application of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such
7 organization.” Here, Fuller fails to qualify for the exemption because it cannot satisfy
8 the “controlled by” test. Fuller is not owned by a church, denomination or other
9 religious organization. Fuller’s board is not selected by a church, denomination or
10 other religious organization. Rather, Fuller is an independent institution. Fuller is
11 controlled by its own self-perpetuating board. Fuller’s control structure differs from
12 many seminaries and other religious educational institutions that are controlled by
13 religious organizations through direct ownership, financial control or the right to
14 appoint board members. For example, numerous Catholic seminaries are owned by
15 the Catholic Church and run by various dioceses. Such institutions would satisfy the
16 control test of Title IX as the seminaries (the educational institutions) are controlled
17 by a religious organization (the Catholic Church).
18 Nonetheless, Fuller argues that “[b]ecause the Seminary is itself both an
19 educational institution and a religious organization and is controlled by its religious
20 board of trustees, the requirement of religious control is met.” Motion, pp. 6-7.
21 However, Fuller attempts to avoid the requirements of the statute by conflating
22 Fuller’s religious identity, which it has, with Fuller’s control by a religious
23 organization, which it lacks.
24 Fuller argues that the Department of Education “has for decades confirmed that
25 an educational institution that is ‘a school or department of divinity’….or that
26 requires its faculty or employees to ‘espouse a personal belief in’ the religion ‘by
27 which it claims to be controlled,’ meets the standard” for the control test. Motion,
28 p. 7. Fuller exclusively relies on an administrative memorandum written during the
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1 Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (as to ambiguous agency regulations); Chevron
2 U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (as to
3 ambiguous statutes). Moreover, before concluding that a regulation or statute is truly
4 ambiguous, “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” Kisor,
5 139 S. Ct. at 2415; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n. 9. Here, the text of the statute is
6 unambiguous. The statute calls out two separate entities: the educational institution
7 and the controlling religious organization
8 As is the case with any statute, courts begin with the statutory text and interpret
9 “statutory terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute clearly
10 expresses an intention to the contrary.” I.R. ex rel. E.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 805
11 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Courts will generally give a statute
12 “its most natural grammatical meaning….” United States v. Price, 921 F.3d 777 (9th
13 Cir. 2019). The most natural grammatical meaning for Title IX’s religious exemption
14 is to recognize that two distinct entities must be involved, an educational institution
15 and a controlling religious organization. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3 ) (exempting “an
16 educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization”). Indeed,
17 “[t]he language of the statute, regulations, and control test all suggest by their
18 grammatical structure that two different entities must be involved to manifest the
19 required control for religious exemption to Title IX: a religious organization that
20 exerts control and an educational institution that receives it.” 65. U. Kan. L. Rev. 327,
21 367.
22 This interpretation of the control test for the Title IX exemption is further
23 supported by a comparison to the religious exemption from Title VII, which exempts
24 an educational institution that is “in whole or substantial part, owned, supported,
25 controlled, or managed by a particular religion or religious corporation, association,
26 or society[.].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e). This exemption is much broader than the
27 exemption in Title IX. Of note, the religious exemption in Title VII provides that
28 control by a religion or a religious organization satisfies the statute, while the
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1 inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and
the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect
2 them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of
their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great
3 weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the
religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are
4 protected views and in some instances protected forms of
expression…Nevertheless, while those religious and
5 philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule
that such objections do not allow business owners and other
6 actors in the economy and in society to deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral
7 and generally applicable public accommodations law.
8 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). As demonstrated below, the Religion Clauses permit
9 Congress to attach non-discrimination requirements, like those found in Title IX, to
10 the provision of federal funds to private actors.
11 1. The church autonomy doctrine is limited to churches.
12 Fuller first argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the church autonomy
13 doctrine. Motion, p. 11. However, Fuller’s argument fails for the simple reason that
14 Fuller, while a religious educational institution, is not a church. The church autonomy
15 doctrine prohibits secular courts from interfering in matters of church government,
16 church doctrine and church discipline. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court and federal
17 appellate courts apply this doctrine exclusively in the context of disputes over church
18 property, church membership and church leadership positions within hierarchical
19 churches. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (church property dispute); Kedroff
20 v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (determination of which prelate was
21 entitled to use and occupancy of cathedral); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
22 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (review of validity of Serbian Orthodox Church’s
23 reorganization of the American-Canadian Diocese); Paul v. Watchtower Bible Tract
24 Society of New York, Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987) (shunning of dissociated
25 member of Jehovah’s Witness Church); Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi v.
26 Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1999) (succession of religious office);
27 Ammons v. N. Pac. Union Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 139 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.
28 1998) (unpublished opinion) (censorship of member of Seventh-Day-Adventist
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1 Church).
2 All of the Supreme Court and Circuit Court cases cited by Fuller concern
3 churches. Indeed, despite the 150 year history of the church autonomy doctrine, a
4 federal court has never applied the doctrine in the context of a case involving the
5 admissions or disciplinary practices of a federally funded educational institution.
6 Nevertheless, Fuller contends that “[C]ourts have repeatedly applied this
7 constitutional principal in the context of religious school admissions and discipline.”
8 Motion, p. 12. However, Fuller’s citation to a single district court case from Illinois
9 and handful of state court opinions are inapposite and unpersuasive, as they involve
10 employment claims, which implicate different issues, or concern private elementary
11 or secondary schools that are not subject to Title IX. See Garrick v. Moody Bible
12 Institute, 412 F. Supp. 3d (N.D. Ill. 2019) (employment claim by faculty member);
13 Flynn v. Estevez, 221 So. 3d. 1241, 1251 (2017) (does not involve a federally funded
14 college or a Title IX claim; involves elementary school owned by Catholic Church);
15 In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d 500, 512 & n. 1 (Tex. App. 2016) (same);
16 Calvary Christian Sch. V. Huffstuttler, 238 S.W.3d 58 (Ark. 2006) (same).
17 Because Fuller is not a church, Fuller may not benefit from the church
18 autonomy doctrine. This Court should not expand a doctrine that has been limited to
19 churches for over a century. In any event, the doctrine is irrelevant in the context of
20 Plaintiffs’ claims against Fuller, where, rather than merely meddling in the private
21 affairs of a church or seminary, the Court is analyzing whether the federal government
22 may attach non-discrimination requirements to laws that provide federal funding to
23 educational institutions.
24 2. The ministerial exception is limited to employment actions
25 involving ministers.
26 Fuller also argues that the ministerial exception of the First Amendment
27 prohibits Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims. However, the ministerial exception is a doctrine
28 limited to employment claims made by individuals considered to be ministers.
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1 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196
2 (2012) (recognizing limited application of ministerial exception to context of
3 employment claims by ministers).
4 The Court noted that the “exception is not limited to the head of a religious
5 congregation” but limited application of the ministerial exception to those, who on
6 balance, qualified as a minister after examining four factors: (1) whether the church
7 held the person out as a minister “with a role distinct from that of most of its
8 members”; (2) whether the person has the title of minister reflected by a formal
9 commissioning process; (3) whether the person held themselves out as a minister in
10 the employment position at issue; and (4) whether the person’s “job duties” reflected
11 a religious leadership role. Id. at 191-92. The ministerial exception has been applied
12 beyond churches to cover other religious organizations, including educational
13 institutions. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 1:04-cv-80, 2008 WL 2789260 (W.D.
14 Pa. Mar. 31, 2008) (dismissing employment claim by chaplain of Catholic diocesan
15 college). However, it has always been limited to employment claims by those who
16 are ministers.
17 Fuller relies on Alcazar v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, in
18 support of its position that the ministerial exception should apply to a Title IX claim
19 brought by seminary students. Motion, p. 14; Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop
20 of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2011). However, Alcazar did not address
21 whether the ministerial exception applied to a seminary student who was asserting a
22 Title IX claim as a student (regarding admissions, discipline, etc.), like Joanna and
23 Nathan are asserting here. Rather, Alcazar concerned a seminary student who was
24 employed by the seminary and asserted employment claims. The case did not involve
25 Title IX claims. The Court recognized that “Churches, like all other institutions, must
26 adhere to state and federal employment laws” but that courts have “recognized a
27 ‘ministerial exception’ to that general rule” for plaintiffs like Alcazar, who were hired
28 to perform religious duties, such as assisting with Mass. Id. at 1289, 1292-93. Here,
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1 Joanna and Nathan assert claims as students, not as employees. Finally, Alcazar did
2 not analyze whether the government may attach non-discrimination requirements
3 when providing federal funding to a seminary. Consequently, Alcazar is not
4 controlling.
5 The ministerial exception is a narrow exception that federal courts have never
6 applied to claims like those before this Court. In order to preserve the broad mandate
7 of Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination in federally-funded education, this
8 Court should decline Fuller’s invitation to drastically expand the ministerial
9 exception.
10 D. Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are not barred by the freedom of association
11 Fuller argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are also barred by the freedom of
12 association. Motion, p. 15. Plaintiffs agree that the freedom of association protects a
13 religious organization’s right not to associate and to be insulated from being forced
14 to accept members it does not desire. See Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
15 (exclusion of gay scoutmaster). Fuller is correct that the “exercise of these
16 constitutional rights is not deprived of protection if the exercise is not politically
17 correct and even if it is discriminatory against others.” AHDC v. City of Fresno, 433
18 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Boy Scouts, a private, expressive association,
19 may exclude gay scoutmasters.
20 Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Fuller is an expressive association with
21 associational rights protected by the First Amendment. If Fuller were a truly private
22 actor, the Constitution might permit Fuller to discriminate based on sex in violation
23 of Title IX. However, Fuller is not a truly private actor, as it is heavily subsidized by
24 the federal government. The Constitution does not compel the government to
25 subsidize discrimination through federal funding.
26 In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468–469 (1973), the Court reasoned
27 that “a private school—even one that discriminates—fulfills an important educational
28 function; however, ... [that] legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from
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1 institutions violate federal laws that prohibit discrimination when the government
2 provides financial benefits. The First Amendment does not require the federal
3 government to subsidize such discriminatory practices. See Christian Legal Soc.
4 Chapter of the University of California v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (law
5 school’s policy requiring officially recognized religious student groups to comply
6 with school’s nondiscrimination policy regarding sexual orientation did not violate
7 First Amendment right to expressive association).
8 Indeed, in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Supreme Court
9 addressed this very question in the context of Title IX. The Court stated that:
10 Grove City's final challenge to the Court of Appeals'
decision—that conditioning federal assistance on
11
compliance with Title IX infringes First Amendment rights
12 of the College and its students—warrants only brief
consideration. Congress is free to attach reasonable and
13
unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that
14 educational institutions are not obligated to
accept…Requiring Grove City to comply with Title IX's
15
prohibition of discrimination as a condition for its
16 continued eligibility to participate in the BEOG program
17 infringes no First Amendment rights of the College or its
students.
18
19 Id. at 575-76. More recently, in Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, the Court
20 recognized that the expressive-association precedents on which the religious
21 organization relied to support its right to discriminate “involved regulations that
22 compelled a group to include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out.” 561
23 U.S. at 682 (emphasis in original) (citing to Boy Scouts v. Dale). The Court stated
24 that “our decisions have distinguished between policies that require action and those
25 that withhold benefits.” 561 U.S. at 682 (citing to Grove City College v. Bell and Bob
26 Jones University, 461 U.S. at 682-83).
27 The Court went on to state that while the Constitution may require toleration
28 of private discrimination in some circumstances it does not require state support for
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1 such discrimination because the government “is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not
2 wielding the stick of prohibition.” Christian Legal Soc., 561 U.S. at 683 (citing
3 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463). In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that the
4 religious group at issues excluded students who engage in “unrepentant homosexual
5 conduct” but went on to note that the group’s expressive association argument “is
6 hardly limited to these facts. Other groups may exclude or mistreat Jews, blacks, and
7 women…A free society must tolerate such groups. It need not subside them[.]”
8 Christian Legal Soc., 561 U.S. at 702-03.
9 Congress, in enacting Title IX, clearly expressed its agreement that sex
10 discrimination in education violates a fundamental public policy. Moreover,
11 numerous Supreme Court decisions have preserved Congress’s ability to further its
12 public policy goals by mandating non-discrimination requirements when extending
13 public benefits to private religious organizations. This Court should not accept
14 Fuller’s invitation to upend decades of Supreme Court precedent.
15 E. Plaintiffs Title IX claims are not barred by RFRA.
16 This suit involves claims by private parties against a private party. RFRA does
17 not bar Plaintiffs’ claims because RFRA applies only to suits in which the
18 government is a party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (the “government ” must
19 “demonstrate...that application of the burden” is the least restrictive means of
20 furthering a compelling governmental interest); § 2000bb–1(c) (“A person whose
21 religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that
22 violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
23 against a government.”) (emphasis added); see also Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of
24 Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (RFRA not applicable to suits between
25 private parties); General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617
26 F.3d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The text of the statute makes quite clear that Congress
27 intended RFRA to apply only to suits in which the government is a party.”); Hankins
28 v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2006 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)) (“this
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1 provision strongly suggests that Congress did not intend RFRA to apply in suits
2 between private parties.”); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 203-204, n. 2 (2d Cir.
3 2008) (the “text of RFRA is plain” and “we do not understand how [RFRA] can apply
4 to a suit between private parties”).
5 Moreover, even if RFRA were to apply to suits between private parties, it
6 would not bar Plaintiffs’ claims because RFRA cannot act as a shield to
7 discrimination claims. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the
8 Court addressed “the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis
9 of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction” and clearly
10 stated that “[o]ur decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a
11 compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce
12 without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored
13 to achieve that critical goal.” Id. at 733. Here too, the government has a compelling
14 interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in federally funded
15 educational programs and prohibitions on sex discrimination are precisely tailored to
16 achieve that critical goal. Indeed, Title IX is narrowly tailored because it only applies
17 to educational institutions that receive federal funding and because it provides a
18 religious exemption for educational institutions controlled by a religious
19 organization.
20 In support of its RFRA argument, Fuller also cites to Trinity Lutheran Church
21 v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). However, Trinity Lutheran did not address RFRA
22 at all, nor did it involve an anti-discrimination statute. Rather, Trinity Lutheran held
23 that a state may not deny a government benefit to an organization merely because the
24 organization is a church. Id. at 2022 (“The express discrimination against religious
25 exercise here is not the denial of a grant, but rather the refusal to allow the Church—
26 solely because it is a church—to compete with secular organizations for a grant.”). In
27 contrast, under Title IX, federal funds are not denied merely because an educational
28 institution is religious. Rather, federal funds are denied to any educational institution,
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1 religious or secular, that discriminates on the basis of sex and that does not qualify
2 for the limited exemptions provided by the statute. Consequently, neither RFRA nor
3 Trinity Lutheran foreclose Plaintiffs’ claims.
4 F. Plaintiffs’ state-law claims should not be dismissed3
5 1. Plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claims should not be dismissed
6 a. Fuller is a business establishment for purposes of the Act
7 Fuller is a business establishment under the Unruh Act. In Doe v. California
8 Lutheran High Sch. Ass’n, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475 (Ct. App. 2009), the Court determined
9 that the Unruh Act did not encompass a small Lutheran high school that primarily
10 served Lutheran congregations. The Court emphasized the “narrow scope” of its
11 holding but determined that the high school was “an expressive social organization
12 whose primary function is the inculcation of values in its youth members.” Id. at 483,
13 485 (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, Fuller does not serve youth, nor does it
14 primarily serve youth from a specific denomination. Rather, Fuller serves graduate
15 students from all over the world and from over a hundred different denominations.
16 Fuller has a large campus in California, satellite campuses, online degree programs,
17 a large administration and sizeable budget. While religious in nature, Fuller operates
18 much like a large business enterprise.
19 Moreover, a seminary qualifies as a business establishment when it sells its
20 services to the public in exchange for tuition and is heavily funded by the federal
21 government. See Stevens v. Optimum Health Institute, 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (S.D.
22 Cal. 2011) (finding that a church’s health spa program was a business establishment
23 even though it claimed that the “Church’s ultimate goal is to bring the participants to
24 an understanding of their purpose in life and to get them to affirm or reaffirm the
25
26 3
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims should not be dismissed on First Amendment grounds
27 for the same reasons that Plaintiffs’ federal claims should not be dismissed on First
Amendment grounds. However, if the court dismisses Plaintiffs’ federal claims,
28 Plaintiffs request that this Court retain supplemental jurisdiction over their state law
claims.
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1 reality of God); Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 383 (1984) (Christian Yellow
2 Pages a business establishment notwithstanding the fact that CYP was incorporated
3 as a nonprofit religious corporation and the owners’ belief that their work was a
4 ministry). In California Lutheran, the court noted that as long as a private
5 organization’s “funding comes from members, it should not matter whether it is
6 called a tithe, dues, fees, tuition, or something else.” Doe v. California Lutheran High
7 Sch. Ass’n., 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 484. Here, however, Fuller receives a large amount of
8 revenue ($77 million in three fiscal years) from the federal government. For these
9 reasons, Fuller is a business establishment under the Unruh Act. At the very least,
10 this issue should be resolved later on summary judgment after examining the facts
11 relevant to Fuller’s nature and operations.
12 b. The Unruh Act applies extraterritorially
13 Fuller argues that the Unruh Act does not apply to Joanna because she is a
14 Texas resident who did not physically attend classes in California. Motion, p. 20.
15 Fuller relies on Loving v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. CV-08-2898-JFW, 2009
16 WL 7236419 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009) and Warner v. Tinder Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d
17 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2015) in support of this proposition. However, Princess Cruise Lines
18 merely held that the Unruh Act does “not apply to claims of nonresidents of California
19 injured by conduct occurring beyond California’s borders.” Loving v. Princess Cruise
20 Lines, Ltd. 2009 WL 7236419 at *8. Here, while Joanna is a Texas resident, she was
21 harmed by Fuller’s conduct occurring within California’s borders. Consequently, this
22 Court may properly exercise its power over Fuller’s conduct towards Joanna.
23 Moreover, while the court in Tinder determined that it was irrelevant that the alleged
24 discrimination was approved by defendants’ employees in California, that case does
25 not account for the circumstance in which a California business sells its online
26 educational services to a customer in another state. Consequently, this Court may
27 properly exercise its power over Fuller’s online operations.
28 2. Nathan’s statutory claims are not time-barred.
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1 Plaintiffs agree that the statute of limitations on Nathan’s Title IX and state
2 statutory claims is two years. Some of Nathan’s allegations go beyond the two-year
3 mark. FAC ¶¶ 76, 108. However, other allegations of sex discrimination are within
4 the two-year mark. FAC ¶¶ 152-160. At the very least, the allegations of sex
5 discrimination within the two-year mark are not time-barred.
6 Moreover, pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine, the Court may
7 consider discriminatory acts beyond the two-year limitations period if they were part
8 of pattern of discrimination. See Cavalier v. Catholic University of America, 306 F.
9 Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2018) (applying continuing violation doctrine in Title IX case);
10 Doe v. Brown University, 327 F. Supp. 3d 397, 408 (D.R.I. 2018) (same). Here,
11 Fuller’s acts in January and February of 2018 were a continuation of a pattern of
12 discrimination that began the fall of 2017. FAC, ¶¶ 76-160.
13 3. Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims should not be dismissed.
14 Fuller also argues that Plaintiffs’ IIED, breach of contract, fraud and EHEA
15 claims must be dismissed. However, each of those claims involve numerous fact
16 issues that require discovery. Moreover, at the motion to dismiss stage, this Court
17 must make all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs as to these claims. Fuller’s
18 arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ state law claims merit only brief additional attention.
19 Regarding the IIED claim, Joanna’s allegations that (1) Fuller’s Title IX
20 officer, the one meant to protect students’ rights under Title IX, misused Joanna’s
21 confidential tax return in order to establish a purported breach of Fuller’s community
22 standards, (2) that the purported breach was Joanna’s constitutionally protected same-
23 sex marriage, which she had disclosed to professors and peers, and (3) that Fuller
24 then expelled Joanna after three years of studying and nearly completing her degree
25 program, are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that Fuller engaged in
26 outrageous conduct towards Joanna that was extreme and should not be tolerated.
27 Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009). Nathan was exposed to similar
28 conduct and his claim should be upheld as well.
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